COMPARATIVE NATIVISM: THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA, 1880s-1910s

Richard Jensen is Research Professor of History at Montana State University in Billings, Montana. Educated at Yale, he has taught and lectured at many universities in the United States, Europe and Asia, and has written eleven books and numerous articles on themes in historiography, as well as ethnic, political, social, military and economic history. His "The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896" pioneered the ethnocultural interpretation of American political history by exploring ethnic interactions and voting patterns. He is presently engaged in organizing a joint Canada-U.S. conference on current issues.

ABSTRACT

The United States, Canada and Australia in the period between 1880–1920, had similar political, legal and cultural systems, and so provide a natural test for the interactions of ethnicity, religion, nationalism and nativism. For example, Germans and other European immigrants were welcomed before 1914, but wartime patriotism pushed them out of the consensus. As a result, in the U.S. and Canada, they were forced to assimilate, and in Australia, they were deported. Increasingly, in Canada and Australia, nativism became a question of loyalty to the country or to the British Empire. The manifestation of this was Anglophones pushing the French in Canada to the wall because they were too traditionalistic and not sufficiently imperial and Irish Catholics who were loyal to their country and to Rome, but hostile to Britain. Drawing from these case studies, this paper posits that nativism can be better understood as a matter of defining the nation to which loyalty is due.

INTRODUCTION

Pluralism is the political acceptance of distinctive groups with varying beliefs and customs. Nativism, on the other hand, proclaims the superiority of a cultural nation, based on language and customs, and forces outsiders to the periphery, if not expelling them all together. Old definitions in terms of reactionary attitudes or psychological pathologies represent polemical judgments rather than analytical categories. The goal here is to use comparative analysis to see how and when nativism takes action in politics. Historically, pluralism was not much in evidence around the world in the period spanning 1890-1910—hatred was more like it. Violence was the norm for the Russian pogroms, the Armenian massacres and the Boxer rebellion. In Africa, formal warfare broke out between the Boers and the British. The *Kulturkampf* against German Catholics had just subsided and anti-Semitism was growing rapidly, as the Dreyfus Affair in France demonstrated. In the United States, the Indian wars had only just ended at Wounded Knee in 1890, as lynchings of blacks soared in the south. This paper does not attempt to present a general history of hatred, instead, the problem addressed is how, in the past, democracies handled ethnic, cultural and religious tensions.

In order to do so, we look at the United States, Canada and Australia—three democracies with a commitment to equal rights for all citizens, all with very highly developed political, economic and social systems, all using similar legal systems, and all having Protestant majorities of British descent, with large ethnic minorities, and a large Catholic population. Each had a strong

tradition of anti-Catholicism and a love-hate relationship with the British Empire.[1] Compared to other nations, they were peaceful countries and all used their political system instead of violence to handle disputes that arose.[2] They all also debated religion and ethnic issues and came to quite different solutions in democratic fashion.[3] The Australians, for example, expelled two large ethnic groups (Kanakas and Germans), while the Americans debated the restriction of immigration (but did not restrict it until later) . Note that nativism and immigration restriction are separate issues, for the chief support for restriction came from the labor unions of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), whose leaders and members were mostly Irish, German or Jewish immigrants.[4]

This paper attempts to answer two related questions. The first basic question that arises is how a nation decides who represents the true citizen and so, who is entitled to participate in a republic. Every state imposed restrictions dealing with loyalty to the nation, independence, civic virtue, and freedom from corruption. The nativist is one who imposes severe restrictions on specific groups that seem to have values alien to those of the nation. In the late 19th century, people thought much more in terms of group identity than today, and to explore nativism we need to explore how groups were treated. More exactly, how groups interacted with each other.

The second basic question is how politicians handled these issues. That is, in democratic societies, how do established political parties and professional politicians handle divisive issues? In all three countries, popular voting behavior was partially, but not entirely, correlated with ethnocultural affiliations. For example, in the U.S., Catholics and liturgical Protestants favored the Democratic Party, while pietistic Protestants (in the North), were Republicans, but the groups were far from unanimous. In Australia, after parties formed in the early 20th century, the working class Irish Catholics supported the Australian Labor Party while the middle class of British Protestants favored the Liberals, again with cross-cutting minorities. In Canada, the ethnoreligious links to parties depended on the province, and there was a much weaker degree of party loyalty that allowed fluid movement between parties. The anti-Catholic Canadian movements of the 1880s and 1890s were more identified with the Conservatives, and led to the success of the Liberal party in French Canada.

UNITED STATES

The American mood ranged between buoyant optimism for most of the 1890-1905 period, but was punctuated by the intense economic panic and conflicts leading to the Depression of 1893-97. The pace of immigration accelerated, but increasing numbers were new ethnics who did not quickly become voters; they were targets that did not fight back.

In the United States at the time, the pietistic Protestants, including Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians and Congregationalists, were aggressively committed to reforming society. Instead of identifying specific sinful groups, like Catholics, as the enemy, they looked for sin itself and identified social evils, fighting against the perpetrators or defenders of those negative factors. The saloon, debauchery and social drunkenness was a high priority in the 1870s and 1880s, but in state after state, the dry crusade fell short. This was due to the fast growing numbers of high church liturgicals (especially Catholics and German Lutherans), who resented the idea that an outside group could define their moral standards. By the 1890s, the prohibition movement was in the doldrums, and played only a slight role in the ethnoreligious battles.[5]

The Catholic Irish were doing very well in America, Canada and Australia in terms of status and prosperity, though most were locked into low-skilled jobs where they used gangs and solidarity to strengthen their bargaining powers, and were starting to form (and dominate) labor unions in each country. They played major roles in politics, especially in the Australian Labor Party and the U.S. Democratic Party, where they were especially notable in the machines emerging in patronage-rich, fast-growing American cities that lacked the civil service regimes in Canada and Australia. The Irish largely controlled the Catholic Church in the U.S., Australia, and in Ontario, thanks to their organizational skills and their alliance with the Vatican to favor ultramontane policies that put power in the hands of the bishop. Nevertheless, the Irish suffered from an inferiority complex in all three countries—they imagined seeing non-existent signs everywhere that said "No Irish Need Apply." This myth of Protestant hostility greatly strengthened Irish solidarity.[6]

The Republican Party had its main base among pietistic Protestants, but had a large unaffiliated and liturgical element. The pietists took the initiative in reforms such as prohibition that alienated the liturgicals and weakened the GOP in state after state. When Republican James G. Blaine tried in 1884 to gain a sliver of the Irish Catholic vote, he carelessly allowed a supporter to ridicule the Democrats as the party of "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion", thus angering the very Irish who were targets of his overtures. Professional Republican politicians tried to suppress the liquor issue, while trying to confine its pietistic enthusiasts to the small Prohibition Party or to the amateurish Woman's Christian temperance Union [WCTU] whose members were nonvoters. Amateur

moralists used the system of local democracy, in which open township and county conventions controlled party decisions, to take control of the Iowa GOP in 1889; the dry crusader they nominated took the party down with him and threatened permanent alienation of wet voters. The party professionals fought back in 1893, outvoted the crusaders (whose enthusiasm had run dry), and ensured that a newly visible tolerance for diverse customs allowed the drinkers to return to the GOP.[7] Prohibitionists returned later after 1905, with a much more effective strategy and the professional leadership of the Anti-Saloon League. However, the battle lines between the pietistic reformers, and the liturgical reformees remained a keen memory.[8]

BENNETT LAW

The Bennett Law was a highly controversial state law passed in Wisconsin in 1889 that allowed only the use of English to teach major subjects in all public and private elementary and high schools. Schools that failed to comply would not be recognized by the state and the students who attended would be treated as truants. The law affected Wisconsin's many German-language parochial schools (and also the handful of Norwegian Lutheran parochial schools), and was bitterly resented by the state's large German-American population. The German Catholics and German Lutherans each operated large networks of parochial schools in the state, hence the language used in their classrooms was German; the Bennett Law would force German language teachers to be replaced with bilingual teachers.[9]

Wisconsin's Republican politicians were controlled by a statewide machine that had long avoided antagonizing the Germans. However in 1888, the professionals were pushed aside and the party nominated William D. Hoard, a journalist who found the opposition of the Germans to the Bennett Law an insult to the English language. Hoard worked outside the party organization to rally the Yankee population of the state behind his reelection in 1890 by hammering at the necessity to have all children speak English. (Most German children were bilingual in the cities and towns, but not in rural Wisconsin.) As opposition swelled, Hoard escalated to a defense of the public school system (which was not under attack); "The little schoolhouse--stand by it!" he cried out. Hoard ridiculed the Germans by claiming he was the better guardian of their children than their parents or pastors. Hoard counted votes and thought he had a winning coalition by whipping up nativist distrust of Germania as anti-American. In Milwaukee, a predominantly German city, Hoard attacked Germania and religion:

> "We must fight alienism and selfish ecclesiasticism.... The parents, the pastors and the church have entered into a conspiracy to darken the understanding of the children, who are denied by cupidity and bigotry the privilege of even the free schools of the state."[10]

The Germans were incensed not only at the blatant attack on their language and culture, but also on their religion, for the parochial schools were set up and funded by the parents in order to inculcate the community's religious values. Most importantly, the idea that the state could intervene in family life and tell children how to speak was intolerable, not just to the Germans, but to many English-speakers as well. By June 1890, the state's Missouri Synod and Wisconsin Synod (the two main German Lutheran groups) had denounced the law. The German Catholic leadership of the state swung into line. Democrats, led by Yankee William F. Vilas took up the German cause and secured the election of George W. Peck, a Yankee, as mayor of Milwaukee. They then nominated him for governor. Irish Catholics, who had been feuding with the Germans, generally supported the law, but did not bolt to the GOP. The Germans organized thoroughly and supported Peck. Vilas crisscrossed the state defending Germania and German culture, and calling for tolerance and an end to nativism.

1890 was a major victory for the Democrats, their first in decades in Wisconsin. The law was repealed in 1891, but Democrats used the memories to carry Wisconsin and Illinois in the 1892 presidential election. The Bennett Law was the last major attack on German language schools until 1914.

The smashing defeat of the Bennett law by the voters helped establish the principle that parents, not the state government, had the primary responsibility for the education and language skills of their children. It caused Republican leaders, especially William McKinley, to shy away from attacking ethnic or religious groups; instead they promoted pluralism. However, there were unintended consequences for the victory of the machine over the moralists. Republican Robert LaFollette was outraged at the crushing of the popular will by the bosses, and he and Hoard fought back, creating the Progressives faction that fought for control of the GOP for many decades.[11]

AMERICAN PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (APA)

The American Protective Association was a mass-membership organization as well as a coordinating body for anti-Catholic groups. Formed in Iowa in 1887, it grew in the wake of the Bennett campaign and was strongest in the upper Midwest, especially among Protestant Irish

immigrants from Canada and Ulster, and from Lutheran immigrants from Scandinavia and Germany. It drew primarily upon European traditions of anti-Catholicism. Apart from sponsoring lurid talks by ex-priests and runaway nuns, the APA's list of achievements was short indeed. Its main role was a sparring dummy for the Democrats, who rallied support among Catholics by repeated attacks on the Republican Party as tainted or even controlled by the APA. When the economy went into a tailspin in 1893-94, the APA shed members but gained more attention, as the desperate Democrats rallied again and again against the APA.[12] The APA members were immigrants, not nativists, and were astonished and alarmed by the success of Catholic politicians in this new country. They certainly had never seen anything like it in Europe. When Irish Protestants pushed the APA to endorse an English language test for voters —a test Irish Catholics could pass more easily than Swedes, the Scandinavians started to leave the APA. One APA marching song summed up their hapless self image: "Noble men are in our ranks / We are not a band of cranks/ We are not a lot of bigots or of fools".[13] The major parties had effective ways of dealing with the APA. They attacked it to solidify their own base of support, while making clear America opposed anti-Catholicism and nativism.

For the Democrats, pro-business conservative Episcopalians allied with President Grover Cleveland came to the rescue of the German Catholics and Lutherans, and pounded away at the theme the GOP was increasingly controlled by the nativists. These so-called "Bourbon Democrats", such as Vilas of Wisconsin, were ousted on economic issues by the radical agrarian and silver wings of the party in 1896. Many bolted the party and supported the Gold Democrats in 1896, or sat on their hands to watch Bryan go down to defeat. The Irish Catholic city politicians did not like Bryan either, but they worked on his behalf in 1896 and used the opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the Bourbons, taking increasing power inside the Democratic party away from the Bourbon Democrats in major cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago after 1896.[14]

In the GOP, the professionals took control at the state and local levels to make sure that troublemaking amateur moralists would not inflict defeat on the party by raising issues like prohibition, anti-Catholicism or nativism. McKinley took the lead, calling for "America for Americans, native and naturalized." He wanted America to be open to immigrants "who are well disposed to our institutions, seeking new and happier homes."[15] High levels of immigration for McKinley were indicators of prosperity. The 1896 *Republican Campaign Textbook* summed it up: "Immigration follows high wages—high wages follow the tariff."[16] The strategy worked as McKinley assembled a coalition based in industrial, urban America that lasted until the Great Depression.

GOP Congressional leaders in 1897, supported by big business and German groups, blocked the intellectuals (led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, at this time still an outsider and not accepted by the leadership) to restrict immigration from eastern and southern Europe using literacy tests. The leadership was highly impressed that the nation's immigrant strongholds had voted decisively for McKinley in 1896, deciding the election and dispelling fears of nativists that immigration was politically unhealthy. By the time the restrictionists tried again in 1898, they were out-organized by immigration advocates.[17]

GERMANIA

The largest and most diverse American ethnic group in the late 1800's, were the Germans. They were well established throughout the urban and rural Midwest, and the urban east, with flourishing communities to show for it.[18] The communities were based on skilled workers and owners of small crafts businesses. There was a striking absence of politicians among the Germany, although they did vote along the standard pietistic-liturgical lines. The Germans communities were divided along lines of religion, with about equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants, but the Protestants included liturgical Lutherans (esp. Missouri Synod, as well as pietistic and in-between groups). There were also large anticlerical and Jewish elements. Germania showed unity on the importance of preservation of religion, language, customs, social organizations and paternalistic traditions. But there was a failure to set up a system for training new leadership; they never set up the network of colleges and universities, which they needed to ensure long-term language maintenance. The result was that generational tensions were building up, especially as the younger generation clearly favored use of English language.

The Germans felt highly defensive on issues of prohibition. They also showed a striking commitment to hard money and opposition to inflation, which caused them to reject free silver and Bryanism. They were famous for their beer gardens and rejected the "puritanical" strains of reformism exhibited by pietistic Protestants.

The Irish were outnumbered by the Germans in the pews of the Catholic Church, but controlled the levers of power and held most of the bishoprics. When the Germans attempted to promote German language parishes and programs, the Irish (led by Archbishop John Ireland) counterattacked against "Cahenslyism" in the 1890s, insisting on English-language based assimilation. By their ultramontane loyalty to the Pope, the Irish secured Vatican approval and decisively

defeated the Germans.[19] On the other hand, the Catholic Church needed the Germans, and so tolerated a high degree of Germania in areas where Germans had large majorities.

One dog that did not bark was anti-Germanism as a political device. The temperance reformers attacked saloons endlessly, but at this time, did not focus on the German dimension; that was added later by the Anti-Saloon league. Two of the most bitterly hated politicians of the 1890s were born in Germany—Governor John Peter Altgeld of Illinois and Governor William Goebel of Kentucky. It is hard to find a third politician in American history as reviled as these two—and not surprisingly, Goebel was assassinated by his Republican opponents. However, the German theme was never used against them. As the World War experience showed, the opposition was quite capable of attacking Germania in the harshest terms, it is just that they did not do so in the U.S., Canada or Australia before 1914. Indeed, in Canada and Australia, German immigrants were quite welcome in the early 20th century.[20]

The World War changed everything. It forced ethnics to define and display their relative loyalties to the old country, to the traditional culture, to their current ethnic group, to their counrty of residence, and to show their assimilation to its cultural norms. The war allowed dominant groups to define the acceptable identities of aliens, especially enemy aliens. Groups loyal to the war effort measured the Germans and found them wanting. This led to a systematic assault on the culture of Germania, especially the use of the German language, in all three countries. German spokesmen were marginalized and ignored, and suspicion and restrictions of all sorts were imposed. Germans were numerous in Queensland and South Australia; most had arrived before 1890 and they were very well accepted until the Great War. The 2900 adult men with German citizenship were interred, and after the war, about 5000 Germans were expelled from the country.[21] Indeed, the Australian response was so disproportionate to the remote danger posed by Germans that it represented less a security measure than an extension of the "White Australia" policy, with the goal of eradicating the well established, peaceful German-Australian community as a non-British autonomous, sociocultural entity within Australian society.[22]

The 400,000 German speaking Canadians came under special scrutiny during the World War. By 1914, only 5% were German citizens and the other 95% had little or no connection with the German state. The war years forced a transition to English; the treatment of Germania was moderately harsh, especially in Winnipeg. The German and Austrian empire contained many nationalities at odds with their government; yet they were enemy aliens and treated harshly. Many naturalized Canadians from enemy countries lost the right to vote for the duration; none were drafted into the army.[23] The most notorious example were the Ukrainians, most were young single men in the Prairie Provinces; who were unemployable and 6000 were put in camps in 1914. The internment of civilians as if they were captured POWs resulted from the government's eagerness to support the British war effort, and did not reflect any special hostility toward the Ukrainians, who were mostly released in 1916 to help with the labor shortage.[24] What was at stake was not so much Australian or Canadian nativism as nationalism—that is, loyalty to the British Empire. In the U.S., by contrast, no immigrants were interned; the restrictions on the Germans were almost all symbolic, focused on language, and reflected nativism.

CANADA

The Canadian case involves a much more complex situation than the American one, set against the backdrop of a newly formed nation (Confederation came in 1867), and continued membership in the British Empire. 'Who is a "true" Canadian?', the citizens of the new country asked. The French said they were, for not only had they arrived first, their loyalty to Canada was pure and paramount, and not contaminated by trans-Atlantic loyalties to either Paris or London. It proved the justification for largely sitting out the Great War, and fiercely resisting conscription then (and in the Second World War as well).

The British Canadians retorted that the French claims were spoiled by their lock into a highly traditional form of Catholicism, which permanently made them an ignorant and backward people—a theme repeated ever since Lord Durham attributed the backwardness of French Canadians to their language and religion in his 1839 report, which stressed their inferiority and of the need to assimilate them and uplift them to British standards.[25] Assimilation had clearly failed by 1880, so the British Canadians took the position that the backward French should be contained in Quebec, and should not be allowed to export their backwardness to Ontario or the new Western Territories.

The French had numerical strength and cultural fortitude, but suffered systemic economic weaknesses. French Quebec was based on poor rural habitants; the strong and growing elements of the Quebec economy were controlled by British businessmen. All the French were strongly committed to their language, but religion was a different matter. They were divided among an ultramontane faction that looked to Rome, a Gallican faction that tried to be more independent of Rome, and a small but powerful anticlerical element. . The Irish, with their

strong Vatican connections, at several decisive points, tipped the balance to the ultramontane position. The French had demographic strength—based on a high birth rate, although that was offset by a continuous stream of emigration to the textile mills of New England. The population growth meant the French could force the Anglophones out of their districts in rural Quebec and also spill over into eastern Ontario, where the issue of French language schools became a bitter dispute. British Canada worried that the French would eventually dominate because of their numerical growth, a factor that led to support for higher levels of European and American immigration. However, the French had a sense of falling behind economically and politically, as British Canada was industrializing and growing noticeably wealthier year by year. They knew they were unwelcome outside Quebec, and the execution of Louis Riel in 1885 for his rebellion was a stunning shock to the French, who saw Riel as a hero (or rather, his hangmen as villains).[26]

In politics, the Liberals of the 1850s in Toronto used anti-French rhetoric to demand more political power. Their leader was George Brown, editor of the Toronto *Globe*, but he was defeated in a critical election when the Irish Catholics mobilized against him. Accordingly, Brown dropped his harsh rhetoric after Confederation. There was relatively little anti-French rhetoric in Ontario politics in the 1870s and 1880s. But Confederation was not an economic success, and the growing pull of the United States alarmed supporters of the Empire, who became increasingly vocal in their loyalty to the Empire.

French nationalism became a potent political force in the hands of Honore Mercier (1840-1894), the Liberal premier of Quebec from 1887-91. Mercier proved brilliantly adept at organizing grass roots support on the basis of French nationality, and he governed by using the emotions conjured up by the words 'national,' 'French,' and 'Catholic,' thus building upon and enlarging the old Catholic self image as a saving remnant of God's true religion in a hostile Protestant land. In 1888, he achieved a settlement of the longstanding issue involving Jesuit estates. After the Jesuit order was dissolved in 1773, its large landholdings became the property of Quebec, but the Catholic factions fought bitterly over a solution for a century. Mercier cut the Gordian knot by giving the Catholic Church $400,000 to relinquish all its claims, and then going to Rome for a solution on dividing the money, (thus satisfying the ultramontanes and the Jesuits), but giving most of the money to the Gallicans and buying off the Protestants with cash for their schools too. It was a brilliant solution and enabled the French to develop a common front for the first time among all the factions. The downside was that Protestants, especially those outside Quebec who received no cash, took umbrage that the Pope was allowed to make a decision for Canadians. They demanded that the national government overturn the decision, producing an issue that lit the fires of religious hatred.

Meanwhile, Manitoba repudiated the old agreement that called for government funded French Catholic schools. The issue was used by British nationalists to demand the government stop French expansion. D'Anton McCarthy, a top Conservative leader, took up the challenge, advising, "This is a British country, and the sooner we take in hand our French Canadian fellow subjects and teach them the English language, the less trouble we will have to prevent;" he warned darkly of a future civil war.[27] For McCarthy, Canada's national mission was to bring British civilization to North America, replacing the French variety as soon as possible. The Manitoba Schools Question did little to change schools, but it did outrage the French and did split the Conservative party, with the Quebec wing demanding the national government reverse the ruling while the Ontario wing, with strong Orange representation, celebrated Manitoba's apparent destruction of French schools. The Manitoba issue became central to the 1896 national election. The Liberals won under French Catholic Wilfrid Laurier, who took control of the national parliament by building on Mercier's groundwork and making major gains in Quebec. 1896 was thus a realigning election in Canada as well as for the U.S.[28] The Liberals refused to let the national government overturn Manitoba, citing provincial rights. Laurier then found a compromise that allowed limited French schooling in Manitoba, and which satisfied the Vatican. Laurier proved a master of inter-ethnic and inter-religious compromises that kept his Liberals in power with himself as prime minister from 1896–1911 (the first time the post was held by a French Canadian).[29]

Orange lodges had emerged in Ireland as strongholds of Protestant anti-Catholicism and although Orange lodges existed among the Protestant Irish in Australia, they were not important factors. Orange lodges in the U.S. virtually collapsed after the violent Catholic attack on the Orange Parade in New York in 1871. In Canada, however, the Orange Lodges flourished, promoting Protestant Irish solidarity while spreading horror stories from ex-nuns and priests.[30] The commitment of the Orange Lodges to the Conservative Party was consistently exaggerated by the Liberals, for the order was internally divided and not geared to operating political campaigns.[31] A separate organization, the Equal Rights Association (ERA), was set up in Ontario to battle the Catholics. Led by D'Alton McCarthy, it tried to force the Conservatives to ride the anti-Catholic horse. The Conservatives refused, and when the ERA tried to run separate candidates, its basic weaknesses became apparent and it collapsed.[32]

McCarthy's narrow focus on the ethnoreligious enemy ruined his Conservative career. The Toronto *Mail* likewise took up the anti-French crusade and was repudiated by the Conservative party, as Conservative Prime Minister John McDonald insisted on the importance of his Catholic supporters.[33] The Manitoba Schools Question was decisive in defeating the divided Conservatives in 1896, as Wilfrid Laurier managed to hold together the Liberals and win over more Catholics. It took 15 years for the Conservatives to make their comeback at the national level, by winning the 1911 election on the basis of anti-Americanism and an appeal to the British Imperial nationalism.[34] The Conservative party was held together mostly by nonideological thirst for office or "corruption", but key leaders like John Macdonald (prime minister 1867-73 and 1878-91) and Robert Borden (prime minister 1911-20) had a broad vision of Canadian nationalism, based on the dominion's unique role in the Empire.[35]

The language issue repeatedly proved a loser on election day, but the undaunted reformers pushed on. In province after province, the Anglo-Canadians tried to reduce or abolish the role of French in schools and block state support for Catholic schools in new provinces. Modernizers emphasized that their motivation was to end the backwardness of the French Canadians by uplifting their schools. Protestants who demanded and received state support for their schools in Quebec now refused support for French-language schools in Ontario. The final crisis came in 1915-16 in Ontario where Regulation 17 promised to impose English on all schools in Ontario. The Catholics split, as the Irish joined the anti-French coalition and won Vatican support.[36]

Defeat on the Ontario Schools Question was the last straw for the French. Although the French had originally supported entry into the Great War, they now rejected the war effort and refused conscription into the army. From 1916 forward, there were two Canadas, one looking outward as part of the Empire, the other looking inward. The Liberal party split in two on the war issue and almost collapsed. But as the war ended, the new leader William Mackenzie King found a way to reunite the Liberal party, while the Conservatives mishandled the postwar chaos.

The end of World War I brought the sense of a new independence, wrought by war time sacrifices, that created a new form of nationalism in British Canada that looked inward to Canada, not outward to the Empire, for inspiration and identity. The refusal of the French to support the Empire was no longer so horrifying to the Anglophones. The Anglophones did not make it a political issue because they too had turned away from the Empire as Canada took its own place in world affairs, with its own seat in the League of Nations and shook off practically all remaining control of its affairs by London. The Liberal party accepted the inward-looking nationalism in Quebec and gained a political lock on the province for two generations after 1917, as well as the votes of most Catholics outside Quebec, giving the Liberal party a dominance that was rarely broken.[37]

AUSTRALIA

Politics in Australia were more factionalized, and probably milder, than in Canada or the U.S. during this period. The dominant liberal mindset of the 19th century deplored sectarian conflicts as outdated and unwise.[38] The tighter bond with Britain perhaps had a moderating influence.[39] In religious terms, Australia was about equally divided between Church of England and Church of Scotland at the upper end, evangelical Methodists and Baptists in the middle, with the Irish Catholics most numerous "wherever the hours were long, the climate merciless, the labour unskilled, the comforts few, and the remuneration small."[40] Political and social tensions among Australia's European groups were quite mild, though there was an outburst of anti-Catholic outrage in 1869 when a Fenian terrorist tried to assassinate a royal visitor.[41] The most serious dispute erupted in 1879 in New South Wales, which was 20 percent Catholic, over schools. Both public and Catholic schools received state aid, but the Catholic bishops decided to promote their parochial schools attacking the "godless" public schools as "seedpots of future immorality, infidelity and lawlessness." A storm of protest ensued and premier Henry Parkes, who strongly disliked the Irish, retaliated by ending funding for Catholic schools. Politics was based on factions not parties, and so there was no party to rally either the Catholics of their opponents.[42]

Evangelical Protestants made temperance their favorite cause, and they formed a Woman's Christian temperance Union (WCTU). Class factors were similar too, with the pub the same sort of target as the American saloon. But Australia had a Labor party which was comfortable in the world of pubs, as well as an Anglican establishment that disparaged revivalistic crusades and the "wowsers" who led them.[43] The "drys" affiliated with the Liberal Party, and the Methodists in New South Wales in 1907 saw a cultural war between decency and middle class virtue on their side, and on the other, Labor's unholy coalition of "Rum, Romanism, Socialism and Gambling".[44] The democratic solution was an emphasis on local option (an echo of popular sovereignty) and the plan to close drinking places at 6pm. The temperance crusaders achieved modest successes, especially the 6pm closing hour, during the First World War.

Partisanship developed in the early 20th century, with the working class Irish Catholics dominating the Australian Labor Party, and middle class British Protes-

tants affiliating with the Liberal party.[45] Class, religion and loyalty were mutually reinforcing to form permanent party identities.[46] In the Great War, the Labor party split, with the British/Protestant factions in control of the government and pushing conscription to help the Empire, while the Irish Catholic faction and the socialists broke off, and managed to defeat the referendum on conscription. In a very similar split in Canada, the minority Liberal Party split over conscription.[47]

The gold rush brought tens of thousands of Chinese men (and no women) to Australia. Most went back to China, but hostility levels were high against the "threat" of an alien culture. However, laws to ban further immigration were disallowed by London. But after a surge of Chinese immigration in the late 1880s, the Australians used narrower restrictions, such as arrival taxes, to limit new arrivals.[48] Much the same happened in British Columbia.[49]

The most controversial group was the Pacific Islanders (called "Kanakas" at the time), brought to Queensland on three year contracts to work in the sugar fields. White labour strenuously objected to their presence. Outmaneuvering the business interests who wanted the Islanders, the government of the new federation passed a "Pacific Islands Laborers Act" in 1901, inaugurating a "White Australia" policy that ensured that no further Islander or Asian immigration would take place. The explicit goal was a nation united in mateship in a common nationality—indeed a sense of nation built on what Parkes called the "crimson thread of kinship" that tied together Britons and Celts (and no one else—"we should be one people, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin explained, "without the admixture of other races.").[50] Unlike Canada and the U.S., Australia funded a program that sent most of the Kanaka back to their original islands, allowing a few thousand who had become well established to remain. The White Australia policy remained in effect until after World War II, when the need for more immigrants, and for better relations with Asia, combined with a more tolerant outlook, reversed the policy.[51]

Nativism in Australia took a new turn with the formation of the Australian Natives' Association in 1885. Only people born in Australia were eligible, so it represented a generational revolt against the older settlers who had indeed built Australia, but who had loyalties to the Empire. The ANA successfully promoted a spirit of localistic nationalism and worked hard for Federation in 1901. Like every other major group it insisted on a "White Australia". By 1900, it had 20,000 members in 150 branches across the six colonies.[52]

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

With Canada and Australia part of the British Empire, it is worth noting that London generally let them do anything they wanted with one exception. Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain pointed out that it was unwise for one part of the Empire to ban imperial subjects. Chamberlain said that London sympathized, "with the determination of the white inhabitants of those Colonies …that there shall not be an influx of people alien in civilization, alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx, moreover, would most seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labour population."[53] He recommended the "Natal solution", a literacy test that was on its face fair to all, but which could be adjusted locally to keep out any unwanted group. Natal had been inspired by the U.S. where literacy tests were first used by Mississippi to disfranchise Blacks in the South.[54]

The Boer war of 1899-1901 rallied imperial supporters in Canada and, especially, Australia, while the Irish Catholics favored the Boers and the French Canadians kept quiet.[55] London appreciated the unofficial support of the U.S. government in the crisis, realizing that Americans in general favored the Boers. Payback came in the Alaska boundary dispute, in which the British representative on an arbitration panel sided with the American claim against Canada, shocking the Canadians to the sudden realization London was prepared to sacrifice their interests in seeking closer relations with Washington. The British policies paid off, as Canada and Australia officially supported the war effort in 1914 in unified fashion. But the loyalty to the Empire was not deep, as the conscription debate convulsed both countries, causing severe disruptions in the Australian Labor Party and the Canadian Liberal party.

Rome had its worldwide religious empire and followed its "colonies" closely. Rome typically sided with the Irish position, recognizing the Irish as the best supporters of ultramontane policies, despite the grief this favoritism caused in French Canadian and German American circles.[56] In Australia, the Irish comprised practically the entire Catholic population, apart from a few English Benedicties who were soon brushed aside.

Finally, we need to address our second basic question on how politicians handled the existent issues. In democratic societies, how do established political parties and professional politicians handle divisive issues? It is striking—astonishing really—that from 1880 to 1914, not a single major politician in any of our three countries took up the cause for nativism and anti-Catholicism, even though everyone knew those issues had traction in large elements of the population. On the contrary, the profes-

sional politicians systematically suppressed efforts by amateurs and moralists to interject these issues into the political arena. In Canada, Prime Minister Laurier tried to stifle anti-Japanese sentiments on the West Coast for reasons of state. He did not want to alienate a major trading partner with a powerful navy and the proven capacity to equal Europeans. In the U.S, President Theodore Roosevelt sent William Howard Taft to negotiate a gentleman's agreement in 1907, whereby there were no official restrictions on Japanese immigration but Tokyo did not allow emigration.[57] The conclusion is that the professionals took a broad, long term look at the society from the point of view of the entire electorate (not just their own supporters). The mistreatment of non-voting groups, such as the Chinese and Kanakas, demonstrate that the politicians were not looking beyond the electorate.[58] The success of the professionals in stopping the nativists led to long-term political success by the McKinley Republicans in the U.S. and the Laurier and King Liberals in Canada.

CONCLUSION

Examined in a comparative perspective, nativism shows unexpected complexities. Old definitions in terms of reactionary attitudes or psychological pathologies represent polemical judgments rather than analytical categories. Defined in terms of intense loyalty to the nation, coupled with a demonstrated intolerance of alternative loyalties, is a beginning, but it begs questions. Loyalty to a nation is the most important factor, but to what nation? How much loyalty are immigrant groups allowed to have to the old country, or to the current group? When an empire is involved—here, the British Empire and the Roman Catholic Church—there is another level of divided allegiance, which flares when the Empire is at war.

In all three countries, the Irish Catholics showed a loyalty to Rome mixed with hostility to the British Empire, but there were levels of complexity. In Canada, the long-standing battle between the Anglophone Protestants and the Francophone Catholics found the Irish in the middle; they opted for the Anglophone position and thereby gained control of the Catholic Church outside Quebec. In the U.S., battles in the 1880s and 1890s over prohibition and the German language saw the Democratic Party triumphant, with the Irish poised to take advantage by replacing the Protestant Democrats who had led the party.

In all three countries the Germans, outsiders in politics, managed to defeat forced assimilation before World War I, but their enclaves of Germania proved so isolated from the mainstream that they were marginalized in the War and forced to give up their language. In Australia they had no allies and were deported after the war because they represented an alien threat to both the Australian and the Imperial nationalism. Perhaps some similar fate was possible in Canada, but the Anglophones were locked in battle with the Francophones and had no time for the relatively small German population.

The paradox of Anglophone imperial nationalism was that the World War turned the British in Canada and Australia inward, as they celebrated their psychological and political independence from Britain, and indeed effectively graduated from the British Empire. In Canada that meant that both the Anglophones and Francophones had turned inward to define their Canadian nation, yet they were unable to this day to find a common language and had become two nations. When the French Catholics in Quebec underwent the "Quiet Revolution" in the 1960s, they dropped traditionalistic Catholicism and became just as modern as the Anglophones, but defined themselves even more intensely in terms of language in a way that made many of them nativistic and hostile toward minorities in Quebec to the point of seeking secession from Canada.

The empires, based in London and Rome, wisely avoided a heavy-handed intervention. When the Canadian language crisis reached Rome, the Vatican sided with the Anglophone Irish for strategic reasons, for throughout the Catholic empire the Irish were the most ultramontane and pro-Vatican ethnic group. London did not interfere in its Empire, expect to prevent any colony from officially excluding subjects from another colony. London did tolerate the solution that Canada and Australia found to exclude nonwhites, which was a variation of the Mississippi solution that kept American blacks in second class status despite Constitutional guarantees.

Professional politicians wanted to avoid or suppress ethnocultural conflict. In complex democracies they realized that they had to build complex coalitions that cut across many lines of ethnicity, religion, region and class. When grass roots forces tried to launch cultural wars, the professions resisted and rallied behind politicians like Laurier in Canada and McKinley in the U.S. and Deakin in Australia who had a pluralistic vision. When the Great War came, the spontaneous demand for national unity and national purity gave nativism enormous momentum, excusing rash moves like the suppression of foreign languages, the roundup of Ukrainian aliens and the expulsion of Australia's Germans. The professional politicians had no choice but to denounce "hyphenated" or divided loyalties. In conclusion, the War created a new sense of independent nationalism in Canada and

Australia that dissolved most of the wartime grievances among the majority. The War thus forced the rapid assimilation of the ethnic groups in all three countries, leaving nativism with fewer targets for attack.

NOTES

[1] We can leave out Britain, where nativism was weak and ineffective (as typified by the British Brothers League), but where the Irish issue was overpowering.

[2] Except of course for the Civil War and Reconstruction era in the U.S.

[3] "Whiteness," which some historians have used as a solvent to dissolve ethnic and racial issues, was never alluded to regarding a European group in any of the primary documents from any of the countries in the controversies examined here. But see Marilyn Lake, "From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: the invention of the literacy test as a technology of racial exclusion," in Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, eds. *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective* (2006) ch 13 online

[4] Gwendolyn Mink, *Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development: Union, Party, and State, 1875-1920* (1986)

[5] Paul Kleppner, *The Cross of Culture* (1970); Kleppner, *The Third Electoral System, 1854-1892* (1979); Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: 1888-1896* (1971)

[6] Richard Jensen, "'No Irish Need Apply': A Myth of Victimization," *Journal of Social History,* Vol. 36, 2002; the Irish in Canada were doing well. Donald Akenson, *The Irish in Ontario: A Study in Rural History* (1984). They were even more numerous, and well-accepted, in Australia. Eric Richards "Irish in Australia" in Graeme Davison, ed. *The Oxford Companion to Australian History* (2001) , 353-55; Patrick O'Farrell, *The Irish in Australia* (1987).

[7] Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest*, ch 5;

[8] The anti-polygamy campaigns of the 1880-1905 period fit our ethnocultural conflict model, but with the reformees localized in Utah, and the reformers spread nationwide, it had a dynamic that was played out not in the states but in the U.S. Senate. Kathleen Flake, *The Politics of American Religious Identity: The Seating of Senator Reed Smoot, Mormon Apostle* (2003)

[9] Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest*, ch 5; William Foote Whyte, "The Bennett law campaign in Wisconsin" ''Wisconsin Magazine Of History.'' Volume: 10 / Issue: 4 (1926-1927)online edition. Also Robert J. Ulrich, *The Bennett Law of Eighteen Eighty-Nine: Education and Politics in Wisconsin* (1981)

[10] Whyte, "The Bennett law campaign" p 388

[11] Robert LaFollette, *Autobiography* (1913) p 190

[12] O. Fritiof Ander, "The Swedish American Press and the American Protective Association," *Church History*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jun., 1937), pp. 165-179 esp 176-7

[13] Donald L. Kinzer, *Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association* (1964), p. ???

[14] Samuel T. McSeveney, *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896* (1972)

[15] William McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses* (1893) p 547, 1891 speech; see also ibid p 238.

[16] In 1896 McKinley's campaign manager Mark Hanna wrote of the "prime importance" of rallying "to the support of Republican ticket many thousands of Roman Catholics." Kinzer, *Episode in Anti-Catholicism*, p 224

[17] Daniel J. Tichenor, *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America* (2002) pp 83-5; Paul Kleppner, *Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893-1928* (1987) pp201-3 However Natal copied the Lodge literacy test to keep out the Chinese, and Australia copied it to form the "White Australia" policy. Lake, "From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: the invention of the literacy test as a technology of racial exclusion,"

[18] See Russell A. Kazal, *Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity* (2004) on Philadelphia; and Jon Gjerde, *The Minds of the West: Ethnocultural Evolution in the Rural Middle West, 1830-1917* (1997).

[19] Colman Barry, *Catholic Church and German Americans*, (1953) chapter 4.

[20] Howard Palmer, *Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta* (1982).

[21] Stuart Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia: vol. 4, The Succeeding Age, 1901-1942* (1993) , pp 153-55; and Gerhard Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia 1914-1920*, (1989). However, Jurgen Tampke, *The Germans in Australia* (2007) pp. 120-24, cautions against exaggerating the mistreatment of the Germans; still, it was clearly worse than in Canada or the U.S.

[22] Gerhard Fischer, "Negative Integration' and an Australian Road to Modernity: Interpreting The Australian Homefront Experience In World War I,". *Australian Historical Studies* 1995 26(104): 452-476.

[23] Pat Brennan, "Canada, Germans in" in Thomas Adams, ed. *Germany and the Americas* (2005) 1:202-12; John Thompson, *Ethnic Minorities During Two World Wars* (Ottawa, 1991).

[24] About 4% of the Ukrainians were incarcerated. Bohdan S. Kordan, *Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War: Internment in Canada during the Great War* (2002); James Farney and Bohdan S. Kordan, "The Predicament of Belonging: The Status of Enemy Aliens in Canada, 1914," *Journal of Canadian* Studies 39.1 (2005) 74-89

[25] J.R. Miller, "Anti-Catholic Thought in Victorian Canada," *Canadian Historical Review* 65, no.4. (1985), 474-94; Stephen Kenny, "A Prejudice That Rarely Utters Its Name: A Historiographical and Historical Reflection upon North American Anti-Catholicism," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 2002 32#4 pp 639+

[26] Mason Wade, *The French Canadians, 1760-1945* (1955) ch 6-10; J. R. Miller, E*qual Rights: The Jesuits' Estates Act Controversy* (1979).

[27] Edmund A. Aunger, "Justifying the End of Official Bilingualism: Canada's North-West Assembly and the Dual-Language Question, 1889-1892," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique,* Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 451-486. For the ideas see Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1869-1917* (1970)

[28] Donald E. Blake, "1896 and All That: Critical Elections in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1979), pp. 259-279

[29] Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, *Canada: 1896-1921* (1974) ch 2 pp 12-18

[30] Robert McLaughlin , "Irish Nationalism and Orange Unionism in Canada: A Reappraisal," *Éire-Ireland* 41.3&4 (2007) 80-109

[31] Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smyth, *The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada* (1980)

[32] J. R. Miller, *Equal Rights: The Jesuits' Estates Act Controversy* (1979).

[33] The Prime Minister warned the newspaper's editor, "We get a strong support from the Catholics as a whole in the Dominion," mentioning the Maritimes in particular and insisting they not be alienated. McDonald to C. W. Bunting, 25 May 1886, in *Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald* (1921) p 380

[34] The Conservatives played on Anglican support for Britain over the United States; Heath Macquarrie, "Robert Borden and the Election of 1911," The *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et de Science politique,* Vol. 25, No. 3 (Aug., 1959), pp. 271-286, and William M. Baker, "A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in English-Speaking Canada: The Election Campaign of 1911," *Canadian Historical Review* 51 (1970): 426-49. Richard Johnston and Michael B. Percy, "Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment, and Party Politics in the 1911 Election," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 711-729. stress the economic dimension as farmers feared what reciprocity would do tot them.

[35] John English, *The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System 1901-20* (1977) stresses corruption.

[36] Brown and Cook, *Canada: 1896-1921* pp 254-62

[37] John Meisel, "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behavior." *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (1956) 22: 481–496. For recent decades the pattern still hold; see André Blais, "Accounting for the Electoral Success of the Liberal Party in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique,* (2005) 38, pp 821-840

[38] Mark Lyons, "Sectarianism" in Graeme Davison, ed. *The Oxford Companion to Australian History* (2001), 583-4; Michael Hogan, *The Sectarian Strand: Religion in Australian History* (1987)

[39] Luke Trainor, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century* (1992), 78-79.

[40] Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia: vol. 4*, p 66, statement of Catholic bishops in 1885.

[41] O'Farrell, *The Irish in Australia*, pp 209-10.

[42] Henry Parkes, *Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History* (1892) 2: 10-24; A. E. Cahill, 'Vaughan, Roger William Bede (1834–1883)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, (1976) 6: 327-328; Geoffrey Partington, *The Australian Nation: Its British and Irish Roots* (1997) ch 4

[43] Supposedly from the slogan in South Australia, "We Only Want Social Evils Remedied."

[44] Macintyre, *The Oxford History of Australia: vol. 4*, p 112

[45] Judith Brett, *The Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class: From Alfred Deakin to John Howard*. (2003), ch. 3

[46] Judith Brett, *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class* (2003) ch. 3

[47] Conscription was much more successful in the U.S. and there were no schisms.

[48] The new laws cut the number of Chinese arrivals in New South Wales from 4436 in 1887 to only 9 in 1889. Frank Parsons, "Australasian Methods of Dealing with Immigration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 24, (Jul., 1904), pp. 209-220 at p. 214. In 1901 there were 32,000 Chinese in Australia, nearly all men; they gradually left or died out, reaching a nadir of 7000 in 1947.

[49] W. Peter Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy toward Orientals in British Columbia* (1978)

[50] Winsome Roberts "The Politics of Federation," *Melbourne Journal of Politics* (2000). Page 7+.

[51] 4000 Kanakas were repatriated and the remaining 2500 were pushed out of the sugar fields by labour unions. Doug Munro, "The Labor Trade in Melanesians to Queensland: An Historiographic Essay," *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Spring, 1995), pp. 609-627

[52] Charles S. Blackton, "Australian Nationality and Nativism: The Australian Natives' Association, 1885-1901," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar., 1958), pp. 37-46

[53] Cited in Australia Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (13 Sept 1905) p. 2150

[54] Marilyn Lake, "From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: the invention of the literacy test as a technology of racial exclusion," in Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, eds. *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective* (2006) ch 13 online. In practice, ships no longer brought in Asians and the literacy test was seldom used.

[55] B.R. Penny, "Australia's Reactions to the Boer War-A Study in Colonial Imperialism." *Journal of British Studies*, 7 (November 1967): 97-130

[56] Roberto Perin, *Rome in Canada: The Vatican and Canadian Affairs in the Late Victorian Age* (1990)

[57] Ward, *White Canada Forever*, 67; Kiyo Sue Inui, "The Gentlemen's Agreement. How It Has Functioned," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 122, (Nov., 1925), pp. 188-198

[58] Church groups sometimes spoke for the disfranchised, and played a major role in eventually reversing the White Australia policy in the 1950s, as well as black disfranchisement in the U.S. in the 1960s. In Canada, however, the churches were at the center of the controversies and did not engineer compromises.