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CANADIAN ISSUES
THÈMES CANADIENS

September / Septembre 2002

CANADA AND THE WORLD
CANADA ET LE MONDE

ONE YEAR AFTER
UN AN APRÈS

9.11

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

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THÈMES CANADIENS

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A TIME to Reflect

The actions of a handful of terrorists reverberate still. Across much of the globe, nation upon nation has attempted to come to grips with an event that, in ninety minutes, mandated a re-examination of governmental priorities, domestic vulnerabilities and international alliances. Little has been left untouched. This is perhaps most true within the shifting sands of foreign policy.

Canada's proximity to the United States, however defined, ensured that the spotlight would focus sharply on our leaders as well. Each word, each response, each suggested modification of policy was closely monitored by an attentive population. Rarely since 1945 has domestic security been so woven into the fabric of world affairs. Over the course of the past year, Canadians have demonstrated both support for American counter-terrorism efforts and concern for an over-reaching commitment to a prolonged war. Fears of repeated attacks have waned, but memories have scarcely abated.

In the shadow of a remarkable year in history, it is only now possible to begin a fair assessment of how a few hours last September sparked a significant re-alignment of priorities for Canada and Canadians. Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, leads off the debate by answering some pointed questions on the challenges to Canadian foreign policy since 9-11 and into the unpredictable years ahead.

Charles Doran then looks at how Canada and the US diverge on their respective views of globalization, which he points out is not tantamount to Americanization. David Grondin then makes the case for how 9-11 could lead to an eventual synthesis of North American military forces into a continental defence structure. Stephen Clarkson suggests that Canada's security parameters have not been severely affected, and that Canada should continue to resist significant North American integration and ensure that Canadian autonomy on such matters survives.

Kathy Bickmore addresses the critical issue of teaching in light of modern terror and, as she calls it, a fragile peace. She warns that Canadians have an awesome responsibility in education, then offers an academic model for peacebuilding citizenship. Martin Rudner examines how Canada's security and intelligence community is mobilizing itself for the war against terrorism.

Hector Mackenzie then returns us to the international realm with a look at Canada's fundamental foreign relations over time. Denis Stairs takes a critical view of Canada's assets internationally, and wonders where Canada can make a particularly useful contribution abroad. David Malone and Patrick Wittman look favourably on one aspect of Canada's foreign policy – its productive role within the UN Security Council.

Desmond Morton writes that 9-11 finally led many Canadians to recognize the limits of their armed forces. He examines the historical significance of this. Jack Jedwab explores the effect of public opinion polls since September 11, noting how Americans have grown more interested in world opinion over the last twelve months. John Biles and Humera Ibrahim then provide a report card for the level of domestic tolerance Canadians have demonstrated since last September. Dean Oliver wraps up the discussion with his views on whether the acts of last year will have so profound an effect that homeland defence and international security will become closely fused in the minds of Canadians.

The Association for Canadian Studies is proud to offer this special edition of *Canadian Issues* at its conference *September 11th, 2001: The Impact and Aftermath for Canada and Canadians*. The editors hope it contributes to a lively and important debate.

UN TEMPS de réflexion

Les gestes d'une poignée de terroristes retentissent encore. Plusieurs nations de partout au monde ont dû tenter de donner un sens à un événement qui, en 90 minutes, a provoqué la réévaluation des priorités gouvernementales, des vulnérabilités domestiques et des alliances internationales. En effet, rien n'est demeuré intact suite à cet événement. Particulièrement en ce qui concerne les politiques étrangères.

La proximité du Canada et des États-Unis a forcé nos leaders à ce mettre sous la lumière des projecteurs. Chaque mot, chaque réponse et chaque modification de politique suggérée a fait l'objet d'un examen minutieux de la part d'une population attentive. Depuis 1945, rares sont les moments où la sécurité intérieure a joué un rôle prépondérant dans les affaires internationales. Au cours de la dernière année, les Canadiens ont supporté les efforts des États-Unis afin contrer le terrorisme tout en ce montrant inquiet face à un engagement dans une guerre prolongée. La crainte d'une reprise des attaques s'est affaiblie mais les souvenirs se sont à peine apaisés.

À la lumière d'une remarquable année en termes d'histoire, il nous est maintenant possible de débuter l'évaluation de comment ces quelques heures en septembre dernier ont provoqué une réorganisation des priorités du Canada et des Canadiens. Bill Graham, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, ouvre le débat en répondant à des questions pointues au sujet des défis touchant la politique étrangère canadienne depuis le 9/11 et dans les années imprévisibles à venir.

Charles Doran pose son regard sur les divergences entre les visions du Canada et des États-Unis face à la globalisation, ce qui, d'après lui, n'est pas synonyme d'américanisation. David Grondin discute ensuite de la manière par laquelle le 9/11 pourrait éventuellement mener à une synthèse des forces armées de l'Amérique du Nord et à la création d'une structure de défense continentale. Stephen Clarkson quant à lui suggère que les paramètres de sécurité du Canada n'ont pas été sérieusement affectées et que le Canada devrait continuer de résister à l'intégration Nord-Américaine et assurer la continuité de l'autonomie canadienne dans de telles circonstances.

Kathy Bickmore nous propose une discussion sur la question de l'enseignement dans une ère de terreur moderne et de paix fragile. Elle affirme que les Canadiens et Canadiennes ont une énorme responsabilité en éducation et nous offre ensuite un modèle académique de ce qu'elle appelle « peacebuilding citizenship ». Martin Rudner examine comment la communauté de sécurité et d'information se mobilise afin d'affronter la guerre contre le terrorisme.

Hector Mackenzie nous ramène dans le domaine des affaires internationales en examinant les fondements des relations étrangères canadienne. Denis Stairs porte ensuite un regard critique sur les actifs internationaux du Canada et se demande où le Canada pourrait faire une contribution particulièrement utile. David Malone et Patrick Wittman portent un regard favorable sur un aspect particulier de la politique étrangère du Canada – son rôle productif au sein du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

Desmond Morton affirme que le 9/11 a finalement permis au Canadiens de reconnaître les limites de leurs forces armées. Par la suite, il examine la signification historique de cet état de fait. Jack Jedwab explore quant à lui l'évolution des sondages d'opinion publique depuis le 11 septembre et note que l'intérêt des Américains envers l'opinion internationale a augmenté au cours des douze derniers mois. John Biles et Humera Ibrahim nous fournissent un compte rendu des niveaux de tolérance domestique démontrés par les Canadiens depuis septembre dernier. Dean Oliver termine la discussion en offrant ses opinions sur la possibilité que les événements de l'année dernière aient un effet d'une telle profondeur que la défense nationale et la sécurité internationale en viennent à se fusionner dans la tête des Canadiens.

L'Association d'études canadiennes est fière de vous offrir ce numéro spécial de *Thèmes canadiens* lors de sa conférence *Le 11 septembre 2001 : L'impact et les conséquences pour le Canada et les Canadiens.* Les éditeurs espèrent qu'il contribuera à un débat animé et important.

LETTERS

Comments on this edition of Canadian Issues? We want to hear from you.
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INTERVIEW WITH BILL GRAHAM
Minister of Foreign Affairs

A year has passed since the terrorist attacks on the United States. Since that time we have seen tremendous shifts in global relationships. What have been the most important foreign policy shifts for Canada since 9-11?

I would say that it is less about major policy shifts than it is a re-adjustment of our priorities. The fundamentals of our foreign policy, as articulated in the Government's 'Canada and the World' statement of 1995, remain quite sound. Here I refer to the well-known three 'pillars' upon which our foreign policy is built: the protection and promotion of our security, our prosperity, and our culture and values.

The most important adjustments of the past year, of course, concern our efforts to combat the emergence of international terrorism on an entirely new scale here in North America, particularly through closer collaboration with the United States in a range of ways to protect our citizens, keep our borders open, and prevent future attacks both here at home and abroad. This requires recognizing the complex nature of modern terrorism which uses the very means of communications and techniques on which our international prosperity depends. It also requires a concerted effort on our part to engage moderate elements, particularly in the Muslim world, which will isolate those wishing to commit acts of terrorism.

Our close relationship with the U.S. is clearly fundamental to our security and our prosperity. Looking ahead, I can say that we will continue to explore ways to improve our cooperation in order to assure our continental security and the free movement of legitimate goods, services and people across the border – but we will do so only in ways that we believe will enhance our sovereignty and uphold our core values and interests. At the moment, for instance, we are very much absorbed with the ongoing campaign against terrorism and possible U.S. action against Iraq, with continued progress toward full implementation of the 30-point Smart Border Declaration of late last year, and with the necessary planning and sharing of information among our various civilian agencies and our militaries to think through the best ways to respond and protect our citizens in the event of catastrophic attacks.

I think it is fair to say that these adjustments to our priorities are the direct result of last September's attacks.



In retrospect, do you have a better idea today of why the events of 9-11 occurred?

At a very general level, many explanations have been offered. Some analysts sought immediately to apply Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' view and situate the attacks within the context of a perceived divide between the Christian and Islamic worlds. I think this is both simplistic and wrong. Others have described the attacks as a manifestation externally of tensions internal to Muslim societies. Others still are quick to point out that despite the horror of the attacks of September 11, we must recognize that terrorism has existed throughout history and occured within many different societies, religions and cultures. The difference today is that the attack took place in North America, bringing it closer to home. We must not forget, however, that not all such attacks come from outside, as the Oklahoma bombing illustrated. Such recognition makes it more difficult to draw quick and easy conclusions about the 'root causes' of terrorism generally.

Certainly, what we do know about the case in question is that a small number of committed and well-organized extremists were able to evade surveillance using relatively inexpensive communications technology, to circulate freely under legitimate cover, to absorb specialized knowledge from reputable institutions, and to carry out destructive attacks that few of us would previously have imagined.

Canada-U.S. relations on foreign affairs are often a mix of alignment and tension. The Government of Canada has supported the broad purpose of the U.S.-led war on terrorism and the military efforts in Afghanistan, yet has been careful in its support elsewhere. Under what circumstances should Canadians expect their government to support an initiative against terrorist interests beyond Afghanistan, for example in Iraq?

We are committed to the international effort to eliminate global terrorism. Canadians have in fact assumed a leadership role in doing so in various G-8 working groups on counter-terrorism and through our work in a range of other bilateral and multilateral fora.

In confronting the threat of terrorism beyond Afghanistan, we have stated frequently that we will make decisions as required in individual cases based upon our assessment of the relevant legal, political and security context. This is particularly the case when you are talking about somewhere as complex as the Middle East, where the potential for regional destabilization is always present.

We have no illusions about Saddam Hussein and know well his past record. In the face of any commonly perceived imminent threat that Saddam Hussein would use weapons of mass destruction I believe that the U.N. Security Council and the world community generally would support action against him.

The setting of foreign policy in a potential war zone requires a strong understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the national military. How confi-

dent are you that Canada's Armed Forces can properly meet the demands placed on it where the foreign policy seeks active engagement of an enemy?

Canada's Armed Forces have consistently demonstrated their ability to get the job done. Here we need only recall recent missions abroad such as our peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and East Timor, and the combat role of Canadians during the NATO air campaign in Kosovo.

The exceptional performance of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battalion under extremely difficult conditions in Afghanistan is only the most recent example of the high quality of our Armed Forces.

That being said, we have to be mindful of questions of capacity, particularly when our troops are committed to various global regions at once, and I can assure you that this is something I have been discussing regularly with my colleague John McCallum, the Minister of National Defence.

Because of 9-11, Canadians have been well educated in the foreign policy dilemmas in certain parts of the world. At the same time, other regions are in turmoil yet continue to receive scant attention. Which corners of the globe are international crises in-waiting and thus deserve the attention of the Canadian people?

You are very right to point out that there are some areas of the world just don't seem to get the same amount of public attention as others, but there are also those such as India/Pakistan where the threat of a nuclear exchange remains ever present and has engaged the world community.

More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, countries of the developing world can be divided into two groups: those experiencing slow but significant growth and advancement; and those, including too many in Africa, which seem to be sliding into the abyss, as failed states.

This is why, as Chair of the G-8 for 2002, we chose to focus on African development. The alarming spread of disease and economic instability in parts of Africa simply must be addressed, not just for the good of the African people, but for our own well being and that of our children. We live in an increasingly interdependent world, in which such regional crises can very quickly have an impact throughout the international system.

Does Canada have sufficient international standing to act as an effective broker in regional disputes? If this an objective of our government, when should it engage itself in the internal troubles of another country?

We hold a unique and highly-respected position in international affairs, which has enabled us to assume the role of broker in a range of disputes and among a range of parties. I think we should engage in such activity where the parties in question are willing to accept our assistance, and where we believe we have some particular experience or expertise to offer that can make a difference. Canadians I talk to really do want to see their government promoting our values in the world, sharing our unique experience with others, letting them know more about our own very successful model of society. I think it is fair to say that in areas such as our innovation with governance structures, and our ability to live and flourish amid such remarkable diversity, we are rightly considered with great admiration by most countries of the world. Our federal make-up and experience, together with our Charter, provide useful models for pluralistic societes within a stable governmental framework.

The United Nations has come under increasing criticism in recent years for its lack of impact on many of the world's conflicts, such as Rwanda and the Middle East. Is the UN losing its authority on regional disputes and what kind of UN would Canada most like to see?

I think we would most like to see an effective UN, one that is above all capable of dealing with issues of peace and security, economic and social development, and respect for human rights. Canada has been at the forefront of efforts to enhance the capacity of the organization, and we fully support Secretary-General Kofi Annan's efforts in this respect. The most recent example of such a cooperative effort is the reform package known as the Brahimi Report, aimed at a complete overhaul of the way the UN conducts peace operations. The problem, I would say, is not that the UN has lost authority, but rather that it has been confronted with increasingly complex instances of conflict, during a period in which global demands and expectations of the UN have also expanded enormously. Despite all of this, however, I think we must also acknowledge some of the recent successes of the UN in places such as Sierra Leone and East Timor, and encourage efforts to make the UN, and the multilateral system generally more effective. If we prefer that disputes be resolved politically rather than militarily, we really have no alternative.

What are the greatest challenges Canada faces today on the international stage?

In the broadest sense, I suppose, the challenge facing Canada is the same as that facing most countries, which is to manage interdependence, whether regionally, and in our case particularly with a view to the United States, or globally. We are committed to protecting the sovereignty and security of our country, which exists to uphold our values and interests, and indeed, among the nation-states of the world, ours has been a remarkable success. Yet we are also assuming our place in new and evolving structures and institutions of global governance, in which we seek to expand our prospects and project our values and interests among other nations of the world–in effect, to expand our sovereignty by pooling it. There is no clear model or formula for doing this. It really is a question of looking closely at each opportunity to do so, and carefully evaluating the anticipated costs and benefits.

We know we have no choice, however, but to engage fully in this process. Nearly all of the issues of greatest concern to Canadians – the fight against terror or organized crime, our prospects for economic growth, the state of the environment, the health of our population, and more – all of these are affected dramatically by events and conditions beyond our borders. No one country can address these issues alone, and Canada must remain in the forefront of those nations committed to crafting innovative international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, and adjusting existing institutions in ways that enhance their ability to meet these global challenges.

La version française de l'intrevue est disponible au http://www.acs-aec.ca/fr_magazine.html

WHAT CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES STAND FOR... IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

BY Charles F. Doran

IN NORTH AMERICA, SOCIETIES ARE STRUCTURED NOT TO INDUCE GOVERNMENTS TO COMPETE AGAINST EACH OTHER, BUT TO ENABLE FIRMS TO COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER, AND TO ALLOW INDIVIDUALS TO COMPETE. IN THE MID-19TH CENTURY, LONG BEFORE MOST OTHER GOVERNMENTS, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES LEARNED TO CONSTRAIN THE NATURE OF THEIR COMPETITION AND TO INTERNALIZE THAT COMPETITION. THE DEMOCRACIES OF NORTH AMERICA LEARNED, IN LOCKEAN TERMS, TO STAND ON HEAD THE OLD DICTUM, STILL PROMINENT IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, THAT GOVERNMENTS MUST COMPETE ZERO-SUM AGAINST EACH OTHER, OFTEN BASED UPON FORCE USE. THIS OLD DICTUM HELD THAT 'THE NEIGHBOR OF MY NEIGHBOR IS MY FRIEND,' IMPLYING THAT ONE'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOR WAS AN ENEMY IN NEED OF BEING CONFRONTED AND BALANCED. THUS, ALTHOUGH POWER AND COMPETITION EXIST IN THE CANADA-U.S. RELATIONSHIP, THE USE OF FORCE IS UNTHINKABLE. THE SO-CALLED WESTERN "DEMOCRATIC PEACE" IS THE SIMPLE INVERSION OF THAT OLD DICTUM OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS MADE POSSIBLE BY A SALUTARY AND PRODUCTIVE COMPETITION.

Theoretically, out of such benign competition emerges more productive, richer and, therefore, potentially more just societies. (There can be no successful general economic theory of cooperation because co-operation, when generalized, always leads to collusion – which causes inefficiency and rigidity.) Because some additional wealth can be used to cancel corresponding degrees of poverty, the society possesses the potential to become more just. The purpose of the government then is to establish the rules of economic competition, as well as the rules of taxation and of spending. It also must see that these rules are observed.

The rules that the United States and Canada possess to govern the competition are not identical. But, based on democracy and the market, the rules are complementary. The rules in some areas, for example concerning regulation and trade dispute resolution, are even convergent. That has been the task of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and its successor, the North American Free Trade Agreement. Complementarity and competitiveness are the two forces that have driven societal change in North America, including Mexico, toward a freer, more efficient, more prosperous set of social relations.

Perhaps the most visible recent application of this principle of salutary competition in North America occurred not within the economy, but within the polity, when Mexico after some 70 years of one-party rule finally elected the PAN to power, thus establishing a more competitive political party system. Absence of competition leads to stagnation, and worse, to corruption. Through competition, both regarding the market and the political system, emerges a more productive, truly more representative, form of interaction.

Hence, a kind of polity has emerged in North America that is known for (1) democratic institutions (2) capitalism accompanied by a modified social safety net (3) human rights, and (4) a society formed from an immigrant base. Democratic pluralism has become its watchword.

Democratic pluralism assumes that individual cultural-linguistic communities can live together in freedom, and with tolerance and prosperity, under a single democratic roof. The variants of this social philosophy are evident in Canada and in the United States. In Canada, the notion of a thin bilingualism, accompanied by the preference for French in Quebec and for English in the rest of Canada, ensconced within a multicultural mosaic is the outstanding feature of democratic pluralism. In the United States, English is dominant but many languages are spoken in large enclaves across the land. But as with the Afro-American community or the various Hispanic communities, there is no fear of loss of identity merely because the community is geographically dispersed or uses English as the working language.

So democratic pluralism has a unique characterization in each of the two countries, but its normative message remains the same. Differing ethnic, cultural, or linguistic communities can interact positively and harmoniously inside a federal, democratic framework.

TRADE AND NORTH AMERICA

Canada is a great trading nation. An index of this propensity to trade is the value of Canadian foreign trade as a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At above 40 percent, Canada ranks on this index among the highest in the industrial world. Likewise, the United States, because of the huge size of its GDP, is deeply involved in world trade and investment. The United States has been at the forefront of every multilateral trade round since the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Presently, despite some differences at the margin of policy, Canada and the United States have interests regarding the importance of further trade and investment liberalization that are scarcely open to doubt or qualification.

Yet, in the age of globalization these interests and this involvement are under siege, not just by noisy demonstrators at WTO meetings, but by rank and file labor members, by business firms in aging industries like steel, and by threatened members of the Canadian Parliament and of the U.S. Congress seeking re-election. The far-left and the far-right have linked hands condemning globalization and the values underlying it. So what are those values, and how do Canada and the United States articulate them? In terms of Canada-U.S. relations, where do the differences lie? In the age of globalization, what do Canada and the United States really stand for?

In Canada, the notion of a thin bilingualism, accompanied by the preference for French in Quebec and for English in the rest of Canada, ensconced within a multi-cultural mosaic is the outstanding feature of democratic pluralism. In the United States, English is dominant but many languages are spoken in large enclaves across the land.

DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is not a lot of things it has been claimed to be. Globalization is not just internationalization, for that has been going on since the founding of the nation-state in the 17th century. Globalization is not merely economic interdependence among markets and countries. At the end of the 19th century, the very high degree of economic interdependence in Europe, and between Europe and its colonies, in terms of the mobility of capital and labor was only once again matched in the 1990s. Globalization is also not Americanization. That fast-food restaurants happen to be equated with MacDonald's does not deny that Burger King is British-owned. That the mania for rapidly served, cheap, standardized, and comparatively nutritious food happened to emerge at a time in history when the United States was politically prominent and industrially mature does not mean that there is anything innately American about fast food. Industrial innovation, as a func-

tion of the historical interval and culture are being confused and falsely intermixed here.

Globalization is the confluence of two factors at the end of the 20th century. One factor is the capacity of the modern corporation to source globally regarding production, and then to market globally in terms of sales. A Nokia cell-phone, for example, is nominally made in Finland where the home office of the company is located. Yet according to the accompanying brochure, it contains parts and labor contributed by Japan, Thailand, Taiwan and the United States. The determination of where the cell-phone is actually is "made" must be a custom agent's nightmare. Yet a cell-phone is a typical product in the age of globalization that is sensitive to the slightest fluctuations in price anywhere in the world market and is totally dependent upon an open investment and trading system.

The second force that contributes to the definition of globalization is the information revolution. The speed and volume of information transmittal has transformed not just information flows in the areas of finance, investment and trade, but has reduced the number of managers by eliminating the middle echelons. Productivity has increased not just in industry but in the services where it has lagged the most. The information revolution has changed those businesses most that were previously thought the most traditional, like agriculture. The information revolution has changed business in North America profoundly by substituting communication for transportation and by flattening and broadening managerial responsibility. Transformation of the old economy by the information revolution is much more important than the transformation of the so-called new economy.

Hence, globalization – a product of both the changed nature of global production and distribution on the one hand, and of the information revolution on the other – has contributed greatly to the prosperity of North America. But notwithstanding that reality, Canada and the United States still perceive globalization in somewhat different ways. These differences become politically important and require evaluation.

DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE REGARDING GLOBALIZATION

Foreign Investment. Canada is a country that was built on a foundation of foreign investment. Economist Paul Krugman has gone so far as to say that Canada is the only successful example of the Import Substitution Model in the history of economic development. This model was based on the notion that, if a country maintained high tariffs, capital would come in from abroad to take advantage of the protected market. Local firms would prosper in this "infant industry" atmosphere where they were protected from intense outside competition. Both things did happen.

Domestic firms prospered, but unfortunately they were not very efficient and often were unable to compete in international markets. Foreign firms did invest in Canada to the extent that it had the highest level of foreign investment of any of the advanced industrial countries. But these firms often were branch plants which, like the domestic firms, produced only for the local market.

The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, followed by NAFTA, changed much of the industrial structure of Canada. Canada's great banks and its corporations like NORTEL, Bombardier, and many other companies, rapidly developed more of a worldwide competence. The North American automobile industry continued to remain a central part of both the Canadian and U.S. economies. Economic growth surged in Canada and in the United States as the three economies – Canada, the United States and Mexico – became more specialized and productive.

Yet Canada and the United States still look at foreign investment, as opposed to foreign trade, somewhat differently. "National treatment" is something the United States embraces but Canada accepts. With a very high level of foreign investment, and a lower degree of investment abroad on the part of its own companies, Canada in some quarters is less enthusiastic about unbounded investment openness (as opposed to trade openness) than the United States. To the average Canadian, globalization looks a bit more like a "mixed bag" than to the average American. Structural differences in the two economies, combined with a different history of economic development, yield different attitudes towards, for example, how the Economic Development Corporation as opposed to the World Bank should operate. These differences of perspective are felt in the way that future trade and investment liberalization is approached by the two countries.

Culture. Notwithstanding that French is spoken in Quebec and English is spoken in the rest of Canada, whereas English is the primary (though not the sole) language throughout the whole of the United States, deeper differences exist in the way the two countries view culture. The United States does not think very much about its culture; Canada is quite reflective about its own. The United States tends to distinguish between "mass" culture and "elite" or "high" culture. Canada, France and many other countries, such as China or Russia, tend to make no such distinction and instead tend to emphasize how mass and high culture intermingle. The United States looks at mass culture as a commodity to be sold in the marketplace. Canada believes that all of Canadian culture is precious and must be either protected or promoted.

In consequence of these differences of perspective regarding culture, the

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trade policy of the two countries regarding culture is much affected. Canada wishes to exempt the "cultural industries" from trade liberalization. The United States looks upon the cultural industries as a source of foreign exchange. Canada worries that trade will bash Canadian culture. The United States worries that barriers to trade in culture will prevent American companies from selling enough of it abroad.

At heart, Canada thinks of itself as an importer of culture whereas the United States thinks of itself as an exporter. Indeed, both perspectives are probably wrong. The United States in gross amounts probably consumes more foreign culture than any other country in the advanced industrial world. Canada, one-tenth the size of the United States, nonetheless across the entire spectrum of the arts, music and the media, produces and exports a far greater amount than the ratio of one-to-ten would suggest. Canada, for its size, is one of the giants of cultural production and export in the world today.

Collective versus Individual Enterprise. Despite the reality that both Canada and the United States historically have had a very dynamic co-operative movement, the two countries are very different in their preferences for individual versus collective enterprise. The Canadian penchant for Crown Corporations has some equivalents in the United States, such as regarding the huge electrical power projects in some regions of the United States, but not many such initiatives. Canada also has dairy product purchasing boards, many collectives in Quebec, for example, that are similar to, but not identical with, the American savings and loans, and the soft-wood lumber marketing arrangements. Each of these collective initiatives is bred of a fear of smallness in the market, fear of an inability to compete with larger foreign-based producers.

American commercial enterprise is so firm-centered that it is very difficult for American governments and American corporate elites to understand what the collective movement is about. There is a deep American suspicion that these are price-fixing arrangements, much like the cartels which since 1912 American government has been regulated or broken up. Hence the sense that, in the soft-wood lumber negotiations, Canada must be doing something illegal because it is not relying on an open auction in the way Americans are.

Given the different approaches to commercial enterprise in Canada and the United States, at least on the margin of the economy, rules for commercial activity must be quite different. Where differences in institutions persist, a greater effort must be made by economists, news analysts and government spokespersons to show that the outcomes in terms of production, distribution and price may not vary much at all. Otherwise, the commercial activities of the two countries will continue to clash over distinctions where in most cases there are no real differences in terms of outcomes.

Security versus Economic Development and Humanitarian Concerns, No single statistic so distinguishes Canadian foreign policy, from that of the United States, than proportionate military spending. The United States spends 3 to 4 percent of its GDP on average for security. Canada spends

perhaps 1 percent. This is big money. Why such a stark difference?

There is a theory in international political economy that considers alliance security a collective good, that is, as indivisible. Also, none of the members can be excluded from participating in the benefits which are regarded as equal. Under these circumstances, the big actor does what it must and the small actor does what it thinks it can. The big actor spends a lot to protect itself; the small actor spends as little as possible, thinking that it cannot influence the security situation much anyway. The small actor becomes a "free-rider". This model does have relevance for the Canada-U.S. dyad.

But at a deeper level of analysis, Canadians, because of their historical experience, place a higher value on economic development and humanitarian concerns than on security relative to Americans. Americans tend to rely more on force use in international relations than Canadians. Canadians are more idealist about world politics than are Americans. Given these differences of value, perspective and power, not surprisingly Canada will adopt one position vis-a-vis Cuba and the United States will take another even though each government has exactly the same ultimate goal in mind, that is, a more market-oriented, more democratic Cuba.

CANADA-US RELATIONS AND GLOBALIZATION

As governments, Canada and the United States have learned to create a region in which competition between themselves, though real, is benign and minimized, and in which the opportunity for rule-based competition among firms and among individuals is at a maximum. That is the secret to North American prosperity: comparative transparency of institutions and unequaled independence of individuals. While some difference between the two countries exists regarding the relative emphasis of these values and outcomes, these in general and in contrast to much of the world are what Canada and the United States stand for.

These are the same values and the same dimensions of behavior that allow globalization to flourish. Globalization requires a minimization of violent conflict between governments through security arrangements and adequate power, and a maximization of salutary competition between firms, organizations, coalitions and individuals. Many have spoken of the collapse of the state and of the obsolescence of the firm, but nothing could be further from reality. At the dawn of the 21st century, the state and the firm are the preferred form of political and commercial organization, respectively. Globalization has added greatly to the vitality of each.

That is the secret to North American prosperity: comparative transparency of institutions and unequaled independence of individuals.

But North Americans must avoid smug condescension towards others in the world whose lot may be improving but not as fast as that in North America. When globalization is combined with self-centeredness, and the image that the rules are being written to benefit the rich and powerful, globalization builds within itself its own destruction. Naïve paternalism, calculated to win votes at home, in the form of well-intentioned, but scarcely useful or lasting, foreign assistance can be just as objectionable.

North Americans must avoid smug condescension towards others in the world whose lot may be improving but not as fast as that in North America.

A response to terrorism is essential. But terrorism, and the response to terrorism cannot be allowed to derail globalization that promises so much for everyone around the world. Borders must remain open, although more carefully monitored, immigration must continue, and the bulk of foreign policy attention must be on the productive and product-creating aspects of existence, not the negative or restrictive aspects. The fight against terrorism may be long and it must be adequate, but it cannot be allowed to distort understanding of the fundamentals of trade or diplomacy. In statecraft, interactions between governments remain key; in commerce, interactions between firms remain primary.

Globalization requires choices and strategic vision. Canada and the United States must decide whether the principal objective ought to be the region and the Free Trade Area of the Americas or, alternatively, another global round of trade and commercial liberalization. Canada, the United States and Mexico must decide how to deepen NAFTA. The NAFTA countries need to think about whether they and the European Union, or APEC, or ASEAN, have something to talk about concerning the issues of regulation and deregulation. Globalization will never (and should not) replace localization because localization can do many things best. Localization will back and fill behind globalization, within a shifted context that will enable localization to perform even more effectively. Through salutary competition, every one of these choices yields positive-sum benefits to the citizens living within the North American region and the world.

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LE CANADA À LA CROISÉE DES CHEMINS: L'APRÈS-11 SEPTEMBRE COMME PRÉSAGE D'UNE INTÉGRATION MILITAIRE NORD-AMÉRICAINE

PAR David Grondin

LES ÉVÉNEMENTS DU 11 SEPTEMBRE 2001 AURONT DEUX EFFETS MAJEURS SUR LA RELATION CANADO-AMÉRICAINE : ILS RAPPROCHENT ENCORE PLUS LE CANADA DES ÉTATS-UNIS EN MATIÈRE DE SÉCURITÉ ET DE DÉFENSE ET ILS AMÈNENT LES ÉTATS-UNIS À REVOIR LEUR DÉFENSE CONTINENTALE ET LA SÉCURITÉ DES FRONTIÈRES QU'ILS PARTAGENT AVEC LEURS VOISINS. CE NOUVEL ALIGNEMENT S'APPARENTE À L'INTÉGRATION ÉCONOMIQUE NORD-AMÉRICAINE DÉJÀ ENTAMÉE. MÊME SI CE PROCESSUS A ÉTÉ AMORCÉ AVANT MÊME LE DÉBUT DE LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE, LES ÉVÉNEMENTS DU 11 SEPTEMBRE AURONT EU POUR EFFET D'ACCÉLÉRER CE PROCESSUS ET DE LE RENDRE D'AUTANT PLUS IRRÉVERSIBLE. CET ÉTAT DE FAIT FORCE LE CANADA À SE QUESTIONNER SUR LES ORIENTATIONS FUTURES DE SA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE ET DE SÉCURITÉ, AINSI QUE SUR SON RÔLE SUR LA SCÈNE INTERNATIONALE.

Les Américains et les Canadiens partagent un espace continental commun ainsi que des racines linguistiques, politiques, culturelles, sociales et historiques. Depuis l'Accord de libre-échange (ALE) canado-américain, ils partagent également un espace économique commun. En dépit de leur intégration économique, les deux États souverains ont préféré et préfèrent toujours demeurer souverains, du moins politiquement. Depuis les événements du 11 septembre 2001, le spectre d'une intégration accrue est réapparu : cette nouvelle phase viserait la sécurité et la défense du continent nord-américain. Avec les accords de coopération sur la sécurité des frontières et le contrôle de la migration régionale et sur la création d'une frontière intelligente de décembre 2001, les premiers jalons ont certes été posés, ils le sont depuis longtemps pourrait-on dire, mais il est encore trop tôt pour parler d'une intégration militaire nord-américaine comme étant chose faite.

Traditionnellement, les relations canado-américaines ont été marquées par une profonde asymétrie. L'importance que leur accorde chacun des partenaires diffère: pour les États-Unis, le domaine politico-stratégique, qui concerne la défense et la sécurité, est primordial, alors que pour le Canada, ce sont les relations économiques qui prévalent. Cela s'explique assez facilement par leur rôle respectif sur la scène internationale. D'emblée, il faut reconnaître que la relation de sécurité et de défense s'est toujours faite dans un sens plutôt que dans l'autre, le Canada voyant sa sécurité et sa défense assurées à faible coût par les États-Unis. Dans le monde post-11 septembre, cette relation retient plus que jamais l'attention des décideurs américains et canadiens. Or, plus que la fin de la guerre froide, le 11 septembre et la menace terroriste transnationale pourraient profondément altérer les rapports canado-américains en matière de sécurité et de défense. Le présent article vise à décrire et analyser l'évolution des relations canado-américaines en matière de sécurité et de défense à la lumière des événements tragiques du 11 septembre 2001 en ayant à l'esprit le processus d'intégration militaire continentale que l'on voit poindre.

LE POIDS DU CONTINENTALISME SUR UNE PUISSANCE MOYENNE CHERCHANT À S'ASSUMER

L'aube de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale a vu naître la collaboration canado-américaine en matière de défense. L'imminence de la menace allemande conduisait le président américain Franklin Delano Roosevelt à évoquer la pertinence d'une défense continentale pour l'Amérique du Nord avec son homologue canadien, le premier ministre William Lyon MacKenzie King. À Kingston, en Ontario, le 18 août 1938, ils s'entendaient pour que les États-Unis assurent la défense du Canada s'il était menacé par une puissance étrangère et le Canada promettait en retour aux États-Unis de faire son possible pour empêcher qu'une puissance étrangère passe par le Canada pour diriger une attaque contre le territoire américain. De cette initiative américaine émergeait alors la réciprocité caractérisant depuis la relation canado-américaine de défense. Si le ciment de cette relation était la présence d'une menace à la sécurité du continent nord-américain, la pierre originelle scellant le partenariat stratégique canado-américain s'avère la Déclaration d'Ogdensburg du 18 août 1940, créant la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense (CPCAD ou *Permanent Joint Board on Defense* (PJBD)). La défense de l'Amérique du Nord devenait ainsi la responsabilité conjointe du Canada et des États-Unis. Tout en assumant désormais son indépendance par rapport à la mère patrie britannique, le Canada amorçait la continentalisation de sa politique de défense et de sécurité.



Durant la guerre froide, les relations de défense entre le Canada et les États-Unis ont été marquées par une collaboration plus étroite en ce qui a trait à la défense aérospatiale et aérienne nord-américaine avec la création du NORAD (le *North American Aerospace Defense Command* ou le Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord) en 1958. La menace d'une attaque nucléaire soviétique justifiait cette nouvelle coopération institutionnelle.

Un contexte similaire à ceux de 1940 et de 1958 prévaut depuis le 11 septembre. En effet, une menace à la sécurité continentale pousse inexorablement vers une plus intime collaboration militaire entre le Canada et les États-Unis : le terrorisme transnational. Et comme en 1940 et 1958, ce sont les États-Unis qui font des pressions en ce sens. Toutefois, le Canada n'est plus dans la même position face à son voisin du sud. S'il avait théoriquement le choix en 1940, il n'est aujourd'hui plus en mesure de le faire. L'asymétrie initiale n'a plus rien à voir

avec celle qui règne maintenant[1]. Aujourd'hui, les États-Unis forment une hyperpuissance, la première puissance mondiale, alors que le Canada peine à assumer son statut de puissance moyenne. Par conséquent, s'il s'est historiquement permis de négliger les aspects traditionnels de la défense nationale afin de pouvoir utiliser ses ressources à d'autres fins et d'agir dans d'autres forums multilatéraux, le Canada ne peut plus s'en remettre aux États-Unis sans assumer sa part du fardeau, ou sinon, il devra subir leurs impératifs de puissance.

Cette réalité – la disparité dans la puissance – donne le ton au partenariat stratégique canado-américain. Cette disparité s'exprime particulièrement dans le peu d'attention que consacrent les États-Unis à la relation canado-américaine[2]. Pourtant, le Canada demeure une assise stratégique indéniable pour les États-Unis pour la défense conjointe de l'espace continental nord-américain : les États-Unis ont besoin d'un accès à l'espace aérien canadien, à ses voies maritimes et à son territoire pour leurs forces défensives stratégiques. C'est pourquoi le Canada doit disposer de forces pouvant collaborer avec celles des États-Unis pour la défense du continent. Mais au grand dam des Canadiens, le Canada est rarement considéré par les États-Unis comme un allié exceptionnel dans l'élaboration de sa politique étrangère et de défense. Pour les stratèges américains, l'Amérique du Nord a toujours constitué une sorte de retrait géostratégique permettant aux États-Unis de pouvoir s'affirmer davantage sur la scène extérieure et de pouvoir projeter leur puissance à l'échelle mondiale. Ne disposant pas des mêmes atouts et n'étant pas poussé par les mêmes intérêts de puissance que les États-Unis, le Canada a lui aussi bénéficié de la situation géostratégique de l'Amérique du Nord. Depuis le 11 septembre, en raison de la « nouvelle » menace terroriste transnationale, l'Amérique du Nord n'est plus considérée comme étant stratégiquement isolée. Sa vulnérabilité a été révélée. Par conséquent, les États-Unis voient désormais la sécurité continentale, celle du territoire national américain avant tout, comme leur priorité. Le Canada s'étant toujours ajusté aux États-Unis et non l'inverse dans leur relation de défense, il n'est pas surprenant qu'il soit amené à revoir sa vision de sa sécurité et celle de son territoire en suivant l'orientation américaine. Le 11 septembre 2001 consacre ainsi ce qu'on pourrait appeler la continentalisation de la sécurité canadienne.

LE 11 SEPTEMBRE, CAUTION ABSOLUE DE L'INTÉGRATION MILITAIRE NORD-AMÉRICAINE?

Pour le Canada, la sécurité continentale n'a jamais été la première des préoccupations; il était plus facile de bénéficier de l'abri sécuritaire fourni par l'arsenal nucléaire et l'appareil militaire de la superpuissance américaine. Maintenant que les États-Unis exigent du Canada qu'ils voient à la sécurité de leurs frontières et de son territoire, il n'a pas vraiment le choix d'obtempérer selon les volontés américaines. Aujourd'hui, la principale menace consiste en une attaque terroriste utilisant des armes de destruction massive visant le territoire américain et perpétrée à partir du territoire américain (la menace nucléaire conventionnelle – une attaque faite à l'aide d'un missile nucléaire – demeure, mais elle n'est plus considérée comme la plus imminente). Dans un tel contexte, le contrôle des frontières avec les pays voisins des États-Unis devient primordial, car il faut s'assurer que des terroristes ne puissent transiter par ces pays (le Canada et le Mexique) pour ensuite s'installer aux États-Unis. Le Canada peut déplorer d'être contraint de s'ajuster tant bien que mal aux considérations sécuritaires américaines, l'asymétrie dans les attributs de puissance entre les deux partenaires l'oblige à suivre l'orientation américaine en ce qui a trait à la sécurité continentale : l'intégration de la défense nord-américaine.

Sans sombrer dans un optimisme béat ni dans un fatalisme naïf, la question de l'intégration continentale doit être prise au sérieux par les dirigeants canadiens. Le Canada n'est plus en mesure d'assurer seul sa propre sécurité et les frontières séparant le Canada des États-Unis sont vulnérables. Ce faisant, les États-Unis veulent s'assurer que c'est le continent dans son intégralité qui est sécurisé. Si le Canada n'est pas prêt ou apte à défendre son territoire, les États-Unis le feront pour lui, avec ou sans son consentement. Encore plus que durant la guerre froide, la donne post-guerre froide et post-11 septembre impose aux Canadiens un choix difficile et, peut-être coûteux. Veulent-ils avoir un mot à dire dans la future défense de l'Amérique du Nord ou plutôt s'en remettre entièrement à la toute puissance américaine, avec les conséquences graves que cela risque d'entraîner, notamment la perte de souveraineté? Comme une intégration continentale est déjà partiellement instaurée avec le NORAD pour la défense aérienne et aérospatiale, le Canada se retrouve devant une alternative quant à une intégration continentale accrue sur le plan de la sécurité et de la défense : y participer ou la subir. La suite logique voudrait que le Canada prenne part à une structure conjointe chapeautant les dimensions terrestre et maritime de la défense continentale reposant, comme pour le NORAD, sur une coopération entre le Canada et les États-Unis (et non une alliance). Le Commandement nordique (*Northern Command*) qui entrera en vigueur le 1er octobre 2002 pourrait, entre autres choses, ultimement servir à cette fin[3]. Historiquement, le Canada a cherché, par l'institutionnalisation de la relation canado-américaine, à réduire l'effet de l'asymétrie lorsque cela était possible. C'est notamment ce qu'il avait fait lors de la création du NORAD, question de préserver sa souveraineté face aux impératifs de défense des États-Unis au plus fort de la guerre froide. Une fois de plus, le Canada pourrait avoir avantage à participer à cette nouvelle institution et/ou coopération institutionnelle. Un tel constat peut sembler fataliste, mais c'est l'asymétrie de la relation canado-américaine qui l'exige.

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Le Canada se trouve donc à la croisée des chemins: il devra choisir sa voie dans l'élaboration de la nouvelle architecture de sécurité continentale. Il ne doit pas se contenter d'un rôle passif et simplement réagir aux initiatives américaines comme il le fait actuellement. Certains esprits, davantage soucieux d'une indépendance canadienne en matière de politique étrangère, affirment que l'opportunité est idéale pour le Canada de prêcher par l'exemple. La vision élargie de la sécurité que promeut le Canada s'avère la pierre d'achoppement sur laquelle le Canada doit miser. Or, pour ce faire, le Canada doit dépasser le stade de la rhétorique et réinvestir dans ses capacités internationales : « Une politique étrangère " à rabais " ne suffira pas à sauvegarder et à avancer les intérêts et les valeurs du Canada dans ce monde plus dangereux. Bref, le Canada ne peut pas continuer de " jouer dans la cour des grands " et d'assumer le rôle que les Canadiens attendent de lui, celui d'une vraie puissance internationale, sans se doter des outils nécessaires[4] ».

VERS L'ALÉNA MILITAIRE?

Avant même que ne surviennent les événements du 11 septembre, il était prévu que la sécurité binationale (pour parler de la sécurité des États-Unis et du Canada) soit repensée pour lutter contre les menaces « asymétriques » à la sécurité nationale que sont le terrorisme et le crime organisé transnationaux. Or, la déstabilisation de l'environnement stratégique continental survenue le 11 septembre 2001 constitue sans contredit un tournant inattendu et crucial pour les relations canado-américaines. Le 11 septembre a mis en relief l'urgence d'élaborer une nouvelle architecture de sécurité continentale. La constitution d'un périmètre de sécurité nord-américain est ainsi de plus en plus évoquée. Il n'est pas encore déterminé s'il comprendra le Mexique, mais tout porte à croire qu'il pourrait épouser militairement les limites de l'ALENA, même si le Canada s'y est pour l'instant opposé, préférant tenir le Mexique à l'écart et confiner la question aux seules relations canado-américaines. La période post-11 septembre s'annonce donc tout autant matricielle que la période ayant mené à la Déclaration d'Ogdensburg de 1940. En fin de compte, elle devrait conduire la relation de sécurité canado-américaine à une nouvelle phase de son évolution : l'intégration continentale. Fait à noter, comme cela avait été le cas à Ogdensburg, cette nouvelle étape résulte d'une pression des États-Unis en ce sens à la suite de nouvelles menaces à la sécurité du territoire national des États-Unis. Hier, c'était l'Allemagne nazie, puis le communisme soviétique; aujourd'hui, c'est le terrorisme et le crime organisé transnationaux. Que demain réserve-t-il?

Hier, c'était l'Allemagne nazie, puis le communisme soviétique; aujourd'hui, c'est le terrorisme et le crime organisé transnationaux. Que demain réserve-t-il ?

Plus que les actions et les initiatives des hommes politiques canadiens ou américains, ce sont donc des mutations profondes du système international qui auront contribué à un rapprochement fondamental entre les États-Unis et le Canada sur le plan de la sécurité. S'il est vrai que les États-Unis et le Canada partagent des traits culturels, normatifs, politiques et sociaux communs, reconnaître cette communauté et l'enchâsser dans un cadre institutionnel conjoint constituent toutefois deux actions bien distinctes. L'institutionnalisation est une aventure périlleuse et effrayante, pour les États-Unis comme pour le Canada. La forme que prendra l'intégration de la sécurité nord-américaine est encore inconnue. Pour l'instant, il est davantage question d'une coopération bilatérale informelle que d'une institutionnalisation au niveau de la sécurité continentale. Pourtant, dans ses rapports avec les États-Unis, le Canada a souvent préféré l'institutionnalisation, afin que soit régie et réglementée l'asymétrie. C'est ainsi qu'il a traditionnellement cherché à contenir les effets pervers de la continentalisation. Cependant, selon le politologue Stéphane Roussel, devant le spectre d'une intégration formelle de la sécurité, le Canada semble privilégier la coopération informelle, qui lui permettrait de préserver une plus grande autonomie décisionnelle tout en évitant de projeter l'image d'un État inféodé à Washington[5].

La défense de l'Amérique du Nord est l'obligation déterminante des relations canado-américaines; c'est la prospérité de l'Amérique du Nord en entier qui en dépend.

La défense de l'Amérique du Nord est l'obligation déterminante des relations canado-américaines; c'est la prospérité de l'Amérique du Nord en entier qui en dépend. Le Canada doit considérer comme réelles les menaces à son commerce et à sa sécurité qui pourraient résulter d'attaques sur le territoire canadien ou américain faites avec des armes de destruction massive ou sur des infrastructures essentielles. Négliger cette réalité stratégique du XXIe siècle serait faire preuve d'une insouciance grave. Un élargissement de la coopération militaire telle qu'elle se fait déjà avec le NORAD pour la défense aérienne et aérospatiale doit donc être envisagé pour les autres pans de la défense et de la sécurité continentale, à savoir la défense terrestre, maritime et la sécurité frontalière. À l'heure du terrorisme transnational, la sécurité des États-Unis s'avère inévitablement liée à celle du Canada. Après l'économie, l'on en est maintenant rendu à l'intégration complète de la défense nord-américaine.

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Les références complètes sont disponibles au http://www.acs-aec.ca/fr_magazine.html

UNCLE SAM AND US ONE YEAR LATER:
The Geopolitical Consequences for Canada of September 11th

BY Stephen Clarkson



WASHINGTON'S RESPONSE TO THE STUNNING CATASTROPHE SUFFERED ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 BY THE PENTAGON AND NEW YORK'S WORLD TRADE CENTER RAISED A DOUBLE QUESTION IN CANADA ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS ONLY NEIGHBOUR, THE GLOBAL HEGEMON. WOULD AN OBSESSIVE AMERICAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM JEOPARDIZE WHAT *POLITICAL AUTONOMY* OTTAWA HAD MANAGED TO RETAIN UNDER NAFTA'S HEIGHTENED CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION? AND ONCE THE LIFE-AND-DEATH ISSUES OF MILITARY SECURITY HAD BEEN ADDRESSED, WHAT WOULD BE THE FALLOUT FOR CANADA'S *ECONOMIC ACCESS* TO THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMERCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKET?

The immediate blockading of its borders and airports conjured up the prospect of a surgical severing of that Siamese twin otherwise known as the integrated Canadian-American economy, a radical operation from which the tiny twin could hardly be expected to recover. For those first hours of the trauma and the first days of shock, rational thought about an integrated continental economy was no match for the hysteria that overtook Washington about the terrorist threat facing the United States. Scenarios of a Fortress America that erected not just commercial but human fortifications along the 49th parallel and the Rio Grande sent Canadians a frightening message that, after decades of being lured into ever deeper intermingling of their economy and society, they were now faced with immediate and total exclusion, unless...

The alternative to total exclusion seemed total inclusion. The scenario competing with a Fortress America, defined narrowly as the territories of the fifty U.S. states, was a broader Fortress North America. To be brought within these continental fortifications Canada would have to accept not just common external tariffs proclaiming a customs union, but common immigration, refugee, intelligence and security policies in which it would abandon its autonomy in return for protection within the American sanctuary.

For some such as the business economist Wendy Dobson and retired historian Jack Granatstein whose proposals were published by the C.D. Howe Institute, a leading corporate think tank in Toronto, the requisite policy response to these stark alternatives was clear – and linked. To regain the secure *access* that free trade had supposedly achieved for companies exporting to the United States, Canada would have to propose a "big idea" to eliminate whatever remnants of an economic border that remained under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At the same time, to buy off possible punishment by Washington for the Chrétien government's insufficiently supportive behaviour in the autumn of 2001, Ottawa would have to negotiate an extension of military integration under the Pentagon's control to include its navy and army units. In short, access could not be partial; it required full integration.

Others, including this writer, considered that negotiating a new bilateral economic agreement with the United States was a political non-starter in post-traumatic Washington. As for the Bush administration's plans to weaponize space and attack Iraq, Ottawa should resist rather endorse both initiatives because of their inherently counterproductive potential. It was as unlikely that the White House would exact retribution for Ottawa's non-compliance as it was repugnant to adopt such a policy reversal out of simple cowardice. This school of thought argued that Canada should develop its military capacity not to provide a northern garrison for Washington's homeland defence but to enhance the United Nations' capacity for constructive intervention in situations of social disintegration that threatened human security as in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In short, meaningful autonomy in practice required real autonomy in mind.

What differentiated the Canadian responses from other countries' reactions were the special intimacy problems generated by sharing a common border with the U.S.A. Because its 8,900 kilometres constituted the United States's longest frontier with another state, Canada presented a special internal security concern to Washington. After all, over 500,000 people cross the Canada-U.S. border's 425 crossing points each *day*. But with $1.9 billion worth of daily trade – that is, 81 per cent of Canada's exports and 71 per cent of its imports – traversing the boundary largely by truck, the same border caused Canada an acute concern about its economic security. Any measure that slowed trade simultaneously imposed a serious liability on the increasingly integrated Canadian-American economic system.

Initial responses to this double problematic veered from one extreme to another. The unruffled among Canadian analysts held that nothing had changed on September 11, except that the human calamity suffered by workers in the twin towers and the Pentagon had brought Americans into the club of the vulnerable to which the rest of the world already belonged. Those successful suicide missions were only spectacular dramatizations of globalization's dark side. Al-Qaeda's stunning coup showed that security measures and intelligence capabilities would need to be improved in Canada in close conjunction with every other state, even if it was the United States, whose immigration and intelligence failures had been demonstrated by the terrorists' freedom of movement on American soil, which needed to make the greatest changes.

Such northern cool was dismissed by alarmists in Canada when Washington caused traffic gridlock at customs posts and panic in boardrooms by temporarily closing down its northern border. According to their view, if Canada wanted to regain an open economic border with the U.S., it would have to pursue a degree of military integration with the United States even greater than what it had accepted during the Cold War. In effect, Canada would have to merge its land and sea forces within the Americans' command structure.

Such full support for the American response to Islamic terrorism came naturally to the Canadian military whose strategic and industrial integration was first defined in formal agreements during World War II and then institutionalized during the Cold War through numerous arrangements – most prominent of which was the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD, 1957). Canadian leaders became used to endorsing whatever strategic doctrine on nuclear retaliation the Pentagon might issue as it responded to new circumstances and incorporated its military-industrial complex's latest technologies.

Immediate post-catastrophe behaviour on both sides of the 49th parallel seemed to confirm that the Cold War provided the appropriate template for the Canadian-American security relationship, but it turned out to fit operations abroad better than continental defence. George W. Bush's rhetorical declaration of war against terrorism connected Canada to the state of mind that existed before the Berlin Wall came down, namely a war psychosis that rallied the forces of light against an evil, if invisible, empire. In this apocalyptic

spirit, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien immediately endorsed the Bush Doctrine and offered his armed forces for the execution of the United States's military attack against the Taliban government and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

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Ottawa's decision in early 2002 to send 750 Canadian soldiers in the Light Infantry Battle Group to be deployed in Kandahar seemed gratuitous. Questions in Parliament were raised about the troops' subordination to U.S. command causing them to violate the Geneva Convention by handing over their prisoners to the Americans who refused to concede them the rights of captured soldiers. Consternation spilled out from the House of Commons to the whole country when on the night of April 18 four Canadian soldiers on a night-time training exercise were killed by a bomb dropped on them by an American pilot mistaking them for the enemy.

In offering up the Princess Pats as sacrificial lambs to do America's dirty – and, as it turned out, deadly – work in the mopping-up phase of its high-tech bombing war, the Chrétien government had sent an unambiguous signal to Washington. Integrating its troops in the U.S. military machine gave the White House the message that Canada was fully on-side. For Ottawa's main priority was not peace in Afghanistan. It was credit with Uncle Sam in a situation starkly different from that of the Cold War. Then the threat was military, distant and external to both the hegemon and its northern neighbour, leaving their common border as a traditional inter-state barrier whose economic height was determined by tariffs and whose human height was set by immigration and tourist regulations.

In George Bush's global campaign against terrorism, no rogue, axis-of-evil state's army, navy, nor air force was credibly able to threaten North America. The threat was less from visible states than from invisible networks whose destructive capacity was cunningly embedded throughout the world's multicultural mosaic. Washington had to assume that "sleepers" continued to go about their otherwise normal daily routines anywhere, even as fully-fledged U.S. citizens professed they loved America as much as Allah.

This absence of a traditional defence problem did not prevent some Canadians, including leading figures in the armed forces, from arguing that the new realities revealed on September 11 required not just the extension of NORAD to include control of the eventual National Missile Defence system, but the full integration of Canada's navy and army within their American counterpart services.

This was a Canadian solution in search of a not-yet-existent American need. Preliminary evidence that the White House was not overly exercised about its Canadian connections could be seen in the proposed Office of Homeland Security, which was about reorganizing domestic institutions. Subsequent proof that the Pentagon was not particularly concerned with a northern threat could be seen in its Northern Command, created in April 2002 to integrate the U.S. military's four famously autonomous services within a single entity and be responsible for North American defence. If Northcom's formal mandate was only to "co-operate" with Canada and Mexico, this suggested that the reorganized American military's domestic mission was not to integrate with, let alone displace, its neighbours' armed forces.

As a possible target in its own right for al-Qaeda's retribution, Canada had in any case to look to its own defences against terrorism. Consequently Ottawa's non-military policy response to September 11 was driven both by *domestic* and by *American* demands for security against terror. Between these two pressures on Canadian policy there was some common ground and some divergence.

The domestic needs of Canadian security were not substantially different from those of governments elsewhere facing increased threat levels. With the globalization of interdependence, domestic security had become transnationalized. Canada's security perimeter now extended to every visa office, seaport and international airport, whether Heathrow, Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt, or Tokyo, from which dangerous weapons could be shipped or potential terrorists could arrive, presenting themselves as immigrants, refugees who had lost or destroyed their documents, or innocent-looking tourists with dollars to spend on sightseeing in the Rockies. Defence against terrorism therefore required a generalized sharing of data among intelligence services, which would use the latest technologies for trying to ferret out the dangerous, and then tracking their movements. The role of the military was secondary in this effort of trans-social sleuthing. Primary was the work of immigration, customs, intelligence and police forces co-operating globally to detect the planning, and then abort the execution of horrific sabotage.

The government of Canada's signals were mixed. Despite Chrétien instantly offering expressions of sympathy and the government's quickly organizing a mass demonstration on Parliament Hill of public solidarity with the victims, the prime minister was made to appear niggardly in his support by the cheerleader standard set by Tony Blair, his British counterpart. In suggesting that September 11 had not radically changed the parameters of the military or subversive threat posed by terrorism, he appeared to endorse positions expressed by the unruffled observers. In acting backstage with energetic enthusiasm to transform Canada's security stance, his government showed it was closer to the views of the alarmist who insisted that the acid test would be American satisfaction that Ottawa and the provinces were conforming with what Washington deemed necessary.

If U.S. government required the

complete *harmonization* of the two countries' practices and the full integration of their personnel and data-gathering, Canadian security would suffer. Since 1996 Ottawa's refugee and immigration control system had put officers in airports abroad where they had stopped more than 33,000 people with false documents before they boarded planes for Canada. As a result, immigration security in Canada was considered tougher than in the U.S., so continentalizing the insecurity that characterized American society – including the ease with which al-Qaeda's plotters could immigrate and train at flight schools – would clearly be retrograde.

Within the understandably heated debates around these issues, the American ambassador to Canada was an important voice of reasoned calm. For Paul Cellucci, the issue was gaining informed American confidence in Canadian procedures. Standards for accepting desirable immigrants and procedures for dispatching dangerous applicants could be the same, or different, as long as they were effective. A process of intense, often tense, bilateral discussions between officials took place through the autumn, with Canadian officials explaining their practices to their predictably overbearing, but frequently less knowledgeable, U.S. counterparts.

Ottawa proceeded to take measures strengthening Canada's internal counter-terrorism capacity on a wide variety of fronts, many of which implemented the country's international obligations spelled out in treaties Ottawa had helped negotiate. Some new legislation was also introduced. Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, which became law on December 18, 2001, defined terrorist activity broadly and decreed tougher sentences for terrorism offences. A new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act came into force on June 28, 2002 to introduce higher penalties for immigration offences and declare violators of international human rights, members of organized crime syndicates, and other security threats ineligible for refugee status. Finance Minister Paul Martin's fall budget allocated C$7.7 billion for five years to the various terrorist control and border maintenance programs, a sum proportionately larger than the U.S. allocation to the same objectives.

Seen from the Rideau Canal, it was the government of Canada that actually set the bilateral agenda on border issues, because it had done its homework and because it was institutionally more nimble than the U.S. government. For years it had been trying to get Washington to undertake joint measures to improve border security (detecting dangerous immigrants) and increasing border efficiency (to speed the crossing of reliable cargoes while focusing on higher-risk shipments). Canada-U.S. border partnership talks had been initiated with the Clinton administration, but had not gone far. Once September 11 caused the U.S. government to focus on the issue, Ottawa had coherent plans ready to propose such as Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and fraud-resistant permanent identity cards for new immigrants.

The Canadian counterpart to former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge whom Bush appointed to co-ordinate the administration's action on homeland security was John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom the prime minister assigned as point man on Canada-U.S. security relations after September 11. Whereas Ridge took months to get his act together, the centralization inherent in parliamentary government gave Manley immediate command over all the federal government's relevant programs and officials.

As a result, the Canadian embassy in Washington could claim that the bulk of the 30-Point Smart Border Action Plan, signed by Ridge and Manley in December, was Canadian-inspired, although the stationing of U.S. customs inspectors in major Canadian seaports that act as trans-shipment depots for cargoes heading for the United States was clearly a Washington demand. Measures announced in order to satisfy the government's two publics — its electorate at home and the hegemon in Washington — raised the perennial question of Canadian sovereignty. But if the Canadian public agreed with the Liberals in wanting the same heightened levels of security, little autonomy seemed to have been sacrificed.

Developments over twelve months had confirmed the prime minister's initial unruffled hypothesis that September 11 had not fundamentally changed Canada's security parameters. With the U.S. success in Afghanistan and the worldwide toughening of anti-terrorist surveillance having decimated al-Qaeda's capacity to wreak havoc, it had become difficult for President Bush to maintain the sense of high anxiety necessary for a permanent war psychosis. Meanwhile it had learned that, with terror-by-anthrax having domestic roots, total security was a pipe dream and that, even if its northern neighbour was disconcertingly liberal, Canada's immigration procedures were tight and its officials reliable. With trade flows across the border having largely returned to normal, the Canadian business community had backed away from such "big ideas" as dollarization through a North American currency union.

In sum, Canada was not having to look across an impassable moat at a Fortress America. Nor did it have to beg for inclusion within Fortress North America through total offering policy harmonization. In place of these extremes of exclusion or annexation, Ottawa could continue managing its crucial bilateral relationship on a pragmatic, case by case basis. And on global issues such as the International Criminal Court, which it believed crucial for promoting human security in the international system, it was not afraid to oppose Washington's position at the United Nations.

In short, if a famous American poet could insist that good fences make good neighbours, a post-September 11 Canadian response about its role in the world relative to the United States could be what it had been before 2001: good neighbours make good fences.

Stephen Clarkson professes political economy at the University of Toronto. Some of the material for this article was adapted from his new book, *Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State* (Toronto and Washington: University of Toronto and Woodrow Wilson Presses, 2002, 535 pages).

EDUCATION FOR PEACEBUILDING CITIZENSHIP:
A Proposal for Teaching and Learning in the Context of Fragile Peace

BY Kathy Bickmore

CANADIANS ARE LIVING IN A FRAGILE PEACE. WE ARE AMONG THE FEW COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD THAT HAVE NOT EXPERIENCED AN ACT OF WAR ON OUR OWN SOIL DURING THE 20TH CENTURY. YET THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ASSAULT ON THE US WAS NONETHELESS A WATERSHED IN MANY CANADIANS' ERODING SENSE OF SECURITY. INCREASINGLY SINCE THE 1963 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THROUGH THE 1980S NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, THE 1990S PERSIAN GULF WAR, AND NOW IN THIS 21ST CENTURY TERRORIST LANDSCAPE, PROFOUND CHANGES IN COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE HAVE MADE IT MORE AND MORE IMPOSSIBLE TO PROTECT CHILDREN AND OTHER NON-COMBATANTS FROM THIS INSECURITY. CHANGES IN THE PRACTICE OF WAR-MAKING ITSELF HAVE MADE CIVILIANS, EVEN CHILDREN AND THOSE WHOSE GOVERNMENTS ARE SUPPOSEDLY NOT AT WAR, INCREASINGLY TARGETS. AS WITH MANY ASPECTS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY AND POPULAR CULTURE, OFTEN THE CHILDREN SEEM TO NOTICE THESE CHANGES EVEN BEFORE THE REST OF US. GLOBAL INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS AND URBANIZED POSTMODERN CULTURE BRING THE NEWS DIRECTLY TO THE YOUNG PEOPLE, INCREASINGLY UN-BUFFERED (ELKIND 1995). PERHAPS THEY ARE MORE OPEN TO THAT NEWS, OR LESS EXPERIENCED WITH DENIAL, THAN MANY ADULTS. SO IT WAS WITH NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES 20 YEARS AGO (MACY 1983), AND SO IT IS TODAY. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 MADE VISIBLE WHAT WAS ALREADY BECOMING TRUE: OUR SMALL WARRING WORLD KEEPS GETTING SMALLER, AND EVEN CHILDREN IN RELATIVELY PEACEFUL CANADA ARE NO LONGER IMMUNE.

So let's be clear that we're not talking about *whether* to tell the children about terrorism. They know. What we need to talk about is *what* young people need to know, and *how* we can help them to learn what they need, in order to regenerate hope and security in a world that includes terrorism. This article is about how we can help young people to develop their individual and collective capacities for building a more robust, stable peace.

Peace, to be real and sustained, requires vibrant activity, not quiet. Among diverse human beings in a complex and shifting environment, conflict (although not necessarily violence) is a constant. Thus peacebuilding requires *processes* for handling various kinds of conflicts, problems, and disagreements, equitably and nonviolently, so that solutions will last. Equally important, sustainable peace is built upon healthy, reliable, balanced *relationships* (thus connection, communication, and equitable interaction) among individuals and among social groups. Such a vibrant peace would be impossible to impose from the top: since everybody has social relationships and everybody has conflicts, everybody has the need and the opportunity to participate in peacemaking and peacebuilding. To participate in peaceful conflict management and in healthy relationships, citizens need access to justly-exchanged *resources* for sustaining their lives and for helping with difficult conflicts, and a breadth of *knowledge and skills* for handling conflict and human differences.

Where there is weakness in any of these four dimensions – inaccessible or unfair conflict management processes, scarcity or inequitable exchange of resources, inequitable relationships, and/or citizens lacking knowledge and capability to manage conflict – then conflicts tend to be more intense and harmful. Thus coercive peacekeeping becomes necessary, whereas pro-active, sustainable peacebuilding becomes more difficult.

Democracy is essential to peacebuilding (Mousseau 2001). Democratic governance and participation processes are mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution – ensuring equitable access, protecting rights in human relationships, regulating the development and exchange of resources, and engaging in critical reasoning to make other self-governance decisions. In short, peace is built upon active democracy, and thus upon informed citizenship. Thus education for peacebuilding is citizenship education: children need to learn how to become full participants in building and sustaining this vibrant peace.

People learn through experience, as much as through receiving and reflecting upon information. Thus in *peacebuilding citizenship education*, learners' awareness and competence are developed through models and practice, as they participate in problem-solving processes, in developing, protecting, and exchanging resources, and in their relationships within and between the cultures and communities around them. Also, because human minds rely on language for understanding, explicit knowledge and skills for handling conflict are an essential complement and anchor for this learning through practice. While teaching without authentic practice would be suspect and easily forgotten, practice without thoughtful naming and reflection would tend to be uncritical, inaccessible for some and not easily adapted to new situations or needs. In schools, the lived curriculum of school discipline and governance, resource use, and human inclusion and exclusion educates hand in hand with the peace and conflict topics in the formal curriculum. Peacebuilding citizenship education does not require adding a great deal of new curriculum content, but requires identifying and refining or reorienting the hidden education about conflict that is already embedded in the lived and the formal curriculum. I will illustrate in turn four dimensions of this education.

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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

The culture and (implicit and explicit) regulations of any community or school provide a pattern of opportunities and processes for managing conflict. These habits and procedures are important as elements of building, making and keeping peace. Accessible mechanisms for handling conflict can make the difference in whether tensions escalate into violence. As models and practice, these cultural practices are equally important as learning opportunities for their participants (Lederach 1995).

Contrary to the impression given by the mass media, the incidence of violence among young people has not increased in recent years (Brooks et. al. 2000). However, restrictive and punitive approaches to discipline in schools are increasingly prevalent (Canadian Press 2002a). Unfortunately, these policies often disproportionately punish less-affluent and non-white students (Johnston 2000). Similar racialized biases in our formal legal system have been especially visible in counter-terrorist security measures since September 11, 2001 (Canadian Press 2002b, Walkom 2002). Children learn about conflict management, obedience and social differentiation from their experiences with these processes, in and out of school. Replacing punitive and inequitable discipline procedures with initiatives for student learning through participation in problem-solving – such as student governance and conflict negotiation – can improve students' capacity to handle differing viewpoints and their interest in engaging in school (Adalbjarnadóttir 1992, Sadowsky 1992). Because expertise and planned curriculum are important in formal education, schools are unlikely to practice 'real' democracy: teachers and administrators are not elected, nor are students offered the right to refuse to participate (Raywid 1976).

Nonetheless, schools can offer regular opportunities for students to practice many skills associated with 'civil peace' — thoughtful, equitable, nonviolent decision-making in the context of diversity (Perkins 2002).

Some of the most well-studied school-based conflict resolution programs are alternative conflict resolution procedures that complement discipline regimes. In most cases, a relatively small group of students are trained as peer mediators; the other students learn by observing and participating in this peer-facilitated conflict negotiation process. Where implemented equitably and fully enough to affect some patterns of conflict management, such programs have been shown to improve students' understandings of nonviolent conflict management, their social conflict behavior, and their constructive engagement with school (Bickmore 2003, Cunningham et.al. 1998, Jones 1998). Because of the academic relevance of conflict management skills and safe, engaging learning contexts, peer mediation program implementation is also associated in many cases with strengthened academic achievement (Bickmore 2000). Peer mediation is neither sufficient as a sole approach to student conflict education, nor effective for every conflict such as power-imbalanced situations (Bickmore 2002b, Opffer 1997). However, this research demonstrates the valuable contribution to peacebuilding education of student participation in conflict management and self-governance processes.

PEACEBUILDING CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
MULTIPLE DIMENSION OF PRACTICE, REFLECTION, AND LEARNING



(RE)BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

Canadian society – because of its wonderfully diverse membership of recent and longer-ago immigrants and aboriginal peoples – presents a unique opportunity for rebuilding relationships across the boundaries of difference that often divide the world. We are not one big, happy family: serious conflicts and inequities persist. However, policies such as multiculturalism, hate crime laws, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provide a threshold, were designed to move our relationships in the direction of respectful coexistence. There has been an escalation of hostile incidents against Middle Easterners, Muslims and Jews in Canada over this last year, but also there has been condemnation of such hateful actions, and some attempts at redress, from those in authority (B'nai Brith 2002, Brown 2001, Rushowy 2001).

Public schools are among the first places where children work together and share 'public' space with their diverse neighbors. As such, schools present opportunities for young people to learn to develop healthy, equitable and inclusive relationships with people of different origins, religions, economic statuses and cultural backgrounds (Paley 1992). Unfortunately, schools and classrooms are often organized in ways that actually encourage social competition, bullying, and exclusion (Aronson 2000, Gordon et.al. 2000). It is possible and effective to reorganize learning contexts to encourage respectful co-operative interaction and recognition of diverse abilities (Cohen & Lotan 1997, Oakes et.al. 1997). Certain curriculum and teaching strategies also can effectively reduce bias and intolerance (Avery et.al. 1997, Fine 1995, Ladson-Billings 1994, Mock 2000). Schools do not have a uniformly good record in nurturing peaceful relationships, but there is clear evidence that they can do so.

Relationship rebuilding requires practice, i.e. concrete action. Paradoxically, 'feet first' behavior change probably influences attitude change, more often than 'hearts and minds' attitude change causes behavior change (McCauley 2002). Past behavior, for example having worked with a member of a previously-disliked group, tends to have a strong influence on future behavior. Obviously not all interaction across differences leads to such happy conclusions. Simple contact is not enough, and in fact it can reinforce prejudices and hostilities if interactions are not equitable and safe. However, well-designed

programs of peacebuilding communication among members of conflicting groups can help them to unlearn hostility and prejudice, if they involve close, prolonged and frequent contact, co-operation toward common goals and equalized status among participants (Cairns & Hewstone 2002, Maoz 2002, Tal-Or et.al. 2002). Rebuilding hurt relationships in the wake of post-September 11 intolerance will require carefully sustained, joint collaborative action. The recent crisis creates an opportunity, by providing a catalyst to get moving together. In order to create safe and effective educational opportunities for children, adults, too, have to co-operate across differences that have divided us.

DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

Peacebuilding itself requires resources. The allocation of resources to basic education, as well as to peacebuilding citizenship education in particular, makes social inclusion and sustainable violence reduction possible (Bush & Saltarelli 2000). In Ontario today, such educational resources are often denied to children whose parents' legal immigration status is unclear (Koehl 2002). Such a denial deepens social divisions and puts our society, and these children most of all, at risk. Children learn what their society and government values by observing where tangible resources are placed, and which efforts at resource creation are valued. For example in schools, resources for competitive assessment, regulation and punishment seem to outweigh those for pro-active relationship-building and problem-solving learning activities.

Resource scarcity, contamination, or unfair exchange – whether local or global in scope – may cause and exacerbate conflict as well as inhibit efforts at resolution. Education about development, protection and exchange of resources is not sufficient for peacebuilding, but this awareness and capacity to analyze is a necessary condition. In Canada, as in other places that on average have high standards of living, many are not very conscious of the world's rapidly-increasing gap between 'haves' and 'have-nots' (Rogers 2000). Meanwhile, modern mass communications have made that gap appallingly obvious to those experiencing relative deprivation. There is no more important source of global conflict and violence than this resource gap, and the 'ingenuity gaps' it exacerbates (Homer-Dixon 2000). Conflicts are often filtered through particular ideologies and identity interpretations, but underlying resource interests cause or exacerbate many of the most protracted social conflicts (Mukarubuga 2002, Ross 1993).

Some Canadians have seemed baffled by the depth and breadth of hostility toward North America that recently has become more visible. An important dimension of peacebuilding citizenship education is to help Canadian children to understand 21st century processes of global resource development and trade, and the poverty, disease, war, and terrorism that are the deadly consequences of the current inequitable exchange. This is not intended to discourage: only awareness can unleash the creative ingenuity needed to overcome these problems. Priorities in the allocation of physical and human resources limit what we can do in education, and are themselves educational topics that deserve more attention in the context of our fragile world system.

Education about development, protection and exchange of resources is not sufficient for peacebuilding, but this awareness and capacity to analyze is a necessary condition.

KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS FOR HANDLING CONFLICT

Peacebuilding citizenship education will be best served by systemic changes that model and encourage tangible practice of nonviolent conflict management processes, healthy and equitable relationships, and development and just distribution of resources. At the same time, citizens' capacity for such peacebuilding depends upon their development of awareness, understanding and skills for making sense of conflict, violence and alternatives. There is a continuous interdependence between problem-posing and problem-solving, between the word and the world: "The unfinished character of [humans] and the transformational character of reality necessitate that education be an ongoing activity" (Freire 1970, p.72). Thus knowledge development – in dialogue with new patterns of behavior – is an important dimension of peacebuilding.

While it is true that schooling needs constantly to catch up with the world, there is already significant space for peacebuilding citizenship education in our formal curriculum. Ontario's 1998 Science and Technology curriculum expects grade 4 children to determine positive and negative effects of human alteration of the landscape (p.96), and Grade 5 children to evaluate the effects on natural and human environments of our use of different natural resources for energy (p.63). Ontario's 1998 Social Studies curriculum expects Grade 2 children to understand similarities and differences in the ways communities around the world meet their needs (p.30), and Grade 5 children to understand the rights and responsibilities of Canadians and how immigrants become Canadian citizens (p.37). By Grades 7 and 8 History, children are expected to examine conflicting viewpoints regarding historical issues (p.47) and to understand factors including social movements that contribute to change in society (p.53). Meaningful school curriculum faces the real-life conflicts that make science, geography, civics and history worth knowing.

Interpersonal conflict resolution skills are also important to success in the elementary curriculum. Ontario's 1997 Language curriculum expects children to present and justify their viewpoints to specific audiences in Grade 5 writing (p.19) and to make judgments about an author's content and viewpoint in Grade 5 reading (p.34). Nearly all literature plots involve some kind of conflict, so reading and writing are natural places for conflict education. In oral and visual communication by Grade 7, students are expected to respond constructively to alternative ideas or viewpoints, expressing opinions confidently but without try-

ing to dominate (p.46). Ontario's 1998 Health and Physical Education curriculum's healthy living strand includes personal safety and conflict resolution skills, for example describing exploitative behaviors in Grade 1 (p.12) and identifying challenges such as conflicting opinions in their relationships with family and friends in Grade 4 (p.15).

It can be daunting to teach questions without clear answers, but there are indeed places to begin.

At the interpersonal and relatively non-controversial level, conflict concepts and skills are easily integrated into the existing curriculum in many academic subjects. To really do peacebuilding citizenship education, however, we also need to find a little more space for the difficult questions — those that touch upon human fears, injustices and struggles over problem-solving.

More crucial than ever in this terrorist era, young people need to distinguish conflict (problems) from violence (symptoms). Conflicts are inevitable, and it is important to understand that they present choices because they can be handled in many different ways. To try to explain a problem, or to seek alternate solutions, is not to excuse a violent act. Even when hurt feelings might make retaliation seem attractive, other responses are more likely to be effective in eliminating the causes of future atrocities. Peacebuilding citizenship education includes vocabulary, examples and reflection on the ways conflicts may arise, evolve, escalate and de-escalate, and on the ways participants, bystanders, advocates, third party peacemakers and institutional changes can help to move conflicts away from violence and toward resolution.

Second, peacebuilding citizenship education must examine human diversity, including particular global and local conflicts, their contexts, and their participants. Bland multicultural awareness is not sufficient: building peace requires facing deep differences and felt enmities. The particular problems and players in conflict will change in our students' lifetimes, but today's preoccupations nonetheless present concepts and skill-building opportunities that will be useful in the future. In the wake of the September 2001 attacks, key knowledge that often is inadequately covered includes the geopolitics of global resources and trade, especially our own relation to energy consumption and oil interests in the Middle East (Klare 2001). Studying and overcoming ignorance and bias against Muslims, including the 18% of Muslims who are Arab, is important in its own right and as an instance of anti-intolerance education (Alavi 2001). Perhaps the Christian and 'white' identities of other terrorists, such as David Koresh, Timothy McVeigh and the anti-abortion murderers, also deserve more thoughtful attention. It is an on-going process to develop understanding for the identities and viewpoints of unfamiliar others, right here and across the world, especially when they are also parties to major geopolitical conflicts.

The September attacks have shown the need to study the changing character of war itself, including terrorism, and the evolving national and international institutions for conflict management and security. It can be daunting to teach questions without clear answers, but there are indeed places to begin. For example, many political change initiatives and international conventions already have invented successful ways to handle sticky transnational problems and even massive human rights violations (Ackerman & Duvall 2000, Boulding 1988, Soudien 2002). Our individualistic culture misleads us when it suggests that individuals are somehow so independent that we are not particularly influenced by, or influential in, big social institutions such as the state, the military and the 'globalized' business infrastructure. We make up those social structures, and we need to learn to see and understand them in order to change them (Bellah et.al. 1991).

Last and most important, peacebuilding citizenship education needs to help young people develop the capacity to think, speak and make decisions for themselves (while at the same time they expect and respect others' disagreement). Democracy and innovation depend upon this capacity. Open discussion of controversial matters in the classroom can help students to develop interest in the social and political world, capacity for reflective analytical and evaluative thinking, and a sense of efficacy as actors in their own lives (Hahn 1996, Houser 1996). Canadian curriculum guidelines do not preclude this kind of active citizenship education, but they don't encourage or guide it as well as is needed.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Canadians have an opportunity and an awesome responsibility. We have had a wake-up call. We cannot protect our children by closing our eyes, hoping that wars would be fought far away between professional soldiers. Supporting the bullying tactics of our southern neighbor will only give more people reason to think of us as enemies. The foundations of positive peace already exist in this country: our responsibility and hope is to build on those foundations an education for peacebuilding citizenship that can give our children the opportunity to create, together, a more nonviolent world.

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THE GLOBALIZATION OF TERRORISM: Canada's Intelligence Response to the Post-September 11 Threat Environment

BY Martin Rudner

THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11 CATAPULTED CANADA'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO THE FOREFRONT OF OUR SECURITY AND DEFENCE EFFORT. IN THE URGENT SCRAMBLE TO PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY AND VULNERABLE INTERESTS, CANADIANS TURNED TO THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO COUNTERACT AN AUDACIOUS AND ELUSIVE THREAT FROM GLOBAL TERRORISM. TO BE SURE, TERRORIST THREATS WERE NOT NEW TO CANADA. CANADIANS HAD THEMSELVES BEEN TARGETED BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN THE RECENT PAST, AND OUR TERRITORY WAS USED AS A SANCTUARY AND BASE OF OPERATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS ATTACKING OTHER FRIENDLY AND ALLIED COUNTRIES. NEVERTHELESS, CANADA'S RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11 SIGNIFIED A SIGNIFICANT ESCALATION OF THIS COUNTRY'S COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITMENTS. THIS WAS MANIFESTED IN A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE EXPANSION OF CANADA'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, A SHARPENING OF ITS LEGISLATIVE WEAPONRY, INTENSIFIED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF AN EXTENSIVE ARRAY OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD PUBLIC SECURITY, PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DISRUPT TERRORIST NETWORKS AND ACTIVITIES IN CANADA AND THEIR EXTERNAL LINKAGES. THE DISTINCTIVE TASKING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THIS COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORT IS TO PROVIDE GOVERNMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WITH TIMELY, ACCURATE AND ACTIONABLE INFORMATION ON THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE TERRORIST THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Even prior to September 11, international terrorism figured prominently on the threat assessments of Canada's intelligence community. The annual reports of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted regularly that many of the world's terrorist groups had established a presence in this country. Canada's open society, and the presence here of large, identifiable homeland communities from societies in conflict, created a distinctly attractive arena for international terrorist networks. Whereas virtually all of the terrorist groups with a presence in Canada were engaged in ethnic, religious or nationalist conflicts elsewhere in the world, these groups did not scruple to sometimes mount attacks in this country and against Canadians. International terrorist organizations and rogue states have targeted individuals, groups and institutions in Canada, to intimidate the uncommitted, wreak vengeance on adversaries or gain public attention for their cause. Among the more notorious incidents were the Air India bombing, the assassinations of Turkish diplomats, a plot to attack on the Montreal Jewish institutions, and the foiled Millennium attempt to bomb Los Angeles International Airport.

Terrorist organizations typically maintained a presence in Canada in order to raise and transfer funds, to create false identities for operatives, to procure weaponry and material, to set up operational sanctuaries, and to support infiltration across the border to the United States or overseas. Local cells of groups like Al-Jihad engaged in financial fraud and theft, identity and document forgery, and people smuggling in support of their parent terrorist networks. Some terrorist groups, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, became extensively involved in criminal racketeering to generate financing for their insurgency war in Sri Lanka. Terrorist criminal syndicates were active in drug trafficking, immigrant smuggling, commercial fraud, and extortion from homeland residents in this country and elsewhere. International terrorist groups were reputed to have taken over legitimate businesses and even Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as a means of money laundering and in order to disguise their activities.

As the economic downturn that followed from the attacks of September 11 amply demonstrates, international terrorism can wreak havoc on the economies of many countries, and not solely the target. Over and above the costs of their criminal activities and destruction of property and infrastructure, international terrorism has caused far-reaching economic destabilization and massive capital losses on world financial markets.. The mere risk of terrorist activities taking place in or through Canada can suffice to impel the United States to tighten controls on cross-border movements of goods and persons. This could cost the Canadians dearly.

One of the more alarming aspects of international terrorism relate to the reported attempts by terrorist groups to deploy radiological, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Canada may be vulnerable both as a locale for illicit access to radiological, chemical or biological technologies and as a possible target for WMD attacks. It is known than Al-Qaeda attempted to develop radiological, chemical and biological weaponry on its own in Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere as well, so far unsuccessfully. There is now a risk that terrorists seeking WMD proliferation may dispatch students or researchers to enroll in university programs or join research institutions in countries like Canada in order to gain access to dual-use technologies and weapons-related expertise. Given the sensibilities of academe, countering any such espionage would call for considerable sensitivity and dexterity on the part of security authorities.

Among suspect groups, the Al-Qaeda network and its affiliates and partners constitute certainly the most dangerous threat to the security of Canada, its allies and friendly countries. This threat environment is characterized by elusive, widely-dispersed and loosely structured terrorist networks, formed in tightly knit cells embedded in various Islamic communities, and capable of deploying large numbers of trained, committed operatives almost anywhere in the world. These networks are difficult and hazardous to penetrate. In Canada, the primary responsibility for counter-terrorist intelligence is vested in CSIS, working together with other components of the Security and Intelligence Community, pertinent government departments (*e.g.* Citizenship and Immigration, Department of Justice), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and local police forces.

EXPANSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Government of Canada injected a increased funding of almost $47 million to CSIS and to the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the signals intelligence agency, to expedite improvements in their capabilities to collect foreign intelligence. Some $37 million of this went to CSE for research and development and to upgrade its interception technology infrastructure, while CSIS obtained authorization to augment its operational staffing by over 300 during the coming years. After more than a decade of cutbacks, Canada's two major intelligence collection agencies were now to be given resources to deal with the new threat environment posed by global terrorism. The RCMP for its part was given an additional $54 million to bolster up its counter-terrorism capabilities. Subsequently, the 2001-02 federal budget provided an additional $7.7 billion to strengthen government capacity to combat terrorism and ensure national security.

CSIS is a civilian security intelligence agency, created by an Act of Parliament (CSIS Act) in 1984. Historically, CSIS and its predecessor, the RCMP Security Service concentrated primarily on Communist subversion and espionage, and on perceived threats of separatist violence in Quebec Since the early 1990s, however, CSIS has refocused its security intelligence efforts more towards counter-terrorism, economic espionage, WMD proliferation, and foreign influenced activities deemed detrimental to the national interests of Canada. Under its legislative authority, CSIS can investigate any individual, group or organization suspected of constituting a threat to the

security of Canada. CSIS conducts investigations, analyzes its findings and advises government and law enforcement agencies on activities deemed threatening to national security.

In the aftermath of September 11, CSIS is endeavoring to improve and extend its tradecraft, linguistic and political-cultural proficiencies to run agents in highly sensitive and perilous counter-terrorism operations.

A very large proportion of the foreign intelligence provided to the Canadian government derives from communications interceptions on the part of CSE and its partner signals intelligence agencies in the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand. CSE and its partners deploy sophisticated interception technologies to monitor terrestrial, microwave, radio and satellite communications, along with other electromagnetic emissions. These intercepts are then processed through advanced computer systems programmed to search for specific telephone numbers, voice recognition patterns or key words, and to decrypt text. CSE is, arguably, the most secretive entity of the Government of Canada; for decades the very existence was a classified secret. It had no statutory mandate until recently, and virtually all details of its resources, objectives and operations are still shrouded in official secrecy.

In the aftermath of September 11, CSIS is endeavoring to improve and extend its tradecraft, linguistic and political-cultural proficiencies to run agents in highly sensitive and perilous counter-terrorism operations.

The new counter-terrorism legislation enacted in Bill C-36, in the aftermath of September 11, empowered CSE to monitor communications to or from Canada (hitherto not permissible) specifically for the collection of foreign intelligence, subject to authorization by the Minister of National Defence. Communications intelligence reportedly had some success monitoring Al-Qaeda, including operations in Canada. Yet, the effectiveness of this source subsequently may have been compromised by unfortunate leaks from abroad. In any event, it was becoming clear that the increasing availability of encryption and advances in communication security were eroding the interception and cryptanalysis capabilities of signals intelligence. In order to sustain an effective role for communications intelligence in future massive new investment in costly and innovative technologies for interception and cryptanalysis and, indeed, analytical capacity building will be called for. Canada may have no other option but to turn to its allies, and in particular the United States, for the futuristic technologies required for the collection of foreign intelligence. Indeed, Canadian dependence on its American intelligence connection will likely grow even more acute apropos some of the most technically sophisticated technologies, such as satellite imagery.

The revitalization of CSIS and CSE was accompanied by a far-reaching role expansion of other components of the Canadian intelligence community. Existing intelligence units in government departments like Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency were considerably reinforced. As well, the recently established Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) was mandated to protect Canada's cyber and physical infrastructure, and a new Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) was created to monitor suspicious international financial transactions. The Intelligence Assessment Secretariat at the Privy Council Office was also strengthened.

The expansion of Canada's intelligence community highlighted the challenges of operational co-ordination. Up to now the mechanisms for co-ordination among the decentralized and increasing disparate array of specialized agencies and units has always been weak, as they work mainly through periodic consultations and moral suasion. Deficiencies in the co-ordination and sharing of intelligence between organizations like CSIS, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the RCMP, for example, reportedly resulted in mishaps in the identification of terrorist suspects. A tighter fusion of the intelligence capabilities of all components of Canada's security and intelligence community is a prerequisite for operational effectiveness. At the Cabinet level, an *ad hoc* Committee on Security was set up under the Deputy Prime Minister to oversee the direction and management of Canada's national security response to the threat of global terrorism.

STRENGTHENING THE LEGISLATIVE ARMOURY

The intelligence effort against international terrorism will have to be targeted against relatively small and amorphous sleeper cells, elusive networks, obscure organizations, suspect elements in homeland communities, and rogue governments, probably over prolonged periods of time. Intelligence operations will doubtless undergo an offensive mode to identify, penetrate, monitor and counter the terrorist threat. In order to bring suspected terrorist operative and their co-conspirators to justice, intelligence will have to work closely with law enforcement. In the aftermath of September 11, new anti-terrorism legislation has been introduced in Canada and in other countries to equip intelligence agencies and police forces with enhanced powers of surveillance and investigation, and allowed the police expanded powers of arrest. Increased attention has also being devoted to the phenomenon of illicit trans-national fund-raising and money laundering in support of international terrorism. These new legislative initiatives aroused strong reactions, leading to amendments and wholesale revisions being adopted to satisfy parliamentary and public concerns about the appropriate balance being struck between national security requirements and the preservation of civil liberties.

The Anti-Terrorism Act, which came into force in December, 2001, defined and designated terrorist groups and activities and introduced new measures designed to better enable intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorist operatives and co-conspirators in

Canada. The Act gave police and national security agencies extraordinary powers of preventive detention and to compel testimony in investigative hearings. Furthermore, the Act provided enhanced authority for electronic surveillance of suspected terrorist groups, and established, for the first time, a statutory basis for CSE. To be sure, human rights safeguards were built in to the Act, including a sunset provision of five years for prevention arrest and investigative hearings, unless renewed for a further five years by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

Along with this Anti-Terrorism law, which bolstered up the terrorism provisions of criminal law, the Government also introduced a second Bill, C-42, aimed at strengthening its own legal-institutional capacity to combat terrorism. Faced with intense public and parliamentary concern over certain of its provisions, this legislation was subsequently withdrawn and replaced with Bill C-55, the Public Safety Act. The new legislation included provisions for improving airport and aviation security, deterring the proliferation of biological weapons and related WMD technologies, and expedites coordination and the sharing of relevant information among government departments, national security and law enforcement agencies. It still retained the controversial clauses enabling the declaration any part of the country a Controlled Access Military Zone, albeit now for more limited, specified purposes. It also gives legal authority for FINTRAC to monitor and report on suspicious international financial transactions.

Canada was slow to enact legislation proscribing international terrorist organizations and criminalizing their fundraising activities, but by October of 2001 new regulations were enacted to block money transfers to terrorist organizations, in anticipation of further changes to the law regarding the suppression of terrorist financing. In addition, a raft of new regulations and orders were introduced so as to tighten security in the sensitive domains of immigration and citizenship, cross-border movement, civil aviation, shipping and ports, science and technology research, public health and critical infrastructure. Even at the provincial level, governments took steps to reinforce the security of their own respective areas of jurisdiction against the elusive threat of terrorism.

The heightened involvement of national security services in counter-terrorism, and in co-operating and information sharing with police and prosecutors, risks blurring the boundaries between intelligence and law enforcement. The new anti-terrorism legislation implies a rebalancing of the scales of justice between the requirements for national security and the principles of civil liberty, somewhat to the side of public safety. Yet, intelligence is characteristically obsessive about protecting its sources and methods; law enforcement must always comply with the rules of evidence and judicial procedures; the twain do not always meet, and resultant tensions can impede co-operation. The price of failure can be high: anything that jeopardizes the gathering of admissible evidence can compromise the prosecution of terrorists under law, any deficiency in law enforcement could culminate in an intelligence failure to prevent terrorist acts.

INTERNATIONAL COALITION-BUILDING

International co-operation in intelligence collection has always played a pivotal part in Canada's foreign and security intelligence efforts. In order to acquire foreign intelligence needed by government, and lacking a dedicated foreign intelligence service of its own, Canada has embarked on a wide range of bilateral liaison relationships with many other countries, and co-operates with several plurilateral groupings, in order to access and share foreign intelligence in relation to specific threats. Since the end of the Cold War these international intelligence relationships have refocused their attention to deal with international terrorism, transnational crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, financial fraud, people smuggling and WMD proliferation. The aftermath of September 11 inspired a vast extension of international co-operation in the intelligence domain, with many countries across the world acting to share information and collaborate in operations against suspected terrorists, cells and networks. This intelligence coalition has been just as important to the campaign against global terrorism as its counterpart diplomatic and military coalitions.

The longest standing arrangement involving Canada in international co-operation and intelligence sharing is the so-called UKUSA security agreement on signals intelligence, in force since 1948. The architecture of this agreement embraces the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as other more limited "third parties" (*e.g.* Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands) in global collaborative mechanism for signals intelligence collection, processing and product sharing. Canada's role in the UKUSA alliance was valued not so much for this country's inherent capabilities in signals intelligence production, which remains modest, as for its unique geographic advantages. During the Cold War, Canadian signals intelligence concentrated on communications across the northern Soviet Union and East Asia; later, the interception facilities at Leitrim, Ontario appeared to target Latin American satellite relays. As *quid pro quo* for this coverage, the UKUSA alliance offered Canada shared access to a global capability to collect and deliver real-time communications interceptions on foreign intelligence targets. As well, the agreement gave Canada a place at the high level strategy councils of its American and British allies, along with privileged access to the most sophisticated technologies for intelligence and defence generally.

The global interception capabilities available to the UKUSA allies from space based, terrestrial and submarine facilities are integrated into a seamlessly networked signals intelligence processing system. At the functional heart of this system is the *Echelon* "Dictionary", a specialized, powerful computer system having the capacity to store a comprehensive database on designated organizations or individuals, including names, topics of interest, addresses, telephone numbers and other criteria for target identification. Highly secret still, the *Echelon* system is able to process and sort through vast flows of telecommunications traffic to or from most parts of the world and identify specifically targeted messaging. The great challenge confronting the UKUSA partners has been how to handle the vast influx of intercepts, which can

overwhelm their capacity to analyze and translate raw communications, as reportedly occurred just before September 11.

The reciprocal sharing arrangement under UKUSA gives each partner, including CSE, virtually automatic access to the entire interception infrastructure and capability, although only for its own *Echelon* "watch list". Following the attacks of September 11, Canada reportedly intercepted encrypted communications from international terrorist networks warning of renewed terrorist assaults, which were forwarded to the American authorities. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 empowered CSE to monitor communications to or from Canada, something hitherto not permissible, specifically for the collection of foreign intelligence. It is germane to note in this regard that the CSE Commissioner, who is responsible for executive oversight of the organization, has provided a public assurance that CSE does not use its international alliances to circumvent the laws of Canada, or provide allies with communications they could not otherwise legally collect for themselves.

Apart from the UKUSA alliance, Canada also relies on bilateral liaison and other plurilateral arrangements to acquire foreign intelligence. While CSIS can and does operate abroad in keeping with its statutory mandate regarding the security of Canada, the very limited extent of foreign intelligence collection abroad engenders a high propensity to exchange information with others. At present, Canada maintains bilateral liaison relations with nearly 150 countries. Much of this liaison is taken up with immigration and visa security screening. Yet, liaison with the intelligence services of even friendly countries is always an ambiguous affair. It may well be the case that liaison relationships may curtail some foreign intelligence activities in Canada, however there is a strong propensity among intelligence services to monitor neutral and even friendly countries, which can render international co-operation somewhat awkward. As it is said, "There are no friendly secret services, only the secret services of friendly states."

Canada also participates in several plurilateral intelligence sharing arrangements. These arrangements tend to be highly secretive, going by code names that are rarely affirmed. The Kilowatt group was formed in the 1970s by Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden and UK to deal with Arab terrorism, in parallel with the Megaton group that concentrated on other (non-Arab) terrorist phenomena. Later, the Egmond group was formed to deal with terrorist financial flows and with money laundering. These plurilateral sharing arrangements are backed by integrated data banks on terrorist organizations, operatives, methods and links. Along with the so-called Club of Berne, these groupings are intended to facilitate the synthesizing of available intelligence, and thereby to enhance the counter-terrorism capabilities of participating countries.

The post September 11 war on terrorism engendered an urgent effort to penetrate the tightly-knit, amorphous cells and loosely structured networks of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This has prompted an extension of operational co-operation with intelligence services of countries in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere, with whom in some cases such dealings would hitherto have been unthinkable. Exchanges of intelligence are reportedly taking place even with countries like Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, whose security services may have penetrated these networks and have information to trade. There is also far-reaching international cooperation in investigations, as demonstrated by the case of the Canadian Al-Qaeda suspect, Mohammed Mansour Jarabah, who was tracked from Singapore to Oman, arrested there and handed over to CSIS, who in turn made him available for interrogation in the United States. In other cases arrested Al-Qaeda suspects have been sent, secretly, for interrogation in tougher, hardened jurisdictions like Egypt or Jordan. In return for gaining the results of such investigations, countries like Canada may possibly be asked to reciprocate by sharing sensitive information regarding exiles and opposition groups, or strategic intelligence about third countries. The imperative for intelligence co-operation can sometimes make strange international bedfellows, and can have profound implications for foreign policy, civil society and human rights.

BUILDING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

The intelligence war on terrorism will call for broad public support for the policy, legislative and operational elements of the campaign. By way of contrast with other allies, such as the UK and US, Canada has not built up an intelligence culture of innate political cultural acceptance of the role of intelligence in national security. Knowledge resources about intelligence matters are not widely available to Canadians: until recently the intelligence services themselves preferred reticence over publicity; parliamentarians had little scope or interest in probing the intelligence domain; the mass media seldom reported on intelligence and security matters except in sensationalist terms; intelligence studies were generally neglected in academe, with singular exceptions, even where there exist programs in security and defence studies. While shocked by the attacks of September 11, Canadians remain uneasy about the national security implications of the counter-terrorism effort, especially as these are perceived to encroach on democratic values and civil liberties.

Since the campaign is unlikely to be of short duration, the longer-run political sustainability of Canada's counter-terrorism effort may be predicated on building public confidence and understanding about security and intelligence matters. Three urgent confidence-building tasks can be identified: improved transparency of the security and intelligence community, consistent with its needs for elements of secrecy; more extensive recruitment and promotion of pertinent cultural proficiencies and skills in the security and intelligence community; and greater attention to public education about intelligence and security affairs. Such initiatives as these could serve. Failure to build public confidence may result in chinks in the political armour, could bring about intelligence failures and security lapses.

Public accountability for security and intelligence affairs, in the Canadian practice, has emphasized executive oversight and review. Thus, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the Inspector-General of CSIS, the CSE Commissioner, the Auditor-General of Canada, all exercise

oversight authority of the Government of Canada to ensure compliance with law and policy. Parliamentary oversight, however, has been relatively weak in Canada. Until now there is no committee of the House of Commons responsible for oversight of the security and intelligence community as a whole; in the Senate, a newly established Standing Committee on National Security and Defence may perhaps take on that function. Indeed, the vigorous parliamentary and public discourse that accompanied the introduction of the new anti-terrorism bills should challenge Parliament to perform a more vigorous oversight function, akin to the experiences of other countries like the US and UK. A move towards a more robust system of Parliamentary oversight could help achieve greater transparency and reassurance, whilst also facilitating broader public awareness of the role and purpose of the security and intelligence community.

As Canada's security and intelligence community mobilizes itself for the war against terrorism it will also have to upgrade its capacity to deal hitherto unfamiliar and obscure protagonists. This implies a human resource development effort on the part of the intelligence services in particular to acquire the cultural and language proficiencies, and analytical and linguistic skills for the tasks ahead. Notwithstanding certain sensitivities regarding recruitment and security clearances, the Canadian security and intelligence community has moved, like its counterparts in other Western democracies, to widen its catchment of personnel and proficiencies. Not only can this contribute to operational effectiveness, but the trend towards a more inclusive security and intelligence community may help overcome any latent distrust among segments of the broader Canadian public.

In girding up to do battle against international terrorism it is incumbent upon the governments of democratic societies to prepare their publics for a prolonged, probably arduous and possibly traumatic campaign. Al Qaeda, its co-conspirators and their protagonists and supporters in Western democracies are unlikely to remain passive before the counter-terrorism effort. They will doubtless seek to exploit any chink in counter-terrorism armour, and especially the skepticism and concerns that may emerge in public opinion in democratic societies.

In order to build and sustain public confidence in the counter-terrorism effort it will be vital for governments to reach out to civil society with greater transparency and resources to help build up a repertoire of knowledge about national security affairs. Outreach can have many arms and can touch on different needs. Thus, an accelerated declassification of historical documentation can help to demystify intelligence and foster appreciation and pride in the Canadian experience. Likewise, establishing an intelligence exhibition at the Canadian War Museum, perhaps modeled after the Secret War gallery at the Imperial War Museum in London, can do much to promote interest and awareness among Canadians. Our allies have been swifter to recognize the importance of building up knowledge bases and inspiring public confidence: thus, the British government has gone so far as to commission the preparation of an official history of MI-5, which was itself once a most secretive organizations, to mark the centenary of the Security Service in 2009.

In the field of education, the Government of Canada can build on existing instruments to promote the development of national expertise on security and intelligence affairs, among students, in the academic community and in research. National associations and professional meetings can serve as valuable fora for dialogue between practitioners and concerned others sharing an interest in security and intelligence matters. Since the counter-terrorist effort may likely involve very sensitive domestic issues, especially in dealing with sleeper cells embedded in ethno-religious communities, or highly-charged foreign policy matters, such as attacks on rogue states, the maintenance of public confidence in the bona fides of their anticipated actions will have to constitute a significant element in government responses to this unprecedented security threat.

DEMOCRACIES AT WAR WITH TERRORISM

Combating international terrorism implies a very different kind of warfare than do conventional military, or counter-insurgency or even domestic counter-terrorist campaigns. Precisely because their consuming hatred of the West and its values, their asymmetric deployment of weaponry of mass destruction, their obscure command structure and embedded cellular network, their near-global linkages and self-sacrificing ethos, Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups present a security threat of exceptional complexity, resilience and peril to open and democratic societies in Europe, North America and Asia, as to the established authorities in the Arab and Muslim worlds. To be sure, countries like Great Britain, Israel, Spain, Turkey and Sri Lanka, among others, have had considerable experience fighting terrorism. While there may be lessons to be learned from those essentially internal encounters with terrorism, the global terrorist threat is significantly further-reaching, more stealthy and furtive, and potentially more devastating. Persistent threats and attacks causing mass carnage could well jeopardize the very foundations of democratic societies, their existential security, social tolerance and economic well-being.

This globalization of terrorism and the escalation of threats places a dual onus on the intelligence community. Offensively, the function of the intelligence community is to supply the information and assessments that enable the civil and military authorities to overcome the terrorist menace. From a defensive perspective, it is the role of intelligence to support government and law enforcement agencies in protecting persons, institutions, lawful activities and constitutional ideals of Canadians. In performing these functions the principal challenge for the security and intelligence community remains, as ever, to uphold the ethos of democratic governance whilst combating the avowed enemies of those very principles.

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DEFINING AND DEFENDING A PLACE IN THE WORLD:
Canada's Vital Interests in International Affairs

BY Hector Mackenzie

IN THE WAKE OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ONE YEAR AGO AND IN LIGHT OF THE MYRIAD OF RESPONSES TO THOSE EVENTS IN NORTH AMERICA AND AROUND THE WORLD, THERE HAS BEEN AN UNDERSTANDABLE ATTENTION IN CANADA AS ELSEWHERE TO WHAT HAS CHANGED IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS DISCUSSION SUGGEST THE BROAD RANGE OF IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS NOT TO CONTRADICT OR TO QUALIFY THOSE ASSESSMENTS BUT RATHER TO SUGGEST SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED CANADA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE PAST AND THAT WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE.

CONTEXT FOR DECISIONS: DETERMINANTS OR INFLUENCES

All countries, irrespective of relative power and influence, must take into account various factors that advance or constrain the realization of their national interests in world affairs. Nations measure their commitments and contributions in some relation to such criteria, informed as well by their values. Most countries believe that their situations and roles are unique. Most states, along with international movements and organizations, believe that the world would be a better place if others followed their lead. In spite of similar approaches to external affairs, each country is unique and governments tend to emphasize those aspects that underscore that distinctiveness.

GEOGRAPHY

Canada is surrounded by three oceans and one country. It has a lengthy and sinuous coastline. In spite of a vast territory and abundant natural resources, Canada has a relatively small population, most of which is located in cities in southern regions close to the American border. Its harsh climate plays a key role in both phenomena. Whatever physical challenges it poses to Canadians, Canada's geography has usually been regarded as an asset or advantage in national defence and international affairs. For most of the twentieth century, the country's location was a source of security. Vast oceans kept most dangers and crises distant from its shores. Proximity to the United States has reinforced the myriad of ties that bind Canada to its wealthy and powerful neighbour, so that no other bilateral or multilateral relationship rivals the importance of Canadian-American relations. Though there are regional variations within Canada with respect to the relative significance of other parts of the world – with greater attention to trans-Atlantic ties in the East and to trans-Pacific links in the West – and not all continental influences are seen positively, the United States understandably dominates the world-view of all Canadians.

HISTORY

Diplomacy and international affairs have shaped the character and prospects of Canada, as well as the attitude of Canadians towards the rest of the world. Aboriginal populations had vast experience of conflict and negotiation long before the first contact with Europeans. That heritage played a critical part in Canada's destiny in the northern half of the North American continent. For France and Britain, this land was a destination for exploration, enterprise and settlement, as well as a battleground for imperial clashes. The distinct quality of British North America was determined in part by the impact and aftermath of the Conquest and the American Revolution. At Confederation, the Dominion of Canada combined the legacy of an increasingly democratic parliamentary tradition with constitutional development of a federal system, all within an imperial setting. In the twentieth century, a preoccupation with status and recognition (in North America, in the British Empire and in the League of Nations) gave way to an acceptance of international responsibility. Canada's participation in the two world wars and its active involvement in the United Nations and other international organizations since then have enhanced the country's reputation domestically and overseas. Justifiable or not, Canada's self-image as a positive force for good in the world has been important to its national identity.

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DEMOGRAPHY

The ebb and flow of people to and from Canada (which have often been treated as barometers of national well-being), patterns of settlement, duality of language and diversity of culture have all contributed to the composition of the Canadian population. The myriad of overseas connections of the Canadian people contribute to Canada's attitudes toward other countries and regimes, its reaction to events in the rest of the world and its response to global phenomena. The distinction between refugees and other immigrants is a modern judgment, but Canada has long represented a haven as well as a land of opportunity, to Canadians and foreigners alike. That image and self-image – as well as the diverse population that sustains them – may help to explain why Canada has had a "predisposition to international activism," as Richard Gwyn puts it. Along with other factors, changes in the Canadian population may prompt shifts in international priorities and stances by Canada. In light of these alterations, perhaps more remarkable is the persistent importance of traditional concerns to Canadians.

ECONOMY

Canada's economic fate and fortune have always been linked to foreign trade and investment, whether as a colony within an empire or as a nation whose development and prosperity hinged on its economic ties to the rest of the world. National demands (particularly those associated with the exploitation of natural resources, transportation, settlement and communications) have necessitated international inputs. The protectionist impulses of the National Policy of the nineteenth century have been overtaken by events. Since the Second World War, Canada has increased its already significant dependence on international trade and investment for prosperity. The American share of that economic activity has ascended to extraordinary heights in recent years. Diversification of trade and globalization, so often cited in discussions of external economic policy options, have made little impact on the rising tide of Canadian-American financial and commercial transactions.

IDEOLOGY: VALUES OR BELIEFS

Though not universally endorsed, some beliefs are deemed to be sufficiently central to how Canadians collectively view themselves as a country and to how

they relate to the international community, that support for these attitudes may be regarded as tantamount to upholding a national interest. The values themselves and the actions undertaken to implement them have been depicted as fostering national unity. That these principles may not be unique nor original does not diminish their apparent importance (for example, political liberty was stressed during the Cold War in part to highlight its absence in the Soviet Union and other adversaries). On the contrary, a shared set of beliefs has often been seen as critical to key bilateral and multilateral relationships, notably with Britain and the United States as well as other OECD members. Often these attitudes frame the debate over options for Canadian foreign policy, even as diminishing resources challenge Canada's ability to achieve its aims. Most Canadians depict such tenets as aspects of "internationalism," though that virtuous spirit is more nebulous than they believe. At the heart of the Canadian world view are commitments to international order, to the rule of law, to justice and to democracy, along with respect for human rights. Fairness, tolerance and compassion are seen as vital characteristics of Canada's approach to world affairs. Most Canadians take the view that their government and its representatives can and should play an active and constructive role in international relations (analogous to support for government intervention in domestic matters).



ALLIANCES TO BUTTRESS POWER AND INFLUENCE

Over the years, Canada has made a virtue out of a necessity. The need to ally or collaborate with other nations – without whose co-operation Canada's prospects for success would be nil – in furtherance of common objectives in external affairs has often been depicted as a talent or predisposition supposedly derived from an internationalist tradition and disinterested commitment to the well-being of the global community. Except when national prestige is linked to the defence of sovereignty – and even that exception must be qualified – unilateral action is not a viable option for Canada nor is it one likely to be sustained by popular support.

OMNIPRESENT: THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

What is most noteworthy about the foregoing inventory is how much Canada's relationship with the United States historically and currently dominates all of these considerations. Clashes of interests or differences in values between Canada and the United States, however minor in a global reckoning, understandably attract more attention from commentators and policy-makers on both sides of the border than do the common experiences and perceptions of the countries that are taken for granted. Often it is the exceptional integration of the continent that raises the stakes in disputes over economic and defence matters or questions that Canadians associate with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Canada. In assessing their position, Canadians must bear in mind not only the interdependence of the two nations but also the considerable disparity in power and influence between their own country and its closest neighbour. Unquestionably, however, the commonalities are much greater than the differences. Moreover, a Canadian policy in international affairs that over-emphasizes differentiation from American policy for domestic political reasons may simply fail to achieve its aims as a consequence of distance or detachment from the critical criteria that link Canada's international relations to its fundamental bases.

WHAT MATTERS? TRANSCENDENT ISSUES AND CONCERNS

NATIONAL UNITY

"The first general principle upon which I think we are agreed," Louis St. Laurent stated in 1947, "is that our external policies shall not destroy our unity." As he noted, the challenges involved not simply relations between English and French Canada, but also regional differences and jurisdictional disputes that frequently arose in a federal system grappling with the notion of one international voice. For most of the first half of the twentieth century, international issues tended to divide Canadians, so that the safest course for Canadian governments was usually to avoid overseas commitments. Since the Second World War, however, an opposite

tendency has preponderated. Ventures such as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention abroad have usually struck a responsive chord with the Canadian people. However, some cautionary notes should be sounded: international questions are usually not priorities for Canadians, especially if allocation of scarce resources is considered; with the significant exception of Canadian-American relations, political attention and possible advantage on external matters tends to be transitory; public awareness of and interest in world affairs is limited, with media coverage consequently assuming disproportionate if still limited influence; and, national unity can be interpreted variously, so that it can be invoked as a justification in instances that do not withstand closer scrutiny. Even so, the ultimate litmus test for any international or national policy of a Canadian government must be its possible impact on national unity.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Provision for national defence is an essential aspect of sovereignty for a state. Acceptance of overseas military commitments, whether as part of an alliance or within an international body such as the United Nations, demonstrates a sense of shared responsibility for collective security as well as a recognition that there is an overall interest in maintaining world order and limiting conflict, where possible. The debate over Canadian defence policy is less about options than about resources. The impossibility of independent and effective national defence for Canada has meant that the country has relied on informal and formal alliances to protect itself. Defending Canada is inseparable from safeguarding North America. Seen in that light, the obvious interest of the United States in the protection of the continent from foreign threats ensures that Canada will never be defenceless. The attendant risks, however, are that the United States will define its appropriate response or precautionary measures in ways that do not take sufficient account of Canada's distinct concerns and that the Canadian government will lose even nominal shared control over (or input into) decision-making in this sphere. As for overseas contributions, these have raised serious doubts about Canadian capacity for intervention abroad, directly as a result of the budget allocated to national defence. Moreover, there are some issues, such as boundary questions (and matters of territorial integrity generally), maritime transit in the Arctic Ocean (involving both sovereignty and environmental protection) and protection of coastal fisheries, on which Canadian policies vary and Canadian priorities differ from those of the United States. Thus, reliance on its continental partner to bear the principal burden of Canada's national defence poses the threat of undermining its position on matters that Canadians consider important, if not essential, to Canada's national interests. Even the selection of overseas military tasks must take into account the lack of self-sufficiency of the Canadian Armed Forces. Beyond these considerations, there are global dangers to which all like-minded countries, including Canada, must respond co-operatively so as to prevent the emergence of systemic threats to individual and collective security – such as the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of terrorism. These challenges reinforce the need (yet increase the cost) of Canada's traditional commitment to world order.

The impossibility of independent and effective national defence for Canada has meant that the country has relied on informal and formal alliances to protect itself. Defending Canada is inseparable from safeguarding North America.

PROSPERITY

Foreign investment and trade are vital to Canada's economic well-being, so that it is a cardinal purpose of Canadian external economic policy to concert with other countries to ensure international economic freedom within a reasonable and stable system of exchange. However, Canada's financial and commercial world is so dominated by the United States that Canadian external economic policy succeeds or fails largely on the basis of its ability to ensure fair access to American markets. Thus it becomes a fundamental objective of Canada's international economic policy to safeguard the Canadian economy from deleterious decisions taken in the United States and to attempt to secure remedial action whether through international institutions or by efforts to overturn or qualify American actions that respond to domestic political and economic considerations in that country. In other words, the most important foreign economic concerns for Canada are often domestic economic matters for the United States. Occasional Canadian ambivalence about exemptions or special treatment of Canada by American policy-makers is more than offset by the critical need to maintain constructive and productive relations with the United States. Consequently, a philosophical commitment to multilateralism cohabits with a practical preoccupation with bilateral concerns.

The most important foreign economic concerns for Canada are often domestic economic matters for the United States.

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Current policy-makers may disdain the traditional image of Canada as a comparatively unspoilt land with abundant natural resources, but that impression has been significant for the national and international identity of Canada. In the past, abundant and inexpensive sources of energy, for example, have been vital to Canada's economic development – though arguably that wealth reinforced com-

placency about questions associated with global scarcity of fuel and with efficient use of non-renewable resources. The ready availability of natural resources has attracted foreign investment and sustained Canadian exports. In keeping with this perception, public opinion polls have suggested that environmental concerns animate and unite Canadians (though political responses to possible signature of the Kyoto Agreement have demonstrated the extent to which such topics can divide Canadians). However, these sentiments are not always measured in relation to choices or commitments that might affect the standard of living or convenience of Canadians. What prompts a deeper public reaction on such questions is often the implication for dealings with the United States – as with issues such as sales of energy and water or transboundary pollution.

HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

There are interwoven international policies and programmes advanced intermittently and inconsistently by Canada that complement the country's political values and respond to the avowed humanitarian impulses of its citizens, particularly with respect to the alleviation of poverty and the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights. Though Canadians tend to regard these stances and actions as indicative of Canada's place in the world, most such endeavours can trace their roots no further back than the Second World War, except as private causes advanced by well-intentioned groups or individuals without government support or endorsement. However inspired or even beneficial, the response to these urges may not correspond to any reckoning of Canada's geopolitical interests. Moreover, the humanitarian impulses may be undermined or contradicted by other considerations, such as the quest for markets for Canadian exports. Nonetheless, good deeds – even when intervention abroad may be involved – are seen as appropriate undertakings for Canada in world affairs.

WHO MATTERS MOST?

Not surprisingly, the country that dominates the context for Canadian decision-making in international affairs likewise has the greatest impact on the content and the viability of the options that confront the Canadian government in dealing with the rest of the world. This often takes the form of self-restraint by Canada, rather than direction or dictation of policy by the United States. However, the over-arching influence is unquestionable.

CANADA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD: INTERNATIONAL AND CONTINENTAL RELATIONS

Although most Canadian commentaries on world affairs attend to events or issues far from its shores, Canada's vital national interests in international relations have increasingly become continental rather than global in scope. That is true whether one considers trade, defence or foreign policy. As the foregoing indicates, that trend poses problems for Canada, as the lesser country in power and influence, but it also offers some reassurance about the furtherance of broad Canadian objectives. Often lost in the understandable attention to specific points at issue between Canada and the United States is the remarkable harmony of interests and values of the countries. The commonalities are much greater than the differences, so that any effective advancement of Canadian aims in world affairs will likely fare better in association or partnership with the United States.

What matters most in Canada's external policies – most obviously with respect to trade but also running the gamut of other topics – is often the domestic policy (and politics) of the United States rather than the goodwill and co-operation (or lack of same) of the rest of the international community, whether "like-minded" or not. American farm subsidies and restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber demonstrate the impact on Canada of decisions taken primarily for domestic political reasons in the United States. Defence of the American "homeland" necessarily requires effective co-operation in North America. On foreign policy questions generally, Canadian policy-makers must be mindful of congressional as well as administrative positions south of the border. That tendency is compounded by the cross-border implications of questions formerly regarded as domestic matters, where the lead is often taken by a "domestic" Canadian or American department. Moreover, the international issues that evoke the strongest response in Canadian politics tend to be those that involve relations with the United States.

Canada's preoccupation with the United States is hardly unique in world affairs, nor is it simply a recent phenomenon. Peoples and states pay closest attention, when they look beyond their borders, to their neighbourhood. Canada's location has precluded its acting as a regional power. However, there have been advantages. "We in Canada are particularly fortunate," Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King observed to the League of Nations in 1936, "both in our neighbours and in our lack of neighbours." That observation remains valid today, albeit with less sense of detachment now than then from the rest of the world. Canada's neighbourhood is less isolated and more vulnerable than it was when King spoke. Now even more than then, relations with our closest neighbour dominate our view of the world and our policies in international affairs.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of the Association for Canadian Studies nor the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

CANADA IN THE POST-911 WORLD: OLD PERCEPTIONS AND NEW REALITIES

BY Denis Stairs

FOR A VERY LONG TIME NOW, CANADIANS HAVE BEEN LUXURIATING IN WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS A SELF-CONGRATULATORY CONCEPTION OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY AND THEIR COUNTRY'S ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE IN THE WORLD.

TO BE FAIR TO THEM, THERE IS AT LEAST SOME HISTORICAL FOUNDATION FOR THEIR SENSE OF SATISFACTION, EVEN IF THEIR SMUG COMPLACENCY IN PROCLAIMING IT IS UNSEEMLY ON ITS FACE, AND IRRITATES THEIR FRIENDS. IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD, THEIR DIPLOMATS PLAYED A SURPRISINGLY INTRUSIVE ROLE IN THE CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BRETTON WOODS APPARATUS, IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, IN THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND IN BOTH THE DIPLOMATIC POLITICS AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE KOREAN WAR. THEY WERE CENTRALLY INVOLVED – SOMETIMES IN COMMAND POSITIONS – IN PEACE OBSERVATION CONTINGENTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, AND THEIR SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, LESTER B. PEARSON, HAD MUCH TO DO, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956, WITH DESIGNING AND ESTABLISHING THE PROTOTYPE FOR THE FIRST GENERATION OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO RECURRENT INTERNATIONAL DEMAND, THEY SUBSEQUENTLY REPEATED THE PERFORMANCE ON ALMOST EVERY CONCEIVABLE OCCASION – IN THE CONGO, IN CYPRUS AND IN A HOST OF SIMILAR OPERATIONS OF VARYING SIZE AND SIGNIFICANCE THAT FOLLOWED OVER THE ENSUING DECADES, AND WELL INTO THE 1990S ERA OF SECOND-GENERATION ENTERPRISES IN 'PEACE ENFORCEMENT' AND 'PEACE-BUILDING.' THEIR ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT 'LAW OF THE SEA' REGIME (NOT IN EVERY RESPECT A HAPPY EVOLUTION FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW) WAS BY ANY MEASURE SUBSTANTIAL, AND THEIR LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AN INTEREST GROUNDED IN FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC NEED, HAS GIVEN THEM AN ENERGY, ENTHUSIASM AND EXPERTISE IN THE FIELD THAT HAS LED TO THEIR HAVING AN IMPRESSIVE IMPACT ON TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AT BOTH THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS.

Their isolation in northern proximity to the United States has made them keen multilateralists – so much so that they are now among the most pervasive of the world's diplomatic 'joiners.' Almost anyone, almost anywhere, can set up a diplomatic table, and the Canadians will want a seat at it. Usually they get one. Their interest in arms control and disarmament has been legendary. They have not been particularly successful at it; but then, no one else has been particularly successful at it, either. They have been fairly aggressive (if not always entirely honest) in their support for the developmental and other needs of the countries of what used to be called the "third world", and from the start they were leading players in the promotion of international standards bearing on human rights. More recently they have been at the forefront of attempts to create a new round of norm-changing international regimes (as in the well-known cases of the ban on anti-personnel landmines and the creation of the International Criminal Court, both of which are continuing 'works-in-progress'). And to cap it all off, they are included, however anomalously, among the unabashedly visible members of the G-7 (now the G-8) – a position they are likely to retain if only because their being deprived of it would cause the other participants more trouble than the result would be worth.

As these things go, this is not a bad showing for a country that even now has only 30 million inhabitants, particularly one that is enveloped in the kinds of constraints that come from living next door to the world's most powerful and pervasively influential state. In the circumstances, it is probably not surprising that Canadian politicians have succumbed to the temptation to exploit the diplomatic record, however shamelessly, for vainglorious nation-building purposes of their own, and having done so, to cling to the images they have created even when their meanings have begun to turn to myth.

But if mythologizing is good for politics, it is bad for the mind. It creates blinkers. It erects false premises. It leads to ill-founded policy analysis. And in so doing, it generates behaviours that can be counterproductive both at home and abroad.

This is worth saying because the reality, notwithstanding past performance and current perceptions, is that Canada's international political assets, in relative terms at least, have seriously declined. Even to those whose attention to such matters is only casual and sporadic, this reality has become starkly evident in the months that have followed the horrors of September 11. The phenomenon warrants examination.

THE CONTEXTUAL REALITIES

The decline, it should be understood, is partly the result of "vast impersonal forces" – forces that no one can control – and partly the consequence of decisions that Canadians have made for themselves. These are decisions that reflect their *real* national priorities, the priorities about which they care the most (no matter what they or their leaders may find it convenient to claim).

The "vast impersonal forces" include such obvious developments as the recovery and rise of an increasingly united Europe, the growing significance of previously isolated or incapacitated players like Japan, India and China, the disappearance of the Soviet Union and its bloc of obedient satellites as a source of countervail to the United States, the emergence of the U.S.A., for both this and other reasons, as a hegemonic power (an "imperial power with good manners", as someone once said), and the pervasiveness in that context of the processes of economic globalization (processes that for Canada have not been global, but continental).

The "decisions that Canadians have made for themselves" include above all their 'decision' to allow their armed forces establishment to run down, to permit the resources available for their foreign assistance programs to decay, and to deprive their public service (including their foreign service) of much of its capacity for considered policy analysis. The latter has resulted partly from budgetary constraints, but also from an unrestrained escalation in the volume of what can only be described as "busy work" – much of it, but not all of it, having to do with public consultations. As any beleaguered foreign service officer will now complain (after the second drink, if not the first), their professional lives are suffused more than ever before with the 'transactions' of bureaucracy. They are sometimes tasked with compiling a page or two of bulleted one-liners, but they no longer write carefully-nuanced policy memoranda, and no one would read them if they did. There is no time for considered thought. The challenge is to get through the day.

There is not space here to comment adequately on whether these various 'decisions' have been warranted or not, inevitable or not. Clearly there are reasons for them. They have been taken – it might be more accurate to say they have 'happened' – in response to the press of circumstance. Perhaps the circumstances have been irresistible. But whether the decisions themselves can be defended or not, Canadians have acquiesced in them. In effect, they have succumbed to the temptations of the free – or at least the cheap – ride. The results are thus matters of fact. And they have real consequences. The Department of National Defence, its Minister has recently announced, will soon embark upon the writing of a white paper. But precisely because of the run-down in the size of his establishment, the exercise is certain to have more to do with adjusting the purposes to the assets than the assets to the purposes. His advisers have no hope left of there being any point in doing it the other way round.

The primary implication of all these developments and others like them has been very clear to *cognoscenti* for some

If mythologizing is good for politics, it is bad for the mind. It creates blinkers. It erects false premises. It leads to ill-founded policy analysis.

time, but as already indicated, it became starkly visible to almost *everyone* in the wake of September 11. The official response to the cataclysms in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania demonstrated beyond all possible doubt that the one fundamental imperative in the conduct of Canada's external relations is the maintenance of an effective working relationship with the United States of America. This was because the American republic, in the defence of its citizens, was showing signs that it might be led to impede the flow of traffic across the Canada-U.S. border. For Ottawa this was not a tolerable prospect. Canadians, including Canadians in high places, sympathized deeply and identified profoundly with their counterparts south of the border as they reacted to the massive destruction and loss of life that had resulted from the terrorist attack. Their feelings were real. But emotions aside, it was immediately obvious that Canada's economic dependence on the United States had now reached the stage at which any serious threat to Canada-U.S. economic exchange would lead not merely to consternation, as it did at the time of the Nixon surcharge affair in August 1971, but to outright panic.

Rather interestingly from the 'foreign policy' point of view, much, and perhaps most, of the public policy response seemed to be initiated elsewhere in government – in Justice, in Citizenship and Immigration, in the Solicitor-General's department, in Finance, in the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, in the Department of National Defence, in Transport, and in a host of others. Almost no federal agency was exempt from the potential repercussions of the American response to the terrorist attack. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley, was brought in for a time to co-ordinate the Canadian reaction, and he earned an enviable reputation in the country for his performance. (He took the longer-term responsibility with him when he was subsequently promoted to Deputy Prime Minister.) But the fact of the matter was that the challenge to the government as a whole had more to do with the administration and protection of what had become a continentally-imbedded economy than with 'foreign policy' as traditionally defined. From the point of view of anyone who might be interested in the maintenance of a degree of Canadian autonomy in world affairs, this has proven to be one of the more obvious by-products of the linking of Canada's prosperity to continental integration. It is not clear that many Canadians worry about this any more. But whether they do, or they do not, it, too, is now an unforgiving reality.



THE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

There are many of these, and not everyone would agree on which of them are the most important – or even on what belongs on the list and what does not. It seems safe enough, however, to suggest that the following may be among them.

First, the basic reality is that Canada cannot usefully pursue any policy option that significantly challenges what the Americans perceive (rightly or wrongly) to be in their fundamental interest, especially when that interest has a security dimension. This has always been true in *some* degree, but it is now truer than ever. If Canadian policy makers are wise, they will do as the post-war generation of Canadian foreign service officers understood that THEY had to do, which was to calculate very carefully their margins of manoeuvre so that (as Kenny Rogers might have said) they could «know when to hold them and know when to fold them.» The challenge to Canadian policy posed by the looming American deployment of a National Missile Defense system probably provides a currently visible case in point. Canadians as a whole, including Canadians in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, may not like it very much, but it might be prudent for them to "go with the flow" all the same. (Canadians in the Department of National Defence, of course, will welcome the opportunities for the collaboration that NMD is likely to bring.)

Second, in the past, when attempting to cultivate room for manoeuvre in dealing with the United States on security (and indeed on some other) matters, Canada was sometimes able to gain a little ground by working closely with others, and most notably with the Europeans. Ottawa can still try this on – and indeed there is a strong case for Canada tapping constructively into the European perspective on such matters as the Afghanistan intervention when discussing U.S. policy with American representatives behind the scenes. There is always the possibility, however remote, that the responsible expression of an

alternative point of view, a view flowing from a different geopolitical perspective, can help to offset the dangerous intellectual myopia that frequently goes with the enjoyment of hegemonic power. But given current circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic, it has to be recognized that Canada is now regarded by the Europeans not merely as a *minor* player, but as a player that is tightly locked in a compromising symbiotic relationship with its overwhelming neighbour. This is not, after all, an inaccurate perception. That being so, the sort of game that was played so well by Lester Pearson and his colleagues in the period from the 'forties to the 'sixties is much less easily played now.

It was immediately obvious that Canada's economic dependence on the United States had now reached the stage at which any serious threat to Canada-U.S. economic exchange would lead not merely to consternation ... but to outright panic.

Third, this problem is greatly compounded by Canada's lack of objective foreign policy assets, including military and development assistance assets – a phenomenon to which reference was made earlier. Ottawa has less to bring to the table. This almost certainly means that the counterparts of Canadian officials and politicians overseas listen to them as courteously as before, but not as attentively as before. They may probe them for intelligence – on the American position (a position that they will expect Ottawa to know very well). But, most of the time, they will have little regard for the *Canadian* position.

None of this should be taken to mean that the 'high politics' agenda of world affairs is totally beyond Canada's reach. Multilateral diplomacy still counts and opportunities for useful initiatives will occasionally come along. But by the measures that normally apply to diplomacy of the traditional sort, it has to be recognized that Canada has receded into what may well be its more 'natural' – and much more modest – place in world affairs.

Fourth, there is, perhaps, one major area of Canadian diplomatic accomplishment that needs to be recognized as an on-going specialization of considerable importance. It has to do with the politics of international trade. Here, as noted earlier, Canadian officials have made significant and influential contributions – partly, no doubt, because Canadians 'trade' a great deal and everyone knows it, but also because their deeply vested interest in the subject has concentrated their minds and has led in consequence to their developing an unusually rich store of technical expertise. For Canada, trade diplomacy is not a hobbyist's diplomacy, but a diplomacy that goes to the core of the national economic welfare. Canada's diplomats thus *have* to do it, and it is reassuring that they know how to do it well.

Quite apart from the political controversies that surround them, however, trade negotiations have at least two limitations as a vehicle for expressing the Canadian political community abroad in a way that promotes a sense of national achievement at home. The first comes from the fact that their practical consequence has been to intensify Canada's integration with the United States and hence to complicate further, rather than relieve, the underlying Canadian problem. The second is even more fundamental. It derives from the fact that trade policy is ultimately policy in the service of Mammon. It is about the satisfaction of appetites through the effective management of a branch of macro-economic policy. This is essential – like putting gas in the car. It also makes other things – even creative things – possible. But in itself it is not a source of national inspiration. Those who produce goods and services for trade, and profit from doing so, may feel they have made an important contribution to their employees, to their shareholders, to the keepers of the public purse, to the economy as a whole. And indeed they have. But their activities inspire no public sense of collective exhilaration. If the wealthy are remembered after they have departed, it is less because of the money they made and how they made it than because of the way it was spent. And only then if it was spent philanthropically.

THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT REMAIN

Rather surprisingly, these observations seem to leave Canadians, in their somewhat desperate search for creative invention, hovering somewhere around the so-called 'human security' agenda – although not, one hopes, without their paying heed to some crucially important qualifying reservations.

To be drawn to a focus on the human security agenda (the prominence of which has greatly receded in the outpourings of the foreign service establishment since Mr. Axworthy's departure from the Foreign Minister's office in October 2000) does not require enormous faith in either the capacity or the will of Canadians to engage in long-term social engineering abroad. It requires only a willingness to believe that there may be areas within the agenda to which Canada can make a particularly useful contribution – most often, perhaps, in tandem with other governments that are similarly positioned, and occasionally in the company of private actors (NGOs and the like), as well.

Canada is sometimes able to do this kind of work not, of course, because 'Canadian values' (a tiresome phrase if ever there was one, but now pandemic in both Ottawa and the country at large – even among officials and intellectuals who should know better) are particularly different from the values of anyone else, but because Canada's geopolitical good luck gives it the luxury of indulging them. As observed earlier, the only thing Canadian officials **have** to do is to maintain an effective working relationship with the United States. Almost everything else they do in foreign affairs is voluntary. They can do it or not, as they please. And provided the cost is not TOO high, the public is prepared to go along for the ride, and to gain vicarious pleasure from the 'warm glow' that appears to result. The self-congratulatory rhetorical cant that seems to come with the sensation is not an edifying

spectacle, and observers elsewhere probably find it nauseating. Nonetheless, it does mean that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade enjoys at least a little political room at home for diplomatic manoeuvre – and hence for constructive invention – abroad.

Trade policy is ultimately policy in the service of Mammon. It is about the satisfaction of appetites through the effective management of a branch of macro-economic policy.

It is possible, for example, that Canada could do something really meaningful about AIDS in Africa – and there are indications that it wants to make the attempt. It is also possible that it could clear some landmines from what passes for arable land in Afghanistan. There are many possibilities of this sort, and they are well known to the Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian diplomatic missions overseas, and the host of NGOs upon which the government has come increasingly to rely for the delivery of well-intended services abroad.

But if Canada continues along this route (and there are signs that it may not), the «crucially important qualifying reservations» come into play. In essence, they define important rules for the government and its representatives to follow if they are to avoid causing irritation, not to say offense, to their friends, and if they are to keep their own expectations, and those of their constituents at home and abroad, from getting out of hand.

First, they should do it more, talk about it less, and boast about it not at all. The latter – boasting about it – can sometimes yield political rewards at home, and on occasion it may be required for the effective cultivation of appropriate levels of domestic political support. But in the end it weakens the country's reputation, and hence its capacities, abroad. Least of all in diplomacy, should Caesar praise himself. This is especially true if he is only a little *Caesar*. Others can praise him if they like.

Second, Ottawa should limit its objectives in any particular case (a) to what it can reasonably hope to accomplish, and (b) to what it is honestly prepared to pay for. Canadians can certainly help other folk run their elections in cases where the task is new to them. But that is not the same thing as making them into democrats, or converting autocracies or oligarchies into democracies. It is not at all clear that Canadians (or Americans, either) know how to do that, and even if they did, it is obvious that they lack the will to pay the price and stay the course. They do not have it even in reference to a tiny place of misery disaster like Haiti. No advantage can be gained by pretending that they do.

Third, they should avoid spreading their initiatives too broadly and thinly about. Concentrating their efforts – particularly when they are reluctant to put significant stores of resources into *whatever* they do – is essential if Canada is to have any serious impact. This is easier said than done. There are folk in the system at home who *like* the thought of Canadians being everywhere. And everywhere abroad there are folk who want Canadians to be where *they* are, even if they do not care whether they are anywhere else. But in the end it does not work – either for their objectives, or for Ottawa's. Not in significant measure, at any rate. This is not to advocate an attempt to articulate Canadian niches in the style of the publicly announced grand design, a strategy that can lead to diplomatically inconvenient resentments, and in any case deprives the government of the flexibility that a working foreign policy in a kaleidoscopic world requires. But it does suggest the need to quietly and responsibly pick and choose, and then to quietly and responsibly get on with the job.

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In sum, Canada needs to recognize that its options are relatively limited in the areas where its vital short-term interests lie. Outside those areas, however, it has the luxury of being able to indulge in the performance of useful works of its own choosing. But it needs to choose well, and avoid displays of self-serving cant.

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CANADA AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
in the post-Cold War Era

BY David M. Malone and Patrick Wittmann

AS CANADA'S WEIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INEVITABLY DECLINES WITH THE EMERGENCE OF MAJOR POWERS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD SUCH AS CHINA, INDIA AND BRAZIL, AND AS ITS ECONOMY INTEGRATES EVER FURTHER WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO REFLECT FURTHER ON HOW FOREIGN POLICY CAN BEST MEET THE ASPIRATIONS AND SERVE THE INTERESTS OF CANADIANS. THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT, *CANADA IN THE WORLD*, OF 1995 TOOK A STAB AT THIS BUT MUCH HAS OCCURRED SINCE, INCLUDING A TERM BY CANADA ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1999-2000.

Canada has, from the inception of the United Nations, been one of its most active and committed members. Lester B. Pearson is widely considered the father of UN peacekeeping, having won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his assertive role during the Suez crisis in negotiating the deployment of the first UN Emergency Force in the Sinai. Canada is no longer a leader in UN peacekeeping in terms of the numbers of personnel provided, currently ranking 32nd among troop contributors with 210 military personnel and 95 civilian police officers. (India tops the current list with 4,460 peacekeepers deployed. Canada's peak was roughly 2,600 in 1993). It continues to be recognized for the quality of its troops and equipment, and makes significant contributions to a non-UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, but it can no longer coast on its past reputation as the world's foremost peacekeeper.

For many years, Canada also was one of the most generous funders of UN development and relief efforts. This era, sadly, is over. Canadian Official Development Assistance fell from a high point of 0,44 percent of its GNP in 1990 to 0,28 percent in 1999. While this trend, reflected also in the performance of several other major donors, passes largely unnoticed in Canada, it has generated considerable regret internationally.

This article aims to assess how Canada has forged a productive, independent and respected foreign policy identity within, and in relationship with, the UN Security Council in the post-Cold War era.

BACKGROUND

When the United Nations was established in 1945, its Security Council was seen in its Charter as the principal organ to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Five states were granted permanent membership of the Council: the Republic of China (replaced in 1971 by the People's Republic of China), France, the USSR (succeeded in 1991 by the Russian Federation), the UK and the USA. Founders of the UN thought that only through the active involvement of these major victors of World War II (particularly that of the USA, the absence of which had wrecked the League of Nations) could the UN hope to be successful in protecting the peace. In order to promote their engagement, they were each granted a veto over Council decisions. Six non-permanent members were to be elected by the UN General Assembly, increased to ten in 1965.

Canada has, to date, won six terms on the UN Security Council, a larger number than any other Western country. Canada's stock-in-trade during the Cold War years, beyond its excellent international citizenship, was as a "helpful fixer", able to build bridges between contending parties (sometimes permanent members). Canada's margin for manoeuvre in the Council was constrained by its alliances (notably within the North Atlantic Council), but it was generally recognized as diplomatically creative during the Cold War Period when NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact members between them often paralysed Council action.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The first evidence of the relaxation in East-West tensions within the Security Council was the co-operative manner in which the Permanent Five (P-5) countries agreed among themselves in 1986 to a second term for Javier Perez de Cueller as UN Secretary-General. In January 1987, Perez de Cuellar challenged them publicly to tackle resolution of the murderous Iran-Iraq war and by mid-1987, Security Council proposals for a ceasefire, monitored by a small UN observer mission, were accepted. This encouraged the Council to tackle other "regional" conflicts that had been fueled by the Cold War superpowers, often working through regional proxies. The post-Cold War era had started at the UN.

On the strength of new concord among the P-5, the Council tackled many more conflicts than it had earlier, when it was stymied by Cold War animosities and a plethora of vetoes (cast and threatened). The 1990s witnessed a sharp drop in the use of the veto. Factors held by the Council as constituting a threat to international peace expanded to include humanitarian catastrophes, particularly those generating large exoduses of displaced persons and refugees, internally and internationally. This, in turn, allowed the Council to address a range of conflicts, mostly internal in nature, which it most likely would have avoided in the past. The Council's decisions in the 1990s proved highly innovative in shaping the normative framework for international relations and stimulated several radical legal developments at the international level, notably the creation of International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994. This in turn greatly intensified pressure for a more universal international criminal court, a statute for which was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome in 1998, under the chairmanship of Canada's Philippe Kirsch.

The Council's willingness to involve itself in a broad range of internal conflicts, encompassing inter-communal strife, crises of democracy and fighting for control of national resources, forced it to confront hostilities of a much more complex nature than the inter-State disputes with which it had greater experience. International efforts to mitigate and resolve these conflicts required mandates significantly more ambitious than the modalities of "classic" peacekeeping were designed to meet. The most striking feature of "new generation" peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the 1990s were not so much the large numbers of military personnel involved – several earlier PKOs (e.g. in the Sinai, Congo and even Cyprus) had featured large deployments of Blue Helmets – but rather the important role and substantive diversity of their civilian and police components. Civilian functions discharged by PKOs or otherwise mandated by the Council included civil administration (most notably in Namibia, Cambodia, the Former Yugoslavia); humanitarian assistance; human rights monitoring and training; police and judicial support, training and reform; and even a degree of leadership on economic revival and development. However, Council-mandated activities often encountered significant resistance by frequently shadowy belligerents, leading to incidents involving heavy loss of life among peacekeepers and relief workers (in Rwanda, Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia). The Council's inability to induce compliance with some of its decisions fuelled two apparently contradictory, but all too frequently complementary, responses. On the one hand, it moved to enforce decisions, notably in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti; on the other, in the face of significant casualties, it cut and ran, as in Somalia and at the outset of genocide in Rwanda.

Resort to enforcement by the Council was not new: this had occurred in Korea and to a lesser extent in the Congo during the UN's early years. But the number of Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter during the 1990s was wholly unprecedented. Quite rapidly, in the face of disappointing, occasionally catastrophic results in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, it became clear to Member States that transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement represented more than "mission creep". The two types of operations were, in fact, fundamentally different, one requiring consent and impartiality, the other requiring international personnel to confront one or several belligerent groups. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali concluded by 1994 that the UN should not itself seek to conduct large-scale enforcement activities. Consequently, the Security Council increasingly resorted for enforcement or "robust peacekeeping" of its decisions to "coalitions of the willing" in Bosnia, Haiti, the Central African Republic, East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Hybrids emerged, such as the support by UK combat troops of the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in 2000. The UN retained

the capacity to deploy more classic peacekeeping operations of interposition between contending countries, as it did between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000. The UN's chancy operation in the Congo, deployed as of 2000, defies any categorization.

More common than military enforcement were economic (and, increasingly, diplomatic) sanctions mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter. While arms embargoes remained in vogue, imposition of comprehensive trade and other economic sanctions, seen as more gentle than the resort to force, faded noticeably once the humanitarian costs of sanctions regimes against Haiti and Iraq became widely known. The ability of government regimes in countries struck by sanctions to enrich themselves by controlling black markets eventually sank in.

The Council increasingly confronted, shaped and adapted to the role of regional organizations in seeking to prevent and resolve conflict. In the former Yugoslavia, the Council and UN staff found themselves contending with an array or regional actors, including European Union monitors, civilian administrators and economic development staff, OSCE negotiators and NATO enforcement units in the skies and on the ground. With the Council eventually stymied by several conflicts, regional organizations came to be seen by some as a possible substitute for the UN. However, with the exception of NATO, regional bodies generally commanded even scarcer resources and offered even more limited capacities than did the UN.

The shifts in the nature and scope of Council decisions, many setting precedents even where the Council asserted that they did not, arose from evolving interpretations of the Charter and deeply affected understanding of sovereignty at the international level.

The early post-Cold War period saw the Council at its most optimistic and activist, with some notable successes, as in El Salvador and Mozambique. Wishful thinking on resources, increasing risk, poor planning, the dilution of responsibility inevitable in committee decision-making, and the absence of a powerful and consistently engaged leader among its members all contributed to the Council's subsequent decline into recrimination, risk-aversion and flight from reality.

CANADA AND THE COUNCIL – THE EARLY POST-COLD WAR YEARS

By the time Canada was elected to the Council for a term in 1989-90, the USA and the USSR were prepared to help put an end to conflicts in Namibia, Central America, Angola, Western Sahara and Cambodia. Canada's bridging role at the UN was much in evidence. Both Canada and Finland, the two Council members that belonged neither to the Permanent Five nor to the Non-Aligned Movement, were generally agreed to have played a valuable role in inter-mediating between these groups. They were trusted on most issues as having a largely impartial and constructive approach.

This was the case, for example, on Namibia. The issue had been on the agenda of the Council since the late nineteen seventies, with active Canadian involvement. Interested actors on the Council were monitored by broader groups outside the Council, notably the Front-Line States, SWAPO, and the whole NAM, which made for slow and uneven progress. African States were not only deeply distrustful of South Africa, but also suspected the motives of some Western States. However, a determined approach within the Council, largely spearheaded by Canada, paid off, with Namibia achieving independence in 1990 following a very sizeable UN deployment of peacekeepers and civilians providing for a transitional administration from South African to autonomous rule.

Canada also played a major role on the interlocking conflicts of Central America, which were brought to the UN by the countries of the region themselves. Although negotiations with often inexperienced, frightened local parties was ably handled by the UN Secretariat, strong international support was required to induce compromises and to reassure often understandably paranoid local actors. Once again, the super-powers co-operated. As in Namibia, Canada provided personnel to the UN's operations in the field to anchor peace agreements and its then-flush aid program was able to lubricate the path to sustainable peace in this and other areas newly on the Council's agenda.

The Council's success in tackling regional conflicts was vital to its ability (surprising at the time) to react decisively in seeking to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a culture of co-operation having taken root among the Permanent Five by August 1990. Finland and Canada were selected by other Council members to play the key roles in chairing the Council committees dealing with sanctions against Iraq.

Canada was supportive from the outset to a Council role on international terrorism. The breakthrough case was that of attacks against Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, and that of UTA flight 771 over North Africa, eventually resulting in Council-mandated sanctions against Libya for its lack of co-operation with efforts to investigate and prosecute Libyan suspects.

In those years, Canada's credentials on peacekeeping were second to none. Peacekeeping doctrine and practice were evolving very rapidly at the time. The UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (The Committee of 33, then 34 when China joined) had been blocked for several years because of fundamental differences on principles for peacekeeping between the USA, which advocated as much flexibility as possible and a free hand for the Secretary General, and the USSR, which wanted the Council to approve any new development. Troop contributors had tried to get the Committee to focus on practical issues, largely unsuccessfully. A breakthrough occurred in 1989 when Philippe Kirsch, Canada's Deputy Permanent Representative at the time, was selected to chair a Working Group on key doctrinal and operational peacekeeping issues. Coinciding with Canada's term on the Security Council, this position, which it retains today, gave Canada added influence over peacekeeping questions at the UN even though its own participation in the UN's field missions is now dwarfed by that of countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Jordan.

CANADA IN THE COUNCIL'S ERA OF EUPHORIA, 1991-94

Canada's relationship with the Security Council does not cease during

the extended periods when it is a non-member. During the early 1990s, when the Council's ambition for international order over-reached its capacity to support, financially and in terms of political will, its objectives, Canada remained extremely active. Its significant deployment of troops in Croatia and Bosnia made it a major international player in the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia (being included in informal consultations of the principal troop contributors on the rapidly shifting international strategy). On Haiti, Canada helped develop the Council's strategy alongside France, the USA and (initially) Venezuela. General Romeo Dallaire's tenure as the UN Force Commander in Rwanda illustrated the worst of the Council's erratic impulses in addressing conflict after American casualties were sustained in Somalia in late 1993, and the best of Canadian stewardship of international mandates in adverse circumstances.

THE TROUGH OF DESPOND, 1994-1998

The expansion in the Council's agenda and in the scope and sweep of the mandates it set in the early 1990s was followed by a dawning realization of the scale of the disasters with which it was associated in Somalia, Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. (Given the break-neck pace of the Council's deliberations, the full implications of developments in the field took a long time to register). The massacre of thousands of civilians at Srebrenica, on the UN's watch, in 1995 capped a grim series of reverses, the most dreadful of which was the Council's indecisive response to genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

With the exception of a small peacekeeping operation mandated to support peacebuilding objectives in Guatemala in 1997, no new peacekeeping operations were launched by the Council after 1995 and until 1999. During these years of introspection, several UN operations had to adapt to new developments, notably in Bosnia, where UNPROFOR yielded to several smaller UN missions under the protective cover of the NATO-led IFOR (and subsequently SFOR). Canada continued to play a significant role in international operations in Bosnia, notably in IFOR and SFOR, but neither were UN missions – rather they belonged to that increasingly common international hybrid, the coalition of the willing under UN Security Council mandate. The sober mood in the Council coincided with sharp questioning in Washington of the UN's capacity to support US foreign policy objectives. US arrears to the UN widened dramatically to US $ 2 billion, further constraining the Council's margin for manoeuvre.

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In 1998, Saddam Hussein forced the withdrawal of UN inspectors from Iraq, crystallizing divisions among the P-5 over Iraq policy that had been developing for some time. The sanctions regime imposed in 1991, supplemented by the oil-for-food program initiated under intense pressure of humanitarian organizations in 1995, no longer commanded much support at the UN, although the USA and the UK clung to it hard. Serious tensions among the P-5 over Iraq continued throughout 1998 and early 1999. Many Canadians had grown skeptical of the sanctions regime, seeing in it an opportunity for the Baghdad regime to enrich itself while the Iraqi population endured great hardships. Energetic sanctions-busting by Iraq and several of its neighbours also attracted Canadian attention. The Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, on several occasions criticized the ineffectiveness and the serious humanitarian consequences of the sanctions regime.

CANADA'S TERM ON THE COUNCIL, 1999-2000

As early as 1993, Canada had signalled (in order to head off potential rivals) that it would seek a Security Council seat again in 1999-2000. It turned out to have competition. The Netherlands, Greece and Canada vied for two seats. After a campaign marked by enthusiastic wooing of the electorate (Greece offered an all-expenses paid cruise of the Greek Islands for UN Ambassadors and their spouses), Canada and the Netherlands won. Canada had run on a platform of Security Council democratization and transparency, complaining of a condominium of power among the P-5 and excessive secrecy surrounding Council deliberations. It also called for a reassertion of Council leadership and engagement in the wake of Somalia and Rwanda-induced retrenchment. The centrepiece of Canada's platform was its promise to advance its human security agenda which Foreign Minister Axworthy was vigorously championing. This was a bold approach, given the largely reactive stance of the Council, and the self-serving realpolitik practised by its permanent members. Canada's agenda also included a pledge to reform Security Council-mandated sanctions. With the sharp rise in UN peace operations, Canada also pledged to dedicate considerable energy to addressing deficiencies in UN peacekeeping.

In promoting human security, Canada sought a more forceful and consistent Council response to intra-state conflicts marked by the victimization of civilians. There were precedents of Council intervention in internal conflicts to build on, as well as a trend towards consideration of cross-cutting, "soft" security issues (for example war-affected children). Canada sought to make human security, in particular the protection of civilians, an integral element of the Council's mandate, on par with the security of states for which the UN Charter made clearer provision. This proved challenging, but some important progress was made.

Using the first of its two rotating monthly presidencies of the Council in February 1999, Canada chaired an influential debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. This led the Secretary-General to address victimization of civilians, even suggesting triggers for international intervention, for example massive and systematic human

rights abuse. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's recommendations. Canada gave this agenda substance by fighting successfully for peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and DRC to be mandated to protect civilians. This contrasted with earlier UN operations where peacekeepers became bystanders to attacks against civilians because they lacked the authority to intervene. (In practice it was not clear, however, that either peacekeeping mission possessed the capacity effectively to respond to most attacks against civilians.)

With its focus on the protection of civilians, Canada anticipated one of the most neuralgic issues of its tenure on the Council, the oppression of Kosovars by Belgrade, leading to NATO's air campaign of March-May 1999 to induce Serb compliance with earlier Council decisions. By March 1999, Council members earlier suspicious of the protection of civilians as a Council priority in the abstract, were very much advocating it in the context of Kosovo. Russia, which attempted to thwart NATO's action in the Council found itself overwhelmingly out-voted (by twelve to three), its influence diminished. The Council's much speedier response to the crisis in East Timor later that year suggested its members had learned some lessons.

In a bid to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the Council, Canada also focussed on improving sanctions, a key but increasingly discredited Council instrument. Prior to joining the Council, Canada had sought expert advice on how to make UN sanctions more effective and humane. As a member, and with energetic leadership by Canada's then Ambassador Robert Fowler, Canada chaired the Angola sanctions committee, aiming to give teeth to widely-flouted sanctions against UNITA which included an arms, materiel and diamond embargo and travel and financial bans against the rebel leadership. The Council agreed to a Canadian proposal for independent experts to investigate violations of the sanctions. The experts took the unusual step of naming publicly those responsible for sanctions-busting. Several African heads of state and a number of European countries were implicated. Such naming and shaming was unprecedented in Council circles, and led to moves by those identified to clean up their acts. It also resulted in the Council examining more closely the economic looting of the Congo and the role of diamonds and other commodities in the Sierra Leone crisis. As a result, the Council now pays more serious attention to monitoring compliance with its sanctions regimes. More broadly, the Council finally came to grips with the critical role of economic factors in contemporary conflicts in Africa and beyond.

Canada advanced the debate on sanctions reform by advocating the launch of a comprehensive review of all UN sanctions regimes in the 1990s. A volume from the International Peace Academy, funded by Canada, *The Sanctions Decade*, contained recommendations for better targeted sanctions and mitigation of their humanitarian impact. Canada also spearheaded the creation of a Council working group on sanctions reform. These efforts yielded a number of improvements in the design and implementation of new sanctions regimes, but old divisions over the Iraq sanctions ultimately derailed the systemic proposals from the working group. Its report was never formally tabled.

Canada also focused on improving the instrument of peacekeeping, on which numerous problems in implementing complex mandates had become apparent throughout the 1990s. The urgency of reform was underscored by the launch of five new missions in 1999 and 2000, all of them large, in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo and on the Ethiopian/Eritrean border. During this period, the UN's financial crunch, mostly the result of defaulted US payments, intensified while Washington pressed to keep the costs of peacekeeping down as the demand for it grew. The result in some cases was poorly configured peacekeeping operations that were shaped more by political and financial considerations than operational necessities. In an uphill battle, Canada sought to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations were given mandates consistent with realities on the ground, and that they had the resources needed to do the job. Nevertheless, in May 2000 the UN operation in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, was unable to repel rebel attacks and peacekeepers were taken hostage en masse. (This embarrassment mobilized the Council to reinforce UNAMSIL's mandate and troop strength to provide a credible deterrent, while, *in extremis*, the UK landed a deployment of highly effective military personnel to reinforce the UN presence.) Canada's focus on matching resources to rhetoric, and on a greater role in decision-making for non-Council troop contributing countries received a boost from an international panel on past peacekeeping failures. Its findings, in the so-called Brahimi report, provided a severe reality check for the Council. A deal negotiated by US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on terms for the payment of US arrears also improved the climate for UN peacekeeping.

Canada championed procedural reform to make the Council more transparent by encouraging more open debates in which important Council decisions could be discussed before they were taken. (The Council's work had mostly been conducted behind closed doors.) The range of issues debated grew to include the impact of conflict on women, small arms, HIV/AIDS and other human security issues. Canada succeeded in getting the Council to agree to more flexible and inclusive meeting formats to allow non-Council members, including parties to a conflict, to participate in discussions that had traditionally been closed to them. This created new opportunities for conflict prevention and resolution through direct engagement between the Council and the parties concerned. Although

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conclave diplomacy continues, Canada worked to enhance the role of non-permanent members, challenging the P-5 condominium, including its privileged access to the Secretary-General and members of the Secretariat.

Canada's agenda, involving several good ideas, also benefited from good timing. Events in Kosovo and East Timor validated many of Canada's human security goals.

Canada engaged actively on a range of specific security problems on the Council agenda. On Iraq, Canada helped break a P-5 deadlock following the expulsion from Iraq of UN weapons inspectors. As a result, the Council was able to agree on a new weapons inspection agency and make improvements to the humanitarian exemptions process under the sanctions regime (although, due to Iraqi resistance, some of these decisions have yet to be implemented).

Canada's agenda, involving several good ideas, also benefited from good timing. Events in Kosovo and East Timor validated many of Canada's human security goals. Ottawa also had a powerful and articulate ally in Secretary-General Kofi Annan, whose focus on human rights and the humanitarian imperative earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001. His willingness to expose the UN and himself to the devastating findings of the Rwanda and Srebrenica inquiries, and the subsequent Brahimi report, gave added impetus both to Canada's efforts to reform UN peacekeeping, and to place the protection of civilians more centrally on the Council's agenda. Canada's term demonstrated both the value of an agenda and also the factor of chance in international relations. It enabled Canada to be proactive and to make a difference, very much for the good.

KEY CANADIAN ASSETS: IDEAS AND PEOPLE

In an era of sharp deficit-cutting and reduced availability of public funds for international relations and co-operation, it was clear during the 1990s that Canada needed to draw on non-financial assets in pursuing its security agenda at the UN.

During the era under review, Canada fielded five Permanent Representatives to the United Nations. The first, Stephen Lewis, former head of the federal New Democratic Party, was strongly identified with advocacy of the humanitarian imperative, human rights and development. On these issues his impact was significant, indeed unique. He later became Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF and, recently, Kofi Annan's, Special Envoy on AIDS in Africa. His public identification with the plight of Africa helped establish a strong link between African political and economic development and Canada's foreign policy overall. A distinguished practitioner of international public and commercial law, Yves Fortier, held Canada's seat on the Security Council in 1989-90. Fortier became known for his fairness of mind, always hearing out all parties to a dispute before advancing Canadian views on steps forward. He personified Canada's capacity to build bridges and develop consensus in multilateral fora. His close relationship with the prime minister provided additional authority to Canada's voice during tense Council negotiations. Fortier, by the end of his term, was admired within Ottawa's foreign policy establishment as a political appointee whose achievements were second to none in the Foreign Service. Louise Fréchette, in a packed term in New York mid-decade, focused on challenges to the UN's role in peacekeeping and on systemic issues requiring significant UN reform. Her success as ambassador led to appointment as the UN's first Deputy Secretary-General in 1998, after she had served as Canada's first woman Deputy Minister of Defence. Robert Fowler, in Canada's Security Council seat 1989-90, built on his personal commitment to Africa by chairing the Council's Angola Sanctions Committee. He also secured significant improvements in the role of non-Permanent Members relative to the P-5. His work on Angola was pivotal: he introduced into the Council economic factors in that country's civil war that were soon recognized as systemically important in contemporary conflict all over the world. His successor, Paul Heinbecker, with Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy the architect of Canada's Human Security Agenda and a particularly incisive intellect, rounded out the term with the satisfaction of seeing human security considerations thoroughly internalized in the Council's consideration of conflict issues.

This narrative of Canadian representation in New York and the themes it evolved at the UN makes clear that people and ideas matter greatly, even when large sums of money and ever-growing peacekeeping deployments are no longer available to buttress government rhetoric. All of these individuals and their teams achieved real impact on the conduct of international relations. That said, the government's budget announcement in late 2001that $ 1 billion would be added to Canada's aid program ($ 500 million of which for Africa) recognized that the pendulum of budget-cutting at CIDA had gone further than Canadian international credibility could support indefinitely, particularly with Canada hosting the G-8 Summit in mid-2002.

CONCLUSIONS

Canadian diplomatic capacity has provided Ottawa with leverage at the United Nations it has not always been able to deploy in bilateral relations, where issues of national scale and interest are even more acute than in multilateral fora. Canada's most recent term on the Security Council demonstrates that, with the right people and a compelling set of ideas, Canada can achieve results well beyond its relative statistical weight. If an independent, active foreign policy is important to Canadians in years ahead, the UN Security Council will continue to provide opportunities for engagement on many of the geo-political crises ahead. We are optimistic that Canadian governments of the future, as of the past, will seize these opportunities.

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CANADA AND ITS WORLD

BY Desmond Morton

ONE WAY TO REFLECT ON CANADA AND ITS WORLD IS TO LEVER UP OUR LAND MASS AND TRY TO FIND A PLACE FOR IT SOMEWHERE ELSE ON THE GLOBE. IT'S A BIT OF A CHALLENGE, REALLY. FINDING SPACE FOR ALMOST TEN MILLION SQUARE KILOMETRES IS NO JOKE. ABOUT THE ONLY CONCEIVABLE HOLE WOULD BE SOMEWHERE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE. CHANCES ARE THAT THE CLIMATE WOULD NOT BE A GREAT IMPROVEMENT. STILL, IMAGINE WAKING UP WITH INDIA, AUSTRALIA OR ARGENTINA, OUR ONE-TIME COMPETITOR FOR THE UPPER SLOPES OF PROSPERITY, AS NEAR NEIGHBOURS. BUT DON'T WORRY. GIVEN ITS GLOBAL REACH, CULTURAL ENERGY AND CORPORATE POWER, THE UNITED STATES WOULD STILL BULK LARGE ON OUR HORIZON.

Wouldn't that have been the point of moving? Or, for others, the best argument for moving back to the old location? "So far from God," complain Mexicans, "and so near to the U.S.A." But consider the options for so huge and under-populated a country. With a polar icecap and two broad oceans to insulate us, Canada has been invulnerable on three sides since the Royal Navy our defender in 1760. For close to half a century we lay between two bitterly hostile super powers and nothing worse dropped on us than some radioactive debris from a Soviet satellite.

Since First Nations times, our vulnerable frontier has been the bottom side. In the 1860s, the U.S. Civil War finally convinced the British that they would lose any future War of 1812. They helped us confederate and pulled out, pledging that if Canada "would devote all her resources, both in men and in money" to defend the British connection, the British accepted a reciprocal obligation. Canadians know what happened to our side of the deal. Our politicians sensibly agreed that war with the United States was unthinkable. Instead of arming for a hopeless struggle, Ottawa committed a million dollars a year for a 40,000-member volunteer militia capable of dispersing rural rioters. Out west, Sir John A. Macdonald created a mounted police so that U.S. cavalry would not be tempted to keep order up here. Instead of buying fortresses and heavy artillery, Ottawa gave us a peace dividend big enough to build railways from Halifax to Vancouver. Most Canadians forgot all about soldiering. Peace-loving immigrants fled old world conscription to find peaceful homes for their families. Ultimately, even Britain and France shared the benefits because, with Canada safe, hundreds of thousands of Canadian soldiers, sailors and pilots came to their defence.

In the summer of 1940, after the fall of France, Canada suddenly ranked second to Great Britain in war against Hitler's Third Reich. When the implications of this horrifying reality finally dawned on our prime minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King dialled the White House. Two days later, on August 18, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was in Ogdensburg. By nightfall, the two leaders had approved a "Permanent Joint Board of Defence" to manage continental security. When Japan destroyed the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, American troops flooded into the Yukon to link Edmonton and Alaska by road. U.S. engineers built airfields and

pipelines across the Arctic. After a visit, the British High Commissioner persuaded Ottawa to appoint a commissioner, buy him a DC-3 and show our flag. After the war, Ottawa bought up every airfield and a thoroughly impassable Alaska Highway to extinguish U.S. claims. Old suspicions were not allayed by wartime dealings with Washington.

Still, the PJBD was permanent. When revelations of Soviet espionage in Ottawa helped segué Canadians from the Axis defeat into a Soviet-American Cold War, the polar cap looked thinner than before the era of airpower. In 1947, Canada agreed to Americanize its armed forces in doctrine, training, equipment and style. More dependent on the latest technology than on old traditions, Canada's navy and air force embraced the U.S. linkage enthusiastically. The army was slower. In Korea, our soldiers served under a British-led Common-wealth Division. In 1951, our brigade joined the British Army of the Rhine, though the air force and navy joined American commands. Ottawa's price for an American-built Distant Early Warning (DEW) line across the North was belated recognition of Canada's Arctic sovereignty. Generations later, that left us with the bill for clean-up.

Early in the PJBD days, a shrewd general, Maurice Pope, warned that Americans would demand a higher standard of defence than most Canadians thought necessary. In 1957, a newly-elected John Diefenbaker agreed to a North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), allowing a U.S. general to make the split-second decision about what to tell the President when NORAD radars spotted Soviet bombers, missiles or merely overweight geese. On off days, a Canadian deputy might choose. Acceptable when the veteran Dwight D. Eisenhower occupied the White House, Diefenbaker drew the line at his lecherous young successor, John F. Kennedy. After the Cuban missile crisis, Lester Pearson's loyalty to the alliance broke up Diefenbaker's government and let our Liberals rule for sixteen uninterrupted years. Bad vibes from the Reagan White House because of Pierre Trudeau's peace-grandstanding helped make Brian Mulroney our prime minister in 1984. "Good relations, perfect relations with the United States," purred Brian, were his top priority.

Canadians should never exaggerate party differences. A Trudeau-chosen royal commission gave Mulroney the arguments for his historic Free Trade Agreement with the United States. A Liberal leader, John Turner, turned the 1988 election into a referendum on the FTA rather than on Tory sleaze. Tory plans for nuclear-powered submarines to patrol our Arctic faded because the Pentagon wanted our Arctic waters restricted to American submarines. Other people decided how best to defend us.

After the Cold War collapsed, what was the case for Canadian defence? What was the threat? Did U.S. paranoia about North Korea, Iran and Iraq make Canada a likely target? One of Chrétien's many defence ministers came home from a NORAD briefing shaking with laughter. The North Koreans, he reported, had a "dong". Still, we were linked to a superpower. Trouble anywhere – the break-up of Yugoslavia, massacres and misgovernment in Africa, aggression in the Persian Gulf – was our trouble.

As sole surviving superpower, Americans reluctantly accepted the obligation to "project power" wherever needed. Fearful of fresh Vietnams, mindful of hundreds of marines killed in the Beirut bombings, the Pentagon turned to hyper high-tech for solutions. A "Revolution in Military Affairs" or RMA linked radar, global positioning systems, radar and high-speed telecommuni-cations to locate, target and destroy enemies with minimum manpower and risk. Republicans and Democrats alike met the costs by cuts in social spending and in conventional forces.

In Canada, Trudeau's 1974 budget had cut taxes, indexed social spending and created a spiralling deficit the Mulroney government refused to control. One of many cost-cutting gestures condemned the Canadian Forces to let weapon systems from the 1960s rust out. By the 1990s, a huge annual deficit undermined the dollar and threatened Canada's economy. Buying American from the gold-plated U.S. defence industry with 65 cent dollars undermined already inadequate capital budgets while feeding an over-dependence on U.S. markets. Going global to most Canadian exporters meant crawling up the biggest, fattest spoke in the wheel, not going to Europe or Asia.

In 1993, when Jean Chrétien's new Liberal government finally addressed the deficit, defence spending was a major target for cuts. Two years earlier, Vice-Admiral Charles Thomas, vice-chief of the Canadian defence staff, offered a plan: maintain the navy and air force because they had some new equipment. Scrap the army, which had none. Focussed on peacekeeping, from Cyprus to Croatia to Oka, Canada's soldiers had become a camouflage-clad constabulary. Thomas was put out to pasture. Chrétien's 1994 defence policy talked of forces "fit to fight the best, along side the best," but most defence capital spending in the 1990s concentrated on keeping our CF-18s fighters and twelve new patrol frigates interoperable with their American counterparts. When Canada sent forces to the U.S.-led war in the Gulf in 1990 or the 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo, CF-18s led the way and Canadian warships lay offshore. Any soldiers did guard duty. Total defence spending dropped to $9 billion and then climbed to $12 billion after media reports that service members delivered pizza and needed food banks forced a pay raise. Canadians told pollsters in 2001 that Canada's forces were under-sized but they had no desire to spend more on them. What was the need?

On September 11, a handful of terrorists provided an answer. Brilliant in its horror, novelty and simplicity, 9-11 sent a wave of panic, confusion and dismay across North America. President George W. Bush responded that anyone who was not with the United States in combatting terrorism was an ally of terrorists. By September 14, Congress gave him authority and funds. Thousands of innocent dead and the vengeful outrage of the world's superpower produced startling unanimity from the world. Accustomed to "best friend" status in Washington, Canada found itself in a humiliating race to prove its loyalty. Added to appropriate sympathy was the practical fear that enhanced U.S. border security might close down 80 percent of Canada's for-

eign exports.

In 1990, Liberal leader Jean Chrétien had been harshly critical of Brian Mulroney's "Ready, Aye, Ready" response to American leadership in the Gulf War. In 2001, six ships, not three, headed for the Arabian Sea. New frigates escorted the U.S. carrier fleet assembled to punish Afghanistan for harbouring terrorists. Almost unnoticed, Canada's top-secret Second Joint Task Force joined American special forces near Kandahar. When AP photographers caught members of 2JTF delivering prisoners to the Americans, not even Canada's national newspaper knew who they were.

Could Canada do more? A U.N. mandated, British-run security force in Kabul was an obvious opportunity – but the British already had too many white, Christian soldiers for a delicate task. Pressure on the Pentagon allowed the same regiment that provided rogue paratroopers for Somalia, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, to send a battalion to Kandahar. Lacking desert camouflage, their green uniforms at least marked them as Canadian.

Did this make Canada, or even North America, safe from terrorism? Many citizens argue that it does the opposite. The fanaticism that fed al Qaeda – or Hamas, the IRA, or the Tamil Tigers – with self-immolating recruits grows from the desperation of relentless injustice. It thrives in the gap between rich and poor. It prospers when powerful corporations extract wealth and leave poverty behind. Does Afghanistan's latest war and foreign-protected regime really offer hope? Can prisoners in cages at Guantanamo Bay avoid becoming martyrs?

Such arguments have little currency now, but they will grow as the outrage of September 11 inevitably fades. History takes longer than television's attention span.

We are warned that the so-called Terrorist War will be long unless, by mutual consent, we change the language. Perhaps we should. Calling the anti-terrorist struggle a war met an emotional need but we need another word. Wars, even bitter ones, have beginnings, ends and mutually accepted rules. Terrorists are not soldiers but, as Michael Ignatieff has argued, the exact opposite, removed from discipline, rules and even the concept of non-combatants. In Britain's long struggle with the IRA, the historian Michael Howard recalls, Whitehall consistently refused to grant IRA terrorists combatant status, despite U.S. pressure. Fighting terrorists, Howard reminds us, requires accurate, rapid information, preferably from willing sources. An alternative is the marriage of an unfettered police and modern electronics. Here lies the September 11 threat to our freedom.

September 11 finally led many Canadians to recognize the limits of their armed forces. The pretext was understandable but fostered by the president's war talk and misleading. Federal spending on anti-terrorist security offered little to the Canadian Forces beyond doubling the mysterious 2JTF and covering costs associated with Canada's support for American reprisals against Afghanistan.

In February, Ottawa finally promised a defence review, eight years after Jean Chrétien promised forces able to "fight the best alongside the best." That promise was not kept. Selected ships and aircraft can serve under American command but Canada's tradition of autonomous command is abandoned. Collective exercises cost too much. The army no longer has combat-capable long-range guns and tanks. The Coyote, a Canadian-built wheeled light-armoured reconnaissance vehicle, is a lonely reminder of past prowess. With official strength cut from 83,000 to only 59,000 men and women, real regular force strength is much smaller. Exasperated by low pay, repeated overseas deployments and family stress, thousands have quit. An urgent recruiting drive is an inefficient solution.

Will a fresh review help? Ottawa veterans expect fresh deceptions, more cuts to bone and sinew and bundles of last-year slogans from the corporate world. True believers are cynics with ambition for higher rank.

Ironically, their allies may be American. Only the United States can force Ottawa to improve the Canadian Forces. President Bush's ambassador to Ottawa, former Massachusetts governor Paul Cellucci, has bluntly warned Canadians that they must carry more weight in the defence alliance, or find themselves left outside the latest Fortress America. Canadians who might prefer the latter choice should look closely at New Zealand, a country which, whatever its rhetoric, distanced itself from ANZUS, pruned its forces and vanished into South Pacific marginality. The example is worth studying.

It also has limited relevance. Canadians don't live in the South Pacific, as we reminded ourselves earlier. Canadians have agreed to integrate our defences with the United States for over half a century. Our soldiers had no trouble figuring out the chain of command in Kandahar, whatever was going on with Art Eggleton or Jean Chrétien. Disentangling is always possible, but the economic and social tentacles are jungle-dense and pain-sensitive. Until the 1940s, the British used to be agents for Canadian military efficiency. Ambassador Cellucci was only the latest American to remind our generals, admirals and military lobbyists where influential friends can now be found. Big decisions are waiting. Soldiers wonder whether we will have an army with tanks or merely special forces, on the edge of legality, like 2 JTF. The air force wonders whether we will transport our forces in Canadian aircraft or trust our men and women to Russian or Ukrainian planes. As the CF-18 nears the end of its operational life, the Pentagon has chosen the American replacement fighter. British, French and German air forces are weighing their options if they, too, want to be "interoperable". Will we take twenty more years?

In 1914, Canada was still a colony of the British Empire. When Britain's ultimatum to Berlin expired at midnight on August 4, Canada was at war with the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. On September 14, 2002, Congress approved President George W. Bush's war. Perhaps buoyed by a *National Post* opinion poll showing 80 per cent support for backing the U.S. with troops, our prime minister agreed. Parliament did not decide. But Canada is not a colony, is it?

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L'APRÈS 9/11 : L'OPINION PUBLIQUE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS

et dans le reste du monde

PAR Jack Jedwab

SUITE AUX ATTAQUES TERRORISTES DU 11 SEPTEMBRE 2001, LA SUPER-PUISSANCE MONDIALE S'EST RETROUVÉE DANS UNE SITUATION DE VULNÉRABILITÉ. L'APPUI INTERNATIONAL DES ACTIONS ENTREPRISES PAR LES ÉTATS-UNIS EN RÉPONSE AUX ATTAQUES TERRORISTES FUT CONSIDÉRÉ VITAL. CONSÉQUEMMENT, LES ÉTATS-UNIS SONT APPARU PARTICULIÈREMENT SOUCIEUX DES OPINIONS D'AILLEURS CONCERNANT LES RAISONS D'AGIR DE CEUX QUI ONT PERPÉTRÉ CES ACTES HAINEUX ET DU NIVEAU DE SUPPORT POUR DES ACTIONS MILITAIRES (OU AUTRE) QUE LES ÉTATS-UNIS AVAIENT L'INTENTION D'ENTREPRENDRE AFIN DE CONTRER LA MENACE TERRORISTE. LES AMÉRICAINS VOULAIENT SAVOIR QUI LES APPUYAIENT DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES DIFFICILES. EN EFFET, CES ÉVÉNEMENTS TRAGIQUES ONT DONNÉ LIEU À D'IMPORTANTS CHANGEMENTS D'OPINION PUBLIQUE DANS DE NOMBREUSES RÉGIONS DU GLOBE PUISQUE PLUSIEURS PAYS PROFITÈRENT DE CETTE ÉPISODE AFIN D'ÉVALUER LEUR RELATION AVEC LES ÉTATS-UNIS. LES GOUVERNEMENTS DE DIVERS PAYS ONT CONSULTÉ LEURS CITOYENS AFIN DE DÉTERMINER LE NIVEAU D'APPUI POLITIQUE ET LE DEGRÉ DE SOUTIEN DES ACTIONS ENTREPRISE PAR LES ÉTATS-UNIS. EN PLUS DES QUESTIONS DE CONFIANCE POLITIQUE, LES INQUIÉTUDES LIÉES AUX QUESTIONS DE SÉCURITÉ ET AU TERRORISME DEVINRENT UNE SOURCE D'INTÉRÊT GRANDISSANTE POUR LES SONDEURS.

CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Following September 11, Americans rallied around President George W. Bush and the level of confidence in his leadership has remained very high since that time. The President's handling of the crisis was also widely supported by the American population. Americans, and for that matter many Canadians, recall the presence of British Prime Minister Tony Blair during Bush's first major address to the population in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Initially, Blair too benefited from an increase in popularity as some 83% of British respondents supported the Prime Minister's handling of the response to the terrorist attacks. By mid-October, Blair's approval dropped by slightly over ten points to 72%. For his part, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had an approval rating of 74% for his handling of the issues related to the terrorist attacks in the weeks after September 11.

Some two-thirds of Canadians felt that government support of American policies struck the right balance while one quarter felt that the federal government was not supportive enough of the United States.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF AMERICAN POLICIES IN WAR ON TERRORISM

	Too Supportive	*About Right*	*Not supportive enough*
Canada	10%	65	23
France	11	69	16
Germany	20	69	8
Italy	27	56	13
Great Britain	35	55	10

Sources: Focus Environics, October 2001,
Pew Research Center, October 2001

Canadians remember the failure on the President's part to mention Canada amongst the countries to which he extended appreciation on behalf of the United States (something which he later attempted to correct). In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Blair's presence in Washington and his unequivocal commitment of British support for the United States resulted in considerable appreciation from the American population. According to British analyst Robert Worcester, in the first few days following the events of September 11 there was an outpouring of solidarity in his country. In France the level of sympathy for the United States rose to new heights as reflected in a poll in early November 2001 that had some 65% of French respondents sympathetic, compared to some 41% who felt that way in May 2000. As to Canada, some 78% of the population expressed a favorable view of our southern neighbor.

ALLIES AND ALLIANCES

Since the attacks, more Americans have come to support an active U.S. leadership role on the international front. According to American foreign policy analyst Kenneth Pollack, "... a growing proportion of the public has become more sensitive to the need for the United States to cooperate and listen to its allies, especially with regard to the international response to the threat of terrorism." In October 2001 – by a 2-1 margin (59% to 30%) – Americans felt that they should take into account the interests of their allies with regard to the war on terrorism as opposed to basing decisions mostly on U.S. national interests (this represented an 11 point jump over the opinion given by Americans when the same question was asked just prior to September 11).

LES ACTIONS PARLENT PLUS FORT QUE LES MOTS

Lorsqu'il fut question de l'effort de guerre en Afghanistan, le degré de la sensibilité américaine envers les opinions d'ailleurs a atteint ses limites. Il est évident que les Américains ont recherché le support de leurs alliés dans l'effort militaire en Afghanistan. La période post- 11 septembre est ainsi devenue une occasion pour les alliés de se situer face aux Américains. Quelques trois quarts des répondants britanniques, canadiens et français ont appuyé l'effort militaire des États-Unis afin de combattre le terrorisme. D'après Pew Research, en Italie (66%) et en Allemagne (53%) le pourcentage de la population prêt à participer dans l'effort militaire était plus bas. En ce qui concerne les opérations militaires des É.-U., tandis qu'une majorité des Japonais (59%) et des Sud-Coréens appuient de telles interventions, seulement 36% des répondants chinois furent d'accord avec la réaction américaine.

Expressions of friendship for the United States did not imply unequivocal support for all actions taken by that country, and both in Europe and Canada important numbers of citizens wanted to take a closer look at the root causes of the attacks. Some 48% of Canadians believe that efforts should be focused on addressing the root causes of terrorism, such as the despair and poverty of displaced peoples around the globe. Similar sentiments were expressed in many European countries.

Indeed a 2001 Pew Research Center survey revealed that Americans have failed to convince the European public that the war on terrorism was *their* War. Pollack writes that:

> *on the other side of the Atlantic the view appears to be that September 11th changed the United States but not the world, and Washington is waging a war on terrorism for its own good, and not necessarily for the good of the Atlantic Alliance ... the view from the old world seems to be that this is an American war on American enemies, not a universal struggle against evil, as the White House likes to define it.*

AXIS OF EVIL

The characterization by President Bush of the 'axis of evil' (Iran, Iraq, North Korea) was greeted with mixed enthusiasm in various parts of the world. About three-quarters of Americans think the statement was correct and half agree that he should have stated it publicly (some 25% that share this point of view do not think he should have said it publicly). Approximately two-thirds of Western European respondents disapprove of the Axis of Evil rhetoric with some three-quarters expressing such sentiment in Germany and 55% in Great Britain. Within Canada some 53% approve of Bush's statement on the axis of evil although there appears to be a big gap in opinion on this matter based on mother tongue with 37% of English-speaking Canadians disapproving Bush's declaration and 69% of French-speaking Canadians expressing such disap-

Approximately two-thirds of Western European respondents disapprove of the Axis of Evil rhetoric with some three-quarters expressing such sentiment in Germany and 55% in Great Britain.

proval. In effect while opinion on such discourse amongst English-Canadians is closer to that of the American population, opinions given by francophones are closer to the views expressed by Western European respondents.

LA PEUR DU TERRORISME

En octobre 2001, quelques 71% des Américains étaient de l'avis qu'une autre attaque majeure était soit très ou quelque peu probable, (73% en février 2002). L'imminence d'une autre attaque terroriste était une opinion partagée par 79% des répondants en France. Entre octobre 2001 et janvier 2002, le groupe Environics observa une importante baisse du pourcentage des Canadiens qui craignaient une autre attaque terroriste. Au début de cette période une majorité (55%) pensait qu'une telle attaque était probable tandis qu'à la fin de cette même période se pourcentage était de 44%. D'après Michael Marzolini de Pollara (le groupe de sondage du parti Libéral), les Canadiens se sont

Entre octobre 2001 et janvier 2002, le groupe Environics observa une importante baisse du pourcentage des Canadiens qui craignaient une autre attaque terroriste.

remis du choc causé par les attaques du 11 septembre et ne craignent plus une attaque terroriste au Canada. En juillet 2002, 77% des Canadiens questionnés ont déclaré qu'ils ne croyaient pas qu'une attaque terroriste pourrait avoir lieu au Canada. Seulement 14% ont affirmé être de l'opinion qu'une attaque sur le sol canadien était probable. De plus, contrairement aux Américains qui démontre un appétit beaucoup plus prononcé pour des actions fortes et décisives et une attitude semblable à celle des Canadiens à la fin du mois de novembre, Marzolini observe une baisse significative de l'inquiétude au sujet du terrorisme parmi les Canadiens.

SENTIMENTS MUTUELS

Le support et la sympathie du Canada pour les États-Unis sont similaires à ceux de la Grande-Bretagne. En fait, les États-Unis ont des sentiments positifs pour les deux nations qui sont placées au premier rang de leurs alliés principaux. En février 2002, quelques 93% des Américains avaient une opinion favorable du Canada, 90% étendaient cette opinion à la Grande-Bretagne, suivi de l'Allemagne avec 83% et la de France avec 79% de la population américaine la percevant de manière favorable.

On balance, the view that residents of Saudi Arabia have of the United States is not a positive one. Nearly half (49%) describe their view of the Unites States as "very unfavorable", and almost two-thirds (64%) say their view of the United States is either mostly or very unfavorable. The United States is typically seen as a country that pursues biased diplomatic policies (65%), is saddled with a high crime rate (65%), and is characterized by aggressive (62%), conceited (61%), ruthless (54%), and arrogant (54%) behaviour. Roughly two-fifths (43%) also see the United States as a country that is easily provoked. Americans tend to view Saudi Arabia amongst its least favored nations, with some two-thirds expressing either a very or mostly unfavorable view of that country.

America is viewed with disdain by some countries and ambivalence by others, including some of its allies.

Since September 11, Americans have grown more interested in world opinion and they tend to view things in a polarized way. Shades of gray are more commonly seen elsewhere. America is viewed with disdain by some countries and ambivalence by others, including some of its allies. It remains important both for the United States and its allies to identify those values and interests transcending that which is seen as exclusive to the national interest.

Jack Jedwab is the Executive Director
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TESTING "THE CANADIAN DIVERSITY MODEL"

Hate, Bias and Fear After September 11th

BY John Biles and Humera Ibrahim

IN THE 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, CHIEF COMMISSIONER MICHELLE FALARDEAU-RAMSAY OBSERVED, "CANADA HAS A REPUTATION AS A PLACE WHERE PEOPLE FROM EVERY CORNER OF THE WORLD CAN LIVE IN HARMONY WITH MUTUAL RESPECT AND TOLERANCE. THAT REPUTATION IS WELL-DESERVED. BUT IN THE FALL OF 2001, OUR RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER WAS PUT TO THE TEST. IN SOME WAYS, OUR RESPONSE WAS ADMIRABLE; IN OTHER WAYS, NOT SO" (CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 2002: 4).

The reputation to which the commissioner refers is one that has been built most extensively since the end of the Second World War (Dreisziger 1988, Jaworsky 1979; Joshee 1995, Pal 1993, and Schiffer-Grahame 1989), but one which other researchers suggest has been developing for well over a century (Biles and Panousos 1999; Day 2000). While far from a coherent 'model' *per se*, the Canadian approach to fashioning a country composed of extremely diverse peoples does have some core elements: an emphasis on bringing Canadians of diverse backgrounds together; fostering a culture of inclusion; and a commitment to core values of equality, accommodation and acceptance.

This approach has been largely driven by Canadians themselves and is an amalgam of initiatives of individuals, communities, different levels of government and judicial decisions.

Of late there has been a number of attempts to meld this approach into an explicit "Canadian Diversity Model." Two of the most recognizable attempts are Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's "Canadian Way" speech at a conference on "Progressive Governance for the 21st Century" in Berlin 2-3 June, 2000 and a paper commissioned by the Department of Canadian Heritage from the Canadian Policy Research Network (2001) entitled, "The 'Canadian Diversity Model': Repetoire in Search of a Framework."

These attempts to articulate a coherent model are matched by a number of stock-taking exercises in the field of diversity undertaken by the Multiculturalism Program and other elements of the Department of Canadian Heritage. In preparation for the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), two major exercises were undertaken. The first was a series of consultations with communities across the country, and the second was a pair of research studies that examined reports made to governments in Canada over the last twenty years in the broad field of diversity (Jedwab et. al. 2000, Davis and Brandt Castellano 2000). Each was designed to gauge the state of our "diversity model" and ascertain where future work needed to be targeted. In addition, a database of Canadian graduate work on diversity in the last twenty years was prepared for the Multiculturalism Program (Mulholland 2001). Collectively, these stock-taking exercises painted a picture of an actively engaged population.

Thus, many Canadians, non-governmental organizations and the Government of Canada were engaged in an exercise to refocus the "Canadian Diversity Model" to tackle new and emerging issues and to focus on entrenched issues that had not been successfully addressed. A sizeable Canadian delegation attended WCAR in Durban South Africa in early September 2001. Many of the delegation had not returned to Canada when all commercial air traffic ground to a halt in North America in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York City, the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania.

POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH BACKLASH

Canadians and the Government of Canada were not resting upon their diversity laurels, but were actively trying to figure out how to proceed more effectively. Nevertheless, there was considerable confusion and several Canadian communities paid a price for that confusion. Muslim, Jewish, Hindu and Sikh Canadians all once again found themselves on the receiving end of unjust treatment meted out by their neighbours. Arab Canadians, and in at least one puzzling case Aboriginal Canadians, also found themselves victimized by hate and bias.

Hate and bias activity is notoriously difficult to monitor. Different police forces record incidents differently and there is no centralized reporting structure to allow a truly national comparison. (The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics at Statistics Canada has examined the issue and has a forthcoming report on how this should be tackled in the future.) As a result, to examine the hate and bias incidents that followed the September 11, terrorist attacks, we will use a combination of statistics, some collected by non-governmental organizations and others by police forces. The result is a portrait of some of the reported incidents, many more are likely to have gone unreported.

In addition, we will examine the sense of fear that gripped many Canadians following the events of September 11, and the hate crimes and bias activity that followed. This is essential since, as criminologist Julian Roberts notes, "The statistics fail to convey a sense of the true harm inflicted upon the individuals and groups that are the target of hate crimes" (Roberts 1995: 3).

ISLAMAPHOBIA

As the community most commonly linked to Osama Bin Laden, Muslim Canadians bore the brunt of hate and bias incidents. Although generally those who engage in hate and bias activities are not terribly discerning. For example, a Hindu temple was burnt to the ground, Sikh Canadians reported prejudice and an Aboriginal man was attacked in British Columbia. Jewish Canadians, perennial targets of hate in Canada, were also targeted by hate and bias.

The Muslim Canadian community has settled in Canada in large numbers fairly recently (roughly 600,000 Muslims live in Canada according to community estimates, but most have arrived since the 1970s). As a result, the community is not as institutionally complete as the Jewish community (356,315 Jews lived in Canada in 1991. Jews have been in Canada since the 18th century, but the first big wave came to Winnipeg in the 1870s according to historians Abella (1999) and Tulchinsky (1992)). Nevertheless, a sizeable number of community organizations helped Muslim Canadians contend with the backlash aimed at them. These organizations included the Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association, Canadian Labour Congress, Council on American-Islamic

As the community most commonly linked to Osama Bin Laden, Muslim Canadians bore the brunt of hate and bias incidents.

Relations Canada, Canadian Council of Muslim Women, Canadian Race Relations Foundation, B'Nai Brith Canada, Canadian Arab Federation, Center for Research Action on Race Relations, Federation of Muslim Women, Canadian Association of Jews and Muslims, Council of Agencies Serving South Agencies, Afghan Women's Organization, Urban Alliance on Race Relations, Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Agencies, Chinese Canadian National Council, Jamaican Canadian Association, and the Canadian Islamic Congress.

The organization that took the lead in tracking hate and bias activities was the Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada (CAIR-CAN). In a press release on November 20, 2001 CAIR-CAN reported 110 anti-Muslim incidents across Canada in the two months following September 11th. When considering these figures, it should be noted that there is likely to be significant differences between incidents that will be reported to a non-governmental organization and those that will be reported to the police. The variance is probably especially pronounced among newcomers to Canada who may have negative perceptions of the justice system shaped by experiences in their country of origin, or by negative experiences with the Canadian justice system. Nevertheless, many incidents were reported to the Toronto Police Service: 57 hate and bias incidents aimed at Muslims were reported in Toronto in 2001: 1 arson, 13 assaults, 2 bomb threats, 5 criminal harassments, 20 mischief, 1 robbery and 15 threat incidents (Toronto Police Service 2001).

ANTI-SEMITISM

The Canadian Jewish community has faced discrimination in Canada for over fifty years, most notably on the eve of the Second World War (Abella and Troper 1983). As a result, the community has developed solid infrastructure to tackle hate and bias. Indeed, much of Canada's hate crime legislation springs from the work of the Jewish community (Walker 2001).

The level of hate and bias is so consistent that B'Nai Brith Canada publishes an annual audit of anti-Semitic incidents. The 2001 Audit reported 286 anti-Semitic incidents in 2001, roughly the same level as 2000, but an increase of 35% over the figures of five years ago. According to the report 35% of all incidents were reported in the aftermath of September 11th, with 20% in the immediate aftermath and close to an additional 15% in October (B'Nai Brith 2001).



For 2001, the Toronto Police Service reported 60 incidents of anti-Semitism: 1 mischief, 1 threat, 1 advocate genocide, 3 assaults, 2 bomb threats, 7 criminal harassment, 7 mischief, 24 threats and 14 wilful promotion of hate (Toronto Police Service 2001). While there were more anti-Semitic incidents than anti-Muslim incidents reported by the Toronto Police Service, it is important to note that the Muslim community was much more likely to experience physical violence than their Jewish counterparts, especially assaults.

HATE AND BIAS

B'Nai Brith Canada reported that the various police reports across the country report "a spike in hate crimes in general during that volatile period [September-October 2001], targeting minority ethnic and religious groups" (B'Nai Brith 2001). This was reinforced by Krista Foss who reported in The Globe and Mail that police in Ottawa and Calgary confirmed that "'hate crimes doubled in the 30-day period after the terrorist attacks and police confirmed that the incidents ranged 'from assaults, arson, death threats and bomb threats to slurs yelled out of passing cars, vandalism and venomous e-mails.' Police in Montreal, Calgary and Ottawa reported 40, 24 and 44 hate-related incidents respectively" (CAIR-CAN 2001, Foss 2001: A6).

The Toronto Police Service's "2001 Hate Bias Statistical Report" recorded an increase in reported hate crimes in Toronto from 204 in 2000 to 338 in 2001, a 66 percent increase. The report notes, "The Toronto Police Service received 121 hate occurrences directly related to the terrorist attacks. This figure represents 90 percent of the total increase in hate crimes from the year 2000" (Toronto Police Service 2001).

What stands out most clearly from the statistics is the clear predominance of religious and race related hate crime occurrences. Hate crimes based on religion ballooned from 35 incidents in 2000 to 118 in 2001, representing 36 percent of the total hate crime occurrences. While relatively less frequent, hate crime motivated by nationality also increased dramatically from 9 incidents to 35 in 2001.

FEAR

Researchers examining hate and bias activity observe that the crime is against both the individual and the

community in general through lingering fear. After September 11 fear gripped much of the western world and it preyed particularly heavily upon the minds of minority communities within western societies.

Allan Fotheringham, a senior journalist, went so far as to observe that the racism facing Canadians in the wake of September 11 was, in fact, terrorism by another name (Fotheringham 2001: 88). The fear felt by the Muslim Canadian community in particular manifested itself in closed schools, cautionary tips on websites, a wallet-sized card advising Canadians of their rights, and a number of children and youth carrying cell phones with a pre-programmed emergency number (Page 2001: A7). One Ottawa woman mused in the *Ottawa Citizen*, "I've always thought that Canada was the land of freedom and multiculturalism, but now it doesn't seem like it. Most Muslims came here seeking a better life, but why do we have to live in fear?" (Zeidan 2001).

Community fear in the immediate aftermath of September 11 came to a particularly ugly head on two occasions. First, when a Muslim teenager was pulled off his bike in Ottawa and badly beaten (Roman and Korn 2001: A4). Second, when a 50-year old Muslim woman was beaten up on a Toronto bus (Madaka 2002: 1). Fear from high profile cases like these two was compounded by a number of anthrax threats directed at the Jewish community. The Toronto Police Service reported 79 criminal biological threats, 19 including hate/bias motivation (Toronto Police Service 2001: 22).

During debate over the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (C-36) the fear felt by Arab and Muslim Canadians was highlighted repeatedly. For example, then president of the Canadian Arab Federation, John Asfour, told a parliamentary committee "some members of the community are so afraid of mistreatment that they have stopped leaving their homes" (Tibbets 2001b). Similarly, a spokesman for the Muslim Lawyers Association, Khalid Baksh told a senate committee "We have issues up and down the line because of this climate of fear ... C-36 ratchets it up to an unbearable level that you can feel it every time you walk into the community" (Tibbetts 2001c). This fear may have been well-founded. Roco Galati, a lawyer renowned for defending Canadians accused of terrorism, estimated that 800 Muslims and Arabs were detained by Canadian immigration officials following the terrorist attacks (Tibbets 2001b).

Fear of the state also manifested itself in many ways in the months following September 11. Restrictions on charities following the passage of the *Charities Registration (Security Information) Act* (C-16) led many Muslim Canadians to stop their charitable donations or remittances to "impoverished relatives overseas for fear of being investigated by police" (Tibbetts 2001c). Given the importance of remittances to international development (DeSipio 2000) this may prove to be an extremely harmful outcome. Various security alerts also increased fear in minority communities. For example, in January 2002, as the hunt continued for potential terrorist suspects, the announcement that a Tunisian suspect was sought led to a perceptible level of fear in Montreal's Tunisian community (Brooks 2002a; 2002b).

The extremely contentious issue of profiling was debated widely in public discourse. The announcement of a special police unit in Ontario to "hunt down illegal immigrants with outstanding deportation warrants and deport them" drew both then Premier Mike Harris and one of his security advisors, retired Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, into the debate. They both claimed that racial profiling was a problem and Mackenzie stated "I find that [profiling] distasteful and only increases tensions," yet at the same time maintained that "closer scrutiny of particular ethnic groups at certain checkpoints is an aspect of security" (Schmidt 2001: A5).

Many proponents of profiling, especially newspaper editorials, argue that it is only common sense that it be allowed (*National Post* 16 February 2002: A17, Gillis 2001: A5, *Vancouver Sun* 7 June 2002: 13-14, Krauthammer 2002: 60, Morgan 2002: A14). On the other hand, as political scientist Reg Whitaker pointed out, "[Profiling] inevitably involves actual injustice" (Gillis 2001: A5). This point of view was taken up by the New Democratic Party when it censored the government:

> *Just as harmful, though not noted in the Report [Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration Report on border issues], is a more subtle mythology that has emerged that equates immigrants – especially refugees – with terrorism. The most disturbing manifestation of this is the association by some Canadians of specific groups with a terrorist threat based on race or religious beliefs. Incidents including vandalism, insults and assaults have been reported across Canada. This is unacceptable and a pro-active government response is necessary. Instead, the government has sent the exact opposite signal by sanctioning its officials' profiling of certain immigrant and refugee applicants ... (Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 2001: New Democratic Party Dissenting Opinion).*

Critics of profiling argued that it would be ineffective (Berck 2002: A14, or that it put Canada on a slippery slope

The victimization associated with hate-motivated crimes can be more severe when compared to non-hate crimes. Hate crimes result in a disproportionate level of harm, which affects not only the individual, but also the entire community, associated with the victim.

CRRF Appeal for Ongoing Vigilance

that would lead to greater racism and discrimination in Canada across the whole spectrum of activities (Hurst 2001: A30, Ovenden 2001: A1, Saloojee 2002: A15 .

When polled, Canadians appear almost evenly divided although slightly more in favour of profiling immediately after September 11. In an EKOS poll conducted from September 24-26, 2001 50 percent of respondents agreed that it was acceptable for police and customs officials to give special attention to individuals of Arabic origin, while 34 percent disagreed and 15 percent opted for neither (Gwyn 2001: A6). However, two months later in an IPSOS-Reid poll only 37 percent of respondents agreed with racial profiling of people of Arab appearance at the border and 36 percent disagreed (Lindgren 2001: A1).

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The largest spectre that raised its head over the last year has been the question of internment. The Prime Minister moved quickly to dispel fears, yet constant media references kept the concern in the centre of public discourse (Harper 2001: A8). Minorities in Canada decried the imposition of security measures that limited civil rights and argued that this was the slippery slope to internment (Cooper 2001: A17, Hebert 2001:A15). The right wing critics of diversity argued that this might be a justifiable measure. Journalist Dan Gardner in the *Ottawa Citizen* noted that 'columnist Diane Francis called for mass arrests under the authority of the (long defunct) War Measures Act" (Gardner 2001: A18). Even more frighteningly, however, journalist David Warren wrote in the *Ottawa Citizen*, "What I fear is that we are now moving instead in the direction of mass expulsions, and internment camps. And let me make this clear as day: this is not something that I want to see, it is something that I dread. It would represent the death of an important part of our old 'liberal dream' that is also my dream, a closing of the 'open society.' But how can it be prevented, given the way the world is now moving?" (Warren 2001: A14).

Mutual suspicion also fuelled fears. While communities were afraid of immigration officials, there was also a fear campaign targeted at then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Elinor Caplan, who received 15 to 20 pieces of hate mail per day following September 11th (Aubry 2001b).

CONCLUSION

In any exercise as complex as the reaction of Canadians and the Government of Canada there are lessons to be learned that will guide future actions and allow society to handle future crises. This was definitely true post-September 11. To be sure, there were mistakes made, and there are knowledge gaps that need to be addressed. However, no domestic crises emerged that indicated any fundamental failures of "the Canadian diversity model." Indeed, much of the response commends the resilience of Canadians and their communities. In roundtables conducted with Canadian youth, D-Code found that "in the aftermath of September 11 our respondents became more aware of the importance of multiculturalism and tolerance not only in words, but, more importantly, in actions. They indicated that episodes of ethnic intolerance made them more adamant about the need to protect and support multiculturalism as a core Canadian value" (D-Code 2002: 4). This response and that of Canadians and the Government of Canada suggests that our collective commitment to social inclusion in Canada may have been strengthened rather than weakened by the post-September 11 fallout. This is not to discount the hate, bias and fear that some Canadians experienced. Rather, it is to emphasize that a renewed commitment to eradicating these types of incidents is required.

To be sure, there were mistakes made, and there are knowledge gaps that need to be addressed. However, no domestic crises emerged that indicated any fundamental failures of "the Canadian diversity model."

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The complete bibliography for this text can be found at http://www.acs-aec.ca/e_magazine.html

GOING GLOBAL?
Exporting 'Security' Post-9/11

BY Dean F. Oliver

CANADA HAS BEEN EXPORTING SECURITY FOR A VERY LONG TIME. SINCE SORTING OUT MOST OF ITS OWN FRONTIER PROBLEMS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY BY THE COMBINED PROCESSES OF CONFEDERATION, WESTWARD EXPANSION, AND POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, CANADA HAS BEEN, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, A RELIABLE PARTNER OF THE PRINCIPAL WESTERN POWERS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, IN THE BUSINESS OF SECURITY PROJECTION. STEADILY FROM THAT PERIOD, CANADIANS, WHETHER IN IMPERIAL KHAKI, THE POST-UNIFICATION GREEN OF THE TRI-SERVICE CANADIAN FORCES, OR THE POWDER BLUE BERETS AND HELMETS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES HAVE GONE ABROAD IN SUPPORT OF CANADIAN INTERESTS AT HOME.

This progression from consumer to supplier was neither strictly linear nor chronologically distinct. As late as the 1920s, defence planners still ran war games with Uncle Sam as the opposition, while during the Cold War, American naval, air, space, and intelligence assets protected Canadian sovereignty even as Canadian troops stood shoulder to shoulder with Brits and Belgians, Dutch and Danes in the defence of northern Europe against the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, Canadian international security policy shifted over the decades from a fixation on 'homeland defence' (to apply a contemporary phrase to the preoccupations of Montcalm, Brock, and their successors) to what Sean Maloney and other scholars have called 'forward defence', the protection of Canada's growing international interests wherever threats to them were made manifest around the world. Whether defending the Empire against the Kaiser, the world against the Nazis, or central Africa from its own post-colonial malaise and internecine strife, Canadians had clearly moved, intellectually and physically, beyond their own borders to the considered expenditure of blood and treasure around the globe in pursuit of a lengthening list of national objectives. Who in 1899 might have thought that one hundred years later Canadians would shoulder arms in the Balkans in support of a Muslim minority, or in East Timor against the pro-government militias of one of Asia's most populous states? By 1999, however, such deployments were commonplace and, debates over specific missions and Canada's capacity to contribute notwithstanding, widely accepted.

The objectives such deployments supposedly served have, to be sure, evolved, from the obedient fulfillment of colonial obligations in one period to the pangs of humanitarian conscience in another. But all have evinced an inherent, cross-sectional similarity as well as a collective difference from previous Canadian patterns of introspection and pseudo-isolationism. Canadians can yet worry, and for all the right reasons, that a penny-wise foreign policy risks leaving them as so many loud but naked emperors strolling obliviously the world's stage, but they should also recognize the transition that even rhetorical posturing represents. There was a time, after all, when they would not even have bothered, when Europe – or Asia or Africa, for that matter – really was not worth the bones 'of a single Torontonian grenadier.'

Few now would remember fondly such a stance. That war-weariness and exhaustion could breed disinterest and isolationism after 1918 and appeasement after 1931 seemed a logical enough conclusion to those who had lived through the First World War; that such impassiveness in the face of global peril could be catastrophic and the height of political folly was equally logical to those who had survived the Second. As a result, post-war Canada and the other western powers edged steadily towards greater peacetime international cooperation by broad popular consensus, first in the economic and political spheres, and later, amid the hot house atmosphere of the emerging Cold War, in the military sphere as well. It was certainly true, as a generation of Department of External Affairs' spokespersons never tired of saying, that Canada's interests were now intimately connected to events around the world, especially in Europe, but this was by no means as true or as evident in the 1940s and 1950s as it soon would become. A globalizing and increasingly inter-connected world, a multicultural society, and an economy wildly dependent upon exports and international trade were not inimical to the arguments of successive governments that the national interest continued to require support for the United Nations, the world financial system, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An otherwise well-informed and critical Canadian public, after all, could easily reach the same conclusion. In the latter half of the twentieth century, in other words, Canadian interests really did 'go global' and, for the most part, everybody knew it.

Post-war Canada and the other western powers edged steadily towards greater peacetime international cooperation by broad popular consensus, first in the economic and political spheres, and later, amid the hot house atmosphere of the emerging Cold War, in the military sphere as well.

There remained no shortage of debating points. The precise level of federal spending on national defence or foreign aid, the nature and extent of bilateral relations with odd-sock, ambiguous states like Yugoslavia or India, or even Cuba, the closeness of Canada's relationship with the United States, and the manner in which the effects of global trade should be mitigated by countervailing domestic protections or a national economic policy were – and, for most part, still are – lightning rods for controversy. But on fundamentals the evolution of Canadian international security policy after 1945 reflects a far more consensual course. Diefenbaker, Trudeau, America's Vietnam imbroglio, and the fall of Soviet Communism all administered their shocks, but any serious qualitative assessment of Canadian policies abroad from 1945 to the present cannot fail to be impressed by their essential unity and longevity.

The debate in recent years surrounding the human security project in many ways elucidates the parameters within which Canadian security has long and, on the whole, comfortably been practiced. Canadians, after all, with crotchety old academics in the van, appear to have needed some convincing that human security was a doable proposition, financially or militarily, even as they warmed intuitively to the phrase and expressed – in public opinion poll after public opinion poll – their endorsement of the concept. It was always a grand figment of the imagination, delusional in no small part, to assume that complex diplomatic choreography dropped fully formed from the womb of Canadian altruism, or to posit, however obliquely within the pompous nostrums of public officials, that the good of the commonweal could be dis-

cerned unerringly by the politically self-enlightened or the morally presumptuous. But the project was at least broadly representative of how Canadians seemed likely to think of themselves and, perhaps more importantly, to have themselves thought of by others. Canadians *were* convinced internationalists, whether they liked it or not, and the nature of their internationalism did seem broad enough, in theory at least, to countenance having their responsibility expanded to human as opposed to just state security. How else to account for the impressive dissonance between the minister's academic critics at home (and diplomatic critics abroad) and the generally warm reception accorded the concept by ordinary Canadians? The fact that human security transmogrified too in response to critical assessments by the academy and by Canadian allies brought it even more closely into line with Canadians' self-perceptions. Academics could still complain of the dangers of empty rhetoric and false promises, but in any contest of hearts and minds the protectors of war-affected civilians seemed fated to win every time. Food for the starving made far better copy than the maintenance of close military relations with the United States.

This is hardly to admit that human security's proponents held the field by dint mainly of their own labours. It was, quite simply, an easier sell in the 1990s than in the 1950s, not necessarily because Canadians had ascended to some higher or more righteous moral plane (though for some participants in the debate this was clearly the implication), but simply because Canadians' knowledge base, geo-political circumstances, and national interests made it possible, and often beneficial, to think 'outside the box' in the security equation. The project's backers, having advised first of the revolutionary import of their cause, came belatedly, and under duress, to the idea that Pearsonian traditions connected intimately to contemporary prognoses but, once made, the connections could be mined to considerable advantage. It really was not much of an intellectual leap, in other words, from the essential humanitarianism that underlay Canada's acceptance of Hungarian refugees after 1956 or, in some measure, its international peacekeeping efforts, to the contemporary human security wish list.

But it was a very great leap indeed from the more or less reactive and rhetorical humanitarianism of earlier decades, so suffused – some would say buried – in the politics and programs of national security, Western defence, and the Cold War, to the kinds of aggressive, interventionist, and perhaps even imperialist policies that might make human security a more proactive pursuit. This gap, between broad endorsement of the program's direction and specific enthusiasm for its implications, speaks much of the fundamental sobriety of the Canadian body politic. If human security was a genuine Canadian interest, after all, was war in its pursuit a genuine Canadian interest too?

This is not putting the question too bluntly. It was, in fact, the fundamental question on which, in Kosovo, the security policies of Canada, the United States, indeed the entire Western alliance, very nearly foundered. Writing declaratory checks that sat well with a collective conscience freed from the parameters of the Cold War to play messiah to the world was, in retrospect, an easy business, but restructuring the apparatus of the international system, including its legal regimes and military instruments, in order to make it possible most assuredly was not. Making war in the alleged interests of peace left all the best lines in the hands of anti-war editorial writers. More to the point, a far more basic problem loomed: convincing a skeptical public that global exertions in such causes, up to and including fatal casualties, could meet the test of salience and immediacy once applied to the threats emanating from Wilhelmine Germany, the Third Reich, and the Warsaw Pact. Canadian contributions to the world wars and the Cold War, after all, had been buttressed by the ease with which the 'threat' could be made manifest to the country's stakeholders, its citizens. Support for the Cold War waned, marginally but noticeably, only when European recovery, détente, and the growing illogic of the arms race began to alter public calculations of the necessity for eternal vigilance and the risks inadvertently created as a result. Could human security pass the same test?

The relatively low level of funding allocated to Canada's defence and foreign aid budgets after the early 1960s hardly contradicts the assessment that Canadians understood and accepted that their security had gone global during the Cold War. Instead, to paraphrase the argument once made by historian Desmond Morton, Canadians funded defence when they thought it necessary and lapsed content when they did not. Few seriously countenanced disarmament and few – save the perennially unpopular socialists – countenanced dissociation from the Western bloc, but likewise did few believe that American-like levels of national security spending would be appropriate for a country with more limited interests.

There was much to question in the occasional selfishness of this argument, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the sobriquet of 'freeloader' most closely applies, but also much to admire: acknowledging, funding, and defending, more or less, those assets and interests on which most Canadians could agree secured both internal unity and international respect. The implications of such nation-centric calculi annoyed Canada's key allies to no end, but they nevertheless secured too a certain penumbra of credibility in non-alliance counsels that proved valuable in other contexts. The wisdom of Canada's near-continual creative ambiguity was always open to question, as the legacy of

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such occasionally indecent maneuvering now remains, but the 'helpful fixer', 'middle power', and 'honest broker' roles that Canada carved precariously from the edifice of the Cold War could simply not have come from slavish adherence to the political edicts of American secretaries of state or to the defence funding targets of NATO. There was, clearly, a method to Canada's madness.

The reverse lesson, of course, was also true: that the price of influence remained commitment, and one's interests were rarely defended by default. Critics of Canada's NATO and NORAD ties rejected explicitly such crudely militarist equations, but there is next to no evidence that their qualms, however derived, were widely shared. There is positively no evidence that they ever had a better suggestion. On some key issues, such as the Vietnam War or the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), the peaceable kingdom declined the penalty of imperial complicity with considerable finesse, and on most others practiced a shrewdly efficacious balancing act. But on others Canadians in some numbers quite simply stood ready to die in the collective defence. The protection of key interests when and where Canadians believed them directly under threat thus remained a cornerstone in the security architecture, even at times when the nature and extent of those threats was controversial. Canada's peacetime military declined steadily, indeed catastrophically, from roughly the mid-1960s onward, but it remained several orders of magnitude larger than the pre-1939 force and still intimately connected in all forms to the military organs of the Western alliance. In most of the security emergencies of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, from Korea to Kosovo, it also took the field alongside its allies, and with full public support. For incorrigible anti-Americanists and the unrepentant left, such disappointing surrenders to the imperial hegemon offered no greater proof of Canada's toadying and embarrassing subservience. But there was at least one other, more straightforward, possibility: the demise of the Cold War notwithstanding, there were limits to the luxuries that time, distance, and a friendly superpower ally could afford. From time to time, Canadians had to stand up and be counted.

September 11 tested sorely each of the three primary conclusions drawn in this brief history of Canada's international security policy since 1945.

First, homeland defence, for long largely a forgotten echo of Canada's pre-industrial, pre-Confederation frontier past, despite the threats temporarily evident during the Second World War and the early stages of the Cold War, returned immediately and with a vengeance to the attention of all Canadians and their government. Canadians now know, thanks to the release of a steady stream of documents and personal memoirs from former Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence operatives, that unconventional threats to their infrastructure, industrial capacity, and public safety were every bit as great as their under-funded, long-suffering intelligence agencies had long warned. But these were threats, aside from peacetime espionage, that could only have been made manifest in wartime, when the global stakes would have made acceptable the risks to Moscow of exposing the Soviet Union's long-nourished network of sabotage plans and sleeper agents. They were hardly the ongoing concern of the broad Canadian public that, in the wake of Vietnam and riding the high tide of the irreverent Trudeau revolution, were far more inclined to disbelieve the gloomy prognoses of their security officials in any case.

For the most, the period from at least the late 1960s witnessed an ever-widening gap between the apparent requirements of security precautions abroad (which themselves were, especially in the eyes of Canada's disappointed allies, increasingly token) and the tangible evidence of potentially mortal perils at home. Canadians had learned to live with the bomb, however reluctantly, and the testing of territorial waters or continental airspace by Soviet submarines and long-range bombers respectively was a recurrent media footnote, hardly a going public concern. In recent years, and in large part due to the growing vulnerability of information systems, communications networks, and public services to interruption or damage from electronic sabotage, whether juvenile mischief-makers or genuine cyber-terrorists, Canadian officials have taken far more seriously the risk of catastrophic damage to the country's "critical infrastructure" and taken important steps to guard against such possibilities. But until 9/11 such discussions were not fundamental parts of any public discourse on security, most components of which seemed comfortable with a minimal security establishment that would continue to contribute in predictable ways to multilateral security missions abroad.

The second important point is that 9/11 has raised serious questions about the wisdom or effectiveness of the kinds of passive, reactionary security policies practiced, with broad public support, through much of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. A 'watch tower' defence, even encompassing civil defence measures, peacetime mobilization, coastal defence, and civilian defence industrial mobilization in a long-war scenario, never contemplated the random, multi-directional acts of terror in peacetime that are the hallmark of modern-day fundamentalist terrorist groups. Nothing in Canada's long involvement with international peacekeeping or, of late, peacemaking suggested that this home front paradigm would soon change either. It also appears highly unlikely that models of rational behavior, crisis decision-making, negotiable objectives, or military threat perceptions and vertical or horizontal escalation, all derived principally from the state-centric Cold War security template, will apply with anything more than sporadic utility to the West's dialogue with terrorist groups. Nor do existing legal norms, whether national or international, easily apply. The concept of deterrence, for example, might yet have validity in a broadly based strategy to combat international terrorism (or international crime or intra-state violence), but assessing its modalities and mustering sufficient national and international staying power to make them work, in the absence of easily discernable firewalls or threat points, will make the process an extremely challenging one. Quite simply, against whom

would the façade of preparedness and willingness to act be projected?

This, in turn, raises serious questions about the ability of external actors to effect, by any means short of the application of carefully targeted but deadly violence, the behavior of highly dedicated, fanatically inspired opponents, many of whose weapons are suicidal warriors. Whether social and economic factors, many of them sub-national or sub-regional, can systematically be acted upon in the long term to undermine or counteract the wellsprings of anti-Western terrorism is an important avenue to explore, and for which funding, patience, and international collaboration are all richly warranted, but it is also very largely a moot point. Technological trends alone are pointing to the possession by terrorist groups of far more lethal and indiscriminant threats to Western interests in the very near future, certainly far sooner than foreign aid or a good press on the Arab 'street' could reasonably be expected to forestall, even in the most wildly optimistic scenario. There is every possibility, in other words, that the danger to Western interests will get worse before it gets better, even assuming that Western governments could gradually erode the societal bases for terrorist support in regions like the Middle East.

And third, in light of the doctrines and methods likely to be most effective in responding to these changes, especially the challenges of time and distance in counter-terrorist operations, 9/11 has called seriously into question the size, configuration, and mission of Canada's armed forces as they enter the next millennium. Not only must the military and other security forces face the possibility of assuming far broader, more onerous, and more intrusive domestic security responsibilities, but they must also face the corresponding possibility that both the watch tower defence of the Cold War, with its ponderous mobilization base, and the peacekeeping infrastructure that has correspondingly evolved, might be equally ill-suited, by temperament and by design, to certain security functions necessary in the military actions of the next millennium. One must be careful here not to overstate the case for change, or to assume that the 'lessons' of 9/11 are easily discerned, much less that they point all in the same direction. But it is at least conceivable, perhaps even probable, that 9/11 will serve to aggravate materially the Canadian Forces' requirement for capabilities that include rapidly deployability, special forces, light infantry, fast air and sealift, intelligence gathering and dissemination, close air support, and forced insertion and extraction expeditionary scenarios. It is equally possible that a vastly expanded and differently configured intelligence apparatus, of the sort that appears to be emerging at some speed in the United States, will be necessary and desirable here. None of these are minor alterations in the essential fabric of the Canadian national security state. None are cheap. None certainly are cost-free in either financial or political terms.

But neither are they inevitable. Now, as at the onset of the Cold War or after the fall of France in 1940, when the complexion of Canada's Second World War inexorably changed, Canadians face a scenario that appears for the moment radically different than that with which they had grown comfortable, in this case for more than five decades. It may, in the end, prove an illusory threat, blown out of proportion globally by the tactical but spectacular success of the bin Laden terrorist group on a single unfortunate day, but it is at least plausible that the reverse will prove true, that the threat will not prove ephemeral. It is at least plausible, in other words, that Canada is moving into the third broad phase of its security history, a period in which homeland defence and international security are in fact closely fused into a more intrusive, more proactive, and more interventionist suite of capabilities than most governments in any previous era would have recognized, or willingly condoned. If so, the long-term implications of 9/11 shall have been very great indeed.

Still, it is important to recall the point at which this analysis began: if there is any truth in the hypothesis that the salience and immediacy of threat, and not mere rhetorical appeals to high mindedness and self-interest, has been the motivator for considerable and long-term Canadian commitments to the security project, it is possible, even likely, that with 9/11 this country has turned a significant corner. The current fusion in the popular mind between the necessity for consuming extra security at home and exporting generous dollops abroad, and the immediate links between the two, is therefore almost unique in Canadian history. But Canadians' capacity to alter this view, to reformulate their interests and their comfort level with their own security establishment and its demands on the public purse, has not diminished. September 11 is also slipping from the realm of current affairs and into that of history. And in the latter realm, the popular memory can play great tricks.

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THE NEW ROMANS: CANDID CANADIAN OPINIONS OF THE U.S.

Edited by Al Purdy. Edmonton: Mel Hurtig, 1968.

REVIEWED by Gregory Betts
Assistant Director, The North American Centre for Interdisciplinary Poetics

It is one thing for Al Purdy to talk about "the lamentably undefended American-Canadian border" (*The New Romans* i), or for David Helwig to chime, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids have you killed today?" (155), but it is quite another for Barry Lord to proclaim, "we must all join in [a] struggle, a Canadian independence movement [....] We must take Canada back, by whatever means our owner makes necessary" (150-1) or for Raymond Souster to rant that "America / you have been tested and found wanting [....] so wheel out machine guns, unsling the shotguns, line up the sites from the armoured car, shoot to kill, shoot to kill, shoot to kill, kill, kill, kill / America" (68-9). Such militaristic and patriotic flourishes have not been popular in Canada since the Confederation-era exuberance. Moreover, after three decades of postmodernism irony, and in the sudden current of today's militaristic political atmosphere, the anxious anti-U.S. jingoism found in *The New Romans* seems impossibly disjunctive with the contemporary Canadian morale. In fact, the unbridled, unfocussed nationalism of Canada's literati in 1968 is more characteristic of the post-September 11th patriotic demonstrations by Americans, and reflects the bitterness of a deeply-felt cultural anxiety that no longer dominates the contemporary Canadian imagination.



The collection emerges from the mire of one of Canada's most strident nationalistic periods. While the vociferous tonality of the 1960s revolutionary/militaristic lexis creeps into many of the selections, as the examples above indicate, the predominant imaginative metaphor depicts the hypothetical resuscitation of an ailing Canadian corpse (diseased with the spreading influence of Americanization) and the nature of its theoretical antidote. To be fair, most of the book is less capricious and some contributions, such as by Margaret Laurence, endeavour to sympathize with the moral complexity of U.S. cultural predicaments.

Throughout the book's selections, which include a wide assortment of essays, poems, and stories, an eclectic mix of prominent Canadian writers tackle the pressing issue of how Canada, as a nation and a people, ought to navigate the influence of the southern supra-nation and its people. Though their post-colonial striving remains at the front of contemporary political discussions, as always throughout Canada's history, *The New Romans* surges forth with the ardent desire to imagine a "liberated" Canada, even despite their recognition of our U.S.-integrated social, political, and economic associations. Their solutions to the quagmire are overwhelmingly idealistic, often dogmatic or defeatist, and, although cathartic, almost entirely indistinct and unhelpful. The majority of the collection's Canadian nationalism is dependant on vague declarations that, as Frank Watt explains of a similar tendency in the nationalist writing of the Confederation-era, avoid any prescriptive definitions of the basis of their nationalism for not knowing what characteristics of Canada they value, or what characteristics Canada even represents (Watt, "Nationalism in Canadian Literature").

In his selection, Mordecai Richler adroitly complains, "What is so embarrassing is that while we are determined to defend our culture against any comer, nobody is sure what our culture is, how it differs from the British or American, or come to think of it, if we even have one" (*The New Romans* 12). Richler might have noted, in retrospect, the irony that these same writers, including him, without recourse to a sense of their own nation have become some of the surest symbols of its existence.

In fact, what I find so striking about the collection as a whole is that the fumbling – yet passionate – nationalism of *The New Romans* writers functions without any of the vast lexicon of emblematic clichés Canadians have since collected (including the embrace of a flag, an anthem, and the principles – if not the reality – of multiculturalism and internationalism). The collection, more than anything else, demonstrates the development of the nation into a new level of cultural negotiation by dint of contrast. Their arguments and worries do not correspond to the anxieties of a contemporary Canada struggling to maintain its cherished national icons (such as health care, peacekeepers, cultural content regulations, etc.) through the broadening scope of trade liberalization and the development of international governance. To be sure, the U.S. media invasion remains a daily infringement, as it does throughout the world, but the grossly inflated rhetoric of isolationism and protectionism is now more characteristic of the reactionary post-September 11 U.S.A. and functions increasingly as sign of their recent, worrying, unilateralist posturing. The collection *The New Romans* documents a parallel time when Canadian writers also felt under cultural attack and responded in reckless kind.

Do You Know Your Canadian Issues?





Êtes-vous au fait de vos Thèmes Canadiens ?