



Mel Lastman
Mayor of Toronto



Gérald Tremblay
Maire de Montréal



Peter J. Kelly
Mayor, Halifax
Regional Municipality

Sylvia Bashevkin
University of Toronto

Maurice Beaudin
Université de Moncton

Larry Bourne
University of Toronto

Cindy-Ann Bryant
Statistics Canada

David Crombie
Canadian Urban Institute

Vera Danyluk
Former Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the
Montreal Urban Community

Jino Distasio
University of Winnipeg

Raphaël Fischler
McGill University

Ron Keenberg
Royal Architectural Society of Canada

Rodrigue Landry
Université de Moncton

Glenn Miller
Canadian Urban Institute

Douglas Norris
Statistics Canada

Andrew Sancton
University of Western Ontario

The Assembly of First Nations

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disponible jusqu'au 15 mars 2003

CANADIAN ISSUES THÈMES CANADIENS

February / Février 2003



OUR CITIES NOS VILLES

INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CELEBRATE!



TM Rogers Broadcasting Limited.

INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS ON OMNI

Name of Program	Language	Original Time	
Caribbean Vibrations	English	2:30PM - 3:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Kontakt	Ukrainian	1:00PM - 2:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Latin Vibes Television	Spanish	4:00PM - 5:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Lehen Malti	Maltese	10:00AM - 10:30AM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Macedonian Heritage Hour	Macedonian	5:00PM - 6:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Magyar Képek TV	Hungarian	12:30PM - 1:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Morning Waves	Russian	7:00AM - 8:00AM (Sunday)	- OMNI.1
Moi Români	Romanian	12:00PM - 12:30PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Paqja Shqiptare	Albanian	2:00PM - 2:30PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Russian Waves	Russian	10:00PM - 10:30PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.1
Azmas	Amharic (Ethiopian)	2:30PM - 3:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Alfhan Hindara	Pushto/Dari	1:00PM - 1:30PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Anastran	Bengali	12:30PM - 1:00PM (Sunday)	- OMNI.2
Ariang Korea	Korean	6:30PM - 7:00PM (Sunday)	- OMNI.2
Flp	Filipino-English	12:00PM - 12:30PM (Sunday)	- OMNI.2
Front Page Philippines	Tagalog/Visayan	4:00PM - 4:30PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Iran Zamaneh Today and Pasargad Today	Persian	12:00PM - 1:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Kala Kaviya	Sinhalese	10:30AM - 11:00AM (Sunday)	- OMNI.2
Malayala Shabnam	Malayalam	11:00AM - 11:30AM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Musawa'at Arabia TV	Arabic	1:30PM - 2:30PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Muqsalka Soomsalka	Somali	10:00AM - 10:30AM (Sunday)	- OMNI.2
Nor Kai Horizon	Armenian	9:00AM - 10:00AM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Ondes Africaines	French (African)	3:00PM - 3:30PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
Planet Africa Television	English (African)	3:30PM - 4:00PM (Saturday)	- OMNI.2
TV Viet Tien	Vietnamese	11:00AM - 12:00PM (Sunday)	- OMNI.2

With the launch of OMNI.2, Rogers Media television set new records in diversity broadcasting. Combined, OMNI.1 (CFMT-TV) and OMNI.2 will provide quality programming to over 50 different communities.

Twenty-five Independent producers were introduced at the OMNI Launch and joined The Hon. Sheila Copps, Minister of Canadian Heritage as she congratulated the OMNI team in numerous languages. Ted Rogers spoke of his 35 years of ongoing commitment to multilingual television in Canada.

Upholding this commitment to cultural diversity, Madeline Ziniak, Vice President and Station Manager, announced the production initiatives totalling \$50 million, of which \$30 million will be specifically dedicated to Independent Production.

Committed to Cultural Diversity!



OMNI
DIVERSITY TELEVISION

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EDITOR / RÉDACTEUR EN CHEF
Robert Israel

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS / ASSISTANTS ÉDITORIAUX
Mathias Oliva, Lenny Barboza

DESIGN / GRAPHISME
Bang! Marketing (514) 849-2264 – 1-888-942-BANG
info@bang-marketing.com

ADVERTISING / PUBLICITÉ
robert.israel@acs-aec.ca
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LETTERS/LETTRES

Comments on this edition of Canadian Issues?

We want to hear from you.

Write to *Canadian Issues – Letters*, ACS, a/s UQAM, V-5140, P.O. Box 8888, succ. Centre-ville, Montreal (Quebec) Canada, H3C 3P8. Or e-mail us at <robert.israel@acs-aec.ca> Your letters may be edited for length and clarity.

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Our Cities

For an issue that directly affects four of every five Canadians, the health of the country's cities has received scant attention. That appears to be changing.

Recent amalgamations of some of Canada's largest cities and a federal urban task force have clearly expanded the debate on the future of our metropolitan centres. This month's contributors offer distinct views on the difficult challenges that lie ahead, and together sharpen the focus on a new urban agenda for Canada.

Three of the country's most prominent mayors – Mel Lastman, Gerald Tremblay and Peter Kelly – lead our discussion by answering pointed and provocative questions on the issues confronting their “mega” cities. They look at their successes and failures to date, address the roles of the provinces and the federal government on urban issues and examine what must be accomplished to ensure a bright future.

Douglas Norris and Cindy-Ann Bryant assess the recent demographic changes and migration patterns in Canada's major census metropolitan areas. Larry Bourne then measures the discord between urbanization and the structures of local municipal government and ponders what various urban trends might mean for urban governance.

Specific communities are deeply affected by urban trends. For our francophone minorities, in the midst of an exodus from rural to urban regions, Maurice Beaudin and Rodrigue Landry point to education as the key to community development and full participation in emerging economies. Sylvia Bashevkin analyzes the implications of amalgamation on social policy and electoral gender representation in a comparison of data between Toronto and London, England.

Raphaël Fischler investigates the challenges to municipal administration through the lens of Montreal and cautions that a broad urban policy is needed to offset the counterproductive measures our governments have introduced. Jino Distasio has witnessed a decline of Winnipeg's inner city neighbourhoods and a shift in the commercial structure of its downtown region. An increased role of community groups is helping to reverse the decline and might be leading the way a toward a brighter future.

Andrew Sancton notes that Canada is alone among western nations to go the merger route. He suggests that governments have offered little evidence that the quality of life in our cities will improve under the new structures.

Solutions to urban woes? David Crombie and Glenn Miller probe the underlying principles of a model called “Smart Growth” and explain how its broad precepts can be adapted to the benefit of Canadian cities. Vera Danyluk notes that our cities, now recognized as the drivers of the economy, have serious problems in need of immediate attention. For starters, she proposes that municipalities receive constitutional recognition as an order of government.

The Assembly of First Nations explores its governance concerns through a brief historical review and contends that the recently introduced First Nations Governance Act reflects the aspirations of only some First Nations and therefore should not be imposed upon all.

Ron Keenburtg concludes our discussion with his hope that an ambitious vision for a vibrant urban future in Canada will one day become a reality. Now, who could argue with that?

Nos Villes

La question de la santé des villes canadiennes n'a reçu que très peu d'attention, même si elle affecte directement quatre Canadiens sur cinq. Cette situation semble changer.

Les fusions récentes de quelques unes des plus grandes villes canadiennes et un groupe de travail fédéral sur les questions urbaines ont élargi le débat sur le futur des centres métropolitains. Dans ce numéro, nos collaborateurs nous offrent des points de vue uniques sur les différents défis qui devront être surmontés dans le futur proposent l'établissement d'un nouvel agenda sur les questions urbaines au Canada.

Trois des maires les plus proéminents du Canada – Mel Lastman, Gérald Tremblay et Peter Kelly – débute notre discussion en répondant à des questions pointues et provocantes sur les défis et les questions affectant leur « méga » ville. Ils examinent leurs réussites et leurs échecs jusqu'à date, les rôles des provinces et du gouvernement fédéral vis-à-vis les questions urbaines et ce qui devrait être accompli afin d'assurer un futur brillant.

Douglas Norris and Cindy-Ann Bryant évaluent les changements démographiques récents et les patterns de migration dans les régions métropolitaines de recensement. Larry Bourne mesure ensuite la discordance entre l'urbanisation et les structures des gouvernements municipaux et considère la signification de certaines tendances urbaines au sujet de la gouvernance urbaine.

Certaines communautés sont très affectées par les tendances urbaines. Pour les minorités francophones vivant un exode des régions rurales vers les régions urbaines, Maurice Beaudin et Rodrigue Landry proposent l'éducation comme étant la clé du développement communautaire et d'une pleine participation dans les économies émergentes. Sylvia Bashevkin analyse les implications de l'amalgamation sur les politiques publiques et la représentation électorale des hommes et des femmes dans une comparaison de données entre Toronto et Londres.

Utilisant Montréal comme modèle, Raphaël Fischler examine les défis pour l'administration publique et affirme qu'une politique publique vaste est nécessaire afin de compenser les mesures contre-productives introduites par nos gouvernements. Jino Distasio a observé un déclin des quartiers du centre-ville de Winnipeg et un changement dans la structure commerciale du centre-ville. Le rôle accru des groupes communautaires aide à renverser ces tendances et pourrait mener à un futur plus positif.

Andrew Sancton note que le Canada est le seul parmi les nations occidentales à effectuer des fusions. Il suggère que les gouvernements n'ont offert que très peu de preuves de l'augmentation supposée de la qualité de vie dans nos villes restructurées.

Des solutions aux aspects négatifs de la vie urbaine? David Crombie et Glenn Miller explorent les principes de base d'un modèle nommé « Smart Growth » et expliquent de quelle manière ses préceptes pourraient être adaptés afin de bénéficier aux villes canadiennes. Vera Danyluk note que nos villes, maintenant reconnues comme étant le moteur de l'économie, souffrent de sérieux problèmes et requièrent une attention immédiate. En premier lieu, elle propose que les municipalités reçoivent une reconnaissance constitutionnelle en tant qu'ordre de gouvernement.

L'Assemblée des Premières Nations explore ses inquiétudes envers la gouvernance en présentant un bref résumé historique et prétend que la Loi sur la gouvernance des premières nations, récemment introduite, ne reflète que les intérêts de certaines premières nations et donc ne devrait pas être imposée à chacune d'entre-elles.

Ron Keenburtg conclut notre discussion en exprimant son espoir qu'une ambitieuse vision d'un futur vibrant pour les régions urbaines du Canada deviendra un jour une réalité. Qui voudrait argumenter contre cela?

MEGA-CITIES AND THEIR MAYORS

Interviews with Three Municipal Leaders

LES GRANDES VILLES ET LEUR MAIRE

Entretiens avec trois chefs municipaux



GÉRALD TREMBLAY

Maire de Montréal
Fusionnée en 2002



MEL LASTMAN

Mayor of Toronto
Amalgamated in 1998



PETER J. KELLY

Mayor, Halifax
Regional Municipality
Amalgamated in 1996

As mayors of three of Canada's largest cities, Mel Lastman, Gérald Tremblay and Peter Kelly are at the forefront in the administration and governance of a relatively new urban model for Canada – the mega-city. In candid interviews with *Canadian Issues*, each offers great insight into his city's successes and failures to date, and peers forward to what challenges might lie ahead.

En tant que maires de trois des plus grandes villes du Canada, Mel Lastman, Gérald Tremblay et Peter Kelly se trouvent au cœur de l'administration et de la gouvernance d'un modèle urbain relativement nouveau pour le Canada – la mégaville. Dans des entrevues qui ont été accordés à *Thèmes canadiens*, chacun d'eux nous offre un regard sincère et franc sur les succès et les échecs vécus jusqu'à date et sur les défis qui pourront se présenter dans le futur.

What were your primary concerns when you began your mandate of governing a mega-city?

Lastman Amalgamation was initiated by the province. In a referendum held by the former municipalities in Spring 1997, over 70% of citizens voted against the province's amalgamation proposal. People are our greatest strength. We needed to make sure amalgamation worked for everyone to build the public support required to achieve our vision. Polls conducted in 2000, two years after amalgamation, showed that 66% believed that amalgamation of the former municipalities provides better government than the previous two-tiered system (*Toronto Star/EKOS*). Despite the increasing good will from our citizens, we were dealing with provincial downloading at the same time as the effects of amalgamation. We were very concerned that the lack of proper alignment of the increased responsibilities mandated by the province and our limited financial capacity would make the city's financial situation unsustainable and prevent us from realizing our full potential. This has proved to be the case.

Tremblay Comme nous ne vivions pas un début de mandat « normal », nos préoccupations et les défis qui se présentaient à nous sortaient tout autant de l'ordinaire. Au niveau des préoccupations, la première qui nous animait, et qui nous anime constamment, était d'assurer aux citoyennes et aux citoyens de la nouvelle Ville de Montréal la livraison de services de qualité tout en n'augmentant pas la charge fiscale globale des contribuables montréalais. Il était absolument hors de question d'accepter, sous quelque forme que ce soit, une baisse dans la qualité des services. Un an après la naissance de la nouvelle Ville de Montréal, nous pouvons affirmer que nous avons réussi à remplir cette importante attente des Montréalais.

Un immense défi qui se présentait en ce début d'année 2002 était de compléter harmonieusement l'intégration des quelques 29 000 employés de la Ville. Six mois après le début de l'année, plus de 95 % des employés étaient intégrés au sein d'un poste correspondant à leurs compétences et qualifications. Encore là, donc, le pari a été tenu.

Kelly Perhaps the issue of greatest concern was fear of the loss of community identity in the amalgamated municipality. Since the municipality was formed in 1996 through a provincially initiated amalgamation of Halifax, Dartmouth, Bedford and Municipality of Halifax County which included 196 distinct communities, I felt one of the greatest challenges was to ensure that all communities felt confident that their distinct identities were preserved and protected within the larger political/governmental unit.

The rapid growth and development within the municipality requires sound planning for the infrastructure this growth requires. Ensuring rational growth according to planning standards is important. Having a core of economic activity on a peninsula also keeps transportation issues at the forefront.

Another important issue was the development of wastewater treatment facilities, which would once and for all stop the flow of raw sewage into Halifax Harbour. This \$350 million dollar project is now underway. Over the next 5 years this project will see the completion of three sewage treatment facilities.

What are the major challenges to governing a mega-city?

Lastman With a population of 2.5 million people, Toronto is the fifth largest city in North America. Our \$6.8 billion gross 2002 operating budget is larger than the budgets of most Canadian provinces. Our challenges include trying to operate within a provincial legislative framework that lacks the flexibility required to meet the responsibilities of large local government; relying on local property taxes that are regressive, don't keep pace with changes in the economy and can't respond adequately to changing human service needs and growing infrastructure pressures; and keeping the City accessible and open to the concerns of diverse communities.

Tremblay One of the major challenges of governing the new city of Montreal is maintaining the personalities of all 27 boroughs while developing a shared sense of identity. We are focused on managing a city with a population of 1.8 million and promoting the cultural, economic, social and sustainable development of the metropolis. Another primary area of concern is accelerating the city's growth while ensuring existing wealth is shared among all Montrealers.

Kelly The geography of our regional municipality can be daunting. We are the approximate size of Prince Edward Island. While most people perceive that the vortex of economic activity takes place near the central core, we must remember that the issues of the most rural and remote community are equally important.

Quelles ont été vos plus grandes réussites jusqu'à date ? Vos plus grandes déceptions ?

Lastman There have been many successes. We have continued

our role as the economic engine of the country, successfully competing not with other Canadian cities, but with cities around the world, at the same time striking a balance between social development, environmental health and economic growth. Toronto, along with other great Canadian cities, has stimulated growing recognition that urban issues and concerns are central to the very future of our society. This recognition is reflected in the renewed interest shown by the private sector, by academics, by various new and old community organizations and increasingly by federal and provincial governments. There is a commitment of \$1.5 billion by all three levels of government to fund the infrastructure of our waterfront revitalization, a \$12 billion development that will transform Toronto's waterfront. We were able to maintain a zero tax increase in the first term, in the face of restructuring and service harmonization costs, provincial downloading and limited federal assistance. Now, after much resistance, the provincial and federal governments have returned to helping fund transit and our long term credit rating has gone up. I hope the other levels of government will also be able to co-operate regarding desperately needed affordable housing and other vital services that can't be adequately supported by property taxes alone. And we have harnessed the diverse ideas of our many communities into a unified, long-term vision for the City.

Some disappointments: We have not been able to secure the legal and financial powers we need to meet our unique responsibilities and needs. We will be continuing to press other levels of government to allow us to build on our competitive advantages and achieve our full potential. Despite the fantastic support of our people and the work of our Bid team, the IOC didn't award Toronto the 2008 summer Olympic Games. Nevertheless, we are continuing our commitment to waterfront revitalization, to sport and recreation by young and old alike and to continuing Toronto's leading role in culture and tourism. And while we have made considerable progress, there are still too many young people without a voice in society, too many citizens feel unsafe and despair over having an affordable place to live continues.

Tremblay Notre plus grand succès est certainement d'avoir tenu, tel que promis, le Sommet de Montréal. Ce grand rendez-vous a été l'occasion pour les Montréalaises et les Montréalais de s'approprier leur ville.

Dès les premiers mois de l'année, nous avons tenu plusieurs engagements. Plusieurs de ces réalisations bénéficient grandement aux jeunes montréalais, parce que la jeunesse a toujours occupé de place de choix dans nos préoccupations. Ainsi, les étudiants montréalais bénéficient dorénavant d'un tarif réduit lorsqu'ils se déplacent dans le réseau de transport en commun de la Société de transport de Montréal. La ligne bleue, desservant notamment l'Université de Montréal, a vu ses heures de service augmentées. La génération montante montréalaise pourra maintenant participer à la hauteur de ses convictions et de ses énergies à l'édification d'un Montréal meilleur: le Conseil jeunesse de Montréal a été implanté à cet égard.

Au niveau des ratés, certaines problématiques nous sont apparues beaucoup plus difficiles à régler que nous l'aurions voulu. Nommons, par exemple, la problématique de l'itinérance urbaine. Avec la démolition d'abris de fortune sous



Downtown Toronto, Ontario – photo courtesy Tourism Toronto

un viaduc pour raisons de sécurité, nous avons bien vite réalisé que l'itinérance a plusieurs visages et que chacun d'eux appelle une réponse différente, une intervention distincte. Loin de nous décourager, cette réalité nous stimule seulement à travailler avec encore plus d'acharnement pour apporter à ces hommes et à ces femmes le secours que la société a le devoir moral de leur porter.

Kelly I would have to emphasize our fiscal management as a major success. We have come forward with a budgetary surplus for the past three years and we are projecting another surplus this year. We have reduced our debt load by 42 million dollars over the past four years. Our strong economy and the growth of our assessment roles has allowed us to implement multi-year financial strategies. We have decreased our tax rate for the past three years a cumulative total of 3.4%.

I am very disappointed that we have had little success in forging a new governance relationship with the province. Halifax Regional Municipality has 40 % of the population and generates about half of the GDP of the province. I believe there is duplication and overlap in the provision of services between the two levels. Our citizens deserve the most cost effective government possible. In a properly rationalized governance relationship, HRM and the province would each deliver, exclusively, the services they are best equipped to deliver efficiently. Thus far few of our suggestions in this regard have been implemented.

We have not yet been able to complete our transportation strategy at this point. Citizens have made it very clear that it is very important to improve transportation infrastructure to meet the pressure of rapid growth.

Has the governance of minority communities been made more difficult by the creation of a mega-city?

Lastman The City's policies on access and equity are broad-based and respond to all groups facing disadvantage. The amalgamation of the 7 municipal structures provided an

opportunity to expand and harmonize the various access, equity and human rights policies that were in place prior to January 1998. The Transition Team recognised this and requested the new City of Toronto to establish a Task Force to undertake this task of harmonization. This work was completed and reported in 1999 to City Council which adopted 97 recommendations which formed the City's Action Plan on Access, Equity and Human Rights. As a result of these recommendations City Council also established 5 Community Advisory Committees and 4 Issue Based Working Groups to provide formal mechanisms for the community to provide policy advice to City Council. There are about 100 residents who belong to these Advisory Committees and Working Groups.

City Council has also decided to prepare a plan of Action for the Elimination of Racism and Discrimination. A consultative process has just been completed by a Council Reference Group which is composed of chairs of the Council's Advisory Committees and Working Groups. This consultation report, *Just Do It!* will be forwarded to the Chief Administrative Officer to the preparation of the City's Plan.

Tremblay Non. Chacune des anciennes villes fusionnées dans la nouvelle ville a un ou des représentants au sein du Comité exécutif et/ou du conseil municipal. De plus, la création des arrondissements et le fait que ceux-ci sont responsables des services dits de proximité permettent aux communautés locales un accès direct aux instances décisionnels.

Kelly I don't feel it has become more difficult. It is an important challenge, however, to ensure minority communities don't become lost in the bigness of this amalgamation. All communities deserve respect and our recognition of the issues and challenges which are their priorities.

There were concerns among citizens of the now-defunct cities that the loss of their communities would result in a loss of empowerment over

local issues. How has your administration addressed this?

Lastman Our six Community Councils are committees of City Council that consider the City's business of a local nature at the community level, and provide a forum for local input into Council's decision-making process. Their responsibilities generally include making recommendations to City Council on local planning and development matters, as well as neighbourhood matters including traffic plans, parking regulations and exemptions to certain City bylaws (i.e., sign, fence, ravine and tree-by-laws).

Tremblay Our administration's philosophy is to manage the city on the principles of decentralization. We have tried to ensure the borough councils are as autonomous as possible. Decentralization offers several advantages including allowing the boroughs to maintain control over local issues including permits, snow removal and sports and recreation. As well, encouraging the maximum amount of autonomy for the boroughs fosters a sense of community and empowerment among residents.

Kelly This issue has not arisen in the past two years. With the increased resources we were able to provide all of the communities which were amalgamated, greater access and input in shaping the decisions and framing our future came to all of our citizens. Our awareness of the danger of a loss of community identity coming in to amalgamation ensured that we were very proactive in building in a grass roots public forum into everything we do. We have instituted five community councils which meet regularly and through which citizens have an opportunity to participate in discussions of local community based issues with their councillors and municipal staff.

De quelle manière avez-vous tenté de démocratiser votre administration en invitant des opinions de représentants de différentes régions de la ville ?

Lastman On March 2, 1999, the City adopted four key principles of civic engagement: collaborative decision-making; accessibility; continuous improvement in citizen participation; and community capacity building. The Strategic Plan of the City of Toronto also identifies a strong commitment to open, accountable, transparent and participatory political decision-making.

The City of Toronto launched the civic engagement initiative – *Building the new City of Toronto: Reflections on Civic Engagement*. As part of this initiative, the City organized a series of seminars that explored effective ways for citizens to actively participate in political decision-making and the life of the community. In September 2000, City Council adopted the summary of findings from these seminars.

On the December 9, 2002, we launched another pilot project on civic engagement; it is a workshop entitled "If you love this City". This workshop will examine what individual citizens can do to make the City a better place to live.

We hope that these types of open, citizen-centred and inclusive consultations with citizens will help the City's future direction in civic engagement. We also envision that the City of Toronto will become a much more accessible government through our e-city initiative. This initiative focuses

on mechanisms and technology to pay municipal bills online (e-business), to obtain information about city services (e-services) and to engage in dialogue with other citizens via chat groups etc. (e-government).

Tremblay Il est question plus haut du Sommet de Montréal. Nul doute que cet événement fut un moment névralgique de la démocratie participative que nous instaurons dans la nouvelle Ville de Montréal. Plus de 3 000 personnes ont participé directement aux sommets d'arrondissements, sectoriels et au grand sommet des 4, 5 et 6 juin 2002.

Par ailleurs, nous avons mis sur pied 7 commissions du conseil municipal, qui permettent toutes aux citoyens intéressés de participer et de faire valoir leur point de vue. Nous avons mis sur pied, dans les 27 arrondissements, des comités consultatifs d'urbanisme, qui permettent eux aussi aux citoyens de s'exprimer sur les projets de développement qui touchent leur milieu de vie. Nous avons investi la présidence du conseil de pouvoirs accrus, afin notamment de stimuler et de faciliter la participation des Montréalaises et des Montréalais aux délibérations démocratiques. Nous avons mis sur pied, un conseil jeunesse et un conseil inter-culturel, dédié à ces clientèles et qui rempliront notamment la lourde tâche de favoriser la participation des ces personnes.

Kelly Whenever we are faced with an important or defining issue, we provide a well-advertised and easily accessible public forum in several strategic locations, which tend to be convenient centres for the community around them. I have also put in place the mayor's community round table discussions. Grassroots meetings in school gyms and church halls provide everyone with an opportunity to be heard in a comfortable and familiar environment.

We also use a variety of publications to get the word out quickly and invite comment. Our citizens are never shy about letting us know what is on their minds.

The municipal amalgamations took effect with many promises. Are there any among these that you would like to see amended?

Lastman The Ontario Government's policy on municipal amalgamation has been described as an example of "keeping a promise that was never made". In 1996, the province commissioned a study to estimate the potential savings and costs associated with Toronto's amalgamation. Comparing the estimates to the actual costs and savings reveals that savings from consolidation were under-estimated, immediate savings from efficiency gains were over-estimated and one-time and annual costs were under-estimated.

Tremblay No.

Kelly Yes. Unfortunately, many promises were made when looking through "rose-coloured glasses" at an idealized amalgamated municipal unit. We are now in a position to analyze the promises in terms of the reality of amalgamation. This would be an exercise worth doing.

Will the merger allow your city to successfully address its fiscal concerns?

Lastman It's important to remember that prior to Toronto's merger, 73% of gross expenditures were for pre-



Halifax, Nova Scotia – photo courtesy HRM / J. d'Entremont

viously amalgamated services of the former Metropolitan government, the major ones being social services, police and public transit. This left only 27%, or \$1.5 billion of the city's gross expenditure available for further amalgamation. At the same time, additional responsibilities and costs have been downloaded to the city by the province as part of the realignment of services, estimated at \$276 million in 2001 alone.

In addition, there have been one-time transition costs estimated at the end of 2000 to be \$275 million. These include staff exit costs, retraining costs, business information systems, facility modifications, and negotiating new collective agreements. Net service and user fee harmonization costs for major cost services (e.g. solid waste collection and recycling, winter maintenance etc.) have been held to a modest \$18 million despite the tendency in other jurisdictions to see service levels rise to the highest level of amalgamating municipalities.

On the savings side, by 2000 the city had realized \$136 million in annual savings, most of this achieved through a reduction in staff positions. This exceeded a provincially commissioned KPMG study that estimated the City might achieve \$82 to \$112 million from amalgamation. Executive management positions have been reduced by 60% (from 381 to 154) and management positions were reduced by 34% (from 1,837 to 1,204). In addition further consolidations have been made in facilities, business systems etc.

However as mentioned earlier, the short-term impact of amalgamation is of minor importance as compared to the need for fundamental legislative and fiscal reforms on the part of the provincial and federal government to ensure our long-term financial sustainability.

Tremblay La taxation devient, dans ce nouvel environnement, un puissant outil d'équité entre les différents secteurs de la ville. Nous comptons harmoniser la fiscalité sur le territoire sur une période de 10 ans, comme la loi le prévoit. Cette harmonisation permettra une plus grande équité en terme de charge fiscale supportée par les con-

tribuables par rapport au niveau de service reçu. Dans Montréal-Nord, par exemple, nous avons instauré la cueillette sélective, pratique qui n'était pas en place dans cette ancienne ville.

Un autre avantage indéniable de la naissance de la nouvelle ville est que l'harmonisation de la fiscalité permettra d'orienter notre compétitivité vers les grands centres urbains nord-américains plutôt qu'entre les différents secteurs de l'île, comme c'était le cas avant. Bref, dans le nouveau contexte, la fiscalité devient un levier de développement global, avec des retombées réparties équitablement sur le territoire.

Finalement, dans notre gestion de la fiscalité, nous allons respecter certains principes : l'autonomie locale, l'équité fiscale, la neutralité fiscale et la simplicité. Nous rechercherons aussi la stabilité en évitant les variations brusques des comptes de taxes.

Kelly Yes. The critical mass created by amalgamating our communities is indeed having the effect that it is now possible to address fiscal concerns earlier and more completely.

Provincial officials have been under pressure to give their largest cities more powers. Are there sign of progress on this front?

Kelly As I mentioned earlier, this is one of my disappointments. HRM has the potential to deliver most services and create some infrastructure within our boundaries in a more timely and cost effective way than any other level of government. However, the limitation of the legislation and traditional role relationship with the province and federal government are in the way. The province created amalgamation but failed to give the municipality the legislative and fiscal tools to do the job.

As a member of the Big City Mayor's Caucus of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, I have been very active in lobbying of late to gain recognition that the federal government can deal directly with large municipalities in creating infrastructure partnership. They don't need to work

through the province to a municipal partnership. We do see some movement on the part of the federal government in this direction. Manitoba and British Columbia recently passed legislation which allows Winnipeg and Vancouver to operate more autonomously and therefore more directly with the challenges they face.

Tremblay Lors du Sommet de Montréal en juin 2002, le gouvernement du Québec s'est engagé à conclure un contrat (appelé le contrat de ville) avec Montréal. Ce contrat de ville doit prévoir de nouvelles sources de revenus pour la nouvelle ville. Les négociations entourant le contrat de ville ont toujours lieu et devrait se conclure en début d'année 2003.

Lastman There is growing recognition on the part of many provinces that Canada's largest cities need a new deal that provides them with access to financial resources in line with their responsibilities. On August 19, 2002 Premier Eves announced to the Association of Municipalities of Ontario that he is prepared to "consider other methods of revenue sharing among municipalities, the province and the federal government, provided that they are equitable, make sense and are responsible to taxpayers". However, subsequent messages from the Province suggest that they will only move decisively on this front if and when the "vertical fiscal imbalance" between the province and the federal governments is addressed (i.e. the feds pony up a lot more money for health care).

Ontario's new Municipal Act, which came into effect on January 1, 2003, is responsive to the language and concepts of municipal empowerment that have been in use in other provinces and territories for a number of years. For example, it talks about natural person powers; broad spheres of municipal jurisdiction; and a willingness to consult with municipal government. Unfortunately, the Act doesn't really deliver on its promise to empower cities. It doesn't do nearly enough to provide large cities, like Toronto, with the legislative tools and flexibility we need to carry out our responsibilities in an effective, innovative and efficient manner. The Act still takes a "one size fits all approach" to dealing with municipalities in Ontario, and it appears to have been drafted for the smallest, least sophisticated municipalities in the province.

In contrast to Ontario's new *Municipal Act*, the new Liberal government in BC appears to be developing municipal legislation that signals a dramatic departure from the traditions of top-down control, prescription and paternalism that have traditionally characterised provincial-municipal relations in Canada. Specifically, BC's *Community Charter legislation* will reinforce in law that municipalities are an order of government in the province.

Quel rôle le gouvernement fédéral peut-il jouer afin d'améliorer la condition des villes du Canada ?

Kelly The infrastructure partnerships mentioned above are one way. Another would be to put pressure on the province to create a new charter for large amalgamated municipalities. This charter would create a new model of governance, which would reflect all the advantages of large amalgamated municipal units.

Tremblay Les municipalités constituent une juridiction

provinciale. Par ailleurs, le gouvernement fédéral est un important propriétaire foncier à Montréal, étant notamment propriétaire du Port de Montréal. Le gouvernement fédéral, notamment par sa contribution aux programmes de subventions aux infrastructures municipales, est un partenaire de premier plan de la Ville de Montréal. Par ailleurs, dans les dossiers de développement économique majeurs, le gouvernement fédéral participe aux efforts concertés visant à accélérer la création de richesse.

Lastman The federal government can enhance its role as a funder, partner, and enabler of municipal governments by augmenting direct investment in cities, developing new revenue-sharing arrangements, and providing more frequent and meaningful opportunities for federal-municipal consultation. Some specifics:

Direct Investment: Commit to providing cities with access to long-term, stable financing to support and invest in public transit, affordable housing and infrastructure – and give cities a seat at the table where these federal programs are designed and priorities are set.

Revenue Sharing: Provide cities with greater access to tax revenues that are generated in cities (e.g. portion of the federal gas tax or GST) and/or extend the GST exemption for municipalities.

Consultation: Invite municipal representatives to participate in the federal budget process; Meet regularly with municipal representatives to review federal policy and programs that have a direct, substantial impact on cities – i.e. immigration and immigrant settlement. Consult with municipal representatives before developing federal policy that has a significant impact on cities.

Apply an Urban Lens: Develop administrative and political structures that apply an "urban lens" to federal policy and programming.

Many of Canada's mayors have stressed the importance of labour peace, and easing animosity and confrontation with municipal unions. Where is your city on this critical issue?

Kelly We do our utmost to maintain a healthy productive workforce where unionized employees feel they are treated fairly in the compensation they receive and the working conditions at their workplace. We want our employees to be proud to work for the municipality and to show this pride in the way they do their work. All of our managers receive extensive labour relations training. They are trained to properly manage within a collective agreement. In addition we have labour/management committees which meet monthly. This allows the proactive handling of issues that crop up and doesn't allow a build up of unresolved issues. We also emphasize workplace safety through our safety committees.

Tremblay Dès son arrivée au pouvoir, l'administration Tremblay a rencontré les représentants syndicaux pour leur proposer une nouvelle approche afin de conclure les premières conventions collectives de la nouvelle ville. Cette approche s'est concrétisée par une annonce commune des parties syndicales et de la ville lors du Sommet de Montréal en juin 2002. Les négociations sont toujours en cours.

Lastman Amalgamation has created tensions in our workforce. It has served as a catalyst to review wages that had been frozen or received very limited increases since the early 1990s. It also meant that some employees doing similar work were being paid at different rates. We have worked closely with all the unions involved to manage the transition in a way that was fair to city employees, while being responsible to our taxpayers. We have been able to accomplish a great deal through good will, hard work and compromise. Unfortunately, a number of issues have needed to be resolved through arbitration, sometimes accompanied by job action. With the latest arbitration award, I am sure we can now move forward to continue delivering the services Torontonians need and expect.

A generation from now, what will we be saying about municipal mergers?

Kelly A generation from now we will be wondering why the financial means to fulfill the promise of amalgamation was not framed along with the act of amalgamation. Progress could have come even more quickly if we were properly empowered.

Tremblay Initially, people expressed many concerns about municipal mergers. We listened to their concerns and have worked very hard to preserve the quality of life of citizens. With our administration in power, people will say it was possible to build a city that respects the true values of its citizens and is developed to its full potential in partnership with the other major metropolises of the world.

Lastman Municipal mergers are neither inherently good nor bad. Each municipal merger proposal should be evaluated on its own merits. This was true 10 years ago, this is true now, and my guess is that this will still be true in a generation.

As with any kind of major organizational change, municipal mergers create new challenges and new opportunities. Hopefully, we'll be able to look back on how amalgamation unfolded in Toronto and say: "We made a few mistakes along the way, but Toronto is still one of the greatest cities in the world – it's a prosperous, safe, vibrant urban centre, with a responsible and responsive municipal government."

What do you see for your city in the decades to come? What must be done to make it happen?

Kelly With the very rapid cycle of growth we are presently undergoing, we have to carefully plan and budget for infrastructure to maintain the quality of life we now enjoy. A very real possibility on the transportation horizon is the development of a commuter rail service. Certainly, the resources are at hand to maintain and even enhance our quality of life. The challenge will be for us to seize this opportunity and to convince our provincial and federal governments to grant the municipality the autonomy to meet its challenges quickly and directly.

Tremblay Nous négocions présentement les conventions collectives des employés de la nouvelle Ville. L'harmonisation des 29 conventions collectives en vigueur sur l'île constitue un travail colossal. La Loi 170 indique que cette harmonisation doit se faire à coût nul pour les

contribuables montréalais. Parallèlement, lors du Sommet de Montréal, nous nous sommes engagés, avec nos partenaires syndicaux, à développer un nouveau cadre de relations de travail, davantage axé sur le partenariat. Nous tenons à cette nouvelle approche car elle nous permettra de travailler conjointement à l'amélioration des services que nous offrons aux Montréalaises et aux Montréalais.

Par ailleurs, la nouvelle Ville de Montréal est devenue une métropole de classe mondiale. Son environnement compétitif s'est considérablement élargi et nous devons revoir nos façons de faire pour y prendre la place qui nous revient. Notre objectif est aussi ambitieux que réalisable : hisser Montréal dans le peloton de tête des grandes villes nord-américaines. Pour y arriver, nous devons ajouter de la valeur aux interventions et aux projets de développement qui sont actuellement proposés et à ceux qui sont à venir. L'administration municipale se propose d'être proactive dans le domaine du développement économique et fait appel à ses partenaires pour qu'ils développent une approche intégrative avec les autres projets et acteurs de développement. Les projets de développement montréalais devront dorénavant répondre à deux critères de base : ils devront accélérer la création de la richesse pour mieux la répartir et ils devront également contribuer à l'amélioration de la qualité de vie des Montréalaises et des Montréalais.

Finalement, notre plus grand défi est sans aucun doute de faire de Montréal une ville encore plus ouverte, encore plus juste pour tous. Nous travaillons quotidiennement à l'amélioration des milieux de vie montréalais et l'amélioration de la qualité de vie des Montréalaises et Montréalais. Notre défi est donc simple : faire encore plus et le faire encore mieux.

Lastman Although we face some very real short and medium-term challenges, I think millions of people will still be proud to call Toronto home 10, 20 and 30 years from now. In many ways, Toronto is already a model for cities around the world, and there's no reason why this can't continue to be the case. Toronto's cultural, social and economic diversity will continue to be its greatest strength. To ensure that Toronto achieves its full potential and continues to be a place that people from around the world want to call home, three things need to happen:

(I) We need a "new deal" from both the province and the federal government that provides the City with financial resources and legislative tools in line with its responsibilities. Simply put, the current financing arrangement between the three levels of governments is fiscally unsustainable for the City. A better alignment of resources and responsibilities is desperately needed.

(II) Current and future generations of this City's political leaders need to adhere closely to the City's new Official Plan – a plan which will allow the City to effectively manage its growth.

(III) We need to develop more robust mechanisms to co-ordinate planning, growth, transportation, waste management, and watershed management issues with all of the communities that comprise the GTA. It's time we all recognize that Toronto's long-term success depends on the success of the GTA, and vice versa.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN CANADA'S URBAN AREAS:

Results from the 2001 Census

ABSTRACT

The authors assess the demographic changes in Canada's major census metropolitan areas as shown by the 2001 Census, in particular population changes, the aging of the urban population, and changes in the composition of their households. This article is based in part on 2001 Census analytic articles released in *The Daily*, Statistics Canada's official release bulletin, and available on Statistics Canada's website (www.statcan.ca). The authors would like to acknowledge the comments received from John Flanders on an earlier draft.

During the past several decades, Canada's population has become increasingly concentrated in four broad urban regions: the extended Golden Horseshoe (the census metropolitan areas of Toronto, Oshawa, Kitchener, Hamilton and St. Catharines-Niagara, as well as the census agglomerations of Barrie and Guelph, and some adjacent areas); Montréal and its adjacent region; the Lower Mainland of British Columbia and southern Vancouver Island; and the Calgary-Edmonton corridor.

Between 1996 and 2001, the population of these four regions combined grew 7.6%, compared with virtually no growth (+0.5%) in the rest of the country. In 2001, 51% of Canada's population lived in these four regions, compared with 49% in 1996 and 41% in 1971.

The nation's 27 census metropolitan areas (CMAs), large urban centres with a population of 100,000 or more, were home to just over 64% of the total Canadian population in 2001. In fact, one-third of the population lived in one of the three largest metropolitan areas: Montreal, Toronto or Vancouver.

The national perspective: Lowest census-to-census growth rate in history

Nationally, the 2001 Census counted just over 30 million people, a gain of 4% from the 1996 Census. This was one of the lowest census-to-census growth rates in the history of the country.

There have been only two other periods in which the population grew this slowly: during the Depression of the 1930s and the period between 1981 and 1986. The slow growth between 1981 and 1986 was due to exceptionally low levels of immigration, less than 500,000 a year.

In contrast, between 1996 and 2001, immigration reached its highest levels in recent decades, accounting for about 60% of the total growth. During the late 1990s, immigration to Canada exceeded one million.

Nevertheless, the low level of natural increase, resulting from a decline in the number of births and an increase in the number of deaths, offset the positive impacts of immigration. The drop in births was due to continuing low fertility, coupled with the fact that the large baby boom cohorts had moved through the prime child-bearing ages. The increase in deaths was due to the aging of the population.

Large metropolitan areas grew four times faster than smaller urban centres

Between 1996 and 2001, the population in the 27 census metropolitan areas combined increased 6.2%, compared with a growth rate of 1.5% for smaller urban areas of 10,000 to 100,000, known as census agglomerations, or CAs. The remaining small town and rural areas experienced a small 0.4% decline in population for the same period.

Although the large urban areas as an aggregate grew most rapidly, there was a wide variation in growth rates. The population in 11 of the 27 census metropolitan areas increased at a faster rate than

**TABLE 1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS, CANADA
(RANKING BY % CHANGE 1996-2001)**

CMAs	Population			Migration 1996-2001			From Outside of Canada
	Population 2001	% Change 1991-96	% Change 1996-01	Net Internal			
				15-29	All Other Ages	Total	Total
Calgary	951395	9.0	15.8	32100	24910	57010	42415
Oshawa	296298	11.9	10.2	4110	13340	17450	2765
Toronto	4682897	9.4	9.8	27560	-72100	-44540	374195
Edmonton	937845	2.6	8.7	16035	13155	29190	24095
Vancouver	1986965	14.3	8.5	12415	-33020	-20605	168125
Kitchener	414284	7.4	8.2	3030	4705	7735	14505
Abbotsford	147370	20.2	8.0	130	2270	2400	4950
Windsor	307877	6.3	7.3	2015	4075	6090	13300
Ottawa-Gatineau	1063664	7.3	6.5	15415	11085	26500	43215
Hamilton	662401	4.1	6.1	3025	13610	16635	21530
Halifax	359183	3.7	4.7	6630	940	7570	6575
London	432451	4.5	3.8	1520	-1720	-200	11730
Saskatoon	225927	3.8	3.1	1600	-3415	-1815	4165
Montréal	3426350	3.7	3.0	27400	-39935	-12535	115215
Sherbrooke	153811	4.7	2.8	-1740	25	-1715	2510
Victoria	311902	5.7	2.5	2095	145	2240	8020
Québec	682757	4.1	1.6	-475	-12845	-13320	6165
Kingston	146838	5.1	1.6	-1505	1865	360	2975
St. Catharines-Niagara	377009	2.2	1.2	-1830	4900	3070	6285
Winnipeg	671274	1.0	0.6	1665	-9640	-7975	14885
Regina	192800	1.0	-0.4	-170	-5715	-5885	2555
St. John's	172918	1.3	-0.7	-2945	-2585	-5530	1400
Trois-Rivières	137507	2.7	-1.7	-2210	95	-2115	570
Saint John	122678	-0.1	-2.4	-800	-1485	-2285	1000
Saguenay	154938	-0.3	-3.4	-3905	-1780	-5685	360
Thunder Bay	121986	0.5	-3.7	-2710	-2120	-4830	605
Sudbury	155601	1.8	-6.0	-4070	-3210	-7280	650

Source: Census of Canada

the 4% national average. But nine others had smaller positive growth, while the population of seven CMAs declined.

With three exceptions (Ottawa-Gatineau, Windsor and Halifax), the census metropolitan areas with the strongest growth were located in three regions: the Golden Horseshoe in southern Ontario, the Calgary-Edmonton corridor, and British Columbia's Lower Mainland. The fastest growing census metropolitan areas were Calgary (+15.8%), Oshawa (+10.2%), Toronto (+9.8%), Edmonton (+8.7%) and Vancouver (+8.5%).

Among the 115 census agglomerations, or CAs, the population of 23 increased at a faster rate than the national average of 4%. Some 35 CAs had a slower but positive growth rate, while the population of 57 declined. Those experiencing the greatest rate of growth were Barrie, (+25.1%) and Wood Buffalo and Grand Prairie, both of which grew at a rate of about 18%. Seven of the 10 census agglomerations with the highest growth rates were located in Alberta.

The data also showed a continuation of movement to rural and small town areas within commuting distance of a CMA or CA. ("Commuting distance" was the distance at which more than 30% of the working population commuted.) These areas experienced a population growth of

3.7% between 1996 and 2001, following a 6% gain during the previous five-year period.

Migration patterns: 15 of 27 CMAs lost more people than they gained

Between 1996 and 2001, 15 out of the 27 census metropolitan areas, including Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, lost more people than they gained in migratory exchanges with the rest of the country.

However, since nearly seven in 10 immigrants settle in one of these three areas, the loss of population to other parts of the country was more than offset by moves into these areas from outside Canada. Even in smaller CMAs, it is interesting to note that in many cases movement from outside Canada accounted for as much, or more, growth than internal migration (Table 1).

All three of the largest census metropolitan areas – Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver – experienced a net loss of population due to internal migration. Each showed a net gain among young people aged 15 to 29. But this gain was more than offset by a net loss of older families and seniors.

In the case of Toronto and Vancouver at least, it appears that much of the net population loss was to areas

within the larger urban region. For example, moves to other parts of the Golden Horseshoe, such as Oshawa, Barrie, and Burlington, accounted for much of the net out-migration from the census metropolitan area of Toronto.

A similar trend appeared in Vancouver. Many individuals who pulled up stakes in the census metropolitan area moved to adjacent areas within British Columbia, including Abbotsford, Chilliwack, Mission and Victoria.

Intra-urban growth: Migration to the suburbs

All census metropolitan areas consist of a number of municipalities around a major, or core, city. In most cases, the population growth of the core city was lower than the growth in the rest of the metropolitan area. For example, the population of the suburban area surrounding the core city of Toronto increased 17.2%, four times the growth rate of the core itself (+4%).

In census metropolitan area of Vancouver, the population of the city of Vancouver increased 6.2%, compared with 9.4% in the remainder of the CMA. In Montreal, the Montreal Urban Community increased 2.1%, while the rest of the CMA grew 4.1%.

The growth in these surrounding municipalities has been fueled by migration and natural increase, as young families choose to live and raise children in suburbs. Seventeen of the 25 fastest-growing municipalities in Canada were those that surround the core of census metropolitan areas.

In fact, an interesting trend is the continued emergence of large, rapidly growing suburban municipalities, those with a population of 100,000 or more, within the largest census metropolitan areas.

For example, in the census metropolitan area of Toronto, the populations of Vaughan, Markham, Richmond Hill and Brampton increased 20% or more. The populations of Mississauga and Oakville increased between 10% and 20%. In many cases, these gains were five times the growth rate of the city of Toronto.

In the census metropolitan area of Vancouver, the population of the city of Surrey grew 14.2%, more than twice the growth rate of only 6.2% for the city of Vancouver.

Census data from 1996 have shown the increased tendency toward the concentration of employment in these large suburban municipalities.

Information yet to be released from the 2001 Census will allow for a more complete analysis of this trend and its impact on commuting and other patterns.

Aging of urban populations

In general, the 19 million people who lived in the 27 census metropolitan areas were younger than the people who lived outside them. Overall, the median age of individuals living in these metropolitan areas was 37.0 years, compared with 38.8 years for the population in the rest of the country.

The oldest census metropolitan area was Trois-Rivières, where the median age in 2001 was 41.2 years, an increase of 3.6 from 1996. Victoria, the oldest census metropolitan area up to 1996, became second oldest, with a median age of 41.0 years, up 2.3. St. Catharines-Niagara maintained its position as third oldest with a median age of 40.2 years, an increase of 2.6 from 1996.

Saskatoon kept its rank as the nation's youngest census metropolitan area, with a median age of 34.4 years. It was followed by Calgary, at 34.9, and Kitchener, with a median age of 35.3.

Calgary replaced the census metropolitan area of St. John's in Newfoundland and Labrador, which slipped from second to tenth youngest with a median age of 36.3 years, up 3.0 from 1996. This high increase in median age was due in large part to very high out-migration of young people.

The 2001 Census showed a clear relationship between population growth and population aging. Census metropolitan areas that had the largest growth in population did so by attracting relatively young migrants. In general, among census metropolitan areas, the faster the population growth, the lower the increase in median age.

Table 1 summarizes some key demographic indicators for the 27 CMAs.

Household composition: More people living alone

Between 1996 and 2001, the number of private households continued to grow faster than the population. For Canada as a whole, the number of households increased 6.9%, while the number of people living in these households rose 4.0%.

The number of private households increased in almost all census metropolitan areas from 1996 to 2001, whether or not their populations increased. Households in all metropolitan areas combined rose 8.0%, while the total population grew by 6.2%.

The increase of smaller households was the biggest contributor to the growth of private households. More people are living alone, and more families have no children at home.

Again there was a wide variation in household composition across the urban areas. Census metropolitan areas with the oldest populations tended to have a high proportion of one-person households.

For example, one-person households accounted for nearly one in every three households in Sherbrooke, Trois-Rivières, Victoria, Quebec and Montreal. These single households often consisted of older women living on their own. In contrast, one-person households accounted for 19% of the total in Oshawa.

The future: Increasing concentrations in three largest urban areas

If fertility remains low and recent international migration patterns persist, population growth will continue to depend on international migration. In fact, under this scenario, by 2025 the number of deaths will surpass the number of births, and immigration would then account for all of population growth.

As a result, if current levels of immigration and settlement patterns continue, the population will be increasingly concentrated in the three largest CMAs, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, which now attract most immigrants. By 2026, nearly 40% of Canada's population would be living in one of these three metropolitan areas, up from 33% in 2001.

ELASTIC CITIES; INELASTIC GOVERNMENTS

URBAN GROWTH AND URBAN GOVERNANCE IN CANADA

ABSTRACT

What are the implications of today's urban trends – metropolitan concentration at the national and provincial levels, decline of peripheral communities, and decentralization within mega-urban regions – for how we govern an urban society at the local and regional scales? The author focuses on the discord between urbanization and the structures of local municipal government, challenges those who favour retaining small local governments, particularly in large metropolitan areas, and poses questions for those who push for more resources and autonomy for cities.

The conundrum in urban governance is simply that the social and territorial entities we purport to govern change much more rapidly than do the institutions of governance. Political norms, systems and boundaries, once established, tend to become inelastic. They are changed, if at all, only with great difficulty, and then often in an illogical and overzealous fashion. The recent and frequently heated debates in Canada in reaction to municipal amalgamations and mergers is a case in point. In Canada we are still trying to adapt structures, functions, boundaries and legal frameworks for local governments inherited from the 19th century to contemporary urban conditions, geographies and life styles.

Here I want to focus on the mismatch between the outcomes of the urbanization process – the patterns and dynamics of urban development – and the structures of local municipal government. I do not focus on the nuts and bolts of running municipalities, such as fiscal accounting, or the politics of city halls. Instead, I intend to illustrate the increasing discordance between the emerging geography of urban growth and decline in Canada and an outmoded local political system. I also want to engage in a debate with those who favour retaining small local governments, particularly in large metropolitan areas, and to pose questions for those who push for more resources and autonomy for cities. To set the stage I begin with a brief overview of recent trends in urban Canada.

Uneven Development: The Contrast of Growth and Decline

There is now general agreement, even among politicians in senior levels of government, that Canada is overwhelmingly an urban nation. To be historically accurate, Canada became a predominantly urban nation, in the sense that more than 50 percent of the population lived in urban areas, in 1921; and it became a predominantly metropolitan nation in 1971, when more than 50 percent lived in metropolitan areas with over 100,000 population (or CMAs as defined by Statistics Canada). By the Census of 2001 over 80 percent of Canadians were reported as living in urban areas – those with over 10,000 population and 68 percent in metropolitan areas. Only three percent are now actively engaged in agriculture pursuits. This trajectory mirrors a massive transformation of Canadian society, the economy and the nation's territory. It would not be a stretch of logic to argue that urbanization, and its attended ingredients of modernization, industrialization and social change, represents the major transformation of the past century.

The recent Census, however, suggests that we are entering another era of urban growth and decline that poses even stronger challenges to conventional thinking on how we govern our communities. First, the rate of national *population growth is declining* and is becoming *more uneven* across the country. Moreover, the sources or components of growth have also changed. The primary source of growth – over 50 percent – is now attributable to immigration. Ironically, this was also true in the late 19th century, but today immigration is combined with very low fertility levels and thus low

LARRY S. BOURNE

Larry S. Bourne is a Professor of Geography and Planning, Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Department of Geography and Program in Planning, University of Toronto

rates of natural increase – which was not the case in the 19th century. This means that the contrasts between places (cities and regions) that are growing and those that are declining will become wider and more visible. The policy challenges will be equally varied.

Second, within the country's urban system there has been an accelerated growth of metropolitan areas, and thus an increase in the level of *metropolitan concentration*. At the 2001 Census date, over 35 percent of Canadians lived in the four largest metropolitan areas with over one million population – Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Ottawa-Gatineau – and 68 percent resided in the 27 census metropolitan areas defined by Statistics Canada. Moreover, those same 27 urban places have captured over 80 percent of recent growth; and essentially all growth is located in the 139 places that constitute Canada's urban system. The entire part of the country located outside the zone of influence of a metropolitan area, or smaller city, actually declined in population over the recent census period by 0.4 percent. Even some of the smaller metropolitan areas – e.g. Regina, Thunder Bay, Sudbury, Chicoutimi, Saint John, St Johns – also declined in population. Overall, communities in the country's non-metropolitan resource periphery are shrinking.

The level of metropolitan concentration is even greater than these figures suggest. While growth has continued to concentrate when viewed at the national scale, urban development at the local and regional scale has continued to decentralize, that is, to *deconcentrate*. In most regions urban development has spread beyond local municipal boundaries, and in some regions well beyond the boundaries of regional authorities and the functional regions (the census metropolitan areas) defined by Statistics Canada. As in other countries, we are in effect creating *new and very extensive urban regions* that have overwhelmed municipal governmental structures and resources, not to mention provincial policies. These regions will continue to attract the overwhelming majority of all new growth.

The Toronto region is certainly the most extreme, but not the only, example. The Toronto census metropolitan area (4.8 million), combined with the adjacent and closely integrated metropolitan areas of Hamilton (700,000) and Oshawa (300,000) now constitute the urbanized core of a region that extends from Peterborough in the east to Barrie-Collingwood in the north, Kitchener-Waterloo in the west, and St. Catharines-Niagara in the south. The total population of this integrated region, sometimes called the Golden Horseshoe, is now over 7.5 million. The provincial government in Ontario has belatedly recognized the existence of this mega-urban entity, which it blandly calls the "Central Ontario region", as the territorial basis for developing a "smart growth" strategy. There is, however, no regional government, or even an effective coordinating agency, that is looking after this emerging region.

At the national scale we can now visualize the country's future as an urban nation, whether we like it or not, as centred on and organized by five extensive urban regions that are much larger and more dispersed than those defined in the Census. These regions act as the

control centres of the economy, and the milieus for innovation and cultural change. They also serve as the principal nodes linking smaller urban centres and rural areas to the world outside. The five mega-regions include the greater Toronto region (7.5 million), the Montreal region (3.5 million), Vancouver-Victoria (2.5 million), the Edmonton-Calgary corridor (2.0 million), and Ottawa-Gatineau (1.1 million). These five regions alone garnered 80 percent of national growth in the last census period. They are, moreover, the principal destinations for new immigrants (over 80 percent go to Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver), and the locations for most investment and innovation in the new economy. As a consequence, they will likely capture even higher percentages of growth in the future. Smaller metropolitan centres such as Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Halifax, and Quebec will continue to dominate their respective regions, but are not likely to attract substantial future growth. For the rest of the country, with a few small exceptions, the combination of an older and aging population, and the absence of domestic in-migrants and immigrants, ensures that decline will become more widespread in the future.

Implications for Governance

What are the implications of these trends – metropolitan concentration at the national and provincial levels, decline of peripheral communities, and decentralization within mega-urban regions – for how we govern an urban society at the local and regional scales? How have

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municipalities and their political masters, the provincial governments, responded to these new urban imperatives? First, there is no single best model of governance that fits all urban areas, and certainly not for places where most Canadians live – the large and growing metropolitan regions or those communities undergoing decline.

In a recent review for the World Bank (*Designing an Urban Region: The Lessons and Lost Opportunities of the Toronto Experience*”, in M. Freire and R. Stren, eds. *The Challenge of Urban Government*) I described ten different variations in the

observed responses to rapid urban growth and the diffusion of urban development beyond municipal and service boundaries. One of these options, perhaps the most common, was the inelastic “do nothing option”. Other options included the creation of unitary urban governments at a regional scale (e.g. Halifax-Dartmouth), two-tier elected regional governments (e.g. the former Metro Toronto; now remaining only in the outer suburbs of Toronto), outright amalgamation (Toronto city, Winnipeg, Ottawa-Carleton and Montreal Island), the regular annexation of new suburban areas (e.g. Calgary), the establishment of a two-tier system but with voluntary participation in a regional authority (Greater Vancouver Regional District), the creation of regional service districts (e.g. many US urban areas), the uploading of responsibilities from local to higher levels of government, such as counties (e.g. Florida), provinces (e.g. Quebec) or states (e.g. Australia), and various forms of public-private partnerships for service delivery (also a common approach in the US and UK).

Clearly there is no one optimal strategy for adapting political structures, boundaries and service functions to urban expansion. In the past, some provinces in Canada have been pro-active in creating regional governments, special service districts, and regional planning and conservation authorities, especially during the 1970s. And there has been some success in achieving municipal consolidation and service realignment. As a consequence, urban areas in Canada on average are less politically fragmented than are comparable American metropolitan areas.

Nevertheless, the challenges we now face in adapting local government to the geography of urban growth are more daunting than in the 1970s. How do we manage urbanized regions as large as the greater Toronto region, where the population grows by 100,000 annually (the equivalent of adding a new Kingston each year), and the metropolitan “shadow” effect extends outward for 150 km? At the same time, how do we manage the extensive areas of decline, including small towns and cities, that now dot much of the nation’s periphery? In growing regions, local and even regional governments are overwhelmed by

the requirements of accommodating new development and more diverse populations, and most face an immense infrastructure gap – in both physical and social infrastructure. In contrast, in declining urban centres and regions, municipalities struggle to provide the required level of

services while drawing on a declining revenue base. Ironically, the demands imposed on the public sector for specialized services (e.g. medical) are greatest in areas that are not growing, due primarily to a rapidly aging population.

It would seem obvious that local governments, especially small ones, are increasingly – and in



City Skyline, Calgary, Alberta – photo courtesy City of Calgary

some instances, hopelessly – inadequate units in which to address the contrasting futures of rapid metropolitan growth and incipient urban decline. Yet, there is a prevailing mythology that municipal governments can remain autonomous, and that small units are preferred over large ones. They are said to provide easier access for citizens to their elected representatives and government officials. This, in theory, makes the political system both more accessible and more accountable; that is, more democratic. This may be true, to a degree, but there is a downside. Small units of government are more susceptible to manipulation by special interest groups. Having many small municipalities within a metropolitan area may offer residents more choice in services (the public choice paradigm, which supports the notion that fragmented political jurisdictions – ie. many small governments – within metropolitan areas is preferred because it offers individual households to choose a municipality whose basket of goods and services, and taxes, most closely approximates their own preferences), but they also increase inequalities between communities. Further, small municipalities are often unable to provide the high-quality, specialized services, especially in the public sector, that people increasingly seem to want.

They are also incapable of dealing with processes and problems that are inherently of a regional scale – notably transportation, pollution control, water and sewage, waste management, environmental conservation, and regional social equity; all of which have extensive externality or spillover effects. These issues, typically, are not localized; that is, they are not contained within municipal boundaries. Responsibility for addressing such issues could be shifted upward to higher levels of government, but this in turn would weaken local governments.

It is also possible to argue that these regional issues can and should be dealt with through specialized regional agencies or authorities and therefore do not require a formal governmental structure. There is merit to this approach, but there are problems. One is that such agencies are generally not directly accountable to the public;

and second, there is little likelihood of coordination among individual regional service authorities. Each would tend to act in its own interest; within its own mandated “silo”. Further, if participation by local governments in such authorities is voluntary, there is little possibility that those governments would willingly agree to share fiscal resources as part of regional equity sharing, especially for social costs.

Without a form of equitable revenue sharing (called pooling) among the local municipalities making up a metropolitan region we will almost certainly end up with a more socially fragmented landscape, contrasting low-income poorly-serviced districts next to wealthy well-serviced districts. This could be called the “American model”. If, on the other hand, participation in these regional districts is not voluntary, then in my view there needs to be an elected regional government that can be held responsible. The Toronto region, for example, currently has regional revenue sharing for some social services, but there is no representation for those suburban municipalities contributing to the revenue pool.

There are frequent calls from municipalities, civic bodies, including the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), that cities need more autonomy and more resources, in other words, new powers and new sources of revenue. This view is also reflected in the recently released reports from the TDBank and the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force (November 2002), among others. There is, undoubtedly, a strong case for giving additional powers and revenue sources to local governments, particularly given the imbalance between the increasingly complex (and costly) services that municipalities are being called on to provide and the revenue base they have available to deliver those services.

But exactly who are the local governments, the “cities”, to whom these powers are to be given? Presumably, at least from the perspective of FCM, this means politically incorporated municipalities – the cities – but not the larger urban regions identified above. And, what cities or municipalities are to be given new powers – all cities, or only the larger ones? And, what for specific powers? If the recommendation is meant to include all cities then the powers would have to be very limited. Most small cities have limited staff resources; others do not have a solid track record of administrative competence. If the proposal is limited only to the large cities, what is the dividing line? Is it based on population size, or revenues, or the number of seats in provincial or federal parliaments? Who is in, who is not? This set of issues again raises the question of boundaries and territory – i.e. the geography. How we define and delimit the urban landscape is crucial; and unfortunately for the proponents of the status quo, that landscape is changing relatively rapidly and in an very uneven fashion across the country.

Finally, it should be noted that local government does not mean the same thing it did a generation or two ago. The range of services it provides, or is mandated to supply, at least in Ontario, is substantially



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greater. At the same time, the daily living spaces of people – where they live, work, shop, visit and so forth – are vastly larger than they were thirty or forty years ago. Consider the Toronto example again. The City of Toronto, before provincially-imposed amalgamation with the other municipalities in the former Metro Toronto in 1998, was (excluding small additions) essentially the same size in territorial extent and population (700,000) as it was in 1914. It is hard to accept that a city that was a sufficient size in 1914 can be viewed as a suitable and sufficient size for a unit of local government today. As a social space, or activity space, that is, the area over which people play out their daily and weekly existence – e.g. the area of commuting to work, shopping, visiting etc. – the amalgamated city of Toronto in 2002 (population 2.5 million) is actually much smaller in relative terms than the city that existed in 1914. But, aside from tinkering with specific municipal functions, little changed until Metro Toronto was formed in 1953, and then little changed until provincially-imposed amalgamation in 1998.

Conclusions

The argument here is that the changing nature and patterns of urban growth and development in Canada, and indeed in most other countries, have made our inelastic and outmoded systems of governing urban areas even more inadequate, and in some cases, dis-functional. A major part of the problem is the territoriality of public administration – that is, the geography of governance – and specifically for urban areas, the boundary question. All politics is territorially bounded; all territories are political units.

The proponents of the benefits of retaining small local governments have little to say about how such governments might deal with these new urban realities, with region-wide issues, and with the increasing demands for high-order services. It is certainly not possible to effectively administer a large metropolitan region, especially one that is growing rapidly, with a patch-work of local jurisdictions. Such patch-works, although offering wider (but constrained) choices to urban residents as consumers of local public goods and services, are inadequate in terms of addressing metropolitan-wide development pressures. The latter include almost all of our major urban concerns – such as social services, the environment, housing and labour markets – that in combination define the quality of life. At the other end of the settlement scale, the capacity of local governments to respond is similarly inadequate in the face of widespread urban and regional decline, but for rather different reasons.

I am not suggesting here that smaller local governments have no role in managing urban development or in delivering important services to their residents. Retaining small local governments in a status quo situation may

even contribute to enhancing a sense of place by encouraging civic participation, and thus local democracy. But these assumed benefits are often exaggerated. Perhaps they are based on nostalgic images of times past. People today move frequently and with relative ease; and few define their “place” according to local political institutions or boundaries. The persistence of small local governments in their present form and with fixed boundaries may be appropriate, or at least acceptable, in areas of population and employment stability, but there are fewer and fewer of such areas. Others may persist as little more than small “boutique” administrations for the benefit of elite communities. The reality is that most of the country now falls into two categories, rapid growth or persistent decline, in both of which inelastic municipalities are clearly inappropriate and increasingly inadequate.

Nor am I arguing for big urban governments, writ large, in Canada. Rather, I am suggesting that the structure, functions and boundaries of local governments should reflect the milieu – the context – in which they find themselves; that is, the size, changing needs, behaviour and territorial organization of the population and economy they are

intended to serve. Small municipalities can deliver some services, efficiently and effectively, but only relatively few. The smaller the place the fewer the functions it can perform. This is not simply a matter of achieving scale economies but rather of meeting the threshold necessary for the provision of specialized services, for managing growth or decline, and for the equitable distribution of urban revenues and resources. Big cities, in contrast, require correspondingly big governments. They cannot be wished away. The challenge in such situations is to find ways and means of ensuring local representation and input to regional or metropolitan-scale decision-making.

My own preference is for two-tier elected governments in large metropolitan regions. The distribution of functions between tiers – and between urban and provincial levels – should reflect population size, the fiscal and human resources of the units involved, and the requirement to balance local and region-wide needs and responsibilities. For slow-growth or declining regions, and specifically for small and isolated communities on the nation’s periphery, there seems no alternative but to have services delivered by larger regional authorities, perhaps coordinated (and funded) by the provincial government involved. Unfortunately, local governments in both growing and declining regions are far less elastic than the communities they are intended to serve.

At the national scale we can now visualize the country’s future as an urban nation, whether we like it or not, as centred on and organized by five extensive urban regions that are much larger and more dispersed than those defined in the Census.

L'ATTRAIT URBAIN :

un défi pour les minorités francophones au Canada

RÉSUMÉ

Les minorités francophones du Canada vivent un exode des régions rurales vers les régions urbaines. La restructuration économique et l'émergence de nouvelles industries axées sur le savoir en sont deux causes primaires, et posent des défis majeurs pour certaines régions, surtout celles axées sur l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. Les auteurs, en examinant les facteurs démographiques, économiques et sociaux, nous suscitent à réfléchir sur les différents modèles qui pourraient mener à une coexistence communautaire et culturelle et à une pleine participation à la vitalité économique et nous proposent l'école comme pierre angulaire du développement communautaire.

Partout dans les pays industrialisés, les régions sont aux prises avec la restructuration économique et l'émergence de nouvelles industries axées davantage sur le savoir. L'économie change rapidement sous l'effet de la globalisation des marchés, mais également en raison de l'accès rapide et élargi aux nouvelles technologies et à l'information sous toutes ses formes. Les capacités différentes d'adaptation au plan régional et l'inclinaison urbaine des nouvelles activités économiques mènent inévitablement à un clivage accentué entre régions ou zones géographiques en ce qui a trait aux opportunités d'emploi et du niveau de vie. Or, cette reconfiguration de l'activité économique pose des défis majeurs pour certaines régions, à fortiori celles axées sur l'exploitation des ressources naturelles.

De ce mouvement spontané d'intégration vers la nouvelle économie semble ainsi se profiler deux types distincts de régions : celles qui « gagnent » et celles qui « perdent », pour emprunter un jargon propre à la spécialité régionale. Le premier groupe profiterait d'une économie plus diversifiée, dynamique et innovante, tandis que l'autre demeurerait figé dans ses traditions tout en maintenant une forte dépendance à l'égard de l'extraction et de la première transformation des ressources. On devinera qu'il s'agit des régions urbanisées d'une part et, d'autre part, des régions rurales et semi-rurales périphériques dont plusieurs risquent de s'enliser dans un processus de marginalisation socio-économique. À vrai dire, la démarcation entre ces deux types de régions n'est pas aussi claire, peu de régions épousant strictement l'un ou l'autre de ces cadres typologiques. Il n'en demeure pas moins que le clivage déjà apparent entre les régions rurales périphériques et les zones urbanisées est en train de s'accroître.

C'est ce qui se produit au Canada, alors qu'on assiste à une relocalisation de la main-d'œuvre des régions à ressources (en phase de rationalisation) vers les centres axés sur les services et la fabrication diversifiée. Certaines régions de l'Ouest, de même que le sud de l'Ontario et la région de Montréal devraient maintenir, voir même intensifier leur rôle d'attraction. À une échelle plus restreinte, mais très significative pour les francophones des Maritimes, le corridor reliant Saint-John à Halifax, en passant par Moncton, semble s'affirmer de plus en plus au détriment des zones périphériques de la région.

Ce constat est largement partagé et préoccupe tant les instances gouvernementales que les collectivités rurales elles-mêmes. De telles tendances inquiètent par ailleurs au plus haut point les groupes minoritaires qui voient dans l'effritement socio-économique de leurs régions de souche un recul en matière de préservation du patrimoine, de la culture et de la langue. Non seulement ces régions sont-elles confrontées à l'exode des jeunes, mais la plupart des centres urbains d'accueil constituent, à leurs yeux, de véritables machines assimilatrices, un constat qui se vérifie pour la minorité francophone au pays. Qu'en est-il au juste et comment interpréter ces tendances lourdes ?

MAURICE BEAUDIN ET RODRIGUE LANDRY

Maurice Beaudin est professeur à l'Institut canadien de recherche sur le développement régional, Université de Moncton
Rodrigue Landry est professeur à l'Institut canadien de recherche sur les minorités linguistiques / Canadian Institute for Research on Linguistic Minorities, Université de Moncton

Le point sur les tendances : voir au-delà des chiffres

Les analyses menées à ce jour au plan démo-linguistique nous mènent à penser que la minorité francophone au Canada perd effectivement du terrain et que les nouveaux développements n'augurent rien de rassurant quant à son avenir. Bien que les données officielles (recensement de 2001) laissent voir une relative stabilité quant au nombre de canadiens de langue maternelle française, ces derniers ne sont que 61,6% à parler le plus souvent leur langue à la maison, comparativement à 64,7% en 1991.

Le glissement vers la langue de la majorité s'expliquerait par le nombre grandissant de couples époux-épouse dont le conjoint est anglophone, dont la proportion est passée de 34,3% en 1991 à 37,1% en 2001. Cette proportion frôle ou dépasse 40% dans la plupart des provinces et territoires, à l'exception du Nouveau-Brunswick, et peut même atteindre les deux tiers. L'assimilation de la minorité francophone serait également liée aux migrations des jeunes des régions de souche vers les zones urbanisées à forte majorité anglophone. À cet égard, les données du dernier recensement sont non équivoques : les régions rurales perdent de leurs effectifs (surtout les jeunes) au profit de certaines zones urbaines de l'Alberta, de la Péninsule ontarienne et de la région d'Ottawa, qui semblent bénéficier à la fois des mouvements infra-provinciaux, des migrations inter-provinciales et de la migration internationale. D'autres centres, tels Winnipeg, Halifax ou Moncton profitent essentiellement des flux infra-provinciaux ou infra-régionaux.

La structure démographique jouerait également à l'encontre de la minorité francophone qui compte proportionnellement moins de jeunes en âge de procréer, ce qui contribue à réduire leur accroissement naturel en raison d'un taux de fécondité déjà très bas. Ainsi, l'âge médian des francophones vivant à l'extérieur du Québec se situe à 42,8 ans, comparativement à 35,1 ans pour les anglophones. Le vieillissement de la minorité francophone est très préoccupant dans les provinces de l'Ouest où l'âge médian dépasse de plus de 10 points celui des anglophones. Les différences sont moins fortes en Ontario et dans les Maritimes, mais la tendance est la même.

Sans vouloir occulter ces tendances qui minent la vitalité de la minorité francophone au pays, on se doit d'interpréter ces développements dans un contexte plus large que le simple constat démographique. La réalité est que la mondialisation de l'économie, l'accès aux nouvelles technologies d'information et de communication, l'amélioration des moyens de transport et le rehaussement généralisé du niveau d'éducation font en sorte que les régions — et les minorités qui les habitent — n'ont d'autre choix que de s'ouvrir toujours davantage vers l'extérieur. Où qu'ils vivent, les gens ne sont-ils pas tous « culturellement urbanisés » ? Par ailleurs, on se doit d'appréhender la francophonie pan-canadienne dans sa diversité : il n'existe pas un type de régions, et les groupes francophones minoritaires présentent diverses réalités, tant au plan spatial que socio-économique et organisationnel.

L'émigration des jeunes travailleurs des régions périphériques vers les centres nationaux et provinciaux est ressentie plus ou moins intensément dans toutes les parties du pays. Il ne s'agit pas d'un phénomène nouveau,

sauf que le problème semble s'accroître avec la restructuration économique. Dans les Maritimes, par exemple, les zones urbanisées (régions métropolitaines et agglomérations de recensement) se sont enrichies de quelque 20,000 résidents depuis 1996, tandis que les régions rurales en perdaient près de 30,000. Qui plus est, quelques agglomérations seulement semblent profiter de ces flux migratoires, à savoir, Halifax, Moncton, Fredericton et Charlottetown. L'attrait urbain n'en dément pas ailleurs au pays, et il joue nettement à l'avantage des centres de plus grande taille, comme le laissent voir les données du tableau 1.

Tableau 1. Évolution des effectifs selon la taille, Canada, 1996-2001

	Population totale		Var 96-2001	en%
	2001	1996		
Canada	30 007 094	28 846 761	1 160 333	4,0
Canada urbain	24 975 240	23 725 472	1 249 768	5,3
Ville > 1 million	11 456 174	10 689 362	766 812	7,2
Villes 500 000-1 million	3 905 672	3 647 567	258 105	7,1
Villes 100-500 000	4 785 832	4 644 180	141 652	3,1
Villes 50 000-100 000	1 572 974	1 547 147	25 827	1,7
Villes 25 000-50 000	1 232 770	1 227 448	5 322	0,4
Villes 10 000-25 000	958 154	971 050	-12 896	-1,3
Canada	30 007 094	28 846 761	1 160 333	4,0

Source : Recensement de 2001 ; compilation des auteurs.

Certains diront que l'exode rural n'est pas un problème unique à la minorité francophone. Il est vrai qu'on assiste depuis des décennies à l'émigration des jeunes dans les régions périphériques, et que ce fléau touche autant la majorité que la minorité linguistique. D'ailleurs, l'exode des jeunes anglophones est très prononcé au Québec, ce qui contribue aussi à affaiblir la minorité anglophone de cette province. On peut néanmoins affirmer que l'exode rural affecte plus durement la minorité francophone pour deux raisons. Premièrement, contrairement aux anglophones, les jeunes francophones des régions de souche qui déménagent dans des centres urbains à majorité anglophone sont confrontés au problème d'assimilation linguistique. Deuxièmement, la minorité francophone est probablement davantage exposée aux effets pernicieux de l'exode rural en raison d'une structure démographique défavorable. Ce n'est pas tant le taux de fécondité (nombre moyen d'enfants par femme en âge de procréer) qui pénalise la minorité francophone — ce taux est somme toute comparable et partout très faible — mais plutôt sa proportion moindre de jeunes adultes. Dans une étude antérieure basée sur les données du recensement de 1996, nous avons estimé que, dans une douzaine de régions, les francophones comptaient une proportion de jeunes (moins de 25 ans) qui correspondait à moins de la moitié de ce qu'on observait chez leurs homologues anglophones. Le recensement de 2001 confirme ce vieillissement accéléré chez la minorité francophone dont l'âge médian s'établit à 42,8 ans, versus 35,1 ans pour les anglophones. Il est clair que la faible proportion de jeunes adultes hypothèque davantage la minorité francophone.

Deux réalités pour la minorité francophone

Il ressort nettement des études et analyses sur la francophonie pan-canadienne que nous avons affaire à deux réalités non pas opposées mais distinctes et inter-dépendantes. L'espace francophone à l'extérieur du Québec présente d'un côté des régions traditionnelles de souche, avec des effectifs relativement concentrés sur le plan

présentent une bien meilleure stabilité sur le plan linguistique, bien que leur taux d'assimilation est loin d'être négligeable (13% en moyenne). Pour autant, leur poids démographique régional (39%) et leur relative concentration spatiale constituent des atouts indéniables qui sont à la base de leur dynamisme culturel et linguistique.

Tableau 2. Vitalité linguistique des francophones, en fonction du poids démographique régional

	Nombre de francophones selon la langue parlée au foyer (1996)	Taux régional de francophones (%)	Taux d'assimilation (%)
Nord N-B (Comtés maj. franc.)	152,725	79.9	0.5
Comtés mixtes N-B (Forte rep. fr.)	64,590	38.1	8.6
Sud-Ouest N-É	10,980	28.5	16.5
Nord-Est Ontario	106,995	21.7	25.8
Sud-Est Ont. (Ott.-Cornwall)	152,305	20.3	19.4
Poids dém. régional > 20 %	487,595	39.0	13.4
Poids dém. régional < 10%	155,445	2.7	56.2
Total - Franco. hors-Québec	643,040	4.7	31.3

Source: M. Beaudin, *Les groupes et régions francophones au Canada: État de la situation en 1996*, Institut canadien de recherche sur le développement régional, Moncton, 1999.

régional et, de l'autre, des regroupements minoritaires résidant dans les centres urbains anglophones. Les premiers semblent plus stables sur le plan linguistique et culturel mais partagent des conditions très difficiles sur le plan économique; les autres s'accommodent aisément au marché du travail urbain mais sont aux prises avec un sérieux problème d'assimilation. Plus qu'un espace hétérogène et éclaté au plan géographique, la francophonie pan-canadienne reflète ainsi deux réalités, deux types de regroupements devant lutter chacun à leur façon pour leur survie.

Les principaux foyers francophones se retrouvent dans la partie nord et est du Nouveau-Brunswick, dans le sud-est ontarien (axe Ottawa-Cornwall), dans le nord-est ontarien, ainsi que dans la Péninsule ontarienne. Ensemble, ces quatre grandes régions regroupaient en 1996 plus de 80% des francophones à l'extérieur du Québec dont le français est la langue la plus souvent parlée à domicile (voir tableau 2). Outre ces principaux foyers, on décèle au moins une dizaine de concentrations plus modestes, qui sont loin de constituer un ensemble homogène. Le terme région s'applique donc plus ou moins dans la plupart de ces zones. C'est pourquoi, en plus de délimiter ces regroupements, convient-il de raisonner en termes de représentativité, en tenant compte du poids démographique du groupe francophone au sein de chacune des régions. On peut voir que le taux régional de francophones pèse lourd dans la vitalité linguistique et, conséquemment, dans la survie du groupe minoritaire.

Sur la base d'un poids régional supérieur à 20%, on retrouve cinq régions qui, ensemble, regroupent les trois quarts des parlant français à domicile. Ces cinq régions

Pour ce qui est des autres regroupements, on dira simplement qu'ils forment un tout pour le moins disparate et surtout fortement minoritaire; ils composent, en moyenne, moins de 3% des effectifs régionaux. Ce sont des groupes parfois strictement urbains, parfois des régions de souche, répartis aux quatre coins du pays. Ces regroupements sont les plus exposés à la langue dominante. Bref, l'assimilation des francophones minoritaires progresse en fonction de deux facteurs complémentaires: l'éloignement des régions de souche et l'urbanisation.

Comment maintenir la vitalité ethno-linguistique?

Les francophones vivant en milieu urbain, bien qu'ils soient fortement minoritaires, sont économiquement à l'aise et maîtrisent plutôt bien leur avancement sur le plan personnel. Il s'agit d'une population instruite qui occupe des emplois professionnels ou de métier. Leur problème n'est pas tant leur avancement sur le plan économique que leur difficulté à maintenir leurs acquis sur le plan linguistique et culturel, surtout chez les jeunes. Cette population a de sérieux problèmes d'assimilation, d'où le besoin urgent d'établir des mécanismes de préservation.

Pour les régions francophones de souche, leurs problèmes sont plutôt d'ordre économique, même si, dans bien des cas, le problème d'assimilation est très sérieux. Il faut, pour ces populations, créer des opportunités d'emplois, tout en assurant des infrastructures et des services susceptibles de maintenir les jeunes en région.

Les tendances lourdes qui semblent conduire à l'effritement inévitable de la minorité francophone au pays doivent nous interpeller, mais nous convier en même temps à faire des choix judicieux. Il faut voir au-delà de la



simple comptabilité du nombre, pour tenir compte des perspectives d'ensemble à la fois au plan démographique, social, économique et politique. Nul doute qu'au plan interne, à l'échelle des communautés, l'organisation sociale demeure un défi. Ce sont les jeunes adultes qui quittent leurs régions pour des centres urbains à majorité anglophone. Il leur est dès lors difficile de maintenir des réseaux de contacts linguistiques pouvant favoriser le maintien de leur langue, de leur culture et de leur identité. Qu'en sera-t-il des enfants de ces jeunes? Les centres urbains d'accueil sont-ils en mesure d'assurer à ces groupes minoritaires des espaces socio-institutionnels capables de favoriser leur épanouissement culturel? Il nous apparaît évident que sans un minimum d'institutions gérées par l'élément minoritaire, les chances d'assurer la pérennité du groupe sont minces.

Il est primordial, dira le sociologue du langage Joshua Fishman, que la minorité puisse connaître dans sa langue une «*vie communautaire*». Or, l'urbanisation a souvent pour effet de rendre très difficile cette vie communautaire, surtout lorsque la minorité n'est pas concentrée dans un secteur particulier de la ville. Minoritaire et dispersé, le groupe linguistique connaît alors l'isolement des individus et des familles, la dominance de la langue de la majorité dans les interactions sociales et dans le monde institutionnel. Plus disposés à l'exogamie et aux pressions sociales, les membres de la minorité auront tendance à adopter la langue majoritaire même au sein de la famille. La cellule familiale, qui est à la base même de la communauté, devient ainsi de plus en plus fragilisée et voit son rôle d'incubation s'inverser au grand détriment du groupe minoritaire.

Appuyée par l'article 23 de la *Charte Canadienne des droits et libertés*, la francophonie minoritaire canadienne a mis beaucoup d'espoir dans l'école de langue française comme source primaire de socialisation et de construction identitaire. De fait, l'école est souvent pour ces minorités la seule institution qui soit franco-dominante et gérée par les francophones. Plusieurs recherches ont démontré, de plus, que l'école était la principale force d'influence pour

le développement de la compétence langagière en français et de l'identité francophone.

Introduit au Nouveau-Brunswick dans le but de pallier aux menaces de l'assimilation en milieu urbain, le concept de *centre scolaire communautaire* (CSC) est de plus en plus répandu chez les communautés francophones minoritaires habitant des villes majoritairement anglophones. Le CSC a pour but de procurer à la minorité dispersée en milieu urbain une base de vie communautaire qui n'existe pas naturellement. C'est un défi de taille et il existe encore peu de recherche permettant d'en évaluer l'efficacité. Il est encore incertain si le désir des francophones minoritaires de maintenir la langue et la culture et de les transmettre à la prochaine génération pourra rivaliser avec cette forte attraction sociale fondée sur les besoins de subsistance et de mobilité sociale. Une solution viable serait de favoriser à la fois la solidarité communautaire de la minorité et son insertion aux activités économiques de leur milieu.

La portée limitée de cet article ne nous permet pas d'élaborer un modèle heuristique visant la coexistence chez les minorités francophones d'une solidarité communautaire et culturelle, d'une part, et d'une pleine participation à la vitalité économique, d'autre part. Nous proposons, toutefois, que ce modèle, dans le contexte canadien, pourrait s'ériger en ayant l'école comme pierre angulaire du développement communautaire. Il existe des droits juridiques sous l'article 23 justifiant ce rôle de l'école. Le regroupement communautaire autour de l'école peut devenir le noyau d'une expansion plus large de la vitalité communautaire, voire d'une certaine autonomie culturelle de la minorité. Le centre scolaire communautaire revêt aussi une importance particulière vu que les foyers d'accueil urbains reçoivent régulièrement un afflux de jeunes francophones susceptibles d'avoir ou de fonder une famille. Mais quel que soit le modèle proposé, on se doit d'appréhender les défis de minorité francophone dans sa diversité, avec une approche et des outils calqués sur les véritables problématiques, qu'elles soient de nature socioéconomique (régions de souche) ou démolinguistique (regroupements minoritaires urbains). Puisse ces quelques lignes susciter la réflexion en ce sens.

DO URBAN GOVERNANCE CHANGES AFFECT WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION?

A preliminary look at Toronto and London

ABSTRACT

In Toronto, little attention has been devoted to concerns raised by women's organizations over amalgamation. What have been the implications for social policy and for women in local office since 1997? The author compares urban governance in Toronto and London, England – both redesigned in institutional terms during the late 1990s – and explores patterns of women's election to public office and issue representation in the two cities. The author is grateful to Genevieve Johnson, Joy Fitzgibbon, Heather Murray and Tristan Fehrenbach for their assistance on the research side, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support of this study.

In early 1997, on the eve of forced municipal amalgamation in Toronto, a group of local women's organizations gathered signatures for a declaration opposing the elimination of borough government. Sponsored by the Women's Coalition for Local Democracy, the anti-megacity declaration asserted that women in Toronto had much to lose if amalgamation proceeded. The coalition predicted likely substantive losses in the social policy field, including on low-income housing, child care and public transportation issues, as well as probable setbacks at the level of numerical representation.

More than five years have passed since the coalition held a grand signing ceremony at Toronto City Hall on 12 February 1997, to launch the anti-amalgamation declaration. Yet relatively little analytic attention has been devoted to concerns raised by the group. To be sure, amalgamation went ahead, but what were its implications for social policy and for numbers of women in local office? How have developments in these areas in Toronto compared with those in other large cities that underwent local governance changes during the same period? In particular, how have women elsewhere fared when their central governments redesigned urban political systems?

This discussion opens with a brief overview of shifts in urban governance in Toronto and London, England during recent years. Using preliminary data from an ongoing comparative study, it explores patterns of women's election to public office and issue representation in the two cities. These cases were chosen because both are global cities, operating in larger Westminster-style political units, that were home to dynamic women's movements since the 1960s era of social movement mobilization. Moreover, both Toronto and London were significantly redesigned in institutional terms by their respective central governments during the late 1990s, albeit in divergent ways. The project concludes that women's numerical as well as substantive representation appeared to be considerably more robust under post-reform arrangements in London than under the amalgamation scenario in Toronto.

Urban Governance Changes

Both Toronto and London experienced significant shifts in local political structures as a result of decisions reached by their respective central governments. In the former case, Mike Harris' right-wing Ontario Conservative regime imposed municipal amalgamation on older downtown and inner suburban districts. This process eliminated existing local borough government in both areas, did not redesign the governance of Toronto's outer suburbs, and retained simple plurality electoral arrangements for all positions in the newly created megacity. In the older downtown and inner suburbs, far fewer locally elected positions were available after amalgamation than before. The top metropolitan mayoral position under the new scheme was won by Mel Lastman, a conservative suburban politician.

By way of contrast, Tony Blair's New Labour national government of the Third Way persuasion created a new strategic local authority for London, with a mayor and 25-member assembly to be elected by residents of inner and outer London. Since that city's existing borough system remained in place alongside the newly created Greater London Authority (GLA), the overall number of locally elected positions increased by more than two dozen. Most important, the new London mayor and 11 (of the 25) assembly members would be chosen using variations on European-style proportional representation schemes: supplementary vote in the case of the mayor and additional member with party lists for 44 percent of the

assembly. In 2000, the first London-wide mayoral campaign under these arrangements was won by Ken Livingstone, a left populist who ran as an independent candidate after being denied the official Labour party nomination.

From the perspective of women's political representation, the creation of the GLA was significant because it held out the promise of restoring a London-wide profile to issues of key concern to feminist activists. The Women's Committee of the Greater London Council (GLC), abolished along with other metropolitan council units by the Thatcher government in 1986, had been a leading campaigner for improved child care, social housing and public transit provision, and funded many local initiatives including a feminist planning group known as Women Plan London.

The latter inspired the establishment during the 1980s of a mirror organization called Women Plan Toronto; both groups shared a commitment to inserting women's safety, child care, housing and transportation concerns in urban planning discussions. By the early 1990s, Women Plan Toronto had branched out in the direction of encouraging greater female participation in local politics. In 1997, the group joined the Women's Coalition for Local Democracy, which sponsored the anti-amalgamation declaration described earlier in this discussion.

GLA creation also held out the promise of increased numerical representation for women in London. In contrast to single member plurality electoral arrangements that prevailed in Toronto, the scheme in place for the first London Assembly elections offered voters two choices, one for a constituency member selected on the basis of first-past-the-post, and the second for a London-wide party list. The latter scheme, under which 11 of the 25 assembly members were elected, ensured some measure of proportionality, and was expected to benefit smaller parties as well as female candidates.

What were the consequences of amalgamation and GLA creation for women's representation? The next section addresses this question with respect to one formal dimension of political citizenship, the election of women to public office at borough and municipal levels. The subsequent part examines substantive influence over urban public policy, in this case the ability of women's organizations to insert their perspectives about child care, safety, housing and public transit into the first official plans of the new Toronto and London units.

Electing Women to Public Office

During the period prior to Toronto's amalgamation, women held about one-quarter of the seats on six local borough councils, and about one-third of the seats on the municipal Metropolitan Toronto Council. After the megacity scheme was imposed by the province of Ontario, all six borough units were eliminated, and the number of elective local offices was more than halved. The increased geographical size and population of the metropolitan wards created under amalgamation, combined with the musical-chairs competition among incumbents that targeted a shrinking number of council positions and the enormity of the at-large mayoral constituency in the megacity (Canada's largest in terms of population), were all expected to hinder the election of candidates with limited financial resources, including women.

Consistent with this proposition, former downtown

mayor Barbara Hall lost the first amalgamated mayoral election in 1997 to suburban North York mayor Mel Lastman; Lastman was reelected for a second three-year term in 2000. Approximately 30 percent of the 44 megacity council seats in 2000 were won by women, a figure which differed little from their roughly one-third share of seats under the old Metro arrangement. Yet this small quantitative gap likely masked more significant disparities in political influence. For example, the executive clout of women under pre-amalgamation arrangements was considerable, given that two borough mayors out of six who held office in 1996 were female, including Barbara Hall. In addition, relatively few women on the new megacity council were high-profile feminists or progressives, and only one female, feminist and progressive member (Olivia Chow) came from a visible minority background.

By way of contrast, women won 40 percent of the newly created assembly seats in the first GLA elections in 2000, which employed partial proportionality arrangements. Two years later, female candidates won about 30 percent of council seats under first-past-the-post rules in the 32 London local boroughs. Parallel with Barbara Hall's experience in Toronto, Susan Kramer, the mayoral candidate of the Liberal Democrats in the first at-large, metropolitan-wide election in London, placed fourth in the first preferences count and was eliminated from the second round. Like Ken Livingstone, Labour MP Glenda Jackson sought the official party nomination for London mayor but, unlike Livingstone, she did not enter the field as an independent after losing the Labour contest.

Comparing the amalgamated Toronto council and Greater London Assembly units shows women's numerical representation was approximately 10 percent higher in the latter than the former in 2000. The presence of some proportional representation seats and the absence of incumbents in London, versus an undiluted plurality scheme and competition among incumbents for reduced seats over time in Toronto, may help to explain differing outcomes. Although men won mayoral office in both cities in 2000, executive control in Toronto rested in the hands of a conservative suburbanite with no formal cabinet organization, while Londoners elected a progressive populist whose advisory cabinet included 50 percent women, including the outspoken black Labour MP Diane Abbott as women and equality advisor.

Voice in Urban Planning

To what extent did the first official plans released by the Toronto megacity and Greater London Authority reflect the influence of feminist planning interests? The initial draft plan released in Toronto was a relatively brief, 99-page document that set out broad principles to guide future urban development. Among the most significant of the plan's objectives was intensified commercial and residential land use at particular locations in older downtown and inner suburban areas, where existing transportation systems were viewed as sufficient to accommodate additional growth.

The overwhelming focus of the 2002 Toronto plan remained the city's built environment, including land use at particular nodes, rather than the human consequences (for better or worse) of intensified development. The approach

to urban governance presented in the official plan was generally a hands-off one that privileged market forces. For example, at no point did the text prescribe aggressive intervention by municipal officials in such sectors as housing, transit, safety or child care. Instead, the language of choice and opportunity dominated, including in the title of Chapter 1 (“Making Choices”).

Urban residents were generally referred to in the Toronto document as homogeneous “people” or, in the vision statement, “everybody,” with rare exceptions in short passages dealing with the transportation of “people with disabilities,” “the elderly” or “people with special needs.” The particular characteristics of individuals in these categories were not discussed, even though elderly persons in Toronto in 2002 were disproportionately female, as were adult users of public transportation. Overall, the 2002 Toronto plan made no reference to women. It acknowledged the role of voluntary community action in one brief illustrative section on the Task Force to Bring Back the Don [River] and the Tree Advocacy Program, both of which were ongoing local environmental campaigns. The photograph accompanying the discussion showed five women planting trees, but the text described these participants simply as citizen volunteers.

By way of comparison, the 2002 London plan set out a more detailed (419 pages), directive and equity-oriented blueprint for intensified urban growth. The mayor’s introductory vision statement emphasized a crucial interdependency among three key themes, namely economic growth, social inclusivity and environmental improvement. Sections devoted to housing, for example, established a target of 23,000 new homes per year, with half of these to be built for low-income families and essential workers (including nurses, police officers and school teachers). In the field of transit, the London plan recommended two new cross-London rail lines as well as a 40 percent increase in bus capacity by 2011.

Women received frequent and explicit recognition in the 2002 London plan, as one category within a larger group of disadvantaged “communities of interest and identity.” According to the document, “the Mayor recognizes that there are particular groups of Londoners for whom equality of opportunity has more resonance than for others. This relates to those people who suffer discrimination, or have particular needs, as a result of their race, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation or religion” [Greater London Authority, The Draft London Plan, 2002, section 4C.12]. With reference to employment, women were described in the 2002 plan as disproportionately low-wage, less skilled workers, often holding public sector jobs, who confronted specific impediments to economic participation including limited child care provision and concerns about safety on public transit.

The contrast between Toronto’s and London’s 2002 official plans could hardly have been more stark. While the Toronto document referred not once to women, the London text offered multiple references to low-wage women workers, teachers, nurses, child care provision as a barrier to employment, and so on. The extent to which the documents laid out aggressive plans to increase the supply of affordable housing, or improve public transportation systems, also differed widely, with the London text consistently more expansive and interventionist in its approach. Finally, the discussion in the English plan of urban diversity and equality was far more

analytic and interrogative than in the Canadian one; the latter simply asserted that Toronto was a diverse, multicultural city, apparently assuming that jobs, skills, housing, income and other attributes were distributed in an unproblematic way among urban residents.

Conclusions

As a preliminary review of one numerical and one substantive dimension of representation in two global cities, this discussion suggests women’s citizenship status in London was considerably more promising, or less endangered, than in Toronto. As one part of significant governance changes that unfolded during the late 1990s, New Labour promised the residents of London a strategic metropolitan authority for their city. In subsequent elections, Londoners chose Ken Livingstone, a progressive populist and long-time left Labour maverick, as mayor. Women won 40 percent of Greater London Assembly seats in the 2000 elections, under a partial proportionality scheme. The Draft London Plan released two years later paid particular attention to the needs of disadvantaged urban residents, including women, and set out a vigorous agenda for improvements in such areas as affordable housing and public transportation.

By way of contrast, the Ontario Conservatives foisted an amalgamated arrangement on Toronto during the late 1990s, which eliminated local borough government and dramatically reduced the number of council seats. Municipal elections in 2000 (held under first-past-the-post arrangements) produced a Toronto city council in which women held about 30 percent of ward positions. The mayoral post was won in both 1997 and 2000 by Mel Lastman, a suburban conservative with a reputation as a flamboyant home appliance tycoon. The official city plan released in 2002 focused almost exclusively on creating an intensified built environment; it did not mention women, nor did it discuss any social aspects of urban development such as inclusion or inequality.

Obviously, a great deal that matters to women’s citizenship in these two locations remains unknowable at this point. Can London’s mayor follow through on his ambitious ideas about housing, transport, child care and skills training, in the absence of an autonomous budgetary base for many of these projects? Would a change of mayoral leadership in Toronto make much difference to women’s citizenship prospects? How secure were the positions of senior women decision-makers in the Greater London Assembly? Would a new generation of diverse female politicians arrive on the Toronto municipal scene in the near future?

Although the data presented in this study remain preliminary, they tend to support both optimistic and pessimistic views of urban governance reform. As of 2002, there were reasonable grounds for hopefulness regarding numbers of elected women and the influence of feminist planning interests, particularly if observers focused on the specific example of the Greater London Authority. At the same time, evidence from Toronto presented a firm case for pessimism, since it demonstrated the degree to which numbers could plateau or decline, at the same time as substantive voice in the planning process could be virtually silenced.

The declaration of the Women’s Coalition for Local Democracy on the eve of Toronto’s amalgamation may, unfortunately, have been prophetic.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE:

The View from Montréal

ABSTRACT

Recent trends in urban development are posing a number of important challenges to those administering Canada's cities. The author uses the example of Montreal to argue that physical-planning measures must be attached to a larger policy that addresses social, economic and environmental problems. Rather than paving the way for urban economic champions, our governments have introduced counterproductive measures which could lead to a "graceful decline of our central cities".

Given the similarities that exist between the Québec metropolis and other large cities in Canada, Montréal's evolution in terms of spatial patterns, public policies and structures of decision-making can serve as an illustration for trends in the country overall. On the other hand, because no two cities are alike and because Montréal is part of a société distincte, its unique characteristics must be noted. Following important changes in municipal boundaries and metropolitan institutions, greater Montréal finds itself better equipped than its rivals to plan for its growth but less in need of doing so. It also benefits from social policies that are somewhat more favourable than in other provinces but suffers from a growing cultural and political gap between the city and the rest of the province.

The Montréal metropolitan area has a population of some 3,4 million residents and a territory of slightly more than 4 000 square kilometers (the equivalent of a circle with a 40km-radius). Despite ongoing suburbanization, it has remained densely settled, more densely settled, perhaps, than any other metro region in North America (depending on the definition of the metropolitan territory). Since its merger with twenty seven of its suburbs on the Island of Montréal, on January 1, 2002, the central city has a territory of nearly 500 square kilometers and a population that has more or less stabilized around the 1,8 million mark. Like Montréal, the other large cities of the metropolitan area, Laval and Longueuil (with close to 360 000 and 390 000 residents, respectively), have known low rates of growth recently. Other municipalities

on the North Shore and the South Shore, which number about seventy, have remained small in population but dynamic in residential growth.

Montréal also has one of the most monocentric structures of all metropolitan areas on the continent: its downtown core is still by far the largest employment centre in the region, and two other primary nodes are located nearby as well, within the territory of the new City of Montréal. A certain commercial, industrial and institutional decentralization has occurred on the heels of residential suburbanization, but the Island of Montréal still contains a majority of regional shopping centres, though perhaps not for long, of manufacturing plants, especially in the high-tech sector, and of public institutions, particularly in higher education and health care. Areas of employment have grown in Laval and in Longueuil as well, but they have not acquired the same profile as the "edge cities" that have mushroomed around Washington and Atlanta or, to a lesser extent, around Toronto. This difference in metropolitan structure can be explained in part by the lower average income of Montréal households and by the local topography (i.e. the presence of waterways acting as barriers); but it seems to follow as well from a greater tolerance for urban densities.

Montréal also remains the undisputed core of the metropolis in terms of immigration. Over eighty percent of all new arrivals to Québec settle on the island, where they represent close to twenty percent of the population (about half as much as in Toronto). In light of this influx and in light of the constant exodus of francophone households to the suburbs, some demographers

RAPHAËL FISCHLER

Raphaël Fischler is an Associate Professor,
School of Urban Planning, McGill University

predicted until recently that French would soon become a minority language on the island. However, a slowdown in the rate of suburbanization, the continued movement of English speakers to other provinces (together with well-educated Francophones and Allophones) and the adoption of French as main language by an increasing number of immigrant children have made that prediction obsolete.

The demographers' "warning" may have been unjustified, but it seem to have played a role in the political dynamics that ultimately led to the merger of Montréal with its island suburbs. (Québec City, Gatineau-Hull, Longueuil, and Lévis were merged with their suburbs as well; in all 64 municipalities were turned into five larger entities.) Article 1 of the law that brought the new City of Montréal into existence (Bill 170, passed in December 2000), says: "Montréal est une ville de langue française." Ensuring the French character of Québec's largest city was of course never explicitly presented as a motivation for the amalgamation. The justifications that the government put forward in its public statements and documents were that the merger would effect economies of scale in municipal service-delivery and administration, foster equity among central-city and suburban tax-payers and residents, facilitate intra-metropolitan cooperation and render the city more competitive.

In fact, none of these five reasons – linguistic status quo, municipal efficiency, fiscal equity, metropolitan cooperation and global competitiveness – could or should have been decisive for the government. If anything, the annexation of suburbs such as Westmount, Hampstead and Beaconsfield over the staunch opposition of their mostly Anglophone residents has galvanized West-Islanders as a significant political force in municipal politics. So much so that Québec Minister of Culture and Communications Diane Lemieux found it necessary to notify Mayor Tremblay in early December 2002 that his administration was threatening to slip into an unacceptable bilingual mode. Premier Bernard Landry followed up with a similar message to local businessmen with respect to commercial signage and communication in the workplace. Yet data from the 2001 census, issued at the same time, indicates that a majority of Montréalers is now bilingual.

The government may also be in for some surprises on the financial and fiscal fronts. Economies of scale are generally illusory beyond a certain city size. In Montréal, chances are even bigger than elsewhere that fiscal benefits will amount to nothing (or turn into losses) because of strong demands on the part of powerful unions and because of the complex administrative structure that the city was given. For the new Montréal is both a unified city, which replaced the Montréal Urban Community in the same manner that the new Toronto took over from Metro Toronto, and a collection of twenty seven arrondissements. These boroughs are in charge of local services, such as development control (zoning), snow removal and parks and recreation, which have a direct impact on residential quality of life. Eighteen boroughs are new embodiments of former suburban municipalities (sometimes of a couple or even three together) and nine of those have been given an official bilingual status under Québec language laws. Another nine boroughs have been carved out of the for-

mer City of Montréal. Thus the amalgamation has induced both centralization and decentralization, and it has launched a most interesting experiment in local democracy in what was traditionally the kingdom of populist and autocratic mayors.

In any case, the cost of running both a central city and local boroughs, together with the demands of the unions, will probably render savings illusory. The administration has already admitted that the new city is facing a structural deficit due to the mismatch between the rate of increase in expenditures and the rate of growth in revenues. At the time of writing (mid-December 2002), it appeared that the province would once again fill the City's fiscal hole by purchasing some of its assets.

Large-scale amalgamations do not necessarily serve the goal of fiscal equity, either. First, redistribution between richer and poorer areas is not guaranteed; if it does occur, it can remain minimal in scope. Thus the first budget of Montréal's new administration allocated only one percent of expenditures to equalization among boroughs. Second, if the merged municipality does not enjoy the saving it expected or if, like Toronto, it faces increased responsibilities without increased revenues, it will generally resort to user fees (as well as to property-tax increases) to balance its budget. It will thereby render its tax structure more regressive and will annul whatever equity it may have gained from pooling together various municipal tax-bases. In Montréal, the political imperative to freeze or even lower municipal taxes makes recourse to user fees nearly unavoidable.

Regional consensus-building, too, may be harmed rather than helped by a large-scale merger. Although the measure reduces the number of players at the metropolitan table, it gives the central city fewer reasons to collaborate with its little siblings and gives the latter more reasons to fear their big brother and to compete with it. Indeed, since the birth of the mega-city of Montréal, the rhetoric and politics of local competition have increased in intensity. (We will come back to this issue below.)

Finally, global competitiveness does not appear to be much influenced by the size of the central city or even by jurisdictional divisions around it. When Québec politicians "sell" Montréal abroad, they mention its universities and research centres, its infrastructure, its quality of life and, yes, its bilingual workforce, all of which are indeed factors of competitiveness. At best, as the Montreal Board of Trade argued in its support for the merger, a centralized administration can rationalize the permitting process and the allocation of subsidies over a larger territory. Whether this will boost development, let alone innovation, is an open question. Also open is the question of whether Québec had any choice but to enlarge Montréal after Ontario enlarged Toronto. It is doubtful that rankings of cities by size really matter that much to their economic competitiveness, especially if they are each only one part of a larger metropolitan region, which is the economic unit that counts.

The main reason for the mergers of Montréal and other cities in Québec and in the rest of Canada, in the end, was most probably related to the sustained efforts of higher-level governments to balance their accounts and



Downtown Montréal, Québec viewed from parc Jean-Drapeau – photo © Ville de Montréal, Johanne Palasse

lower their taxes on the backs of lower-level governments. Despite their ostensible political differences, Québec and of Ontario have tried to lessen their responsibility towards older, poorer central cities by enabling them to get their hands on the tax-base of their suburbs. In Québec, this process has not been accompanied, so far, by the same downloading of social responsibilities as occurred in Ontario. Indeed, the Parti québécois administration has maintained its hold on social welfare services and, to a certain extent, its commitment to them. Yet municipalities have been forced to pay part of the bill to absorb the provincial deficit in the 1990s, and the enlargement of Montréal has not put it in a better position to deal with immigrant absorption, urban revitalization or crime prevention.

In addition to creating much larger cities in the regions of Montréal, Québec City and Gatineau-Hull, the Québec government created three communautés métropolitaines there. These bodies, which are in charge of coordinating infrastructure, social-housing and economic-development planning at the metropolitan scale, do not constitute a new level of government, as they are run by officials from local municipalities and do not have independent taxation powers. The Council of the Montréal Metropolitan Community (or CMM, to use its French acronym) is made up of fourteen representatives of the City of Montréal and an equal number of representatives of the suburbs, but the Mayor of Montréal is its President and can cast a tie-breaking vote.

The mandate of the CMM, as stated in Bill 134, passed on June 16, 2000, is to ensure the “harmonious economic development” of its territory, to ensure a fairer distribution of costs and revenues pertaining to metropolitan facilities, and to establish regional frameworks for land-use, waste management and social housing. (Public-transit coordination is also on the CMM’s agenda, but this issue is really being taken care of by the Agence métropolitaine de transport, a planning body that answers to Québec City, not to local officials. The AMT is funded by income from local property taxes, gas taxes and automobile registration fees.) To meet both its developmental and redistributive mandates, the CMM can tap into a Metropolitan Development Fund that is nourished for one half by municipal contributions based on the absolute size of the existing tax-bases and for the other half by contributions based on the annual increase that the respective municipal tax-bases have enjoyed. CMM plans will have to fit directives issued by the province and their implementation will depend on the collaboration of provincial ministries.

The addition of the Metropolitan Community occurred without the removal of either the Regional County Municipalities, which regroup local municipalities for planning purposes, or the Administrative Regions, which represent provincial agencies at the regional level. In addition, as we have seen, Montréal has been designed with a decentralized structure of local boroughs. (The same goes for Longueuil.) The result of municipal reform in the metropolitan region, then, is a five-tier system of local or regional government and administration—not exactly the “common-sense” simplification of government structures that allegedly drove municipal reform in Ontario.

If municipal restructuring was different in its modalities in Ontario and in Québec, its impact on metropolitan coordination and planning has been quite similar so far. Preoccupied first and foremost with making the merger of their cities a success, Mel Lastman and Gérard Tremblay have not exercised much leadership on the metropolitan scene. In the Montréal region, suburban mayors, most notably Laval’s Gilles Vaillancourt, have filled the void, working hard to ensure that the CMM would not become an instrument of regional domination in the hands of Montréal officials, a means to impose decisions that would hamper development in the periphery. Laval and Longueuil see themselves as direct rivals of Montréal, in part because they, too, are now subject to competition from the outer suburbs. The latter, especially on the North Shore, have also shown a greater willingness to stake their claims openly in their competition with the central city. Now that they are part of a CMM whose mandate is to foster economic development and redistribution and now that the Ministry of Municipal Affairs has officially declared the structure of the metropolitan area to be polycentric rather than monocentric (Government of Québec, Cadre d’aménagement et orientations gouvernementales, 2001), suburban municipalities are less prone than ever to let Montréal, or Québec for that matter, tame their ambitions in the name of sustainable development. Given their electoral power as makers or breakers of governments,

suburbanites can afford to call Québec's bluff when it swears that it will realign its policies to limit sprawl.

In fact, sprawl is probably less of a problem that it is made to be. First, low-density development still corresponds to strong consumer preferences. Second, residential densities in the suburbs have started to increase somewhat, even if they remain far too low to warrant the provision of decent public-transit services. Third, suburban expansion around Montréal has slowed down since it peaked in the 1960s and 1970s. This is due much more to demographic trends than to government policies.

Herein lies the main difference between Montréal and Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa or Calgary: despite its excellent record in job-creation and in construction recently, the Québec metropolis will grow at a much smaller pace than its rivals in the coming decades. Demographic forecasts speak of an added 300 000 residents or so in greater Montréal between by 2020, as compared to an additional two million residents in greater Toronto and a million in greater Vancouver. Also, the amount of vacant land in the Montréal metropolitan area available for development (i.e. outside of protected agricultural zones) is estimated to be about 365 km². This area should be sufficient to accommodate housing, commerce, industry, recreation and all other uses for at least a quarter of a million people, at very low densities, or for half a million people, at low-to-medium densities. Clearly, with its slow projected growth and its ample supply of vacant land within the urbanized territory, Montréal is not facing the same planning problems as Toronto and Vancouver, where suburban and exurban sprawl, fueled by rapid population increases, remain important challenges.

Despite their differences, Canada's largest cities are facing a shared set of problems. As the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues argued, the provision of affordable housing, the improvement of transit and transport systems and the rehabilitation of aging infrastructure networks should be high on the agendas of all three levels of government (Canada's Urban Strategy: A Blueprint for Action, 2002). In addition, the fate of our older suburbs should be a matter of concern. Places such as Laval and Longueuil are starting to suffer from "urban problems" related to poverty (especially among the elderly) and marginality (among the young). The declining physical conditions of homes built in the post-WWII era, the instability of property values as baby-boomers retire and move, and the relative paucity of public and private services in low-density residential areas all require immediate attention if we want to preserve healthy inner suburbs between a thriving (or not-so-thriving) centre and a growing periphery. In this context, solving the problem of road congestion should not be a top priority. It is in fact a

problem without a solution so long as Canadians want to have it all: living in spread-out cities, working at the same regular hours, enjoying the comfort and convenience of private automobiles, and using freeways to move about. As the saying goes, something's got to give.

What the case of Montréal suggests, is that physical-planning measures must be part of a larger policy package that attends to social as well as economic and environmental problems. Cities with limited population growth could very well continue to expand into the countryside if conditions in older neighbourhoods are allowed to deteriorate, as has happened in the United States. The Canadian model of racial and ethnic harmony is going to be put to the test as immigration continues to feed urban development, and there is no reason to believe, a priori, that our vaunted multicultural ethos will be a match to the growing economic and social marginalization of youths from visible minorities. In that light, the downloading of social responsibilities onto the municipal level, especially without the attribution of corresponding fiscal powers, is a counterproductive measure, to say the least, on the part of governments who otherwise want their largest cities to be their economic champions and main sources of revenue.

Twenty-five years ago, Peter Hall concluded his book on large metropolises on a sober note: "The central city may be destined slowly to decline, but it must be permitted to do so gracefully" (World Cities, 2nd edition, 1977, p. 256). In this new century, let us hope that we will do better than merely ensuring the graceful decline of our central cities and that we will, through enlightened policies, make urban development socially as well as environmentally sustainable.

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URBAN REVITALIZATION IN WINNIPEG

ABSTRACT

Urban growth in Winnipeg over the last two decades can be characterized by the decentralization of business and the continued suburban expansion of the city. The outcome of this pattern of development has been a further decline of inner city neighbourhoods and a shift in the commercial structure of the downtown. The response has been the increased role of community groups in helping reverse the decline of inner city neighbourhoods. Many of these community-based responses are the direct result of the many strategic partnerships formed amongst all levels of governments. For the commercial district of the downtown, a more targeted effort has been underway with government lead development corporations playing an increasingly vital role in the marketing of Winnipeg's historic downtown precinct to attract not only new business but to also increase the residential component.

Over the last two decades, the inner city of Winnipeg has become a laboratory for urban regeneration programs. Many of these programs attempted to stimulate, restructure and/or revitalize ageing neighbourhoods and declining commercial areas. Inasmuch as these efforts have been valiant, the symptoms of urban decline remain prevalent, especially in Winnipeg's centrally located neighbourhoods. To combat this situation, the tireless efforts of community groups have worked to improve not only the physical condition of the inner city but also to create a more positive image. Two such groups are The Spence Neighbourhood Association and The West Broadway Development Corporation. The West Broadway Development Corporation formed in 1995 as a way to give voice to neighbourhood residents and organizations. Their mandate remains creating a stable neighbourhood through the active participation of residents. The Spence Neighbourhood Association has been active in community efforts for the past three years. Both groups have been able to access much needed government funding to improve a large section of the inner city.

Winnipeg is a medium-sized metropolitan centre with just under 700,000 inhabitants. It has had a long history of being a working class city, strengthened by its central geographic location within Canada and North America. Location has contributed to the prominent role transportation played in shaping its economic development. Whether it was the early fur trade by Red River Cart or by river, to the more recent role rails, truck and air transportation have played, Winnipeg has held its grip on ensuring transportation remains a central component of the local economy.

Looking back over the last 50 years, Winnipeg, like other Canadian cities, underwent a significant restructuring of its economy and internal geography. This has resulted in shift from agri-business, transportation and manufacturing to more information based functions such as technology and medical research. Change to the internal geography of the city has been characterized by an increased decentralization of business and the continued suburban expansion of the city.

Urban change has resulted in a shift in the demographic profile of the inner city. According to Statistics Canada data, just over 20% of Winnipeg's population reside within the inner city. Overall, the bulk of population growth over the last two decades has been centred in the expanding suburbs. For the inner city, the result has been a deepening concentration of single persons, lone parent families, seniors and a high concentration of Aboriginal persons. As an example, the 1996 percentage of single persons living alone in non inner city neighbourhoods was approximately 25% while in the inner city this number swelled to 46%.

On average, the age and condition of housing in Winnipeg is older and in greater need of repair when compared to other western Canadian cities (Table One). In fact, the 1996 census data showed that Winnipeg had more than three times the amount of older housing than either Calgary or Edmonton along with a higher average need of major repairs. When looking specifically at the inner city of Winnipeg, these numbers become more pronounced. This is evident in the fact that 25% of inner city housing was in need of major repairs with just over 40% of this housing built prior to 1946. The result remains an ageing housing stock with an increasing need for repair – repairs that

JINO DISTASIO
Jino Distasio is the Assistant Director of the Institute of Urban Studies
at the University of Winnipeg

become more cost prohibitive as homes age and internal components become obsolete and expensive to repair or replace.

TABLE 1. AGE AND CONDITION OF HOUSING BY CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS

	Winnipeg	Calgary	Edmonton	Saskatoon
Home Built Prior to 1946 (%)	20	5.6	5.3	10.9
Need of Major Repairs (%)	9	6	5.5	6.4

The challenges facing the inner city of Winnipeg are numerous in scope. Perhaps the most important are dealing with the price and condition of housing. In many neighbourhoods, housing prices have declined considerably over the last two decades. This has resulted in selling prices dropping, in some cases, to less than \$10,000 for properties that once sold in the range of \$45-\$60,000. This devaluation has led to a dramatic decline in the percentage of homeowners (33% in 1996). In contrast, the home ownership rate for non-inner locations was just under 70% for the same period. The drop in the value of homes along with an increase in renters has made the conversion of single family units into multi-family more attractive. This has been especially true for converting older homes into rooming houses. The majority of these rooming houses remain located within the inner city where cheap housing prices have allowed owners to carve up stately character homes into anywhere from 6-12+ units.

The precarious situation experienced in the inner city was further examined by the present author in a city-wide survey of sixteen neighbourhoods. The intent of the survey was to examine for differences amongst neighbourhoods with respect to housing and general characteristics. The results pointed to significant spatial differences amongst Winnipeg's neighbourhoods. These data revealed that inner city neighbourhoods tended to be less optimistic about their neighbourhood's present condition and the future outlook. When asked how confident residents were presently about their neighbourhoods, 43% of inner city residents were either not overly or not confident at all about their neighbourhood which was in direct contrast to the 88% of suburban residents who were somewhat or very confident (Table 2).

TABLE 2. LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE

	Inner City (%)	Suburban (%)
Very Confident	13.5	55
Somewhat Confident	33.8	33
Not Overly Confident	32.4	5
Not Confident at All	10.8	1
Not Sure	9.5	6
Total	100.0	100.0

This question was followed up by asking residents what they thought the future held in terms of whether the neighbourhood would remain the same or become a worse place to live over the next three years (Table 3). Again, inner city residents tended to be less optimistic about the future as compared to their suburban counterparts. To put this question in perspective, nearly 60% of inner city residents stated

their neighbourhoods would remain the same but presently rated their neighbourhoods poorly – meaning they felt they the neighbourhood would remain in poor condition. This was contrasted by the 75% of suburban residents who felt their neighbourhoods would remain the same while rating the current condition of the neighbourhood quite high – meaning they anticipated that their neighbourhoods would remain positive places to live.

TABLE 3. FUTURE OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

	Inner City (%)	Suburban (%)
A Better Place	27	23
A Worse Place	13.5	2
About the Same	59.5	75
Total	100.0	100.0

These factors further entrench the dichotomous relationship which exists between inner city and non-inner city neighbourhoods. Traditionally, these differences have contributed to the negative stereotypes many residents have about the inner city.

A key issue facing community groups in the inner city is the “market gap” that has emerged in the housing sector. This gap is the result of low overall market values and the high costs associated with undertaking renovations and repairs to an ageing housing stock. As an example, an inner city home can be purchased in the range \$15,000-\$25,000+. Once purchased, the renovation costs can easily exceed \$35,000 for projects such as internal reconfiguring (if converting from multi-family to single), electrical upgrading, heating systems, windows, roofs, etc. It is at this point in which the market gap occurs as the initial purchase cost plus renovations would result in a total investment (by the community group) of \$50,000-\$60,000 but the eventual selling price remains lower – perhaps \$35,000-\$45,000 or a gap of \$15,000-\$25,000. Although this is a simplified example, the point remains that in many cases, the market gap has resulted in the need to have the strong commitment of all three levels of governments to help offset the market gap and allow for homes to be sold or rented.

In the inner city of Winnipeg, home prices are showing some signs of recovery but the gap between the cost of purchase and renovation still exceeds the eventual selling price for many homes. Therefore, for community groups to be successful in purchasing, renovating and the subsequently selling inner city homes, government subsidy programs are essential to bridge the market gap while continuing to create a stabilized housing market capable of functioning without direct assistance of community groups.

In Winnipeg, government involvement has historically been a cornerstone for the delivery of inner city programs and funding. Although, roles have changed (with community groups becoming more active) Winnipeg remains a centre where tripartite delivery mechanisms remain prominent. It is important to note that the blueprint for tripartite funding programs remains the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative which was a massive \$200 million dollar program which spanned 11 years (1981-1992) and injected a much needed boost to the social, physical and economic environments of the inner city of

Winnipeg. Since 1992, many other tripartite initiatives have been critical in assisting community based efforts achieve success.

Overall, Winnipeg remains unique in the delivery of funding for inner city revitalization. The recent model which has emerged is a strong partnership between community based groups (who act as delivery agents) and the three levels of government that provide necessary funding and program direction through a newly created “single window agency” consisting of representatives from all three levels of government. This agency is the Winnipeg Homeless and Housing Initiative (WHHI) which has become the central location from which community groups can access funding and program information and support. The WHHI programs have received funding from the Supporting Community Partnerships Initiative (SCPI) which was a Federal program established in response to Canada’s increasing homeless population. This program was struck in December, 1999, with the mandate of investing \$753 million over a three-year period.

The SCPI program resulted in the establishment of Winnipeg’s “single window agency” whose mandate has been to act as a delivery mechanism for programs offered at the Federal, Provincial and local level. The benefit of this single window approach can be significant as combined funding per unit can total \$38,000.00. This includes \$18,000.00 from the RRAP program (Federal Program), \$10,000 from the Province under Neighbourhoods Alive and \$10,000 in matching funds from the City of Winnipeg. This funding has been critical for community groups to purchase, renovate and subsequently sell or rent properties within the inner city.

The types of programs funded have included creating more student housing for the University of Winnipeg, dealing with homeless youth in the inner city, expanding outreach programs to those most in need, creating job opportunities through training and education and providing needed resources to various communities. The value for many of the projects have ranged from just a few thousand dollars to many hundreds of thousands. As an example, the Tenant Landlord Co-operation (TLC) Program based in the West Broadway neighbourhood, received an initial \$20,000 grant to begin work. The TLC program is an educational program for current owners of rental properties. The program operates by working with owners to meet standards set by the community to ensure that the rental properties are safe, clean and secure. The TLC program is targeted towards rental units at the lower end of market and when an owner meets the standards, they are given a sign to place on the front of the building. This program is an excellent example of the strength of the single window approach as the TLC program has accessed funding from all three levels of government. This has allowed the program to not only provide support and education to owners but also the ability to provide small grants to make necessary renovations.

The Winnipeg model works because of the strong partnerships between community groups and all three levels of government. This has produced a well integrated system of allocating funding to various areas of need. In the end, without programs and support of all three levels of government, the market gap would be insurmountable to overcome. Without these strategic partnerships and innovative programs, community based efforts would not be able to achieve

the successes they have had over the last five years.

Within the inner city boundaries of Winnipeg, the downtown region has also undergone a number of significant changes over the last two decades. This period has seen a continued pattern of commercial growth in suburban areas while at the same time, decline of the downtown has accelerated. As in other Canadian cities, the big box phenomena has swept across Winnipeg and resulted in hundreds of thousands of square feet of new retail space being developed – complete with plentiful free parking. Much of this retail space has located at the junctions of high traffic regional streets that pull in not only suburban residents but also commuters from nearby rural communities.

This pattern of growth has led to the decreased prominence of downtown as a shopping destination. The final blow for the downtown remains the destruction of the once symbol of downtown shopping – the Eaton’s building. With the first three floors demolished and shards of glass and brick strewn on Portage Avenue, the face of downtown will be radically redefined as a new glass and brick hockey rink, touted as a key component of downtown revitalization, will rise on the same location. Although many planners and citizens remain skeptical as to whether the new arena will ‘save downtown’ most do agree that there will be positive benefits from this project such as new retail, restaurants, increased traffic and more activity outside of the regular 9-5 schedule of the downtown office workforce).

If there is reason for optimism, it remains in the numerous “pieces” of downtown redevelopment. This includes the continued expansion of the Forks. This area of the downtown straddles the Red and Assiniboine rivers and has become a tourist destination including retail, office and green space. However, a criticism of the Forks development has been that it is not connected well with the rest of the downtown. To correct this, the city has worked to create a new roadway which integrates the Forks with the nearby and very successful baseball park and the historic Exchange District. Furthermore, the completion of a pedestrian bridge that will connect the Forks with St. Boniface (Winnipeg’s French quarter) will further integrate and connect these precincts.

The final element for the revival of downtown Winnipeg is centred on increasing the residential component. This has led to an increased number of warehouse conversions into condominiums. For the most part, preliminary housing projects have catered to the middle to upper income groups but some affordable housing is being renovated within the downtown district. A further catalyst for this renaissance has been in the clustering of educational programs in the warehouse district. This has resulted in substantial investment in the new construction of the Red River College Campus as well as the relocation of the University of Winnipeg’s Continuing Education program. Both of these projects are expected to inject new vigour into this section of the downtown and potentially lever further activities and people into the area.

The future of Winnipeg’s inner city and downtown remains somewhat positive. Certainly, community groups, the business community, educational institutions and others are laying the groundwork for continued revival but the rest of the city must decide if they too will invest – both socially and economically. It will be only at this point that the seeds being planted today will blossom into a vibrant and exciting down-

MUNICIPAL AMALGAMATIONS:

A Made-in-Canada Solution to an Undefined Problem

ABSTRACT

Are amalgamations simply part of a worldwide trend relating to neo-conservatism, globalization, and/or the apparent victory of capitalism over socialism? No, says the author. Canada is alone among western nations to place municipal amalgamations high on the policy agenda. Governments in eastern Canada implemented amalgamations all by themselves for reasons that remain obscure and have offered little evidence that the quality of life in our cities will improve.

Since the early 1990s, municipal amalgamations have taken place within the following major Canadian cities: Sydney and Halifax in Nova Scotia; Toronto, Ottawa, Hamilton, and Sudbury in Ontario; and Montreal, Quebec City, Hull, and Longueuil in Quebec. The temptation is to assume that, like so many other changes in public policy in this period, such amalgamations are simply part of a worldwide trend relating to neo-conservatism, globalization, and/or the apparent victory of capitalism over socialism. Nothing could be further from the truth. With the exception of controversial municipal amalgamations in Melbourne, Australia and in post-apartheid South Africa, it is only in Canada among western developed nations that municipal amalgamations have recently been high on the policy agenda.

The first part of this article explores the historical background to municipal amalgamation. The second looks at what has been happening in the United States. The third briefly describes the recent Canadian amalgamations and the conclusion examines their potential impacts.

The historical background

Municipal amalgamation is not a new or innovative policy. The Pennsylvania legislature amalgamated 28 municipalities in the Philadelphia area in 1854. Most of the claims, counterclaims, successes, and failures associated with the Philadelphia amalgamation are echoed in all the recent debates we have recently experienced in Canada. Whatever the benefits of the amalgamation, it did not prevent Philadelphia's long economic decline in relation to other major American cities, first New York and later Chicago and Los Angeles.

The best known of all North American amalgamations was the one in New York in 1898. Its approval by the narrowest of majorities in a referendum in Brooklyn was the culmination of a decade of political machinations involving the Tammany Hall machine and urban reformers intent on cleaning up corruption and waste. In the end, the reformers got their amalgamation but lost the ultimate prize: they did not gain control of the amalgamated city as they originally expected. Amalgamation in New York led to increased municipal spending, but this was no surprise because its proponents were anxious to build new municipal infrastructure in the far-flung suburbs of Queen's and the Bronx. Whether these suburban areas were actually better off in the long run in the amalgamated New York is an interesting question. In many respects it is hard to imagine how they could possibly have fared worse on their own.

Unlike Philadelphia, New York (especially Manhattan) did prosper economically in the twentieth century. But much of the large-scale infrastructure that helped insure its physical growth was not built by the municipal government of New York, as any reader of Robert Caro's famous biography of Robert Moses (*The Power Broker*, Knopf, 1974) can attest. In any event none of the recent scholarly work on "global cities," of which New York, London, and Tokyo are the exemplars, says much at all about the relevance of municipal government. Certainly no one has come close to

suggesting that New York's amalgamation in 1898 had anything to do with its current dominant role in the hierarchy of world cities. One recent study of local governments in the New York area (Gerald Benjamin and Richard P. Nathan, *Regionalism and Realism*, Brookings, 2001) actually documents how the loss of "smaller-scale government" has negatively affected the quality of urban life.

Canadians often find it hard to believe that New York's amalgamation was the last major amalgamation sponsored by a state government in the United States. In 1910 the Alabama legislature merged municipalities in the Birmingham area, but such action has never occurred since. Most states now have constitutional provisions preventing state legislatures from changing municipal boundaries without some form of local consent, usually expressed through a referendum.

Throughout the twentieth century much thought was given to how best to govern multi-municipal city-regions. The London County Council, and later the Greater London Council, exemplified the two-tier model in which a regional or "upper" level of municipal government was super-imposed on "lower-tier" municipalities that continued to concern themselves with a wide array of local services and regulations. The establishment of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953 transferred this model to North America. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Toronto's two-tier system of metropolitan government was the envy of almost all progressive American students of urban affairs who longed for effective local institutions to plan and control the outward expansion of the city. Indeed, its reputation as an innovative mechanism for urban governance spread far beyond North America.

During the 1960s and 1970s, municipal amalgamations were back on the public-policy agenda in many jurisdictions, but not in any part of the United States. Many countries in Europe (but not France or Italy) dramatically slashed the total number of municipalities. There was great confidence among policy-makers that larger municipal governments would ultimately enhance the quality of urban life. There was less thought given to the notion that amalgamations could save money or enhance economic competitiveness.

One of the most dramatic examples in the world of a central government acting to establish a single municipal government for a significant city-region was the decision by the NDP Manitoba government in 1970 to establish a "unicity" model of government for Winnipeg. From one perspective, this can be seen as simply an attempt by the government to model Winnipeg's pattern of municipal government on that which had evolved over time in other prairie cities, notably Calgary, Regina, and Saskatoon. In these cities, the municipal government had extended its boundaries into rural areas more or less as urban expansion occurred. In Winnipeg on the other hand, many new suburban areas had been incorporated as autonomous municipalities, creating a pattern of municipal government much more common in the older eastern parts of North America.

As befitted an NDP government in the early 1970s, initial plans for Winnipeg's unicity attempted to wed the virtues of administrative centralization and a common tax

regime with a more radical system of participatory democracy at the neighbourhood level. During the initial legislative process, and for decades thereafter, the original hopes for a dramatically new and innovative model for urban governance gave way to a much more conventional system of big municipal government. Observers today are hard-pressed to find anything that is especially unique about urban governance in Winnipeg. What is perhaps most significant is that, in the early 1980s, the largely rural area of Headingley was allowed to secede, providing a potential model for dissatisfied rural residents of Canada's more recent unities (or "megacities" as they are now more commonly called). Meanwhile, urban growth in the Winnipeg area is now occurring at a faster rate outside Winnipeg's boundaries than within, much to the chagrin of people who thought the creation of unicity had at least solved this one classic problem of urban governance.

Developments in the United States

It would be misleading to suggest that no one in the United States even thinks about amalgamating municipalities. Some urban experts, notably David Rusk, have such an issue relatively high on their preferred agendas. In some places, most recently Louisville, Kentucky, there have been successful campaigns to merge a central-city municipality with its surrounding county. Canadians must realize, however, that these "city-county consolidations" are implemented only if approved by local voters and that incorporated suburbs within the county are not included. The new "consolidated" city-counties can include dozens of independent suburban municipalities within their boundaries, hardly an amalgamation by Canadian standards.

Considering what happened in Ontario under the Harris government in the late 1990s, it is important to realize that in the United States, market-oriented conservatives are usually opposed to municipal amalgamations. In academic theory, these attitudes can be traced back to the 1950s, particularly to a well-known article by Charles Tiebout who pointed out that having many municipalities in the same metropolitan area created a market-like framework for municipal services and taxes that would enable citizens to closely match their desire for municipal services with what they were willing and able to pay for, thereby enhancing allocative efficiency in society as a whole and generating organizational efficiencies through competition. Such theories were most dramatically transferred to the real world when Ronald Reagan was Governor of California. Faced with a proposal from business supporters to take steps to reduce dramatically the number of local governments in California, he turned to his informal group of conservative academic advisors, whereupon he was told that reducing the number of local governments was a recipe for increasing the size and scope of the public sector, not for reducing it.

In more recent times in California, conservatives in the San Fernando Valley have led an unsuccessful movement to separate the valley from the City of Los Angeles and to establish a new municipality. Their main opponents, apart from Los Angeles politicians based in the central part of the city, were labour unions and organizations representing African-Americans and Hispanics. An impartial



Vancouver, British Columbia – photo courtesy Tourism Vancouver

review of the issue conducted by LAFCO (Local Agency Formation Commission) ruled that, if voters approved the secession, the San Fernando Valley would have to financially compensate the old city, but it also determined that there was no reason to expect total municipal expenditures in the two resulting municipalities to be higher than in the one. In any event, voters in Los Angeles rejected the proposal in November 2002 so, for now at least, it is dead. One of the great questions about recent amalgamation debates in Ontario relates to whether or not conservative Ontario cabinet ministers had any knowledge of what Ronald Reagan had decided two decades before or of what conservatives in the San Fernando valley thought about big municipal government.

Since the early 1990s, American liberals have become quite exercised about the governance of large metropolitan areas. They have been pushing for new institutions – both formal and informal – to facilitate metropolitan cooperation and joint action. Their efforts have generally been labelled “the new regionalism,” the implication being that “old regionalism” generally involved state governments imposing structural solutions on unwilling municipalities. Some new regionalists (notably Neil Peirce) are convinced that targeted intermunicipal cooperation can dramatically improve prospects for economic development. Their problem is that throughout the 1990s the economic condition of most American city-regions improved dramatically regardless of whether or not such cooperation actually occurred.

Other new regionalists are more concerned with equity. They want wealthy suburbanites to share tax resources with the central city. Here the main issue is whether central cities still generate suburban growth or whether the creation of new jobs in the suburbs is the best way of easing unemployment in the central city, thereby aiding central-city rejuvenation. Neither side seems likely to prove its case, demonstrating at a minimum that the

complex interaction of central city and suburb is not well understood by social scientists. In the absence of such understanding, simplistic public policies based on unproven assumptions are likely to have just as much potential to do harm as to do good.

In any event, the main point about the American experience in the past century is that there have been no municipal amalgamations of the type that eastern Canadians have experienced in the 1990s.

Municipal amalgamations in eastern Canadian cities

Serious proposals for major municipal amalgamations in Cape Breton and Halifax go back to the 1970s. The merger in 1995 in the area around Sydney in Cape Breton was implemented in order to use the growing tax bases in villages and rural areas to support the towns and cities that had been formerly dependent on mining. As a method for redistributing tax bases, the amalgamation has worked. The fact that the merger progressed relatively smoothly in Cape Breton probably encouraged Premier John Savage to proceed with amalgamation in Halifax, even though he had opposed it when in opposition. As a former mayor of Dartmouth, Savage could demonstrate by supporting amalgamation that all had to make sacrifices to pull Nova Scotia out of its apparently desperate financial straits.

Although the Halifax amalgamation was supposed to save money, the most commonly cited justification for it is that it was needed to prevent destructive economic competition among the four municipalities that surrounded Halifax harbour. Since amalgamation in 1996, the Halifax economy has been remarkably healthy, leading recently to proposals that it should partially share its tax base with poorer areas of the province, including Cape Breton. But no one has seriously claimed that amalgamation has been the source of Halifax’s relative economic success. It owes much more to the development of offshore natural gas. After a very shaky beginning, the Halifax Regional

Municipality (the municipality's official name) is now relatively stable. At the last municipal election, the former mayor of Bedford, an arch-critic of the amalgamation, was elected mayor.

The merger in Toronto in 1998 was primarily about saving money. Merging the six municipalities within the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto enabled Premier Harris to appear to be addressing serious concerns about governance and to appear to be reducing the size of government itself. Less obviously, it enabled him to eliminate a significant source of political opposition, the council of the city of Toronto and to install a more sympathetic, suburban-dominated regime headed by the former mayor of North York, Mel Lastman.

It is almost impossible to see any clear benefits from the Toronto amalgamation. Although preliminary official financial analyses pointed to some cost savings, even in late 2002 the costs of wage harmonization are not fully known. The Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry is currently in the process of revealing the chaotic nature of municipal administration in post-amalgamation Toronto. In its wake it is unlikely that there will be anyone still claiming that amalgamation in Toronto was a financial success.

In 1999, before the full extent of the problems in Toronto had become apparent, the Ontario government pushed ahead with amalgamations in Ottawa, Hamilton, and Sudbury, in each case eliminating the upper- and lower-tier municipal institutions that had been battling each other for many years. Unlike Toronto, each of these newly-amalgamated municipalities contained small towns, villages, and rural areas that fiercely resented being included in the "city." One of the great unresolved issues of these amalgamations – especially in Ottawa – is how fairly to represent rural residents. If "rep-by-pop" is the guiding principle, rural areas have virtually no representation. If they are given more representation than what their population implies, a fundamental principle of democratic governance is compromised and we are left to wonder why such rural residents were included in the first place. Are Headingley-like secessions inevitably on the horizon?

The latest round of amalgamations has been in Quebec. The most dramatic has been in Montreal, but others in the province have caused considerable political turmoil, especially for the Bloc québécois during the federal election of 2000. As was the case in Toronto, the Montreal amalgamation came after a decade of debate about how to govern the wider Montreal metropolitan area. If the Halifax amalgamation was about economic development and the Toronto one about saving money, the Montreal amalgamation was about equity, making sure that taxes and service levels became more equal throughout the island of Montreal. Not surprisingly perhaps, the political motivations of the Parti québécois government were more like Manitoba's NDP government in

the 1970s than those of the Harris conservatives in Ontario in the 1990s.

Remarkably, the Montreal amalgamation has been accompanied by a simultaneous effort to establish borough councils throughout the Island. Many of these perpetuate, in a much-attenuated form, the old suburban municipal councils. But totally new ones are being established throughout the territory of the old City of Montreal, a feat of simultaneous centralization and decentralization that is quite unprecedented. Because the borough councils have considerable control over local services, but no independent authority to tax, there remains much opportunity for conflict. As with Halifax and Toronto, the current mayor of Montreal, Gérald Tremblay, has his political base of support in the suburbs.

Conclusion

It remains to be seen whether or not the eastern Canadian amalgamated cities are able to convert their apparent political strength into real influence on the national stage. Claims are frequent that such increased influence in the long term is inevitable. But, as citizens of Toronto know better than most, size brings burdens of its own and size is not immediately converted into the kind of political strength that enables a municipal government to overcome the immense constitutional advantages possessed by provincial governments.

In any event, suburban politicians have generally triumphed in amalgamated cities (except in Quebec City). When optimists envisioned a new generation of central-city mayors to lead a kind of urban revolution in Canada, did they really expect suburbanites to be in charge? Surely they had in mind some-

body more like Vancouver's new mayor, Larry Campbell, who speaks so passionately for the interests of the inner city. Would Larry Campbell ever have been elected in a City of Vancouver that included Richmond, Surrey, North Vancouver, Burnaby, and all the other municipalities of the Greater Vancouver Regional District? Surely not. Whatever one might think of the social-democratic motivations for municipal amalgamation in Winnipeg and Montreal, does the election of Larry Campbell not at least give pause for thought.

As we contemplate the fate of our amalgamated cities in eastern Canada, we can at least free ourselves from the notion that amalgamations were somehow the inevitable result of the increasing pressure of global capitalism. Governments in Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Quebec implemented municipal amalgamations all by themselves for reasons that remain murky and obscure. There is little or no evidence that these amalgamations will improve the quality of life in our cities. If we can figure out ways for central-city residents to maintain some control over their neighbourhoods – as is being attempted now in Montreal – there is at least a chance that the amalgamations will not cause serious harm.

Canadians often find it hard to believe that New York's amalgamation was the last major amalgamation sponsored by a state government in the United States.

WHY SMART GROWTH AND THE ASCENDANCY OF THE “URBAN AGENDA” ARE CONNECTED

ABSTRACT

Canadians are sensing the need to restore the competitive edge of our urban centres. A model called “Smart Growth”, which has assisted U.S. cities in reinvesting in urban infrastructure, is being given a serious look north of the border. The authors examine the six underlying principles to the model and explain how the broad and inclusive precepts of Smart Growth can shape “the urban agenda” to the benefit of Canadian cities.

The recent but rapid emergence of Smart Growth as a rallying cry for a better way to build our cities owes a great deal to timing. From Halifax to Hamilton, and from Winnipeg to Vancouver, Smart Growth has attracted the attention of government, business leaders, environmentalists and other stakeholders committed to protecting the quality of life in Canadian cities. What is Smart Growth, and why is it resonating with communities across the land at this time? Most importantly, can Smart Growth thinking help Canadian cities compete in the 21st century?

Ironically, some of the answers to these questions are to be found south of the border. For many years, we in Canada used to pride ourselves on the quality of life in our cities, pointing to the contrast with American cities, which were synonymous with declining cores and sprawling suburbs. But in the 1990s, things began to change as community leaders in rapidly growing cities such as Atlanta, Denver and San Diego realized that the competitiveness of these giant city regions was at risk. Smart Growth emerged as a positive way to deal with necessary growth.

Uniting under the banner of Smart Growth, and with significant and sustained financial support from Federal and State governments, U.S. cities have been reinvesting in essential urban infrastructure. Unlikely partners such as the National Association of Home Builders, the Sierra Club, the Urban Land Institute and the banking community have formed effective coalitions to merge public and private investment to make a new kind of planning possible.

A similar sense of urgency regarding the need to restore the competitive edge of our urban centres is now motivating Canadians to embrace Smart Growth. To help accelerate this process, the Canadian Urban Institute last year organized three major conferences on the topic and published “Smart Growth in North America,” the result of our research into the U.S. experience. We suggest that there are six principles underlying Smart Growth.

1. Promote our cities as engines of the economy

The New Economy is knowledge-based, and the competition for the best brains will be won by cities that offer a high quality of life. Decisions by senior levels of government regarding investment in post-secondary education are critical in this regard.

Since 1999, the Canadian Urban Institute has been working with post-secondary educational institutions, federal and provincial staff, municipal decision makers and the private sector to enhance the ability of Ontario cities to compete in the knowledge economy.

Our project began with a major conference that explored how to tap the potential of the rich resources for innovation that reside in our communities. Dubbed “Competitive City Regions in the Knowledge Economy,” this conference struck a chord with participants. They encouraged us to continue the experiment at the local level. Through a unique partnership (known as OCCR or Ontario Competitive City Regions) involving HRDC, Industry Canada, the Ontario Ministry of Enterprise, Opportunity and Innovation, the universities (Council of Ontario Universities) and colleges

DAVID CROMBIE AND GLENN MILLER

The Hon. David Crombie, P.C., is President and CEO of the Canadian Urban Institute, a Toronto-based, independent urban think tank. He is the former mayor of Toronto, a former federal cabinet minister, and for over 10 years, the chair of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust. Glenn R. Miller, MCI, RPP, is Director of Applied Research with the Institute. He is also managing editor of the Ontario Planning Journal, the professional practice magazine of the Ontario Professional Planners Institute. Visit www.canub.com for details on conferences, publications and partnerships.



(Association of Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology of Ontario), the Canadian Urban Institute has been working in cooperation with the OCCR partnership with cities such as Kingston, Guelph, Thunder Bay, Peterborough, Ottawa, Sudbury and Hamilton to help local representatives articulate how to collectively leverage their community's resources.

Although Smart Growth is often discussed in the context of controlling growth, the examples of Hamilton and Sudbury illustrate why the Smart Growth concept can be applied to strategies for attracting investment and expanding the economy. In the case of Hamilton, the challenge was to shift the mindset from “heavy industrial” to positioning the community as “wired to compete,” utilizing the research strengths of McMaster University and the growing cluster of firms attracted to that knowledge base. This compliments Hamilton's determined effort to restore its inner city neighbourhoods, which have some of the best heritage structures in Ontario.

For Sudbury, currently basking in the international spotlight resulting from neutrino research, the process took longer, but succeeded in engaging representatives from all sectors to establish a new, independent economic development entity. One element of its mandate will be to complement the steps being taken by the newly amalgamated municipality to revitalize its downtown – a key goal being to support the nucleus of new media software startups occupying vacant retail space in the core.

2. Contain urban sprawl

Smart Growth is about promoting the efficient use of existing infrastructure, specifying strict criteria for new growth and working with the private sector to build compact communities. This is not a quick fix but we need to quickly become more effective in this key area. Portland, Oregon is well-known for maintaining firm boundaries and investing in transit to promote compact urban form

but their success is the result of a 20 year commitment. In Ontario, new brownfield legislation promises to spur much-needed reinvestment in well located but under-utilized sites. Quebec has a head start, having already established an excellent policy framework and a culture of cooperative project development utilizing provincial and federal funds to leverage private investment dollars.

The Canadian Urban Institute has taken strong positions on growth management, citing the need for Greater Toronto to guide future investment to support a

viable urban structure of vibrant, mixed use centres linked by high density corridors. To make this work, we must also promote brownfield development – the necessary reciprocal of efforts to restrict greenfield growth.

To underscore our commitment to brownfields, we hold a major brownfields conference every fall. This is done in cooperation with the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the Ontario Ministries of Municipal Affairs and Housing, and Environment, the Montreal Centre for Excellence in Brownfield Redevelopment and other key players. Other partners include a large law firm and the principals involved in AboutRemediation.com.

We have also instituted annual “CUI Brownie Awards,” to recognize and encourage excellence in brownfield development. The 2002 winner for the best major project was the Canada Lands Corporation (CLC) for their very successful large scale redevelopment of former railway lands in Moncton, N.B. In addition to setting the highest technical and design standards, the CLC project won high marks for how it engaged the public. The ability to bring stakeholders with different priorities together to support a common interest is an important feature of Smart Growth thinking.

3. Provide transportation alternatives

One of the primary motivations for American cities to begin investing in public transit in a major way was that commuting times, congestion and air quality were getting worse at an increasing rate. With support from their provincial governments, Vancouver and Montreal have established regional-scale transportation agencies. Montreal is also today reaping the benefits of modest but regular investments in their Metro system over a 30 year period.

In Ontario, the lack of an appropriate agency with a mandate to formulate and implement a plan, combined

with lack of on-going financial support from senior levels of government, makes it difficult to see how Greater Toronto can move beyond the current cycle of indecision. In contrast, the U.S. government is committed to spending more than \$40 billion on transit in large cities over six years – and that’s just the federal share. Some of these funds are applied to the maintenance of metropolitan planning organizations.

The Canadian Urban Institute has been active in promoting debate on transit and other infrastructure-related issues. We argue that rail-based transit has the most potential to shape land use (and thereby help determine future travel habits), so decision makers responsible for allocating funds for transit need to think about longer term benefits. We have suggested strongly that while there is clearly a need to fix many nagging urban problems, it is also critical that decision makers keep enough in reserve to invest in the future quality of life of our cities.

This argument has particular relevance in the current debate about the need to persuade the federal government to invest in our cities in the same way that the U.S. federal government does. We believe that a sound business case has to be made for capital-intensive decisions such as rapid transit, but that the business case has to look beyond whether a fledgling transit project will need operating subsidies. We need to take into account the hard-to-quantify benefits of improved air quality, and the value to society of creating land use patterns that will allow people to leave their cars at home.

A case in point from the annals of Smart Growth is the contrast between recent corporate decisions made in Atlanta and the Toronto area. In Atlanta, known for its stifling grid-lock and relentless urban sprawl, the Bell South Company is about to move into five new high rise office buildings recently constructed at two subway stops. Together with an existing head office tower at a third station, and four satellite offices at the extremities of the subway system, this complex of buildings will permit the company’s employees to conduct nearly all business without using the city’s congested roads. This “Smart Growth” solution, which consolidates business activity previously conducted in 18 different locations across Atlanta, was made for purely selfish economic reasons: fed up with losing top employees, the company conducted a poll among their workforce and found that the grind of commuting and inter-office travel was literally running their people into the ground. Bell South is banking on this transit-based solution to help them keep their best employees.

Contrast this to the situation in Greater Toronto, where the Royal Bank recently opened an 800,000 square foot office complex in the west end of Mississauga on lands adjacent to the Highway 401, originally designated for industry. Although the City of Mississauga has numerous locations designated for high density office development, including the Mississauga City Centre, none of them offer high order public transit. As long as land economics are determined by the amount of surface parking that can be constructed within the permitted zoning without resorting to structured parking, planning controls will always be trumped by practicality.

If decision makers in Greater Toronto had provided

the Royal Bank with a location the company could “invest against,” by backing plans for a compact urban structure with high order rapid transit in the first place, the bank’s decision might have been different.

A related issue is that, faced with losing precious assessment, Mississauga could not afford to let Royal Bank “escape” to a neighbouring municipality and so felt obliged to agree to allow the office complex to be developed in a less than appropriate location. In the long run, the community of Greater Toronto is the loser, since the Royal Bank’s investment is already spurring other companies to follow them to their auto-oriented location. In addition to reinforcing auto-focused commuting patterns, these investments also have the unfortunate effect of making it more difficult for the designated office centres to reach the critical mass necessary to support investment in transit.

4. Provide housing choices

Affordable housing is an essential ingredient in the quest for a high quality of urban life. Without it, employers find it difficult to attract workers. Few places in Canada are still building public housing, and our tax regimes make it unattractive for the private sector to invest in rental housing. In contrast, one U.S. developer builds 20,000 rental units a year in the major markets. Fanny Mae (an independent U.S. mortgage insurer) promotes cheaper mortgages for people who select transit-oriented locations closer to their place of work.

The Canadian Urban Institute is hoping to undertake research into the feasibility of creating similar financial instruments in this country. The key is to acknowledge that housing location decisions are made by individuals on the basis of fixed costs they can afford and in response to what is available. The challenge is how to influence individual decisions but to achieve a desired cumulative impact.

Since builders are the last entrepreneur in the supply chain, and because builders have the lowest threshold of risk, builders will only build what they can reasonably expect to sell. “Greenfield” land located on the periphery is less expensive, so there is no economic incentive for the builder to risk building higher density housing or to select more costly locations where transit is available. This creates a vicious cycle where we build housing that goes some way to meeting the needs of future owners, but which requires these new homeowners to commit to longer commutes in locations with few amenities. The location-efficient mortgage would encourage prospective homeowners to examine the true cost of selecting a particular location by including more than fixed costs such as the mortgage in their calculations.

The location-efficient mortgage is potentially a way to give “points” (either a cheaper mortgage or a higher ratio mortgage, or both) to the prospective homeowner to make transit-oriented (and therefore more expensive) locations more financially feasible. The conceptual breakthrough that needs to be made is for the financial institutions to acknowledge that a two-person household living in a more accessible location is potentially a better risk because the householders will only need one car instead of two (or possibly no car at all). For this reason, the institution may be prepared to offer a higher ratio mortgage that

allows the purchaser to choose the more expensive but more accessible location. Government could play a role by absorbing the cost of mortgage insurance for qualifying purchasers. From the point of view of government, this is also a way to leverage the marketplace to support public policy. For the builder, brownfield locations, which are inherently more likely to be better located, become more attractive (and therefore less risky) if he or she knows that the buying public is being encouraged to make a different kind of lifestyle decision.

5. Protect natural areas and cultural heritage

Canadian cities have a strong tradition of protecting the environment but we need to find ways to expand that commitment and make it easier for builders to integrate natural systems into urban development and retain our built heritage. The federal government and the Ontario governments are currently working independently on tax reform to benefit heritage properties. In the U.S., federal and state laws complement each other. Will the same be true for federal and provincial laws here?

One of the most important natural disasters to strike a Canadian city was Hurricane Hazel in 1954. Although the loss of more than 200 lives can never be discounted, Toronto and its neighbouring municipalities have benefited enormously as a result. On the one hand, stringent environmental restrictions effectively banned new development below a designated flood plain line. On the other, 50 years later, the community benefits from hundreds of kilometers of nature trails, bike paths and related amenities that thread through the city's ravines. With recent innovations in land trusts and by borrowing some ideas from the U.S. for stimulating the granting of permanent easements over natural hazard lands and greenspaces, we could make similar strides in further integrating nature into our cities.

6. Create community

Prescriptive solutions rarely work and this is especially true with community building, as we discovered with early attempts at urban renewal. Healthy communities and strong neighbourhoods are the basic building blocks for competitive cities, and the active participation of citizen groups of all kinds is key to creating places in which people want to live, invest or visit. The Canadian Urban Institute will be holding a unique workshop early in 2003 to examine the challenges of "placemaking" in high-growth suburban areas.

Cleveland is a classic example of citizen-led economic recovery, which has transformed that city from bankruptcy to a Triple-A credit rating in less than 20 years. On a smaller scale, the neighbourhood of Durand in Hamilton, Ontario demonstrated similar qualities of recovery.

Last summer, in a bid to stimulate new thinking about the leadership required to address the competitive needs of Greater Toronto, the Canadian Urban Institute, together with three other organizations (The Toronto Board of Trade, the United Way of Greater Toronto and Rogers Communications), collaborated to hold the first Toronto Urban Summit. One of the keynote presenters, David Pecaut, who heads a company headquartered in

New York but managed three days a week from Toronto, is leading the follow up to this two day event. As CEO of the Toronto Alliance, Pecaut will be reporting on the results of five working groups this spring.

How far can Smart Growth take us?

The ideas behind Smart Growth are not new, but the breadth of their application definitely is breaking fresh ground. Canadian municipalities are well positioned to apply (or in some cases, re-learn) the principles of Smart Growth, but success will need the active involvement of everyone with a stake in the quality of life and competitiveness of our cities to participate in how decisions are arrived at. This means that all levels of government, major institutions, NGOs and the private sector need to be involved. This requires the right enabling legislation, appropriate financial incentives to encourage private investment and recognition that Canada today is an urban nation defined by the competitiveness of its cities.

It is also important to acknowledge that cities are more than the sum of their municipal achievements. When we think of Paris, London or New York, we seldom extol the virtues of the civic administration of those cities. The French government recognizes that Paris is the principal hub and point of attraction for the entire country and spends lavishly to protect its investment. Only a regional government such as Isle de France endowed with a mandate to stimulate culture, knowledge and reputation in equal measures could afford to cite enhancing the quality of life for students as a civic priority. Yet by investing in this resource consistently over many decades, the Parisian regional government knows that the corporations making Paris their home can count on a constant supply of graduate top students from around Europe and beyond.

In our submission to the Sgro Caucus Task Force on cities, we noted that the newly emergent concept of the city region is an economic unit happily not defined in the constitution. If municipalities are the domain of the provinces, city regions can – and do – serve as the country's economic engines within which federal resources can be effectively channeled for the benefit of the country as a whole. Federal interests include but are not limited to investment in the infrastructure necessary to support a competitive city such as public transit; meeting the needs of new immigrants without straining scarce municipal resources in the major cities; supporting the ambitions of our universities and colleges; effectively amending the tax structure stimulating research and development or affordable housing. We see Smart Growth and the emerging Urban Agenda as mutually supportive ideas. Smart Growth is in contrast to earlier attempts to plan rationally and comprehensively that sank under their own weight. The emphasis today should be to focus on the cumulative impact of the many complex decisions made that affect the quality of life in cities rather than a single large plan.

At its root, Smart Growth is about creating competitive city regions.

MAJOR CITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

ABSTRACT

The urban agenda has been largely ignored for too long, and putting it off any longer will not help the development of our cities for the 21st Century. A "New Urban Agenda" has been brought on by some serious problems including poverty, shortage of affordable housing, ageing infrastructures and inadequately-funded public transportation systems. What can be done to help our cities? First of all, argues the author, municipalities should have constitutional recognition as an order of government.

The "New Urban Agenda" with its far-reaching issues regarding the management of our major cities in Canada is gradually making its way onto the radar screen and provoking discussion. It has been finally recognized that major urban centres are the catalysts of change and the drivers of the economy. In every corner of the globe, whether it be in Africa or North America, the focus for human, social and economic growth is in our cities.

Eighty percent of the population of Canada lives in urbanized areas, and slightly over fifty percent lives in four of the biggest cities, that is, Toronto, Montreal, Calgary and Vancouver. This fact alone indicates the undeniable importance of the urban agenda in an age of globalization, knowledge-based economies and the concentration of strategic service industries in large urban centres. Even though electronic, wireless and satellite communications eradicate time and distance between major cities and continents, they have also created concentrated centres for research, development and high-performance industries gravitating to urban areas. This phenomenon will continue to exist as interdependence and rapid change are ever-present in our lives.

This 21st century reality does not in any way diminish the importance of regions and rural areas in the global picture and greater scheme of things. It only serves to accentuate the need for balanced, integrated and coherent public policies which enrich and facilitate this interdependence at the three levels of governance, federal, provincial and municipal. The last half century has proven that hierarchical governments, especially at the provincial and federal levels with specific jurisdictional and legislative authority, have led to power bastions forgetting that citizens are the sole reason of their existence. It was the cities, towns and villages that made up the "stem cells" of our country creating the beauty, the strength and the diversity known as our Canada today. The common good should be the driving force leading to convergence on unity of purpose and objectives rather than the partisan geopolitical power struggles witnessed throughout the land.

The crucial need for co-operation, compromise and establishing a new paradigm for dignity, growth and prosperity of our cities and our country, all of humanity for that matter, seems utterly beyond the irrelevant exchanges witnessed in government assemblies. Political representatives give the impression of deriving their leadership and power from confrontation, intransigence and aggressive behaviour rather than the human qualities and values that marked many of the builders of this country. Might does not make right, and it never will. The present attitudes observed will make the whole house of cards crumble, not only in Canada.

The "New Urban Agenda" brought on by the serious problems created by poverty, shortage of affordable housing, ageing and decaying infrastructures, inadequately-funded public transportation systems, and the list goes on, has provoked, at least, the embryo of attention-getting it deserves in the last decade. The recession of the early 1990's was the first sign of impending disaster for the major cities across Canada. By 1993, unemployment, poverty, boarded-up buildings, decaying sewer pipes, roads, bridges and water-distribution systems along with insufficient revenues to correct what

VERA DANYLUK

Vera Danyluk is a former mayor of the Town of Mount Royal, Quebec, and former Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Montreal Urban Community

needed fixing or funding triggered the first alarm bells. There was a flurry of activity at that time producing joint efforts and “concertation” bringing people as well as vital energies and resources together. The economy did pick up steam in the ensuing years providing some relief and getting us back on track. However, reducing deficits at senior levels of government and concentrating on economic development did not change the fragility of supporting cities with long-term structured, revenue-producing frameworks in order to move away from dependence on municipal taxes based on market-value assessments which were already overexploited. Market-value assessments on property are not the measure of wealth or the capacity of property-owners to pay their municipal tax accounts. Municipal taxes have become a mechanism for redistribution of wealth which is totally contrary to any democratic constitution. The municipal tax format is no longer used to support basic municipal services as it was originally intended to be used.

During the last year, the “New Urban Agenda” did provide impetus for several initiatives drawing closer attention to this vital issue which is the core of future success and prosperity. The Prime Minister’s Task Force on Urban Issues and the TD Forum on Canada’s Standard of Living Study both concluded on the urgent necessity to deliver a “new deal” for our cities. The submissions from business, labour, academics and all segments of Canadian society agree that all three “orders” of government have a crucial role to play if, the well-being of citizens and our cities is taken seriously. Health of citizens, quality of life, conditions that allow young people especially children to self-actualize, find their sources in our cities. The Federal Government has maintained a Department of Rural Affairs, but the fate of our cities gets lost in the shuffle and crossfire of federal-provincial infighting. Nonetheless, the fact that these two events took place sounded a wake-up call for all elected representatives who care about the survival of our cities.

What can be done to place our cities at the decision-making table on equal footing with provincial and federal partners? First of all, municipalities should have constitutional recognition as an order of government. The constitution as it presently stands, confines cities to the position of “creatures of the provincial governments”. This lowly subjugation of cities leads to many of the insurmountable problems and challenges facing cities today. Provincial governments have treated municipalities neither gently nor with great generosity; in fact, provincial authorities always protected their own jurisdictions, their authority and their hierarchical interests. The jurisdictional powers of provincial governments take precedence over citizens’ real needs and aspirations.

One of the most striking examples of patriarchal authority usurped by provincial authorities is the imposition of mergers or amalgamations of municipalities. This is not to say that mergers were not needed in some areas and regions of Canada. However, the use of legislative powers to impose mergers in the face of democratic principles which had no place in the process leaves a majority of citizens mistrusting their governments and politicians. And, the relationship of trust between citizens and their

elected representatives is the foundation of a free and democratic society.

Worst still, in the spate of mergers taking place in recent years, no one has been able to demonstrate with solid proof that these result in savings, improved quality of life and the financial structures to better support the greater needs of these large urban municipalities. There are many factors which may theoretically justify mergers such as uniformization of services, geographic collaboration between centre cities and their suburbs as well as fairer allocation of resources throughout the larger area. Not one of the new cities created through mergers has produced economies of scale offsetting tax increases necessitated by the new and larger administrative structures. The increasing financial needs of major cities across Canada have merely been increased substantially due to the decisions of provincial governments which do not have the means to provide for their larger “creatures”. Provinces were hoping that mergers would bring greater revenues to the former central cities, and, in this way, spare the provinces the obligation of subsidizing these cities. The necessity of developing a “New Urban Agenda” is significantly greater now because of this provincial solution to their own financing problems and lack of vision.

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) has been at the forefront of pressing governments to obtain constitutional recognition for municipalities giving them the status of order of government. No one needs another constitutional battle at this time, and we all agree on that. However, the urgent issues surrounding our cities will not evaporate until open dialogue and debate on the future of our cities are maturely and intelligently addressed. The urban agenda has been relegated to the back burner for far too long; putting it off any longer will not help the development of our cities for the 21st Century.

The FCM and the Big City Mayors must continue to assume leadership in this national issue. The federal, provincial and territorial governments alone cannot and will not find the sustainable solution to this problem. Cities, like the question of the environment and climactic changes, are everyone’s concern and responsibility. We must formulate a national strategy to support our cities and make them healthy and viable within the present context of competition, global markets and greater security concerns. We have learned the hard way that economic development must go hand-in-hand with social development, and FCM along with its member municipalities have contributed to this essential ingredient in our communities. They, in many cases, have been innovators in responding to needs in new areas of activity which extend far beyond the offering of basic municipal services such as snow removal, water purification and distribution networks, cleaning streets, planting trees, and the lengthy catalogue of commonly known “municipal” services. The social, intellectual and health development responsibilities in a context of growing diversity of our cities have increased exponentially over the years without any new sources of revenues being factored into the equation of municipal budgets.



Vieux-Québec en hiver – photo de J-F Bergeron, Enviro Foto, copyright©2001 Office du tourisme et des congrès de la Communauté urbaine de Québec

Municipal authorities do not have the facility or the privilege of distancing themselves from the front-line of their citizens' complaints, pre-occupations or demands. FCM has consistently stressed the importance of the "order of government" closest to the people who experience daily the conditions of their neighbourhoods and local communities. The challenges of healthy, happy and safe communities are not faced by leaving the management and financing of cities to chance and solely dependent on municipal tax dollars. Again, it must be said that all levels of governance must share in the fiscal responsibility and accountability for achieving the goals and objectives associated with communities where citizens want to live and bring up their families.

Constitutional recognition of municipalities would allow cities a greater bargaining power with provincial and territorial authorities. It would also allow cities to enter into agreements directly with the Federal Government eliminating the turf wars which currently hinder the programs established by the central government to help these cities. The Federal Government Infrastructures Program is an excellent example of initiatives where provincial intervention often slows down the process or completely sidesteps certain deserving cities.

The most recent Throne Speech made reference to promised action on urban infrastructures which provoked the cry for a "new deal" for Canadian cities. It is to be

hoped that in the period of time between the Throne Speech and the next election, this promise does not get lost in campaign rhetoric as citizens have so sadly seen in the past. Financing our cities, maintaining the Canadian standard of living and even enhancing it along with quality of life in our major cities cannot become part of empty political promises devoid of firm commitment and determination to deliver.

The *Star* (Toronto) columnist Christopher Hume best summed up the dire reality afflicting our cities in this way. "Until recently Canada had just two solitudes. Now it boasts three: the country, the provinces and the cities. Though none is doing well, Canadian cities are in a crisis so deep their future is at stake. Abandoned by Ottawa and provincial governments, they have been left to fill the void without possessing the means to do so."

At the hearings of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Urban Issues, the co-chair of the second annual Urban Summit, Jane Pepino declared, "The status quo is simply not an option for Canadian cities." To redeem the democratic potential of our cities, and our country, fundamental human values and the building of citizens' trust in government must be part of the other options.

THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE AND THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

ABSTRACT

Over the protests of the Assembly of First Nations, numerous provincial and regional First Nations organizations and a large percentage of the band leadership, the Minister of Indian Affairs introduced Bill C-61 (later reintroduced as Bill C-7), the First Nations Governance Act (FNGA), into the House of Commons in June 2002. While the Bill has been publicly promoted as the result of extensive consultations with the “grass-roots”, its design and content betray a neo-liberal agenda that has less to do with the aspirations of First Nations people than with preconceived notions of administration and accountability systems. This paper is intended to discuss the concepts of governance, administration and management as it relates to First Nations, and contrast these to the notions advanced by in the FNGA.

Defining Governance

In recent years, many disciplines have entered into the Aboriginal rights discourse, debating the impacts, justifications and consequences of colonization, Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal self-government. Through negotiated agreements, government studies, commissions and policies, the term “Aboriginal self-government” has come to evoke particular understandings about the processes, boundaries and methods of actualizing a type of self-administration that adheres to specific “democratic” or “universally-accepted” principles. Of late, the term “good governance”¹ has come into favour, finding its way into discussion of Aboriginal governance. The term is apparently intended to portray the attributes of “strong, accountable and sustainable governments and institutions”² and entail practices that are superior to mere “governance”. What is evident from most of the discussion is that the epistemological basis for these concepts lies not in the nature of the Aboriginal nations, but rather in the socio-economic status of the post-colonial state and its administrative needs.

Although in its general sense, the term “governance” describes a variety of societal conditions that involve some degree or other of decision-making, much literature discusses governance in terms of practical elements, programs and administration rather than the expression of philosophical values and world-views³. In considering the indigenous nations, what is deemed “good governance” may thus bear little or no relationship to the worldview of the people being governed but may instead reflect the needs of the state to address a social, economic or political need of its own.

From Friendship to Domination

Before one can fully appreciate the perspective of First Nations, it is necessary to have at least a rudimentary understanding of the historical relationship between Canada and First Nations.

The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) describes four stages in the relationship between Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal people in Canada. These are:

- *Separate Worlds* – This was pre-contact (before 1500) when Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people lived on separate continents and knew nothing of one another;
- *Nation to Nation relations* – Immediately after contact, this period was characterized by fragile relations of peace, friendship and rough equality during which treaty relationships were formed;
- *Gradual Domination by Non-Aboriginal people* – As the indigenous nations declined in population and power due to death from disease, warfare and genocidal practices, the settler colonizers increased and came to dominate, taking over Aboriginal lands and resources, pushing Aboriginal people to small areas of land “reserves” and instituting policies and laws aimed at obliterating Aboriginal nations.
- *Renewal and Renegotiation* – This was described as the turning point when Aboriginal people became revitalized, demanding a critical review of the relationship; renegotiation and renewal based on recognition, respect, sharing and responsibility⁴.

Although the longest stage was pre-contact, the best documented stage is that of settler domination, wherein the indigenous nations were weakened in all aspects such that a relationship of relative equality between sovereigns was altered to one of domination. The diminished position of indigenous nations vis-a-vis the colonizers was conveniently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in the precedent-setting case decided by Chief Justice Marshall in *Johnson v. McIntosh* who states @ 572:

On discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and *the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim ascendancy...*⁵

He goes on at 590 as follows:

...But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness. (emphasis added).

Marshall's statement illustrates a commitment to the philosophy of manifest destiny which endorsed divine principles of superiority and a duty of the colonizers of North America to rule over the savage primitive inhabitants. Apparently convinced of their inferiority, First Nations were not represented in these proceedings or the Canadian precedent that followed this case, *St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. R.*⁶ As a result, the debate and subsequent implications of colonizing laws and policies occurred in the absence of the nations whose partnership was originally sought and relied upon by both England and France, and, aside from providing that the Parliament of Canada had legislative authority over "Indians and lands reserved for the Indians"⁷, the original constitutional arrangements ignored the indigenous nations. In accordance with the prevailing attitudes of the day, First Nations who had so recently been partners and allies were relegated to little more than an administrative hindrance in the construction of a new colonial empire on the lands of the ancestors had shared.

Governance and "Canadian Indians"

In administering "Indians and lands reserved for the Indians", the federal government controlled virtually every element of the lives of First Nations people, including their manner of governance. The *Indian Act*⁸ has been the primary legislative expression of governance for First Nations⁹ in Canada for over a century. In keeping with the view that indigenous people were "uncivilized", the objectives of the Indian Act administrative system were twofold: to segregate indigenous people from "civilization" and to gradually assimilate them into "civilization" through programs aimed at changing the culture, economy and lifestyle of Aboriginal people¹⁰.

The *Indian Act* redefined in racial terms the many diverse nations of indigenous people in Canada,

segmenting settlements into "bands of Indians", and using blood quantum, marriage and paternity as determinants of Indian status and membership. The governance systems established under the *Indian Act* were principally intended to enable the Canadian officials to delegate some of their administrative duties to the Aboriginal people. Thus, with the introduction of the elected council system in 1869¹¹, a provision that was replicated in the subsequent consolidated federal Indian Acts, a system of external controls was introduced into the internal governments whereby the colonized enforced the rules and structures of the colonizer. It is apparent that, although this could be perceived as a form of "self-government", it was not modeled on the governing practices of the indigenous nations; rather it mirrored the values and aspirations of the colonizing nation. The Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs is reported to have described the objectives in this way:

The Acts framed in the years 1868 and 1869, relating to Indian Affairs, were designed to lead the Indian people by degrees to mingle with the white race in the ordinary avocations of life. It was intended to afford facilities for electing, for a limited period, members of bands to manage, as a Council, local matters – that intelligent and educated men, recognized as chiefs, should carry out the wishes of the male members of mature years in each band, who should be fairly represented in the conduct of their internal affairs.

Thus establishing a responsible, for an irresponsible system, this provision, by law, was designed to pave the way to the establishment of simple municipal institutions.¹²

Despite the lack of enthusiasm of First Nations to embrace these "advancements", the federal government found ways to implement its objective by "allowing" bands to use customary means to form councils¹³. From the perspective of the First Nation community, what is hailed as success by the federal government may in fact be a demonstration of how, through active resistance to an unworkable and unacceptable policy, they were able to manipulate government policy so as to maintain their own forms of governance. This phenomenon is noted by O'Malley in his discussion of Australian policy relating to social programs intended for administration by the Aboriginal population, wherein he notes:

The governmental version of self-determination was failing in its own terms because of the robust nature of Aboriginal forms of governance. These subjects of self-determination were not liberal subjects already primed with the taken-for-granted assumptions, knowledge and practices of the populace of urban, white Australia. Despite attempts to create such an Aboriginal citizenry, the strength of what Trigger refers to as the Aboriginal 'Blackfella domain' frustrated white political programmes. This resistance did not appear so much in hostile conflict, as in more subtle processes which sustained indigenous governance.¹⁴



Inner Harbour, Victoria, British Columbia – photo © 2002 Copyright Tourism Victoria

A similar phenomenon could be observed in the First Nation people of Canada. While the transformation of bands to the elected band council system was declared successful by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC), by 1971, over 100 years after its introduction, only 71% of all bands were using the elected system¹⁵. According to at least one study, this success rate was more likely due to INAC's insistence on dealing only with the elected council than to the desire of the First Nation population¹⁶.

A History of Resistance

It is notable that the interaction between indigenous nations and their colonizers is frequently characterized by the level of resistance maintained in the face of persistent attempts to override culture and traditions. First Nations people have voiced concerns about government policies relating to governance for many years. Because indigenous people were resistant to the introduction of the elected council system, by 1895 INAC had unilaterally drawn up a list of bands to be placed under the Act¹⁷. It thus became the practice to pressure, cajole or entice indigenous people into adopting the legislative policy by the most efficient means possible. At the other extreme, Indian agents were equally able to prevent bands from engaging in elections if they felt they were not sufficiently "advanced". This practice was apparently fairly routine, particularly when concerned with more remote communities. In some instances, bands were surprised to learn that in accepting

an elected system, they were considered to have abrogated their treaty.¹⁸ Even with the institution of elected systems, life chiefs frequently retained influence and in a number of communities, traditional forms of government continue to retain certain authority.¹⁹ Aboriginal culture has demonstrated its resilience in the face of repeated assaults through legislative and program design.

The Penner Special Committee on Indian Self-Government and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples were both in agreement that any movement toward self-government must begin with the First Nations themselves. As a starting point, RCAP suggests that there are three potential models for Aboriginal self-government – the nation government, the public government and the community of interest government.²⁰ The Penner Committee²¹ recommended that the band begin by defining its membership, which would then adopt a constitution which would be recognized under federal legislation. RCAP saw nation rebuilding as an essential first step for First Nations government. Both RCAP and the Penner Report noted the need for First Nations to have flexibility in implementation, and a solid economic and financial base, including access to lands and resources.

Contrary to the recommendations of the aforementioned reports, Bill C-7 takes a prescriptive approach to First Nations government, leaving little discretion to the band while much remains with the Minister. Rather than addressing membership, which is considered fundamental to governance, Bill C-7 omits mention of membership,

instead focussing on the enactment of codes to address leadership selection, band administration, and financial management and accountability. Although, the act appears practically oriented, one cannot help but be struck by the alternatives that will face bands who must either enact codes within two years or come under the default provisions of the act.

A similar approach was taken with the enactment of Bill C-31, an *Act to Amend the Indian Act*. Enacted in 1985 in order bring the act into conformity with the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*²², that Bill gave bands two years to enact membership codes failing which, they would fall under the *Indian Act* default membership provisions. Bands that were already struggling financially, worried that INAC would not provide adequate financial support for the influx of new members. In response, many hurriedly adopted codes that later proved to be unduly cumbersome or too costly to administer or were challengeable in court. Despite receiving incentives to develop the codes, when challenged, the bands seldom received any assistance from INAC.

Concepts of Governance versus Administration

At the heart of the debate relating to self-government is the question of who defines it. Both the Penner Committee and the RCAP recommended that the fundamentals of governance be left to the First Nations. There is an acknowledgement of the difficulties this entails, and the likelihood that First Nations will need time and support to sort out issues that will inevitably arise. According to RCAP, governance is dependent on power, legitimacy and resources in order to be sustainable. Legitimacy is founded in the cultural values of the people being governed and is the basis upon which such things as authority and mechanisms of government lie. So while the notion of liberal democracy may be generally appealing to the Euro-Canadian, it may seem less fair within a more closely-knit kin-based society. In such a group, a traditional family or clan based government, or even a system based on heredity may be abundantly more just. Similarly, notions of common ownership, potlatch or “giveaway” that are part of some First Nations traditions are likely counter to values of the dominant capitalist consumer society, yet they are linked to philosophies inherent to the spirituality, existence and lifeworld of specific indigenous nations that are likely incomprehensible to the average Euro-Canadian²³.

It is these very communal values that make the indigenous nation unique. While many social theorists have debated the meaning of community, any self-defining community based on national identity provides a potential source of common values. Admittedly, the history of legislated interference in First Nations membership and government has influenced the perspectives of some First Nations, and in a few cases may highlight foundational issues of major significance in the First Nations. Despite this, if governance is the *process* of self-regulation as

opposed to the regulating institutions²⁴, First Nations governance can only be regained through internal discourse that redefines the common, *sui generis* values.

While this may seem an affront to the notion of equality in a pluralistic state, Patrick Maklem²⁵ argues, as have First Nations leaders, that the justification for self-government is sovereignty based on prior claims and it is the very fact of their unique nature that validates them. He states at p 1345:

... claims of prior sovereignty need to be recast in the discourse of distributive justice. Principles of distributive justice are required to explain why it is important to deviate from the ideal of equal citizenship and to promote respect for prior sovereignty through indigenous-specific distributions of political rights and responsibilities...

He goes on at p. 1348:

To those who possess it and those who seek it, the meaning of sovereignty, internal or external, is at once complex and simple. Its complexity arises because different collectivities express sovereignty in

radically different ways... Given such diverse expressions of sovereignty, one might doubt that principles for its distribution can be grounded in shared meaning. Sovereignty, however, is valued by different collectivities for the same reason. Sovereignty's value lies in the fact that it creates a legal space in which a community can negotiate, construct, and protect a collective identity. Sovereignty, simply speaking, permits the expression of collective difference.

History has shown that the will of the federal government can impose policies against the will of the First Nations, but only at great human and financial cost.

Conclusions

“Effective tools for governance” can only be determined with a clear vision of governance. Governance is an expression of the values and choices of individuals and their society. In order to be effective, First Nations governance should be founded in the values, traditions and practices of the indigenous nations themselves. This perspective has been advanced by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, and by the pleas of many First Nations over the past century. History has shown that the will of the federal government can impose policies against the will of the First Nations, but only at great human and financial cost. A belief that a particular course of action is “in their best interests” does not make it so if the end result creates fear and confusion. While the proposed FNCA may reflect the aspirations of some First Nations, it should not be imposed upon all. Neither First Nations nor the federal government will be prepared for such a massive change in such a short time frame.



RON KEENBURG

DARE TO DREAM

In the ancient Roman Forum, the Sewer God stood proudly beside Venus – the goddess of beauty and bloom. The Romans knew health, beauty and landscape were the keys to a city's ability to delight.

Here we live in a land of lush rainforests, soaring mountain ranges, azure lakes, undulating prairie grasses, lavish stands of hardwood and thousands of miles of rugged coastline.

Our cities cut into this wondrous landscape like festering lesions. They pay little tribute to the land and the seasons celebrated by our poets and writers and artists. Rather, Canada's cities, largely built since World War II, are mean places.

Other than the classic buildings that first began our sense of nationhood – like our many legislatures or the few special places of our current time – our cities are largely places of banal cores linked by freeways to suburban wastelands. Places where cars rule, ferrying us to dull structures that may be offices, shopping centres, garages or hospitals – you often need a sign to tell you which is which.

This is the modern heritage of a cabal of city planners, zoning by-laws and architectural design approval panels where those with vested interests interact with councillors and cranks. No matter which way the mayors and councillors turn, they're doomed to criticism or even corruption.

The concept of zoning is a failure in all Canadian cities. There's the office building zone (highrise) and then there's the office building zone (medium rise), the high rise apartment zone (now sprinkled here and there by the pressures of time), the shopping zone (once downtown and now a shopping centre or a big box zone) and the single family residential zones, separate from all others. A place for everything. Everything separate from the other. The word alienation comes to mind.

City cores empty at 5:30, their inhabitants rushing to the castled suburban sanctuary of the middle classes free from all that could harm. These zoning by-laws have failed us. They have robbed us of a sense of teeming, pulsing city life. We are not elevated by the cities we live in, but rather by our occasional escape from them – away to that patchwork of azure lake and forest that surrounds us or to the warmth of southern climes.



"Can you imagine visiting
Winnipeg instead of Paris
... I can."

Enough! What can be done?

It begins with the way we treat people. Industry and businesses must offer their employees more than paychecks. Cities must offer more incentives to landlords. Cut the taxes of those buildings that elevate the spirit of our citizenry and that win design awards. Cut them by 15% annually. Others will follow if they see there is a benefit to them. Let's call it creative taxing; it can be a powerful tool for positive change.

Let us no longer put our trust in the hands of the mayors and the councillors and the city planners. Let us not be held ransom by a handful of cranks who show up at town hall meetings and who therefore are seen to dignify the process of so-called interactive civic participation. This is a farce. These are not the 'experts' who will change our urban fates.

The special landscapes of cities, now the unspoken preserves of the wealthy, must be brought back to the public domain. River banks captured by mansions built nearby must be free for all to walk. Special places – city lakes, parks, ravines and neighbourhood enclaves of lovely homes – must be accessible to everyone. Line their edges with cafes, markets and meeting places.

Build schools that charm and delight the students who must spend so many years in them. These are not places to build with the prudent economies of the short-sighted and virtuous. These are places where our children form a vision of our society.

There is no formula or tidy recipe for success. If there was, I am sure the mayors, councillors and planners would have made wonderful, chocolate-cake cities. But we do have a choice. We can continue to debate our feelings or we can invite, through open competitions, the best and brightest to develop comprehensive plans – visions to reshape our cities into the most delightful places – places that everyone in Canada as well as those from other lands will wish to come to – to feel the vibrancy, to delight in the texture of our streets. Can you imagine visiting Winnipeg or Halifax or Toronto instead of Paris, Prague or New York? I can.

It's the dream we must make real.

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