RCBB called, in comparable situations, for comparable opportunities and facilities. Underlying the recommendations, but never fully spelled out, was the principle that there should be an equal distribution of the costs and benefits of partnership, and thus attention given to the overall balance of advantages and disadvantages. But because in one setting after another – school, work, public service, media availability – it was practical to provide Anglophones opportunities and facilities and impractical to provide them to Francophones due to low population concentrations, an off-setting factor had to be found. An obvious candidate for the off-set was the jurisdictional scope of the Québec government. Greater autonomy for Québec, compared to provinces where the anglophone partner predominated, could right the balance. And it was difficult, without Utopian proposals, to find any other balancer.

If the equal partnership balance is examined as a dynamic system, it becomes clear that the more Francophones see respect for their language, and the more they share in power and recognition in running the federal government, in running the provinces like New Brunswick and Ontario where there numbers are significant, and in the business and non-governmental organizations of the whole of Canada, the weaker becomes the logical, and much more important, the emotional need for a gathering of all powers in Québec.

Not surprisingly, this reciprocal relationship is fiercely denied by Québec nationalists, among whom the romance of statehood is deeply held. It is more surprising when anglophone federalists cast doubt on the usefulness of francophone recognition outside of Québec as a means strengthening the fundamental Canadian partnership.

The RCBB saw its major task as helping Canada to survive the life-threatening crisis in French-English relations it identified in its Preliminary Report. But its terms of reference spoke not of survival, nor of "regime maintenance", nor of remedies, but of development within an equal partnership. And indeed the Commissioners were not just concerned with the expedient, or with plastering over a deep split in Canadian unity. They were concerned with justice and fairness; they called for generosity in intercultural dealings and for mutual respect and recognition. It is important to stress this point, for maximizing Canadian unity is hardly a profound good in itself. Only if we have reason to believe that this state can be the arena for the exercise of power for worthwhile purposes is it essential to study the ways to strengthen equal partnership. A radically decentralized Canada, with a watch-dog central government, based on enforcing the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and with courts more important than Parliament, can be envisioned. Within it, the problems of partnership would have little significance.

But it was argued earlier that states like Canada have crucial roles to play in managing the transition to a world where even broader partnerships for achieving common security, equitable distribution and just relationships can be assured. We must look also for models to improve our international system, where concerns about equal partnership and division of powers and responsibilities are even more complex. For such tasks, a Canada that pays close attention to the RCBB problem of equal partnership is needed.

TRUDEAU'S LEGACY: A NEW CANADIAN NATIONALISM BASED ON THE DENIAL OF THE *QUÉBÉCOIS* HEART OF CANADA

CHRISTIAN DUFOUR
Trained as a lawyer, Christian Dufour is a teacher and a researcher at École nationale d'administration publique in Montréal. In 1989, he wrote *Le défi québécois* – published in English in 1990 under the title *A Canadian Challenge* and republished in French in 2000 at Les Presses de l'Université Laval. In 2002, Mr. Dufour published *Restoring the Federal Principle: The Place of Quebec in the Canadian Social Union* for the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Montréal (Policy Matters,vol.3, no1, January 2002).

ABSTRACT
Why is a growing majority of Quebecers feeling alienated by the existing Canadian federation? The refusal to listen to and to integrate Québec into the reflection of what is Canada has negative consequences for the Canadian political system. Ironically, Trudeau's vision for Canada seems to be at the root of a new emerging Canadian nationalism.

When former prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau died in September 2000, nearly every Canadian appeared deeply moved, even those who fiercely fought Trudeau's political ideas during his lifetime: English Canadians from Ontario, but also from the West and from Québec, Canadians from neither French or English origin and Aboriginals all over the country, and French speaking Canadians outside Québec. The emotion, the pain and the pride were sincere and surprisingly intense: everybody mourned the great Canadian man, the

statesman who had changed Canada for the best forever. Everybody, except those for whom Trudeau had specifically entered Canadian politics in the first place, more than thirty years ago. The French-speaking majority of Québec clearly stood apart from the rest of the country, respectful but silent.

Contradicting the official line over Trudeau's admirable political achievements, the clear difference in the popular reaction within and outside Québec was the measure of Trudeau's – and contemporary Canada's – big failure: the Canadian incapacity to make French Québec more comfor-table within Canada, to integrate even the moderate, pro-Canadian aspects of Québec nationalism. In a very real way, an old problem has been made worse, unsolved by the golden child of Québec and Canada, the most gifted politician of his generation, whom both parties had trusted to solve that problem. Instead, the legacy of Trudeau, the enemy of all nationalisms, is paradoxically a new Canadian nationalism based on the denial of the *Québécois* heart of Canada.

The *Québécois* as the founding people of Canada

A century ago, the first French Canadian to become Prime Minister of Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, exhorted the English Canadians of that time to perceive themselves less as members of the British Empire and more as Canadians, the way their French-speaking compatriots had felt themselves to be Canadians as far back as the 17th century. Now, 100 years later, a substantial number of Quebecers would like to make Québec into an independent state, and a majority of the French-speaking population no longer feels comfortable in today's Canada.



"Laurier exhorted the English Canadians to perceive themselves less as members of the British Empire and more as Canadians"

What has happened in the interim to have caused the most Canadian of all Canadians to adopt such a negative attitude toward a country that is envied the world over? There is no understanding this change if one is limited to the English Canadian vision that often is the only perspective conveyed and if one fails to consider another point of view deeply rooted in the history of Canada – that is, the vision of Canada specific to French-speaking Canadians[1].

Concerning the construction of Canadian identity, French-speaking Quebecers are the first Canadians. Forget for a moment the attempts to rewrite history to suit the current fashion for political correctness.

The first element of this vision, which is overlooked to a great extent abroad and to an increasing degree within Canada itself, is probably the most fundamental one. Concerning the construction of Canadian identity, French-speaking Quebecers are the first Canadians. Forget for a moment the attempts to rewrite history to suit the current fashion for political correctness. In terms of identity, there are not three, or even two founding peoples of Canada. There is only one such people, represented by the ancestors of francophone Quebecers of today. They alone called themselves *Canadiens* in the century preceding the British conquest in 1763. Throughout that time, they lived side by side with the first occupants of the land, the Aboriginal peoples, who never thought to call themselves Canadians, for the Canadianization of Amerindian identity only began around the mid-20th century. Beginning in 1763, the *Canadiens* would be joined by British subjects, who would take more than a century to feel they were Canadians – until the late 19th century, when Laurier was prime minister. For more than two hundred years, during the formative years of Canadian identity, the French speaking ancestors of today's *Québécois* were the only ones to feel and call themselves *Canadian*.

So, in relation to Canadian identity, Québec identity is not a phenomenon coming after, or on the margins of, some other construction, as is the case with Scotland vis-à-vis Great Britain, or Slovakia vis-à-vis the former Czechoslovakia. In its French-Canadian embodiment since 1840 and in its *Québécois* embodiment since 1960, the identity of Québec francophones has, in many ways, remained the fundamental Canadian identity throughout history[2]. There is absolutely no understanding the profound ambivalence of Québec francophones and their great reluctance to leave a country they feel attached to despite being increasingly marginalized within it, without also considering the farewell they will have to bid to a Canadian identity they have brought into being. All opinion polls show that the first choice of Quebecers would be a Canada where Québec could enjoy a particular status that took into account the fact that it is home to the only society with a French-speaking majority in North America.

Canada as a pact between two peoples

The second major factor explaining the growing alienation of French-speaking Quebecers within Canada could be summarised as follows. Historically, French Canadians have likened the modern-day Canada stemming from the Confederation of 1867 to a pact between two peoples that their representatives – chief of whom was Georges-Étienne Cartier – had concluded with English Canada in their name and that could not be amended without their consent. A keystone of this agreement was a federal system of government, instead of the unitary type of system preferred by many English Canadians, including the man who was to become the first Prime Minister of Canada, John A. Macdonald. Although this dualistic conception of the country was never completely accepted in the rest of Canada, it nevertheless was adhered to by the great majority of French Canadians until 1982.

In the aftermath of the rejection by Quebecers of the proposal for sovereignty-association put forward during the 1980 referendum, this conception was discarded without the consent of the government of Québec, the only such authority to be controlled by a majority of franco-phones. It is difficult to overestimate Trudeau's role and responsibility in that process. In 1982, Trudeau imposed into the Canadian constitution a number of far-reaching amendments that marginalized Canada's predominantly French-speaking province: multiculturalism, Aboriginal rights, linguistic minority rights, equality among provinces, the Canadian Charter of Rights.

Worse, seventeen years later, Trudeau came back from retirement to effectively torpedo the Meech Lake Accord, a political compromise accepted by every Canadian government to make Québec part of the new 1982 constitution. The Meech Lake accord had been worked out among all of the country's premiers and provided for approval of the new constitution by Québec in return for recognition of a minimum of political and institutional duality: Québec was to be recognised as a distinct society within Canada. It was a historic compromise on the part of Québec society, which had always considered itself to be a nation.

The Meech Lake agreement had been reached under ideal conditions. At the time, the government in power in Québec was federalist and the Canadian federal government was open to the specificity of Québec. It was also a period of prosperity which fostered generosity and openness. With the failure of this agreement, it became patently clear that the Canadian system had become significantly biased against the French-speaking majority of Quebecers and their specific concerns, that were henceforth relegated to a marginal status as never before in the history of Canada.

It became patently clear that the Canadian system had become significantly biased against the French-speaking majority of Quebecers and their specific concerns, that were henceforth relegated to a marginal status as never before in the history of Canada.

One last key to understanding the Canada-Québec problem has to do with demography. The percentage of francophones in Canada has been declining since the middle of the twentieth century, and now stands at less than one fourth of the total population. On the other hand, with 83% of its seven million citizens being French-speaking, Québec is now home to 90% of the country's francophones. The official Canadian discourse often makes little mention of Québec but refers instead to a French Canada extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific and encompassing the country's ten provinces and three territories. In reality, however, the French-speaking society of Canada has become increasingly concentrated in Québec and the bordering areas inhabited by the Franco-Ontarians and the Acadians. The problem with the Canadian political system is that it fails to consider the fact that Québec constitutes the only non-anglophone society on a massively English-speaking continent (where francophones are outnumbered 40 to 1) that tends to consider Québec society as an ethnic phenomenon.

A new English Canadian nationalism

Clearly, the inability of the Canadian political system to recognise that Québec collective difference has political consequences, that this is a distinct society within Canada, is bad for Québec. For example, in a Canadian constitutional system based on equal individual linguistic rights from coast to coast, without any reference to the French-speaking majority of Québec, it will become more and more difficult to defend in the courts the fact that French is – and must be – the predominant language in Québec, without excluding English. This is because, from a simple individual point of view, the predominance of French in Québec is discriminatory: indeed, it implies that a francophone is superior to an anglophone. There is a potential danger here as the predominance of French in Québec is for a large majority of Quebecers a question of equity and common sense. It is something basic and essential for the Québec identity to stay open and not feel unduly threatened[3].

Therefore, it is a Québec problem. But it is, and will increasingly become a Canadian problem too because everything indicates that Québec will stay in Canada. So this inability of the Canadian political system to recognise that Québec collective difference has political consequences and affects in a negative way this whole system. Whether they are recognised or not, these consequences are there. But, because they are not well integrated, they make the Canadian system dysfunctional; reality takes its revenge[4]. First, a dangerous idealism is affecting every new tenet of Canadian identity since 1982: bilingualism, multiculturalism, equality of the provinces, aboriginal rights, the Charter. Second, it weakens the federal principle itself,

particularly the separation of constitutional powers between the federal government and the provinces that this principle implies. Third, the Quebec problem, via the presence of the sovereignist Bloc Québécois at Ottawa, makes the federal government a one party property, namely that of the Liberal party of Canada, and it worsens the regional alienation of the West[5].

These consequences of Trudeau's failure to integrate Quebec within Canada in a healthy way are clearer now that people realise that the biggest probability is not Québec leaving Canada but staying in Canada, its French-speaking majority more alienated than ever. But the worst part of the Trudeau legacy is a stunning paradox, considering the prime minister's well-known supposed aversion for nationalism of any kind. This odd legacy is a new Canadian nationalism – for which Trudeau is a hero – an ideology doomed in the longer run because it is based on the denial of the *Québécois* heart of the country[6]. A big problem with this ideology, that can be surprisingly intolerant toward modern Québec political difference, is that it is not aware of itself: it doesn't see itself as nationalism at all[7]. It is therefore very difficult for these new Canadian nationalists to be critical of themselves.

Those with a real interest in Québec are already aware of many of these facts. Unfortunately, that is not the case with too many Canadianists. And yet, to do solid research on Canada, it is important to at least be aware of the existence of another vision of the country; otherwise, there is simply no understanding the Canada-Québec problem. Obviously, that does not mean that this other vision can be defended on every point. Québec indépendantistes, for example, have underestimated the threatening aspect of a political project which would separate an already highly Americanized and henceforth exclusively anglophone Canada in two; in this scenario, absorption by the U.S.A. would ultimately become likely. The two referenda they have lost, along with the resulting weakening of Québec's position, have highlighted a certain lack of realism among Québec nationalists concerning the nature of Québec identity and its relation with Canada. It is the other part of a political dead-end that Trudeau's actions clearly contributed to make worse.

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM: A NEW DIRECTION FOR OFFICIAL LANGUAGES IN EDUCATION

MATTHEW HAYDAY
Matthew Hayday is a PhD candidate in the Department of History at the University of Ottawa. He recently submitted his thesis, which addresses the impact of Canadian federalism on the development of the Official Languages in Education Program. This article draws on the archival research conducted for that thesis, particularly the records of the RCBB held at the National Archives of Canada.

ABSTRACT

Amidst the criticism of official languages programs initiated in the wake of the RCBB, a success story has emerged: that of second language instruction and of minority language schools. The official languages in education program, with its federal funding and provincial administration has ultimately laid the groundwork for new constitutional guarantees for minority language education.

In the forty years that have passed since the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB) was created, both the Commission and the official languages programs initiated by the federal government in response to its recommendations have come under fire. Not only have the Trudeau government's language policies been criticized for failing to protect and promote the French language in Quebec (Guy Laforest,