CANADA AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
in the post-Cold War Era

BY David M. Malone and Patrick Wittmann

AS CANADA'S WEIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INEVITABLY DECLINES WITH THE EMERGENCE OF MAJOR POWERS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD SUCH AS CHINA, INDIA AND BRAZIL, AND AS ITS ECONOMY INTEGRATES EVER FURTHER WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO REFLECT FURTHER ON HOW FOREIGN POLICY CAN BEST MEET THE ASPIRATIONS AND SERVE THE INTERESTS OF CANADIANS. THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT, *CANADA IN THE WORLD*, OF 1995 TOOK A STAB AT THIS BUT MUCH HAS OCCURRED SINCE, INCLUDING A TERM BY CANADA ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1999-2000.

Canada has, from the inception of the United Nations, been one of its most active and committed members. Lester B. Pearson is widely considered the father of UN peacekeeping, having won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his assertive role during the Suez crisis in negotiating the deployment of the first UN Emergency Force in the Sinai. Canada is no longer a leader in UN peacekeeping in terms of the numbers of personnel provided, currently ranking 32nd among troop contributors with 210 military personnel and 95 civilian police officers. (India tops the current list with 4,460 peacekeepers deployed. Canada's peak was roughly 2,600 in 1993). It continues to be recognized for the quality of its troops and equipment, and makes significant contributions to a non-UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, but it can no longer coast on its past reputation as the world's foremost peacekeeper.

For many years, Canada also was one of the most generous funders of UN development and relief efforts. This era, sadly, is over. Canadian Official Development Assistance fell from a high point of 0,44 percent of its GNP in 1990 to 0,28 percent in 1999. While this trend, reflected also in the performance of several other major donors, passes largely unnoticed in Canada, it has generated considerable regret internationally.

This article aims to assess how Canada has forged a productive, independent and respected foreign policy identity within, and in relationship with, the UN Security Council in the post-Cold War era.

BACKGROUND

When the United Nations was established in 1945, its Security Council was seen in its Charter as the principal organ to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Five states were granted permanent membership of the Council: the Republic of China (replaced in 1971 by the People's Republic of China), France, the USSR (succeeded in 1991 by the Russian Federation), the UK and the USA. Founders of the UN thought that only through the active involvement of these major victors of World War II (particularly that of the USA, the absence of which had wrecked the League of Nations) could the UN hope to be successful in protecting the peace. In order to promote their engagement, they were each granted a veto over Council decisions. Six non-permanent members were to be elected by the UN General Assembly, increased to ten in 1965.

Canada has, to date, won six terms on the UN Security Council, a larger number than any other Western country. Canada's stock-in-trade during the Cold War years, beyond its excellent international citizenship, was as a "helpful fixer", able to build bridges between contending parties (sometimes permanent members). Canada's margin for manoeuvre in the Council was constrained by its alliances (notably within the North Atlantic Council), but it was generally recognized as diplomatically creative during the Cold War Period when NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact members between them often paralysed Council action.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The first evidence of the relaxation in East-West tensions within the Security Council was the co-operative manner in which the Permanent Five (P-5) countries agreed among themselves in 1986 to a second term for Javier Perez de Cueller as UN Secretary-General. In January 1987, Perez de Cuellar challenged them publicly to tackle resolution of the murderous Iran-Iraq war and by mid-1987, Security Council proposals for a ceasefire, monitored by a small UN observer mission, were accepted. This encouraged the Council to tackle other "regional" conflicts that had been fueled by the Cold War superpowers, often working through regional proxies. The post-Cold War era had started at the UN.

On the strength of new concord among the P-5, the Council tackled many more conflicts than it had earlier, when it was stymied by Cold War animosities and a plethora of vetoes (cast and threatened). The 1990s witnessed a sharp drop in the use of the veto. Factors held by the Council as constituting a threat to international peace expanded to include humanitarian catastrophes, particularly those generating large exoduses of displaced persons and refugees, internally and internationally. This, in turn, allowed the Council to address a range of conflicts, mostly internal in nature, which it most likely would have avoided in the past. The Council's decisions in the 1990s proved highly innovative in shaping the normative framework for international relations and stimulated several radical legal developments at the international level, notably the creation of International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994. This in turn greatly intensified pressure for a more universal international criminal court, a statute for which was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome in 1998, under the chairmanship of Canada's Philippe Kirsch.

The Council's willingness to involve itself in a broad range of internal conflicts, encompassing inter-communal strife, crises of democracy and fighting for control of national resources, forced it to confront hostilities of a much more complex nature than the inter-State disputes with which it had greater experience. International efforts to mitigate and resolve these conflicts required mandates significantly more ambitious than the modalities of "classic" peacekeeping were designed to meet. The most striking feature of "new generation" peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the 1990s were not so much the large numbers of military personnel involved – several earlier PKOs (e.g. in the Sinai, Congo and even Cyprus) had featured large deployments of Blue Helmets – but rather the important role and substantive diversity of their civilian and police components. Civilian functions discharged by PKOs or otherwise mandated by the Council included civil administration (most notably in Namibia, Cambodia, the Former Yugoslavia); humanitarian assistance; human rights monitoring and training; police and judicial support, training and reform; and even a degree of leadership on economic revival and development. However, Council-mandated activities often encountered significant resistance by frequently shadowy belligerents, leading to incidents involving heavy loss of life among peacekeepers and relief workers (in Rwanda, Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia). The Council's inability to induce compliance with some of its decisions fuelled two apparently contradictory, but all too frequently complementary, responses. On the one hand, it moved to enforce decisions, notably in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti; on the other, in the face of significant casualties, it cut and ran, as in Somalia and at the outset of genocide in Rwanda.

Resort to enforcement by the Council was not new: this had occurred in Korea and to a lesser extent in the Congo during the UN's early years. But the number of Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter during the 1990s was wholly unprecedented. Quite rapidly, in the face of disappointing, occasionally catastrophic results in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, it became clear to Member States that transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement represented more than "mission creep". The two types of operations were, in fact, fundamentally different, one requiring consent and impartiality, the other requiring international personnel to confront one or several belligerent groups. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali concluded by 1994 that the UN should not itself seek to conduct large-scale enforcement activities. Consequently, the Security Council increasingly resorted for enforcement or "robust peacekeeping" of its decisions to "coalitions of the willing" in Bosnia, Haiti, the Central African Republic, East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Hybrids emerged, such as the support by UK combat troops of the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in 2000. The UN retained

the capacity to deploy more classic peacekeeping operations of interposition between contending countries, as it did between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000. The UN's chancy operation in the Congo, deployed as of 2000, defies any categorization.

More common than military enforcement were economic (and, increasingly, diplomatic) sanctions mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter. While arms embargoes remained in vogue, imposition of comprehensive trade and other economic sanctions, seen as more gentle than the resort to force, faded noticeably once the humanitarian costs of sanctions regimes against Haiti and Iraq became widely known. The ability of government regimes in countries struck by sanctions to enrich themselves by controlling black markets eventually sank in.

The Council increasingly confronted, shaped and adapted to the role of regional organizations in seeking to prevent and resolve conflict. In the former Yugoslavia, the Council and UN staff found themselves contending with an array or regional actors, including European Union monitors, civilian administrators and economic development staff, OSCE negotiators and NATO enforcement units in the skies and on the ground. With the Council eventually stymied by several conflicts, regional organizations came to be seen by some as a possible substitute for the UN. However, with the exception of NATO, regional bodies generally commanded even scarcer resources and offered even more limited capacities than did the UN.

The shifts in the nature and scope of Council decisions, many setting precedents even where the Council asserted that they did not, arose from evolving interpretations of the Charter and deeply affected understanding of sovereignty at the international level.

The early post-Cold War period saw the Council at its most optimistic and activist, with some notable successes, as in El Salvador and Mozambique. Wishful thinking on resources, increasing risk, poor planning, the dilution of responsibility inevitable in committee decision-making, and the absence of a powerful and consistently engaged leader among its members all contributed to the Council's subsequent decline into recrimination, risk-aversion and flight from reality.

CANADA AND THE COUNCIL – THE EARLY POST-COLD WAR YEARS

By the time Canada was elected to the Council for a term in 1989-90, the USA and the USSR were prepared to help put an end to conflicts in Namibia, Central America, Angola, Western Sahara and Cambodia. Canada's bridging role at the UN was much in evidence. Both Canada and Finland, the two Council members that belonged neither to the Permanent Five nor to the Non-Aligned Movement, were generally agreed to have played a valuable role in inter-mediating between these groups. They were trusted on most issues as having a largely impartial and constructive approach.

This was the case, for example, on Namibia. The issue had been on the agenda of the Council since the late nineteen seventies, with active Canadian involvement. Interested actors on the Council were monitored by broader groups outside the Council, notably the Front-Line States, SWAPO, and the whole NAM, which made for slow and uneven progress. African States were not only deeply distrustful of South Africa, but also suspected the motives of some Western States. However, a determined approach within the Council, largely spearheaded by Canada, paid off, with Namibia achieving independence in 1990 following a very sizeable UN deployment of peacekeepers and civilians providing for a transitional administration from South African to autonomous rule.

Canada also played a major role on the interlocking conflicts of Central America, which were brought to the UN by the countries of the region themselves. Although negotiations with often inexperienced, frightened local parties was ably handled by the UN Secretariat, strong international support was required to induce compromises and to reassure often understandably paranoid local actors. Once again, the super-powers co-operated. As in Namibia, Canada provided personnel to the UN's operations in the field to anchor peace agreements and its then-flush aid program was able to lubricate the path to sustainable peace in this and other areas newly on the Council's agenda.

The Council's success in tackling regional conflicts was vital to its ability (surprising at the time) to react decisively in seeking to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a culture of co-operation having taken root among the Permanent Five by August 1990. Finland and Canada were selected by other Council members to play the key roles in chairing the Council committees dealing with sanctions against Iraq.

Canada was supportive from the outset to a Council role on international terrorism. The breakthrough case was that of attacks against Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, and that of UTA flight 771 over North Africa, eventually resulting in Council-mandated sanctions against Libya for its lack of co-operation with efforts to investigate and prosecute Libyan suspects.

In those years, Canada's credentials on peacekeeping were second to none. Peacekeeping doctrine and practice were evolving very rapidly at the time. The UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (The Committee of 33, then 34 when China joined) had been blocked for several years because of fundamental differences on principles for peacekeeping between the USA, which advocated as much flexibility as possible and a free hand for the Secretary General, and the USSR, which wanted the Council to approve any new development. Troop contributors had tried to get the Committee to focus on practical issues, largely unsuccessfully. A breakthrough occurred in 1989 when Philippe Kirsch, Canada's Deputy Permanent Representative at the time, was selected to chair a Working Group on key doctrinal and operational peacekeeping issues. Coinciding with Canada's term on the Security Council, this position, which it retains today, gave Canada added influence over peacekeeping questions at the UN even though its own participation in the UN's field missions is now dwarfed by that of countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Jordan.

CANADA IN THE COUNCIL'S ERA OF EUPHORIA, 1991-94

Canada's relationship with the Security Council does not cease during

the extended periods when it is a non-member. During the early 1990s, when the Council's ambition for international order over-reached its capacity to support, financially and in terms of political will, its objectives, Canada remained extremely active. Its significant deployment of troops in Croatia and Bosnia made it a major international player in the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia (being included in informal consultations of the principal troop contributors on the rapidly shifting international strategy). On Haiti, Canada helped develop the Council's strategy alongside France, the USA and (initially) Venezuela. General Romeo Dallaire's tenure as the UN Force Commander in Rwanda illustrated the worst of the Council's erratic impulses in addressing conflict after American casualties were sustained in Somalia in late 1993, and the best of Canadian stewardship of international mandates in adverse circumstances.

THE TROUGH OF DESPOND, 1994-1998

The expansion in the Council's agenda and in the scope and sweep of the mandates it set in the early 1990s was followed by a dawning realization of the scale of the disasters with which it was associated in Somalia, Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. (Given the break-neck pace of the Council's deliberations, the full implications of developments in the field took a long time to register). The massacre of thousands of civilians at Srebrenica, on the UN's watch, in 1995 capped a grim series of reverses, the most dreadful of which was the Council's indecisive response to genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

With the exception of a small peacekeeping operation mandated to support peacebuilding objectives in Guatemala in 1997, no new peacekeeping operations were launched by the Council after 1995 and until 1999. During these years of introspection, several UN operations had to adapt to new developments, notably in Bosnia, where UNPROFOR yielded to several smaller UN missions under the protective cover of the NATO-led IFOR (and subsequently SFOR). Canada continued to play a significant role in international operations in Bosnia, notably in IFOR and SFOR, but neither were UN missions – rather they belonged to that increasingly common international hybrid, the coalition of the willing under UN Security Council mandate. The sober mood in the Council coincided with sharp questioning in Washington of the UN's capacity to support US foreign policy objectives. US arrears to the UN widened dramatically to US $ 2 billion, further constraining the Council's margin for manoeuvre.

During the early 1990s, when the Council's ambition for international order over-reached its capacity to support, financially and in terms of political will, its objectives, Canada remained extremely active.

In 1998, Saddam Hussein forced the withdrawal of UN inspectors from Iraq, crystallizing divisions among the P-5 over Iraq policy that had been developing for some time. The sanctions regime imposed in 1991, supplemented by the oil-for-food program initiated under intense pressure of humanitarian organizations in 1995, no longer commanded much support at the UN, although the USA and the UK clung to it hard. Serious tensions among the P-5 over Iraq continued throughout 1998 and early 1999. Many Canadians had grown skeptical of the sanctions regime, seeing in it an opportunity for the Baghdad regime to enrich itself while the Iraqi population endured great hardships. Energetic sanctions-busting by Iraq and several of its neighbours also attracted Canadian attention. The Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, on several occasions criticized the ineffectiveness and the serious humanitarian consequences of the sanctions regime.

CANADA'S TERM ON THE COUNCIL, 1999-2000

As early as 1993, Canada had signalled (in order to head off potential rivals) that it would seek a Security Council seat again in 1999-2000. It turned out to have competition. The Netherlands, Greece and Canada vied for two seats. After a campaign marked by enthusiastic wooing of the electorate (Greece offered an all-expenses paid cruise of the Greek Islands for UN Ambassadors and their spouses), Canada and the Netherlands won. Canada had run on a platform of Security Council democratization and transparency, complaining of a condominium of power among the P-5 and excessive secrecy surrounding Council deliberations. It also called for a reassertion of Council leadership and engagement in the wake of Somalia and Rwanda-induced retrenchment. The centrepiece of Canada's platform was its promise to advance its human security agenda which Foreign Minister Axworthy was vigorously championing. This was a bold approach, given the largely reactive stance of the Council, and the self-serving realpolitik practised by its permanent members. Canada's agenda also included a pledge to reform Security Council-mandated sanctions. With the sharp rise in UN peace operations, Canada also pledged to dedicate considerable energy to addressing deficiencies in UN peacekeeping.

In promoting human security, Canada sought a more forceful and consistent Council response to intra-state conflicts marked by the victimization of civilians. There were precedents of Council intervention in internal conflicts to build on, as well as a trend towards consideration of cross-cutting, "soft" security issues (for example war-affected children). Canada sought to make human security, in particular the protection of civilians, an integral element of the Council's mandate, on par with the security of states for which the UN Charter made clearer provision. This proved challenging, but some important progress was made.

Using the first of its two rotating monthly presidencies of the Council in February 1999, Canada chaired an influential debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. This led the Secretary-General to address victimization of civilians, even suggesting triggers for international intervention, for example massive and systematic human

rights abuse. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's recommendations. Canada gave this agenda substance by fighting successfully for peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and DRC to be mandated to protect civilians. This contrasted with earlier UN operations where peacekeepers became bystanders to attacks against civilians because they lacked the authority to intervene. (In practice it was not clear, however, that either peacekeeping mission possessed the capacity effectively to respond to most attacks against civilians.)

With its focus on the protection of civilians, Canada anticipated one of the most neuralgic issues of its tenure on the Council, the oppression of Kosovars by Belgrade, leading to NATO's air campaign of March-May 1999 to induce Serb compliance with earlier Council decisions. By March 1999, Council members earlier suspicious of the protection of civilians as a Council priority in the abstract, were very much advocating it in the context of Kosovo. Russia, which attempted to thwart NATO's action in the Council found itself overwhelmingly out-voted (by twelve to three), its influence diminished. The Council's much speedier response to the crisis in East Timor later that year suggested its members had learned some lessons.

In a bid to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the Council, Canada also focussed on improving sanctions, a key but increasingly discredited Council instrument. Prior to joining the Council, Canada had sought expert advice on how to make UN sanctions more effective and humane. As a member, and with energetic leadership by Canada's then Ambassador Robert Fowler, Canada chaired the Angola sanctions committee, aiming to give teeth to widely-flouted sanctions against UNITA which included an arms, materiel and diamond embargo and travel and financial bans against the rebel leadership. The Council agreed to a Canadian proposal for independent experts to investigate violations of the sanctions. The experts took the unusual step of naming publicly those responsible for sanctions-busting. Several African heads of state and a number of European countries were implicated. Such naming and shaming was unprecedented in Council circles, and led to moves by those identified to clean up their acts. It also resulted in the Council examining more closely the economic looting of the Congo and the role of diamonds and other commodities in the Sierra Leone crisis. As a result, the Council now pays more serious attention to monitoring compliance with its sanctions regimes. More broadly, the Council finally came to grips with the critical role of economic factors in contemporary conflicts in Africa and beyond.

Canada advanced the debate on sanctions reform by advocating the launch of a comprehensive review of all UN sanctions regimes in the 1990s. A volume from the International Peace Academy, funded by Canada, *The Sanctions Decade*, contained recommendations for better targeted sanctions and mitigation of their humanitarian impact. Canada also spearheaded the creation of a Council working group on sanctions reform. These efforts yielded a number of improvements in the design and implementation of new sanctions regimes, but old divisions over the Iraq sanctions ultimately derailed the systemic proposals from the working group. Its report was never formally tabled.

Canada also focused on improving the instrument of peacekeeping, on which numerous problems in implementing complex mandates had become apparent throughout the 1990s. The urgency of reform was underscored by the launch of five new missions in 1999 and 2000, all of them large, in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo and on the Ethiopian/Eritrean border. During this period, the UN's financial crunch, mostly the result of defaulted US payments, intensified while Washington pressed to keep the costs of peacekeeping down as the demand for it grew. The result in some cases was poorly configured peacekeeping operations that were shaped more by political and financial considerations than operational necessities. In an uphill battle, Canada sought to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations were given mandates consistent with realities on the ground, and that they had the resources needed to do the job. Nevertheless, in May 2000 the UN operation in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, was unable to repel rebel attacks and peacekeepers were taken hostage en masse. (This embarrassment mobilized the Council to reinforce UNAMSIL's mandate and troop strength to provide a credible deterrent, while, *in extremis*, the UK landed a deployment of highly effective military personnel to reinforce the UN presence.) Canada's focus on matching resources to rhetoric, and on a greater role in decision-making for non-Council troop contributing countries received a boost from an international panel on past peacekeeping failures. Its findings, in the so-called Brahimi report, provided a severe reality check for the Council. A deal negotiated by US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on terms for the payment of US arrears also improved the climate for UN peacekeeping.

Canada championed procedural reform to make the Council more transparent by encouraging more open debates in which important Council decisions could be discussed before they were taken. (The Council's work had mostly been conducted behind closed doors.) The range of issues debated grew to include the impact of conflict on women, small arms, HIV/AIDS and other human security issues. Canada succeeded in getting the Council to agree to more flexible and inclusive meeting formats to allow non-Council members, including parties to a conflict, to participate in discussions that had traditionally been closed to them. This created new opportunities for conflict prevention and resolution through direct engagement between the Council and the parties concerned. Although

In a bid to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the Council, Canada also focussed on improving sanctions, a key but increasingly discredited Council instrument.

conclave diplomacy continues, Canada worked to enhance the role of non-permanent members, challenging the P-5 condominium, including its privileged access to the Secretary-General and members of the Secretariat.

Canada's agenda, involving several good ideas, also benefited from good timing. Events in Kosovo and East Timor validated many of Canada's human security goals.

Canada engaged actively on a range of specific security problems on the Council agenda. On Iraq, Canada helped break a P-5 deadlock following the expulsion from Iraq of UN weapons inspectors. As a result, the Council was able to agree on a new weapons inspection agency and make improvements to the humanitarian exemptions process under the sanctions regime (although, due to Iraqi resistance, some of these decisions have yet to be implemented).

Canada's agenda, involving several good ideas, also benefited from good timing. Events in Kosovo and East Timor validated many of Canada's human security goals. Ottawa also had a powerful and articulate ally in Secretary-General Kofi Annan, whose focus on human rights and the humanitarian imperative earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001. His willingness to expose the UN and himself to the devastating findings of the Rwanda and Srebrenica inquiries, and the subsequent Brahimi report, gave added impetus both to Canada's efforts to reform UN peacekeeping, and to place the protection of civilians more centrally on the Council's agenda. Canada's term demonstrated both the value of an agenda and also the factor of chance in international relations. It enabled Canada to be proactive and to make a difference, very much for the good.

KEY CANADIAN ASSETS: IDEAS AND PEOPLE

In an era of sharp deficit-cutting and reduced availability of public funds for international relations and co-operation, it was clear during the 1990s that Canada needed to draw on non-financial assets in pursuing its security agenda at the UN.

During the era under review, Canada fielded five Permanent Representatives to the United Nations. The first, Stephen Lewis, former head of the federal New Democratic Party, was strongly identified with advocacy of the humanitarian imperative, human rights and development. On these issues his impact was significant, indeed unique. He later became Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF and, recently, Kofi Annan's, Special Envoy on AIDS in Africa. His public identification with the plight of Africa helped establish a strong link between African political and economic development and Canada's foreign policy overall. A distinguished practitioner of international public and commercial law, Yves Fortier, held Canada's seat on the Security Council in 1989-90. Fortier became known for his fairness of mind, always hearing out all parties to a dispute before advancing Canadian views on steps forward. He personified Canada's capacity to build bridges and develop consensus in multilateral fora. His close relationship with the prime minister provided additional authority to Canada's voice during tense Council negotiations. Fortier, by the end of his term, was admired within Ottawa's foreign policy establishment as a political appointee whose achievements were second to none in the Foreign Service. Louise Fréchette, in a packed term in New York mid-decade, focused on challenges to the UN's role in peacekeeping and on systemic issues requiring significant UN reform. Her success as ambassador led to appointment as the UN's first Deputy Secretary-General in 1998, after she had served as Canada's first woman Deputy Minister of Defence. Robert Fowler, in Canada's Security Council seat 1989-90, built on his personal commitment to Africa by chairing the Council's Angola Sanctions Committee. He also secured significant improvements in the role of non-Permanent Members relative to the P-5. His work on Angola was pivotal: he introduced into the Council economic factors in that country's civil war that were soon recognized as systemically important in contemporary conflict all over the world. His successor, Paul Heinbecker, with Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy the architect of Canada's Human Security Agenda and a particularly incisive intellect, rounded out the term with the satisfaction of seeing human security considerations thoroughly internalized in the Council's consideration of conflict issues.

This narrative of Canadian representation in New York and the themes it evolved at the UN makes clear that people and ideas matter greatly, even when large sums of money and ever-growing peacekeeping deployments are no longer available to buttress government rhetoric. All of these individuals and their teams achieved real impact on the conduct of international relations. That said, the government's budget announcement in late 2001that $ 1 billion would be added to Canada's aid program ($ 500 million of which for Africa) recognized that the pendulum of budget-cutting at CIDA had gone further than Canadian international credibility could support indefinitely, particularly with Canada hosting the G-8 Summit in mid-2002.

CONCLUSIONS

Canadian diplomatic capacity has provided Ottawa with leverage at the United Nations it has not always been able to deploy in bilateral relations, where issues of national scale and interest are even more acute than in multilateral fora. Canada's most recent term on the Security Council demonstrates that, with the right people and a compelling set of ideas, Canada can achieve results well beyond its relative statistical weight. If an independent, active foreign policy is important to Canadians in years ahead, the UN Security Council will continue to provide opportunities for engagement on many of the geo-political crises ahead. We are optimistic that Canadian governments of the future, as of the past, will seize these opportunities.

David Malone is President of the International Peace Academy, an independent research and policy institution in New York.
Patrick Wittmann anchored at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa Canada's campaign for a UN Security Council seat in 1998 and Canada's tenure on the UN Security Council, 1999-2000.

They are grateful to David Angell, Philippe Kirsch and Patricia Lortie for their suggestions.