Religion and Social Capital in Canada

Jack Jedwab

Jack Jedwab is the Executive Director of the Association for Canadian Studies.

ABSTRACT

Experts examining the respective state of multiculturalism and/or social cohesion have seen growing attention directed at measuring levels of civic participation, inclusion and social capital. The impact of volunteerism and networking on democratic life constitutes the basis of social capital and religious engagement represents a considerable degree of the capital that is generated in Canada. By consequence, meaningful discussion of the relationship between diversity and social capital must consider the salience of religion and how it is expressed civically. Social capital initiatives often reflect community values through social engagement. Jedwab argues that there is no causal evidence in support of the idea that the social capital of minority religious groups is motivated by a different set of values. Moreover, he demonstrates that minority religious volunteer activity neither undercuts trust of others nor the sense of belonging to Canada.

1. INTRODUCTION

Religious identity and religion's institutional presence in the public and private domain have had a powerful influence on recent debates about multiculturalism and social cohesion. Social cohesion has been defined as the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians (Jackson et al., 2000). There often appears to be greater consensus about what threatens social cohesion (unemployment, poverty, income inequality and social exclusion) than what it promotes. The identification of shared values and norms seems to be closely associated with the pursuit of social cohesion.

According to the Department of Canadian Heritage, multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal and diversity is viewed as a national asset. It is defined by this department as follows: "all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and violence."

Those desiring that social cohesion become the dominant paradigm in the management of diversity in Canada are concerned with in the perceived absence of strong common norms and references. They worry that too much emphasis on diversity risks undercutting social harmony. For their part, those who favour the multicultural approach fear that cohesion is a euphemism for assimilation and that many cohesionists reject the accommodation of difference – a central tenet of multiculturalism. Those who view multiculturalism and social cohesion as opposing goals are unlikely to find common ground around the best approach to managing diversity. There appears to be some convergence around assessing the impact of diversity on society. Measurement of the societal outcomes of diversity by those respectively stressing multiculturalism or social cohesion is increasingly focused upon civic participation, inclusion and social capital. The impact of volunteerism and networking on democratic life constitutes the basis of social capital. Religious expression and engagement represent a considerable degree of the social capital generated in North America. Therefore, it would be difficult to meaningfully discuss the relationship between diversity and social capital without considering the salience of religion and how it is expressed civically. Clearly not all religious engagement results in positive societal outcomes, nor does it all pursue civic objectives.

Framing questions

This article explores how the Canadian stock of social capital is affected by religious engagement and its impact on policies and practices in regard to multiculturalism and social cohesion. To do so, the following questions have been identified:

a) How do faith-based organizations produce social capital and how is it being used? What elements of social capital do faith-based groups manifest and what is the effect of their community work? This can range from various types of

activities, including fulfilling member's lives through community school programs, athletic programs and voluntary activities.

b) How do faith-based communities, including those involved in charitable work, education, and social services (i.e., health care) affect the quest for social cohesion and integration of minorities and newcomers in Canada? Does membership in faith-based social/cultural/sports organizations discourage joining similar mainstream organizations? Do faith based organizations contribute to the isolation/alienation of their members, especially youth, from mainstream society?

c) Do faith-based communities pose a policy challenge to a religion-neutral State? What models could be applicable to the Canadian context where the principles of Canadian multiculturalism are upheld, respect for human rights is maintained, and individual integrity and enjoyment of life and freedom are not jeopardized? Are there faith-based community organizations that could encourage adherence or attachment to a country other than Canada, and would their members have an emotional and possibly even material investment in that foreign country?

d) Some communities receive provincial funds for faith-based school boards (e.g., Catholic), or for faith-based education purposes (such as Arabic or Hebrew schools). Is that discriminatory to other communities who do not receive such funding? Does this kind of funding affect Canadian national social cohesion? What did the court or the established laws say about such funding?

e) What does the charitable status mean to the faith-based communities in Canada, and what is the significance of this on taxpayers? Is there a distinction in the charitable status between a church or a place of worship and a faith-based community association that is not necessarily involved in theology or prayers? Some charitable faith-based organizations engage in benevolent work to help vulnerable individuals and groups in Canadian society or even in foreign countries (such as Catholic aid to Africa or Mennonite help to refugees), but are such organizations using donations for non-social activities or for supporting states or organizations that condone violence?

f) What do we know about Canadians views concerning organized religion and about state funding to faith-based groups?

2. SOCIAL CAPITAL, IDENTITY FORMATION, AND RELIGION

The notion of social capital – those features of social organization that facilitate working and cooperating together for mutual benefit – has been the object of considerable attention from researchers and policy-makers across the world and particularly since the publication of Robert Putnam's (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. In part, the popularity of Putnam's exhaustive study on social capital reflects concerns in various countries over the erosion of respect for democratic institutions as reflected through diminishing levels of civic engagement. Amongst the principal examples offered for the decline are reduced voter turnouts and decreasing volunteerism. Hence social capital theorists frequently seek to determine how best to revitalize the engagement of citizens in the institutions of society that enhance democratic life. Putnam's (1995) contention that "the vibrancy of American civil society… has notably declined over the past several decades" has moved the study of associational life to the very forefront of analyses of the state of democracy (Putnam, 1993).

In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam contends that: "…of all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, perhaps the most important is the distinction between *bridging* (or inclusive) and *bonding* (or exclusive)." Bonding social capital is often inward looking and thus reinforces exclusive identities and homogeneous groups (i.e., ethnic fraternal organizations) while bridging is outward looking and involves people across diverse cleavages (i.e. ecumenical religious organizations). Putnam remarks that: "bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40."

There are several methodological and theoretical challenges in making distinctions between bonding and bridging social capital. Initiatives described as fostering social capital frequently have an impact on identity formation, a relationship that has not been the object of sufficient attention. Regarding the relationship between identity formation and social capital, the quantity of capital that is generated is less important than the quality of that which is produced. As Putman (2000) has correctly observed, not all social capital necessarily generates positive societal outcomes, as this will often depend upon the type of activity that is pursued and its objectives.

There lacks an important body of work around the role of religion in generating social capital in Canada. Yet, religious or religiously affiliated associations contribute significantly to the quantity of social capital that is generated within society. Roughly speaking, nearly half of North America's stock of social capital is religious or religiously affiliated, whether measured by association memberships, philanthropy, or volunteering.

How do faith-based organizations produce social capital and how is it being used? Undoubtedly, religious social capital is distinctive in terms of its "quantity." There are a variety of ways in which religious engagement can contribute to social capital. The most common form of such engagement is through volunteering and charitable contributions, which is often directed at assisting the more vulnerable segments in society. Given the capacity of religious institutions to mobilize individuals around charitable ends, it is widely held that it has significantly greater potential for harnessing social capital than most other identity-based institutions (Miller, 1998). Churches, synagogues, mosques, and other houses of worship provide a vibrant institutional base for civic good works and a creative ground for civic entrepreneurs. Those regularly attending religious services are believed to do disproportionately greater networking, making such institutions a prime forum for informal social capital building. As Wuthnow (1999) notes, however, "Religion may have a

salutary effect on civil society by encouraging its members to worship, to spend time with their families and to learn the moral lessons embedded in religious traditions. But the impact of religion on society is likely to diminish if that is the only role it plays."

Other ways in which religious social capital may differ from other forms of social capital include the criteria along which services are extended. Efficiency or effectiveness may be less of a consideration in religiously based service delivery than is the case for many secularly-based organizations. Like other identity-based forms of social capital, the religious dimension of such engagement may provide a stronger focus for group cooperation than social capital generated by more secular sources.

When it comes to religious engagement, there are often both bridging and bonding dimensions in the formation of social capital. Indeed, the bridging and bonding dichotomy is highly problematic when it comes to assessing the value of religious social capital, since it often carries elements of both. From a social capital perspective, active participation in voluntary organizations leads to greater and deeper networks of social contacts.

Social capital, identity formation and the role of the State

Civil society is often thought of in terms of communities and associations that operate at a distance from the state. Critics of social capital theory have legitimately argued that there is a tendency to either underestimate if not to entirely neglect the role of the state in supporting civil society and community formation (Walzer, 1991). In Canada, civil society and the engagement of citizens often depends on direct or indirect government assistance. Moreover, identity formation is also shaped in part by government priorities, policies and programs. Federal government support of official language minorities is an example of the way in which the state stimulates identity formation and social capital. Support for aboriginal communities – however satisfactory – is yet another example of the importance of government in identity formation. And while it no longer extends direct support to ethnic communities, some observers contend that multicultural policy enhances ethnically based social capital by encouraging the preservation of cultural heritage. Expressions of religious identity also receive some state support in Canada, notably at the provincial level of government via financial assistance to religious schools. In some cases full funding to religiously-based schools is extended as observed in Ontario with the Roman Catholic separate schools.

However modest in size and scope, government also provides support to religious identity via the provision of assistance to certain charitable initiatives. It is estimated that the federal government provides almost two-thirds of the funding used to operate the country's charitable foundations. Organizations may receive either direct state funding through grants and contributions and/or contracts to undertake or manage projects on behalf of the government. Indirect support is also extended through the extension of tax receipts to organizations doing charitable work. To varying degrees, Canadian governments can play a crucial role in influencing certain expressions of identity by providing direct or indirect forms of support. While there is wide agreement that volunteerism is something to be valued when it intersects with certain expressions of identity, it risks being the object of public debate and this is especially true when government assistance is extended.

> According to the Department of Canadian Heritage, multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal and diversity is viewed as a national asset. It is defined by this department as follows: "all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging."

There are at least three types of religious organizations. The first is the place of worship which is generally funded through donations and charitable tax receipts. A second type of organization extends social services under denominational auspices. A third category of organization may extend social services from the place of worship and thus benefit from both its chartable status while securing support for projects from government.

Services that today are widely extended by governments in Canada were once overseen by congregations and religiously-based associations that ran a variety of programs for members and non-members. Such services include self-help groups, job training courses as well as social services, food and housing for the poor and elderly. In pre-1960 Quebec for example, education and health and social services were generally provided by clerical authority and religion was the most important marker of identity in the province. As the government of Quebec replaced the religious organizations by assuming responsibility for such services, the importance of religious identity dramatically declined in the province. Despite considerable increases in state welfare over the course of the twentieth century, religious congregations have by no means abandoned their social mission. However, as Phillips (2000) points out, "little is known in Canada about the extent of social and community involvement of religious congregations, and that which is known is not well-documented."

On occasion, cuts in government funding have affected social service provision, the state and community leaders have encouraged private non-profit agencies to fill the gaps. The capacity of the non-profit sector to address the needs of the population in this regard is uncertain. But when such issues arise, the role of religious charitable associations cannot be avoided given the important place that they occupy in the sector. Some observers have questioned the

capacity of religious bodies to extend services as a result of their parochial character and their presumed inclination to provide benefits to their members only. Operating on this assumption, some critics have questioned whether religious bodies should retain their charitable tax status.

Examining the types of services offered by religious congregations in Ontario, Phillips (2000) finds that some 41 different functions are conducted by more than a quarter of the congregations she surveyed. The services include: "counselling programs for families; programs for the elderly; programs for children and youth; programs for the homeless, poor and other needy persons; health programs; arts and cultural programs; community organizations and development; and a diverse set of social concerns".

What conditions are attached to government support of community based organizations? Although they operate at arms length from government, the direct support obtained by organizations representing official language minority communities makes them more susceptible to the influence of the state. That said, several minority language organizations receiving government funds do political advocacy in order to advance their concerns. In the case of religious organizations, it will be observed that for the most part, they are less dependent on direct government aid and presumably therefore possess greater autonomy in establishing priorities and allocating resources. Thus religious bodies might have greater latitude to defend various political causes. However, their possessing charitable tax status tends to require that they exercise caution when it comes to defending political causes. Moreover, the notion that religion and the state are at least in theory separate in Canada implies that religious organizations should at the very least act prudently when it comes to political matters.

3. ORGANIZED RELIGION AND THE STATE

It is often said that governments in Canada are neutral in matters of religion. But neutrality does not imply that the State does not support religious identity either directly or indirectly. Moreover, such an affirmation overlooks both the historic importance of organized religion – that is the institutional expression of religious communities – and organizations defined along religion lines that deliver services to the public. Religion has a long organizational history in Canada. Unlike the United States and France, it would be incorrect to describe Canada and its provinces as founded upon the principle of the separation of Church and State or separation of religion from public life. Separation of religion from government does not imply a diminishing in the importance of religious identification. Although the United States has constitutionally enshrined the separation between church and state, it is a country with one of the world's highest rates of religious adherence and participation.

Religious organizations can take at least two different forms: (1) places of religious worship, and (2) service organizations, such as schools and hospitals with a religious affiliation. Both are included as part of what constitutes civil society and thus to varying degrees will foster engagement and hence build social capital. Usually the religiously affiliated service organizations are linked to other service organizations and religious worship organizations are looked upon separately. It can be contended that religious service delivery bodies that operate in Canada with state support are de jure religious-or religious in name-rather then de facto religious. It is assumed that the service delivery organizations serve persons outside the faith community with which they are affiliated. Hence a hospital with a Christian or Jewish affiliation tends to provide services to a clientele that may or may not belong to the associated religion. Such institutions may be designated by analysts as examples of bridging social capital even though they reflect the challenge of distinguishing bridging from bonding since they clearly incorporate aspects of both. Not all religiously affiliated service delivery bodies have diverse clienteles. It is not always easy to separate them from places of worship and indeed often to deliver such services. It is the intersection between the place of religious worship and the religious affiliated service body that is the object of debates about bonding and bridging when it comes to generating religious social capital.

Those areas where religious organizations were especially active were within the purview of the provinces. Section 92 of the *British North America Act* stipulates that in each Province, the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, – the establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals, asylums and charities amongst others. From Confederation to the middle of the twentieth century, religious communities continued to work closely with provincial authorities in large part because they were responsible for the provision of charitable and philanthropic services. It was the control over the distribution of such services that was crucial to the clergy in supporting religious identification.

Soon after Confederation, the provincial governments began subsidizing private mostly clerically-based welfare initiatives. State involvement though remained somewhat limited and sporadic, in part because provincial revenues were not abundant at the time. Moreover, the dominant ideology of the period saw individuals as principally responsible for their own well-being and so it was expected that any government involvement would channel funds through religious institutions that in turn supported such things as shelters and orphanages.

Over the course of the twentieth century, provincial governments widened their role in the economic domain and also pondered a larger role for the state in social and welfare functions. From the 1960s to the 1980s, spending by all levels of government on health, education, and social services grew at a rapid pace. The direct delivery of many services, however, remained in the hands of non-profit organizations.

As a result, the relationship between the state and the non-profit and voluntary sector became increasingly complex. Many organizations came to rely on government funding, and governments, through various programs and policies, began to influence and increasingly regulate non-profit organizations. In those periods where economic growth slowed and revenues diminished governments

frequently turned to taxation and borrowing to finance the needs of the population. By the 1990s, the public seemed prepared to accept that these solutions were not sustainable, and governments began reducing or eliminating programs and services and devolving others to the local level.

Government cutbacks have served as reminders of the important role that non-profit and voluntary organizations have played in Canadian communities and their dependence on state funding in the extension of services. Moreover the diversification of the composition of the population and the desire for more inclusive standards in social service delivery funded by the State resulted in a growing evolution over time of those institutions that were previously dedicated to serving members of the same community.

In the year 2000, of the 323 major service agencies in the province of Ontario, some 14 had religious affiliations and received $92 million in state support accounting for approximately 8 percent of the province's $1.1 billion annual social service budget. ''If there's a service to be provided and a religious group can deliver the service, we will sign a contract with them regardless of their connection," declared to an official from the Ontario community and social services minister.

The periods which saw reductions in spending on welfare had a profound impact on the non-profit and voluntary sector. Levels of funding for many organizations declined – in some cases dramatically – while the need and demand for services increased. Government criteria for funding also evolved. Whereas many organizations had previously received grants that allowed them to operate according to their own principles, they were often required to compete – sometimes with for-profit companies – to deliver services according to strict government guidelines. Such organizations as the Catholic Children's Aid Society-Ontario branch established in 1894 remain legally responsible for the protection of all Catholic children in the province up to age 16. It receives most of its financing from the federal, provincial and municipal governments. Such charities as the Jewish Child and Family Services have long worked with and been supported by the government.

According to Phillips (2000), congregations do not see themselves as directly responding to government cutbacks by stepping in to fill the gaps created, but were responding to the social needs arising in their communities due to the cutbacks. Congregations emerge as ubiquitous, almost wholly privately funded charities. They are best known as local churches, temples, mosques, synagogues, and other places of worship, and are often viewed as member organizations where individuals go to fulfill spiritual and religious needs. Rarely documented is the commitment to the provision of social services to their communities.

Of those religious organizations that serve people directly, 73% primarily serve the general public in contrast with less than half of all other organizations that do so. From the perspective of what is sometimes described as "good" social capital, it is worth noting that some 27% of religious organizations say that their members benefit most from their activities, while nearly seventy percent report that both members and non-members alike benefit from their services compared to 46% of all organizations where non-members report benefiting from the services that are provided (i.e. in the case of a library you, may benefit from the services that are offered even if you are not a member).

More than 75 percent of the congregations surveyed by Phillips dispensed food, clothing, and international relief. Soup kitchens, services for the homeless, shelters for men, shelters for women and children, and hospital visitations are offered by over 50 percent of the congregations.

Phillips concludes that local religious congregations should not be viewed as member-serving organizations only, but as charitable organizations concerned with the welfare of others. Although members and non-members were likely to provide services that congregations offered, the recipients were more likely to be non-members by a ratio of more than four to one. Nonetheless, important cuts in the social spending in the non-profit sector by certain provincial governments affected the capacity of religiously-based organizations to deliver social services and generate social capital on that basis either via volunteerism or networking.

Observers believe that government is more likely to cut ties with faith-based charities rather than increase support for them. Under these circumstances, some faith-based leadership in the social services domain believe that faith-based communities engaged in charitable work are better served ''to pressure the whole community for more government funding." This realization and the growing shift in charitable resources have undoubtedly influenced debates around political advocacy and charitable purpose. As governments move to assume greater responsibility for social service delivery, the opportunity for generating

Table 1: Society should try harder to accept minority groups' customs and traditions

Permit subsidies for private religious schools	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Strongly agree	16.7%	8.8%	5.0%	11.8%
Somewhat agree	26.4%	25.7%	18.7%	14.3%
Somewhat disagree	18.5%	28.6%	24.8%	11.3%
Strongly disagree	36.3%	35.0%	48.5%	59.6%
DNK/Refusal	2.2%	1.8%	3.1%	3.0%

Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, June 2007.

religiously-based social capital presumably diminishes. Such traditional charitable activities as the relief of poverty and the advancement of education increasingly assumed by governments have meant that charitable organizations will turn to advocacy as a means to deal with social problems. An organization that deploys its "capital" to call upon the state to spend more in addressing issues of social justice (i.e. the relief of poverty) may not be considered a charity – even if it is potentially more effective through advocacy than a shelter that offers support to the homeless. Hence there are increasingly frequent situations where the lines between social and political capital are blurred. In a society where the population is increasingly diverse, one can expect that increasing attention will be directed at multicultural policy and social cohesion where government is increasingly viewed as the principal avenue for addressing social justice.

The State and faith-based schools

On matters of public support for religiously-based schools, there is ongoing debate around relationships between multiculturalism and social cohesion. Confessional school funding is one of the most important ongoing debates around the relationship between religion and the state, both within Canada and abroad. In the province of Ontario, a proposal by the Conservative opposition leader John Tory to extend historic public funding of Roman Catholic schools to other faiths became the dominant issue of the 2007 provincial election campaign and contributed to the re-election of the governing party which rejected the idea.

It was in the area of education where confessional identification was a dominant characteristic through much of the nineteenth century and as we shall observe. On a reduced scale, religious instruction continued to be widely available in several parts of Canada well into the twentieth century. In the pre-Confederation provinces of Upper and Lower Canada (present day Ontario and Quebec), problems arose because the religious minorities, Catholic and Protestant respectively, would not adopt the religious practices of the majority. Catholics in what was to become Ontario did not want their children following the Protestant practice of Bible studies in school, while Protestants in Quebec did not want their children learning Roman Catholic dogma. As a result, governments in the two jurisdictions established dual school systems to accommodate both religious denominations. In fact, Quebec and Ontario were unlikely to agree to the terms of Confederation unless the educational rights of the religious minorities were respected. Such protection was not to be extended to other religious minorities-though aside from the relatively small number of the persons of the Jewish faith there were not many non-Christians to defend at the time of the Federation.

From its very inception, the federal government was seen as the contractual protector via its constitution for the confessional minorities residing in the respective provinces. Protecting the needs of what were at the time deemed too vulnerable religious collectivities was to be enshrined in Canadian law. However, such protection was to be limited to Catholics and Protestants on the basis of the federal constitutional framework and any extension of the rights of Catholics and Protestants would depend on the will of provincial authorities that were responsible for education.

Ontario is the only province that fully funds Catholic education while not providing any funding to other faith-based schools as stipulated under the arrangements of the Federation referred to previously. Currently in Ontario, 95 per cent of students attend publicly funded schools, with 650,000 of those or roughly 31 per cent attending Catholic schools. Two per cent or approximately 53,000 students attend faith-based private schools, while the remaining three per cent attend other private schools. The exclusive funding of the Catholic system has confronted ongoing criticism from leaders of non-Christian groups in the province and has prompted numerous court challenges. A number of non-Christians groups have insisted that the situation is unjust and have campaigned for other faith communities to secure similar funding. The matter was even taken to the UN Human Rights Committee, which ruled in 1999 that this was discriminatory. But the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the view that the failure to extend such funding to other religious communities was a violation of the Canadian Constitution.

Advocates of the extension of such funding to other faith-based schools have maintained that the support would generate a system that properly reflects the diversity of 21st-century Ontario. For their part however, Ontario public school authorities have countered that such support would be divisive and foster the creation of "silos" where people focus on their differences rather than unite students in a multicultural society.

Premier Dalton McGuinty argued that "If we are going to bring about more improvement in publicly funded schools, it is regressive to contemplate segregating our children according to their faith," (Wilson, 2007) adding that he wanted kids to continue to come together. A September 2007 survey conducted by Ipsos found that two-thirds of Ontarians opposed the plan to extend funding to all faith-based schools that comply with provincial standards.

Although the discourse underlying the debate over religious school funding seems to pit multiculturalism against cohesion, such a juxtaposition of the issue does not do justice to the complexity of the matter. In effect, such a positioning of the debate says more about the appropriation of the notions of multiculturalism and cohesion in support of the funding than what those who possess a multicultural or cohesionist perspective on such matters may prefer in terms of a societal approach. Based on a national survey conducted in 2007 by Leger Marketing, one observes that those who support the retention of cultural identities do not have substantially different views on funding of religious schools than those who favour the abandoning of cultures of origin. In this regard, we assume cohesionist thinking in its maximal expression to be more assimilationist and multiculturalists to be least so. Those who either somewhat agree or disagree with various diversity issues are classed as either soft multiculturalists or soft cohesionists. According to the Leger marketing survey below, both "cohesionists" (70%) and "multiculturalists"

(60%) are in the majority unfavourable to subsidies for private religious schools.

Similarly, those who feel that society has been strengthened by diversity (58%) and those least likely to agree (68%) both tend to disagree in the majority with the subsidies for private religious schools.

Greater divergence appears between those most favourable to accepting minority groups customs and traditions who are more inclined to agree with subsidies (43%) versus those least likely to agree more effort is needed as some 26% of the group believe there should be subsidies.

In effect, those Canadians most favourable to religious expression in public schools (i.e. the crucifix on the wall) are also most favourable to subsidies for private religious schools (49%), versus those least Some 37% of those favourable to hijabs in public schools agree with subsidies for private religious schools, while those least favourable to the Hijab are least favourable to subsidies.

Civil society organizations, the role of the State and religion

Canada has the second largest non-profit sector in the world, according to a report entitled the *Canadian Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective* (2004), which examined the sector in 37 countries on the basis of size, scope and donations. When comparing the full-time equivalent workforce within the non-profit/volunteer segment with the rest of a country's population, only the Netherlands (14.4%) topped Canada (11.1%). The next highest were Belgium (10.9%), Ireland (10.4%) and the United States (9.8%).

Within the non-profit sector, Canada employs more paid workers than other nations and follows Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the use of volunteers. Only about 25 percent of Canada's full-time equivalent workers within the non-profit sector are volunteers, as compared to an average of 38 percent among the nations surveyed.

The non-profit sector makes a significant contribution to the Canadian economy employing the equivalent of over two-million full-time workers (two-thirds in paid positions and the remainder as volunteers). Excluding the one-third of paid non-profit employees who work for hospitals, universities and colleges, the Canadian non-profit sector still employs one-third more workers than the transportation industry and more than one-and-one-half times as many workers as the country's construction industry.

Because of its long tradition of relying on non-profit organizations to address the needs and interests of its population, Canada has one of the largest and most vibrant non-profit sectors in the world. It encompasses "service delivery" organizations in areas such as health, education, social services, community development and housing, as well as those that serve "expressive" functions in arts and culture, religion, sports, recreation, civic advocacy, environmental protection, and through business, labour, and professional associations.

Service organizations dominate the makeup of Canadian nonprofits (74 percent), providing education, healthcare and social services. Canada leads other nations in workers providing healthcare and housing services. The remainder of Canada's non-profit sector is largely 'expressive' – servicing cultural, religious, and professional or policy interests (22 percent).

Service activities are a more dominant feature of non-profit and voluntary organizational activity in Canada than is the case elsewhere. About 74 percent of all Canadian non-profit sector workers (both paid and volunteer) are engaged in the delivery of direct services such as education, health, and housing (compared to 64 percent internationally). Health organizations employ a much larger percentage of workers in Canada than is the case in other countries. Overall, there are fewer individuals involved with organizations supporting expressive activities (e.g., arts, culture, religion, sports, and recreation).

Table 2: Status of belonging: Church, religious organizations in selected countries, 2004

Status of belonging: Church, religious organizations	Belong and participate	Belong not participate	Used to belong	Never belonged to
Ireland	55.8%	19.8%	7.5%	16.8%
Mexico	52.4%	37.5%	1.5%	8.6%
United States	40.1%	21.5%	21.6%	16.8%
Canada	32.7%	28.6%	21.1%	17.6%
Poland	26.5%	37.5%	3.2%	32.7%
Philippines	25.6%	11.5%	8.3%	54.6%
Switzerland	25.5%	35.0%	11.4%	28.1%
Venezuela	20.9%	35.3%	9.2%	34.6%
Chile	20.5%	16.5%	10.5%	52.4%

Source: International Social Survey Program (for Canada, the data was collected by the Carleton University Survey Centre), 2004.

In Canada, more than half (51 %) of the non-profit sector's revenues come from the government, which is more than other nations surveyed in the report. Healthcare, education and social service organizations are the primary recipients of these grants. Fees account for 39% of non-profit revenue in Canada, and only 9% is attributed to private donations. Even when religious organizations are added into the mix, philanthropy only accounts for 13% of revenue.

Government funding is particularly prominent in the fields of health, education, and social services reflecting the special form that the welfare state has taken in Canada and echoing what is found in a number of European countries. Government support also plays a prominent role in the funding of civic and advocacy organizations. Fee income dominates in other fields.

When expressed as a share of the economically active population, the non-profit sector workforce in Canada is one of the largest in the world, outdistancing the United States and second only to the Netherlands among the countries for which data are available. When it comes to belonging and participating in a church or religious organization, some one-third of Canadians reported doing so in 2004, ranking the country fourth out of thirty-five countries surveyed.

4. HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGIOUS SOCIAL CAPITAL

In 2004, religious organizations in Canada accounted for approximately 31,000 or 19% of the country's estimated 161,000 non-profit and voluntary organizations. More than half (51%) have existed for at least four decades. These findings are from Statistics Canada's National Survey of Non-profit and Voluntary Organizations (NSNVO) which conducted interviews with 13,000 individuals representing incorporated non-profit organizations and registered charities in 2003. (The data presented in the NSNVO were weighted to provide estimates for the 161,000 incorporated non-profit and voluntary organizations and registered charities in Canada).

Non-profit and voluntary organizations, which receive 49% of their revenues from government, 35% from earned income, and only 13% from gifts and donations. The charitable sector is thus quite dependent on the state for its well-being. As a result, government budget cutbacks directly and negatively affect programs that receive the bulk of their funding from the government. The revenue profile of religious organizations is distinct from others in the sector. Unlike other such charitable organizations, religious bodies are considerably less dependent on government support, as two-thirds of their revenue comes from gifts and donations. Their next most important source of funds is from earned income – Government (8%) furnishes less than ten percent of the revenues from religious organizations.

Organizations that obtain half or more of their revenue from one source (i.e. government, earned income, or gifts and donations) are deemed to be dependent on the source. Those which do not have a dominant source are described as diverse. Again, unlike other non-profit and voluntary organizations, religious bodies have different relationships of dependency as over three-quarters are financially dependent on gifts and donations, compared to about one quarter of all organizations.

Only one in six religious organizations is dependent on earned revenues, compared to 46% of all organizations. Less than 1% of religious organizations are dependent on government, compared to 17% of all organizations. The dependency on gifts and donations entails various challenges that have been the object of analysis. Such challenges will vary across communities whose institutional infrastructure is often at different stages of development. Only through comparative analysis of the communities is it possible to determine the relative rates of infrastructure and the services delivered on this basis.

While more of the direct financial support to religiously-based organizations has come from the provinces owing to their jurisdictional authority in education, health and social services, the principal basis for support to religiously-based institutions has been indirect (that does not mean that the federal government does not provide direct assistance to such organizations in other areas). According to the NSNVO, almost all religious organizations (94%) are registered charities allowing them to issue tax receipts for donations. By contrast, some fifty-six percent of all non-profit and voluntary organizations in Canada had charitable tax status.

Under the *Income Tax Act* of Canada (hereafter ITA), charities receive preferential treatment through the exempting of their income from taxation (a charity can issue charitable receipts to donors, who are in turn allowed to deduct amounts from their personal income tax). The preferential tax treatment of a charity is regarded as an indirect government subsidy. Moreover, registered status confers a certain degree of organizational legitimacy as they are accepted for such status on the basis of meeting selective government criteria.

In 1994, there were 71,413 charities registered in Canada, of which 36% were classified as places of worship – the single largest category of charities in the country. Classification according to what is listed as eligible for charitable status that is faith-based is identified as either religion or places of worship. Among the registered charities, more than 40%, or 32,000, are faith-based. In 2006, there were more than 80,000 charities registered with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). A search on the basis of key words of Canadian registered charities reveals that some 2284 included Christian, 1490 Jehovah, Anglican 749, Jesus 786, Jewish 225, Muslim 149, and Sikh 88. Although the figures need to be used with caution, one can tentatively conclude that registered charitable tax status does not include substantial numbers of non-Christian organizations.

The criteria favouring the admission of organizations for charitable tax status is laid out in a manner that is favourable to the objectives and structure of religious organizations and it is in part for this reason that religion represents a critical share of Canadian social capital. An overwhelming majority of religious organizations (89%) provide products or services to people directly versus nearly three-quarters of the entire non-profit sector. Yet another criterion in determining eligibility for charitable tax status is the degree of voluntary participation on the part of the

organization either in the pursuit of its activities (program volunteers) or in the management of its affairs (voluntary members of the board of directors). In this regard, the relative degrees of bridging and bonding social capital on the part of religious organizations are not directly relevant to decisions made by the relevant government authorities in determining whether they qualify as charities. In any event, the evidence from the NSNVO does not support the view that religious organizations are less inclusive in the manner in which they serve constituents.

Approximately nine in ten religious organizations have members, compared to eight in ten of all organizations. Religious organizations are less likely to have restricted membership (33%) than organizations in general (57%). Instead, the majority of religious organizations with individual members report that anyone can join (67%).

Religion and the politics of social capital

There often appears to be less discussion at the federal level than the provincial level of government around the relationship between religion and the state. In large part, this is because the area where religion is believed to collide with public policies is more likely to be in the purview of the provinces. At the federal and provincial levels, there has been discussion over such things as the rules around uniforms or religious headgear for government employees, but these and other supposed "accommodations" for religious differences have received far greater attention when they arise at the provincial or local level.

The extension of charitable tax status is perhaps the most important area via which the federal state supports the advancement of religious social capital. Those individuals who call for government to extricate itself from supporting the institutional expression of religion have far less frequently targeted the issue of charitable tax status of either places of worship or those organizations engaged in supporting various social causes under religiously-based auspices.

Data from the International Social Survey reveal that those who belong to a church or religious organization were more likely to report voting in a past election than those not belonging. Similarly they are also more likely to have contacted a politician or attended a political meeting or rally. Some one in four persons that report belonging and participating in a church or religious organization in Canada say that they belong to a political party compared to one in two in the United States. In the US just over one in five persons that never belonged to a religious organization say they belong to a political party compared to less than one in ten Canadians. Hence there is ample evidence that those who are more engaged religiously tend to be more engaged politically-the latter often viewed as a critical test of civic participation in democratic societies. Social capitalists will seek to find out what form such political involvement takes and whether it reinforces social cohesion.

Canadians who belong and participate in religious organizations are more likely to agree that people in government can be trusted (41%) than those who have never belonged (31%). Some of the societal concerns around the potentially negative dimensions of social capital arising from organized religious expression are a function of the perceived influence on politics of faith-based leadership. Traditionally, there have been important restrictions in Canada upon charities engaged in political activities. Some believe that such restrictions deter organizations with genuine expertise in service delivery from engaging in important public policy dialogues. Indeed, it is in this area where the intersection between bonding and bridging social capital is a source of concern for some who believe that identity-based groups may not be defending the broader societal interest.

When it comes to charitable tax status, a registered charity is required by law to have exclusively charitable purposes. Under the ITA and common law, an organization established for a political purpose cannot be a charity. Political purpose has been defined by the courts as those that seek to:

- further the interests of a particular political party; or support a political party or candidate for public office; or
- retain, oppose, or change the law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country.

The principal motivation for ruling out political purposes for charities is that a purpose is only deemed as charitable if it generates a public benefit. To assess the public benefit of a political purpose, a court would have to take sides in a political debate. In Canada, political issues are for elected officials to decide, and the courts hesitate to encroach on their sovereign authority (other than when a constitutional issue arises).

Under the ITA a registered charity must commit nearly all of its resources to charitable purposes and activities. Nonetheless, the ITA permits the deployment of a limited amount of resources towards political activity. Hence, an organization established for a political purpose cannot be registered as a charity, but a registered charity may take part in some political activities if it specifically furthers its charitable purpose(s). The CRA has also modified the definition of political activities so that it no longer includes various attempts to inform public opinion on issues. This change was designed to enable charities to more effectively carry out their public awareness programs.

Questionable social capital

Putnam (2000, 22) has noted that: "social capital…can be directed toward malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like any other form of capital." Negative social capital arises where groups with shared norms seek internal cohesion by treating "others" with suspicion, hostility, or outright hatred. Francis Fukuyama (1999) points to the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia as examples of groups that produce abundant negative externalities for the larger society in which they are embedded.

Fukuyama contends that the reason social capital may give rise to disproportionately greater negative outcomes than physical or human capital is because "…group solidarity in human communities is often purchased at the price of hostility towards out-group members." Fukuyama suggests that when measuring social capital, it is essential to consider its true utility net of its externalities (its positive

versus its negative dimensions). In other words, he believes that we need to think at least theoretically in terms of a balance sheet approach in estimating the value of the stock of social capital.

As mentioned, religion is a very important source of social capital in mobilizing members around laudable causes and purposes. In some cases however, religious mobilization may be the object of questionable motivation with negative value for social capital. It is difficult to develop a system of classification distinguishing the positive and negative outcomes of religiously-based engagement and it is essential to avoid making generalizations. Still, it is possible to identify cases where mobilization on the basis of religious identity transgresses societal norms.

The Department of Justice acknowledges that charities are a vital component of Canadian society. They help the sick and the disadvantaged, they promote education and provide community facilities and they provide humanitarian assistance throughout the world. However, domestic and international law enforcement agencies have documented the direct or indirect financing of terrorism through organizations that also have or claim to have charitable goals. In response, Canada's Parliament enacted the *Charities Registration Security Information Act* (CRSIA) as part of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). The CRSIA allows the Government to have recourse to classified information in determining whether an organization should be registered or continue to be registered as a charity.

If there are reasonable grounds, the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of National Revenue may sign a certificate stating that in their view an applicant or a registered charity has made or will make resources available, directly or indirectly, to an entity that engages or will engage in any terrorist activity as defined in the *Criminal Code*. A certificate is automatically submitted to the Federal Court for judicial review. After a hearing determines that a certificate is reasonable, it becomes conclusive proof that an organization is ineligible to become or remain a registered charity.

Still, since obtaining this power, the Canada Revenue Agency has not issued a single "security certificate" against a charity in the country. That said, in their submission to the Air India inquiry, Carter et al. (October, 2007) contend that one of the major effects of ongoing concern with the terrorism is the scrutiny of the activities of charitable organizations. Undoubtedly, this has both direct and indirect effects on the generating of religious social capital, since it is likely religiously-based charities that have come up for the highest level of scrutiny.

Charitable activities that are otherwise never the object of particular attention might be brought up on criminal charges for facilitating "terrorist activities" or for supporting "terrorist groups." This, in turn, may result in the loss of charitable status and its directors being exposed to personal liability. Charities face some uncertainty over whether the broad legislation will be applied to their activities. Carter et al. (October, 2007) maintain that there is a need to strike a balance between efforts to thwart terrorist financing and ensuring that legitimate charitable programs can continue to operate.

Under its religious designation the CRA adds new charities on a regular basis. But it also deregisters various charities for not complying with established guidelines and an important percentage is religiously affiliated. Religious organizations have been the object of increased public scrutiny owing to concern with the potential for groups to perpetrate violent action in the name of religion.

Conformity on the part of religious organizations to Canadian '*Charter* Values' has been the object of debates whose significance may grow in the years ahead. In a text entitled: "*Living Better Multiculturally: Whose values should prevail?*" (*Literary Review of Canada*, fall 2006), political scientist Janice Gross Stein worries about a "resurgence of orthodoxy in Christianity, Islam and Judaism," constituting a threat to the peaceful coexistence of various cultures in Canada's urban centres.

Stein wonders how committed Canadians are to the secularization of public space. Even though the *Charter* strictly applies only to public space, she contends that its "spirit and values" must be taken seriously. Hence Stein questions whether religious institutions that enjoy special tax privileges given to them by governments are engaged in religious practices wholly private since they benefit from the public purse? She wonders whether equality rights of the *Charter* have some application when religious institutions are officially recognized and advantaged in fundraising.

Stein contends that: "If religious institutions are able to raise funds more easily because governments give a tax benefit to those who contribute, are religious practices towards women a matter only for religious law, as is currently the case under Canadian law, which protects freedom of religion, or should the values of the *Charter* and of human rights commissions across Canada have some application when religious institutions are officially recognized and advantaged in fundraising?"

According to Stein, Canadians are uncertain about what limits there should be to embedding diverse religious as well as cultural traditions within the Canadian context. We know pretty well what the "multi" in multicultural means, but are much less confident about "culture."

According to Cere (see Gyapong, 2007), Stein's suggestion raises the issue of whether "…the courts can deploy the "weapon of rights" to pressure religions to conform to so-called Canadian values. He argues that "Freedom of religion is about creating social space in which religious bodies can be themselves [as] the role of the state is not to impose its views about religion on anybody," further adding that such matters are best worked out by the faith community.

According to one of Canada's foremost charitable tax law experts, Terrance Carter, charitable tax status for religious organizations is not "a current concern." To protect against its future erosion he recommends that clerical institutions maintain their charitable status on the basis of "the advancement of religion," category as validated by government and the courts, and not under the heading of "relief of poverty" or "advancement of education" or other similar communal purposes.

Carter also warns that there is a need for vigilance against a narrowing of what "advancement of religion" means. For example, where does the right of a priest come from to speak on his understanding of the sanctity of life, marriage and divorce, same-sex marriage, women in leadership? he

asked. "They're giving an understanding of their faith, their doctrine," he said. "If there's a narrowing of what 'advancement of religion is,' a religion may be limited to discussions on the worship of God but not allowed to advance the sanctity of life and still retain charitable status. That may be seen "as a commentary on societal issues and therefore political," he said.

Carter notes that government has assumed many activities that were formerly religious activities, such as the care for the poor. He noted that traditionally society has viewed religions as teaching civility to their members but that the view of religion as a social good has been losing ground in public opinion.

Carter adds that: "as broad as freedom of religion is, it is not unlimited. Courts have consistently held that an individual's freedom of religion is limited by the rights of others." He contends that both case law and the CRA require that a 'charity's activities must not be contrary to public policy and therefore it is conceivable that a religious organization could be denied charitable status if CRA determined that its objects were indeed contrary or inconsistent with *Charter* values," He said that so far, Canada's courts are doing a good job balancing rights, including religious freedom. He noted the amendment in the same-sex marriage legislation that is intended to protect the charitable status of those religious bodies that hold a traditional view of marriage. Underlying the debates over the type of social capital generated is not only the motives behind volunteering in religious organizations, but also that initiate such engagement. This will be the object of discussion in the next chapter.

5. PROFILING CANADA'S RELIGIOUS SOCIAL CAPITALISTS

The 2004 *Canadian Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating* defines religious organizations as congregations or groups of congregations. Religiously affiliated organizations that operate in other areas such as social services or health are not classified as religious organizations.

Generating social capital is often an expression of community values. Hence for many, the behavior associated with social capital is a reflection of the way in which people express certain underlying values, needs and interests through social engagement. Although many Canadians assist others outside an institutional framework, the measurement of social capital is associated with the institutional practices of volunteers. Charitable giving is the principal focus of the CSGVP, which reveals that the vast majority of Canadians (85%) made a financial contribution to charitable or non-profit organizations over the period covered by the survey. Most Canadians (83%), say that they helped others directly and almost two-thirds (66%) did so by joining an organization, group, or association. In contrast, volunteering on the part of Canadians is a less common activity. Still, the results of the 2004 CSGVP reveal that almost 12 million Canadians, or 45% of the population aged 15 and older volunteered in the twelve months prior to the survey.

Through their donations, Canadians support the activities of those charitable and non-profit organizations that they value most. Religious organizations were the largest beneficiaries of charitable giving, receiving almost $4.0 billion, or 45% of the total value of donations received by organizations in Canada (health organizations were second, receiving over $1.2 billion in donations or 14% of the total value of donations).

Donors to religious organizations made the largest average contributions ($395), thus enabling them to secure more funds than any other organizations. There are other types of organizations with a wider support base. While religious organizations received donations from some 38% of the population, almost 6 in ten Canadians (57%) made donations to health organizations and 43% donated to social services organizations. Although more than half of all donors supported health and social services organizations, the average donations were such that they ranked behind religious organizations.

Not surprisingly, monetary contributions are primarily influenced by age and income. Those aged 15-24 are least inclined to give (71% made a donation) and peaked among those aged 45 to 64 (90% donated), before declining slightly among those aged 65 and older (87% donated). Average donation rises from a low of $197 among those with household incomes of less than $20,000 to a high of $698 among those with household incomes of $100,000 or more. Although they represent some one in five individuals, those with household incomes of over $100,000 contributed 36% of all donations. Canadians with a university degree were more inclined to give than those who graduated high school.

Religious organizations also draw their financial support from different segments of the population than do non-religious organizations. Religious and nonreligious organizations alike receive more support from those segments of the population that is more educated and have higher incomes in comparison to the rest of the population. They also receive more support from persons over the age of 65 than do non-religious organizations. Religious organizations receive a much higher proportion of their donations from top donors (the 25% of donors who contributed $325 or more) than do non-religious

Data from the International Social Survey reveal that those who belong to a church or religious organization were more likely to report voting in a past election than those not belonging. Similarly they are also more likely to have contacted a politician or attended a political meeting or rally.

organizations. Some 41% of the donations to religious organizations came from persons earning over $100 000.

As noted earlier, religious organizations depend heavily on those who attend religious services weekly for monetary contributions and/or volunteerism. Three-quarters of donations to religious organizations (74%) came from those who attended services weekly. Not surprisingly, those Canadians that are actively involved with their religion are more likely than others to be donors and on average give more than other donors. Such behaviour might represent a concern for those who draw distinction between social capital and its broader societal impact versus such capital whose benefits are confined solely to a given community.

Nonetheless, according to the 2004 CSGVP, those Canadians actively involved in religion also make significant contributions to non-religious organizations. One-fifth of Canadians (19%) reported that they attended religious services weekly. Over nine in ten (93%) of those who attended services weekly made charitable donations compared to 84% of those who did not. Those who attended services weekly also made larger annual average donations ($887 vs. $284). Most of this giving (72% of all donations) is directed towards religious organizations. Indeed, the 19% of Canadians who attended religious services weekly account for 74% of the total value of donations to religious organizations. Still, they also provide 22 % of the total value of all donations to non-religious organizations.

Reasons for engagement

When asked whether they were required to volunteer for the religious organization in which they became involved, some 92% said no, a percentage similar to the overall population when asked about similar such engagement. In the case of persons who were neither Catholic nor Protestant, some 90% that volunteered in a religious organization were not required to do so. Some 42% of all those surveyed said that they directly approached the religious organization in which they are volunteers a percentage similar to that for the overall population in describing how they became involved. On the basis of their religious affiliation, some 42% of Catholics that are engaged in a religious organization say that they approached it themselves compared with 41% of Protestants and 46% of persons who are neither Catholic nor Protestant. Some 41% of Canadian born religious volunteers say they approached the organization themselves compared to 46% of immigrants.

For those concerned with the potential negative effects of religious social capital on social cohesion, there is little in the CSGVP that suggests a difference in the motivation amongst volunteers across religious groups in contrast to all other volunteers. Indeed, there are important similarities in the motivation behind volunteerism either in general or on the basis of religion. The principal motivation for all volunteers across the spectrum of religious identification is to make a contribution to community. Some nine in ten persons surveyed describe this as their motivation, followed by some three-quarters who say that it is to use of one's skills and experience. Forty percent of non-Christian respondents cited religious obligations amongst the principal motivation for participation, compared with 30% of Protestants and twenty percent of Catholics surveyed.

As to the motivation of those who volunteered in religious organizations, it is much the same as that which is identified in general as reflected above. The one significant difference is the importance attributed to religious obligations amongst those who volunteer in a religious organization. When volunteering, in general some 21% of Catholics cite religious obligations, but 56% of those doing in a religious organization give that reason. It is the respondents that are neither Catholic nor Protestant that are most likely (73.7%) to cite religious obligations as a motivating factor in volunteering in religious organizations, while 39.4% identify religious obligations as the principal consideration in their volunteering.

Giving and volunteering among immigrants and religious groups

What might be described as the stock of social capital in Canada is generated somewhat disproportionately by Protestants and non-Christians. This is largely a function of persons with no religious affiliation logically investing very little in religious social capital.

Table 3: Belong to religious organization or group by religious affiliation, 2004

	Yes	No	Total % of sample
No religious affiliation	1.9%	23.1%	17.9%
Catholic	28.3%	36.8%	34.1%
Protestant	57.4%	30.1%	35.1%
Other	7.5%	4.1%	4.7%

Source: Canadian Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating, Statistics Canada, 2004.

When examining the stock of Canada's religious social capital across most faith-based groups surveyed for the EDS, it is the Protestants and Jews that invest more in this regard relative to the overall population. Neither group is underrepresented relative to their share of the sample when it comes to non-religious volunteerism. The percentage of Muslims contributing to the stock of religious social capital is equal to their share of the sample, while the percentage contributed by Buddhists and Hindus is somewhat higher.

According to the 2004 CSGVP, immigrants were nearly as likely to make a donation (85%) as native-born Canadians (86%). Moreover, immigrants ($462) made larger average annual donations than non-immigrants ($394). Immigrants and non-immigrants tend to give to the same types of organizations with health, religious, and social services organizations being the leading recipients. Nonetheless, immigrants (44%) are more likely to give to religious organizations than non-immigrants (38%) and somewhat less likely to give to health organizations (48% vs. 60%). Immigrants also donated a somewhat greater share of their charitable contributions to religious organizations than did the Canadian-born population. Among immigrants, those

Table 4: Overall rates of volunteering with religious group, other volunteering and no volunteering by selected religious group, 2002				
Religious affiliated group	**Volunteer with religious group**	**Non religious volunteer**	**Didn't volunteer**	**Total % of sample**
No religious affiliation	1.9%	19.6%	21.0%	18.8%
Catholic	28.3%	36.2%	36.3%	35.3%
Protestant	40.2%	29.3%	25.5%	27.7%
Christian Orthodox	2.9%	1.6%	2.2%	2.0%
Other Christian	12.4%	5.9%	5.5%	6.1%
Muslim	1.9%	1.5%	2.3%	1.9%
Jewish	4.0%	1.7%	1.2%	1.6%
Buddhist	1.8%	0.9%	1.5%	1.3%
Hindu	2.3%	1.2%	1.1%	1,2%
Sikh	2.3%	0.8%	1.8%	1.5%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

who have resided in Canada for longer periods of time tend to give more than others. Immigrants (41%) were somewhat less inclined to volunteer than native-born Canadians (48%). Nonetheless, the immigrant (165 hours) and non-immigrant volunteers (168 hours) contributed about the same number of hours annually.

Nearly half of Catholics and Protestants made donations to a place of worship, versus 42% of persons that identify with other religions. When it comes to volunteering in religious affiliated groups as observed below it is most common amongst persons of the Jewish faith followed by Hindu, Sikh and Protestant. Catholics and Muslims were least likely to report. Members of the Jewish faith were also most likely to have volunteered and persons of the Sikh and Muslim faith least likely to have done so.

Looking at religious volunteerism on the basis of generational status offers some important insight. As observed below, the second generation in the Jewish, Muslim and Sikh groups was more likely than the first generation to volunteer in religious organizations. In the case of Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists and Hindus, the second generation was less likely than the first to volunteer in religious organizations.

On the basis of language, there are important distinctions in the degree of religious volunteerism. For Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and Hindus, religious volunteerism is more common amongst those whose mother tongue is neither English nor French. Anglophones that are Catholic, Protestant or Muslim are more likely to volunteer in religious organizations than is the case for francophones in these three communities.

What does the evidence in Canada suggest around the relationship between engagements in religious associations and the encouragement or discouragement of other volunteer activity notably when it comes to non-religious volunteerism?

The CSGVP reveals that just under one-third of all Canadians (31%) are engaged in all four forms of such involvement. Somewhat fewer (30%) took part in three forms; about one-quarter (23%) engaged in two; and 11% undertook only one. Taken together, 85% of Canadians engaged in two or more and 62% took part in three or more forms of social involvement. Most members of organizations belonged to just one (45%) or two (30%) different types of organizations over the course of a year. One quarter (25%) held memberships with three or more different types of organizations.

Table 5: Rates of Volunteering with Religious Group, other volunteering and no volunteering within each group by selected religion, 2002			
Religious affiliated group	**Volunteer religious organization**	**Volunteer other organization**	**Did not volunteer**
No religious affiliation	0.7%	41.0%	57.4%
Catholic	5.5%	40.4%	53.0%
Protestant	10.0%	41.7%	47.5%
Muslim	6.8%	29.9%	60.5%
Jewish	17.2%	42.5%	38.0%
Buddhist	9.5%	28.4%	59.7%
Hindu	12.8%	37.4%	47.4%
Sikh	10.9%	22.5%	63.7%
Total	6.9%	39.4%	51.6%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 6: Rates of Volunteering with Religious Organization by generational status within each group by selected religion, 2002			
Religious affiliated group	**1st generation born outside Canada**	**2nd generation born in Canada**	**3rd generation or more born in Canada**
No religious affiliation	0.9%	0.9%	0.4%
Catholic	8.1%	5.6%	4.0%
Protestant	11.4%	10.1%	9.4%
Muslim	4.3%	13.0%	–
Jewish	13.5%	19.9%	17.6%
Buddhist	10.5%	7.2%	8.6%
Hindu	13.9%	10.9%	–
Sikh	9.1%	13.8%	–

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 7: Volunteering with Religious affiliated group and not with religiously affiliated group and respondent involvement in numbers and types of organizations, 2002			
	Volunteer in religious affiliated group	**Volunteer but not religious affiliated group**	**Total population**
Not a member of or did not take part in the activities of a group or organization.	–	–	51.3%
1 type of group or organization	48.6%	81.2%	35.4%
2 types of groups or organizations	31.7%	15.2%	8.2%
3 types of groups or organizations	14.3%	3.1%	2.2%
4 or more types of organizations	5.5%	0.5%	0.6%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

The CSGVP does not provide information on the patterns of volunteerism amongst specific minority religious groups (its focus is on those who have no religious affiliation that are Catholic, Protestant or 'other'). Such information can be secured from the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey where the vertical dimensions of engagement can be identified. By vertical dimensions, we refer to the numbers and types of groups or organizations in which Canadians are involved. This information has some bearing on the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital as analysts have contended that those engaged on the basis of their identity are less likely to become involved in various other groups or organization. Nearly half of Canadians were either a member of, or took part in, the activities of a group or organization. As observed below, those involved in religious organizations were more likely to take part in several types of groups or organizations than those who volunteer in non-religious organizations.

Even on the basis of various religious groups, multiple involvements are not uncommon, though it is somewhat more likely in the more established groups.

6. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL COHESION

Social capital theorists often describe their objective as the advancement of democracy. As mentioned at the outset, Putnam and Fukuyama contend that democratic values are enhanced through civic engagement and in this regard increased social capital expands democratic life. Volunteerism augments what is described as the accumulation or stock of social capital. In the previous chapter several value-laden factors motivating volunteerism or civic

Table 8: Volunteering with Religious affiliated group and respondent involvement in numbers and types of organizations, by selected religions, 2002							
Volunteer in religious affiliated group	**Catholic**	**Protestant**	**Muslim**	**Jewish**	**Buddhist**	**Hindu**	**Sikh**
1 type of group or organization	45.9%	45.6%	61.8%	49.1%	65.4%	66.2%	59.7%
2 types of groups or organizations	33.8%	32.0%	27.3%	34.2%	15.4%	26.2%	20.9%
3 types of groups or organizations	13.8%	17.7%	5.5%	11.4%	9.6%	6.2%	16.4%
4 or more types of organizations	6.5%	4.7%	5.5%	5.3%	9.6%	1.5%	3.0%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 9: Status of belonging: Church or other religious organization and importance of citizen engagement and values in selected areas, 2004				
6-7 Very important for citizens to Canada	**Status of belonging: Church or other religious organization**			
	Belong and participate	**Belong not participate**	**Used to** belong	**Never** belonged to
Help less privileged-country	73.0%	58.2%	41.0%	27.7%
Understand other opinions	63.5%	60.7%	43.3%	32.4%
Always Obey Laws	92.7%	88.1%	84.6%	82.6%
Active in Associations	36.2%	22.8%	25.9%	18.9%

Source: International Social Survey Program (for Canada the data was collected by the Carleton University Survey Centre), 2004.

engagement were identified. But as mentioned earlier, Putnam cautions not all social capital contributes to positive societal outcomes and in some instances the values driving collective action or engagement may seek to undermine the desired democratic outcomes. In "Bowling Alone", Putman distinguished between "bridging" and "bonding" social capital with the former targeting positive social outcomes and in turn supporting cohesion by building trust amongst citizens.

Managing diversity is an obvious preoccupation for social capital theorists given their concern with identity formation and the issues of trust and solidarity to which they give rise. As a considerable degree of the social capital generated is identity-based, it is not surprising that social capital discussion has become intertwined with debate over shared or common values, diversity, multiculturalism and national identity. Robert Putnam has recently observed that: "although the linkage between identity and social capital is only beginning to be explored, it is an important frontier for research. The relationship between the two is almost certainly powerful and reciprocal: Whom you hang out with probably affects who you think you are, and who you think you are probably affects whom you hang out with".

Defining social capital as "…an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals" Fukuyama concurs that not just any set of norms and values sustain social capital. The norms that constitute social capital can range from reciprocity between two friends, all the way up to complex and elaborately articulated doctrines like Christianity or Confucianism.

In 2007, Putnam argued that in-group and out-group attitudes need not be reciprocally related, but can vary independently. In effect, it was necessary to allow for the possibility that diversity might actually reduce both in-group and out-group solidarity – that is, both bonding and bridging social capital. The relationship is not necessarily zero-sum – in other words people engaged in bonding with like persons are often more engaged in bridging than is often assumed.

Still, in the essay entitled "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century", Putnam's main argument is that ethnic diversity triggers anomie or social isolation and therefore "…people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to 'hunker down' – that is, to pull in like a turtle." He concludes that in the short term, immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and by consequence inhibit social capital. In the medium to long term, however, Putnam believes that immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more

Table 10: Status of belonging: Church or other religious organization by selected religious group and importance of citizen engagement and values in selected areas, 2004				
6-7 Very important	Status of belonging: Church, religious organization			
	Good citizen: Help less privileged-ctry	Good citizen: Understand other opinions	Always obey laws	Active in association
Roman Catholic	74.6	68.3	85.0	34.2
Protestant	71.6	70.5	86.7	30.4
Jewish	87.6	72.3	82.8	42.6
Islam	71.5	51.2	80.5	51.2
Buddhism	68.7	55.8	79.2	33.0

Source: International Social Survey Program (for Canada the data was collected by the Carleton University Survey Centre), 2004.

Table 11: People can be trusted by immigrant status for selected religious groups, 2002				
Do you trust people	Born in Canada	Born outside Canada	Before 1991	1991 to 2001
No religious affiliation	55.0%	56.4%	56.7%	56.0%
Catholic	44.5%	44.7%	44.3%	47.3%
Protestant	58.6%	54.1%	54.9%	49.3%
Muslim	37.4%	45.7%	49.1%	43.3%
Jewish	54.5%	49,5%	50.0%	47.1%
Buddhist	49.0%	43.4%	42.2%	46.2%
Hindu	39.8%	44.6%	47.4%	41.6%
Sikh	38.9%	33.8%	35.5%	32.1%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

encompassing identities. As we shall observe, Putnam feels that religion –especially the Catholic faith – can constitute an encompassing identity in that it can bring together persons of diverse ethno-cultural and ethno-racial backgrounds within the same institutional setting.

How do religious identities and the values transmitted by religion(s) fit into the bridging and bonding dichotomy? It is an issue with which social capital theorists continue to grapple. When investigating the relationship between religion, values and social capital, there emerge some striking paradoxes. Religion is widely viewed as stimulating charitable giving by establishing norms and responsibilities for it adherents and offering a moral basis for civic pursuits. In the previous chapter, we reviewed data revealing that people who are religiously motivated also have a greater tendency to volunteer and donate money to assist others in society. Much volunteering and charitable aid is based on the ethical mores taught by most religions. Indeed on the basis of a survey conducted in 2004, it is observed that the more one is involved in a religious organization, the more likely they are to feel that it is very important to help others in need, understand their opinions, always obey laws and be active in associations.

Social integration is measured at least in part by degrees of civic engagement (i.e., volunteerism). Recognizing that much of North America's social capital is religiously based, it might follow that where religion becomes salient it, favours social integration. Indeed, North American researchers are divided over how best to assess the role of religion in promoting social capital with some insisting that the primary concern should be with its civic contribution, while others are preoccupied with its cultural and moral underpinnings. So even if religious institutions may promote positive social values and civic engagement and the fundamental reasons for such participation are sound, there remains a concern that religious engagement is not inclusive and that the social capital arising from it benefits only the members of the group to which one belongs. While religion is seen as an integrative force, for some it is also widely viewed as a catalyst in generating social division within civil society. The concern that religion is the principal basis for social division is reflected in surveys conducted in Canada, where tension between faith communities is currently identified as the main source of intergroup conflict. Some have gone so far as too argue that clashes between persons

Table 12: People can be trusted and rating importance of religion for selected religious groups, 2002					
People can be trusted	Rating for importance of religion				
	1-not important at all	2	3	4	5-very important
Catholic	48.3%	46.3%	45.2%	45.7%	42.1%
Protestant	59.5%	62.6%	59.3%	58.8%	54.1%
Muslim	48.9%	55.0%	41.1%	47.1%	40.9%
Jewish	51.9%	47.1%	57.9%	56.2%	50.8%
Buddhist	30.0%	48.5%	40.4%	50.5%	49.4%
Hindu	42.9%	53.3%	62.7%	43.8%	37.0%
Sikh	–	50.0%	41.8%	34.6%	35.7%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 13: People can be trusted in your neighbourhood and rating importance of religion for selected religious groups, 2002					
People can be trusted in your neighbourhood	Rating for importance of religion				
	1-not important at all	2	3	4	5-very important
Catholic	52.7%	54.4%	56.3%	61.7%	62.8%
Protestant	67.0%	70.4%	70.8%	73.5%	70.3%
Muslim	48.9%	47.5%	42.1%	41.3%	49.1%
Jewish	44.4%	52.9%	52.9%	58.7%	65.3%
Buddhist	–	47.0%	43.3%	51.4%	49.4%
Hindu	38.1%	46.7%	52.3%	55.1%	53.1%
Sikh	50.0%	42.8%	47.7%	49.5%	45.7%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

with strong religious identities contribute to irreconcilable global conflict.

Putnam maintains that "Americans have more or less deconstructed religion as a salient line of social division over the last half century, even though religion itself remains personally important…for most Americans their religious identity is actually more important to them than their ethnic identity [according to Putnam's findings] but the salience of religious differences as lines of social identity has sharply diminished." Putnam believes that that the "permeability" of religious identities has resulted in substantial positive gains for social capital for Americans while they have not forsaken their own religious loyalties. Irregardless of whether Putnam's assessment of the place of religion in the US is accurate it does not appear applicable to Canada. As noted in Chapter 3, many Canadians were particularly concerned over the degree to which religion constitutes a basis for social division.

As an example of religion's ability to encompass other expressions of identity, he concludes that "religious institutions – and in our era, as a century ago, especially the Catholic church – have a major role to play in incorporating new immigrants and then forging shared identities across ethnic boundaries. Ethnically defined social groups (such the Sons of Norway or the Knights of Columbus or Jewish immigrant aid societies) were important initial steps toward immigrant civic engagement a century ago. Bonding social capital can thus be a prelude to bridging social capital, rather than precluding it. But we need to work toward bridging, as well as bonding."

Robert Wuthnow (1999) has argued that there is an important distinction between volunteering for the internal maintenance of one's church and volunteering for activities and organizations that stretch beyond it. Mainline Protestants and Catholics are more likely to volunteer in activities designed explicitly to benefit the broader community; conversely, the energies of Evangelical Protestants are more likely to be expanded within church voluntarism, benefiting only members of their denomination.

Table 14: Do you trust people?				
People can be trusted	**Volunteer religious affiliated group**	**Volunteer other**	**No volunteer**	**Total**
No religious affiliation	52.7%	62.4%	51.2%	55.3%
Catholic	59.5%	50.9%	39.0%	44.5%
Protestant	62.6%	63.8%	52.5%	57.8%
Muslim	49.1%	46.5%	43.1%	43.3%
Jewish	57.0%	56.6%	50.2%	53.0%
Buddhist	69.2%	48.1%	42.4%	45.5%
Hindu	41.5%	50.5%	39.4%	42.9%
Sikh	47.8%	42.0%	33.3%	35.9%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

How do religious worldviews relate to social capital when understood through its bonding and bridging prism? Major world religions – Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam – possess some equivalent of the "Golden Rule" (i.e. for Christians that is "Do for others what you would like them to do for you," or "love your neighbour as yourself."). Most persons who engage religiously believe that the relief of poverty and/or suffering (i.e. good deeds) represents a practical application of their faith. When breaking down a 35 country inquiry into issues of citizenship on the basis of five religious groups that are religiously engaged, one observes few differences in opinion of certain tenets of good citizenship.

Religion, trust and identity

It may be countered that analyzing trust on a national scale overlooks the concentration of diversity in larger cities which has been the focus of attention around measures of trust. In this regard however, findings from the EDS that examine trust between people, neighbourhood trust and trust in the school and workplace provide no empirical support for the idea that trust is lower within Canadian cities. Other than Montrealers appearing somewhat less inclined to say they trust other people than do Torontonians and Vancouverites, when it came to neighbourhood trust there were no meaningful differences across communities. Underlying the idea that ethnically diverse cities fuel less trust, it might be assumed that immigrants exhibit lower levels of than non-immigrants. Yet again, the evidence from the EDS reveals that those born in Canada (51.7%), were only slightly more inclined to trust others than those born outside the country (48.3%). As to neighbourhood trust, some 62% of those born in Canada felt people could be trusted a lost compared to 57% of immigrants. As to trust at work or school, some 56% of the Canadian born felt that people could be trusted compared to 48% of immigrants.

Table 15: People can be trusted and strong sense of belonging to Canada for selected religious groups, 2002		
Strong sense of belonging to Canada (4 and 5)	**People can be trusted**	**You cannot be too careful in dealing with people**
No religious affiliation	81.3	83.8
Catholic	82.9	75.6
Protestant	89.2	84.6
Muslim	90.4	84.3
Jewish	86.0	81.6
Buddhist	72.0	70.0
Hindu	81.7	84.6
Sikh	86.4	82.7

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

On the basis of religion, there are some noticeable gaps in levels of trust. Protestants (57.3%), persons with no religious affiliation (55.3%) and Jews (53%) were most likely to say that people can be trusted, while Buddhists (45.5%), Catholics (44.5%), Muslims (43.3%), Hindus (42.9%) and Sikhs (35.9%). Yet another issue that is sometimes the object of attention is immigrant trust in various religious groups. Here again however the distinctions in levels of trust are not substantial. Only in the case of Muslims do immigrants possess noticeably higher levels of trust than non-immigrants. In the case of Sikhs, those born in Canada are more trusting than those born outside of the country.

The above findings focus on issues of religious identification as opposed to the importance attributed to religion. The distinction can be important. In the case of Quebec for example, a significant percentage of the population identifies as Catholic and yet much of that group describes religion as being of little importance. Putnam's findings around diversity suggest that is it is the

Table 16: Rating for importance of religion and strong sense of belonging to Canada for selected religious groups, 2002					
Strong sense of belonging to Canada (4 and 5)	Rating for importance of religion				
	1-not important at all	2	3	4	5-very important
Catholic	62.7%	69.1%	72.5%	81.9%	86.1%
Protestant	83.2%	85.1%	87.8%	88.8%	86.0%
Muslim	87.3%	85.0%	82.1%	76.9%	84.9%
Jewish	85.2%	82.4%	82.8%	78.5%	82.6%
Buddhist	50.0%	59.1%	66.3%	72.5%	73.2%
Hindu	66.6%	63.3%	77.6%	80.2%	83.6%
Sikh	–	78.6%	80.6%	81.3%	83.2%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

Table 17: Strong sense of belonging to Canada by volunteering with religious group, other volunteering and no volunteering within each group by selected religion, 2002			
Strong sense of belonging to Canada (4 and 5)	Volunteer Religious Group	Volunteer Other	Did Not Volunteer
Catholic	87.8%	78.9%	76.2%
Protestant	88.4%	88.1%	85.6%
Muslim	87.3%	82.7%	87.6%
Jewish	87.8%	83.4%	82.9%
Buddhist	76.9%	67.3%	68.9%
Hindu	86.2%	81.6%	81.4%
Sikh	80.6%	82.6%	82.3%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada, 2002.

presence of demographic diversity of groups that fuels mistrust, thus weakening social solidarity and cohesion. He does not look at the importance of their identity and it appears assumed rather than affirmed. Yet examining the degree to which one acts according to their identity raises the matter of whether generalizations about group behaviour can be with confidence. As observed below, members of the Catholic, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh faiths that attribute more importance to religion are less likely to be trusting of other people than those who regard religion as less important. But this is not the case for the Protestant, Jewish and Buddhist groups.

Neighbourhood trust does not vary much on the basis of the importance attributed to religion across various faith groups. While the more religious Christians and Jews are more likely to say they trust people in their neighbourhoods than the other groups, it is unclear that religious salience is the principal reason for such gaps. By consequence caution should be exercised before making strong conclusions about the relationship between religiosity and trust.

Along with several studies, the EDS confirm that income is an important factor in the degree of trust. Those with lower income are generally less trusting. Increases in income amongst all religious groups indeed result in higher levels of trust.

For the most part, religiously-oriented volunteerism resulted in more trust than other forms of volunteerism. As observed below however, this was not the case for those identifying as Hindu, Protestant and reporting no religious affiliation.

Religion, social capital, trust and national identity

Yet another area that is the object of attention for proponents of social cohesion is the question of national identity. In Canada religion is perceived by many as a source of social division and regrettably some raise questions about whether certain religious groups transmit values that contradict Canadian values, however defined. As observed below however, across the religious groups those who say that people can be trusted are no more likely to have a strong sense of belonging to Canada than those who feel you cannot be too careful in dealing with people.

Only in the case of Catholics and Hindus does religious salience generate a stronger sense of belonging to Canada. This may have more to do with the age of the respondent than the importance they attribute to religion

There is little evidence that volunteerism has any significant effect on the sense of belonging to Canada. With the exception of Catholics and Buddhists there the gaps in degrees of belonging across the spectrum of religious groups are relatively unimportant irrespective of whether it is religiously-based volunteerism, other forms of volunteerism or not doing any volunteering. When it comes to the issue of national identity, the causal link between social capital and what is described as social integration is tenuous at best. Conversely, it is difficult to make the case that those whose volunteer engagement is religiously-based emerge with a weaker sense of belonging to Canada.

Conclusion

A distinction between faith-based social capital arising from houses of worship and the extension of religiously-based community service is often made. Often however, the two are interconnected. Assessing the effects of faith-based social capital on social cohesion much depends on how such cohesion is defined. We assume that for purposes of this study the idea refers to a degree of shared values of those engaged in religious social capital, the level of trust of others and the strength of belonging to Canada. As defined on this basis, the empirical data presented here does not support the idea that religiously-based engagement somehow constitutes a threat to cohesion. In effect, there is no casual evidence that engagement across faith communities is guided by different values. Moreover, the results are inconclusive when it comes to the idea that religious engagement fosters less trust amongst its participants. Some religious groups are in fact more trusting of others but it is not apparent whatsoever that this is attributable to involvement in religiously-based activity. As to belonging to Canada, if anything the empirical evidence suggests that religious engagement fosters greater belonging. Nor is there evidence that faith-based organizations contribute to the isolation/alienation of their members, especially youth, from mainstream society. While members of religious minorities are more likely to have friends with the same first ancestry, there is no evidence to suggest that when they are engaged in religious organizations they are more likely to have fewer friends outside of their communities or to have considerably lesser levels of life satisfaction.

Still while there is little evidence to support the idea that religious engagement undercuts cohesion, there is not much proof that it supports it either. And despite the empirical data, the public remains concerned that religious engagement and relations between faith communities undercuts cohesion. It would be imprudent to dismiss these concerns.

The presence of faith-based communities does not pose a policy challenge to a religion-neutral State. Rather, it is the manner in which religious diversity is managed by that State and how the idea of religious neutrality is applied in practice that determines the nature of policy challenges. Multiculturalism presumes that various expressions of identity (i.e. ethnicity, ethno-racial and religious) are not in competition with the national identity. Moreover it assumes diverse expressions of culture rather than a common culture. According to the definition offered by the Department of Canadian Heritage "…multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures." When it comes to policy implementation there are various models of multiculturalism often reflected in the degree and type of resources that are allocated to further such descriptive ends. At least two dominant models of State multiculturalism may be identified. One is more collectivist in orientation and is characterized by State funding for ethnic, religious and/or racial groups is extended in support of their identities. This is more often the case where there is an official state religion and some degree of equity for other groups that are not officially designated to receive State support.

In this model, the State may designate a community organization to represent an identifiable constituency. Oriented more towards the individual is the multicultural model that provides support to persons who wish to preserve their group identities by removing barriers to do so. This is in line with the Canadian approach which is intertwined with commitments to human rights including freedom of religion. But freedom of religion also includes freedom from religion.

That said, the multicultural/individualist orientation does not undercut historic commitments that may have a collective dimension. In the case of Canada, there are constitutional commitments to aboriginal peoples, official language minorities and to Catholic and Protestant religious groups. The Canadian version of multiculturalism either as idea or policy recognizes these commitments. Even in the province of Quebec the modification of a constitutional commitment to Protestant schooling was in no way influenced by multicultural policy. Canadian multiculturalism does not require that the State support ethnic or religiously-based institutions despite arguments to the contrary. Still the lines between the collective and individual approaches to multiculturalism can be blurred and where this occurs, the multicultural policy does not provide simple answers to questions relating to the management of religious diversity. For example, it offers no obvious guidance on such issues as religious arbitration of divorce or the funding of religiously-based schools. Surveys suggest that the public funding of religiously-based schools is not supported by the majority of Canadians in any part of the country. Nonetheless, most provinces do extend support to faith-based schools under varying conditions. As education is provincial jurisdiction, the extension of such funds does not undercut cohesion on a national scale. However, what it implies for equal treatment of religious groups can be a national concern.

The programmatic objectives of Canadian multiculturalism do encourage the facilitation of full and active participation of ethnic, religious, and cultural communities in Canadian society, improve the ability of public institutions to respond to ethnic, religious and cultural

diversity by assisting in the identification and removal of barriers to equitable access and increase public awareness, understanding and informed public dialogue about multiculturalism, racism and cultural diversity in Canada. It is apparent that these objectives are more consistent with the individualist oriented multiculturalism. Organized religion contributes a considerable amount of Canada's social capital, a reality that is too often neglected in discussion of the engagement of citizens. Mutual assistance, employment services, immigrant adjustment, social services and help to the poor and needy both within Canada and abroad are all amongst the types of activities generated by religious organizations. Already a number of organizations that are engaged in such initiatives under the auspices of a religiously-based body do receive some government assistance – though not from the multiculturalism program. It might be contended that organizations engaged therein are nominally religious however when looking at the values motivating the volunteers -- as reported in the CGVPS – they do not appear out of line with principles of good citizenship.

The charitable tax status afforded to religiously-based institutions whether they are houses of worship of religiously-based social or educational initiatives may be seen as incorporating both the collective and individual dimensions of Canadian multiculturalism. It is worth noting that accordance of charitable tax status to religious institutions has a long tradition in Canada that predates the introduction of multicultural policies. Though the origins of such status are rooted in a largely Christian society, in Canada's growing multicultural and multi-confessional environment, such status has been provided to all faith-based organizations that meet criteria set forth by the Canada Revenue Agency. The conferring of charitable tax status is likely the principal means by which the State encourages religiously-based social capital. It is influenced by the idea that both in its bridging and bonding dimensions religiously-based engagement promotes positive societal values. Again however, the organizations that benefit from such status cannot operate outside of the provisions of the *Charter of Rights*. A survey conducted by the Canadian Revenue agency reveals that Canadians widely support the extension of charitable tax status and are comfortable that there are effective mechanisms in place to regulate charitable activities should they contravene Canadian norms.

To-date there has been no detailed analysis of the impact of charitable tax status on religiously-based social capital. Nor has there been a link made between charitable tax status, religious volunteerism and the policy and practice of multiculturalism in Canada. Does according charitable tax status diminish the individualist orientation of Canadian multiculturalism? It is contended here that it does not. In effect, it does not extend direct assistance to religiously-based organizations and instead it provides individuals with indirect incentives to contribute to religious charities if they so choose. As observed, few Canadians feel compelled to either give to – or volunteer for – religiously-based charities. By no means does this suggest that there are neither organizations nor movements that in the name or religion-Christian or non-Christian-pursue activities that may be inconsistent with fundamental rights and freedoms and run counter to the individualist orientation of Canadian multiculturalism. However, the existing data provides little evidence that this phenomenon is sufficiently important within any particular group in Canada to warrant its being dubbed a broader social problem threatening cohesion-defined in this case as either undercutting the sense of belonging to Canada or imperilling the fundamental rights of a group of citizens.

At the community level, cohesion is often associated with bonding, whereas at the societal level it is generally linked with bridging differences in values and reducing inter-group tension. Immigrants often engage in bonding as a means of adjustment to new societies and it is legitimate for persons of the same community to freely associate-bond-in supporting identity needs. The stigmatization of identity-based bonding amongst community members would contradict the spirit of Canadian multiculturalism which will minimally aim to ensure that the conditions for such bonding are in place.

Programmatically however, Canadian multiculturalism tends to prioritize bridging initiatives which is consistent with its emphasis on inclusion. Hence where religiously-based bodies are engaged in bridging social capital and their initiatives support broadly-based participation in Canadian society than they can certainly bid for federal assistance under the multiculturalism program. Such programming will also respond to concerns on the part of Canadians around relations between religious communities and the challenge they potentially represent to cohesion. However, it is not clear in what manner any such religiously-based or interfaith dialogue might be framed. A discussion between faith communities may not successfully address public concerns around cohesion that have more to do with the place of religion in a society that favours a secular state. Indeed, it is somewhat paradoxical that a secular State will invest in interfaith dialogue to strengthen cohesion. Over the years, interfaith dialogue appears to have been the object of less interest in light of the broad decline of religious identity as reflected in data on levels of religious participation amongst the population.

It would follow therefore that religiously-based bridging social capital that is characterized by dialogue or outreach across faiths has been on the wane. Hence investing in such bridging social capital in the Canadian context may support an identity-based dialogue that does not effectively address the broader concern over the role of religion in public life. Those preoccupied by the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism and cohesion are most likely to agree on endorsing initiatives that reach across congregations, denominations, and religions to promote a larger sense of community – that is, to build the stock of bridging social capital without undercutting the bonding that is very often a defining element of religious identities.

References

Alexander, M. (2007). Determinants of social capital: New evidence on religion, diversity and structural change. *The British Journal of Political Science*, 37, 368-377.

Boyle, F.K. (1997). "Charitable Activity" Under the Canadian income tax act: Definition, process and problems. Voluntary sector roundtable publications.

Brownlee, B., Gumulka G., Barr C., & Lasby D. (2005). *Understanding the capacity of religious organizations: A synthesis of findings from the national survey of non-profit and voluntary organizations and the national survey of giving, volunteering and participating.* Imagine Canada.

Campbell, D. E., & Yonish, S. J. (2003). Religion and volunteering in America. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good* (pp.87-106). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Canada. (2002-2003). *Ethnic Diversity Survey*. Ottawa, Ontario: Statistics Canada.

Canada. (2004). *National Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating.* Ottawa, Ontario: Statistics Canada.

Carter, T. (2007, October 26). *The impact of anti-terrorism legislation on charities in Canada: The need for an appropriate balance*. Presented by Terrance S. Carter to the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. Retrieved from http://www.antiterrorismlaw.ca.

Clark, W., & Schellenberg, G. (2006). Who's religious. *Canadian Social Trends*, no. 81.

Cnaan, R. A., Boddie, S. C., & Yancey, G. I. (2003). Bowling alone but serving together: The congregational norm of community involvement. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good.* (pp. 19-32). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Coleman, J. A., S.J. (2003). Religious social capital, its nature, social location, and limits. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good.* (pp. 33-48). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Depalma, A. (2001, July 24). Canada cuts back funds for faith-based charities. *New York Times.* Fukuyama, F. (1999, October 1). *Social capital and civil society.* Prepared for delivery at the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms. The Institute of Public Policy George Mason University.

Gyapong, D. (2007, January 31). Charity law expert warns Catholic Church, other religions to remain vigilant about tax status loss. *Canadian Catholic News.* Retrieved from www.cathmew.net.

Jackson, A. et al. (2000, November). Social cohesion in Canada: Possible indicators by Canadian Council on Social Development for Social Cohesion Network. Department of Canadian Heritage and Department of Justice.

Hall, M., Lasby, D., Gumulka, G. & Tryon, C. (2004). *Caring Canadians, involved Canadians: Highlights from the 2004 Canada survey of giving, volunteering and Participating.* Imagine Canada.

Hall, M. H., Barr, C. W., Easwaramoorthy, M., Sokolowski, S. W., & Salamon L. M. (2005). *The Canadian Non-profit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective.* Ottawa: Government of Canada and Johns Hopkins University.

Kilgour, D. (2003, February 17). Church-State relations in Canada and JIE GUI ('connecting of rails'). MP (Edmonton Southeast) & Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) at a Roundtable for Members of a Delegation on Religious Affairs from the People's Republic of China Ottawa, Canada.

Kitching, A. (2006, February 28). *Charitable purpose, advocacy and the Income Tax Act.* Library of Parliament Law and Government Division.

Kosmin, B. A. & Keysar A. (2006). *Religion in a free market: Religious and non-religious Americans.* New York: Paramount Market Publishing.

Nemeth, R. J. & Luidens, D. A. (2003). The religious basis of charitable giving in America: A social capital perspective. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common Good* (pp. 107-120). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Phillips, S. D. (2002). Voluntary sector - Government relationships in transition: Learning from international experience for the Canadian context. In K. Brock and K. G. Banting, the *non-profit sector in interesting times: Case studies in a changing sector.* Montreal & Kingston, McGill- Queen's University Press.

Phillips, S. D. & Graham, K. A. (2000). Hand-in Hand: When accountability meets collaboration in the volunteer sector. In K.G. Banting, *The non-profit sector in Canada: Roles and relationships.* School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press.

Putnam, R. (1994). *Making democracy work : Civic tradition in modern Italy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam R. (2000). *Bowling alone: Collapse and revival of American community.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement in America. *Better together: Religion and social capital.* John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Smidt, C., Green, J., Guth, J., & Kellstedt L. (2003). Religious involvement, social capital, and political engagement: A comparison of the United States and Canada. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: producing the common Good* (pp. 153-170). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Smidt, C. (2003). Religion, social capital, and democratic life: Concluding thoughts. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good* (pp. 211-222). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Statistics Canada. (2004). National Survey of Non-profit and Voluntary Organizations (NSNVO).

Statistics Canada. (2002). Ethnic Diversity Survey.

Stein, J. G. (2006, Fall). *Living better multiculturally: Whose values should prevail?* The Literary Review of Canada.

Walzer, M. (1991, Spring). The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. *Dissent*, 39, 293-304.

Warren, M. A. (2003). Faith and Leadership in the inner city: How social capital contributes to democratic renewal. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good* (pp. 49-68). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Wilson, J. (2007, September 17). Faith-based schools: How provincial governments finance religious schools. *CBCNews.ca*. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/ontariovotes2007/features/features-faith.html.

Wood, R. L. (2003). Does religion matter? Projecting democratic power into the public arena. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good* (pp. 69-86). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (1988). *The restructuring of American religion: Society and faith since World War II.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (2003). Can religion revitalize civil society? An institutional perspective. In C. Smidt (Ed.), *Religion as social capital: Producing the common good* (pp. 191-210). Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.