THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE CANADIANS? ETHNIC AND NATIONAL BELONGING IN CANADA'S SECOND GENERATION

JACK JEDWAB
Association for Canadian Studies

The assumption around theories of assimilation is that the adoption of a new culture by immigrants means the loss of another. Isajiw has described this notion as unilinearity or zero-sumness, which conversely assumes that the retention of one's ethnic origins means assimilation is not taking place. Early sociologists of ethnicity, such as Park (1922) and Wirth (1928), popularized this theory idea though it is Milton Gordon (1964) who is widely viewed as the authority on the idea that there is a linear character to the process of assimilation across the generations. That cultures of origin would inevitably erode also became a central tenet of the notion of the American melting pot. Early sociologists of ethnicity nonetheless acknowledged that the assimilation process was uneven and often varied, based on the cultural background of the different groups. By consequence, one could observe persons of the second generation still possessing something of their ancestral identity (Park and Miller 1921). Independent of the pace of cultural loss, they still insisted that ethnic attachment inevitably diminished.

In the early 1960s, historian Marcus Lee Hansen (1962) questioned Gordon's thesis, arguing that there is a reversal of the assimilative process as one moves from the second to the third generation. His idea ultimately came to be known as the "Hansen third generation return hypothesis." This hypothesis triggered considerable research that did not generally find in favour of Hansen's view but tended to acknowledge that the third generation did frequently retain some degree of the ancestral ethnic identity and culture (Isajiw 1990: 37-49, Alba and Nee 1997).

The idea that ethnic identities persisted in spite of the melting pot was articulated in a popular book published in 1971 entitled *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*. Its author, Michael Novak, insisted upon the importance of ethnic identification amongst the descendants of European migrants to America – the White ethnics. He challenged the assumption that the ethnic persona and characteristics of the children of immigrants rapidly dissolved in the American assimilative compound.

Ironically, in that same year, a different narrative emerged north of the border with policy-makers conceding that there was no official culture in Canada and, thus, in 1971 they introduced a policy of multiculturalism within the framework of two official languages. The Government of Canada conveyed a strong message to the effect that there were no contradictions between maintaining one's ethnic identity and being Canadian. Then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau observed that the "question of cultural and ethnic pluralism in this country and the status of our various cultures and languages [is] an area of study given all too little attention in the past by scholars" (Trudeau 1971).

He shared the belief that: "adherence to one's ethnic group is influenced not so much by one's origin or mother tongue as by one's sense of belonging to the group and by the group's "collective will to exist" (*Ibid.*). As such, the Government of Canada announced that it would support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for all.

In introducing a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, the Government proposed the following four methods of support: 1) Resources permitting, assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and made an effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and have shown a clear need for assistance; this applies no less to the small and weak groups than the strong and highly organized ones; 2) Assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society; 3) Promote creative encounters and exchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the

interest of national unity; 4) Assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society (Trudeau 1971).

In effect, that year the government officially rejected the idea of the melting pot and assumed that the process of cultural loss on the part of ethnic groups was not linear. It further assumed that the process of ethnic community adaptation could be modified by government intervention. However, the actual impact of the government's policies on ethnic community preservation is often more an object of speculation than fact. This is due in part because it is difficult to establish causal links between government action on diversity and the vitality (or lack therefore) of specific ethnic communities – a phenomenon that is undoubtedly multidimensional. This has not deterred either supporters or critics of the Government of Canada's approach from making assumptions about the impact. Indeed, critics often neglect to mention that in the late 1980s the Government of Canada ceased providing resources to ethnic groups in support of their institutions – a major component of the policy.

There is ongoing debate in Canada about the place of ethnicity in society and the merits or demerits of its purported continuity. Generally, underlying debates about the Government's approach to diversity centre on the opinion about the value of ethnicity as an expression of identity. Critics of multicultural policy argue that it is inherently divisive and surely prevents the construction of a strong national identity. That which follows will examine the degree to which there has indeed been ethnic continuity across the generations in Canada and the form it has taken. Then we turn to whether there is evidence in support of the idea that the persistence of ethnicity undercuts the sense of belonging to Canada.

Underlying debates about the Government's approach to diversity centre on the opinion about the value of ethnicity as an expression of identity. Critics of multicultural policy argue that it is inherently divisive and surely prevents the construction of a strong national identity.

Ethnic continuity

In Canada and the United States, important critics challenged the respective narratives of Canada as a multicultural country and America as a melting pot. In each case, analysts demonstrated that the loss of the culture of origin proceeded along a relatively similar pace and rhythm regardless of either the message directed at the ethnic communities on the preservation of their cultures or, in the case of Canada, the policies in place. American analysts have constantly challenged the idea that assimilation is a linear process and that the melting pot is the model to be favoured. Glazer and Moynihan (1963) argued that it has long "outlived its usefulness, and also its credibility." The melting pot, they added "is that it did not happen." Today it is more commonly held that while some ethnic characteristics erode across generations, aspects of ethnic identity are retained (Gans 1979, Reitz 1980, Yinger 1981, Alba and Chamlin 1983, Breton et al. 1990).

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that minority ethnic belonging has persisted in the second generation despite divergence in the countries' respective philosophies of diversity. The current debate about ethnic persistence centres around the form that it takes. Drawing conclusions on the continuity or persistence of ethnic identity across the generations often depends upon how one defines ethnic identity. Some observers distinguish "substantive" from the "symbolic" dimensions of ethnicity, with the former being described by respected American sociologist Herbert Gans (1979) as "a nostalgic allegiance…a love for and pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour." In effect, he contends that specific ethnic practices may persist, but if they do, they will be taken out of their original cultural context. In his view, "most people look for easy and intermittent ways of expressing their [ethnic] identity."

Gans describes the descent into symbolic ethnicity as part of what he calls the "bumpy line theory" of acculturation and assimilation. He intends this as a corrective to the "straight line theory." The "bumpy line theory" holds than rather than there being a continuous straight line of assimilation, adjustments are made to changing circumstance by individuals with the line having no predictable end. But the bumpy road, according to Gans, is presumably paved with symbolic expressions. It may be an error to underestimate the importance of symbolic attachments, which, down to the line, can be an object for mobilization based on group identification.

The Census of Canada may offer certain insights into whether ethnicity proceeds along a straight line or a bumpy road. First, the Census affirms that from one generation to the next there is an important increase in the degree of hyphenation usually associated with some degree of mixing. This is reflected in the ratio of single to multiple declarations of ethnic origin seen in Table 1 for several groups reporting on their background in the 2006 Census. The loss of the singularity of ethnic identity supports the idea of its intergenerational diminishing or, at the very least, a change in the product that is being generated. The conclusion still needs to be tempered by the fact that many of the second and third-plus generation respondents add "Canadian" to their response on ethnicity. Thus, it should not be assumed that the

multiple declarations are entirely attributable to ethnic intermarriage. The ratio of multiple to single declarations is less pronounced amongst certain visible minorities (i.e., East Indian and Chinese) in the second generation (this is also true for persons of Italian origin), and in the third-plus generation, the level of multiple declarations increases significantly but remains lower on average than for European groups. There is, however, one important exception and that is persons describing themselves as ethnically Canadian. In effect the phenomenon is reversed between the first and third generation as immigrants identifying as "Canadian" are adding to their response contrary to those identifying as third-plus generation who have generally traded in previous Census declarations of British and/or French origin for Canadian (we elaborate on the meaning of this below).

and third generation; the degree to which this erosion occurs is less significant.

In 2002, questions around ethnic identification and belonging were put to some 41,000 Canadians as part of Statistic Canada's *Ethnic Diversity Survey* (EDS). The survey provided a unique body of data that permits unparalleled insight into how the population understands its ethnicity and the ways in which it is expressed. The data sets provide valuable information about the symbolic and substantive dimensions of ethnicity. When it comes to the cognitive aspects of ethnic identification – the feeling of belonging to the cultural group –, intergenerational erosion seems less pronounced than might be presumed amongst various ethnic groups, visible minorities and religious minorities. Table 3 suggests that the importance attributed to ethnic belonging is somewhat greater

Table 1
Declarations of single and multiple ethnic origins for selected groups by generational status in Canada, 2006

	Single and multiple ethnic origin responses	First generation	Second generation	Third generation or more
Canadian	Single	30,670	141,440	4 482,245
	Multiple	80,370	472,005	2 754,125
Caribbeen	Single	210,260	56,840	6,645
	Multiple	74,945	60,035	15,275
Latin, Central and South American	Single	142,960	14,455	1,915
	Multiple	66,770	27,190	6,860
Indian	Single	523,980	89,995	4,620
	Multiple	88,480	32,455	6,405
Chinese	Single	829,450	119,550	9,835
	Multiple	87,395	37,445	15,440
European	Single	1,530,430	1,099,745	742,695
	Multiple	571,480	1,058,130	2,955,505
Polish	Single	149,295	63,185	32,750
	Multiple	64,420	140,535	332,230
Ukrainian	Single	43,125	98,515	142,605
	Multiple	41,625	114,340	500,350
Italian	Single	304,445	301,395	60,380
	Multiple	61,760	137,880	250,830
Jewish	Single	45,430	35,905	29,950
	Multiple	50,660	42,035	49,615
Arab	Single	206,010	27,190	5,745
	Multiple	50,480	27,645	22,050

Source: Statistics Canada, *Census of Canada*, 2006.

Yet another observation related to ethnic continuity involves the relationship between the heritage/non-official language that is associated with a particular expression of ethnicity. We caution that the data in Table 2 is not a correlation but is rather limited to the number of single declarations of ethnic origin and persons that speak the associated heritage language in their home (the numbers that report speaking the language will no doubt be larger). Although more detailed analysis is essential in drawing conclusions around heritage language retention, it is safe to assume that there is considerable erosion in language persistence between the first and second generation and it is further eroded between the second

amongst visible minorities than the White population. Yet the loss of what might be described as some emotional connection between generations is not especially important in either category, and, in some instances, we see rises between the first and second generation, thus breaking off from the straight line.

Whether it is substantive or symbolic ethnicity that is being investigated, the age of respondents is an important factor in determining the salience of identity. Too frequently analysts overlook the age of a group of respondents when studying the manifestation of identity. Contrasting the categories of persons belonging to the same generation often presumes that they start on similar

Table 2
Declarations of single ethnic origin and language used most often at home for selected groups by generational status in Canada, 2006

		Total Generations status	First generation	Second generation	Third generation or more
Italian	Single ethnic origin	666,220	304,445	301,395	60,380
	Home language	166,290	148,970	14,925	2,395
Polish	Single ethnic origin	245,230	149,295	63,185	32,750
	Home language	90,965	84,385	4,680	1,900
Ukrainian	Single ethnic origin	284,245	43,125	98,515	142,605
	Home language	24,820	18,960	4,175	1,685
Arab	Single ethnic origin	238,945	206,010	27,190	5,745
	Home language	111,920	105,515	4,555	1,850

Source: Statistics Canada, *Census of Canada,* 2006.

Table 3
Belong to ethnic or cultural group for visible minority status and selected religious, ethnic and racial minorities, combining the rating of 4 and 5 on a five-point scale measuring the strength of belonging, 2002

	Total	First generation	Second generation	Third generation or more
Non-visible minority	42.7	46.4	43.0	41.3
Visible minority	58.6	60.4	58.8	36.9
Jewish	61.8	60.6	64.2	59.4
Muslim	62.2	59.2	70.6	-
Canadian	39.1	43.7	41.8	34.7
African	64.7	67.8	65.5	53.7
Chinese	52.1	55.3	49.4	33.7
Latin and South American	54.9	55.3	58.3	-
Polish	40.4	51.3	37.9	29.3
Ukrainian	35.4	52.7	38.3	31.1
Italian	58.7	53.2	67.4	56.5
Caribbean	72.5	70.7	75.8	-

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

Table 4
Belong to ethnic or cultural group for selected groups aged 35 to 44, combining the rating of 4 and 5 on a five-point scale measuring the strength of belonging by generational status, 2002

	Total	First generation	Second generation	Third generation or more
Non-visible minority	40.8	46.6	40.3	39.5
Visible minority	56.0	60.2	41.0	35.7
African	59.9	64.0	40.0	-
Chinese	50.5	57.2	33.3	-
Latin and South American	50.8	55.6	37.5	-
Italian	75.0	74.4	74.4	-

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

ground. However, when one considers that the average age of visible minorities in Canada is in the late twenties and the average age of non-visible minorities is in the early forties, it is clear that various social and political behaviours cannot be properly contrasted without controls for age. Indeed, when it comes to measuring the salience of identity, age is frequently a more important consideration than generation. For example, comparisons of voter participation on the basis of generational status and visible minority identification risk producing misleading results when one considers that younger persons vote less frequently in elections than older persons.

When controlling for age and focusing on the 35 to 44 age group, changes emerge in five of the groups in Table 3. In general, the gap between second generation non-visible and visible minority is eliminated, which implies that ethnic belonging diminishes with age amongst visible minorities. This tendency is strongly reflected amongst the second generation respondents of African, Chinese, and Latin and South American respondents to the *Ethnic Diversity Survey*. In the case of persons of Italian descent, the strength of their sense of ethnic belonging appears to grow as they age.

Table 5
Importance of carrying on customs and traditions for visible minority status and selected religious, ethnic and racial minorities by generational status, combining the rating of 4 and 5 on a five-point scale, 2002

	Total	First generation	Second generation	Third generation or more
Non-visible minority	23.1	35.7	24.0	17.4
Visible minority	46.0	49.8	43.4	24.4
Jewish	33.7	36.1	34.6	29.7
Muslim	50.1	50.5	49.4	-
Canadian	12.7	17.6	17.5	10.3
African	44.1	49.8	36.1	41.8
Chinese	39.7	42.8	36.7	25.0
Latin and South American	44.9	47.1	44.7	12.5
Polish	29.6	51.3	18.8	14.1
Ukrainian	26.0	46.5	26.9	22.2
Italian	61.3	61.0	69.4	31.9
Caribbean	53.2	54.5	52.8	16.7

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

When it comes to carrying on customs and traditions related to one's ethnic identity, it is amongst the non-visible/White European origin groups that the gap between the first and second generation appears most pronounced (with the exception of the Italian origin respondents, for whom the erosion occurs in the third generation). Amongst the visible minorities (with the exception of the African descendants), there is relatively little erosion between the first and second generation with the decline occurring mainly between the second and third generation (with the exception of the African group).

With respect to the extent to which people maintain social contacts with persons with the same background, another dimension of ethnic continuity, the EDS reveals that the extent to which most of their friends possess the same first ancestry is considerably diminished. There are three exceptions to this pattern: the ethnic Canadian respondents who, in the first generation, were already less likely to report that most of their friends were of the same background; the Caribbean origin group and the Jewish group, both of whom showed little change between the first and second generation in this regard.

Table 6
Persons reporting that most of their friends had the same first ancestry for visible minority status and selected religious, ethnic and racial minorities by generational status, 2002

	First generation	Second generation
Non-visible minority	27.8	16.4
Visible minority	48.7	24.3
Jewish	27.5	29.5
Muslim	35.5	20.8
Canadian	15.1	13,3
African	40.8	18,9
Chinese	65.2	30.0
Latin and South American	26.4	7.5
Polish	30.6	7.6
Ukrainian	29.0	12.7
Italian	51.1	32.6
Caribbean	43.3	34.2

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

Ethnic identity and Canadian belonging

Prior to the 1991 Census, a campaign was organized by a group of citizens assisted by the *Toronto Sun* newspaper that called upon the population to write "Canadian" in the Census question on ethnic origins. The idea was guided by the belief that ethnic differences were at the root of problems of Canadian unity and the authors of the campaign believed that if everyone simply indicated they were Canadian, intergroup conflict would be eliminated. By asking questions about ethnic background, the State was encouraging people to think of themselves in such terms and, as a result, the Census question on ethnicity became the object of a political campaign to affirm one's "Canadianess." The campaign's architects believed that ethnic attachments ran counter to the primacy of being Canadian, that is to say they undercut one's national identity. In 1991, the campaign's success appeared limited with over 700,000 Canadians – mainly in Ontario – heeding the call, or 3% of the population reporting only "Canadian" and 1% reporting "Canadian" in combination with one or more other origin. Nonetheless, the results did not initially appear to bear fruit as the combined number of responses made it the sixth most popular answer in the country and was placed in that spot amongst the list of examples of responses to the 1996 question on ethnic origins. In 1996, four blank spaces were provided for respondents who could choose from a list of 24 examples of ethnic origin, where "Canadian" was in the sixth spot. ("Canadian" was included as an example on the English Census questionnaire and "Canadien" on the French Census questionnaire).

In the 1996 Census, some 5.3 million persons (almost all of them in Quebec) reported their only ethnic origin as "Canadian" and another 3.5 million persons – some 31% of the population – reported both "Canadian" and another origin. Headlines in major newspapers praised an outcome some described as reflecting a

strengthening of Canadian identity. Professor Rhoda Howard-Hassman of McMaster University contended that the 1996 Census results reinforced the sense of Canadian identity by strengthening our sense of "Canadianess." However, arguing that there is strengthened national identity or citizenship based on the "Canadian" Census responses does not take into consideration which "Canadians" gave this response.

Virtually all persons who reported "Canadian" in 1996 had English or French as a mother tongue and were born in Canada with both parents born inside Canada. This suggests that many of these respondents were people whose families have been in this country for several generations. In effect, the "new Canadians" were persons that previously reported either British or French origins. Moreover, in 1996, some 55% of people with both parents born in Canada reported "Canadian" (alone or in combination with other origins). By contrast, only 4% of people with both parents born outside Canada reported "Canadian." Thus, the "Canadian" response did not appeal widely to either immigrants or their children. Most important, however, was the fact that neatly half of those persons reporting Canadian origin in 1996 were in Quebec; this represented a majority of the French mother tongue population. It is, at best, doubtful that some six months after a divisive referendum on Quebec sovereignty, a majority of Francophone Quebeckers would want to affirm their sense of belonging to Canada by reporting that their ethnicity was "Canadien." In the 2001 Census, nearly 11.7 million people, or 39% of the total population, reported Canadian as their ethnic origin, either alone or in combination with another origin. As shown in Table 7, in 2006, this number dropped back down to approximately 10 million persons, or 32% of the total population.

When analyzing the Canadian responses on the basis of generational status, one observes that the number of immigrants reporting such ethnicity declined by nearly 40% between 2001 and 2006; in the children of immigrants – the second generation – the decline was nearly 30%, while it was 10% in the third-plus generation. As a consequence, the third-plus generation, which in 2001 constituted 88% of all such respondents, saw its share rise to 91%. Less than 2% of all immigrants included "Canadian" as part of their response to the question on ethnicity, compared with 15% of the second generation and 47% of the third-plus generation.

Contrary to what some insist, being rooted in Canada as opposed to possessing roots elsewhere does not necessarily mean either a greater Canadian identification or a greater sense of belonging to Canada. One need only look at the multigenerational French-Canadian and Aboriginal populations of the country to realize that it is not the length of time one has spent in Canada that necessarily fosters attachment to the country. The EDS revealed that 43% of Francophones who identify as ethnically Canadian reported a very strong sense of belonging to Canada, some 25 points less than Anglophones who reported "Canadian" ethnicity and 20 points less than allophones who reported similar origin in the EDS. Indeed, allophones reported significantly higher rates of belonging to Canada despite considerably lower numbers reporting their ethnicity as "Canadian."

As Statistics Canada properly cautioned, "…the concept of ethnicity is fluid and is probably one of the more complex concepts measured in the Census. Respondents' understanding or views about their ethnicity, awareness of their family background, number of generations in Canada, the length of time since immigration, and the social context at the time of the Census can all affect the reporting of ethnicity from one Census to another. Increasing intermarriage or unions among various groups has led to an increase in the reporting of multiple ancestries, which has added to the complexity of the ethnic data."

Yet some analysts have chosen not to heed such warnings and opted instead to draw conclusions on the strength of Canadian identity based on ethnic self-identification . Still, some policy-makers in Canada seem intrigued by the social integration focus on the relationship between attachment and belonging to Canada and the degree to which one chooses to self-define as ethnically Canadian. In January 2007, two University of Toronto sociologists contended that Canada was experiencing a serious problem in "social integration" arising from a purported "racial" gap in the strength of

Table 7
Numbers of "Canadian" responses to question on ethnic origin by total, single and multiple responses, 1996-2006

	Total – Single and multiple ethnic origin responses	Single ethnic origin responses	Multiples ethnic origin
1996	8,806,275	5,326,995	3,479,285
2001	11,682,680	6,748,135	4,934,550
2006	10,066,290	5,748,720	4,317,570

Source: Statistics Canada, *Census of Canada*, 2006.

Table 8
Canadian ethnic response for single and multiple ethnic origin 15 years of age and over by generational status, 2001 and 2006

	Total – Generation status	First generation	Second generation	Third generation or more
2006	7,960,850	111,040	613,440	7,236,370
2001	9,071,320	181,165	839,020	8,051,135

Source: Statistics Canada, *Census of Canad*a, 2006.

Table 9
Do you identify as Canadian?

	Immigrant recent*	Immigrant earlier**	Second generation
White	21.9%	53.8%	78,2%
Total visible minorities	21.4%	34.4%	56.6%
Chinese	30.6%	42.0%	59.5%
South Asian	19.1%	32.7%	53.6%
Black	13.9%	27.2%	49.6%
Other visible minorities	17.4%	32.8%	60.6%

Source : The *Globe and Mail*, January 12 2007. * Arrived in Canada between 1991 and 2001 ** Arrived in Canada before 1991

Canadian identification amongst second generation visible minorities. The findings were based on a study using data from Statistic Canada's 2002 *Ethnic Diversity Survey*. A national headline in *The Globe and Mail* titled "How Canadian are you?" (*The Globe and Mail*, January 12, 2007) maintained that visible minority immigrants are slower to integrate into Canadian society than their White, European counterparts, and feel less Canadian. On the basis of this, the article concluded that multiculturalism does not work well for non-Whites. To illustrate the point, the following table, Table 9, was presented in *The Globe and Mail*.

Presumably, responses to this question represented incontrovertible evidence that Canadian identification is substantially lower for visible minority immigrants and their Canadian-born offspring. The conclusions appealed to an important segment of Canadians who instinctively believe that the strength of attachment to Canada amongst immigrants is inadequate and that the preservation of minority ethnic ties is in part responsible for this presumed condition.

The findings have been widely quoted by national media and held up in some countries as evidence that Canada's approach to diversity is not an example to follow. In other words, the data presented by Reitz and Banerjee (2007) appear to significantly call into question the idea that people can maintain attachments to their ancestry and/or ethnic origins *and* possess a strong sense of belonging to Canada. The results above imply that the lower numbers of ethnic Canadian self-identification presume the persistence of ethnicity or, at the very least, imply that the declaration of other ethnic identities is an obstacle to "social integration." Indeed, when comparing recent and longer-term arrivals, Reitz and Banerjee contend that the "extent of Canadian identification is higher for both Whites and racial minorities, presumably reflecting their higher sense of commitment to Canada, but the difference is greater for Whites than for racial minorities." The assumption that a response indicating that one is Canadian on the basis of ethnic or cultural identity somehow reflects a higher sense of commitment to Canada risks fuelling the tendentious claims of certain critics of multiculturalism. The authors provide no definition for what they mean when they speak of a commitment.

In effect, the results generated by Reitz and Banerjee are based on the number of persons responding "Canadian" to an open question that asks individuals to self-identify their ethnicity. Paradoxically, although immigrants are considerably less inclined to self-identify ethnically as Canadian than their offspring, they report higher rates of belonging to Canada. This presents a potentially serious problem for the Reitz-Banerjee hypothesis with respect to the importance of ethnic Canadian self-identification as a marker of social integration: it would appear Canadian immigrants are more "integrated" than non-immigrants!

However, this apparent contradiction may be explained by a different interpretation of what it means to be "ethnically Canadian" as declared on the EDS self-identification question and the sense of belonging to Canada asked about elsewhere in the EDS. For reasons not offered, the authors seem to feel that results from the former question are a better indicator of social integration into Canadian society. To be fair, the authors do include the results from the question on belonging in their analysis but attribute less importance to it. Indeed, on the basis of the two sociologists' approach, which was to focus on the respondents who gave a score of 5 on the five-point scale for strength of belonging to Canada, the EDS paradoxically validates the idea that those who possess strong ethnic belonging also have a stronger sense of belonging to Canada. Hence, amongst those providing a score of 5 for ethnic belonging, some 79% of respondents gave a similar score on their strength of belonging to Canada, compared with 60% for strength of belonging to Canada amongst those who gave the lowest score for ethnic belonging.

Much of the so-called gap described by the two sociologists is connected to the issue of the age of the respondent and not the generation. In other words, the generational effects of belonging diminish considerably when age is taken into consideration. It is age rather than generation that should be the focus when it comes to examining gaps in identity and belonging to Canada. Indeed, as mentioned previously, the average age of second generation visible minority respondents in the EDS is 25 compared with the average age of 45 for second generation Whites. The importance of age in understanding how the sense of belonging to Canada relates to the generational effects and visible minority status is illustrated in the tables below. As observed in Table 10, respondents between the ages of 15 and 24 have a weaker sense of belonging to Canada than those who are between the ages of 25 and 44, who, in turn, have a weaker sense of belonging than those over the age of 45.

Table 10
Strength of belonging to Canada by age cohort, 2002

Age	1 (not strong at all)	2	3	4	5 (very strong)
15-17	4.7%	7.1%	17.0%	27.8%	40.6%
18-24	4.6%	5.1%	16.6%	27.2%	43.9%
25-29	3.5%	4.4%	13.1%	24.7%	51.6%
30-34	3.1%	3.7%	12.8%	23.5%	54.2%
35-44	2.7%	2.7%	11.2%	20.5%	59.9%
45-54	2.7%	2.6%	9.2%	18.2%	64.8%
55-64 ans	2.2%	2.3%	7.0%	14.2%	70.5%
65+	1.9%	1.3%	4.8%	9.8%	74.5%
Total	**3.0%**	**3.3%**	**10.9%**	**19.9%**	**59.4%**

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

As revealed in Table 11, age is an important factor in determining the sense of belonging to Canada. The importance of one's age in understanding how sense of belonging to Canada is related to generational effects for ethnic and racial groups is illustrated in Table 11 in the 30 to 34 age cohort; with the exception of the group of Caribbean origin, the variations no longer appear significant.

It will no doubt be argued that it is generational differences and not age effects that are at the root of the social integration gap reported by Reitz and Banerjee. For the second generation groups in the same age cohorts of 18 to 14, 25 to 29 and 30 to 44, a modest gap exists amongst visible minority Black respondents. There is no meaningful gap between visible minorities nor amongst the other groups, and, indeed, the second generation South Asian respondents score highest on the issue of belonging to Canada in all three age cohorts; this throws into question whether a racial gap is at work here.

Table 11
Belong to Canada for selected groups aged 30 to 34, combining the rating of 4 and 5 on a five-point scale measuring the strength of belonging for second generation, 2002

Second generation	Sense of belonging to Canada – 4 and 5
	30-34*
Not a visible minority	82.1
Visible minority	79.5
South Asian	86.5
Polish	84.3
Arab	81.8
Jewish	81.3
African	81.0
Canadian	80.8
Ukrainian	80.0
Japanese	77.7
Black	76.8
Chinese	76.7
Italian	70.8
Caribbean	61.6

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

* The choice of the 30 to 34 age group was justified by the number of counts for each group possessing some statistical relevance

Table 12
Belong to Canada for selected groups and age cohorts, combining the rating of 4 and 5 on a five-point scale measuring the strength of belonging for second generation, 2002

	Sense of belonging to Canada by age group		
	18-24	25-29	30-44
Not a visible minority	76.7	80.3	83.4
Chinese	69.1	76.1	78.1
South Asian	77.6	86.3	85.6
Black	60.6	66.7	77.1

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

As noted earlier, it would be difficult to support the argument that the gap is somehow attributable to Canadian multiculturalism public policy and the Government's presumed encouragement that ethnic attachment be fostered. When correlating data related to sense of belonging to an ethnic group with data related to sense of belonging to Canada, we see that the pattern is similar across various groups: respondents with a stronger sense of ethnic belonging are also those with a stronger sense of belonging to Canada. These results are based the same EDS data sets employed by the two University of Toronto sociologists.

Correlation of other questions in the EDS with sense of belonging to Canada also offer little support for the idea that maintaining ethnic ties undercuts attachment to Canada. For example, amongst visible minorities, the more importance attributed to carrying on customs and traditions, the greater the sense of belonging to Canada. A study of ethnic, racial and religious minorities with the same ancestry does not result in a meaningful difference in the sense of belonging to Canada.

Conclusion

In Canada and the United States, there has always been vocal opposition to the philosophical and political approaches to diversity underlying the view that the process of cultural loss on the part of immigrants and their descendants is not as linear as the earlier theorists insisted (or perhaps not as linear as they desired). Paradoxically, several critics of the melting pot and the Canadian multicultural model share the view that maintaining minority ethnic attachments undercuts

Table 13
Belong to ethnic or cultural group for selected groups and belonging to Canada, combining the rating of 4 and 5 on a five-point scale measuring the strength of belonging, 2002

	Belong to ethnic or cultural group			
Belong to Canada (4 and 5)	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Non-visible minority	79.6	78.6	83.1	90.4
Visible minority	72.2	70.8	79.5	88.0
Jewish	80.4	74.8	86.4	88.1
Muslim	86.5	82.7	86.7	91.0
Canadian	84.8	85.1	89.1	94.6
African	75.6	77.6	78.4	85.4
Chinese	71.2	66.1	79.7	85.9
Latin and South American	77.1	76.2	75.7	81.0
Polish	82.8	83.0	86.1	93.6
Ukrainian	89.3	82.8	91.6	93.7
Italian	75.0	67.7	86.3	91.5
Caribbean	53.3	65.4	63.7	84.2

Source: Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey*, 2002.

national identification. In other words the ethnic heritage inevitably competes with either American or Canadian identities. Of the critics who feel that America is not achieving the desired level of assimilation of ethnic groups, a most alarmist view is articulated by Samuel Huntingdon (2004) in his book, *Who Are We?* In Canada similar arguments are made by Gregg (2006) and Cohen (2007).

Yet others hold a contrary view and argue that the assimilation effort has gone too far in suppressing the ethnic identities of immigrants and their children. With regards to visible minorities or racial groups in the United States, some have argued that the melting pot never sufficiently considered how members of these groups fit into the mould and how and whether they get subsumed within. Portes and Zhou (1993) have argue that "the children of today's immigrants will assimilate in several ways – as opposed to the single, straight-line path supposedly followed by earlier immigrant waves." For the second generation, the pathway will be conditioned by the economic condition of the parents and opportunities for higher education. On the other hand, the children of low-skilled immigrants, visibly identifiable and entering a mainly White society, will for the most part follow a more difficult path. Our focus is limited to an assessment of whether ethnic persistence is at all responsible for a diminished sense of belonging to Canada on the part of the second generation.

Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam, author of the widely acclaimed book *Bowling Alone*, recently published a study concluding that ethnic diversity triggers "anomie or social isolation." In the June 2007 issue of Scandinavian Political Studies, Putnam writes: "In colloquial language, people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to 'hunker down' – that is, to pull in like a turtle." In his essay titled "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century," Putnam proposed that the United States redefine the "we" and renew shared identity and social solidarity. Detractors of multiculturalism in Canada and elsewhere were quick to seize upon Putnam's findings to support their point of view.

In Putnam's view, "…a society will more easily reap the benefits of immigration and overcome the challenges if immigration focuses on the reconstruction of ethnic identities, reducing their social salience without eliminating their personal importance." In this regard, Putnam believes it is "important to encourage permeable, syncretic 'hyphenated' identities…that enable previously separate ethnic groups to see themselves, in part, as members of a shared group with a shared identity" (2007). But Putnam does not purport to have established a causal link between the strength of ethnic identities and the weakness of national identities, something he does not assess.

Critics of Canadian multiculturalism insist that the preservation of minority ethnic identities undermine the sense of belonging to Canada and seem to believe they do not require evidence – empirical or otherwise – in support of this assertion. The *Ethnic Diversity Survey* – as employed by Reitz and Banerjee – simply does not provide the critics with such evidence nor do the two sociologists who have analyzed the EDS in this regard offer any proof that ethnic persistence is the cause of a weaker sense of belonging to Canada amongst any particular second generation group exhibiting such a pattern.

After the mercurial rise of the Canadian response to the question on ethnic origin and ancestry between 1991 and 2001, the 2006 Census of Canada witnessed a decrease in the number of persons reporting that their ethnicity was "Canadian," that is to say, the "Canadian Canadians."

Some rethinking is required around the degree to which people's level of attachment to Canada can be linked to Canadian ethnic self-definition, something that the results of the 2006 Census on ethnic origins further calls into question.

References

Alba, R., and M. B. Chamlin. 1983. "A Preliminary Examination of Ethnic Identification among Whites." *American Sociological Review* 48, p. 240-247.

Breton, R., W. W. Isajiw, W. E. Kalbach and J. G. Reitz. 1990. *Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varieties of Experience in a Canadian City*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Canada. Statistics Canada. 2006. *Census of Canada*.

———. Statistics Canada. 2002. *Ethnic Diversity Survey*.

Cohen, A. 2007. *The Unfinished Canadian: The People We Are*. Toronto: MacMillan.

Gans, H. J. 1997. "Toward a Reconciliation of 'Assimilation' and 'Pluralism': The Interplay of Acculturation and Ethnic Retention." *International Migration Review* 31, p. 875-892.

———. 1979. "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, p. 1-20.

The Globe and Mail. 2007 (January 12).

Gordon, M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gregg, A. 2006. "Identity Crisis: Multiculturalism: A Twentieth Century Dream Becomes a Twenty-First Century Conundrum." *Walrus* (March).

Hansen, M. L. 1962. "The Third Generation in America." *Commentary* 14, p. 496.

Howard-Hassman, R. 1999. "'Canadian' as an Ethnic Category: Implications for Multiculturalism and National Unity." *Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques* 4, p. 523-537.

Huntingdon, S. 2004. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. Simon and Schuster

Isajiw. W. W. 1993. 1"The Assimilation-Retention Hypothesis and the Second and Third Generations." Retrieved April 14, 2008 at https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/70/2/Assim_Retention_Hypothesis.pdf.

———. "Ethnic-Identity Retention." In *Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varieties of Experience in a Canadian City*. Edited by R. Breton, W. W. Isajiw, W. E. Kalbach and J. G. Reitz. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 34-91.

Novak, M.1971. *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*. New York: Macmillan.

Park, R. E. 1922. *The Immigrant Press and Its Control*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers.

Park, R. E., and H. Miller. 1921. *Old World Traits Transplanted*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers.

Portes, A., and Z. Min. 1993. "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth." *Annals* 530, p. 74-96.

Putnam, R. 2007. "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century – The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, 2.

Reitz, J. G. 1980. *The Survival of Ethnic Groups*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Reitz, J. G., and R. Banerjee. 2007. "*Racial Inequality, Social Cohesion, and Policy Issues in Canada*." In *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*. Edited by K. Banting, T. J. Courchene and F. L. Seidle. Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, p. 489-545.

Trudeau, P. E. 1971. "Government Response to Volume 4 of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism." Canadian House of Commons (October 8).

Wirth, L. 1928. *The Ghetto*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Yinger, J. M. 1981. "Towards a Theory of Assimilation and Dissimilation." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4: p. 249-264.



Thinking About Immigration Outside Canada's Metropolitan Centres

Special issue of Canadian Ethnic Studies

This special issue of *Canadian Ethnic Studies / Études ethniques au Canada* (Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, 2005) looks at the regionalization of immigration. It was guest edited by Michèle Vatz Laaroussi (Université de Sherbrooke), Margaret Walton-Roberts (Wilfrid Laurier University), John Biles (Metropolis Project) and Jean Viel (Social Development Canada). The issue includes articles on regional dispersal in British Columbia, immigrant settlement in local labour markets in Ontario, on the settlement of refugees in Québec City and in smaller cities in British Columbia, on francophone Acadians, interculturalism and regionalization, and on the services available to new immigrants in Halifax. There is also a conference report from "Immigration and Out-migration: Atlantic Canada at a Crossroads."

To order a copy, visit www.ss.ucalgary.ca/CES