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Author

Arthur Sweetman  
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# CANADIAN ISSUES THÈMES CANADIENS

April / avril 2003

## IMMIGRATION Opportunities and Challenges

## L'IMMIGRATION Opportunités et défis

*Guest Editor / Rédacteur invité*  
**Meyer Burstein**

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CITC est une publication bi-mensuelle de l'Association d'études canadiennes (AEC). Il est distribué gratuitement aux membres de l'Association. CITC est une publication bilingue. Tous les textes émanant de l'Association sont publiés en français et en anglais. Tous les autres textes sont publiés dans la langue d'origine. Les collaborateurs et collaboratrices de CITC sont entièrement responsables des idées et opinions exprimées dans leurs articles. L'Association d'études canadiennes est un organisme pan-canadien à but non lucratif dont l'objectif est de promouvoir l'enseignement, la recherche et les publications sur le Canada. L'AEC est une société savante, membre de la Fédération canadienne des sciences humaines et sociales. Elle est également membre fondateur du Conseil international d'études canadiennes.

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## LETTERS/LETTRES

**Comments on this edition of Canadian Issues?  
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## A Nation of Immigrants

The term “branding” which at one time evoked images of hot irons and bawling cattle has come to mean the perceived set of qualities that renders something unique ... that distinguishes an entity from other, similar entities. For obvious reasons, “branding” has long been of concern to the private sector where companies work hard to differentiate their products from those of their competitors. More recently, however, the term has found its way into our policy discourse. We thus find public officials talking about how to “brand” Canada in today’s global world: how to create and sustain an image of the country that is both appealing and true, an image that attracts outsiders, creates interest and produces a willingness to do business and to partner with Canada in shared ventures, be they political or economic.

Inevitably, the images we choose to describe ourselves invoke Canada’s natural beauty and vast size – the splendor of the Rockies, the expanse of the Prairies, and the ruggedness of the Atlantic coastline. We also present Canada as a modern state, one that is at the cutting-edge of technology and science. And we depict ourselves as a peaceful, caring society characterized by generous social programs, not least our health care system. Seldom, however, do we cite immigration. This despite the fact that our immigration program is unique; unique in a way that our technological modernity and social welfare are not. No other developed country comes anywhere close to Canada’s per capita intake of immigrants nor, by extension, to the pace of Canada’s social and cultural transformation.

Perhaps we do not think of immigration in the same way as we think of health care or industrial development because we are a “nation of immigrants”. But, if that is the case, it is unfortunate because it obscures the fact that immigration is discretionary. Rather than being a matter of who we are, it speaks to who we intend to become – a decision that entails not just one choice but many, across a large number of domains. How we make these choices will establish our unique place among nations and “brand” Canada as profoundly as does the beauty of our physical geography. And, there is an urgency to this task.

What makes this joint venture between the Metropolis Project and the Association of Canadian Studies so timely is that Canada, along with most developed countries, is having to rethink its approach to immigration – what is at stake; what might be realized; and how to effect the country’s aims. This somewhat eclectic volume offers a sample of articles across a range of topics that are engaged by immigration. Hopefully, these offerings will stimulate an appetite among students, researchers and the public to explore the field more widely and to participate, from a base of knowledge, in the decisions that will need to be made.

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The full references and bibliographies for these texts can be found at the back of the magazine.

## Une nation d’immigrants

Le terme « marquer », qui anciennement évoquait des images de fers brûlants et de bétail, est maintenant utilisé pour décrire les qualités perçues qui rend quelque chose unique... qui distingue une entité parmi d’autres entités similaires. Pour des raisons évidentes, la « marque » a longtemps été une inquiétude auprès du secteur privé où les compagnies s’efforcent à différencier leurs produits de ceux de leurs concurrents. Par contre, le terme s’est récemment taillé un chemin dans notre discours politique. Nous trouvons donc des hauts fonctionnaires qui parlent de quelle « marque » on devrait donner le Canada dans le monde moderne : comment créer et soutenir une image pour le pays qui est à la fois plaisante et vraie, attirante pour les étrangers et qui crée un intérêt et produit la volonté de faire affaires et de devenir partenaires avec le Canada dans des entreprises conjointes, soit politiques ou économiques.

Inévitablement, les images que l’on choisit pour nous décrire invoquent la beauté naturelle et l’immensité du Canada : la splendeur des Rocheuses, la grandeur des prairies et l’aspérité de la côte Atlantique. Nous présentons aussi le Canada comme étant un état moderne à la fine pointe de la technologie et des sciences. De plus, on décrit notre société comme étant paisible et bienveillante, caractérisée par des programmes sociaux généreux, entre autres notre système de santé. Par contre, nous ne mentionnons que rarement l’immigration. Ceci malgré le fait que notre programme d’immigration est unique. Aucun autre pays développé n’accepte autant d’immigrants par capita, ou n’atteint le même rythme de transformation sociale et culturelle que le Canada.

Peut-être que nous ne pensons pas à l’immigration de la même manière que l’on pense au système de santé ou au développement industriel parce que nous sommes une « nation d’immigrants ». Mais si c’est le cas, c’est dommage parce que cela obscurcit le fait que l’immigration est discrétionnaire. Au lieu de démontrer qui nous sommes, ceci démontre qui nous voulons devenir – une décision qui implique plusieurs choix, dans plusieurs domaines. La manière dont on effectue ces choix établira notre place unique parmi les nations et « marquera » le Canada autant que sa beauté et sa géographie. Ce devoir s’avère urgent.

Ce qui rend cette entreprise conjointe entre le Projet Metropolis et l’Association d’études canadiennes opportune, c’est que le Canada, avec la plupart des autres pays développés, doit repenser son approche envers l’immigration : les enjeux, les réalisations possibles et les répercussions sur les intentions du pays. Ce numéro, légèrement éclectique, vous offre un échantillon d’articles sur une variété de sujets, tous reliés à l’immigration. Nous espérons que ce numéro stimulera l’appétit des étudiants, des chercheurs et du public, les poussant à explorer ce domaine plus profondément et à participer, à partir d’une base de connaissances, dans les décisions qui devront être prises.

Meyer Burstein, expert politique  
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Les références et bibliographies complètes de ces textes peuvent être trouvées à la fin du magazine.



Entretien avec

# L'HON. DENIS CODERRE

## MINISTRE, CITOYENNETÉ ET IMMIGRATION CANADA



Denis Coderre a été nommé ministre responsable pour la Citoyenneté et l'Immigration le 15 janvier 2002. Député de la circonscription de Bourassa, au Québec, M. Coderre occupait depuis le 3 août 1999 le poste de secrétaire d'État (Sport amateur).

Denis Coderre was appointed Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada on January 15, 2002. Mr. Coderre is Member of Parliament for Bourassa, Quebec. He had been Secretary of State for Amateur Sport since August 3, 1999.

### **Quel rôle l'immigration joue-t-elle dans le premier quart du 21<sup>e</sup> siècle ?**

L'immigration a toujours été un élément fondamental de la société canadienne. Notre histoire est un testament à tous les immigrants qui ont contribué à ce pays. L'immigration est un investissement dans notre futur. Le but de Citoyenneté et Immigration (CIC) est de bâtir un Canada plus fort en attirant et en sélectionnant des immigrants qui peuvent contribuer aux intérêts sociaux et économiques du Canada, de réunir des familles et de protéger des réfugiés tout en assurant la protection de la santé et de la sécurité des Canadiens et Canadiennes. Le programme assiste les immigrants lors de leur arrivée et au cours de leur adaptation et de leur intégration afin de leur permettre de maximiser leur potentiel et de contribuer à la croissance du Canada. La citoyenneté complète le processus débuté par l'immigration.

Notre nouvelle Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés est une réflexion des réalités de la vie moderne au 21<sup>e</sup> siècle.



**Quels sont les défis principaux que votre ministère doit surmonter aujourd'hui ?**

Le Canada reconnaît l'importance d'investir dans nos nouveaux venus. Il est nécessaire pour tous les paliers du gouvernement et pour tous ceux impliqués directement dans l'immigration de travailler collectivement afin d'assurer que les immigrants atteignent leur plein potentiel et contribuent à la société canadienne.

Le gouvernement du Canada s'efforce d'éliminer les barrières qui empêchent les immigrants de s'intégrer au marché du travail. Les fonds du programme d'établissement fournissent une formation linguistique, des clubs qui renseignent sur le marché du travail et des références à des programmes communautaires. La reconnaissance de l'éducation obtenue est un autre domaine dans lequel je suis impliqué avec mes partenaires fédéraux et provinciaux.

**What is the ideal division of labour on immigration among three orders of government ?**

Partnerships are crucial to the development and delivery of our program. Immigration is an area of shared jurisdiction with the provinces and territories. Provinces and territories are consulted annually on the establishment of immigration levels. Most provinces have signed immigration agreements that provide for consultation on immigration matters. In addition, BC, Manitoba and Quebec are responsible for settlement services.

We work closely with other federal departments, provincial and territorial governments, private and voluntary sectors and other stakeholders in order to develop a better understanding of the impact of immigration on broader economic and social issues.

All levels of government need to work together so immigrants can make full contributions to Canada. We work with the provinces and territories, as well as the private and voluntary sectors to help immigrants integrate as quickly and easily as possible.

The Government of Canada is collaborating with the provinces and territories and other stakeholders to develop ways of recognizing foreign credentials, so immigrants can enter more easily into the Canadian labour market.

**What do the 2001 census results tell us about new priority areas for immigration policy in Canada?**

We value the importance of research in furthering public debate and developing policies. CIC will carefully examine the new census information.

The Government of Canada has a carefully managed and balanced immigration program and is committed to being open and transparent in its development and delivery.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, in consultation with the provinces, the territories and key stakeholders, establishes an annual range for the number of immigrants who will be admitted into Canada. Our annual immigration plan is a key element for maximizing the economic and social benefits of migration to Canada.

Canada's immigration program is based on three pillars: economic immigrants (approximately 60%); family reunification (25% to 30%) and refugees (about 10%) (for 2001).

**En 2010, allons-nous accepter des immigrants en provenance des mêmes pays qu'aujourd'hui ? La méthode de sélection sera-t-elle différente ?**

Sélectionner des travailleurs qualifiés qui s'intégreront dans le marché du travail est vital au développement économique à long terme du pays parce que l'immigration devrait être responsable de toute croissance du marché du travail entre 2011 et 2016. Nous avons effectué de vastes recherches et consultations, et elles nous ont montré que l'éducation, l'expérience de travail, l'obtention d'une offre d'emploi et la capacité de parler l'anglais ou le français sont des facteurs fondamentaux d'une intégration réussie pour les immigrants économiques. Nous nous sommes concentrés sur ces facteurs lorsque nous avons redéfini les critères de sélection. La nouvelle Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés et les réglementations connexes sont conçus pour attirer des personnes avec des habiletés transférables au marché canadien. Cette nouvelle approche est mieux adaptée à une économie en évolution constante.

**Que comptez-vous faire pour encourager une hausse de l'immigration dans nos communautés de langues officielles ?**

J'ai inclus une clause de minorité dans tous les programmes de nominations provinciaux et fédéraux, nouveaux et renouveler. Des représentants du ministère et des groupes de minorités française/acadienne m'ont avisé sur les questions linguistiques. La grille utilisée pour la sélection des immigrants accorde des points à ceux qui ont une connaissance d'une des langues officielles du Canada.

**Pouvez-vous décrire votre stratégie de régionalisation qui a reçu tellement d'attention, surtout en ce qui concerne la région atlantique et l'Ouest du pays ?**

Le CIC est déterminé à encourager les immigrants à choisir des communautés plus petites afin de renverser la décroissance de la population dans certaines régions spécifiques du pays. Lors de leur réunion multilatérale du mois d'octobre, les ministres fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux responsables de l'immigration ont été d'accord pour travailler de plus près afin d'augmenter les bénéfices de l'immigration dans toutes les régions du Canada et de développer des approches flexibles afin d'attirer des immigrants dans de plus petits centres. Le budget fédéral récent a aussi prévu presque 4 million \$ pour des projets qui encourageraient des travailleurs qualifiés à s'installer dans des centres plus petits partout au Canada où il existe des pénuries d'habiletés spécifiques.

**How do security concerns impinge on a strategy to increase immigration levels?**

Our strategy is designed to strike a balance between attracting workers with flexible skills, reuniting families and being tough on those who pose a threat to Canadian security, all the while maintaining Canada's humanitarian tradition of providing safe haven to people in need of protection.



# INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CELEBRATE!



TM Rogers Broadcasting Limited.

## INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS ON OMNI

Name of Program	Language	Original Time	
Caribbean Vibrations	English	2:30 PM – 3:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Kontakt	Ukrainian	1:00 PM – 2:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Latin Vibes Television	Spanish	4:00 PM – 5:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Lehen Malti	Maltese	10:00 AM – 10:30 AM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Macedonian Heritage Hour	Macedonian	5:00 PM – 6:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Magyar Képek TV	Hungarian	12:30 PM – 1:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Morning Waves	Russian	7:00 AM – 8:00 AM (Sunday)	– OMNI.1
Noi Români	Romanian	12:00 PM – 12:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Pasqyra Shqiptare	Albanian	2:00 PM – 2:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Russian Waves	Russian	10:00 PM – 10:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.1
Admas	Amharic (Ethiopian)	2:30 PM – 3:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Afghan Hindara	Pushto/Dari	1:00 PM – 1:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Amantran	Bengali	12:30 PM – 1:00 PM (Sunday)	– OMNI.2
Arirang Korea	Korean	6:30 PM – 7:00 PM (Sunday)	– OMNI.2
Flip	Filipino-English	12:00 PM – 12:30 PM (Sunday)	– OMNI.2
Front Page Philippines	Tagalog, Visayan	4:00 PM – 4:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Iran Zameen Today and Pasargad Today	Persian	12:00 PM – 1:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Kala Kavaya	Sinhalese	10:30 AM – 11:00 AM (Sunday)	– OMNI.2
Malayala Shabtham	Malayalam	11:00 AM – 11:30 AM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Munawa'at Arabia TV	Arabic	1:30 PM – 2:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Muuqaalka Soomaalida	Somali	10:00 AM – 10:30 AM (Sunday)	– OMNI.2
Nor Hai Horizon	Armenian	9:00 AM – 10:00 AM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Ondes Africaines	French (African)	3:00 PM – 3:30 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
Planet Africa Television	English (African)	3:30 PM – 4:00 PM (Saturday)	– OMNI.2
TV Việt Tiên	Vietnamese	11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Sunday)	– OMNI.2

With the launch of OMNI.2, Rogers Media television set new records in diversity broadcasting. Combined, OMNI.1 (CFMT-TV) and OMNI.2 will provide quality programming to over 50 different communities.

Twenty-five Independent producers were introduced at the OMNI Launch and joined The Hon. Sheila Copps, Minister of Canadian Heritage as she congratulated the OMNI team in numerous languages. Ted Rogers spoke of his 35 years of ongoing commitment to multilingual television in Canada.

Upholding this commitment to cultural diversity, Madeline Ziniak, Vice President and Station Manager, announced the production initiatives totalling \$50 million, of which \$30 million will be specifically dedicated to Independent Production.

## Committed to Cultural Diversity!



**OMNI**  
DIVERSITY TELEVISION



## Interview with

# THE HON. JEAN AUGUSTINE SECRETARY OF STATE, MULTICULTURALISM AND STATUS OF WOMEN



The Honourable Jean Augustine was born in Grenada. Before entering politics she was an Elementary School Principal with the Toronto District Catholic School Board. In 1993, Ms. Augustine became the first African Canadian woman elected to the Parliament of Canada. From 1994 to 1996 she was the Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister of Canada. Ms. Augustine also served three terms as Chair of the National Liberal Women's Caucus. In February 2002, Jean Augustine was elected Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. On May 26, 2002 Jean Augustine was appointed Secretary of State (Multiculturalism)(Status of Women).

### **Can you describe your own immigration experience?**

I immigrated to Canada 42 years ago to pursue a post-secondary education. The Canadian Domestic Scheme offered me the opportunity. I worked in the home of a Canadian family and subsequently obtained landed immigrant status in Canada.

Upon my arrival in Canada, I joined, formed and worked with community groups to eradicate racism and discrimination. I participated on the very first Canadian Multicultural Council.

I also served as a member of the board of several organizations, including the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women and the Urban Alliance on Race Relations. As national president of the Congress of Black Women, and as chair of the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority, I worked to protect the human dignity of people of colour, the disadvantaged, women, and Aboriginal people.

Canada has afforded me every opportunity to realize my goals and pursue avenues that may not have been available to me in my home land.

### **How does the Multiculturalism Program and Policy fit with the work of Citizenship and Immigration?**

The work that the Multiculturalism Program provides is closely linked with the work of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Citizenship and Immigration is the initial point of contact for immigrants to Canada, helping them complete the formal process towards becoming new Canadians.

The Multiculturalism Program takes the process a step further by working to ensure that these new Canadians are able to participate fully in the social, economic, political and cultural life of the country. The Multiculturalism Policy, and more specifically, the Multiculturalism Program, which works towards achieving the objectives of the Policy, and Citizenship and Immigration, are there to ensure that the process of immigration and settlement in Canada is as smooth as possible. The work of the Multiculturalism Program is of ever-growing importance as the diversity of new Canadians is increasing, as illustrated by the 2001 Census.

The Multiculturalism Program and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration co-operate on a number of initiatives to this end. Canadian Heritage and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration are both partners of the Metropolis Project, an international research effort to study immigrant integration and the impact of immigrants on urban centers. Research is co-ordinated by four centers of excellence – in Montréal, Toronto, Edmonton, and Vancouver – each associated with major Canadian universities.

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Multiculturalism Program play a key role with the recognition of foreign credentials. This is accomplished by supporting and engaging affected communities, and informing and influencing the policies of governments, the estimated 400 professional and trade associations, and regulatory bodies. Through the Voluntary Sector Initiative, a joint undertaking by the Government of Canada and the voluntary sector, the Multiculturalism Program is supporting two large multi-year projects that will strengthen linkages and policy development on the issue of recognition of foreign credentials. The breaking down of barriers towards the recognition of foreign credentials was a priority in the September 30, 2002, Speech from the Throne, and our Program will continue to work with Citizenship and Immigration towards this important end.

### **Can multiculturalism as a Canadian ideology and public ideal handle any level of diversity?**

I feel that diversity is a complex and rich trait of Canadian life, so it is difficult to comprehend in terms of quantifiable «levels.»

Diversity and multiculturalism are not just ideology and public ideals; they are concrete realities experienced in the everyday lives of Canadians.

Canada was the first country in the world to adopt an official multiculturalism policy to reflect the cultural diversity of the Canadian people. The *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* enshrines our principles of equality and the importance of diversity as part of our identity. Through the Charter, we recognize that all Canadian men and women have the same rights, freedoms and responsibilities, regardless of their background or beliefs.

These legislative tools ensure that diversity is not only recognized as a prominent feature of public life in Canada but also as a shared value and as an element of the Canadian way of life. The Multiculturalism Program also supports this goal in promoting diversity, respect and connection among Canadians.

### **Martin Collacott and others have suggested that Canada's cities are on the edge of imploding under the weight of diversity. Do you agree?**

Canada is now one of the world's most urban nations. According to the Prime Minister's Caucus Urban Task Force, four out of five Canadians currently live in large urban centres and there is every indication that this trend will continue.

Any city that aspires to greatness must be internationally competitive, and great cities have been more than just economic powers. They are centres that embrace growing diversity, creativity and innovation. All levels of government and sectors of society must make it a priority to strengthen and support diversity in both urban and rural Canada.

While our record in Canada is far from perfect, there is no evidence that any Canadian city is on the edge of «imploding under the weight of diversity.» In fact, Canadians' attitudes towards multiculturalism and the social values of inclusion and equality have been found to

be quite positive. Rates of ethnic intermarriage, to take just one indicator, have been climbing steadily for decades.

A recent poll reveals that a majority of Canadians believe that government support of Canada's multicultural heritage promotes and helps solve the problems of racism and prejudice, encourages institutions of Canada to reflect and respect cultural diversity, and enhances the value of Canadian citizenship. (See Environics poll results presented in *Canadian Issues* (February 2002), pp. 4-5.)

Canada has learned a great deal from its ongoing efforts to build an inclusive society. Our growing and changing diversity is making our country a better place.

### **How can Toronto and Vancouver handle the developing cultures of violence they appear to be facing?**

As two of the largest and most diverse cities in Canada, Toronto and Vancouver are faced with both challenges and opportunities resulting from that context. Sadly, in past years, particular events in these cities have drawn attention to some of the challenges which are often associated in the media with ethnoracial or immigrant communities.

I feel it is important to keep in mind that urban violence is a complex phenomenon that is often rooted in poverty and marginalization, and which raises the more general issue of social inequality within our societies. So the answer to your question lies in what we can do, as a society, to address this particular challenge.

From the standpoint of the Government of Canada, responding to such issues is a priority. The 2002 Speech from the Throne outlines the efforts our Government has and will continue to commit to, with regards to helping children and families out of poverty and to helping build healthy communities.

Within the Department of Canadian Heritage, the Multiculturalism Program also serves to promote full and active citizenship and equality of access for all Canadians. For example, the Multiculturalism Program is currently involved with different initiatives to build and strengthen partnerships with local institutions, community groups and educational organizations, and strengthen our partnerships with other levels of government so that we can work together to address the issues facing our communities.

The Program supports various projects throughout the country. For example, in November 2002, I announced a multi-year project in collaboration with the Saskatoon Police Service, to make major internal transitions and to improve its community relations. The changes will focus on cultural sensitivity, inclusive hiring practices and community input – all designed to deliver a more culturally aware, community-based police service to the citizens of Saskatoon.

Another example is in Vancouver, where one of our program officers is an ex-officio member of the Vancouver Police Services' Diversity Committee.

### **Did hate and bias activity after 9/11 demonstrate a capacity to handle tension?**

Fortunately, the Government of Canada and a wide swath of Canadians were already actively engaged in a dialogue on diversity, and issues arising from it, prior to



September 11<sup>th</sup>. Consequently, the ability of the Government of Canada to respond on many levels (legislative, outreach and through contact with Canadians) to post-September 11<sup>th</sup> tension was far greater than it would otherwise have been. On the security front, legislation had already been introduced or was under development. The widespread consultations in preparation for the United Nations World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), the active engagement of many communities in the Metropolis Project, and the consultations on the proposed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act meant that the Government of Canada had open lines of communication with many minority communities across the country.

Post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, Canadians, their communities and their governments, have lessons to be learned that will guide future actions and allow society to handle future crises; for example, knowledge gaps need to be addressed. However, no domestic crises emerged that indicated any fundamental failures in «the Canadian diversity model.»

**In the post 9/11 world, religion has returned to the fore as an important aspect of diversity. Indeed, religion was also highlighted at the WCAR. What is our government doing to ensure that policy-makers, practitioners, and the public have a better understanding of both our religious diversity and the issues that arise from it?**

For some Canadians, religion is an integral part of their identity, whereas others may not identify with one specific religion or faith. In this way, religion, in its institutional form, and spirituality contribute to the richness and texture of Canadian identity.

Recent events on the international stage, such as the 9/11 tragedy and the rise of political forms of religion in several countries, have led to renewed public interest in religion and faith as a relevant social element.

In Canada, our Charter of Rights and Freedoms contributes to the elimination of discrimination based on religious affiliation. But we need to continue our efforts to both promote understanding across cultural and religious groups in Canada and combat hate and bias activities that often target religious groups.

The Multiculturalism Program as well as its partners, including the Metropolis network, are working to provide the conditions for enhanced public dialogue on religion and cultural diversity. Supporting interfaith dialogue, institutional flexibility with regards to accommodating religious practices and beliefs, as well as research and public education in these areas will be important tools in achieving this goal.

**It has been suggested that the best way to effect change is to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to participate in decision-making bodies. The Government of Canada tracks the progress of women in the political process; does it track the progress of minorities and newcomers?**

Much of the information we collect as a government, on minorities and newcomers to Canada, is factual data. For example, Statistics Canada has recently released its data on ethnic origin, place of birth, and visible minorities, which

are of great importance in designing public programs and policies to reflect the reality of the Canadian population.

But, qualitative information on how minority groups and newcomers to Canada experience and contribute to public life and the decision-making process is somewhat lacking to date. This issue has been raised in a number of forms in recent years, such as the 2002 «Bringing Worlds Together» Seminar on the political participation of women, minorities and newcomers to Canada.

This is one of the reasons why the Department of Canadian Heritage, in partnership with Statistics Canada, has developed a nation-wide survey called the Ethnic Diversity Survey. We will have the survey results in the summer of 2003.

The Ethnic Diversity Survey is the first large-scale survey in Canada to offer ground-breaking research in areas such as ethnic self definition, family background and interaction, knowledge and use of languages, social networks, civic participation, social exclusion, belonging, trust and satisfaction, and socio-economic activities. This survey will help us better understand how Canadians of all backgrounds, including newcomers and minorities, experience ethnicity in relation to Canadian life.

**Public attitudes and the media play a powerful role in shaping the public perception of diversity and immigration in Canada. What does the Government of Canada do to ensure that a balanced message reaches all Canadians?**

Canada is viewed by Canadians, and by the world, as a diverse and welcoming society, and is considered at the international level as a model of respect and tolerance.

Recent surveys have shown that Canadians are increasingly aware of Canada's Multicultural Policy and that the majority approve of it. (Canada was the first country in the world to adopt an official Multiculturalism Policy). Respondents feel that multiculturalism has a positive impact on our society, and fosters a greater understanding between groups and people of all backgrounds, cultures and religions.

However, we know that there is still a gap between the values of the Multiculturalism Policy and the experience that many Canadians live. Our goal is to achieve an inclusive society where diversity is embraced by all and to ensure that Canadians from all backgrounds and beliefs have equal opportunities.

In the years to come, we will concentrate our efforts on four principle areas of concern: the problem of systemic discrimination and racism; developing cross-cultural understanding; promoting shared-citizenship; and the under-representation of the diverse population in Canadian institutions.

In essence, this cannot be done alone; we must engage other federal government departments, as well as other levels of government to develop short, medium and long-term strategies for greater cross-cultural understanding. Working towards this desired state of shared citizenship, and the elimination of racism and discrimination, will ensure our future generations can be the benefactors of a world that is more accepting and understanding of its ever-increasing diverse population.

# CANADA'S OFFICIAL LANGUAGES

## Cornerstone and Guarantee for Managing Canadian Diversity

# LES LANGUES OFFICIELLES DU CANADA

## La pierre angulaire et la garantie de la gestion de la diversité canadienne

### ABSTRACT

Duality and diversity are the cornerstones of the Canadian Federation. It follows that the continued effective governance of Canadian diversity will depend upon our continued ability to assume the linguistic duality of the country. This means maintaining "our tolerance and openness to linguistic duality (which) is echoed in the attitudes of Canadians towards immigration and diversity." In addition to fostering harmony domestically, Canadian attitudes and policies are availed upon as exemplary in the international community. But above all, Canada's bilingualism has fostered open-mindedness toward diversity and difference.

### RÉSUMÉ

La dualité linguistique du Canada a produit une diversité de sa société qui est à la base de la Confédération Canadienne. "La conclusion qu'il faut tirer de ce fait est que la gouvernance fructueuse de la diversité au Canada dépend de la perpétuation de notre aptitude à assumer la dualité linguistique de notre pays." L'immigration a bien sûr contribué à la diversité Canadienne et aujourd'hui le Canada à l'opportunité de faire valoir de son expérience sur la scène internationale. Cette expérience donne d'ailleurs à notre société une longueur d'avance en termes d'adaptation à un environnement global qui change rapidement.

If you had to pick terms to describe Canada's future, what would you say? *Diversity* is, no doubt, a very likely candidate. Looking at the latest census data, we cannot but be amazed at the Canadian rainbow of origins. Close to one in five Canadians is foreign born and one in seven belongs to a visible minority. *Visible Minority?* Some of our cities are in the process of rendering the very designation absurd because the minority is becoming the majority'. There are plenty of places around the world where a demographic shift of this magnitude would be seen as threatening. Canada's good fortunes are in my view not accidental. They are the result of a particular disposition towards accommodation and compromise – which brings me to the other term I believe is an integral part of our future. It is *duality*, or, more specifically, *linguistic duality*. Duality and diversity refer to a particular Canadian perspective on how to build a country. They are based on the conviction that unity does not mean uniformity. And they are deeply complementary forces in the Canadian Federation.

Si le Canada a pu créer une société pluraliste unique, c'est notamment parce que la dualité linguistique est l'un des fondements de la fédération canadienne. En d'autres termes, s'il n'y avait eu le bilinguisme, la société de tolérance et de diversité qui est la nôtre n'aurait pu advenir de la même façon. La conclusion qu'il convient de tirer de ce fait est que la gouvernance fructueuse de la diversité au Canada dépend de la perpétuation de notre aptitude à assumer la dualité linguistique de notre pays.

Let me explore this relationship a bit further.

### La notion de droits collectifs

Le politologue Will Kymlicka estime que l'un des atouts de la démocratie canadienne est le fait que nous reconnaissons des droits collectifs. Le Canada n'aurait probablement jamais vu le jour sans la négociation d'un compromis réussi entre l'anglais et le français. La notion de droits collectifs est au cœur même de notre fédération, et les Canadiens ont appris que, pour respecter les droits

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des personnes, il faut également tenir compte des groupes auxquels ces personnes appartiennent. Un autre politologue, Charles Taylor fait valoir de façon très convaincante que le fait de conférer des droits à une personne peut ne pas donner grand'chose si la culture et la langue de cette personne sont rejetées. Dans son célèbre article intitulé *The Politics of Recognition*, M. Taylor explique clairement que la reconnaissance d'une personne dépend de la reconnaissance collective des groupes auxquels elle appartient. Le Canada a eu la grande chance de prendre conscience dès le début des liens étroits entre la reconnaissance individuelle et la reconnaissance collective.

In this context, it is important not to forget Canada's Aboriginal People. Canada's history of inclusion and compromise did not extend to them originally – and we feel the consequences of this omission to this day. Clearly, Canada's history of accommodation is not perfect but what our recognition of Canada's two official languages has given us is a process that guides in the search for solutions – including Canada's First Nations. Let me give you an example: The Northwest Territories have their own Official Languages Act which recognizes eight aboriginal languages as well as English and French. And in Nunavut, Inuktitut is an official language. In both territories, there is an awareness that respect for linguistic diversity is a cornerstone for building an inclusive society. These are important steps. As Commissioner I am following and supporting these developments because our official languages policy at the national level has served as a starting point for developing language policies which respond to specific territorial needs.

#### Public Opinion and Second Language Learning

Je ne voudrais pas louer la politique sur les langues officielles du Canada sans toutefois mentionner le fait que chaque réalisation est le fruit d'une importante somme de travail. Je crois fermement que l'une des meilleures preuves de la capacité d'une société ou d'une personne de communiquer avec les autres et de les respecter est son aptitude à apprendre une langue seconde et son ouverture d'esprit à cet égard. Posez-vous la question: Qu'est-ce que votre connaissance d'autres langues vous a-t-elle permis de découvrir? À quel point cela vous a-t-il permis de réellement avoir accès à une autre culture et de la comprendre? Vous conviendrez probablement que le bilinguisme (ou le multilinguisme) constitue une voie d'accès privilégiée à la diversité.

We see the willingness and openness of Canadians towards bilingualism reflected in opinion polls: a stable 82% of Canadians are in favour of the policy of bilingualism. 75% of English speakers choose French for their children and 90% of French speakers choose English<sup>2</sup>. Two out of three Canadians agree that some French language education should be mandatory in English elementary and high schools. Such support is even higher among young, urban and immigrant Canadians<sup>3</sup>.

This tolerance and openness to linguistic duality is echoed in the attitudes of Canadians towards immigra-


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


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


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tion and diversity. The American Pew Research Center published a report<sup>4</sup> in December 2002 based on a survey of 38,000 people in 44 nations. The report states “Immigrants and minority groups are generally seen as having a bad influence on the way things are going by people in most countries.” But the report continues: “Only in Canada does a strong majority of the population (77%) have a positive view of immigrants.” In the US, only 49% of the population believe that immigrants are a positive influence and the numbers are much lower in Europe: 46% in France, 37% in Great Britain, 35% in Germany and only 25% in Italy. How can we explain that an astounding three quarters of Canadians feel positively about immigration? I am convinced that our spirit of accommodation has produced the kind of inclusive social fabric that recognizes and embraces difference, whether this difference is linguistic or ethnocultural.

### **The Impact of Immigration on Duality and Diversity**

Une grande partie de la diversité du Canada est le résultat de l’immigration. C’est pourquoi il est important de rappeler que, en juin 2002, une nouvelle loi sur l’immigration est entrée en vigueur. Elle signalait la plus importante transformation de nos politiques d’immigration depuis 25 ans. Je suis heureuse de constater que la nouvelle loi concrétise beaucoup des recommandations que j’avais proposées au Parlement et au ministre de l’Immigration. Pour la toute première fois, le gouvernement du Canada s’engage explicitement à soutenir l’épanouissement et le développement des communautés minoritaires de langue officielle du Canada par l’entremise de l’immigration. Le Canada a besoin d’immigrants, mais il doit également s’assurer que les Canadiens de langue française et de langue anglaise profitent équitablement de leur arrivée. Malheureusement, la balance penche actuellement beaucoup plus d’un côté. Il y a un grand nombre d’immigrants au sein de la population anglophone : un anglophone sur cinq est né à l’étranger. En revanche, il n’y a pas beaucoup d’immigrants au sein de la population francophone : seul un francophone sur vingt est né à l’étranger. Cela s’applique aussi bien aux francophones du Québec qu’à ceux des autres provinces. Il faut cependant aussi noter que certaines communautés minoritaires anglophones du Québec rural ne reçoivent pas non plus leur juste proportion d’immigrants. La proportion d’immigrants anglophones qui s’établissent à l’extérieur de la région de Montréal a chuté de moitié au cours des quarante dernières années, passant de 36 p. cent à 18 p. cent.<sup>5</sup>

The commitments made in the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act now need to be implemented and I call on both the provinces and the federal government to make sure that the demographic discrepancy between anglophones and francophones is eliminated as soon as possible. My Office has contributed to enhancing general awareness on this important topic by publishing two reports on immigration and Canada’s official language minority communities in the past year.<sup>6</sup>

### **An International Perspective**

La politique canadienne des langues officielles n’est pas réservée à l’usage interne. Il est parfois plus facile de

reconnaître nos réalisations en adoptant une perspective plus large.

The Canadian Government through the Canadian International Development Agency is currently helping Sri Lanka heal the scars of its civil war. As part of this assistance, the University of Ottawa is undertaking a project to help implement a successful official languages policy in Sri Lanka. Canadian experts on linguistic rights are helping Sri Lanka address issues that sound highly familiar to Canadian ears: equitable representation of both language groups in the government, the ability of civil servants to work in their preferred language, the promotion of the other official language in schools, the availability of higher education in both official languages and access to courts in both official languages. The promotion of both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages is an active contribution towards peace and stability in this country whose civil war has cost the lives of 60,000 people. Of course, I am not suggesting that an official languages policy is a magic cure. That would be presumptuous. But it is an important part of the solution.

Un autre exemple est celui de la République d’Irlande. Le gouvernement irlandais travaille fort à promouvoir et à protéger la langue irlandaise. Cette langue historique et nationale est intimement liée à l’identité irlandaise mais n’est parlée que par 5 p. 100 de la population. Le parlement irlandais débat d’un projet de loi sur l’égalité des langues officielles. Ce dernier fait la promotion de la langue irlandaise et accorde des droits linguistiques aux citoyens et citoyennes. L’Irlande va même un peu plus loin en proposant la création d’un poste de commissaire aux langues officielles. En fait, la loi proposée s’inspire grandement de la Loi sur les langues officielles du Canada et, bien que l’on en soit juste au début, il existe beaucoup de parallèles avec l’expérience canadienne. Lors d’un récent voyage, j’étais heureuse de pouvoir offrir quelques suggestions pratiques sur la mise en œuvre d’une loi linguistique qui s’appuient sur plus de trente années de bilinguisme officiel au Canada.

Le Canada a de la chance à bien des égards, car il a pris de l’avance. Notre expérience du bilinguisme nous permet d’affronter avec aisance un monde complexe et de plus en plus hybride. Lorsque nous considérons le Canada moderne, nous constatons que l’idée de deux solitudes linguistiques et d’une multitude de collectivités ethniques fermées ne correspond plus à la réalité. La façon dont les gens jonglent avec les langues et les identités en est la meilleure preuve. L’intersection entre les langues officielles et la diversité devient un carrefour très animé, et nous devrions tous nous en réjouir. Mais, à ce stade précis, il nous faut veiller à ne pas oublier les piliers de ce que sont le français et l’anglais dans l’édification de la demeure canadienne.

As a society we must nurture both duality and diversity. If we do, Canada has the potential to be a leader in setting and advancing a successful bilingual and pluralist agenda. But what is even more important: if we succeed Canadians will continue to enjoy a privilege – the privilege of living in a country where two official languages open the doors through which we accept our nation’s increasing diversity.



# IMMIGRATION:

## Economics and More

### ABSTRACT

Immigration entails a number of important policy concerns across the economic, social and political spheres. Having embarked on a course of large-scale immigration, Canadians and their governments must behave wisely and make the necessary investments to ensure that integration is successful.

It is our belief, and that of a majority of Canadians, if public opinion polls are to be believed, that Canada should continue to be a country that welcomes newcomers and values its ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity. Consequently, the appropriate questions to ask about immigration are not whether we should have it, but how many immigrants to accept, how to choose them and, most importantly, how to ensure that integration takes place.

The answers to these questions should be found in the policies, programs, and practices that seek to capitalize on the opportunities afforded by immigration and to tackle the challenges that immigration provides. It is our contention that this is not necessarily the case at present. Policies, programs and practices need to evolve if they are to address powerful new forces. While much attention has been focused on federal policy and its challenges, we believe that provincial, municipal and non-governmental actors face similar demands. Research questions and paradigms may need to be altered to provide the kind of knowledge that will allow us to steer our course wisely.

Since at least the promulgation of the Official Multiculturalism Policy in 1971, the Government of Canada has been concerned with the full participation of all Canadians in the social, cultural, political, and economic aspects of Canadian society. This was reiterated in the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* of 2002. The Government of Canada stated that the goals of Canada's immigration program are "... to pursue the maximum social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration; to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canada ... to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society."

This emphasis on integration and the insistence on adaptation by both newcomers and host population (individuals and institutions) is explored in various ways in the articles included in this magazine. Economic considerations are covered more extensively than social, cultural or political. This is due, in part, to the difficulties in defining social and cultural integration, but also because of recent critiques of Canadian immigration policy have focused primarily on economic and labour market issues (Collacott 2002, Francis 2002, Stoffman 2002).

There is a certain chicken and egg argument that swirls around the primacy that should be accorded to economic participation and economic outcomes versus those in the social and political spheres. Some insist that social and political participation is contingent upon equitable access to resources and thence to opportunities. Others contend that "In a diverse society nothing is more important than ensuring that all citizens have the opportunity to participate in the discussions that set the rules by which we agree to live" (Metropolis 2002). We believe the implied policy choice to be specious since the agency of citizens must be freely expressed in both economic and social/political spheres if integration is truly sought.

### Economic Inclusion

Far and away the most important factor driving the changes in immigration is economic globalization. In part, the economic problems that have been affecting immigrants find their counterpart in the difficulties that have been experienced by all new labour market entrants, but there is also a component unique to immigration. The core issue concerns the substantial decline in the entry wages of new immigrant workers, including those selected for labour market reasons. Whereas skilled immigrants arriving before 1980 had been exceeding Canadian income norms immediately upon entry, immigrants arriving after 1980 were starting at a very significant deficit. More recent

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Meyer Burstein is co-founder of Metropolis

The views expressed by the authors of this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Metropolis Project, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, or the Government of Canada.

cohorts, those coming after 1995, are starting to do better but there is, as yet, no consensus that this favourable trend will continue allowing skilled immigrants to regain their privileged vantage point.

More dire is the situation facing immigrants who came to join family or who entered as refugees. Their earnings recovery has been minimal. Reflecting this, in 1980, the incidence of poverty among immigrants who had been in the country for less than five years was 24%. By 1995, however, this same measure had risen to 47% meaning that one immigrant in two who had been in the country for less than five years was living at, or below, the poverty line. This phenomenon, unlike the falling wages of new entrants, does not have a Canadian-born parallel, suggesting that something associated with the state of being an immigrant, with changes in the labour market, or with the reception accorded to recent arrivals, post-1980, is involved. Particularly troubling for analysts is the decline in the explanatory power of labour market factors. Instead, it would appear that an increasing component of the decline in earnings is statistically attributable to where immigrants originate. Nobody is comfortable with this state of affairs. Among the explanations that have been put forward are racism associated with the changing composition of immigrants, an inability by employers to evaluate foreign credentials resulting in a substantial discounting of foreign skills, and communication problems experienced by non-English or French speaking immigrants in adapting to the new, knowledge-based economy. All seem plausible.

Whatever the reason or reasons, something will need to be done and, indeed, in a number of areas, policy adjustments have begun. Improved language training, efforts to tackle the non-recognition of credentials, anti-racism measures, and altered selection criteria place more emphasis on human capital are all steps in the right direction. What seems to be missing, however, are policies that directly target immigrant poverty. It is not clear how, in the absence of such measures substantial progress can be made. Further research would be especially helpful in disentangling the factors that account for the blighted prospects facing immigrants. Particularly important is research to examine the effect of lower incomes on the educational opportunities and attainments of immigrant children. The intergenerational transmission of poverty would be disastrous. Results from the New Canadian Children and Youth Study (NCCYS) will provide vital information in this regard.

The issue of immigrant economic performance and of Canada's integrative capacity is closely linked to the question of population policy. By this, we do not mean a simple population replacement strategy but, rather, an immigration policy that is able to support the social and economic adjustments that will ensure Canada's international competitiveness. The importance of immigration in any such policy set is evident from the fact that immigration will soon account for all net labour force growth. This means that immigration policy and labour market policy are inexorably joined. Immigration – notwithstanding the difficulties cited earlier – is also likely to play a key role in Canada's innovation strategy as knowledge based indus-

tries, which are highly dependent on the quality and quantity of human capital available to them, increase their efforts to recruit foreign labour whenever domestic shortages emerge. This will, in turn, require enhancements in Canada's capacity to attract and retain skilled immigrant workers. A number of policy initiatives are designed to achieve just this result. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration's stated intent to increase the ratio of skilled workers to other immigrants constitutes a step in this direction (though it may be difficult to sustain in practice). As well, the growing involvement by provinces and municipalities in selection and recruitment bodes well and is to be welcomed.

Another aspect of population policy that has been receiving a good deal of attention – much of it sceptical – is the interest by both provinces and federal government in producing a more balanced geographic distribution of immigrants, ending the hegemony of large cities, notably Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. A successful policy would reduce the integration pressures on those cities, stabilize anticipated population declines in other areas, and reduce the cultural divide between the cities that are host to large immigrant and ethnic populations and the rest of the country. Whether such a move would be cost-effective, spreading integration costs across the country, or whether costs would rise because smaller centres and second tier cities do not possess the necessary service delivery infrastructure, remains to be seen. At a minimum, however, the greater involvement by provinces, cities and the private sector entailed by such policies would have a salutary effect on the recruitment and integration process.

Other policies that are strongly affected by globalization and will need to be reviewed include Canada's temporary worker programs. These are becoming increasingly important at both ends of the labour market. There is a strong likelihood that pressure will grow to make greater use of low skilled temporary migration to address selective shortages. Currently, this is restricted to agricultural work. The aims here will be to avoid the integration costs associated with low skilled labour. Such policies would likely be effected through bilateral agreements with sending countries. There will also be pressure at the high end to become more competitive on the recruitment front and to ease restrictions on multinational corporations wanting greater freedom to move employees within the corporate network. These changes parallel a growing reality in which elite, transnational workers (still a small group) are less bound by national ties and the strictures of citizenship.

In the context of globalization and regional economic integration, one of the more intractable problems facing policymakers is how to maintain and promote the free flow of goods and services in the face of public fears concerning terrorism. This worry is particularly acute in respect of the United States which, as Canada's largest trading partner, exercises enormous influence over all facets of domestic policy. Canada will need to find ways to assuage American security concerns if it is to retain unimpeded access to United States markets. Higher security expenditures are unlikely to suffice. A more likely development, one that is already playing itself out, will involve the gradual harmonization of Canadian and American



security policies, beginning with a closely aligned common security perimeter. This would gradually evolve into a common visa regime, harmonized asylum, detention and removal procedures and other measures designed to level differences between the two countries. At issue for Canada will be to ensure that the most important aspects of our unique asylum policies are protected and to avoid the greater politicization that prevails within the American refugee system.

### **Social and Cultural Inclusion**

Earlier in the essay, we expressed concern regard the economic prospects facing recent immigrants and rising levels of poverty. We also noted that a majority of analysts believe racism to be among the factors that account for the discrepancy in incomes. This is particularly worrisome given the composition of Canada's immigrant intake and the concentration of immigrants in cities. And while there is currently no evidence to suggest that Canada has ghettos in its cities, the co-location of poverty with visible minority status and racism makes for a dangerous cocktail and requires urgent attention.

It should also be noted that while a great deal of attention has been focused on race, an equally difficult integration challenge is being posed by the emerging importance of religious groups. The importance of religion as a dimension of diversity has been increasing without the development of concomitant research or policy capacity to address many of the issues that arise from religious diversity. This is deeply troubling as ultimately, ideological differences related to religious principles may prove more intractable than the racial divide which presently concerns policymakers.

It must be understood that any serious intervention will require additional per capita expenditures. (This can be realized either by increasing resources or reducing immigration levels). A particular focus of attention should be the school system and higher education. The public school system plays a key role in bridging cultural differences and fostering mutual understanding. This cannot be provided by separate schools, even if they adhere to a core curriculum. Citizenship education, both curriculum-based and practice-oriented are essential. On-going work of the Citizenship Education Research Network continues to inform this key policy arena (<http://www.canada.metropolis.net/research-policy/cern-pub/index.html>).

### **Political Inclusion**

Serious efforts will also need to be made to ensure that new arrivals are given a voice – no mean feat according to Iris Marion Young (2000) and certainly not one that appears to have been mastered in Canada (See work of the Political Participation Research Network at <http://www.canada.metropolis.net/research-policy/pprn-pub/index.html>). Integration efforts must focus on political integration in both formal political institutions and informal institutions of civil society. This requires intelligent policies that seek to develop and engage the leadership and members of new communities. The legitimacy of democratic institutions rests on inclusion and the tacit acceptance of the social contract by all

citizens. An unrepresentative or biased system leads to a weakening of the social contract and a costly over reliance on enforcement mechanisms. Further work in this area will remain an essential component of emerging policy, program and practice designed to facilitate the integration of newcomers.

### **Partnerships**

The shifting policy landscape and the growing importance of immigration, including its links to other strategic policy issues, will require new cooperative arrangements to be developed across federal departments and among different levels of government. These can be expected to expand with time. Already, the level of provincial and municipal involvement has shot up. Much of this interaction is presently focused on skilled workers and recruitment, however, there is significant engagement around language training, settlement assistance and credential recognition.

Internationally, intergovernmental cooperation can also be expected to expand. As indicated above, the U.S. and Canada would appear to be going down the path taken by the European Union in respect of refugee and security issues. Further down the road, this may be extended to greater cooperation between supranational groups, notably NAFTA and the EU. Already, initiatives are underway seeking to create a framework of guiding principles that could serve as a basis for such cooperation. And at least one of these initiatives also seeks to include the concerns of sending and transit countries (the Berne initiative) thus offering the tantalizing prospect of a broad immigration regime wherein migratory flows could be managed for the benefit of all, not least the migrants themselves.

### **Conclusions**

In a topic as vast as immigration, it is not possible to cover all important policy concerns in a single, brief essay. We have, for example, not even touched on humanitarian immigration; we have merely skimmed the surface of social, cultural and political inclusion; and we have not identified critical issues in the health or justice arena, to name but a few.

However, even with these broad brush strokes, it is evident that immigration must become a horizontal consideration of all three levels of government and practitioners. Difficult policy choices await and research lacunae need to be filled so policymakers and practitioners can make informed decisions and effect change where necessary. Having embarked on a course that entails large-scale immigration – a decision that requires not one choice, but many, across a range of social, political, cultural, ethical and economic concerns – it is essential that Canadians and their governments behave wisely and make the necessary investments, financial and personal to ensure that integration is successful.

# IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE<sup>1</sup>

## A New Paradigm in a Changing Labour Market

### ABSTRACT

While a decline in entry earnings has been observed for Canadians as a whole, the very marked increase in low income rates from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s is almost unique to recent immigrants. The last few years suggest a turnaround, but the future remains unclear.

Economists will tell you that each decade has its own specific characteristics – fiscal and monetary policy, trade agreements, external shocks, labour force demographics, etc. And researchers will also agree that the prospects facing new immigrants in Canada have changed over time. Those who came at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to settle the West faced different challenges from those who arrived in the 1950s and that pattern of change continues. But if this is so obvious, why is it so rarely part of the context of examining the economic performance of Canada's newcomers at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>?

The “tradition” for most immigrants was to come to Canada to experience a transitional period of low income but then, over the medium to long term, to “outperform” the Canadian-born. It was clear that over time immigrants managed to succeed, to find work and to prosper. Census data through 1981 generally confirms this “traditional” pattern.

But the patterns in the 1980s and 1990s changed. Increasingly from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s there was evidence that recent arrivals were experiencing lower rates of employment, that entry earnings were declining for certain immigrants and that the rates of low income were rising sharply for others. At the same time, it could be argued, the human capital of immigrants was increasing. Census data since 1981 bears out these patterns.

Data to examine economic performance of immigrants has, until recently, been limited to Statistics Canada's Censuses. There were no longitudinal data sets to research economic performance over time, but there was no demand for this either, since there were few concerns around the earnings and incomes of Canada's newcomers. And, for the same reason, there was no need to carefully examine how the domestic economic context would impact on immigrant outcomes.

Longitudinal data sources<sup>2</sup>, which have only recently become available, show that the proportion of skilled worker principal applicants whose employment earnings at entry exceed the Canadian average<sup>3</sup> has declined since 1980. Research shows that at the beginnings of the 1980s, 66% of skilled worker principal applicants' initial employment earnings exceeded the Canadian average. But by 1996 only 4% entered with initial earnings above the Canadian average<sup>4</sup>. Over the 1990s several changes were made to the skilled worker selection criteria which raised the admission threshold, but the greater human capital of this group did not improve their relative position<sup>5</sup>.

Much has been written about the possible causes of the declining entry earnings of skilled workers, which has been most evident in the last two decades, and about the fact that immigrant earnings do not match those of similarly skilled Canadians. Changes in source country and low returns to foreign education and experience are cited as explanatory factors<sup>6</sup>. These, however, may be proxies for discrimination, the quality of credentials or institutional barriers to credential recognition and/or inadequate language and communications skills. In addition, research shows that the importance of changing source countries in explaining the decline in entry earnings seems to have increased in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. Several recent investigations of immigrant

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outcomes, however, also indicate that the portion of the decline in earnings which cannot be explained by standard human capital models has increased from the 1980s to the 1990s.<sup>7</sup> There appears to be something unique about the current Canadian labour market which we have not been able to measure, which impedes immigrant access to jobs or opportunities consistent with their skills and experience.

While a decline in entry earnings was also observed for the Canadian born, the very marked increase in low income rates from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s is almost unique to recent immigrants. Amongst immigrants, it is primarily skilled worker principal applicants who have experienced declining earnings, while it is other immigrant groups who are in poverty or who find themselves as “working poor” – family class and refugees. It should be noted that Canada’s objective is not that these individuals necessarily contribute “economically”, although many of them do make very significant contributions. The concern is that this is not a desirable outcome for any Canadian and that this may no longer be a transitory situation for immigrants – some immigrants may find themselves in chronic poverty, like some Canadians.

Research using the IMDB shows that, before 1992, most immigrants accessed unemployment/employment insurance (EI) beginning about three years after arrival – once they had established and left or lost their jobs – but that after several years, their use of EI dropped. Since 1992, when significant changes were made to EI eligibility, there has been much less use of EI by immigrants, to some extent because they could no longer voluntarily leave their jobs and collect benefits or access training while they searched for employment. Eligibility criteria for social assistance have also changed since the early 1990s, making it more difficult to qualify and reducing benefit levels. As a result, the patterns of EI and social assistance incidence and the nature of their use in immigrant integration has changed in the 1990s.

The longitudinal data does indicate that those skilled workers who arrived in the latter half of the 1990s are experiencing much stronger growth in employment earnings than earlier arrivals. And in fact, in the year 2000 the average employment earnings of skilled worker principal applicants who arrived in 1995 surpassed the employment earnings of skilled workers who arrived in 1991. And those who arrived in 1996 had comparable earnings in the year 2000 to those who arrived in 1991, suggesting some “scarring” for those who arrived during the recession in the early 1990s. Whether these strong growth rates for the more recent cohorts will continue, and for how long, remains to be seen. Will employment earnings for this group trend back to reach and/or surpass the Canadian average in the next few years? And to what extent will this change result from the domestic situation and/or from the

skills and attributes of immigrants arriving in the more recent years?

The 1990s recovery was characterized by limited job growth until about 1997 – most of it part time or self employment. This discrepancy between growth of full time versus part time employment has not changed as we enter the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It impacts on Canadian-born as well as immigrants, but research is clear that many recent immigrants live on the margin of the labour market for some period of time after their arrival in Canada. Part time jobs generally offer fewer hours and few, if any, benefits. Strong economic growth since the year 2000 should reduce the low income rates of most immigrants, but it is not expected that the indicators will return to the levels experienced in the 1980s.

Understanding this new paradigm will take time. It is too soon to know the extent to which the strong economic growth of the past three years will lead to a more “normal” early labour market experience for newcomers. It is also challenging to determine what it is about changing source countries which has contributed to the outcomes witnessed in the 1990s.

Future research will need to look carefully at the domestic economic context, the nature of job creation and the availability of “traditional” support systems. It will also need to focus more on the longitudinal trajectory of earnings for specific groups. How important is early access to the labour market for the long run economic prospects of immigrants? If immigrants are not able to make use of their credentials, what is the risk of erosion in the value of those credentials over time?

Is it only a lack of credential recognition which keep immigrants from achieving economic outcomes comparable to their similarly educated Canadian counterparts? Or have we underestimated the importance of language and communication skills in English or French in allowing immigrants to make use of their credentials in the Canadian environment? Lack of rigorous, representative data has precluded research on the contribution of knowledge of official languages and of communications skills to economic performance. These information gaps will be filled to a significant extent when the results of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada and other new data such as the IALLS<sup>8</sup> become available.

There appears to be something unique about the current Canadian labour market which we have not been able to measure, which impedes immigrant access to jobs or opportunities consistent with their skills and experience.



# POVERTY EXPERIENCES OF IMMIGRANTS:

## Some Reflections

### ABSTRACT

Canadians hold competing images of immigrants; each image might be correct, but it is also incomplete and flawed. A sound and more realistic approach to studying immigrants is to take all views into account, and to treat them separately, and not as a part of a supposedly homogeneous group that is out there for everyone to see.

When it comes to the discussion of immigrants at dinner tables or in coffee shops, it is not hard to see the conflicting images of immigrants that different people have in mind. Some consider immigrants a group of rich folks who, by virtue of their wealth, 'buy' their entrance into Canada. Yet, others see them as a group of poor people, who have fled their misery in their home countries and are now struggling to make ends meet in every way possible, including working in low-pay jobs, relying on government assistance, and, if neither available, getting involved in illegal activities. Some scholars have tried to portray a third image by looking at immigrants as a whole, and examining whether this huge group, which constitutes about one-sixth of the Canadian population, is an asset or a burden for the society; and often, they have found the former to be the case. Given these conflicting images, a fair-minded person, with a light flavor of critical thinking, may find him/herself at unease with each of them, and feel a need for more. It is this kind of mind that we try to converse with in this brief paper, and hope to be able to give them some food for thought.

Let us straighten things out right from the outset! We believe that all the above images are *simultaneously* correct, and, yet, there is something wrong with each and every one of them. The first image accurately reflects the situation of one group of immigrants, *business-class* ones, who are, well, 'a little' wealthier than other Canadians. But, that is exactly why the Canadian government wanted them here in the first place. The second image corresponds, with a bit of oversimplification, with the refugee and family class immigrants. These immigrants are more likely to be found in various government buildings and in dead-end jobs, because they lack the competitive marketable skills to function otherwise. But, here again, possession of such skills was not part of why Canadian government had admitted them in the first place. The third image is even more problematic, because it immediately raises the obvious question of 'who are these average or typical immigrants?'. Are they the third group, that is, the so-called 'independent immigrants'? That may be a justified answer, because close to half of immigrants admitted every year belong to this group. But, that is exactly where this image becomes problematic, because it takes this half as the core immigrant population, and allows the other two groups to cancel each other out and 'become' a part of the average. As every student of basic statistics would testify, the 'average' becomes a misleading indicator when one is dealing with a highly bipolar group, and immigrants have, almost always, been such a group. The moral of the story, we think, is that a sound and more realistic approach to studying immigrants is to take all these three groups into account, and to treat them separately, and not as a part of a supposedly homogeneous group that is out there for everyone to see. Which segment of immigrant population the researchers choose to zoom in on depends on their research interests. Ours was in poor or low-income immigrants, or, to be more accurate, in the dynamics of poverty-generation forces among immigrants, as compared with native-born Canadians.

But, first things first! How do immigrants fare, compared to non-immigrants, when it come to experiencing poverty? A quick look at the three cities with high concentrations of immigrant population indicates: 'not that good'. Figures 1 through 3 show that, almost consistently, immigrants experience higher rates of poverty compared to non-immigrants, and regardless of whether they live in Toronto, Vancouver, or Montreal. The ones that do not follow this trend are those ethnic groups whose non-immigrant members have such high poverty rates that, one may say, being an immigrant cannot add much to it.

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Figure 1: Poverty Rates of Immigrants and Non-Immigrants Living in Toronto, 1996




Figure 2: Poverty Rates of Immigrants and Non-Immigrants Living in Vancouver, 1996





Figure 3: Poverty Rates of Immigrants and Non-Immigrants Living in Montreal, 1996



A follow-up question involves the factors behind such trends, in order to both understand why such trends exist and see how they can be fixed. In this regard, one can imagine a whole array of factors: Are the higher rates of poverty among immigrants related to their immigration adventure, that is, their newness in Canada? Are they less educated? Is there any discrimination against them out there in the job market? What about their cultures? How about their community traits? These are all relevant questions, but the existing data falls way behind our fine imagination. Therefore, at the moment, we can have only tentative answers for these questions, and that only for some of them. Figures 4 through 9 provide a sketch of our main findings.

Let us start with the most expected ones. Figure 4 shows that the younger the immigrants are when they arrive in Canada, the lower their chances of living in poverty. This is not a surprise to immigration researchers, who know the phenomenon as 'assimilation effect'. Next

comes the timing of their arrival. Figure 5 shows that the lucky immigrants who came here when the economy was booming, that is, during the 1950s and 1960s, have the lowest likelihood of living in poverty, compared to those who arrived before or after them. These are the features that apply only to immigrants, while the following ones allow for a comparison of immigrants and native-born.

Figure 6 shows the impact of education in lowering the chances of poverty. Something to note here, however, is that while a better education is a good thing for all, the degree of its goodness will be higher if you are not an immigrant. In other words, immigrants do not get to enjoy the benefits of their educational attainment to the extent that their native-born counterparts do. Is this because immigrants' credentials are likely to have come from non-Canadian institutions? It might; but, our data is silent about this. Education is viewed as a kind of human capital investment, another example of which is learning a new language. Figure 7 shows that learning the official lan-

guages in Canada is a good strategy to lower your chances of living in poverty. There are, however, two minor problems here; knowledge of 'only French', for native-born Canadians, is not as beneficial as knowing 'only English' is; for immigrants, it involves a penalty.

Last, but not least, is the impact of race on odds of poverty. Compared to Whites (or, Non-Visible Minorities, to be politically correct), Blacks, whether immigrant or native-born, have a much higher likelihood of living in poverty, even after controlling for their education, age, and full/part-time nature of the job. South-Asian and the Chinese experience the same thing, although at a much lower level, but only if they are immigrants. This effect of race, given that it appears even after controlling for all immigration-related factors such as age at arrival and period of migration, calls for further attention. What are the possible factors behind this effect? One factor that immediately pops up in everyone's mind is racial discrimination. Many other studies have shown the existence of racism, particularly in the economic domain. However, there exist other possibilities as well. For example, one may ask, is it not possible that the higher rates of poverty among certain groups be related to their cultural orientations? Or, is it not possible to attribute at least part of the problem to the differences among such groups in terms of the extensity and richness of their social networks? Most likely, the impact of race is a compound effect of all these factors. To determine the relative share of each, however, we need further research in this area.

Figure 6: Full-Time / Part-Time Nature of Employment and Odds of Living in Poverty, 1996




Figure 7: The Period of Immigration and Immigrants' Odds of Living in Poverty, 1996




Figure 4: Education and the Odds of Living in Poverty, 1996




Figure 8: Age at Immigration and Odds of Living in Poverty, 1996




Figure 5: Knowledge of Official Languages and the Odds of Living in Poverty, 1996





Figure 9: Racial Origin and Odds of Living in Poverty, 1996





# IMMIGRATION AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

## ABSTRACT

While immigration is not primarily an economic issue, immigration policy does have broad, subtle and poorly understood, but potentially large, economic implications. It appears as though the net economic impact of current immigration policy is close to zero for the pre-existing population. However, there is much that we don't know and the economic balance could easily be tipped one way or the other.

In thinking about economics and immigration, one of the most important points to remember is that immigration is not primarily an economic issue. Immigration is about family unification, humanitarianism, and national identity, among many other concerns. Nevertheless, there are economic aspects of many immigration issues that affect Canadians as individuals and as a nation, whether or not we understand them. And one of the messages of this article is that there is a lot we do not know, especially in the Canadian context and when it comes to the "big questions". Some of these questions are, however, being addressed in other contexts, and will be reviewed here, though they are at the frontier of research and only tentative conclusions can be drawn. I will address three issues that are relevant for economic aspects of policymaking in the face of an economy that is rapidly changing. First, economies of scale arguments for immigration will be discussed, then I will turn to issues of the complementarity and substitutability of individuals with different skills *in production*, and finally I will look at importance of the relative growth rates of physical and human capital on the level and distribution of economic outcomes.

Remarkably little is known about immigration's impact with respect to the "new economy", productivity or the economic standing of the pre-existing population (which comprises both the Canadian born and previous arrival cohorts of immigrants). Several arguments and hypotheses currently circulate, but each one's empirical force is not fully understood. Overall, the economic impact of immigration on immigrants is firmly believed to be strongly positive on average. While relatively little large-scale evidence exists for this, evidence from non-random and small-scale interviews and the like is fairly convincing. This is not to say that all immigrants experience a gain from immigration to Canada, or that the gain from moving to Canada is as large as that which might be expected from migrating elsewhere. The incidence of return migration, and migration from Canada, points to the increasing welfare that some expect from leaving the country. The economic value of immigration to Canada and to the pre-existing population, which is a primary concern in this article, is more difficult to ascertain.

Knowledgeable policymakers often suggest the economic benefits of Canada's current immigration policies are small, but positive. While there is some disagreement, most economic research suggests that the net impact is indeed not very large. This is not to say that immigration does not increase the size of the Canadian economy – clearly it has a sizeable impact. Rather, the issue revolves around the per capita size of the economy, and the per capita benefit of immigration to the pre-existing population.

There was a period when a strong argument could be made for immigration having an important impact per capita *because* it increased the total size of the economy – that is, there were increasing returns to scale. However, even as early as 1991, an Economic Council of Canada report by Swan suggested that scale was less important than it had been. The report's rationale has become even stronger over the decade that followed as the "new economy" is increasingly characterized by rapid communication, high technology, massively reduced transportation costs (which many economists see as crucial, but which is not prominent in discussion), and increasingly global trade. Having a large domestic market and labour force is not as important as it once was.

Consider next the complementarity or substitutability of new immigrant and pre-existing Canadian labour in production, as reviewed by Borjas (1999). The size of the economic pie is maximized when new immigrants are complements to the pre-existing population in production. New immigrants should, therefore, have different skills and "fill holes" in the Canadian demand for labour. If, alternatively, new immigrants are close substitutes in production, then, not only will there be less output (lower productivity) than under the alternative scenario, but those skills that are common will have their price bid down as the supply increases. This has an implication for measures of discrimination and related issues: occupational and/or industrial differences between immigrants and the Canadian born are the desired result of a selection mechanism that seeks out potential immigrants with skills that are in short supply in the Canadian labour market. Differences in wages for equivalent workers are, however, a different matter.

A puzzling study that attempts to measure the empirical magnitude of any displacement that might result from new immigrants substituting for pre-existing workers is by Card (1990). If displacement is observed, that is, if new immigration causes wages or employment to decline for the pre-existing population, then this is evidence for new immigrants being substitutes in production. Card focuses on a singular event – the boatlift of refugees from the port of Mariel, in Cuba, to Miami. This was a massive migration involving about 125,000 new immigrants and it caused about a 7% increase in Miami's labour force almost overnight. Using a combination of four other cities as a comparison group, he found only very modest reductions in wages and employment in the Miami area, and these were quite temporary and concentrated among the low skill portion of the workforce most similar to the immigrants. This suggests that there are very limited displacement effects – very little substitutability – at least locally.<sup>1</sup>

However, the issue of location turns out to be crucial. Angrist and Krueger (1999) point to the adjustment, or lack of adjustment, to Miami's population associated with the influx of new immigrants. The increase in Miami's population did not endure very long. Domestic migration appears to have adjusted so as to eliminate any population change following the massive immigration from Mariel. Displacement appears to occur not in terms of local wages and/or unemployment, but in terms of internal migration. This implies that the effects from new immigration, if there are appreciable ones, ripple through the nation as a whole (and rather quickly) even if the new immigrants are highly concentrated. Unfortunately, measuring these impacts at the national level is remarkably difficult.<sup>2</sup>

Borjas (1999) tries to get around the measurement issues by developing a stylized model of the U.S. economy with heterogeneous skill levels. He then uses it to estimate the impact of a 10% increase in the labour force due to immigration on the national income of the pre-existing population. Using a variety of estimates for the relevant relationships, he finds that the pre-existing population benefits, but the magnitude is in the range of only 0.01 to 0.4% of GDP. The total size of the economy increases much more than this, but immigrants themselves receive almost all of the value of their production. It is hard to

make Borjas's benefit estimate very large, and it is also very hard to make it negative. Immigration is not primarily an economic issue from this perspective.

Related in purpose, but using a very different approach, is research sponsored by the U.S. National Science Foundation that is reported in a book entitled *The New Americans*. One of its focuses is on estimating the net fiscal impact of immigration to government in a comprehensive way. It concludes that, while government budgets in states with large immigrant populations (it focuses on New Jersey and California) lose financially, the federal government gains, and the pre-existing nation, as a whole, gains. However, the gains are spread broadly across many states, whereas the bulk of the costs are concentrated in a few. Once again though, the gain is small, but unlike Borjas's estimates, in some plausible scenarios it is negative. Interestingly, California, which has much more generous social and other programs than New Jersey, loses more. It is not clear whether a Canadian province with generous social and related programs would, on net, gain or lose financially. One issue that emerges clearly from a procedure such as this is that the gross financial flows are quite large, therefore any change in the characteristics of immigrants, or of public programs (including debt servicing), can alter the net benefit substantially.

Turning next to the amount of physical and/or financial capital available to workers, in the context of the ongoing productivity debate, Beaudry and Green (2002) suggest that one reason for Canada's relatively poor productivity performance is that the amount of capital available to Canadian workers is declining in relative terms. No matter how hard one works, a worker with a bulldozer can move more earth than one with only a shovel. More importantly, as we move to a more knowledge-oriented "new economy" more capital per worker is required. One implication of this is that an aggressive physical capital accumulation strategy needs to accompany new immigration. This is particularly important if there is an emphasis on the recruitment of highly skilled immigrants. Note also that if the supply of labour increases more quickly than the supply of capital, then immigration, by changing relative prices, serves also to redistribute income from the owners of labour to the owners of capital. (This also applies if displacement occurs.)

A central point in this discussion is that while, as I stated in opening, I do not believe that immigration is primarily an economic issue, immigration policy nevertheless has broad, subtle and poorly understood, but potentially large, economic implications. Inasmuch as U.S. evidence can be applied to Canada, and unfortunately there is no comparable Canadian evidence as far as I know, it appears that these large costs and benefits approximately balance currently and the net economic impact of current immigration policy is close to zero for the pre-existing population. However, there is much that we don't know (for example, even though the returns to scale are not what they once were, I wonder if they may still be sizeable). Two things are clear though; first, the economic balance could easily be tipped one way or the other by policy or luck, and, second, as long as the balance is maintained (and maybe even if it is not) non-financial factors are probably paramount for immigration.

# THE MYSTERY OF CANADA'S HIGH IMMIGRATION LEVELS

## ABSTRACT

Canada has a per capita immigration level far in excess of any other large Western nation. Why is that? wonders the author, especially when one considers the economic and social stresses associated with a high number of immigrants.

It is federal government policy that immigration must be used to increase the population of Canada's largest city, each and every year, by more than 100,000 new arrivals from abroad. The government appears to have secret research indicating that Toronto is dangerously underpopulated.

This may come as news to some because Ottawa, which has no jurisdiction over urban affairs, has never announced such a policy. But it is the policy nonetheless, because relentless population growth in Greater Toronto is the inevitable result of permanent high immigration levels imposed by the federal government. The government knows that almost half the newcomers who arrive each year settle in Toronto. Therefore, when it sets an immigration target of 250,000, it is deciding to increase Toronto's population by more than 100,000 whether it says so explicitly or not.

One of the mysteries of Canadian public policy is why Canada has a per capita immigration level far in excess of any other large Western nation and twice as high as those of the U.S. and Australia, the other two major receiving countries with organized immigration programs.

Permanent high immigration is a recent phenomenon in Canadian history. As recently as the Trudeau era, immigration levels fluctuated from year to year depending on economic conditions and were cut sharply during downturns. No longer. The Mulroney government imposed permanent high immigration, divorced from any consideration of labour market need or absorptive capacity. This policy has been continued by the Chrétien government.

The issue, for this writer, is not whether or not Canada should have immigration. We should, in my view, because immigration makes our country livelier and more interesting, because it is an important national tradition, and because there are refugees who need our protection. The issue is why we should have so much of it given that all the adverse effects of immigration are caused by excessive numbers. Among them are stress on the urban infrastructure including public school systems, wage compression, increased poverty among immigrants, and the growth of illegal sweatshops dependent on unskilled immigrant labour.

Why Canada has adopted this policy is a mystery to which neither economics nor demographics provide an answer.

Immigration does not increase per capita incomes. It does increase the population, thereby creating a larger domestic market for Canadian business. But Canadian business does not need a larger domestic market any more than Sweden does. Both countries have always earned their livings by exporting their products to the world.

The only significant economic impact of high immigration levels, in Canada or anywhere else, is to reduce wages by increasing the supply of labour. In the eyes of Allan Greenspan, head of the U.S. Federal Reserve, this is a good thing because it keeps a lid on inflation. In the eyes of workers whose earnings are reduced, it is a bad thing. Are high immigration levels deliberately imposed by Ottawa to suppress wages as part of its anti-inflation strategy? If so, the government should admit it openly, thereby solving the mystery of its immigration policy.

The demographic case for a high immigration level is even weaker than the economic. It amounts to frequent repetition of unproven statements such as that made by John Anderson of the Canadian Council of Social Development in a January interview with the *Toronto Star*. Canada, Anderson told the newspaper, "desperately needs immigrants" because of its aging population.

Because of increasing longevity and decreasing fertility, almost every country has an "aging population." Even China, with below-replacement fertility of 1.8, has an aging population. Why Canada, uniquely in the world, must address this normal demographic development through permanent high immigration has never been explained.

The peculiar notion has taken hold in Canada that the population must be rejuvenated and that immigrants are a substitute for babies as a way to achieve this. But they aren't. Immigrants are much older than babies – a median age of 30 on arrival compared to 0 for babies. True enough, immigrants are younger than the overall population which has a median age of 35. But they are not young enough to make any noticeable difference in the age structure of a population of more than 31 mil-

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lion. Even doubling or tripling the already high immigration levels would have only a minuscule impact.

The other misconception underlying the demographic case is that Canada will run out of workers to “support” the growing ranks of the retired. Yet countries with more retirees than Canada are coping well without resorting to massive immigration. Britain has 3% more people over 65 than Canada, 3% fewer people of working age, and much less immigration. According to British demographer Phil Mullen, also quoted in the *Toronto Star*, over the last 100 years the ratio of working people to retired people in the U.K. has dropped from 14 to 1 down to 4 to 1. The result? “Hardly anyone noticed,” Mullen said.

In Canada, the ratio of workers to retired people has also dropped sharply but not as much as in the U.K. because Canada is younger. So in Canada the elderly dependency ratio is 5.3 to 1. That’s a big drop from where it was 100 years ago – and yet no one has noticed it here either. As our population ages, we will get down to where the British are now. Nobody will notice. The reason, as Mullen points out, is that increased productivity increases national wealth faster than the elderly dependency ratio drops.

Some people resort to the “Canada is a big country” argument to explain the mystery of Canada’s immigration levels. In this view, Canada is a vast, under-populated land mass that needs more bodies.

In 2003 this argument is beyond absurd. For decades, Canadian-born people have been moving from rural areas and small towns to big cities in search of economic opportunity. Immigrants, in search of the same thing, have no intention of replacing the Canadian-born who have left rural Canada. That is why almost all immigrants settle in big cities. There is, therefore, no relationship between Canada’s geographical size and its immigration program. Even if Ottawa succeeds in using immigration to turn Toronto into a Sao Paulo of the north, with a population of 20 million or more, most of Canada’s vast land mass will remain sparsely populated.

Yet the notion of importing people to settle in less-populated regions persists, as demonstrated by the proposal of the current immigration minister, Denis Coderre, to attract 1 million skilled immigrants and require them to live and work outside the major cities. This scheme raises more questions than it answers. Where is the evidence that Canada faces a shortage of 1 million skilled workers? The second-largest population cohort in the Canadian population, the 6.5 million members of the baby boom echo, are currently entering the Canadian labour market; are they not skilled? If not, why not? Is the Coderre plan an attempt to use the immigration program to do what the education system has failed to do?

It would be one thing to require a small number of urgently needed foreign-born doctors to live outside the major urban areas as a condition of their residence in Canada but quite another to impose such a condition on 1 million people. The last country to attempt to regulate the internal movements of a large segment of its population was the apartheid regime of South Africa. Enforcing the Coderre dispersal scheme would require creating a Canadian version of the hated South African pass laws.

This proposal appears to be Mr. Coderre’s attempt to maintain high immigration levels while taking some of the population pressure off Toronto and Vancouver. But surely high immigration levels, in the absence of any economic or demographic need, are not so important that they are worth stripping 1 million people of a fundamental democratic right, the freedom of mobility.

Quite apart from its dubious legality, the Coderre scheme is too impractical to work because immigrants will insist on living in the large cities where others of the same national origin are already established. The inescapable reality, therefore, is that a continuation in Canada of high immigration levels means a continuation of rapid urban growth, especially in Toronto.

Immigration, viewed in this perspective, becomes mainly an issue of the urban environment. The current immigration program is designed to turn Toronto from a big city into a megacity. Yet megacities – urban agglomerations of 10 million or more – are not better places to live and work than smaller big cities.

In this respect, the annual results of the William M. Mercer liveability rankings are instructive. Mercer, an international human resources consulting firm, annually ranks cities around the world for quality of life. Among the criteria used in this ranking are the political and social environment, the economic situation, culture, the standards of schools and other public services, housing, recreation, and the natural environment.

Significantly all the top-ranked cities on this list are small to medium sized ones in the 1 to 4 million range as opposed to megacities. The smaller big cities – such places as Vancouver, Sydney, Stockholm, and Geneva – offer the cultural attractions, shopping, restaurants, and other agreeable features of big city life without the pollution, congestion, and higher crime rates of the megacities. Toronto has been slipping down the rankings each year as its population grows.

Still, the only good argument for high immigration levels I have ever heard is that the truly great cities of the world all have very large populations. A world-class metropolis, so this argument goes, would be an asset for Canada and only immigration on a grand scale can achieve it.

Unfortunately, a Canadian city of 10 million plus would almost certainly have more in common with such modern megacities as Seoul, Mexico City, and Bombay than with such former imperial capitals as London and Paris whose populations grew gradually over many centuries. Just adding millions of bodies over a few decades doesn’t create a great city.

In any event, the people who live in Canada’s major cities deserve to have a say in their futures. It is bizarre that Toronto’s politicians and planners discuss rapid population growth as if it were a natural phenomenon, something that just happens by itself, rather than the direct result of an immigration policy that could be changed.

It’s time the federal government explained why it has decided to use immigration to bloat Toronto’s population. And it’s time the people who live there were heard from and listened to.

## The Skilled Worker Class

### Selection Criteria in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act

BY ERIN TOLLEY  
METROPOLIS PROJECT

#### Immigrant Selection in Canada: Background

Declining birth rates and a rapidly aging population are depleting the size of Canada's workforce. Analysts predict that by 2020, one million Canadian jobs could go unfilled. As a result, immigration is being seen, increasingly, as necessary for economic growth and well-being.

More than 200,000 immigrants come to Canada each year, and the country has adopted a comprehensive immigration policy to process these applicants. The program contains provisions for several classes of immigrants: family, economic (which includes skilled workers, provincial nominees, self-employed persons, entrepreneurs, and investors), and refugees.

The new *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA) was implemented on June 28, 2002, and in the months preceding its enactment, the selection process,

particularly for the Skilled Worker Class, was given considerable attention. The Skilled Worker Class is an economic entry category and the class, as defined by the regulations, covers those applicants "who may become permanent residents on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada." Under the 1991 Canada-Québec Accord, Québec may determine its own selection criteria; this brief looks only at the criteria for those skilled workers who are selected by the Government of Canada. In 2001, Canada admitted 137,000 skilled workers.

Under IRPA, the selection criteria for the Skilled Worker Class emphasize human capital attributes and flexible skills, rather than the specific intended occupations of applicants, as the previous selection system did. It is believed that the new macro approach offers greater flexibility and is more responsive to labour market realities. The new points system assesses education, language proficiency, employment experience, age, arranged employment and adaptability, to a

#### Summary

This policy brief examines research pertinent to the selection criteria for Skilled Workers, which were introduced in the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA). Under the IRPA regulations, the selection criteria for Skilled Workers emphasize human capital attributes and flexible skills, which includes an applicant's education, official language proficiency, age, employment experience, and adaptability. This brief outlines the selection criteria for Skilled Workers and explores selected research. Research findings suggest that although some of the attributes evaluated under the selection system, such as official language proficiency and education, have clear impacts on economic success in Canada, the impact of other attributes is less certain. Moreover, research suggests that many visible minority immigrants face significant obstacles in the Canadian labour market, regardless of their level of official language proficiency or education. The brief concludes by discussing some of the policy implications of the research.

#### Policy Briefs

Metropolis Policy Briefs are intended for a non-specialist audience of policy practitioners, researchers and others who require a concise examination and explanation of existing research on topics related to immigration, diversity and changing cities. Research can, and should, inform decision-making and, as such, Metropolis Policy Briefs give special attention to the policy implications of the research they consider. A bibliography is included at the end of each Policy Brief to facilitate a more detailed examination of the subject matter.

maximum of 100 points. Presently, applicants qualify for landed immigrant status if they achieve 75 points or higher.<sup>1</sup>

This policy brief will examine the selection criteria for the Skilled Worker Class and explore some of the relevant research. It will then outline some of the policy implications of this research. The literature review is not exhaustive, but does provide a sample of some of the most pertinent research findings on the selection criteria. Most of the research used in this review has been undertaken by affiliates of the Metropolis Project.

## Selection Criteria for Skilled Workers

### a) Education

Under the points system for the Skilled Worker Class, applicants are awarded points based on their level of education, up to a maximum of 25 points for a PhD or Master's degree with at least 17 years of full-time study.

Research suggests that education obtained pre-immigration will have a smaller effect on earnings than education obtained post-immigration<sup>2</sup>; positive returns from education increase when the

education is obtained in Canada (Gozalie 2002). However, Gozalie (2002) notes that negative returns from education that immigrants experience may be diminished when immigrants are selected from "elite" countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, which have labour market and education systems similar to Canada's. Nonetheless, even among elite immigrants, "earnings . . . rise at a slightly lower rate than that of their Canadian born counterparts over time in Canada and the impacts of schooling . . . prior to immigration are smaller than if these characteristics were obtained in Canada" (21).

Pendakur and Pendakur (1996) found that "among men and women, visible minority immigrants do worse than white immigrants, even if educated in Canada" (3). Even when they controlled for foreign schooling, the penalty to visible minority immigrants' earnings remained. Thus, for visible minority immigrants, achieving earnings comparable to Canadian-born counterparts is a significant challenge, whether they have been educated in Canada or not.

A further challenge is the recognition of foreign credentials and education. Whether overtly, through outright non-recognition, or covertly, through discrimination or underutilization, immigrants may find that foreign education and training are less valuable than comparable Canadian training and education, or that their education and training place them in significantly lower occupations than in their countries of origin. (see Reitz

2001). However, Hiebert (2002) notes that "while it is true that the education credentials of immigrants are frequently ignored in the Canadian labour market, participation rates and employment earnings rise steeply with higher levels of educational attainment" (34). In other words, while immigrants with foreign education and training may fare worse than the Canadian born, they will fare better than immigrants with less education and training. According to this view, while the non-recognition of foreign credentials and education is problematic and constitutes a waste of knowledge and talents, those immigrants with education and training are nonetheless better placed to succeed in the Canadian labour market than those without such credentials.

However, it is contrary to the very goal of Canada's immigration and multiculturalism policies - to welcome and integrate new Canadians - if we compare immigrants' labour market performance only to that of other immigrants and not in relation to the performance of native-born Canadians with comparable education and experience. Although caution must be exercised when comparing the performance of immigrants and non-immigrants to ensure that differences in life experience and opportunities are taken into account, measuring success based only on immigrant's performance in relation to other immigrants may foster marginalization.

Research has also shown that positive returns from education depend, in large part, on official

1. Citizenship and Immigration Canada will phase in the new selection system and pass mark during a transition period that is outlined in the regulations. Applicants applying after the coming into force of IRPA will be assessed against the new criteria, with a pass mark of 75. Applicants who applied before January 1, 2002 will be assessed under the old system until March 31, 2003. Commencing April 1, 2003, any applicants who applied before January 1, 2002 and who have not yet received a selection decision will be assessed under the new criteria, but with the lower pass mark of 70 points.

2. "Post-immigration" education includes education received in Canada as an international student even if the studies were undertaken prior to formal immigration.



language proficiency. Hiebert's work (2002) indicates that in the absence of official language proficiency, immigrants with higher education will not experience a positive return on earnings, particularly if they are unable to access settlement services, such as language training (27). Similarly, Chiswick and Miller (2000) point out that education "may be of little, if any, value to an immigrant with no knowledge of the destination language" (4). In their view, official language proficiency and education are complements in the labour market.

### b) Language proficiency

Applicants are awarded points based on their proficiency in Canada's two official languages, up to a maximum of 24 points. These points are determined according to standard language benchmark tests, which are administered by a designated language testing organization, and assess an applicant's ability to speak, listen, read and write. Applicants may also choose to submit other evidence of their language proficiency, in lieu of testing.

***"Proficiency in one or both of Canada's official languages has a consistently positive effect on both immigrant earnings and employment opportunities".***

DeVoretz et al., 2000

Research findings indicate that immigrants who arrive in Canada knowing an official language are more likely to succeed in the Canadian labour market. In a review

of studies on the relationship between immigrant's second language acquisition and labour market performance, DeVoretz et al. (2000) found that "proficiency in one or both of Canada's official languages has a consistently positive effect on both immigrant earnings and employment opportunities" and, moreover, that "the rates of return from second language acquisition are large" (48). In addition, as Chiswick and Miller (2000) point out, "Destination language proficiency can have indirect impacts on labor market earnings through the effect on the productivity of other forms of human capital [such as] schooling and labor market experience" (4).

During consultations on the new Act, the Commissioner of Official Languages intervened to emphasize the importance of functional bilingualism, particularly for immigrants choosing to settle in official language minority communities. This intervention resulted in an increase in the number of points awarded for the second official language, from 4 to 8 (Quell, 2002).

However, research has found that the relationship between language proficiency and annual earnings is not strictly linear. For example, Chiswick and Miller (2000) note that there are differences in earnings even among those immigrants who can conduct a conversation in an official language. Specifically, immigrants who can conduct a conversation in an official language and generally use an official language at home earn more than those immigrants who can conduct a conversation in an official language,

but generally use a non-official language at home (7). Still, most researchers support a selection system based primarily on official language proficiency as it is agreed that this is the single best predictor of future economic success in Canada. By setting the pass mark at 75 points, the selection criteria for the Skilled Worker Class virtually

***Most researchers support a selection system based primarily on official language proficiency as it is agreed that this is the single best predictor of future economic success in Canada.***

excludes those applicants with limited or no proficiency in an official language (see Hiebert, 2002).

Nonetheless, Pendakur and Pendakur (1997b) have shown that knowledge of an official language is not always a guarantee of economic parity. Their research indicates that "knowledge of minority languages is correlated with lower earnings for men and women in Canada's three largest cities [Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver]" even when knowledge of an official language is held constant (16). In other words, immigrants who speak both an official and a non-official language tend to earn less than those who speak only an official language, although this negative return diminishes as the local linguistic population grows. Pendakur and Pendakur argue that the negative return on non-official language proficiency is a result of discrimination in the labour market, which may be based on culture as much as on colour, and that large

enclaves of linguistic groups may minimize this discrimination by sensitizing the population to accent and other cultural artifacts.

### c) Employment experience

Applicants are awarded points based on labour market experience, up to a maximum of 21 points for four or more years of experience. The relationship between experience and potential earnings exhibits many of the characteristics present in the relationship between education and potential earnings. Gozalie (2002) points out that while experience from source countries with labour market systems similar to Canada's pays a

***“Where an immigrant cannot conduct a conversation in an official language, pre-immigration experience, like educational attainment, is not associated with higher earnings”.***

Chiswick and Miller, 2000

higher return than experience from other countries, returns on post-immigration experience are greater than those for pre-immigration experience. Employers in Canada may not recognize experience attained abroad, or may value it less than Canadian experience. However, Chiswick and Miller (2000) argue that “experience acquired abroad can be more profitably transformed into higher earnings where the immigrant has shifted fully to the use of an official language in everyday life in Canada. Where an immigrant cannot conduct a conversation in an official language, pre-immigration

experience, like educational attainment, is not associated with higher earnings” (11). This demonstrates, once again, the centrality of official language proficiency to labour market success.

### d) Age

According to the age criteria, applicants between the ages of 21 and 49 are awarded a maximum of 10 points. Other applicants incur a penalty of 2 points for each year above or below this range.

Although doubtless most researchers would agree that immigrants in their “working years” are most able to contribute to the Canadian economy, there may be some disagreement over the age range outlined in the selection criteria and what precisely constitutes one’s “working years.”

Research by Joseph Schaafsma and Arthur Sweetman (1999) indicates that “age at immigration matters” because younger immigrants are more likely than older immigrants to receive education and acquire experience in Canada and are thus less susceptible to the devaluation that research suggests older immigrants experience. They also note that younger immigrants may acculturate more easily than older immigrants and suggest, as well, that younger immigrants are often highly motivated, which leads them to outperform other immigrants and, in some cases, the native born. Schaafsma and Sweetman’s research suggests that immigrants who settled in Canada before the age of 10 experience the lowest earnings differential of all immigrants.

Among visible minority immigrants, those who immigrated before the age of 10 do not experience a reduction in earnings relative to other immigrants; but visible minority immigrants who arrive later in life do. In contrast to Pendakur and Pendakur, Schaafsma and Sweetman suggest that earnings differentials for visible minority immigrants may be a result of age at immigration, rather than necessarily discrimination.

### e) Arranged Employment

A maximum of 10 points is awarded to applicants who have a confirmed offer of employment in Canada.

Although research on the relationship between arranged employment and labour market success is scant, Gozalie (2002) has argued that some immigrants may be disadvantaged in the Canadian labour market, particularly in the period immediately following their arrival, because they lack the networks and knowledge about local conditions that would facilitate employment placement (6). Arranged employment, which may mitigate a newcomer’s need for networks and other connections to obtain employment, therefore is likely a predictor of potential success in the Canadian labour market.

### f) Adaptability

A maximum of 10 points is awarded based on an applicant’s adaptability, which includes: the education of the Principle Applicant’s spouse<sup>3</sup>; previous work

3. “Spouse” refers to the Principle Applicant’s husband or wife or common-law partner.

or study in Canada by either the Principle Applicant or the spouse; a family relationship in Canada; and a maximum of 5 points based on those points received under the arranged employment criteria. This approach replaces the "personal suitability" factor that was previously used and, it is believed, is a more objective means of assessing an applicant's potential adaptability to Canada.

Under adaptability, Principle Applicants are awarded points according to an assessment of the spouse's education, where applicable. It is believed that spouses with higher levels of education will be capable of entering the labour force and augmenting the family's contribution to the economy. The gender-based analysis of Bill C-11 noted that recognition of the spouse's education would "have positive gender impacts" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, undated).

However, the criteria do not assess where the education was obtained, and research suggests that there may be a tenuous relationship between education not obtained in Canada and potential earnings. In addition there is no assessment of spousal official language proficiency, which has been strongly linked to potential earnings and higher returns on immigrant education. In the absence of such an assessment and financial support for spousal language training, it may be more difficult for the spouse to be successful in the Canadian labour market, regardless of his or her level of education, and particularly if the education was not acquired in Canada.

Awarding points for previous work or study in Canada by the spouse or the Principle Applicant recognizes the positive benefits derived from prior Canadian experiences and the relationship between these experiences and more successful integration. Research indicates that immigrants with Canadian work or study experience are more likely to succeed in the labour market.

Finally, it is likely that a family relationship in Canada would enhance immigrants' ability to integrate and, as a result, on their potential economic contribution to Canada. Research on "network capital" has found that contacts in the host country do make a significant difference in integrating, particularly for lower-status ethnic immigrants. Some researchers (Ooka and Wellman, for example) argue, however, that it is heterogeneous networks, rather than networks composed only of members from an immigrant's own ethnic group, that are of the greatest benefit.

### Skilled Workers vs. Other Newcomers

Although the intent of the selection process in Canada's immigration system is to select those immigrants who are most likely to succeed in Canada, some newcomers will nonetheless fare better than others and, indeed, better than some native-born Canadians. This is a result of a complex set of factors, including discriminatory experiences, the ability to form networks in Canada and access to support services that facilitate integration. As such, the

selection process is only a predictor of future success and not a determinant.

Indeed, some newcomers have fared surprisingly well, in spite of lower levels of education and language proficiency (Hiebert 2002). Others have not fared as well, in spite of official language proficiency and higher levels of education (Pendakur and Pendakur 1997a, 1997b). Hiebert's study shows the utility and benefit of offering a full range of settlement services, such as welfare and language training, to newcomers. He found that refugees who arrived in British Columbia with no proficiency in an official language nonetheless were faring quite well in the labour market and hypothesizes that the wide range of settlement services offered to refugees facilitates official language acquisition and offsets their initial lack of proficiency. He therefore recommends "increasing settlement services [to immigrants], especially in the area of social support and language training, in an effort to better prepare immigrants for the work force" (35).

Another reason for increasing settlement services is that even within the Skilled Worker Class, only the Principle Applicant must achieve the minimum pass mark of 75; the Principle Applicant's dependants need not. Dependants may lack official language skills, and any language training required would be the financial responsibility of the family. For the spouses of Principle Applicants, who are assessed based on their education, but not on language ability, low-level official language proficiency may

have detrimental effects on long-term earnings because economic success is generally predicated on official language proficiency (see, for example, Pendakur and Pendakur 1997a).

Similar conclusions can be reached from David Ley's study (2000) of business immigrants to British Columbia. He notes that, contrary to media reports and some scholarly research, business immigrants, who include investors, entrepreneurs and self-employed applicants, may have not fared very well in the province. Available evidence suggests that many were unemployed and living off savings or investments in their countries of origin, some had spouses who had returned without their families to their countries of origin, and most were discouraged about their economic prospects in Canada. Ley points out that one of the central problems was the lax selection criteria, including only limited requirements for official language proficiency, education and experience. Because business immigrants are viewed as self-supporting, they are expected to finance their own language training, which is often not feasible, given their minimal earnings and, when employed, the need to work long hours in order to achieve a degree of success (Ley 2000; Hiebert 2002).

## Criticisms of the Selection System

Critics of the selection system for Skilled Workers argue that it is too restrictive and that too few immigrants will be admitted as a result. This is seen as especially

problematic given concerns over the "brain drain" and the shortage of skilled workers in Canada; researchers have argued that immigration is one way to offset the loss of native-born Canadian skilled workers, particularly if immigrants' skills and credentials are recognized and utilized (see Reitz 2001). In the prepublished regulations for IRPA, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration recommended raising the pass mark for Skilled Workers from 70 points to 80 points, but in the final regulations, the pass mark was set at 75 to respond to concerns that anything higher could prevent the immigration of many skilled workers to Canada. In spite of this change, the criticisms have persisted.

In addition, a gender-based analysis of Bill C-11, the legislation that preceded IRPA, noted that "awarding points on the basis of formal education, training and patterns of paid labour force participation does not always take into account barriers that women face in accessing those opportunities in source countries" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, undated). Gender stratification, unpaid domestic labour and interruptions in paid employment to bear and raise children may all have disadvantageous effects on female applicants under the Skilled Worker Class. On the other hand, the emphasis that the selection system places on education, rather than paid labour force experience, will likely have a positive effect on female applicants.

Other observers criticize the criteria, arguing that points should

be awarded for additional or different criteria, such as the existence of a settlement plan and support from community organizations or intended future study in Canada. According to this view, other attributes, which are not assessed by the current selection criteria, may contribute to an immigrant's economic success in Canada.

## The Australian Example

Australia's Skilled Stream, like Canada's, assesses applicants based on several human capital attributes, including English language skills (20 points), age at immigration (up to 30 points) and work experience (up to 10 points with bonus points for Australian work experience).

However, under the Australian system, while these attributes are assessed and count toward an applicant's overall score, the emphasis is on occupation, not human capital.

### *Australia's selection criteria for skilled workers emphasize intended occupation.*

The applicant's nominated occupation must appear on the Skilled Occupations List, which includes most occupations that require a degree, diploma, or trade qualifications. Occupations that require specific training are awarded 60 points, while 50 points are awarded for more general professional occupation and 40 points for other general skilled occupations. With 150 possible points and a current pass mark of 115 points for independent



migrants, the nominated occupation is a significant component of the selection system.

The emphasis on occupation is evident in other aspects of Australia's selection system. For example, points are awarded to applicants with an occupation that has been identified as "in demand" (10 points for applicants with a job offer for an occupation in demand; 5 points for those with such an occupation, but no job offer). Canada's Skilled Worker selection system has purposefully turned away from using occupation-based criteria.

Other differences exist. For example, although the Australian program awards points for education, applicants obtain these points only if the degree is from an Australian institution because it is believed that applications with Australian qualifications are more likely to find employment in Australia. In addition, whereas Canada's adaptability criterion assesses only the spouse's education, Australia assesses the spouse using the same criteria as is used for the Principle Applicant. Given the research findings on education, which are noted above, these features of the Australian system should be examined in the Canadian context.

In addition, there is little research that directly compares Canada's new selection system for skilled workers, which emphasizes human capital exclusively, with Australia's occupation-based system. This is no doubt due, in part, to the infancy of Canada's selection system under IRPA. Research on labour market outcomes and earnings of immigrants selected under human

capital- and occupation-based schemes could shed light on the utility of the different approaches, as well as on the relationship between selection criteria and immigrant success. The Australian case could be treated as a "natural experiment" – a rare opportunity for Canadian researchers and policy practitioners to test policy inputs, such as selection criteria, against real policy outcomes.

### Policy Implications

The relationship between selection criteria and eventual outcomes is complex, but the research does show that certain attributes are more plausible predictors of immigrants' potential economic contributions and well-being than others.

Official language proficiency appears to be one of the key determinants of labour market success in Canada. Given the emphasis on language proficiency in the selection criteria, it is likely that Skilled Workers will fare well in the Canadian labour market, particularly if their education and experience are obtained in Canada or in source countries with systems similar to Canada's. However, this does not mitigate the challenges that Skilled Workers face in terms of the valuing and utilization of their skills or the differential earnings of visible minority immigrants versus non-visible minority immigrants and native-born Canadians, nor does it mitigate the challenges faced by the spouses and dependants of Principle Applicants, who are not assessed on the basis of their language proficiency and may have difficulty accessing language training.

At the same time, given that the adaptability criteria reward those applicants with educated spouses because it is believed that they will be capable of contributing to the Canadian economy, spousal official language proficiency should be assessed. Spouses who lack official language proficiency, regardless of their education, may be unable to succeed in the labour force. In addition, research has found that earnings are highest among immigrants who generally speak an official language at home. Thus, it would perhaps be beneficial to award points to spouses who can conduct a conversation in the official language of the Principle Applicant as this increases the probability that this language will be used at home. However, increasing the number of points that spouses can contribute favours married and cohabiting couples over single applicants and may effectively permit immigration by weaker Principle Applicants with applications that are supplemented by points from their spouses.

Given that immigrants experience higher positive returns from education attained in Canada, the selection system could award additional points for Canadian education, or for intended future study in Canada. In addition, a promotional campaign aimed at foreign students studying at Canadian institutions may attract applicants with existing Canadian education. Further, research (Reitz 1997, for example) suggests that more should be done to encourage Canadian industries to recognize, value and utilize the education and training that immigrants bring to Canada.

Research on the relationship between earnings and age at immigration suggests that the age criterion should perhaps be revisited. Achieving income parity with established Canadians takes time and thus, younger immigrants are more likely than older immigrants to eventually earn incomes that are comparable to native-born Canadians. The age range could be revised to recognize that immigrants who arrive in Canada before the age of 35 tend to achieve the greatest returns in earnings.

The research also raises questions about how we evaluate immigrants' success. We may need to rethink the benchmarks that have been used and revisit the ways that success is measured. The research of Schaafsma and Sweetman suggests that immigrant integration takes time. We would likely observe more positive outcomes in our integration programs if evaluations focussed on second-generation immigrants and those who immigrated at a younger age.

Finally, it is worth considering whether the selection system does in fact matter. Do skilled workers selected under one system do better than those selected under another system? Research to compare the economic outcomes of immigrants selected under previous systems and those selected under the new human capital system, as well as on the experiences skilled workers in other countries, such as Australia, would be instructive. ■

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*The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Metropolis Project, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, or the Government of Canada. The Metropolis Project is an international forum for research and policy on migration, diversity and changing cities. You can find out more about the Project and Metropolis' four Centres of Excellence by visiting [www.metropolis.net](http://www.metropolis.net).*

## Catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés

Critères de sélection de la Loi sur  
l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés

PAR ERIN TOLLEY, PROJET METROPOLIS

### Sélection des immigrants au Canada : historique

La baisse du taux de natalité et le vieillissement rapide de la population réduisent l'effectif de la main-d'œuvre canadienne. Des analystes prévoient qu'en 2020, un million de postes au Canada pourraient être vacants. Par conséquent, l'immigration est de plus en plus considérée comme nécessaire à la croissance et à la prospérité économique.

Plus de 200 000 immigrants entrent chaque année au Canada, et le gouvernement a adopté une politique d'immigration globale afin de traiter ces demandes. Le programme contient des dispositions pour plusieurs catégories d'immigrants : celles du regroupement familial, de l'immigration économique (qui comprend les travailleurs qualifiés, les candidats des provinces, les travailleurs autonomes, les entrepreneurs et les investisseurs) et des réfugiés.

La nouvelle *Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés* (LIPR) est entrée en vigueur le 28 juin 2002, et dans les mois qui ont précédé son édicton, le processus de sélection, surtout en ce

qui concerne la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés, a considérablement retenu l'attention. La catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés fait partie de celle de l'immigration économique et, d'après le Règlement, regroupe les demandeurs « qui peuvent devenir résidents permanents en raison de leur capacité à s'adapter à l'économie canadienne ». En vertu de l'Accord Canada-Québec de 1991, le Québec peut établir ses propres critères de sélection; le présent document ne s'intéresse qu'aux critères qui concernent les travailleurs qualifiés sélectionnés par le gouvernement du Canada. En 2001, le Canada a admis 137 000 travailleurs qualifiés.

Conformément à la LIPR et contrairement à l'ancien système de sélection, les nouveaux critères retenus pour la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés mettent plus l'accent sur les composantes du capital humain et l'adaptabilité des compétences des demandeurs que sur les professions envisagées. Il est estimé que cette macro-approche est plus souple et mieux adaptée aux réalités du marché du travail. Le nouveau système de points évalue les demandeurs en fonction de leur niveau de scolarité, de leurs compétences linguistiques, de leur

### Sommaire

Le présent «Politiques publiques en bref» se penche sur les travaux de recherche qui concernent les critères de sélection des travailleurs qualifiés, établis par la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LIPR). Aux termes du Règlement qui découle de cette loi, les critères de sélection des travailleurs qualifiés mettent l'accent sur les composantes du capital humain et l'adaptabilité des compétences, notamment en ce qui concerne la scolarité, la maîtrise des langues officielles, l'âge, l'expérience professionnelle et la capacité d'adaptation. Le présent document expose les critères de sélection retenus pour les travailleurs qualifiés et fait état de certains travaux de recherche. Les conclusions de ces travaux donnent à penser que même si certaines caractéristiques évaluées dans le cadre du processus de sélection, comme la maîtrise des langues officielles et le niveau d'éducation, ont des répercussions certaines sur la réussite économique au Canada, l'incidence d'autres facteurs est moins évidente. En outre, les résultats de recherches laissent supposer que nombre d'immigrants appartenant à des minorités visibles se heurtent à de sérieux obstacles sur le marché du travail canadien, peu importe leur connaissance des langues officielles ou leur niveau d'instruction. L'auteur conclut en commentant certains des enseignements, sur le plan des politiques, des travaux de recherche.

### Politiques publiques en bref

Le bulletin d'information stratégique du projet Metropolis, «Politiques publiques en bref», sera destiné aux groupes d'intervenants non spécialisés en matière de politiques publiques, aux chercheurs et aux autres intéressés qui souhaitent obtenir une analyse et des explications concises sur les recherches actuelles portant sur l'immigration, la diversité et l'évolution des villes. La recherche peut et doit renseigner les décideurs et, de ce fait, «Politiques publiques en bref» porte une attention particulière aux conclusions des recherches s'intéressant aux politiques publiques. Une bibliographie est ajoutée à la fin de chaque « Politiques publiques en bref » pour faciliter l'approfondissement de la matière traitée.

expérience de travail, de leur âge, des emplois qui leur sont réservés et de leur adaptabilité; un maximum de 100 points peut être accordé. À l'heure actuelle, les demandeurs peuvent devenir résidents permanents s'ils obtiennent 75 points ou plus.<sup>1</sup>

Le présent « Politiques publiques en bref » analyse les critères de sélection retenus pour la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés et se penche sur divers travaux de recherche pertinents. L'auteur expose ensuite certains des enseignements, sur le plan des politiques, de ces travaux. Le dépouillement de la littérature n'est pas exhaustif, mais il met en relief certaines des conclusions les plus pertinentes à propos des critères de sélection. La plupart des travaux dont la présente étude s'inspire ont été menés par des chercheurs associés au projet Metropolis.

## Critères de sélection des travailleurs qualifiés

### a) Scolarité

En vertu du système de points adopté pour la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés, les demandeurs obtiennent des points pour les études qu'ils ont faites; le maximum est de 25 points pour un doctorat ou une maîtrise obtenu après au moins 17 années d'études à temps plein.

Les recherches semblent indiquer que l'instruction acquise avant l'immigration a moins d'effets sur le revenu que les études faites après l'immigration;<sup>2</sup> les avantages liés à l'éducation augmentent lorsque celle-ci est obtenue au Canada (Gozalio 2002). Toutefois, d'après la même source, les effets néfastes associés à l'éducation peuvent être réduits dans les cas où les immigrants proviennent de pays « d'élite » comme les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne et

l'Italie, qui ont des marchés du travail et des systèmes d'éducation similaires à ceux du Canada. Néanmoins, même parmi les immigrants d'élite, « leur revenu [...] augmente avec le temps au Canada à un rythme plus lent que pour leurs homologues nés au Canada, et les effets de la scolarité [...] acquise avant l'immigration sont moindres que si ces caractéristiques avaient été obtenues au Canada » (21).

Pendakur et Pendakur (1996) ont constaté que « tant chez les hommes que chez les femmes, les immigrants appartenant à des minorités visibles réussissent moins bien que les immigrants de race blanche, même s'ils font leurs études au Canada » (3). Même en faisant abstraction de la scolarité acquise à l'étranger, le revenu des immigrants des minorités visibles demeure moins élevé. Ainsi, pour ces nouveaux venus, il est difficile de gagner un revenu comparable à celui de leurs homologues d'origine canadienne, qu'ils aient fait leurs études au Canada ou non.

Une autre difficulté à surmonter est la reconnaissance des titres de compétence et des diplômes étrangers. Qu'on refuse carrément de reconnaître leurs titres ou qu'ils soient plus subtilement victimes de discrimination ou de sous-utilisation, les immigrants risquent de constater que l'éducation et la formation qu'ils ont reçues à l'étranger valent moins que l'éducation et la formation acquises au Canada ou que ces atouts les confinent à des postes de niveau de beaucoup inférieur à ceux dans leur pays d'origine (voir Reitz 2001). Toutefois, Hiebert (2002) note que « même s'il est vrai que les diplômes des immigrants sont souvent dépréciés sur le marché du travail canadien, les taux d'activité et le revenu d'emploi grimpent fortement en même temps que le niveau de scolarité » (34). En d'autres termes, même si les

immigrants ayant reçu une éducation et une formation à l'étranger risquent de se débrouiller moins bien que les natifs du Canada, ils s'en tirent mieux que les nouveaux venus moins instruits et moins qualifiés. Dans cette perspective, bien que la non-reconnaissance des titres de compétence et des diplômes étrangers demeure problématique et constitue un gaspillage de connaissances et de talents, les immigrants instruits et qualifiés sont néanmoins plus en mesure de réussir sur le marché du travail canadien que ceux qui ne disposent pas de ces atouts.

Cependant, nous allons à l'encontre des objectifs mêmes des politiques canadiennes en matière d'immigration et de multiculturalisme – soit accueillir et intégrer les néo-Canadiens – lorsque nous ne comparons la performance des immigrants dans la population active qu'à celle d'autres nouveaux venus, plutôt qu'à la situation de Canadiens d'origine qui possèdent une éducation et une expérience comparables. Bien qu'il faille faire preuve de prudence en comparant les performances des immigrants et des non-immigrants pour faire en sorte que les différences au point de vue du vécu et des possibilités soient prises en considération, le fait d'évaluer la réussite en ne tenant compte que de la performance d'immigrants par rapport à celle d'autres nouveaux

1. Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada mettra en œuvre le nouveau système de sélection et la nouvelle note de passage au cours d'une période de transition décrite dans le Règlement. Les personnes qui ont présenté une demande après l'entrée en vigueur de la LIPR seront évaluées selon les nouveaux critères et une note de passage de 75 points. Les personnes qui ont présenté une demande avant le 1er janvier 2002 seront évaluées selon l'ancien système jusqu'au 31 mars 2003. À partir du 1<sup>er</sup> avril 2003, les personnes qui ont présenté une demande avant le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 2002 et qui n'ont pas reçu de décision concernant leur sélection seront soumises aux nouveaux critères de sélection et à la note de passage, moins élevée, de 70 points.

2. Les études « après l'immigration » sont celles qu'un étudiant international fait au Canada, même si elles sont entreprises avant l'immigration officielle.



venus risque d'encourager la marginalisation.

Des recherches ont également montré que les bénéfices tirés de l'éducation dépendent en grande partie de la maîtrise des langues officielles. Dans ses travaux, Hiebert (2002) indique qu'en l'absence de cette maîtrise, les immigrants plus instruits ne verront pas leur revenu augmenter, surtout s'ils n'ont pas accès aux services d'établissement comme les cours de langue (27). De même, Chiswick et Miller (2000) soulignent que l'éducation « risque de n'avoir que peu d'utilité, si tant est qu'elle en ait, pour l'immigrant qui ne connaît pas la langue de destination » (4). Selon eux, la maîtrise des langues officielles et l'éducation sont des compléments sur le marché du travail.

**« La maîtrise d'une ou des deux langues officielles du Canada a des effets favorables et permanents sur le revenu et les perspectives d'emploi des immigrants. »**

DeVoretz et coll., 2000

## b) Maîtrise des langues

Les demandeurs peuvent obtenir un maximum de 24 points pour leur maîtrise des deux langues officielles du Canada. La note est établie à la suite de tests standard d'évaluation des compétences linguistiques, administrés par un organisme de contrôle désigné, et elle rend compte de la capacité des demandeurs de parler, comprendre, lire et écrire une langue. Les demandeurs peuvent également choisir de fournir la preuve de leurs compétences linguistiques au lieu de subir des examens.

D'après des recherches, les immigrants qui connaissent une langue officielle à leur arrivée au Canada ont plus de chances de réussir

sur le marché du travail canadien. Après avoir consulté diverses études sur le lien entre l'acquisition d'une langue seconde par les immigrants et leur performance dans la population active, DeVoretz et coll. (2000) ont constaté que « la maîtrise d'une ou des deux langues officielles du Canada a des effets favorables et permanents sur le revenu et les perspectives d'emploi des immigrants » et que de plus, « les avantages retirés de l'acquisition d'une langue seconde sont considérables » (48). En outre, comme le soulignent Chiswick et Miller (2000), « la maîtrise de la langue de destination peut avoir des effets indirects sur le revenu d'emploi grâce à l'incidence sur la productivité d'autres composantes du capital humain [comme] la scolarité et l'expérience sur le marché du travail » (4).

Au cours des consultations sur la nouvelle loi, le commissaire aux langues officielles est intervenu pour souligner l'importance du bilinguisme fonctionnel, en particulier chez les immigrants qui choisissent de s'établir dans des communautés de langue officielle en situation minoritaire. À la suite de cette intervention, le nombre maximal de points attribués pour la maîtrise de la deuxième langue officielle est passé de quatre à huit (Quell, 2002).

Toutefois, des chercheurs ont découvert que la relation entre la maîtrise des langues et le revenu annuel n'était pas strictement linéaire. Par exemple, Chiswick and Miller (2000) constatent des écarts de revenu même chez les immigrants qui peuvent soutenir une conversation dans une langue officielle. Plus précisément, les nouveaux arrivants qui peuvent converser dans une langue officielle et qui utilisent le plus souvent une telle langue à la maison gagnent plus que les immigrants qui peuvent soutenir une conversation

dans une langue officielle, mais qui parlent le plus souvent à la maison une langue autre qu'une langue officielle (7). Néanmoins, la plupart des chercheurs préconisent un système fondé principalement sur la maîtrise des langues officielles, puisqu'il est convenu qu'il s'agit là du meilleur indicateur permettant de prévoir la réussite sur le plan économique au Canada. En fixant à 75 points la note de passage, le système de sélection pour la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés écarte pratiquement ceux dont la connaissance d'une langue officielle est restreinte ou inexistante (voir Hiebert, 2002).

**La plupart des chercheurs préconisent un système de sélection fondé principalement sur la maîtrise des langues officielles, puisqu'il est convenu qu'il s'agit là du meilleur indicateur permettant de prévoir la réussite**

Néanmoins, Pendakur et Pendakur (1997b) ont démontré que la connaissance d'une langue officielle ne garantissait pas toujours la parité sur le plan économique. Leurs travaux indiquent que « la connaissance des langues des minorités est associée à un niveau de revenu plus faible chez les hommes et les femmes vivant dans les trois principales villes du Canada [Toronto, Montréal et Vancouver] », même lorsque la connaissance d'une langue officielle est considérée comme constante (16). Autrement dit, les immigrants qui parlent à la fois une langue officielle et une langue non officielle ont tendance à gagner moins que ceux qui ne parlent qu'une langue officielle, même si ces effets néfastes s'estompent à mesure que le groupe linguistique local s'étend. Pendakur et Pendakur soutiennent que les effets néfastes associés à la

maîtrise des langues non officielles résultent d'une discrimination, sur le marché du travail, qui peut être liée autant à des facteurs culturels qu'à la couleur de la peau, et que les grandes enclaves de groupes linguistiques peuvent atténuer cette discrimination en sensibilisant la population à l'accent et à d'autres caractéristiques culturelles.

**« Lorsqu'un immigrant ne peut soutenir une conversation dans une langue officielle, son expérience pré-immigration, tout comme son éducation, ne débouche pas sur une hausse du revenu »**

Chiswick et Miller, 2000

### c) Expérience de travail

Les demandeurs obtiennent des points en fonction de leur expérience sur le marché du travail (maximum de 21 points pour quatre années d'expérience ou plus). Le rapport entre l'expérience et le revenu éventuel fait ressortir nombre de caractéristiques que présente également le rapport entre éducation et revenu. Gozalie (2002) souligne que même si l'expérience acquise dans des pays sources dont les marchés du travail sont similaires à celui du Canada rapporte plus que l'expérience acquise dans d'autres pays, les avantages que procure l'expérience post-immigration sont plus importants que ceux qui sont associés à l'expérience pré-immigration. Il se peut que les employeurs canadiens ne reconnaissent pas l'expérience acquise à l'étranger ou y attachent moins d'importance qu'à l'expérience canadienne. Toutefois, Chiswick et Miller (2000) soutiennent que « l'expérience acquise à l'étranger peut être plus avantageusement

transformée en hausses du revenu lorsque l'immigrant décide d'utiliser pleinement une langue officielle dans sa vie de tous les jours au Canada. Lorsqu'un immigrant ne peut soutenir une conversation dans une langue officielle, son expérience pré-immigration, tout comme son éducation, ne débouche pas sur une hausse du revenu » (11). Cela montre une fois de plus à quel point la maîtrise d'une langue officielle est importante pour la réussite sur le marché du travail.

### d) Âge

Selon les critères en place, les demandeurs âgés de 21 à 49 ans obtiennent un maximum de dix points. Les autres sont pénalisés de deux points pour chaque année en deçà ou au delà de cette plage.

Même s'il est certain que la plupart des chercheurs conviendraient que les immigrants sont plus susceptibles de contribuer à l'économie canadienne pendant leurs « années d'activité », il peut y avoir désaccord à propos de la plage d'âge retenue dans les critères de sélection et de ce que constituent précisément les « années d'activité ».

Dans leurs recherches, Joseph Schaafsma et Arthur Sweetman (1999) indiquent que « l'âge au moment de l'immigration compte », car les immigrants plus jeunes sont plus susceptibles que les immigrants plus âgés de faire des études et d'acquérir de l'expérience au Canada et sont donc moins exposés à la dévaluation qui, comme les recherches semblent l'indiquer, sont le lot des nouveaux venus plus avancés en âge. Ils remarquent également que les jeunes immigrants peuvent s'acculturer plus facilement que leurs aînés et qu'ils sont souvent très motivés, ce qui leur permet de mieux réussir que les autres immigrants et, dans certains cas, que

les natifs du Canada. Les travaux de Schaafsma et Sweetman laissent supposer que les immigrants qui se sont établis au Canada avant l'âge de dix ans présentent, parmi tous les nouveaux venus, les écarts de revenus les plus faibles. Au sein des minorités visibles, ceux qui ont immigré avant l'âge de dix ans ne connaissent pas de baisse de revenu par rapport aux autres immigrants, mais c'est l'inverse qui se produit chez ceux qui sont arrivés à un âge plus avancé. Contrairement à Pendakur et Pendakur, Schaafsma et Sweetman donnent à penser que les écarts de revenu chez les immigrants des minorités visibles sont peut-être associés à l'âge à l'arrivée plutôt qu'à la discrimination.

### e) Emplois réservés

Un maximum de dix points est accordé au demandeur à qui une offre d'emploi au Canada a été confirmée.

Même si la recherche sur le rapport entre les emplois réservés et la réussite sur le marché du travail est peu abondante, Gozalie (2002) soutient que certains immigrants peuvent être désavantagés dans la population active canadienne, surtout pendant la période suivant immédiatement leur arrivée, parce qu'ils ne disposent pas des réseaux ou des connaissances des conditions locales qui faciliteraient leur embauche (6). Par conséquent, les emplois réservés, qui peuvent rendre moins indispensables les réseaux et les autres contacts facilitant le placement, constituent probablement un indicateur permettant de prévoir la réussite sur le marché du travail canadien.

### f) Adaptabilité

Un maximum de dix points est accordé pour l'adaptabilité du demandeur, évaluée selon les critères suivants : éducation du conjoint du

demandeur principal<sup>3</sup>; emploi déjà occupé ou études déjà faites au Canada par le demandeur principal ou son conjoint; présence d'une personne apparentée au Canada; et un maximum de cinq points calculé en fonction des points accordés selon le critère des emplois réservés. Cette méthode remplace l'ancien facteur « qualités personnelles » et constitue, croit-on, une façon plus objective d'évaluer la capacité d'adaptation d'un demandeur au Canada.

Au chapitre de l'adaptabilité, le demandeur principal obtient des points après évaluation de l'éducation de son conjoint, le cas échéant. On considère qu'un conjoint plus instruit est en mesure d'intégrer la population active et d'accroître la contribution de la famille à l'économie. Dans l'analyse comparative entre les sexes du projet de loi C-11, il était indiqué que la reconnaissance de la scolarité du conjoint aurait « des effets sexospécifiques favorables » (Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, non daté).

Toutefois, on ne tient pas compte, dans les critères, de l'endroit où la scolarité a été acquise, et des recherches permettent de croire qu'il peut exister un lien ténu entre l'éducation obtenue à

l'étranger et le revenu éventuel. En outre, on ne prend pas en considération la maîtrise des langues officielles par le conjoint, facteur étroitement lié au revenu éventuel et aux bénéfices plus importants de l'éducation des immigrants. En l'absence d'une telle évaluation et d'un soutien financier pour l'apprentissage linguistique du conjoint, il peut être plus difficile pour ce dernier de réussir sur le marché du travail canadien, peu importe son niveau de scolarité et

surtout si les études n'ont pas été faites au Canada.

En accordant des points pour les emplois déjà occupés ou les études déjà faites au Canada par le demandeur principal ou son conjoint, on reconnaît les avantages que procure une expérience canadienne antérieure et le rapport entre cette expérience et le succès de l'intégration. Des recherches montrent que les immigrants ayant déjà travaillé ou étudié au Canada ont plus de chances de réussir sur le marché du travail.

Enfin, il est probable que la présence au Canada de personnes apparentées accroît la capacité des immigrants de s'intégrer et, par le fait même, d'apporter une contribution économique à leur pays d'adoption. Des recherches sur le « capital des réseaux » indiquent que la présence de contacts dans le pays hôte facilite grandement l'intégration, surtout chez les immigrants ethniques de statut inférieur. Certains chercheurs (Ooka et Wellman, par exemple) soutiennent cependant que ce sont les réseaux hétérogènes, et non ceux qui sont composés exclusivement de personnes appartenant au propre groupe ethnique de l'immigrant, qui sont les plus utiles.

### Comparaison entre travailleurs qualifiés et autres immigrants

Même si le processus de sélection du système d'immigration canadien vise à sélectionner les immigrants les plus susceptibles de réussir au Canada, il demeure que certains nouveaux venus se débrouillent mieux que d'autres et, en fait, que certains natifs du Canada. C'est là le résultat d'une combinaison complexe de facteurs comme la discrimination, la capacité de constituer des réseaux au Canada

et l'accès à des services de soutien facilitant l'intégration. De ce fait, le processus de sélection n'est qu'un indicateur, et non un facteur déterminant, de la réussite future.

En fait, certains nouveaux venus ont étonnamment bien réussi, en dépit d'une faible scolarité et de piètres connaissances linguistiques (Hiebert 2002). D'autres ont connu moins de succès, malgré une bonne maîtrise des langues officielles et des niveaux de scolarité plus élevés (Pendakur et Pendakur 1997a, 1997b). Dans ses travaux, Hiebert démontre l'utilité et les avantages d'offrir aux nouveaux venus une gamme complète de services d'établissement comme l'aide sociale et les cours de langue. Il a constaté que des réfugiés qui se sont installés en Colombie-Britannique et qui ne maîtrisaient ni l'une ni l'autre des langues officielles se sont néanmoins assez bien débrouillés sur le marché du travail, et il avance l'hypothèse que la grande variété de services d'établissement offerts aux réfugiés facilite leur apprentissage des langues officielles et compense leurs faiblesses initiales à ce chapitre. Il recommande donc de « multiplier les services d'établissement offerts [aux immigrants], surtout dans les domaines du soutien social et de l'apprentissage des langues, en vue de mieux préparer les immigrants à se joindre à la population active » (35).

Un autre argument qui milite en faveur de l'élargissement des services d'établissement est que même à l'intérieur de la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés, seul le demandeur principal doit obtenir au moins la note de passage de 75 points; les personnes à sa charge n'y sont pas tenues. Il se peut que ces personnes à charge aient une connaissance insuffisante des langues officielles et qu'elles doivent suivre des cours aux frais de la famille. Dans le cas des

3. « Conjoint » désigne l'époux, l'épouse ou le conjoint de fait du demandeur principal.

conjoint des demandeurs principaux, qui sont évalués en fonction de leur scolarité et non de leurs compétences linguistiques, une piètre connaissance des langues officielles peut nuire à leur revenu à long terme parce qu'en général, la réussite économique éventuelle est associée ces compétences (voir par exemple Pendakur et Pendakur 1997a).

Des conclusions similaires peuvent être tirées de l'étude de David Ley (2000) sur les gens d'affaires immigrants en Colombie-Britannique. Il estime que contrairement à ce soutiennent les médias et certains érudits, les gens d'affaires immigrants, qui regroupent les investisseurs, les entrepreneurs et les travailleurs autonomes, n'ont peut-être pas si bien réussi dans cette province. L'information disponible permet de croire que nombre de ces personnes étaient au chômage et vivaient à même leurs économies ou leurs investissements dans leur pays d'origine; certains ont vu leur conjoint retourner dans son pays sans sa famille, et la plupart étaient déçus de leurs perspectives économiques au Canada. Ley souligne que l'un des principaux problèmes est lié au laxisme des critères de sélection, notamment à l'insuffisance des exigences aux chapitres de la maîtrise des langues officielles, de l'éducation et de l'expérience. Comme les gens d'affaires immigrants sont perçus comme des personnes autonomes, on attend d'eux qu'ils paient pour leurs cours de langue, ce qui est souvent impossible en raison de l'insuffisance de leur revenu; et lorsqu'ils occupent un emploi, ils doivent travailler de longues heures pour réussir (Ley 2000; Hiebert 2002).

## Critiques du système de sélection

Les personnes qui critiquent le système de sélection des travailleurs

qualifiés soutiennent qu'il est trop restrictif et que de ce fait, trop peu d'immigrants sont admis. Ce problème est considéré comme particulièrement épineux compte tenu des inquiétudes que soulèvent l'« exode des cerveaux » et la pénurie de travailleurs spécialisés au Canada; des chercheurs ont indiqué que l'immigration constitue l'une des façons de compenser la perte de travailleurs qualifiés d'origine canadienne, surtout si les compétences et les titres des immigrants sont reconnus et mis à profit (voir Reitz 2001). Dans la version du Règlement publiée avant l'adoption de la LIPR, le ministère de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration a recommandé de faire passer de 70 à 80 points la note de passage exigée des travailleurs qualifiés, mais dans la version finale, la note de passage a été fixée à 75 points de façon à faire taire les critiques selon lesquelles une note plus élevée pourrait empêcher nombre de travailleurs qualifiés d'immigrer au Canada. En dépit de ce rajustement, les critiques persistent.

De plus, dans une analyse comparative entre les sexes du projet de loi C-11, texte qui a précédé la LIPR, il était indiqué que « le fait d'accorder des points pour la scolarité, la formation et l'occupation d'emplois rémunérés ne prend pas toujours en compte les obstacles auxquels les femmes se heurtent lorsqu'elles veulent profiter de ces occasions dans les pays sources » (Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, non daté). La ségrégation sexuelle, l'imposition de tâches domestiques non rémunérées et les abandonnés d'emplois salariés par les femmes enceintes ou élevant des enfants peuvent tous avoir des effets néfastes pour les femmes qui voudraient se joindre à la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés. Par contre, l'accent mis par le système de sélection sur l'éducation plutôt que

sur l'expérience de travail rémunéré aura probablement des répercussions favorables sur les demandeurs de sexe féminin.

D'autres observateurs qui dénoncent les critères soutiennent que des points devraient être accordés pour des caractéristiques supplémentaires ou différentes comme l'existence d'un plan d'établissement, le soutien par des organismes communautaires ou l'intention d'étudier au Canada. Selon eux, d'autres facteurs qui ne sont pas évalués selon les critères actuels de sélection peuvent contribuer à la réussite économique des immigrants au Canada.

***Les critères de sélection australien des travailleurs qualifiés mettent l'accent sur la profession envisagée.***

## L'exemple australien

Le système australien de sélection des travailleurs qualifiés, comme celui du Canada, évalue les demandeurs en fonction de plusieurs caractéristiques du capital humain comme la connaissance de la langue anglaise (20 points), l'âge à l'immigration (maximum de 30 points) et l'expérience de travail (maximum de dix points et points de bonification pour l'expérience de travail acquise en Australie).

Toutefois, selon le système australien, même si ces caractéristiques sont évaluées et comptent dans la note finale, l'accent est mis sur la profession, non sur le capital humain.

La profession désignée du demandeur doit figurer sur la Liste des métiers spécialisés, qui comprend la plupart des métiers exigeant un degré, un diplôme ou des qualifications professionnelles. Soixante points sont



accordés pour les professions nécessitant une formation précise, 50 pour les métiers d'ordre plus général et 40 pour les autres métiers spécialisés. Le maximum de points étant fixé à 150, et la note de passage, à 115, la profession désignée constitue une composante importante du système de sélection.

L'accent mis sur la profession est évident dans d'autres aspects du système de sélection australien. Par exemple, des points sont accordés aux demandeurs exerçant une profession considérée comme « en demande » (10 points pour ces demandeurs ayant reçu une offre d'emploi et cinq points pour ceux qui n'en ont pas reçu). Pour sa part, le système canadien de sélection des travailleurs qualifiés a volontairement écarté les critères relatifs à la profession.

Il existe d'autres différences. Par exemple, même si le programme australien accorde des points pour l'éducation, les demandeurs n'en obtiennent que s'ils sont diplômés d'un établissement d'enseignement australien, car on considère que les candidats formés en Australie ont plus de chances de trouver du travail dans ce pays. En outre, tandis que le critère canadien relatif à l'adaptabilité ne permet de prendre en considération que la scolarité du conjoint, celui de l'Australie permet d'évaluer le conjoint d'après les mêmes critères que pour le demandeur principal. Compte tenu des conclusions ci-dessus des recherches sur l'éducation, ces caractéristiques du système australien devraient être examinées dans le contexte canadien.

De plus, peu de travaux de recherche comparent directement le nouveau système canadien de sélection des travailleurs qualifiés, qui n'insiste que sur le capital humain, avec le système australien axé sur la profession. C'est sans doute en partie parce que le système canadien

instauré par la LIPR n'en est qu'à ses débuts. Des recherches sur le revenu et la performance sur le marché du travail des immigrants sélectionnés en fonction de leur capital humain, d'une part, ou de la profession envisagée, d'autre part, pourraient renseigner sur l'utilité des différentes approches et sur le rapport entre les critères de sélection et les succès des nouveaux venus. L'exemple australien pourrait être perçu comme une « expérience opportune » – une occasion rare pour les chercheurs et les intervenants canadiens en matière de politiques d'évaluer les aides à l'élaboration des politiques, comme les critères de sélection, par rapport aux résultats réels de ces politiques.

## Implications sur le plan des politiques

Le lien entre les critères de sélection et les résultats éventuels est complexe, mais les recherches indiquent que certaines caractéristiques sont des indicateurs de la contribution et du bien-être économiques éventuels des immigrants plus plausibles que d'autres.

La maîtrise des langues officielles semble être un des principaux facteurs déterminants de la réussite sur le marché du travail au Canada. Compte tenu de l'insistance sur les compétences linguistiques dans les critères de sélection, il est probable que les travailleurs qualifiés auront du succès dans la population active, surtout si leur scolarité et leur expérience est acquise au Canada ou dans des pays sources possédant des systèmes similaires à ceux du Canada. Toutefois, cela n'atténue pas les difficultés que les travailleurs qualifiés éprouvent pour faire valoir et exploiter leurs compétences, ni les écarts de revenu entre les immigrants des minorités visibles et les autres immigrants et les natifs du Canada; de

même, la tâche n'est pas facilitée pour les conjoints et les personnes à la charge des demandeurs principaux, qui ne sont pas évalués en fonction de leurs connaissances linguistiques et qui peuvent avoir de la difficulté à parfaire ces connaissances.

En même temps, étant donné que le critère d'adaptabilité favorise les demandeurs dont le conjoint est instruit parce qu'on estime qu'il pourra contribuer à l'économie canadienne, la maîtrise des langues officielles par les conjoints devrait être évaluée. Les conjoints qui ne possèdent pas cette maîtrise, peu importe leur niveau de scolarité, risquent d'être incapables de se débrouiller sur le marché du travail. En outre, des recherches ont montré que les immigrants qui parlent couramment une langue officielle à la maison gagnent les plus hauts salaires. Par conséquent, il conviendrait peut-être d'accorder des points au conjoint qui peut soutenir une conversation dans la langue officielle parlée par le demandeur principal, car il est alors plus probable que cette langue sera utilisée à la maison. Cependant, le fait d'accorder plus de points pour les conjoints peut contribuer à favoriser les couples mariés et qui cohabitent, au détriment des demandeurs célibataires, et peut permettre l'admission de demandeurs principaux qui seraient moins bien notés si leur conjoint n'obtenait pas ces points supplémentaires.

Comme les immigrants profitent davantage d'études faites au Canada, le système de sélection pourrait accorder des points supplémentaires à ceux qui ont étudié au pays ou qui ont l'intention de le faire. En outre, une campagne de promotion visant les étudiants étrangers qui fréquentent des établissements canadiens pourrait attirer des candidats qui ont déjà étudié au Canada. De plus, des chercheurs (Reitz 1997, par exemple)

donnent à penser qu'il faudrait faire plus d'efforts pour inciter les industries canadiennes à reconnaître, à apprécier et à exploiter l'éducation et la formation des nouveaux venus au Canada.

Les recherches qui portent sur le lien entre le revenu et l'âge à l'immigration semblent indiquer qu'il faudrait peut-être réexaminer le critère relatif à l'âge. Il faut du temps pour rattraper le revenu des Canadiens d'origine, de sorte que les immigrants plus jeunes sont plus susceptibles de gagner éventuellement un revenu comparable à celui des natifs du Canada. On pourrait rajuster la plage d'âge pour tenir compte du fait que les immigrants qui arrivent au Canada avant d'avoir atteint l'âge de 35 ans ont tendance à enregistrer les gains les plus élevés.

Les recherches soulèvent également des questions à propos de la façon d'évaluer la performance économique des immigrants. Il nous faudra peut-être reconsidérer les repères mis en place et revoir la manière de mesurer la performance. Schaafsma et Sweetman laissent entendre que l'intégration des immigrants est un long processus. Nos programmes d'intégration afficheraient probablement de meilleurs résultats si nous nous concentrons dans nos évaluations sur les immigrants de deuxième génération et sur ceux qui ont immigré plus jeunes.

Enfin, il vaut la peine de se demander si le système de sélection compte pour beaucoup. Les travailleurs qualifiés qui sont sélectionnés selon un système réussissent-ils mieux que ceux qui sont évalués selon un autre système? Il serait utile de comparer la performance économique des immigrants sélectionnés selon d'anciens systèmes à celle des néo-Canadiens qui sont évalués selon les nouveaux critères axés sur le capital humain et de s'intéresser à l'expérience que vivent les travailleurs qualifiés dans d'autres pays comme l'Australie. ■

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# UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF IMMIGRANTS

## ABSTRACT

Canadians tend to assess the merits of immigration, and the desirability of immigrants, rather narrowly, focussing heavily on economic performance. While there are definite short-term costs of immigration related to initial settlement, the long-term demographic and economic outcomes of immigration argue for a wider view.

Canada's immigration act, the most recent of which is the 2001 *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, indicates that immigrants are accepted for many reasons. Among the objectives of the act are "to permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration", "to see that families are reunited in Canada", and "to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution". By and large, the immigration policy has been framed to admit three types of immigrants in accordance with the legislative objectives: economic immigrants, family-class immigrants, and refugees. For example in 2001, of the 250,346 immigrants admitted, the economic class accounts for 61 per cent, the family class, 27 per cent, and refugees, 11 per cent.

Canada's public discourse of immigration has adopted a narrow approach that ignores the multiple purposes of immigration and assesses the merits of immigration largely in terms of how well immigrants perform economically. The discourse assumes that (1) immigrants should only be admitted because of their ability to enrich Canadians economically; and (2) the surest way to gauge their economic value is to see how immigrants' earnings measure up to those of native-born Canadians. To the extent that immigrants can earn more than the native born, they are deemed to have higher productivity and to contribute more in taxes and economic growth. Conversely, immigrants who earn less than native-born Canadians are seen as undesirable, less productive and more likely to rely on welfare support. This utilitarian mentality reduces the legal categories of immigrants to two normative types: the more desirable "selected" immigrants who meet the selection criteria of education, language capacity, and work experience as economic immigrants, and the less desirable "unsolicited or self-selected" immigrants who are admitted as family members or refugees not screened for human capital.

The assumptions of such discourse are untenable because immigrants' performance should be assessed in accordance with the objectives of their admission. If the objective of admitting the family class is to allow families to reunite, then the efficacy of this stream of immigration should be measured by the ease with which families can reunite in Canada and not by the economic performance of family-class immigrants. Similarly, the success of refugee admissions should be based on how smooth and speedy it is for Canada to offer a safe haven for victims of persecution, and not on how much refugees can enrich Canadians. In addition, the economic class includes not only principal applicants but also dependants who accompany them; strictly speaking, only principal applicants, and to some extent their spouse, have been screened by the selection point system. But all immigrants once landed are routinely compared to native-born Canadians for their economic performance, as though the only factor that matters is how much immigrants can outperform the native born in order to demonstrate their worthiness.

Studies of immigrants' earnings have compared immigrants, irrespective of admission class, to the native born in part because of data limitations, without due attention to the multiple legislative objectives and categories of immigration. But findings from such studies are frequently used as the

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only relevant evidence to establish the cost and benefit of immigration.

Ironically, most studies in fact show that immigrants earn as much as and sometimes more than native-born Canadians. However, when differences in education, work experience and other measurable variations are taken into account, immigrant men and women, especially those of

after landing” and “Canadian tax filers”) suggests that skilled immigrants who came before 1989 earned more than Canadian tax filers on average, but those who came after 1989 earned less. The finding is taken to mean that the human capital content of recent immigrants has eroded; in response, alarmists push for tighter control of new immigrants to uphold the human capital quality in the

interest of Canada. In reality, there can be other explanations. As Professor Jeffrey Reitz of the University of Toronto suggests, new immigrants can in fact have more education than before, but such higher education would appear lower if Canadians’ educational level is rising even faster. Furthermore, what these studies do not show is that immigrants, over time, tend to improve their earnings relative to Canadians, and most immigrants catch up and indeed surpass the earnings of the average Canadian tax filer. If indeed even recent immigrants, who unlike their predecessors tend to earn less than Canadians upon landing, still manage to catch up in time, then there must be some latent qualities of immigrants that have not yet been noted. Could such qualities be related to willingness to work long hours, entrepreneurship, tenacity to overcome hardship and determination to do well in Canada? In short, these are precisely the factors that are normally not considered when gauging the value of immigrants.

Besides using earnings, researchers have also attempted to measure the cost and benefit of immigrants in terms of whether they contribute more in taxes than they receive in social benefits. The few available

studies indicate that over the course of their life, immigrants contribute taxes that exceed the costs of social assistance and other social benefits they receive through transfer payments. Some studies also show that immigrants rely less on social assistance than native-born Canadians. Thus, as Professor Ather Akbari of St. Mary’s University suggests, native-born Canadians can be said to benefit from immigrants in that the savings from immigrants can be considered as a source of public fund transfer to non-immigrants.

There are definite short-term costs of immigration related to initial settlement, but such costs have to be balanced by long-term gains. The undue emphasis on immigrants’ short-term economic performance produces a narrow vision that overlooks the long-term demographic and economic outcomes of immigration and ignores how immigrants have also been contributing socially and culturally in the building of a global, diverse and cosmopolitan Canada.



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visible minority origin, tend to earn less than their native-born counterparts. How such findings can be interpreted is by no means clear. If a fair and competitive labour market is assumed to work properly, then such “net” earnings differentials can be interpreted as reflecting differences in individual productivity. However, if the market is accepted as imperfect in that it rewards people unequally based on such superficial characteristics as gender, race and linguistic accents, then earnings gaps would reflect the price of being a member of a disadvantaged group in Canada. In the immigration discourse, immigrants’ earnings are often used as proxies of immigrants’ capacities or incapacities but rarely indicators of labour market irregularities.

Some recent studies of immigrants’ earnings have produced another intriguing finding: more recent immigrants tend to earn less than earlier entrants, relative to the average earnings of Canadian tax payers in respective tax year. The slippage in earnings (measured for example in earnings difference between “skilled immigrants shortly



# IMMIGRANT AND MINORITY ENCLAVES IN CANADIAN CITIES

## ABSTRACT

Questions abound concerning minority residential concentration in Canada: To what extent do immigrants and minorities live in separate enclaves? Where they do, does this tendency arise out of choice or constraint? Does it even matter? Yes, says the author, enclaves do exist, but definitive evidence of ghettoization does not. Governments should be wary of creating policies designed to reduce concentrated points of settlement where and when they arise.

*There can be problems assimilating people into our country because we have, in some areas, such sizable populations of some cultural groups that it becomes possible for people to live their lives separate from Canadian culture. (respondent #576)*

*I can't get involved with the Canadian society. The same ethnicity will mix back with the same ethnicity. This means each ethnicity will form a small society in their own social group and the social circle will become smaller in Canada. (respondent #484)*

These quotations are derived from a recent survey of public attitudes about immigration and multiculturalism in Greater Vancouver. Respondents were asked to identify the most important benefits and disadvantages of immigration. On the plus side, the single most prominent view is a widely-held appreciation of diversity among Vancouver residents; in fact, two out of three Canadian-born respondents mentioned this as a benefit associated with immigration. However, this appreciation only goes so far. When asked about the disadvantages of immigration, respondents provide a clear signal that they value diversity but are uncomfortable with most forms of cultural separateness. Frequently, this issue is articulated in geographical terms, with a sense that ethnic enclaves sometimes appear to be exclusive. Places like "Chinatown", therefore, are valued for their representation of Chinese culture, but also raise concern that they might shield residents from participation in the wider Canadian society.

In the 1990s, Canadian researchers began to consider another dimension of immigrant and ethnic enclaves. Intrigued by the conclusions of scholarship on segregation in the US, they wondered whether residential concentrations of immigrants and/or visible minorities are associated with poverty in Canadian cities (as they are south of the border). If so, there could be serious long-term consequences. Unfortunately, the results of this research are mixed and a clear picture has not emerged. On the one hand, for example, Kazempur and Halli (2000) argue that there is a "new poverty" in Canada that is concentrated in selected neighbourhoods that are often associated with Aboriginal or recently settled immigrant populations. Although they note that this pattern is less prevalent in Canada than the US, they believe that emerging ghettos may precipitate a "culture of poverty", wherein residents see no means of improving their livelihood and instead become passive recipients of the welfare state. Ley and Smith (2000), on the other hand, have adapted methodologies developed in the US to study the relationship between deprivation and immigrant settlement. They find few places in Canadian cities where deep poverty coincides with immigrant enclaves. They speculate that this is the case because immigrants arriving in Canada are heterogeneous in terms of socio-economic status, and that the pervasive trend towards suburbanized immigrant settlement has also played a role in preventing ghettoization. Finally, they argue that the Canadian immigrant experience is characterized more by socio-spatial mobility than it is by inter-generational ghettoization.

Despite the mixed and complex conclusions derived from careful empirical research, recent

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popular commentators have presented a simplistic message that links concentrated immigrant settlement to unsustainable social costs, including expensive service delivery, long-term poverty reproduced from parents to children, and social pathology. These links are implicit in Stoffman (2002), who writes more generally about the geographical impacts of immigration to Canada, situating his comments at the scale of metropolitan areas rather than neighbourhoods. He believes that the tendency for immigrants to settle in the largest cities of Canada is a major problem both economically and politically. The latter point is especially prominent in his analysis. He argues that Canada's relatively high level of immigration is sustained because Liberal and Conservative politicians alike are eager to harvest votes in ridings associated with pronounced immigrant settlement. Moreover, he believes that the problems associated with immigration would be reduced if immigrants would be more widely distributed across the country, though it is quick to say that government should not dictate where they should live. His preferred solution is to lower the number admitted to Canada annually by roughly one-third.

Others are more explicit. Collacott (2002, page 29), for example, states: "... there are increasing concentrations of people from the same cultural and linguistic background in [Canadian] metropolitan areas, not infrequently with significant levels of poverty because of their relative lack of marketable skills and of English and French language proficiency." Further, he speculates that these ghettos trap residents and their children into long term poverty and might even lead to social conflict that could culminate in the kind of race riots seen in the US and UK. Diane Francis, similarly, writes that "[e]nclaves of certain ethnic groups, who have taken the most advantage of family reunification rules, have formed in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. These groups have little reason to assimilate. And if they don't assimilate, they cannot achieve. Many don't learn English. Their attitudes are often impediments to social advancement." (2002, page 102). She clearly subscribes to the culture of poverty perspective: "The labour mismatch, and low education levels of most entrants ... is why it is less likely now for the performance of [immigrants'] children to improve in the future. Most will live in economic-ethnic ghettos for generations and remain members of their underclass." (page 101). For Francis, the only solution to this intractable problem is to cut the immigration program back drastically to levels not seen since the 1930s.

These views raise a number of questions about the extent and significance of immigrant and visible minority residential concentration in Canada: to what extent do immigrants and minorities live in separate enclaves? does

this tendency arise out of choice or constraint? does it *matter*? should anything be done about it? I'll take up each of these questions in turn, using research from Vancouver, for the most part, as my point of departure.

What is the actual pattern of urban residential settlement of immigrants and minority groups in Canada? Does the evidence show widespread distribution within metropolitan areas, enclaves of specific groups, relative segregation, or ghettos in the way that Collacott and Francis assert? Unfortunately, to an important degree, the precise answer to this question depends on the methodological approach used by researchers. Analyses at coarse geographical scales and with heterogeneous ethno-cultural definitions (e.g., municipal boundaries as the spatial unit and "Blacks" as the population group) show very little segregation. Conversely, using the most detailed unit, Enumeration Areas (with about 250 households each) and precisely-defined groups (e.g., Ghanaians), inevitably yields higher segregation indices. Still, the results of studies are generally consistent. While there are a tiny number of areas in Canadian cities that hold just one group, this is exceedingly rare. For example, there were over 2,200 Enumeration Areas in Greater Vancouver in 1996 and only *one* housed a single ethno-cultural population – in this case Chinese-Canadians. Ghettoization simply is not the case (cf. Bauder and Sharpe 2002).

But what about segregation? (Unlike ghettoization (see Hiebert 2000), there is no single accepted definition of segregation in the large academic literature on the subject. The most

common approach to the term is to measure the relative degree of concentration of a group using a statistic called the Index of Segregation (IS). The IS describes the proportion of a group that would have to relocate in order to make its geographic distribution the same as the rest of the population. It ranges from zero for situations where a group is not segregated at all to 100, which would mean complete ghettoization. Very generally, values over 60 indicate a highly concentrated residential pattern, while those under 30 are interpreted as evidence of geographical dispersion.) The term segregation is almost never appropriate in Canada either. Among the large cities, the degree of ethno-cultural concentration is highest in Montréal and lowest in Vancouver. But even in Montréal some groups live in concentrated patterns while others do not. In Vancouver, the two most important trends are: (a) a *small* tendency towards greater levels of ethno-cultural concentration between 1971 and 1996; and (b) widely varying levels of concentration between groups (Hiebert 1999). At the opposite ends of the spectrum, Vietnamese- and Persian-Canadians are clustered (their IS values for 1996 were, respectively, 62 and 57), in the inner city in the

To say that "most" immigrants live in enclaves is simply wrong. Some groups have not formed enclaves at all. Others contain a mixture of individuals living inside and outside enclaves. There are no groups, in any large Canadian city, where all members live in close proximity.

former case and northern suburbs in the latter, while those from Korea, the Philippines, and Scandinavia are widely scattered (IS=33, 33, and 29). To say that "most" immigrants live in enclaves is simply wrong. Some groups have not formed enclaves at all. Others contain a mixture of individuals living inside and outside enclaves. There are no groups, in any large Canadian city, where all members live in close proximity.

Why have these patterns emerged? Is residential concentration caused by exclusion from the mainstream or a conscious choice on the part of ethno-cultural groups to create separate communities (cf. Ray 1998)? A respondent to the Vancouver survey provided an answer that echoes scholarship on this issue:

*They did not recognize the education of our country. For that matter they do not recognize the education of any of the immigrants. Another disadvantage is that there is no unity; one has to [rely] on his or her own ethnic group or there is no support. (respondent #328)*

In the Vancouver survey, nearly 40 percent of the immigrants who landed in Canada since 1991 stated that they experienced problems entering the labour market. Half that number believe that their difficulties are the result of discrimination. Little wonder that *some* immigrants feel compelled to live near people of their own kind, seeking support and cultural acceptance. But choice is also involved. Over 80 percent of the same group are determined to hold on to their culture in Canada, and 90 percent hope their children retain their heritage language and culture. Unfortunately, no one has devised a methodology to disentangle the structural causes of residential behaviour from those arising from agency.

What are the consequences of living in an ethno-cultural enclave; are their residents helped by in-group solidarity or harmed by cultural isolation (cf. Peach 1996, Dunn 1998)? Surprisingly, after nearly a century of research by urban sociologists and geographers, we don't really know. In the US there have been animated arguments over this issue, prompted first by the pioneering studies of the Chicago school and more recently by Portes and his colleagues (e.g., Portes and Bach 1985), who argued that immigrants benefit from their participation in "ethnic economies". Many have challenged this view and there has been no resolution since. In Vancouver, we have found a high correlation between residential concentration and various indicators of marginalization and social isolation *but only among the Canadian born* (Hiebert and Ley, forthcoming). Statistical relationships between these variables are weak for immigrants themselves. Simply put, the tendency for low-income immigrants to live in residential concentrations, and for higher-income immigrants to live outside them, is not especially strong. However, we must exercise caution in the interpretation of these results. As in most studies of immigrant and minority well-being, they are

based on census data, a cross-section taken at a specific moment in time. Yet answering the question about the impact of residential location really requires a dynamic view that would trace both the socio-spatial and socio-economic trajectory of immigrants over time. The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada, currently under way, will be a vital resource for this type of analysis.

There is, without doubt, public worry over the tendency for (some) immigrants to create enclaves that appear isolated from the population around them. We found this to be the case in our Vancouver survey, as noted at the outset of this paper; it is also apparent in recent initiatives by the Canadian government to spread immigrant settlement more evenly across the country. However, I am skeptical about these concerns. True, enclaves exist but definitive evidence of ghettoization does not. It is worth noting that urban geographers have also concluded that ghettoization is not occurring in Australia and New Zealand (Burnley 1999; Poulson *et al.* 2000), countries that can be broadly compared with Canada in terms of immigration policy and admission levels. In fact, rather than seeing ethnic enclaves as problems to be solved, I would suggest that they have many beneficial features and, in any case, are to be expected in a multicultural society. Given these points, I see little reason for governments to create policies designed to reduce concentrated points of settlement where and when they arise, with one critical proviso: enclaves *per se* are not problematic as long as they are not associated with economic deprivation.

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# SOCIAL INCLUSION, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND IMMIGRATION

## ABSTRACT

The author points to access to the good life as a constructive way of thinking about social inclusion, then offers social capital theory as an answer to those seeking a pragmatic reason, rather than principle, to promote social inclusion, especially to those who want to come to Canada as new immigrants.

Over the past few years, social inclusion has become a popular subject of discussion amongst policy makers, academic researchers, and civil society generally. We have seen the subject and its relatives discussed under a variety of names such as social integration, social cohesion, and the inverse, social exclusion. In this brief article, I want to suggest that we can enlarge our understanding of social inclusion through the concept of social capital and that we can encourage social inclusion through programs that take social capital seriously.

Frequently, commentators suggest that the key social inclusion issue is poverty. They argue that a society is more inclusive in inverse proportion to its poverty levels. Statistically breaking down poverty according to racial or ethnic groupings can lead us to conclude that a society might be excluding members of specific groups, thus setting up a division of “us” and “them” along ethnic or racial lines. This leads some to link social exclusion and racism; discussions of social cohesion, social inclusion and their relatives often become discussions of racism. It turns out, however, that there is much more to promoting social inclusion than trying to eliminate racism.

Poverty is an important problem. But it is not necessarily a very effective starting point for understanding social inclusion or setting policies in this regard, especially if the offered solutions take the form of simple income re-distribution programs. But what are we talking about when we speak of social inclusion? Economic power? Political power? Jobs, schools, access to social services? Equality or equity? Are we talking about cultural and everyday social life; life in our neighbourhoods? What of religion? Is social inclusion a matter of human rights? If a society guarantees equality of human rights as defined in certain pieces of legislation or United Nations conventions, does that guarantee social inclusion?

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Here is a simple suggestion for organizing our thinking on social inclusion: *A society that is socially inclusive is a society that grants access to everyone to the vehicles of the good life, as it is defined by that society.*

This expresses a liberal democratic principle in the limitation that a socially inclusive society offers not the good life itself but equal access to the means to it. Offers of the good life itself, not just access to the means to the good life, can only be made in a totalitarian state, and by definition the good life cannot exist in such a state. Social inclusion is something best offered by liberal democracies.

Let's pause a moment to ask why a society should want to promote social inclusion, especially to people who come to the society as immigrants? Assume that the good life is a thing of scarcity. Why would a society want to extend access to "outsiders" to something that is scarce? Doing so would seem to be irrational, and one would expect that a rational society would restrict access to the good life to those people who are, let us call them, "insiders". Under this assumption that the good life is a scarce resource, one might think that a rational society would be inclusive only *of its members* and exclude those who were not among its members, those such as immigrants. To offer access to the good life to immigrants would simply make everyone worse off. Under this assumption, promoting social inclusion could be motivated only through a strong altruism that over-rode economic imperatives. There are people who are genuinely motivated by principles of social justice and human rights that would tolerate making everyone worse off for the sake of greater equality for all. But these people are in the minority, and we want stronger reasons for promoting social inclusion than remaining true to certain principles of social justice. We also need to be pragmatic if social inclusion is to be broadly supported by our societies. Fortunately, we can be.

We can find the beginnings of a robust answer in social capital theory. Without going into detail, social capital is a public good that resides in the relationships between members of a society and between members of a society and the institutions of that society, institutions such as government bodies, the police, business organizations, non-governmental organizations, and political organizations. Social capital is said to be at the root of the possibility of co-operation and facilitates the development of individual human capital, smoothly functioning communities, vibrant and stable economies, and an interesting and secure cultural life. Trust forms the most fundamental basis of social capital and, given the fragility of trust, social capital, too, is said to be fragile. Many social scientists and government policy workers are taking social capital seriously these days because of concerns that it is eroding. In summary, social capital is at the basis of a society's prosperity and well-being and thereby grounds the possibility of the good life.

To go directly to the point, social inclusion generates increased social capital and social exclusion reduces social

capital, reduces the levels of trust required for a vibrant economy and a well-functioning society. So although we may grant that the good life may indeed be a scarce thing, social capital theory would suggest that its quantity is variable and can be influenced by the extent to which people in a society, and this encompasses its immigrants, are included in its workings and its decision-making. The end of the story is that a society that promotes social inclusion will be a more prosperous society than one that does not. Promoting social inclusion, then, does not imply making everyone worse off for the sake of principles of social justice. Promoting social inclusion should make us better off.

Let us then turn to how a society ought to promote social inclusion; what should we do and who should take action? Given what I have just said about social capital, I would argue that all members and institutions of a society have a place in this effort. And this includes immigrants taking their own actions. But I will emphasize governments, for governments have the key role in defining social inclusion and, to go back to our fundamentals, what counts as the good life in a given society. (I say this particularly with regard to democratic societies where governments can, at least in principle, be regarded as representing the will of the society.)

The efficacy of a democratic government in promoting social inclusion in a free and pluralistic society is always going to be limited – social engineering can be taken only so far. In Canada the federal government plays a somewhat background role of *creating conditions within which the rest of our society and its institutions can flourish*. Canada is not a full welfare state, and it leaves the management of a great many aspects of our society to individuals, to non-governmental organizations, and to the business community.

The federal policy framework here covers the selection of immigrants, settlement assistance, integration assistance, an offer of citizenship, law enforcement including against hate crimes, and finally and perhaps most importantly, legal instruments such as the *Constitution Act*, the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Multiculturalism Act*, and various other anti-discrimination provision. This set of initiatives with their attendant policies, laws and regulations, comprises a framework within which immigrants enter Canada and settle. It is through this evolving framework that the federal government affects diversity in Canadian cities and the degree to which people of different ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds become integrated into the life of the cities. It is a mix of measures to provide incentives, to promote certain behaviours and attitudes, and to provide the force of law where this is appropriate and necessary. This framework is the primary instrument of the Canadian government for promoting the social inclusion of the diverse peoples in our country; *to a large extent it is a framework within which the people of Canada integrate themselves.*

Governments *have* a major role in promoting social

Trust forms the most fundamental basis of social capital and, given the fragility of trust, social capital, too, is said to be fragile.



# CANADA



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inclusion, and they do this by taking social capital and social inclusion seriously, recognizing the fragility of both, and enacting and implementing framework policy and legislation. In Canada, the work done on the streets of our communities tends to be done through non-governmental actors. In some other countries, especially fully developed welfare states, the government itself might carry out the work at street level, too. Canadian government programs often work by offering funding to non-governmental organizations who submit proposals for local activities to promote social inclusion, the best ideas receiving the funds. This approach transfers ownership of the social inclusion effort to the people and their communities, and this transfer of ownership creates more social capital than were the government to retain exclusive responsibility. Herein lies a major benefit of *framework* legislation. Ideas for promoting social inclusion are developed in greater number, are targeted to the particular situation of a community, and

Responsible governments will look to research for information on emerging trends that point to the exclusion of certain people from our societies.

are deployed by people with a vested interest in the outcome. Frequently the government programs require that the organizations work in partnership with others, including the business community, and this very requirement will stimulate greater trust, greater social inclusion, greater social capital.

Notice, too, that the government's framework legislation provides guidance to the community actors for the types of actions to take. The government does not only offer funds. In general, the institutions of Canadian society, the schools, the non-governmental organizations, the police, the business community are well-meaning, committed, and willing to promote social inclusion. But they often require guidance from government on the objectives to be achieved and the sorts of activities that years of community-level experience tell us might be effective. So our framework legislation also provides a roadmap to promoting social inclusion as well as the legitimacy, grounded in our democratic processes, for its pursuit.

There may, of course, be reasons for a government to intervene more forcefully, to enact new legislation, to offer stronger programs, or to require changes in the ways that communities deliver programs and services. But, in general, governments should intervene more directly in the life of communities only when problems surpass their abilities to solve them with their existing resources. Therefore, it is imperative that governments watch for danger signs, signs that point to a breakdown of trust, of social capital, signs that point to a significant weakening of social inclusion. This is the role of research, such as that done through the Metropolis Project or through research teams housed within government ministries. Danger signs with respect to the social inclusion of immigrants might include the emergence of pockets of poverty among immigrant groups, significant disparities in employment, especially when they are correlated with membership in certain racial or ethnic groups, similar disparities in educational outcomes, in health status or access to health and other social services, access to affordable and adequate housing, disparities in criminal behaviour, in being a victim of

crime, in having equal access to the justice system. Think too of the attitudes of the public towards immigration and to members of ethnic minorities. The point is, responsible governments will look to research for information on emerging trends that point to the exclusion of certain people from our societies, exclusion from an equal access to the good life. When the danger signs reach a certain level, a level beyond the capacity of the communities to respond well, governments must act in order to preserve the social capital that is the basis of our prosperity.

To sum up, promoting social inclusion is warranted because doing so increases social capital. For government to do so through framework policy and legislation together with support for community and non-governmental organizations is the most effective means to take.

# SOCIAL CAPITAL:

## A Key Dimension of Immigrant Integration

### ABSTRACT

Foreign credential recognition, though important, can remove only part of the barriers to economic integration of immigrants. Emphasis must be placed on bonding social capital in immigrants' integration into the receiving society, through which immigrants can expand their social and economic opportunities.

The proverbial immigrant taxi driver who holds a PhD from a developing country reflects a paradox of immigration trends in Canada since the 1990s. On the one hand, immigrants are increasingly skilled and highly educated. On the other hand, they seem to be partially penalized by the qualifications that gained them entrance in the first place. Foreign credential recognition, or the lack thereof, has been identified as a barrier to labour market integration among immigrants. To alleviate the discounting of foreign-earned qualifications, governments, regulatory bodies, and other stakeholders have concerned themselves with improving the assessment and recognition process of foreign-earned credentials. With an integrative and transparent process of foreign credential recognition, it is hoped, skilled immigrants will be able to work in jobs commensurate with their qualifications.

An effective process of foreign credential recognition, though important, can remove only part of the barriers to economic integration of immigrants. In addition to formal recognition of foreign credential by regulatory bodies, skilled immigrants face the challenge of getting their qualifications recognized informally by their employers. This is so for two reasons. First, not all immigrants are trained in regulated professions. It is usually up to the employer to determine the value of immigrants' qualifications. Second, evidence has suggested that, with education and other social demographic factors being equal, immigrants of non-European origin earn less than do their European counterparts<sup>1</sup>. Hence, the value of a degree is dependent upon the individual attributes of its beholder. Success in the labour market depends as much on one's human capital as it does on the social capital one is able to accumulate.

Broadly defined, social capital refers to "networks together with shared norms, values and understanding which facilitate co-operation within or among groups"<sup>2</sup>. Unlike human capital that is observable through diplomas and certificates, social capital is less tangible because it exists in the relations among individuals.<sup>3</sup> Two types of social capital are essential in the social and economic integration of immigrants: bonding and bridging<sup>4</sup>. Bonding social capital refers typically to relations among members of families and ethnic groups. Bridging refers to relations between ethnic groups as well as between immigrants and the native-born.

There is ample evidence showing the importance of bonding social capital in immigrants' integration into the receiving society. Bonding social capital has already been identified as a possible contributor to the concentration of immigrants in urban areas. Through generations of migration, some ethnic groups have developed an infrastructure such as shops, restaurants, and social services that often parallel those in the mainstream society, hence the term, 'institutional completeness'<sup>5</sup>. These ethnic ties can provide a social safety net by meeting material and financial needs during lean times and caring for children and elders<sup>6</sup>. For example, immigrant dual-career couples often prefer to sponsor their parents to the receiving country to take care of their children or, failing that, send their children back home with the grandparents. More importantly, newly arrived immigrants often rely on ethnic and family ties for valuable information on the local labour market.

That said, most people do not intend to stay within their own ethnic enclave, but rather, to be a part of the mainstream society. Bridging capital is therefore essential for immigrants to expand their networks beyond their own ethnic community and to acculturate into the receiving society. By doing this, they will have more social and economic opportunities. Recent studies have suggested that, in terms of employment, ethnic network is useful mainly in finding jobs with low human capital requirements<sup>7</sup>. For those who are highly skilled and educated, it is the bridging capital that enables immigrants to advance economically and socially. In other words, bonding social capital is critical in increasing the economic returns on human capital.

Clearly, in Canada, English/French language proficiency improves one's chances of accumulating bonding social capital. Language proficiency clearly enables immigrants to navigate through the mainstream society more easily. Generally, those who have knowledge of English or French are expected to do better in the labour market than those who do not have such proficiency. More importantly, immigrants need to understand the Canadian way of doing business. While no studies have been done in Canada, research in the United States has suggested that Asian professionals are not as upwardly mobile as their European counterparts due to a lack of familiarity with the corporate culture in North America. For example, their perception of job performance management is often different from that of their supervisors<sup>8</sup>.

Integration, however, is a two-way street. While knowledge of the receiving society facilitates immigrants' transition

initially, the warmth of welcome by the receiving society is critical to immigrant inclusion in the long run. Employers need to be aware and utilize the skills of immigrant employees. This is not always the case. A study conducted in the United States suggests that managers tend to think more highly of staff from Europe than of those from Asia<sup>9</sup>. According to a recent study in Canada among Muslim women in manufacturing, sales and service sectors, women who wear hijab still experience discrimination when applying for jobs<sup>10</sup>. Equally important is for the general public to be more receptive towards a diverse society.

In sum, foreign credential recognition is not the silver bullet that can remove all barriers to the social and economic integration of immigrants. Social capital can play a key role in the successful integration of immigrants.

What does that mean? For immigrants, it means the ability to expand their social network beyond their ethnic boundaries. For the receiving society, it means a greater awareness of the benefits of immigration and acceptance of diversity. Only then can immigration be a win-win situation for immigrants as well as their receiving country.

Most people do not intend to stay within their own ethnic enclave, but rather, to be a part of the mainstream society.



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# INTEGRATION

## ABSTRACT

Settlement services and welcoming communities are both needed in the pursuit of successful economic and social integration for newcomers. Though orientation and basic language training are a good start, important barriers to full participation remain.

Canada is a country that has been built by immigrants. And, in order for immigration to continue to be an investment for this country, we need to ensure that newcomers have the opportunity to reach their social and economic potential in Canada. This includes opportunities for newcomers to work at their level of ability and to participate in our social, economic, educational and political institutions. Settlement services comprise one component of Canada's integration policies and programs that help newcomers to become fully participating members of the Canadian family. Those services are effective only when combined with welcoming communities.

Integration is a two-way process of accommodation between newcomers and Canadians: encouraging immigrants to adapt to Canadian society without requiring them to abandon their cultures; while encouraging Canadians and Canadian institutions to respect and reflect the cultural differences newcomers bring to the country. Integration is a visible expression of our shared citizenship values: accommodation of differences, promotion of cultural diversity, building of communities based on mutual respect and bringing the world inside our borders. The creation of inclusive institutions and political processes, and the participation of newcomers in those processes, is essential to their integration in Canada.

For some immigrants and refugees, the integration continuum begins overseas and continues through the process of acquiring citizenship. Canada's immigration and citizenship programs provide support for settlement services and offer newcomers the opportunity to obtain Canadian citizenship following a three-year residency period. Integration policies, programs and services are managed and delivered through multi-jurisdictional partnerships with other federal departments, provincial and territorial governments, private business, and the voluntary and not-for-profit sectors. In 2001-02, the federal government allocated approximately \$333M to settlement programming for newcomers.

Throughout the continuum, settlement programs assist newcomers with orientation, reception, adaptation services, language training for adults, bridging programs to assist with labour market entry, mentoring programs and more. For example, the Canadian Orientation Abroad program provides approximately 9,000 prospective immigrants per year with a realistic view of life in Canada before arrival. Orientation sessions include information on topics such as education, climate, housing, cost of living, and employment. Reception services in Canada include the distribution of a "Welcome to Canada" kit at major ports of entry and for government assisted refugees assistance with temporary accommodation, additional community-focussed orientation, income support and referral to other settlement services.

Research has shown that proficiency in one of Canada's official languages is critical to effective integration. Canada's current *Citizenship Act* requires that applicants have an adequate knowledge of English or French. Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) is one of Canada's official newcomer language training programs. It is worthy of note that 2002 was the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of LINC. Over its 10 years, LINC has served some 460,000 newcomers, that is, approximately 46,000 per year. The LINC program currently provides basic language training to adult immigrants. Classes are delivered part or full time, days, evenings or weekends; transportation allowances are provided; and childminding is available in order to encourage the participation of women.

Basic language training helps newcomers face the challenges of becoming involved in their communities, in participating in their children's schooling, in feeling that Canada is truly their home. A sense of belonging is a crucial factor to integration and to the ultimate goal of integration – full, constructive participation symbolized by the uptake of Canadian citizenship. Newcomers must have the capacity, the willingness and the opportunity to express their needs, interests and problems. They must be able to contribute to public debates about pressing issues such as poverty, the environment, globalisation, etc. There should be a real probability that their contribution will help to shape the outcome of the debate. On their part, Canadian citizens must also be able to accept the outcome of that debate. Integration is a two way process of learning and growing together. It takes more than language proficiency to develop that mutual bond.

A real sense of belonging is created when newcomers can fulfill their potential – get and keep a job, transfer and apply previously acquired occupational skills and participate fully in Canadian institutions and community life. Welcoming communities fosters that sense of belonging. The Host Program is one way in which Canadian citizens are actually engaged in the integration process. Volunteers are matched with newcomers to help ease the emotional burden of moving to a new country, to introduce newcomers to their community and to help them practice English and French. This is the two-way street of integration – it demands that both immigrants and the host society make an effort, both are mutually involved.

The Canadian school system also plays a significant role in teaching and modeling active citizenship, both for our children, and for the parents of those children. Schools provide a natural microcosm of our multicultural society where we can teach inclusiveness, acceptance of differences, public spiritedness and the conduct of public discussion in a respectful manner. The “Canada We All Belong” campaign, first targeted to schools in 2000, addresses discrimination by celebrating diversity and cultivating a sense among adults and children that newcomers not only belong to Canada, but that Canada belongs to them.

Successful economic and social integration is essential for enabling newcomers to achieve their full potential and become citizens with a stake in Canada's future. Orientation and basic language training is not sufficient for successful integration. Immigrants and refugees still face difficulty entering the labour market. The absence of effective credential assessment and recognition processes, as well as insufficient supports for work-related language training, contributes to the gap between immigrant earnings and employment rates and those of Canadian-born workers. These challenges and the proposed goals for addressing them are out-


lined in Canada's Innovation Strategy's policy paper, *Knowledge Matters: Skills and Learning for Canadians*, which was released in February 2002.

Integration policy strives for a society that is structurally free of barriers to participation. All must feel included. Barriers such as poverty, illiteracy, homelessness and inaccessibility must be removed. That is why research is vital to immigration policy and program development. If the level of participation is a measure of integration, then we need to know what factors either exclude or include immigrants in the work force, in social and political institutions and in everyday community activities. Such information helps to better design our integration programming.

All levels of government and civil society are collaborating to effect change in many ways. Citizenship and Immigration Canada has created an ongoing policy dialogue on the settlement and integration of immigrants and refugees with various stakeholders including service providing organizations and provincial governments. Through this dialogue, the current gaps in integration services can be identified and creative solutions forged.

Working together, we will continue efforts to build the kind of nation that enables all people to achieve their potential.

A sense of belonging is a crucial factor to integration and to the ultimate goal of integration – full, constructive participation symbolized by the uptake of Canadian citizenship.



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## Enjeux de justice

# L'ÉTRANGER EST-IL UN JUSTICIABLE?

### RÉSUMÉ

Depuis l'automne 2001, le gouvernement canadien envisage de prendre et a déjà pris des mesures potentiellement draconiennes qui violent ostensiblement la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés afin de protéger les Canadiens et Canadiennes contre de futurs attentats terroristes. À partir d'un accès sans restriction de la GRC, aux informations données aux sociétés aériennes par leurs passagers, jusqu'au renvoi des demandeurs d'asile vers les États-Unis en vertu d'un accord de réadmission signé en décembre 2002, l'État canadien enfreint les droits fondamentaux garantis par la Charte. Déjà, la Cour suprême du Canada a dû rappeler à l'ordre le gouvernement canadien dans plusieurs dossiers. Les citoyens canadiens ont le devoir de se joindre à ces juristes pour insister, devant le gouvernement fédéral, afin que les droits et libertés des non-citoyens aient la même envergure que ceux de citoyens canadiens.

L'éditorial du *Globe&Mail* du 31 janvier 2003 endosse les critiques sévères du Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée, M. George Radwanski, envers certaines mesures de sécurité prises par le gouvernement canadien suite aux événements du 11 septembre 2001. Dans son rapport annuel au Parlement 2001-2002, le Commissaire peut dire : « Le gouvernement utilise les événements du 11 septembre comme excuse pour justifier de nouvelles collectes et utilisations de renseignements personnels sur nous tous, les Canadiens et Canadiennes. Ces mesures ne peuvent justifier les besoins de la lutte contre le terrorisme et, par le fait même, n'ont pas leur place dans une société libre et démocratique. » Le Commissaire signale, entre autres, la nouvelle base de données sur les voyageurs de l'Agence des douanes et du revenu du Canada; l'article 4.82 du projet de *Loi sur la sécurité publique*, qui donne à la GRC un accès sans restriction aux renseignements des sociétés aériennes sur leurs passagers; les pouvoirs sérieusement accrus de l'État relativement à la surveillance de nos communications; et l'appui du gouvernement à une mesure qui établira un précédent en matière de surveillance vidéo des voies publiques par la GRC.

La question se pose de savoir pourquoi de telles mesures sont soudainement admises par l'opinion publique et par la classe politique en général, alors que, dans un autre contexte, ces dernières les eussent réprochées. Une certaine panique a certainement saisi les responsables de la sécurité publique après les événements du 11 septembre, et cette peur du terrorisme est entretenue par la « guerre » entreprise par le Président Bush, avec les attaques contre l'Afghanistan et bientôt contre l'Irak.

Mais une part de l'explication vient aussi d'ailleurs. Même si les textes législatifs ne distinguent pas, les personnes véritablement visées par ces mesures, comme par toutes les autres instituées depuis le début de la « guerre contre le terrorisme », sont, dans l'imaginaire collectif, des étrangers. Selon l'adage de tous les « maccarthysmes » du monde, les personnes qui n'ont rien à se reprocher ne risquent rien : le discours public sur le terrorisme rappelle constamment l'origine étrangère de ce dernier et sous-entend donc que les citoyens n'ont rien à craindre des mesures prises « pour leur protection ».

Pourtant, l'observateur attentif des questions d'immigration sait bien que, depuis une quinzaine d'années, l'étranger, et particulièrement celui qui n'a pas reçu un statut officiel (résident, touriste, travailleur, étudiant, etc.), voit ses droits considérablement affaiblis dans toutes les démocraties occidentales.

Au Canada, au cours des années 1990, le contentieux de l'immigration est devenu quasi-intégralement un simple contrôle de légalité, dont l'accès est de plus limité par la nécessité d'obtenir une autorisation. La gestion efficace du contentieux en est sans doute améliorée. La protection des droits de ces étrangers n'a pu qu'en être diminuée.

On n'a jamais considéré comme une priorité le fait d'assurer à tout demandeur d'asile, partout au Canada, une aide juridique suffisante pour préparer sa demande : on sait pourtant que la moitié

des demandeurs d'asile sont finalement reconnus réfugiés et que le risque qu'ils courent en cas de décision erronée peut inclure la mort ou la torture.

On vient d'aggraver les peines encourues pour passage illégal de la frontière canadienne. La personne qui fait passer illégalement la frontière à dix étrangers ou plus (sans atteinte aux personnes ou aux biens) risque désormais la prison à perpétuité. C'est plus que l'agression sexuelle armée (14 ans maximum); c'est l'équivalent du crime contre l'humanité. La crainte de l'étranger justifie-t-elle une telle distorsion de l'échelle des peines?

L'accord de réadmission signé en décembre 2002 entre le Canada et les États-Unis permet le renvoi de nombreux demandeurs d'asile vers ces derniers, alors même que nous savons la manière dont de nombreux demandeurs d'asile y sont traités : absence de droits (pour les Haïtiens détenus sur la base de Guantanamo au cours des années '90), absence de garanties constitutionnelles (pour les personnes qui ne sont pas reconnus comme « entrées » aux États-Unis), détention prolongée (voir la description des conditions de détention dans les rapports successifs d'Amnesty International), non-reconnaissance du statut de réfugié pour des raisons politiques (les Guatémaltèques et Salvadoriens des années '80 étaient reconnus à 6% aux États-Unis et à plus de 60% au Canada). En décidant que ces demandeurs ne bénéficieront plus d'un système d'asile expressément fondé sur la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés*, nous les privons d'une protection de leur droits qu'ils ne retrouveront pas aux États-Unis.

Dans le passé, comme bien d'autres pays, le Canada a drogué des étrangers détenus pour pouvoir les déporter plus facilement. Il a utilisé les services de sociétés privées pour déporter et détenir, à l'étranger et sans aucune autorité légale, des expulsés en transit. À quelles conditions ces pratiques seraient-elles désormais justifiées?

Certains pays sont allés plus loin. L'Australie a mis en place des mécanismes de détention obligatoire, sans limitation de durée, sans possibilité de recours, dans des conditions indescriptibles. Elle a aussi débarqué des étrangers dans la petite île de Nauru, devenue prison à ciel ouvert. Elle a encore déclaré que certaines parties de son territoire n'étaient pas son territoire pour des fins d'immigration. Les autorités australiennes ont « l'avantage » de ne pas être soumises à une charte constitutionnelle des droits de la personne et leur « liberté d'action » fait l'envie de bien des agences d'exécution de la loi dans le monde. L'Australie est néanmoins tenue d'obligations internationales qu'elle partage avec les autres grandes démocraties de la planète.

L'action des services d'immigration à l'étranger n'est pas facilement soumise à l'autorité de la *Charte Canadienne des droits et libertés* et au contrôle des tribunaux canadiens, alors même que ces services traitent des milliers d'étrangers annuellement et que des rumeurs de traitements discriminatoires circulent. Leur comportement n'affecte d'ailleurs pas que des étrangers : les Canadiens de couleur savent les difficultés qu'ils éprouvent parfois lors du contrôle des papiers à l'embarquement d'un avion à destination du Canada, difficultés que les étrangers caucasiens ne vivent généralement pas.

Le 28 janvier 2003, le premier ministre britannique a annoncé que, si les mesures actuelles visant les deman-

deurs d'asile ne parvenaient pas à diminuer leur nombre, la Grande-Bretagne envisageait de déroger à l'article 3 de la *Convention européenne des droits de l'homme* qui interdit la torture et, partant, le renvoi de toute personne vers un pays où elle risque la torture. La protection des droits d'une personne dépend-elle du nombre des titulaires des mêmes droits?

Tout cela émeut peu de monde, car les étrangers ne constituent pas un électorat susceptible de mobiliser un soutien politique. Pourtant, sans être citoyens, ils bénéficient des droits de la personne que garantissent les instruments internationaux, ainsi que notre *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* (dont seuls les articles 3, 6 et 23 sont réservés aux citoyens).

Les tribunaux n'ont pas encore saisi toute la mesure du défi auquel ils font face. Protéger les droits des étrangers aujourd'hui correspond à protéger les droits des autochtones il y a vingt-cinq ans, les droits des femmes il y a cinquante ans ou les droits des ouvriers il y a cent ans. Dans tous ces cas, les membres de ces groupes sont alors à la marge des institutions sociales et de la protection de la loi. Il fallut, entre autres mobilisations, que les tribunaux interviennent pour affirmer leur capacité à être titulaires de droits.

La Cour suprême du Canada a ouvert la voie et sa jurisprudence, comparable à celle de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, est nettement plus progressiste que celle de bien des cours suprêmes du monde. Sur plusieurs dossiers, il est remarquable qu'elle ait dû obliger le gouvernement à respecter des règles élémentaires de justice (qu'il ne penserait pas à violer s'il s'agissait de citoyens canadiens, même criminels) : que l'étude du dossier d'une personne qui risque la persécution doit inclure une audience en personne (*Singh*), que l'étude du dossier d'expulsion du parent étranger de l'enfant canadien doit inclure la considération de la protection du meilleur intérêt de l'enfant (*Baker*), qu'être trafiquant de drogue n'est pas un obstacle à la protection à titre de réfugié et à la garantie des droits fondamentaux (*Suresh*).

Étrangers ou citoyens, comme innocents ou criminels, nous sommes tous des justiciables dès lors que nos droits fondamentaux sont en jeu. S'appuyant sur la Charte et le droit international, les tribunaux devront continuer d'affirmer la prééminence des droits et libertés de chacun sur la raison d'État, surtout en des temps troublés comme les nôtres. La protection du Canada, de sa souveraineté et de ses frontières ne peut se fonder légitimement sur le mépris des droits des étrangers.

Quand *The Economist* du 11 janvier 2003 pose la question : « Is torture ever justified? », alors même que l'interdiction absolue de la torture est un des legs les plus importants de la génération qui a vécu la seconde guerre mondiale, on comprend que la tentation est grande de porter atteinte aux droits fondamentaux des terroristes (que nous imaginons forcément étrangers), au nom même de la liberté. Il faudra toute la vigilance des juristes, et plus largement des citoyens, pour que nos gouvernants, aujourd'hui comme autrefois, ne soient pas autorisés à traiter telle catégorie de population comme inférieure en droits et libertés.

# EXPLORING RECEIVING SOCIETY ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AND ETHNOCULTURAL DIVERSITY

## ABSTRACT

The host majority has an important impact on how immigrants adapt to their new land. The authors examine the social climates toward immigration and diversity through the use of acculturation scales and various host acculturation orientations.

The adaptation of immigrants and their descendants to their new society is affected by numerous factors (Berry 1997). Amongst the most important are attitudes held by members of the receiving society toward immigrants and related behaviours such as inclusion and exclusion expressed in everyday life and within public and private institutions. Thus, host majority attitudes and behaviours towards immigrants contribute to the 'social climate' towards immigration and ethnocultural diversity. Better knowledge about this social climate of acceptance or rejection is useful for a number of reasons. Foremost is that an intolerant climate benefits no one: it is not only immigrants who adapt poorly when they face rejection, but backlash may be generated among members of the larger society, creating an even more negative climate for both the immigrants and their descendants. Second, knowledge about these attitudes can be useful in designing public education programmes that seek to bring about attitude change; and the success of such programmes can in turn be evaluated against this social climate information. Third, policy decisions about immigration levels and selection criteria, and about the promotion of cultural diversity could also be made using such information. Generally the importance of such research resides in the fact that the success of any immigration and integration policy depends upon the support of the general host population and its willingness to accept immigrants from different countries of origin. Within western democracies we propose that immigration and integration policies are likely to reflect mainly the desires of the dominant host majority though representatives of various immigrant communities can also have a say in the formulation of such policies (Bourhis, Moïse et al. 1997).

## International study of attitudes towards immigration and settlement (ISATIS)

Host majority attitudes towards immigration and ethnocultural diversity can be monitored with a survey questionnaire developed within the *International study of attitudes towards immigration and settlement* (ISATIS: Bourhis, Berry et al. 1999). Using representative samples of the general population, this survey questionnaire measures the social climate that prevails towards immigration in Western democracies whose immigration history and integration policies may vary greatly. Our key indicator of social climate towards immigration which we call *immigration attitudes* measures three attitude components: a) preferences for/prohibition against certain types of immigrants, b) attitudes about the positive and negative consequences of immigration for the host society, c) comfort feeling in the presence of immigrants from different ethnic, linguistic and religious background.

Two important psychological processes are likely to affect immigration attitudes. The first one, favourable *orientation towards ethnic diversity*, measures the extent to which host society members endorse the multiculturalism ideology and their level of tolerance towards ethnic difference. The second process, *feelings of personal and collective security*, measures the sense of security or insecurity felt by host majority members in the personal, economic and cultural spheres. We believe that individuals who feel personally and collectively insecure are less likely to have favourable orientations

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towards ethnic diversity and less likely to be accepting of immigrants. For instance, culturally insecure individuals are likely to feel that the consequences of immigration are negative for their own host community, to prefer lower rates of immigration and to have less favourable attitudes towards immigrants. Taking stock of previous sociological research, we propose that the demographic background of host majority members can also be related to immigration attitudes. Demographic antecedents include age, gender, language, social class, education and ethnic background.

As a first test of the ISATIS framework we conducted a pilot study with members of two host communities in Canada: Ontario Anglophones attending Queen's University as undergraduates and Quebec Francophone undergraduates attending the Université du Québec à Montréal. Results showed that for both Anglophones and Francophones, personal and cultural security were related to positive orientation towards ethnic diversity. For Ontario Anglophones, favourable orientation towards ethnic diversity and personal/collective security had a positive influence on immigration attitudes. For Quebec Francophones, a feeling of security in the personal and cultural domains was a much stronger predictor of positive diversity orientations and positive immigration attitudes. These preliminary results with undergraduates suggest that improving the social climate towards immigration may need to be addressed differently in English Canada and in French Quebec. Our ISATIS framework was intended as a basis for developing a 'barometer type' survey instrument for assessing the social climate towards immigration not only in different regions of Canada but also in different countries of the western world. In the next section we present selected findings from our international studies using an approach providing a finer grained analysis of the type of acculturation orientations held by host majority members towards immigrants.

### The Interactive Acculturation Model

*Acculturation* is a term used to describe the process of bidirectional change that takes place when two ethnocultural groups come in sustained contact with each other. This definition of acculturation implies that dominant as well as non-dominant cultural groups are influenced and transformed by their intercultural contacts and are expected to change some aspects of their respective culture as a way of adapting to ethnocultural diversity. A common shortcoming of classic acculturation models is the lack of importance given to how the dominant host majority can shape and be shaped by the acculturation orientations of immigrant groups.

The *Interactive Acculturation Model* (IAM) seeks to integrate within a common theoretical framework the following components of immigrant and dominant host majority relations in cross-cultural settings: 1) acculturation orientations adopted by immigrant groups within the host society, 2) acculturation orientations adopted by the host majority towards specific groups of immigrants, 3) interpersonal and intergroup relational outcomes which are the product of combinations of immigrant and host majority acculturation orientations (Bourhis, Moïse et al. 1997).

The acculturation orientations of host majority members are monitored using a new *Host Community Acculturation Scale* (HCAS). The HCAS measures how individuals endorse each of five host community acculturation orientations (Montreuil and Bourhis 2001). Host majority members who accept and value the maintenance of the heritage culture of immigrants and also accept that immigrants adopt important features of the majority host culture endorse the *integrationist* orientation. Ultimately, this orientation implies that host community members value a stable biculturalism amongst immigrant groups which, in the long term, may contribute to cultural pluralism as an enduring feature of the host society. *Individualism* is an orientation in which host community members define themselves and others as individuals rather than as members of group categories such as immigrants or host majority members. For individualists it is the personal characteristics of individuals that count most rather than belonging to one group or another. The *assimilationist* orientation corresponds to the traditional concept of absorption whereby host community members expect immigrants to relinquish their cultural identity for the sake of adopting the culture of the majority host society. Members of the host community who prefer a *segregationist* orientation accept that immigrants maintain their heritage culture as long as they keep their distance from host majority members as they do not wish immigrants to adopt, 'contaminate' or transform the host culture. Host community members who adopt this orientation disfavour cross-cultural contact with immigrants, prefer them to remain together in separate community enclaves and are ambivalent regarding the status of immigrants as rightful members of the majority host society. The *exclusionist* orientation can be adopted by members of the host community who are intolerant of immigrants who maintain their culture of origin while also refusing that immigrants adopt features of the majority host culture. Exclusionists believe that immigrants can never be incorporated culturally, economically or socially as rightful members of the host society. Exclusionists may also endorse the prohibition of immigrants from "devalued" national origins and in some cases would prefer some categories of immigrants to be deported to their country of origin.

### Results of Canadian and International studies using the HCAS

Using adapted version of HCAS, we recently assessed acculturation orientations of host majority members in four major cities of the world where immigration and integration policies differ: Los Angeles, Montreal, Paris, and Tel Aviv. These studies were conducted with university students who share similar socio-economic status and education level. Eventually, university students are also those most likely to occupy key positions in the civil administration of the state, the education and justice system, industry, business and politics.

In all four cities, host majority undergraduates strongly endorsed the integrationist and individualist orientations towards immigrants. For Francophones in Montreal and Paris, assimilationism was weakly

endorsed while segregationism and exclusionism were virtually rejected. In Los Angeles, Euro-American undergraduates moderately endorsed exclusionism and segregationism while assimilationism was only slightly endorsed. Host majority Israeli Jews in Tel Aviv were similar to Montrealers and Parisians as regards their acculturation orientations towards Jewish immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia. Israeli Jews strongly endorsed integrationism and individualism orientations while they were least likely to endorse assimilationism, segregationism and exclusionism.

According to the IAM, the acculturation orientations held by host majority members may differ depending on the 'valued' or 'devalued' status of the immigrants and national minorities being considered. The 'valued' or 'devalued' status of immigrants and national minorities often reflects the positive or negative stereotypes that are held towards such minorities depending on their country of origin, their socio-economic status and their categorisation as 'visible' or 'non-visible' group members. Our results showed that Francophone undergraduates in Montreal were more integrationist and individualist and less assimilationist and segregationist towards valued immigrants from France than towards devalued immigrants from Haiti. In Israel, Jewish undergraduates surveyed in 1999 were less integrationist and individualist towards Israeli Arabs than towards Jewish immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia. Conversely, Jewish undergraduates were more segregationist and exclusionist towards Israeli-Arabs than towards Jewish immigrants from Russia or Ethiopia. Our results in Montreal and Tel Aviv clearly showed that the same host majority members may endorse contrasting acculturation orientations depending on the valued or devalued status of immigrants and national minorities.

### **Social psychological profiles of acculturation orientations**

Do individuals endorsing the integrationist or individualist orientations share the same social psychological profile whether such persons took part in our studies in Los Angeles, Montreal, Paris or Tel Aviv? Overall the psychological profile of each acculturation orientation was remarkably similar regardless of the national origin of the host majority undergraduate we sampled in the four cities. The endorsement of *integrationism* and *individualism* was associated with a positive social identity, rejection of the authoritarianism and ethnocentrism ideologies and feelings that immigrants did not threaten the host majority cultural and linguistic identity. Integrationism was endorsed by people who had favourable attitudes towards immigrants and who sought close relations with immigrants irrespective of their ethnic or national origin. Individualists were less likely than integrationists to expect immigrants to adopt features of the host majority culture given that individual freedom of choice was paramount in their value orientations. Overall, integrationists and individualists shared a 'live and let live' orientation towards ingroup and outgroup others.

Host majority undergraduates who strongly endorsed the *assimilationist* orientation moderately

endorsed the authoritarianism and ethnocentrism ideology and felt that their majority cultural identity was somewhat threatened by the presence of devalued immigrants. *Segregationists* and *exclusionists* tended to have similar social psychological profiles, though exclusionists were even less favourably disposed towards immigrants than segregationists. Segregationists and exclusionists were those most likely to feel threatened culturally by the presence of immigrants and to have the least secure social identity as majority group members. They were those who most strongly endorsed the authoritarian and ethnocentric ideologies. Segregationists and exclusionists avoided relations with immigrants, especially those whose status was devalued. Segregationists and especially exclusionists were likely to perceive that immigrants did not wish to have good relations with members of the host majority.

### **Concluding notes**

The studies reviewed herein were conducted in post-secondary institutions valuing individual achievement, meritocracy and tolerance towards ethnocultural diversity. Studies conducted with more representative samples of the population are needed to gain a more accurate assessment of the social climate towards immigration in Canada and other countries of settlement in the Western world.

Given their majority status and their control of the state and private institutions, host majority members can have a major impact on the acculturation orientations of immigrant and national minorities. For instance, visible minority immigrants may endorse an integrationist or individualist orientation as they first arrive in the country of settlement. However such immigrants may encounter host majority members who happen to be mostly segregationists or exclusionist towards them. The negative impact of such experiences may be accentuated if such encounters have occurred with host majority members holding "front line" positions such as the police, teachers, health professionals and government clerks dispensing services to immigrants. Faced with rejection even from official representatives of the country of settlement, visible minority immigrants may eventually shift from an integrationist to a separatist orientation as a way of limiting aversive contacts with segregationist or exclusionist members of the host majority while seeking protection and solace within their own immigrant community. However, such feelings of rejection may be attenuated by state integration policies which are mainly pluralist rather than assimilationist, thus contributing to a 'social climate' of tolerance towards immigrant diversity.



# FORMAL AND NON-FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY IMMIGRANTS AND NEWCOMERS:

## Understanding the Linkages and Posing the Questions

### ABSTRACT

Studies in Canada, Europe, and the United-States conclude that newcomers tend to participate less in the immigrant-receiving countries' political processes. Recent research has also shown that there is a positive correlation between formal political participation and the number of ethnic organizations. Given the import of social capital in contemporary societies, and given a growing concern with the escalating democratic deficit in these societies, the authors put forth that both formal and non-formal levels of political participation must be promoted by all levels of government.

There are principally two mechanisms by which citizens seek to effect social and political change. One is through formal electoral participation and the other is through participation in civil society also referred to as non-formal or non-electoral political participation. There is a growing interest in the relationship between these two forms of participation. Is there a mutually reinforcing relationship between formal political participation and participation in community organizations? Daiva Stasiulis notes that a focus on formal political participation can obscure the multiplicity of ways that newcomers and members of minority communities engage politically – within ethnocultural communities, in social and protest movements, in trade unions, “homeland politics” and in a variety of civic organizations at the grass roots level (Stasiulis, 1997: 13). Like Stasiulis, Biles (1998) argues for a broader definition of both political participation (to encompass non-formal participation) and the political arena. He calls for further research on the extent to which formal and non-formal participation by organizations representing the interests of newcomer and immigrant communities can overcome their distance and alienation from the formal institutions of government and can leverage a higher profile for their issues and concerns.

### Understanding the Reasons for Political Participation by Immigrants and Newcomers

A variety of complex reasons are involved in the decisions by immigrants and newcomers to participate actively in civic organizations or in the formal realm of politics. Recent studies from Canada, Europe, Great Britain, the United States, and Israel suggest that in general political participation by newcomers appears to be low in most immigrant-receiving countries (Togey, 1999, Fennema and Tillie, 1999). Preliminary research suggests a number of factors account this including:

- Their marginal political status;
- Alienation from institutions in the host country (Diel and Blohm, 2001);
- Discrimination and barriers to political participation;
- The lack of a political opportunity structure that actively encourages the participation of immigrants in politics (Bousetta, 2000);
- A time lag (typically into the next generation) from newcomer arrival to settlement, integration and full political participation (Chui et al, 1991); and
- Political parties do not do much to encourage the incorporation of new immigrants into their ranks (Anwar, 2001).

In the Canadian context, Biles (1998) speaks of the disenfranchisement of the communities from formal political structures, Frideres identifies pull factors that draw them into engagement and push factors that act as barriers to their participation (Frideres, 1997) and Jedwab suggests that “The opportunity to participate and having access to the particular arena is a critical factor in civic engagement”. He goes further and argues that costs and benefits weigh heavily on the decision making of individual actors. The incentives and disincentives are not monetary rather they include considerations of solidarity, personal satisfaction and making a difference to the community as a whole (Jedwab, 2002).

Several recent studies suggest grounds for optimism, that immigrant and ethno-racial representation

is improving in Canada's electoral system. Thus, Black finds that recent federal elections have returned larger numbers of minority candidates, although some communities – particularly visible minorities – remain significantly under-represented (Black, 2002). Similarly, in studying municipal representation in Montreal, Carolle Simard finds increased numbers of politicians whose origins lie outside the francophone and anglophone communities (Simard, 2003). Conversely, in studying election results in the Toronto area, Siemiatycki and Saloojee find a stall in increased newcomer representation, leaving visible minority communities particularly under-represented in elected office (Siemiatycki and Saloojee, 2003).

The political participation of immigrants in society (in both the formal and non-formal realms) can be seen as part of the process of social and political integration in the new society (Mesch, 2003, forthcoming). Studies of newcomers have dealt extensively with different aspects of their integration in the new society including labour market inclusion and exclusion (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991; Portes and Jensen, 1987; Sanders and Nee, 1987), language proficiency (Espenshade and Fu, 1997) and social exclusion and social integration (Zhou and Logan, 1989). Mesch notes that the extensive literature has been dominated by the “assimilation approach” that emphasizes the role of “socio-economic status attainment and acculturation in the integration of immigrants. According to this model, the improvement in the immigrant socio-economic status allows to him/her to feel part of the mainstream of society and to attain housing and social status in the new society” (Mesch, 2003). Significantly less research has been done on the issue of the political integration of newcomers.

A broad survey of the research suggests that there are four sets of factors that determine the extent of civic and political participation by members of newcomer and minority communities. The first set is related to individual resources, such as age, marital status, education and income. (Junn, 1999). The second set of factors is related to the trajectory of settlement and integration (Back and Soininen, 1998). These include: length of residence and language proficiency, acquisition of knowledge of the political system, the different political parties and the different tactics being used in the country for political influence (Junn, 1999). This learning process requires the knowledge of the language as a central tool for the understanding of documents, speeches and local laws. A study on immigrants' participation in Danish local elections indicated that voting was positively related to length of stay: the longer the immigrant has been in the country, the greater the likelihood of participation in local politics (Togebly, 1999). A third set of factors that either inhibit or enhance civic and political participation by members of racialized and newcomer communities has to do with the complex interplay between social identity and the persistence and reproduction of exclusion and discrimination (see below). The fourth set of factors relate to the relationship between formal political participation and participation in ethno-specific organizations.

#### **Identifying the Relationship between Civic Engagement and Formal Political Participation**

The research of Fennema and Tillie in Holland points to the positive correlation between the formal political participation and the number of ethnic organizations (Fennema and Tillie, 1999, 2000). This network of ethnic organizations rep-

resents a form of social capital as groups that were highly organized and interrelated also reported a high degree of trust in the local government and a high level of political interest. Fennema and Tillie found a strong correlation between the number of immigrants' organization and the level of political participation and political trust (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Social capital, information flows and political knowledge which derives from social and organizational networks play an important role in enhancing political participation and political mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1995).

Another lengthy study on political participation by newcomer communities in Holland found that voting patterns by members of immigrant communities was “ideologically driven”, and that there was a strong relationship between participating in elections (as voters and as candidates) and the “civicness” (in Putnam's sense of the term) of ethno-racial organizations. In analyzing the relationship between voter turn out, number of candidates per ethnic group and the number of candidates per ethnic group the researchers concluded that the “The voting turnout of Turks and the high number of Turkish councillors [compared to other newcomer communities] corresponds with a high density of organizations in Amsterdam and a strong network between organizations in the Turkish community. This finding is repeated at the national level. Our results show that ... the general idea that civic community and political participation are interrelated is thus supported” (van Heesum, 2003). This finding was consistent with Putnam's conclusion that a strong and vibrant civic community enhances the functioning of democracy.

In studying patterns of electoral political representation in Toronto, Siemiatycki and Saloojee (2003) identify a ‘dual representation’ gap for immigrants and ethno-racial minorities in the city. Statistically, visible minorities and recent immigrant communities are badly under-represented in Toronto's electoral politics; and substantively, minority politicians who do hold elected office are generally not regarded by community activists in the non-formal sphere of political life as adequate champions of community interests.

Community-based leaders from 15 ethno-racial organizations in Toronto were surveyed for their assessment of the responsiveness of government in general, and elected minority politicians in particular. The verdict was hardly flattering. While they believed that having Toronto's diverse communities represented on Toronto city council was extremely important in principle, they were largely critical of the record of elected politicians from such minority communities. These minority politicians were typically described by community activists as detached from their community, and more mainstream or ‘right wing’ than the organizations actively working on behalf of distinct communities. Moreover this assessment came from community leaders with extensive experience in community organization, mobilization and advocacy. This suggests differences of priorities, goals and ideology between representatives of the same community in the formal and non-formal political spheres. Conversely, Black's research on federal politicians suggests that representatives from minority communities tend to be more left wing than their anglophone and francophone counter-parts (Black, 2003).

More generally, community leaders who were surveyed identified a range of obstacles their communities faced in trying to influence municipal government. These included the

lack of representation (in the employment equity sense); language barriers, discriminatory attitudes and practices, insufficient knowledge of how to engage in civic politics and properly access politicians and bureaucrats, inaccessible politicians and bureaucrats and barriers to civic engagement within ethno-racial communities (absence of unity, lack of enthusiasm for politics). These concerns were also expressed by other community based immigrant settlement groups who found that politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of government tended to see them as “service providers to be excluded from the “decision making and active participation in the governance process of the settlement support system”. The concerns identified by Siemiatycki and Saloojee were also expressed by agencies involved in settlement and housing issues. These agencies noted that they were not simply service providers “passively and mechanically ‘delivering services’ to an equally passive and dependent group of helpless people”. Rather, even though it was not recognized by elected officials and bureaucrats, they saw themselves as “active participants in decision making, from needs assessment, to program development to policy making” (Integrated, Settlement Planning Research Project: 2000: 69).

### **Social Identity and Non Formal Political Participation**

All of these studies point to the importance of utilizing a broad definition of both political participation and a broader definition of the political arena – to encompass issues of political advocacy and protest politics (Jedwab, 2002). A study by Junn found that members of historically disadvantaged racialized communities are more likely to be involved in protest and less in voting. On the other side, members of non-disadvantaged communities are more likely to be involved in electoral voting (Junn, 1999). The Junn study, the questions raised by Biles, and the survey by Siemiatycki and Saloojee all point to another set of factors that either inhibit or enhance political participation by members of racialized and newcomer communities – the complex interplay between social identity and social exclusion. What is not clear from the research is whether the under representation of minorities in the structures of formal political institutions actually contributes to greater involvement in non-formal participation and whether it is the antidote to the disenfranchisement referred to by Biles.

One of the consequences of dealing with the effects of exclusion and discrimination is that members of racialized and minority communities and their organizations find other avenues to engage in political activity. Certainly, social identity has a direct bearing on both the form and the extent of political participation. This is the substantive dimension of political participation. Discrimination leads to incomplete citizenship and undervalued participation and undervalued recognition (Saloojee 2003). The recognition of the absence of social inclusion, coupled with the reality of exclusion and discrimination then prompts a reflexive or what Castells calls a “defensive” assertion of identity (Castells, 1997). The assertion of an identity against discrimination and exclusion in turn creates a politics of advocacy and protest through which social actors seek to build a new identity that redefines their position in society and simultaneously challenges the social and political institutions of society to change. It is this challenge that raises interesting issues for the financial well being of many ethno-racial community organizations working in the non-

formal realm. They utilize their social capacity to hold states and institutions accountable, they provide immense opportunities for civic engagement, their existence and well being are signs of a healthy civil society, but many are also dependent on the state for financial assistance. Thus as the survey of leaders in the Toronto municipal area found that their advocacy and protest functions are heightened in periods of fiscal restraint – leading some elected officials to further question the wisdom of providing financial support to organizations are critical of the state. How can the social capital developed in diverse communities be harnessed in the interests of promoting increased political participation at both the formal level as well as in civil society? According to Jedwab, “The accumulation of political capital in the non-formal arena is at times viewed as contrary to the growth of social capital. In fact political participation outside the formal arena is an area of civic involvement where government frequently exercises prudence in its otherwise ringing endorsement of voluntarism. Such hesitation on the part of the State becomes more apparent when reviewing the evolving literature on non-formal political participation in Canada.” (Jedwab, 2002).

### **Conclusion**

In the sphere of formal political participation, the state has a responsibility to actively encourage the widest possible political participation by members of racialized and newcomer communities. The state, despite the ambivalence cited by Jedwab, should work with community based organizations to reverse the trends towards voter apathy and declining voter turnouts. The state has a responsibility to reverse the perception and the reality of “disenfranchisement” from formal institutions noted by Biles, and ensure the viability of organizations representing the interests of women, gays and lesbians, members of ethno-racial, linguistic, religious and newcomer communities. Federal, provincial and municipal policy makers also have a responsibility to engage in meaningful consultation with civic organizations. The latter is essential to viable substantive political participation. Who comes to the policy table is important. Whose voices are heard around the policy table is critical. Which organizations and which leaders are validated through the consultation process sends powerful signals to policy communities. Within the Canadian context, it is clear that much more research on the relationship between participation in civic organizations and formal political participation is required. Such research would focus on (i) the relationship between healthy, viable and strong community organizations and political participation; (ii) how community organizations currently contribute to political participation; (iii) the various forms of political participation that community organizations currently engage in; (iv) the intersections of immigrant and minority political participation with the engagement and mobilization of women, gays and lesbians, linguistic, religious and other social movements; (v) the role such non-formal activity plays in civic engagement, political mobilization, articulating political interests, and engaging with political parties in the formal political arena. There is much to learn about strengthening democracy in Canada.

# DIASPORIC RELIGIONS IN CANADA:

## Opportunities and Challenges

### ABSTRACT

Should we focus so highly on the capacity of an individual to contribute to the economy in our understanding of citizenship? While we do participate in the structures of economic life, our purpose is to serve the well-being of families, friends and community. It is the recognition of religious and ethnic communities through policies like multiculturalism which define the practice of freedom, human rights and citizenship.

With the re-issue of Neil Bissoondath's *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada* (1994, 2002) the public critique of the policy of multiculturalism in Canada has been relaunched. No less significant, the recent publications by Stoffman (2002), Collacott (2002) and Francis (2002) have mounted a sharp critique of Canada's current immigration policies. These publishing events, while formally unrelated in 2002, converge in their implications around a central question concerning the future of Canadian society. What kind of society do Canadians and landed immigrants wish to create together?

For the most part these critics of immigration and multiculturalism argue for a view of citizenship which accords the highest value to autonomous individuals and their capacity to contribute to the economy. The diverse roles citizens play in their family, immediate communities and in the larger society are either unexamined or viewed as private matters. Coming, as I do, from Nova Scotia where going down the road is lamented locally and celebrated in the *Globe and Mail* and *National Post* as the inevitable, if not proper, economic fate of individuals, the convergence of these currents of thought about immigration and multiculturalism raise some very fundamental issues. At the center of those issues is the place of the various communities of attachment in the life of citizens. For my purposes, religious communities will serve as representative of the communal facets of life which critics of multiculturalism and immigration so frequently disparage.

Citizenship provides a primary "marker" of identity in contemporary nation states. To say, "I am Canadian" expresses a whole range of attachments. Denis Lee's poetry for children (1974), for example, celebrates the cadence (1998) in the names we have given to places on our landscape. Names as diverse as Lunenburg, Kamouraska, Temiskaming, Saint Boniface and Victoria stand for our attachments to family, friends, neighbourhood, local polities, economies, the arts, educational institutions and religious communities. These overlapping and integral facets of attachment constitute the fertile earth which nurtures citizenship. In the depth of these attachments, people both converse and contend in the on-going, never ending debates about how to live well as citizens in Canada. To build public policies which undermine and diminish the capacity of citizens to participate in these many facets of attachment is, finally, to undercut the very roots of citizenship itself.

Multicultural policy is founded on the recognition (Taylor, 1994) of individual citizens who are invested with both constitutional and Charter rights and freedoms, not the least of which is the freedom of religion. No less significant, it recognizes that individuals exist within communities whose diverse languages, religions, and cultures warrant public recognition and support. Such recognition has encouraged new immigrants to band together, very often across ethnic lines, to form religious communities and institutions. The result is that Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Muslims, Eastern Orthodox, Mennonites, Coptics to name only a few have joined together to create places for worship and social life. Religious communities have provided primary support for new immigrants as they adjust to life in Canada. Religious communities have created regional and national associations to support their local religious institutions and communities. In addition they participate in international religious organizations and have maintained strong connections with religious communities in the historic homelands of their religion.

Were this the eighteenth or nineteenth century, the patterns of religious institution and community would include French and Irish Catholics, Scotch Presbyterians, English Methodists, German

Lutherans, and Anabaptists from many parts of Europe (Bruckner, 1993; O'Toole, 1996). As these immigrants left their homelands, they formed "ethnic" and religious communities, built churches, schools and economies in their new country. They formed regional and ultimately national and international religious organizations. They looked to homelands for priests, pastors and teachers. Community building centered on religious institutions. Family and social life took on its form and shape as did the politics of the community based on the shared convictions of religious life. Belief and belonging in the Canadian landscape, as O'Toole suggests, seemed to be one and the same.

Nonetheless, Canadian colonial and post-colonial history was a story of religious and ethnic difference. It told of contention between Roman Catholic and Protestant ethnicities whose memories of old world religious battles and hatreds endured. Even more important, the history told the story of religious freedom expressed in constitutional accommodations to religious/ethnic difference and patterns of interdenominational cooperation in the settlement of the West. It was precisely the recognition of difference between Roman Catholic and Protestant, French and English which permitted the emergence of those intimations of citizenship which were defined by their capacity to incorporate minorities whose religious attachments were different from those of the majority in French and English Canada. The odds against such intimations were enormous. Mimicking British imperialism, Canada's political leadership developed policies to assimilate native peoples, French Canadians, Métis and to exclude South Asian and Chinese peoples. Such policies proved to be both a tragedy and a failure.

Canadians forget their history at their own risk. The names of the religions taking root in Canada in the twenty-first century are different from those in the nineteenth. It is now Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs who are, or have been, the immigrants building religious and community institutions. It is remarkable how consistent the patterns of citizenship building recur. While women and men participate in the structures of economic life, they do so *for* purposes which serve the well-being of families, friends, a whole range of communities and associations. It is those intersecting communities of attachment which shape the identities of Canadian citizenship in our time. It is then the recognition of religious and ethnic communities through policies like multiculturalism which define the practice of freedom, human rights and, in the broadest sense, what being Canadian is becoming.

If imperialism brought the policies of assimilation down upon minority populations in the nineteenth century, what are the kind of barriers to the integrative meaning of citizenship which we have just outlined? The

ideological notion corresponding to imperialist assimilation is the hegemony of the secular worldview. Scholars have come to recognize that secularization doesn't work for interpreting post-industrial societies. Yet, the dominant ideology of governments, media and the arts appears to hold the view that only in a secular society can freedom and democracy flourish. Within such secularist views, religious faith and religious communities are often disparaged and ridiculed – perhaps the most telling form of the irrationality and intolerance of the secular worldview. The

fallacy of such a view is born out by the historic role of religious diversity in Canada and the persistence of religious institutions and convictions worldwide. The pervasiveness of the secular ideology is measured by who and what it chooses to exclude and in this respect religions have become one of the most frequently excluded expressions of difference in Canadian society. That this negatively affects the Muslim, Jew, Christian, Hindu, and Sikh is simply a fact.

Canadian society has never incorporated the constitutional view of the separation of religion and the state. Nor has it imitated in its constitutions and Charter the British model of an established church. In the absence of both of those options, recognition of the historic contribution of members of churches and synagogues to the formation of Canadian society and its public institutions from health care, education and the polity, (O'Toole, 1996) opens up for view the authentic precedents on which we can build the future of a multicultural Canadian society. The bedrock

of that future may be illustrated in how religious diversity in this country is given authentic recognition. As the diversity of ethnic communities and their religious institutions flourish, they will contribute to the on-going debates about our collective future and our shared citizenship. In this respect, Ziauddin Sardar, a Muslim and culture critic, and Meryl Wyn Davies call for an authentic pluralism:

Pluralism is not the acceptance of tradition as quaint exotica in private manifestations of clothing, cooking and at forms or seasonal entertainment.... Plurality is acknowledging the existence of other axioms and values that cherish freedom, justice, equity and much more, *as different modes of operation, within a different construction of life ways. Plurality is accepting that these life ways can contribute constructively to the consensus of a heterogeneous community.* (Sarder and Davies, 1990:253, emphasis mine).

Sarder and Davies, I would argue, are pressing for a view of citizenship which reflects the very best of the historic ideals of Canadian citizenship and the potential inherent in Canadian Multiculturalism.

Scholars have come to recognize that secularization doesn't work for interpreting post-industrial societies. Yet, the dominant ideology of governments, media and the arts appears to hold the view that only in a secular society can freedom and democracy flourish.



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- <sup>2</sup> The IMDB is a longitudinal database of linked immigrant records and subsequent taxfilings. The database is maintained by Statistics Canada on behalf of Citizenship and Immigration Canada and a federal provincial funding consortium. For more information see: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/srr/pd/res4bi.pdf>
- <sup>3</sup> To benchmark the entry earning of skilled workers against the Canadian average is not an adequate reflection of the objectives of the program. A more appropriate benchmark, such as similarly skilled Canadian-born individuals entering the labour market at a comparable time, could be taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances/Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics data.
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
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


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
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
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