THE DANISH CARTOON CONTROVERSY: A DEFENCE OF LIBERAL FREEDOM*

RANDALL HANSEN[1]

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JOSEPH CARENS

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ABSTRACT

In October 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in response to several European incidents of self-censorship out of fear and intimidation in dealing with Islam. The author, in this abridged version of the article, recalls the facts surrounding this international controversy, specifies that they were motivated not by racism but by hatred for a religion. He concludes that the same liberal democratic values that protect a right to practice one's religion and to maintain one's distinctive cultural practices, also protect the right to free speech. These questions are further debated in the correspondance which follows the article, between the author and a colleague from the University of Toronto, Professor Joseph Carens.

In October 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in response to several European incidents of self-censorship out of fear and intimidation in dealing with Islam.[2] The cartoons varied from the anodyne to the offensive. The publication of the cartoons first caused Muslim groups in Denmark to launch protests, then slowly escalated into an international crisis. Islamic countries asked the Danish government for an apology, which was declined, citing principles of free speech and independent press. *Jyllands-Posten* issued apologies for hurting Muslim feelings, though not for publishing the cartoons. Without effect. As protests became ever more violent and spread internationally, papers around the world decided to re-publish the cartoon as demonstration of the right to free speech. Meanwhile, Scandinavian embassies were set on fire, Lebanon closed its embassy in Denmark, the Danish flag was burned, and protestors outside the Danish representation in London held placards stating "Europe will pay, your 9/11 is on its way." Some 139 people were killed during demonstrations in Somalia, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As the accusations of Western hypocrisy and Islamphobia became ever louder, reactions in the West became ever more accommodating. The European Union protested the burning of the embassies, but balked at the prospect of collectively withdrawing its ambassadors. The United Nations (UN) launched an investigation into the cartoons' "racism" and the Council of Europe attacked the Danish government's invocation of free speech as a defense of the cartoons. Politicians condemned Europe's islamophobia. Those who defended the cartoons in the name of free speech found themselves isolated and their motivations impugned. They were at best hypocritical, at worst racist. The majority of liberal newspaper commentators and scholars judged the motives of the cartoon's publishers and relativized that of the violent protestors.

The cartoons seem to equate Islam with terrorism, to argue that Islam is an essentially violent and deadly religion. This is, of course, nonsense, but is it racism? It is not. It is hatred of a religion. And in a liberal society, there is and must be a distinction between racism and religious hatred for the simple reason that while there can be no acceptable reason to object to "Blackness" there are many good reasons to object to religion, whether Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. Many people believe, not without historical evidence, that religion encourages intolerance and violence (how many throats have been slashed in religion's name?) and oppresses women and minorities (think of all three religions' attitudes toward gays). In a liberal democratic society, religion is, like it or not, a fair target for criticism, satire, mockery and ridicule.

Some might reject the distinction between hatred of religion and hatred of race as untenable on the grounds that putative hostility to religion masks a deep-suited hostility to Muslim people. After all, as Tariq Modood points out, the "victimization of another religious group, the Jews, is paradigmatic of many people's understanding of racism" (Modood 2006). This argument, however, oversimplifies the matter. A religious group may be transformed by racists into an ethnoracial

group, which is exactly what happened to the Jews. There are, of course, clear-cut instances when Muslims are attacked because they are Muslim: women wearing the *hijab* are spat on, men who appear Muslim are denied jobs. This does not mean, however, that every injustice suffered by Muslims can be tied to a hatred of religion. In many if not most cases, those committing the injustice could not distinguish a Muslim from a Hindu and are motivated by nothing other than base racism. Such actions can and should be criminalized on the basis of racism, but such protection cannot be extended to the mockery of religion.

It would be hypocritical if Western countries protected some religions but failed to protect others. They do not. When Christian fundamentalists burn abortion clinics, they are told that their religious beliefs are inconsistent with liberal constitutional values. If any religion has been treated with leniency and indulgence, it is Islam. The real hypocrites in the debate were liberal intellectuals, too many to name, who spent years denouncing Christian fundamentalist demands for prayer and the teaching of evolution in schools, the censorship of books and films, and limits on abortion, only to cave to fundamentalist Muslim demands: for the introduction of Sharia law, for separate swimming classes for boys and girls, and – in the Danish case – for the respect for religious rules not only by members of the religious group but by the society at large. Portraying the prophet may be prohibited for Muslims, but it is not and cannot be for anyone else.

I sympathize with the many Muslims who are deeply and genuinely offended by the Danish cartoons. But this offence is the price of living in a liberal society, one that has been paid by many groups before. Soldiers in Canada or Britain who were disgusted by the thought of serving in the army with homosexuals have been told they must; Jews, including holocaust survivors, have been told that they could not stop neo-Nazis from marching past their front windows. In these as in many other cases, people have been told that their beliefs were inconsistent with liberal democracy and that, however offensive a failure to respect them was, they simply had to accept it. Those Muslims who think that their religion is above satire and mockery have to accept that it is not; no religion is.

Those who wish to restrict free speech, whether they be Muslim or non-Muslim, citizens or non-citizens, recent immigrants or longstanding permanent residents, have to decide whether they wish to live in a liberal democratic society. If they do, they have to accept that they will hear and see things that offend them, sometimes deeply. They are free to protest them peacefully, but not to demand their criminal sanction. In the end, the same liberal democratic values that protect a right to practice one's religion, to maintain one's distinctive cultural practices, to be reunited with one's family through family reunification, protect the right to free speech. It is part of the liberal democratic framework, not a negotiable addition to it.

The cartoons seem to equate Islam with terrorism, to argue that Islam is an essentially violent and deadly religion. This is, of course, nonsense, but is it racism? It is not. It is hatred of a religion.... In a liberal democratic society, religion is, like it or not, a fair target for criticism, satire, mockery and ridicule. – Richard Hansen

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Reply by Joseph Carens

Dear Randall,

I feel compelled to write in response to your article's accusation of hypocrisy against "liberal intellectuals" who criticized the publication of the cartoons by *Jyllands-Posten*, since I am myself one of those liberal intellectuals. Your article derives much of its rhetorical force from the implied claim that one cannot be a principled liberal committed to free speech and critical of the publication of the Danish cartoons. I think this is plainly wrong, and I paste below a few pages from a recent paper in which I defend this view. (Although excerpted from a larger piece, I think they can be understood on their own.) If you think my position is intellectually respectable (even if you do not agree with it), then your article loses a lot of its steam since the position I am defending is one that is common to many liberals and your accusations have a much more limited target than first appears, if indeed they apply to anyone. If you think the position is indefensible, you have to confront the arguments more directly than you have in your own piece.

Excerpts from "Fear vs. Fairness: Migration, Citizenship, and the Transformation of Political Community," by Joseph Carens (forthcoming in the 2006 Yearbook of the Philosophers of Education Society)

Consider these general comments about normative expectations and democratic values in relation to a recent controversy: the Danish cartoons case. For the purposes of my paper what is most important about this incident is what it can tell us about legitimate normative expectations that immigrants and the receiving society can have of each other. Who violated those legitimate expectations (if anyone) and in what way? I will simply assume here (though I would be prepared to defend it) that the newspaper had a right to publish the cartoons in the sense that no liberal democratic State could prohibit their publication without violating fundamental norms about free speech, (even if one does not accept the strong American version of this liberty). The cartoons were offensive to most Muslims but they cannot reasonably be characterized as the sort of hate speech that is restricted

by law in some liberal democratic States. Relatedly, but importantly, I will assume that everyone accepts the principle that the cartoonists and the publishers should not have been subjected to death threats. No one should be subject to death threats for what they write or publish, no matter how offensive. No one should feel unable to express views out of fear of violent retribution. I take these claims to be uncontroversial…By the same token, those who engaged in non-violent protests against the publication of the cartoons were exercising their rights of free speech as permitted by liberal democratic laws.

But what about liberal democratic norms? Did the protestors – or the publishers – violate those? Some people have argued that even protesting against the publication of the cartoons reveals a lack of commitment to democratic norms of free speech. I think that is just wrong. To say that the cartoons were offensive and that the newspaper should not have published them is not, in itself, a violation of democratic norms. Freedom of speech does not entail immunity from criticism, including criticism of the decision to say what one said. On the other hand, one can reasonably say that placards advocating "death to the cartoonists" would be a violation of democratic norms, (even if they were legally permissible because they did not in themselves constitute the sort of threat that could be punished by law). In my view, the people who advocated or endorsed violence against the cartoonists deserve criticism, regardless of where they live or whether they accept democratic principles, but, in addition, any resident or citizen of a democratic State expressing such a view can be criticized for violating legitimate normative expectations that members of a democratic community should be able to have of one another, and, in our context, that the receiving community is entitled to have of immigrants. I have heard different reports about what the placards in the actual demonstrations said, so I do not know to what extent this sort of advocacy of violence actually occurred in Europe or North America. It seems clear, however, that it was generally not the typical public reaction of Muslims in Western States.

"…treating people with respect, when it does not cost you anything to do so, is not the same as internalising their religious norms." – Joseph Carens

What about those who published the cartoons? Do they deserve any criticism? Some would argue that they do not, on the grounds that, in a democratic society, no subject is taboo and one must be able to criticize, even mock all sacred cows (including, as the phrase "sacred cows" suggests, religion). Even if one accepts this general principle, however, it does not follow that anyone may publish anything in any context without violating democratic norms.

Step back for a moment and consider the origins of the controversy. An author was writing a children's book about the life of Mohammed. That sounds admirable. It evokes an image of some multiculturally oriented Danish author who wants to provide Danish children from the non-Muslim majority with some information about the leading historical figure in the religion practised by some of their fellow Danes. Rhetorically this reference to the origins of the conflict has made it appear as though an innocent exercise in intercultural communication was suddenly disrupted by the irrational reactions of an illiberal minority. But wait a minute. If the author knew anything about Islam, he must have known that many Muslims do not think that anyone should draw pictures of Mohammed. And if he did not know this at the outset, he ought to have figured it out when the illustrators kept turning him down. So, why would someone deliberately present information to children about another religion in a way that the author knows will be offensive to many followers of the religion? Suddenly the author's agenda does not appear so benign, and the refusal of the illustrators (if they acted out of principle and not fear) an admirable exercise of multicultural respect rather than a suppression of free expression.

What about *Jyllands-Posten*, the Danish newspaper, that solicited and published the cartoons of Mohammed, ostensibly because it was outraged about the restrictions on free speech revealed by the inability of the children's book author to find an illustrator? Here again, context matters in interpreting what is at stake and evaluating actions. On the one hand, it is crucial that there be few legal restrictions on expression, and, on the other hand, every major newspaper has to make choices about what to publish. And *Jyllands-Posten* is a major newspaper in Denmark. The mere fact that it is legally permissible to publish something does not mean that it should be published, and especially, that a given newspaper is obliged to publish it. As many commentators have noted, *Jyllands-Posten* chose not to publish some anti-Christian cartoons a few years previously, and at least partly justified its reactions on the grounds that it did not want to offend its readers. It is legally permissible to publish racist and anti-semitic cartoons but no major newspaper – or perhaps I should say no reputable newspaper – in Europe or North America would do so, even though such cartoons are available on the web and appear in print in small circulation journals. (Furthermore, I suspect that if we looked at the archives of major newspapers from the first half of the 20th century, we would have no difficulty in discovering such cartoons in them.) Why won't newspapers publish such things? One of the reasons, I assume, is that they think such cartoons do not treat Jews and racial minorities with the respect that is due them as members of a democratic society.

Are the Danish cartoons comparably objectionable? Some are, some aren't. But even the ones that only depict Mohammed and don't portray him as a terrorist are intended to offend Muslim sensibilities, and not just the sensibilities of Muslims who do not accept democratic norms of free speech. There are many, many Muslims

who live in Western democratic States and accept familiar democratic constraints upon politics (e.g., rule of law, freedom of speech and religion, no use of threats of violence against those with whom one disagrees, etc.) who were deeply offended by the cartoons. And, it seems to me, giving offence in that way, requires justification. It violates a norm of civility and respect in engaging with other members of society. Sometimes there may be good reasons to be uncivil and disrespectful, but I do not think this case is one of them. In Denmark, the Muslim minority has been marginalized socially, economically, and politically and has been portrayed as a threat to the Danish nation. So, one can reasonably say that Denmark has not met the morally legitimate expectations of Danish Muslims about how they should be treated in a democratic society, and the publication of the cartoons by *Jyllands-Posten* is part of this failure.

There is a wider context as well. I think there is a deep and unjustified hostility to Islam within Western States – not just to Islamists and their actions and versions of Islam – and that this is manifested in a wide variety of attitudes, dispositions, and actions, as reflected in part by the reactions to the Danish cartoons controversy. It seems to me that one's views on what policies and practices are appropriate in Western States and what must be done to meet the morally legitimate expectations of immigrants will depend, at least in part, on whether one thinks that islamophobia is a serious problem in these States or not.

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Reply by Randall Hansen

Dear Joe,

Thank you for your comments. On the minor issue of hypocrisy, I did not mean that there was anything inherently hypocritical about liberals opposing the publishing of the cartoons. My point was this: the same liberals who are indulgent towards Muslim fundamentalist (and some moderate Muslim) demands have been uniformly hostile in response to Christian fundamentalist (and some moderate Christian) demands: Sharia law yes, Christian prayer in school no. The hypocrisy lies in treating one religious group's demands differently from another; on this charge, I think many of us would have to plead guilty.

My first reaction is that your qualifiers have narrowed the ground considerably. Of course we all agree that the death threats were wholly unacceptable. You also say, though, that there was no question that the newspaper had a right to publish the cartoons. Where does this leave us then? It seems that the publication of the cartoons was fully legitimate, but not nice. I suppose it wasn't, but this line of argument begs the question of how we judge the niceness of proposed material when deciding whether or not it is to be published. It also seems to me to be an intellectually unstable position: conceding that they had a right to do it, but then condemning them for doing it. To get back to the question of standards, at one point, your text suggests that newspapers should not exercise their right to publish material when that material is racist. I made clear in the article why I don't accept that the cartoons were racist: they attack a religion, not a race. "Muslim" is not a race anymore than "Christian" is ("Jewish" is a unique hybrid category because of unique historical experiences that do not obtain in the case of Muslims), so this prohibition would neither prevent nor condemn the publication of the cartoons.

The other possibility – and I think this is what most people have in mind when they object to the cartoons – is offence. Is offence a legitimate ground for limiting free speech? Legally, it isn't at all, as you have noted. You seem to suggest that intentionality is relevant here: if the actors intend to offend, then they can be justly criticized. This can't be sustainable. Intending to offend or knowing that one will offend cannot themselves be grounds for limiting or condemning the exercise of free speech. Whether the newspaper wanted to offend Muslims or show that Muslims do not share the same values as others in liberal democracy (and, frankly, there is more evidence for those who wish to believe this assertion following the publication of the cartoons than there was before they it) seems to me to be irrelevant.

> My view is that as a society becomes more diverse and pluralistic, liberal secularism and the common framework of liberal democratic rights becomes more, not less, important. Many things can be transformed through dialogue, but this framework isn't one of them.
> – Richard Hansen

This takes me to your point about context. Since many Muslims suffer disadvantage in Europe, there was a particular, Muslim-relevant reason for not publishing the cartoons:

> In Denmark the Muslim minority has been marginalised socially, economically, and politically and has been portrayed as a threat to the Danish nation. So, one can reasonably say that Denmark has not met the morally legitimate expectations of Danish Muslims about how they should be treated in a democratic society, and the publication of the cartoons by *Jyllands-Posten* is part of this failure.

The logical corollary of this is that if Muslims were socially integrated, politically influential and affluent, it would have been acceptable to publish the cartoons, and Muslims would have been happier with them. It also means that it is acceptable to offend Jews and Hindus (who are more affluent and politically integrated), but not Muslims. Would we really want to support this? If context is determinative, we would have to. What if we disaggregate the category of Muslim into individuals? Is it acceptable to offend rich Saudis living in South Kensington but not poor Bangladeshis living in Mile End (London's East End)?

We end up with these uncomfortable questions because liberals have not, I would venture, been entirely honest with themselves about why they oppose the publication of the cartoons. I submit that they have internalized Muslim norms: they think the cartoons should not have been published because it is prohibited by Islam. This becomes doubly clear if we accept – as I think we must – that most Muslims were offended because Islam prohibits portrayals of Muhammad. This position is, as I argue, wholly unsustainable: in a liberal society religious dictates apply only to members of the religion and to one else. So I conclude both that the publication of the cartoons was legal, and that the only tenable liberal position is that it was acceptable.

My last point on your comments refers to the argument that: "There is a wider context as well. I think there is a deep and unjustified hostility to Islam within Western States – not just to Islamists and their actions and versions of Islam – and that this is manifested in a wide variety of attitudes, dispositions, and actions, as reflected in part by the reactions to the Danish cartoons controversy. It seems to me that one's views on what policies and practices are appropriate in Western States and what must be done to meet the morally legitimate expectations of immigrants will depend, at least in part, on whether one thinks that islamophobia is a serious problem in these States or not." I have expressed my views of where your context-based arguments take us, but I have to say that this strikes me as an intellectual cheap shot. It's saying that you have to deny islamophobia to defend the publication of the cartoons. I don't agree at all, and view this is the equivalent of the argument that you have to deny the existence of anti-semitism to criticize Israel. Many of those who are most concerned to emphasize islamaphobia would be the first to reject this argument.

My main point is that this alternative account, downplaying the significance of islamophobia, illustrates how context matters morally and politically...The only reason to publish pictures of Mohammed was because Muslims do not like pictures of Mohammed to be published. That is not a good enough reason. In fact, it is not a good reason at all.
– Joseph Carens

To conclude, I think my argument stands in the face of the arguments presented in your text. My view is that as a society becomes more diverse and pluralistic, liberal secularism and the common framework of liberal democratic rights becomes more, not less, important. Many things can be transformed through dialogue, but this framework isn't one of them. You can't have a dialogue about it anymore than you could have one about ending free elections.

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Reply by Joseph Carens

Dear Randall,

I want to make 4 brief points in response. First, on hypocrisy. I don't think a charge of hypocrisy is a minor issue. It is quite a different claim from inconsistency, for example, because of what hypocrisy implies about the intentions of the actor. It is like the difference between "making a mistake" and "cheating." You say, the same liberals who are indulgent towards Muslim fundamentalist (and some moderate Muslim) demands have been uniformly hostile in response to Christian fundamentalist (and some moderate Christian) demands: Sharia law yes, Christian prayer in school no. The hypocrisy lies in treating one religious group's demands differently from another.

Do you mean to include in this charge scholars such as Jeff Spinner-Halev, Melissa Williams, Will Kymlicka, and Ayelet Shachar, to name just a few of those who have written from a liberal perspective about religion and multiculturalism? These are scholars who are neither "indulgent" toward Muslims nor "uniformly hostile" towards Christians. They adopt nuanced, careful and principled positions that sometimes advocate accommodation of the demands of religious groups (Muslim or Christian) and sometimes oppose such accommodation. You may disagree with any of them (as they often do with one another) and you may argue that they are occasionally inconsistent (which is a perfectly fair critique) but to accuse them of hypocrisy seems to me unwarranted, to put it very mildly. And I could say something similar about other scholars like Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood who do not identify themselves as liberals but also adopt carefully reasoned and principled positions. Indeed, I would hope to include myself in this general company. If you do not intend to direct your animadversions at these sorts of scholars, you ought to say so (since the context does not make clear why they should be exempt). If you do intend to include them, I think you are wrong to do so.

Second, my fundamental argument was that there are there is a distinction to be drawn between what is legally permissible and what it is morally right to do. Some things, including expressions of opinion, may be legally permissible but may still deserve moral criticism. You seem to recognize the distinction but you want to reject any position that builds upon the distinction: "It also seems to me to be an intellectually unstable position: conceding that they had a right to do it, but then condemning them for doing it."

There is in fact nothing "intellectually unstable" about the view that something is legally permissible but morally wrong. I used the example of racist cartoons to illustrate the point. It is legally permissible to publish

them, in many States at least, but I think that it would be morally wrong to do so (as is now widely accepted). Your insistence that the Danish cartoons were not racist (which I never claimed) misses the point of this example. If you really think that it is wrong to object to the publication of anything that is legally permissible, you would have no grounds to say that racist cartoons ought not to be published, when there are no legal obstacles. Is that really your view? If so, you should acknowledge it explicitly, rather than ducking behind the distinction between racism and hostility to Islam. (And you should acknowledge that your position is an extreme one, not shared by most liberals or by most liberal newspapers which generally acknowledge some responsibility to exercise discretion – in various forms – in what they publish. Even those newspapers that published the Danish cartoons did not take this extreme position.) If this extreme position is not your view, i.e., if you think that newspapers in a democratic State should not publish racist cartoons even when they are legally free to do so, then you, too, are adopting a sort of position that you characterize as "intellectually unstable," even if the sorts of things you would object to being published are more limited than the ones I would object to. Then we are back to the substantive argument about whether these cartoons were so objectionable that they should not have been published or whether they were not so objectionable or perhaps not objectionable at all but just fair comment.

Third, in addressing that substantive issue, your radical rejection of context is deeply misguided. Again, take an extreme case. Do you really think that Germans had no more reason than others in the second half of the 20th century to worry about the expression of Nazi or anti-semitic views? Leave aside the question of what was legally permitted. If a major German newspaper had published an anti-semitic cartoon in the 1950s, would this have warranted (or received) only the same level of public criticism that it would have received anywhere else in Europe or North America at the time (or none at all, if we adopt your extreme standard)? Of course context matters, both morally and politically, because it inevitably affects the nature of the problem in various ways. If context did not matter, why did you spend so much time supplying it in your original article? In this case, it matters greatly whether one sees the publication of the cartoons as an isolated event or as part of an overall pattern of negative and hostile public communications about Islam by major players in civil society and in the State within Denmark. In the former case, ignoring it may well be an appropriate strategy. In the latter case, ignoring it entails sticking one's head in the sand.

Your appeal to individual variations among Muslims in Europe strikes me as a strange move for a social scientist. It is as if you thought it were impossible to make any generalizations about social groups or social trends. If you think that islamophobia is a serious problem in Europe today and that many Muslims are disadvantaged in part because they are Muslims – your text is somewhat ambiguous about your own views on these issues – then how could you ignore the ways in which civil society contributes to this problem, including by means of the legitimation of anti-Muslim views in major newspapers? Is the formation of public opinion somehow beyond critical scrutiny? You might still think for some reason that it was appropriate for *Jyllands-Posten* to have published the cartoons or that the cartoons themselves did nor contribute to or reflect this islamophobic pattern or perhaps that it would be inappropriate for you to pass judgment on *Jyllands-Posten*, but surely this account of the context would create moral and political concerns that would be quite different from the ones that would emerge if you think, say, that the basic social problems in Europe today arise from class divisions and immigration generally or from the dynamics of the global economy and have little to do with Muslims as a social category or with Islam as a marker of social identity. I'm not saying that such an analysis is an indefensible position. (On the contrary, I think it contains elements of the truth, though I think it is wrong about the irrelevance of Islamic identity.) My main point is that this alternative account, downplaying the significance of islamophobia, illustrates how context matters morally and politically (which was the point of my original comments which I think you have misunderstood).

Fourth, on the point about religious dictates applying only to believers, I think that you miss the point that treating people with respect, when it does not cost you anything to do so, is not the same as internalising their religious norms. If Muslims had a norm against publishing pictures of any contemporary Muslim figure, the conflict with the obligations of newspapers to report the news would be clear and direct. But Mohammed is not news. The only reason to publish pictures of Mohammed was because Muslims do not like pictures of Mohammed to be published. That is not a good enough reason. In fact, it is not a good reason at all.

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Reply by Randall Hansen

Dear Joe,

I would like to thank you for this response. It is very energizing to engage in intellectual debate (something we talk about doing more than we do) and I appreciate your taking the time to comment on my work.

I'll leave most of my comments for a larger debate we're having in *International Migration* (forthcoming in volume 44, issue 5, 2006) but I'll just respond to your comments on the hypocrisy issue. First, I apologize if I cause anyone offense. Second, I want to nuance but not retract my comments.

For those who supported the adoption of Sharia law in Ontario, I naturally don't think this is an inherently hypocritical position. Wrong, but not hypocritical. And I certainly didn't intend to single any of these individuals out; I have a high regard for the work they have produced. There are naturally disagreements between me and some of them, as there are disagreements among them, but it would be odd and boring if it were otherwise. There is a Canadian craving for consensus, but I don't share it.

My point on hypocrisy is this: if one accepts the argument that Muslims' religious attachments are so profoundly important to their identity, sense of self-

worth, integration and so on that we need to make an exception to the application for liberal democratic laws for them, but reject the same argument when it is made by Christians, then that is an inconsistent and hypocritical position. I know that you were reacting to the provocative word "hypocrisy." I chose it deliberately because some (Muslim and non-Muslim) activists, intellectuals and members of the anti-racist lobby frequently accuse "the West," "Europe," the US, or democrats of flagrant hypocrisy in its approach to Islam. They introduced the term hypocrisy; I didn't. What the Sharia law made clear is that if there is hypocrisy Muslims and Islam are not those that primarily suffer from it; Christian fundamentalists are.

Notes

* The full version of this article first appeared in *EUSA Review* 19, 2 (Spring 2006), I am grateful to the publishers for granting permission to reproduce it.

[1] Professor Hansen's Website is www.randallhansen.ca.

[2] I have discussed the issues raised in this essay with many people, and I am grateful for their comments: Emmanuel Adler, Fiona Adamson, Erik Bleich, Joseph Carens, Matthew Gibney, Todd Lawson, Rahsaan Maxwell, Shourideh Molaei, Shahreen Reza, Phil Triadafilopolous, Gokce Yurdakul, and Melissa Williams.



Our Diverse Cities
World Urban Forum

In 2006, Metropolis partnered with the Housing and Homelessness Branch of Human Resources and Social Development Canada, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, the Multiculturalism Program of Canadian Heritage, and the Association for Canadian Studies to produce a new edition of *Our Diverse Cities*. This publication examines immigration and diversity in Canada's second- and third-tier cities. Guest edited by James Frideres of the University of Calgary and featuring articles from researchers, policy-makers and non-governmental organizations and contributions from across Canada, *Our Diverse Cities* helps build awareness and understanding about the different ways diversity is manifesting itself in cities outside of the large urban centres. Metropolis released this publication at The World Urban Forum (WUF3), which was hosted by the Government of Canada and UN-HABITAT from June 19 to 23, 2006, in Vancouver, Canada. The theme of the conference was "Our Future: Sustainable Cities – Turning Ideas into Action," and more than 10,000 participants from over 150 nations met to discuss how to make our cities better places to live.

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