

CANADIAN ISSUES THÈMES CANADIENS

Winter / Hiver 2007

The Impact of Digital Technology on Canadian Culture

L'impact de la technologie numérique sur la culture canadienne

Victor Rabinovitch

Jacques Bensimon

Joy Cohnstaedt

Marcel Fournier

Will Straw

Darin Barney

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Michael Rushton

Martin Rose

Katherine Watson

Nicolas Gachon



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THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ON CANADIAN CULTURE: RESEARCH THEMES AND QUESTIONS

L'IMPACT DE LA TECHNOLOGIE NUMÉRIQUE SUR LA CULTURE CANADIENNE : THÈMES DE RECHERCHE ET QUESTIONS

CULTURAL POLICY, HISTORY AND IDENTITY / POLITIQUE CULTURELLE, HISTOIRE ET IDENTITÉ

Questions:

- How do you define Canadian Culture?
- What are the particular areas in which cultural expression is strongest in the country and where do you think that it is weakest? In the areas of weakness, what do you think needs to be done to improve things?
- Who should take the lead role in promoting the growth and development of Canadian culture?
- How can the Government of Canada best support the efforts of organizations that contribute to culture?

- Comment définissez-vous la culture canadienne?
- Quels sont les domaines où l'expression culturelle est la plus forte au Canada et où pensez-vous quelle est la plus faible? Dans les domaines de faiblesse, qu'est-ce qui doit être fait selon vous pour améliorer la situation?
- Qui devrait prendre le rôle principal pour promouvoir la croissance et le développement de la culture canadienne?
- Comment le gouvernement pourrait-il mieux supporter les efforts des organismes qui contribuent à la culture?

HOW TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING THE DEFINITION OF CANADIAN CULTURE / COMMENT LA TECHNOLOGIE TRANSFORME LA DÉFINITION DE LA CULTURE CANADIENNE

Questions:

- Does technology strengthen our ability to share and experience Canadian culture?
- Does technology diminish the consumption of Canadian culture by vastly widening the opportunities to consume cultural products across the globe?
- What are the most effective ways of protecting Canadian culture? How much protection is too much?
- What will help Canada compete more effectively on the world stage in the area of culture?
- La technologie renforce-t-elle notre habilité à partager et à faire l'expérience de la culture canadienne?
- La technologie diminue-t-elle la consommation de la culture canadienne en élargissant les opportunités pour consommer des produits d'à travers le monde?
- Quels sont les moyens les plus efficaces de protéger la culture canadienne? À quel point la protection est de trop?
- Qu'est-ce qui aiderait le Canada à faire concurrence plus efficacement à l'échelle mondiale dans le domaine de la culture?

CULTURE AND ECONOMICS / CULTURE ET ÉCONOMIE

Questions:

- How can we help Canadians better understand the economic benefits of culture?
- What will help Canada compete more effectively on the world stage in the area of culture?
- What potential challenges or barriers do you see to the implementation of a cultural policy?
- What are the most effective ways of protecting Canadian culture? How much protection is too much?
- Comment pouvons-nous aider les Canadiens à mieux comprendre les bénéfices économiques de la culture?
- Qu'est-ce qui aiderait le Canada à faire concurrence plus efficacement à l'échelle mondiale dans le domaine de la culture?
- Quels défis et barrières potentiels voyez-vous concernant la mise en œuvre d'une politique culturelle?
- Quels sont les moyens les plus efficaces de protéger la culture canadienne? À quel point la protection est trop?

DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION / DÉMOGRAPHIE ET CONSOMMATION CULTURELLE

Questions:

- How do you define Canadian Culture? How would you assess the state of Canadian culture? In what ways has the growing diversity in the composition of Canada changed the definition of Canadian culture?
- Has Canadian culture successfully responded to the challenge of the diversification of Canada's population?
- What are the particular areas in which cultural expression is strongest in the country and where do you think that it is weakest? In the areas of weakness what do you think needs to be done to improve things?
- Who should take the lead role in promoting the growth and development of Canadian culture?
- How can the Government of Canada best support the efforts of organizations that contribute to culture?

- Comment définissez-vous la culture canadienne? Comment évaluez-vous l'état de la culture canadienne? De quelles façons la croissance de la diversité de la composition du Canada a transformé la définition de la culture canadienne?
- La culture canadienne a-t-elle répondu avec succès au défi de la diversification du Canada?
- Quels sont les domaines où l'expression culturelle est la plus forte au Canada et où pensez-vous quelle est la plus faible? Dans les domaines de faiblesse, qu'est-ce qui doit être fait selon vous pour améliorer la situation?
- Qui devrait prendre le rôle principal pour promouvoir la croissance et le développement de la culture canadienne?
- Comment le gouvernement pourrait-il mieux supporter les efforts des organismes qui contribuent à la culture?

FOUR “CONSTANTS” IN CANADIAN CULTURAL POLICY

ABSTRACT

Political and public attention to cultural policy in Canada goes through cycles, varying over time, and has often been motivated by technology change. Many programs, rules and strategic directions were developed over the past century, giving rise to a unique national model for promoting and enhancing cultural expression. Today, in response to the global revolution in communications and information management, Canadian cultural policy is again being challenged. The history of previous public initiatives shows that it is entirely possible for Canada’s cultural strategy to adjust creatively and effectively to this latest set of conditions. This is important because an assertive cultural policy is an essential condition for Canadian unity and continuity.

Even as we continue to be affected by the world wide revolution in digital technology, it is important to keep the cultural impacts on Canada in perspective. Canada’s ability to express its independent cultural voice has often faced dynamic challenges. Whether these were technological or demographic, institutional or artistic, there have been certain patterns to cultural policy debates which have asserted themselves regularly. We need to recognize these patterns, even while agreeing that the digital revolution has introduced a profound global challenge to sustainable cultural diversity. In my opinion, there are four fundamental constants – we can call them Canada’s cultural ‘verities’ – that describe how this country has responded to past challenges and shaped a successful record of cultural policy initiatives.

1. Cyclical public attention

Concern with cultural policy issues goes through alternating cycles of public and political attention. At different times in Canadian history there have been widely varying levels of interest in culture as a subject of policy concern. I use the term ‘culture’ in a wholly inclusive manner to mean all aspects of expression that communicate social identity and creativity. We can readily identify periods of high interest in culture when issues were very visible and voluble. Some of these periods date back to the early years of Canadian modern history, while others are more recent.

In the mid-1860s, for example, when the terms of Confederation were being negotiated, the issue of language was very sensitive. For representatives from Quebec, the right to use French in the Dominion’s Parliament and in the courts was essential. And for Thomas D’Arcy McGee, a non-French member of the Quebec delegation, culture represented an idealistic opportunity to shape a national character that would suit the new country. McGee, who eloquently promoted an inclusive, tolerant Canadian identity, was silenced in 1868 with a bullet to his brain from an assassin who felt his views on political cooperation betrayed the cause of militant Irish nationalism.

The tragedy of McGee’s violent death was never repeated in Canada’s political life, but his quest for defining a unique national approach to cultural expression has been echoed on many occasions. In 1929, for example, the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting chaired by Sir John Aird concluded that the country required a publicly-owned broadcasting system to enable Canadian voices to be heard over the airwaves. Aird was the President of the Canadian Bank of Commerce and his

VICTOR RABINOVITCH is President of the Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation, and has been a leader for many years in cultural policy development.

recommendations led a Conservative government under Prime Minister Bennett, followed by a Liberal government under Mackenzie King, to create the forerunner of today's CBC. A mere twenty years later, in 1951, another Royal Commission, this time led by Vincent Massey, recommended many additional initiatives to promote cultural undertakings under state patronage. The Massey Commission laid the policy basis for the Canada Council for the Arts and for public support of many other cultural activities.

Issues of cultural policy have repeatedly surfaced in modern history as sensitive and controversial, often leading to new program or regulatory initiatives. In the early 1970s, following intense debates around bilingualism and biculturalism, the first Canadian content (Cancon) rules were adopted for radio broadcast license holders, specifying minimum requirements for air play of Canadian music. Ten years later, after extensive hearings at the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunication Commission (CRTC), licenses were issued for the new medium of PayTV, with the requirement that a small quota of Canadian films be offered to subscribers. At the same time, a parallel decision was made by the federal government to support more output from Canada's emerging commercial film industry.

There have also been periods when the cultural sector was not successful in the competition for government attention. In essence, political interest in cultural programs ebbs and flows, sometimes growing stronger and other times becoming weaker. At present, Canada is going through a phase of lessened interest in activist cultural policy. This is apparent in the federal sphere, extending over several recent governments, but it is also the situation in many provincial jurisdictions. We might speculate as to the reasons for this lower interest. We should certainly recognize that even in low-profile periods, the ongoing administration of cultural programs may spark occasional controversies, but this is not the same as engendering debates and public expressions of support that galvanize initiatives for new directions.

Political interest in Canadian culture is cyclical in nature; this is one of our 'verities'. We can anticipate that cultural issues will return to prominence in a number of years, much as Canadian environmental concerns returned to the public agenda after a quiet period during the 1990s.

2. Driven by technology

While political and social leaders occasionally proclaim their love of things artistic and cultural, it has really been technology challenges that propelled cultural policy development for nearly 100 years. Innovations and commercial opportunities triggered private and public investments, political uncertainties and strategic decisions. For example, the emergence of commercial radio networks in the United States and their spillover to Canada gave rise to fears about this country's lack of presence in this new communications medium. The cultural importance of Canadian broadcasts and was key to the Aird recommendations in 1929. Similarly, concerns about the new commercial technology of television and recognition of the power of the 'mass media' were powerful stimulants to the proposals of the Massey Commission.

We can identify other key technology motivators for cultural policy innovations. In the 1960s, the rapid expansion of cable distribution systems drove political debate on the importance of Canadian ownership rules and priority carriage for domestic broadcasting. In the 1980s, the arrival of Pay-Per-View technology led to the licensing of television movie channels. In the mid-1990s, the availability of satellite distribution systems led to a major controversy and, eventually, to revised regulations on broadcast licenses and 'Cancon' balance. Again in the mid-1990s, the new ability to transfer content across borders through digitized signals led to a high profile trade dispute with the United States over so-called 'split run magazines'. The potential effects of this technology persuaded the federal government to create a new program of support for Canadian publications.

Technology impacts on culture during the Twentieth Century have been seen especially in the field of broadcasting. Even the powerful medium of commercial film has been harnessed to the packaging and distribution capacity of television (although feature films are still normally shown in cinemas for their first-release window). Consequently, the primary focus of new policy and funding has been on broadcasting. A second focus has been complementary to broadcasting, in the sense of assisting the creation of Canadian content to supply the needs of broadcast media. Assistance to recorded music, to the feature film industry, and to documentary film production were directly related to challenges in broadcasting. Even the traditional activity of book publishing, which has

often received government attention, can be thought of as a nurturing ground for the supply of materials to TV production.

By contrast, those areas of cultural activity that are not readily perceived as related to new technologies, notably arts performance and museum operations, are usually relegated to the lowest position on the cultural policy totem pole. Of course, Canadians and foreign visitors continue to attend and enjoy the performing arts and museums, even while these receive less political attention and funding than comparable institutions in other major countries.

In other words, culture in Canada has often obtained its strongest political attention as an offshoot from its relationship to technological innovation, rather than for its intrinsic worth as a voice of creativity, social values and identity. We might speculate as to why this is so. Does technology make public opinion leaders feel vulnerable? Alternatively, do they feel that technology creates uniquely effective vehicles for cultural expression? In other words, is technological innovation viewed as a threat or as an opportunity for Canadian culture and identity? Whatever the underlying motivation, the outcome is that technology has been the fundamental driver of modern cultural policy and this has been a consistent 'verity' in the shaping of the policy agenda.

3. A Canadian cultural model

Despite periods of cyclical neglect and the narrow political focus on technology impacts, a distinct Canadian cultural model of considerable breadth and depth did emerge during the second half of the Twentieth Century. Research studies and public consultations examined the dynamics of different cultural activities, shaping policies toward the arts and what became known as the 'cultural industries'. Interventions to support Canadian content were implemented across a full range of undertakings, and a pattern or 'model' has been defined. This model came under pressure during the mid-1990s, when some major players in the fields of digital technology systems argued that the 'convergence' of telecommunications and broadcasting would make cultural regulations entirely outmoded. An acute observation by the federal Heritage Minister of the time, Michel Dupuis, summarized the essential challenge. He pointed to the emerging growth of 'converged' undertakings and commented: "Ça, c'est le

contenant; mais où est le contenu? Those wires are the containers; but where is the content?"

Minister Dupuis' ironic question drew attention to the continuing relevance of cultural policies and programs that had evolved over many years. Despite funding restrictions and occasional campaigns from trade liberalization advocates (often related to suppliers of foreign TV programs and films) a policy model that envisages public intervention across the cultural production continuum remains effective in Canada. This model touches all aspects of cultural creation, production, distribution, consumption and preservation. It recognizes that there is vast access to imported cultural products, but that access to Canadian products, with support from funding and regulatory regimes, is essential to national identity.

In effect, as Sir John Aird and Sir Vincent Massey had foreseen many years ago, culture is similar to education or even to national defence: it is a 'public good' that must be managed to achieve more than economic market outcomes. In the absence of public interventions, a purely market-driven approach would relegate most large-scale cultural expression to economic oblivion (whether in the English or French languages).

This model is a central constant in Canadian cultural life: it is one of our cultural 'verities'. It can be modified through timely initiatives, such as the recent efforts to negotiate an international legal convention to protect cultural diversity. The model is not purely federal in scope, allowing for complementary measures by different levels of governments. When major cultural construction projects take shape, for example, they inevitably require tiered funding from federal, provincial and municipal governments. Similarly, it is the layering of tax credits from different governments that effectively enhance the value of private philanthropy, or the value of private funding in operations such as film companies and book publishers.

Ironically, the only institutions that do not benefit from the layering of assistance are those of a national nature, notably the national museums. No provincial or municipal governments accord any support to national projects: everyone seems to expect that Ottawa alone will look after the pan-Canadian perspective. That unfortunately is another Canadian cultural 'verity'.

4. Culture and national continuity

Controversy and competition between private interests, or between private undertakings and public authorities, are normal aspects of civic democracy. Examples are found in many activity areas, even in the field of cultural policy. Conflicting views are expressed on the broad goals and the detailed designs of cultural funding programs, broadcasting rules, copyright laws, construction of museums and so on. We should not mistakenly assume that because there are differences of opinion there is a lack of support for the essential public model. This leads to my final observation on the wider importance of cultural expression and public policy within Canada – an importance which reflects a fundamental concept of community values.

The continued existence of Canada rests on its capacity as a collective social enterprise to protect the independence and distinctiveness of its peoples. After all, if there is nothing unique about the country, why should it exist as a political entity? This is hardly a truism: the survival and strength of the French language and Francophone communities is a unique attribute of this country within North America.

While tensions with Quebec and with other French language groups are ongoing national realities, the unity of Canada has been sustained through the persuasive argument that this country operates as a first barrier for linguistic protection. This is one effect of cultural policy. A similar though more subtle argument applies to English-language communities. The ability of English-Canadians to voice narratives, values, goals and histories that differ from the American colossus depends entirely on the effective communication of independent Canadian cultural thought.

Beginning with the *Quebec Act* of 1774, reaffirmed by Confederation in 1867, the identity of Canada has been rooted in its bilingual and bicultural nature. In recent years, with the immense growth of immigration from ‘non-traditional’ areas, and with the entry of aboriginal interests and voices into the mainstream, Canada has invented an approach to social identity which is called ‘multiculturalism’. This important social experiment is very different in concept and outlook from either the American or European traditions of integrating (and managing) diverse populations.

The success of this country’s multicultural initiative, and its future success in remaining

united despite tensions over language, ethnicities, or regions, will depend on a combination of economic and social factors. Canada’s historical challenge of being a home to its founding peoples and a welcoming place of settlement to widely diverse immigrants is profoundly cultural. We might adapt the German expression of ‘kulturkampf’ or ‘culture struggle’ to describe the challenge of creating shared identities, values and historical experiences while also respecting diversity. We cannot abandon this cultural struggle without also abandoning the battle to survive as a sovereign country. This is another ‘verity’ in our cultural being.

Concluding observations

Today, as we witness remarkable innovations to all forms of communications and information management, it is not surprising that the shape and methodologies of Canadian cultural policy are being challenged by some people. Yet, the essential cultural goals identified in the past remain unchanged: to develop practical methods that enable the creation, promotion, distribution and exchange of Canadian creative materials.

During the current period of intense innovation, there will inevitably be pressure from some who will argue that new forms of digital technology cannot be harnessed exclusively for Canadian content. Critics may argue that the country cannot afford to provide financial assistance for cultural production. Others may argue that the international rules governing global trade will nullify efforts by Canada – or any country – to protect ‘space’ for domestic cultural voices.

The history of past encounters with these types of arguments indicates to me that it is entirely possible for Canadian policy makers to respond creatively and effectively. Moreover, as long as there remains a collective interest in sustaining the Canadian experiment, an assertive cultural policy will be part of our solution for national continuity. The greatest threat to future success in Canadian cultural policy is not from technological innovation or foreign pressures. In my view, it is from our own pattern of domestic cyclical interest and our short-term attention span. We cannot afford to be passive, defeatist or ‘asleep at the wheel’ while innovations and commercial pressures accelerate along Canada’s cultural networks.

L’AFFIRMATION CULTURELLE ET SOCIALE PAR L’AUDIOVISUEL

RÉSUMÉ

Le Canada est né à la fin du XIXe siècle, soit en même temps que la création du cinéma. Grâce à cela nous pouvons raconter notre histoire par le biais d’images pour nous donner le portrait d’un pays qui se construit. Dans ce contexte, une approche du patrimoine audiovisuel canadien a été mis au service du progrès social, de la conscientisation des citoyens. Cette approche sociale de l’audiovisuel est un leitmotiv dans notre histoire et une spécificité qui nous caractérise comme peuple et comme culture. Pourtant, personne n’a fait l’effort de raconter notre progrès social de cette façon. Pour le moment, ces fabuleux trésors d’images sont éparpillés, pêle-mêle, dans plusieurs institutions sans que personne n’en fasse la synthèse. Aujourd’hui si nous procédions à la numérisation de ces collections, nous pourrions reconstituer et rendre ce patrimoine social accessible à tous. L’internet et les technologies numériques permettent la convergence et la pleine intégration sociale de tous les médias. Si nous valorisons notre patrimoine audiovisuel social en le mettant sur support numérique, il deviendrait accessible à tous les citoyens de notre pays. Cela leur permettrait d’utiliser ce matériel pour raconter leur propre histoire, celle de leur collectivité, en les mélangeant à ceux qu’ils créeront eux-mêmes et faire ainsi acte de création.

Introduction

Lors d’un récent panel organisé par l’Association des études canadiennes, cette vaste question nous a été posée : « Comment définir la culture canadienne et quels sont les domaines où l’expression culturelle est la plus forte ou la plus faible? ».

Plutôt que de couvrir cet immense chantier, j’ai choisi de me concentrer sur mon champ d’expertise : l’audiovisuel. Les images, à notre époque, se retrouvent dans toutes nos activités de citoyen. Elles sont un moyen d’expression et de création, de communication, d’échanges. Elles sont aussi universelles tout en traversant toutes les frontières.

Où nous situons-nous dans cette culture des images? Le Canada est né à la fin du XIXe siècle, soit en même temps que la création de l’image argentique et du cinématographe. Grâce à cela, l’histoire du Canada peut littéralement se raconter avec des images fixes ou en mouvement afin de nous donner le portrait global d’un pays qui se construit.

On pourrait ainsi distinguer trois approches de l’histoire de l’audiovisuel dans notre pays.

A. Trois voies

- 1- Par l’entremise d’institutions publiques, les artistes se sont souvent servis des images pour communiquer leur vision du Canada. Les scientifiques et documentaristes les ont utilisées pour « enregistrer » les événements marquants de notre histoire.
- 2- Les gens d’affaires en ont fait une source de revenus en s’assurant que les images deviennent une industrie lucrative de divertissement de masse.
- 3- La troisième approche qui m’a toujours guidé et inspiré est celle de notre patrimoine audiovisuel canadien qui a été mis au service du progrès social, de la conscientisation des citoyens. Je voudrais évoquer ici la vision de John Grierson (premier Commissaire et fondateur de l’ONF), ainsi que de rappeler les expériences des premières radios d’état avec Graham Spry, des premières chaînes de télévisions publiques et éducatives et des

cours de formation à distance. Bref, à mes yeux, le but de cette troisième voie a toujours été d'aider chaque citoyen canadien à développer son autonomie afin qu'il puisse mieux se prendre en main. Cette approche sociale de l'audiovisuel a toujours été un *leitmotiv* dans notre histoire et une spécificité qui nous caractérise comme peuple et comme culture.

B. Un itinéraire

J'ai eu le privilège, au cours de ma vie professionnelle, de participer à plusieurs types d'expérience qui étaient liées à «l'audiovisuel social» :

- J'ai travaillé en milieu défavorisé dans des écoles où les premières caméras Super 8mm étaient mises dans les mains de jeunes enfants en difficulté.
- J'ai participé, à l'ONE, dans le cadre de l'équipe *Challenge for change/Société nouvelle* à des expériences où, grâce à la venue de la vidéo et des fameux «portapacks», l'image et la parole ont été donnés à ceux qui avaient besoin de s'exprimer pour mieux comprendre leur sort, chercher des solutions à leurs problèmes et engager un dialogue avec ceux qui étaient au pouvoir.
- J'ai participé à la création d'une chaîne éducative au Canada : TFO en Ontario, un réseau de télévision qui produit et diffuse en français, dans un milieu minoritaire, avec le but de donner à toute une collectivité une voix culturelle quotidienne pour affirmer son identité.

Par cette approche unique de l'audiovisuel social, notre pays a donc développé une spécificité qui lui est propre et qui nous a permis de mesurer nos progrès sociaux, c'est-à-dire qui avons-nous été et qui souhaiterions-nous devenir avec le temps?

Pourtant, notre histoire sociale, vue sous le prisme de l'audiovisuel, est rarement racontée car elle n'est pas reconnue comme une spécificité canadienne. À ce jour, personne n'a fait l'effort de raconter notre progression sociale comme il se doit. Pourtant, elle existe sur films, images, bandes vidéos, mais elle est éparpillée, pêle-mêle, dans plusieurs institutions, dans plusieurs collections sans que personne n'en ait encore fait la synthèse. Nos trésors visuels sont ainsi répartis un peu partout, ils sont disséminés entre nos institutions

publiques comme les archives nationales du Canada, l'Office National du Film, quelques cinémathèques, les réseaux de télévisions publiques comme CBC et SRC, les chaînes éducatives et universitaires et ce, à l'échelle du pays.

En France ou en Angleterre, des institutions comme l'INA ou le BFI ont été créées qui ont eu pour mandat de protéger et de valoriser ces collections. Ces organismes sont reconnus comme les seuls dépositaires légaux par la loi. Au Canada nous dormons pour ainsi dire sur ce patrimoine et nous ne l'utilisons pas pour communiquer aux jeunes générations cette histoire sociale unique à notre pays! De la cérémonie du «Potlatch» aux premiers immigrants d'Asie, des débuts des logements sociaux aux affres des grandes guerres, le Canada regorge d'images qui pour le moment sont empilées dans des voûtes. Ces images sont laissées aux affres du temps, à l'usure, à la détérioration alors que nos institutions, faute de moyens, finissent par s'en laver les mains et que nos gouvernements s'en détournent, ce qui est, j'ose dire le mot même s'il est fort, une sorte de génocide de la mémoire visuelle collective du Canada.

Ceci dit, il demeure tout de même un espoir, une porte ouverte. Cette porte, c'est celle de la numérisation de notre patrimoine audiovisuel et des possibilités qui s'offrent à nous, grâce à ce traitement.

C. Recommandations

- En premier lieu, Patrimoine canadien devrait constituer un inventaire de cet héritage audiovisuel social en ramenant ensemble, autour de la même table, tous les intervenants qui sont dépositaires de ce matériel dispersé dans autant d'institutions.
- Deuxièmement, le gouvernement du Canada devrait nommer un responsable, une structure et allouer des budgets qui permettraient d'inventorier tout ce matériel.
- Troisièmement, un programme de numérisation de ces ouvrages devrait être mis en place en faisant appel tant aux institutions publiques que privées. Cela est en effet envisageable aujourd'hui car les coûts de la numérisation sont devenus extrêmement abordables. Maintenant que cela peut être une réalité, nous nous devons de nous assurer de monter un programme nous

permettant de transmettre cet héritage aux prochaines générations.

Je viens ici d'émettre des idées afin de faire un rattrapage sur une partie importante et unique de notre histoire. Pour cela, nous devons nous assurer de protéger notre patrimoine audiovisuel social dans ses aspects « préservation, conservation et valorisation ».

En même temps, je ne peux regarder le passé sans pour autant penser à l'avenir immédiat.

D. L'innovation technologique

Depuis les frères Lumière et Léo-Ernest Ouimet jusqu'à nos jours, nous voyons que l'audiovisuel a pu être, non seulement une industrie de divertissement et un art, mais aussi, au Canada en particulier, un outil de changement social et de développement. Nous pouvons donc désormais utiliser l'audiovisuel numérique pour donner, encore plus que jamais, la parole aux « sans voix » de notre pays, à ceux qui sont isolés économiquement ou socialement.

Quelques exemples que j'aimerais partager avec vous :

Lors de mon mandat comme Commissaire à l'Office National du Film du Canada, nous avons décidé d'utiliser pleinement ces nouvelles possibilités pour mettre à profit diverses technologies numériques. De l'internet en passant par les téléphones portables, nous avons mis en place une communication instantanée, en temps réel et bidirectionnel. L'élément majeur et primordial, venu avec le numérique pour bouleverser la donne, c'est l'interactivité. L'interactivité change le rapport à l'image et nous offre aujourd'hui des possibilités d'une richesse inouïe.

- Par exemple, pour *Paroles citoyennes/Citizenshift*, nous avons bâti un site internet où des citoyens se rencontrent, comme dans une agora virtuelle, afin d'échanger leurs idées et d'élaborer des solutions communes.
- Dans un autre projet, *Homeless Nation*, nous avons aidé à regrouper des jeunes démunis qui vivent sans domicile fixe dans les grandes cités. Par le biais de l'internet, ils se sont développés en communauté où ils s'entraident en élaborant ensemble des solutions à leurs problèmes de logement, de travail ou d'études.

Aujourd'hui l'internet et les technologies numériques, dont les coûts de production sont très raisonnables, sans commune mesure avec ceux du passé, font en sorte que nous sommes entrés dans l'époque de la convergence technologique et de la pleine intégration sociale de tous les médias. La polyvalence de tous ces médias est sans aucun doute la voie de l'avenir.

Nous nous servons en quelque sorte des médias comme l'artiste peintre le fait de sa palette. Maintenant nous pouvons donc envisager d'aller plus loin grâce aux progrès technologiques en audiovisuel qui se mettent au service du social.

E. Un nouveau modèle idéal ?

Il est possible désormais, grâce aux technologies numériques, de concevoir de nouvelles options qui donnent une pleine autonomie à leurs utilisateurs et mettent le processus de décision entre les mains des citoyens. Voyons ensemble quelques modèles :

1. L'utilisateur producteur de contenus

Le citoyen devient, de fait, lui-même le producteur de contenus grâce à l'internet et à la possibilité d'y diffuser ses productions numériques. Cela permet de développer un médium citoyen, de donner la parole à celui qui ne l'avait pas, pour être l'écho de lui-même, de sa communauté, de ses questions existentielles, impliquant sa responsabilisation dans la mesure où il entre dans l'agora publique électronique et s'expose aux autres.

2. La place du Canada

Le numérique nous propose une véritable révolution des médias. L'approche proposée est au service du citoyen; elle développe son autonomie et son initiative créatrices. Elle peut rejoindre tous les citoyens, à toute heure et dans toutes les régions, même éloignées. Elle offre aussi de plus en plus au citoyen des outils : des contenus de qualité, les livres des bibliothèques virtuelles, des moteurs de recherche, des images, des vidéos, des plateformes de collaboration, des exercices pour l'autoformation et l'autocorrection, des laboratoires de langues et des exercices d'apprentissage dans toutes les disciplines. La question qui se pose alors est que le monde numérique est désormais devenu accessible à tous, partout sur la planète, vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre et qu'avec des appareils de la grosseur d'un iPod, de plus en plus miniaturisés et puissants, nous allons avoir la

mémoire et la connaissance du monde à portée de mains. Où se situera donc le Canada dans cet enjeu planétaire?

C'est là que la synthèse se fait pour moi entre les deux sujets que j'ai développés. À l'instar d'organismes comme la BBC, si nous préservions notre patrimoine audiovisuel social en le mettant sur support numérique, il deviendrait accessible à tous les citoyens de notre pays afin d'être étudié, épluché mais aussi pour permettre à nos concitoyens d'utiliser ce matériel pour raconter leur propre histoire, l'histoire de leur collectivité, l'histoire de leur famille. Nous joindrons ainsi ici le passé au présent. En y donnant accès à tous les Canadiens, ils pourraient y piger des événements de leur histoire sociale visuelle, les mélanger à ceux du présent et faire acte de création. Nous ne sommes plus ici dans un Youtube ou Myspace anarchiques et fourre-tout mais bien dans un lieu où tous les Canadiens pourraient raconter leurs histoires, jonglant entre passé et présent pour mieux nous la faire partager à tous.

En conclusion :

- Le Canada pourrait se raconter à travers son inventaire immense de productions audiovisuelles qui, si elles sont assemblées en collection à partir de sources disparates et dispersées, aideraient à raconter l'histoire du progrès social de notre pays.
- Il faudrait donc regrouper et préserver ces œuvres et les éditer pour les rendre accessibles grâce au numérique dans le cadre des nouvelles technologies.
- S'il y a un dénominateur commun qui nous a «rassemblés» comme peuple, c'est d'avoir fait de l'audiovisuel un outil démocratique à la portée de tous.
- Aujourd'hui au-delà de la préservation, conservation et valorisation de notre histoire du passé, nous devrions mettre en place de nouvelles approches pour accéder au numérique pour permettre à nos concitoyens de prendre le relais et de raconter dorénavant notre histoire, notre passé, notre présent et notre avenir.

CULTURAL POLICY IN CANADA: A BRIEF HISTORY

ABSTRACT

Canada has grown and transformed itself from a predominantly rural nation to an urban society of peoples of diverse heritages. Technological change has focused attention on the economy of the mass media and the cultural industries. The need for change in the policy roles of federal, provincial and municipal governments and for a broad-based cultural infrastructure remains.

Cultural policy and cultural institutions began as instruments of nation-building and social cohesion. The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), begun in 1881 and completed in 1885, linked Canada's populated centers with the relatively unpopulated west. The establishment of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in 1936 linked Canada by radio. As Graham Spry put it in arguing for the creation of public broadcasting, Canada had a choice between "the state and the United States." This distinction has been the unspoken premise behind much of our cultural policy and many of our cultural institutions.

Over time, Canadian cultural policy has had to reflect the points of view not only of peoples of British and French heritages but those of European and Aboriginal heritage. Recent growth and demographic change has resulted in still more diversity in Canada's population. Tension between claims of history-based rights, especially associated with language, and the more recent needs and demands of contemporary Canadian society are in play throughout the country. Add to this issues of jurisdiction and political and government priorities, and it's not surprising that the outcomes of cultural policy-making are bound to be asymmetrical and turbulent.

The history of the founding of early cultural institutions mirrors the pattern of settlement before and after the passage of the Constitution Act of 1867. The earliest libraries made their appearance in Quebec City in the 17th Century. The first legislative libraries in the Atlantic Provinces marked the arrival of government. Today all governments maintain legislative libraries. Their initial collections often predate their creation. As a record of nation-building, they document the intrusion of foreign values on lands first occupied by diverse Aboriginal peoples and the invention of Canadian values.

Early governments were engaged in aggressively building an infrastructure to support a resource-based economy. The new economy demanded settlers and workers. In turn they required transportation to natural resources, agriculture, fishing, and their markets, in addition to employment opportunities and access to retail. This need and demand encouraged the development of rural and urban infrastructure: water and sewage, electricity and communications, education, health, libraries, and other social services.

The competition for immigrants promoted by the provincial and the federal governments put pressure on entrepreneurs and municipal governments to make new and growing communities attractive. The pattern of economic development varied across Canada. Telephone services, for example, were originally the

responsibility of municipalities in communities such as Edmonton. In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, they became public utilities rather than private sector businesses as in eastern Canada. As the economy expanded, the demand for new skills and training followed.

Racism became imbedded in Canadian legislation with the passage by the federal government of the first *Indian Act* in 1876. The belief by those of British and French origin that they were intrinsically superior was not limited to Aboriginal peoples. Blacks, Asians, and Jews were subjected to racist policies and practices. The continuing presence of racism is slowly being mediated by the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Regardless of place, or social and economic status, telling our stories to one another has been, and continues to be, a shared value and a source of social cohesion. In response to interest in documenting our past, the Public Archives of Canada was established in 1873, twelve years after Nova Scotia passed the first *Public Records Act* (1861). The National Gallery of Canada (1880) was the first federal museum to be established, followed by the Museum of the Geological Survey in 1927. The Battlefields Park, an urban site in Quebec City, was created in 1908 and in 1919 the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada was established. Some provinces have been more aggressive in establishing heritage institutions. In 1906, one year after the *Saskatchewan Act*, the Provincial Museum of Natural History, now the Royal Saskatchewan Museum, was created. Military history has been a central feature of our cultural infrastructure. The new Canadian War Museum is a testament to that.

Unfortunately, artifacts of local Aboriginal heritage were taken off-shore or to the United States by early explorers, missionaries and traders, and lost to their communities of origin and to Canada. Stewardship of our natural and human heritage remains one of Canada's pressing cultural issues and requires the attention of each level of government.

The first *Copyright Act* came into force in 1924. The nation-building mission of broadcasting was begun privately in 1923 on the Canadian National Railway. The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Corporation was established as both public broadcaster and regulator of broadcasting in 1932. It was replaced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in 1936. The regulatory function of the CBC was

taken over by the Canadian Radio Television Commission (CRTC) in 1968. In 1976, jurisdiction over telecommunications was transferred to the CRTC, now known as the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, from the Canadian Transport Commission. In 1939, the National Film Board was established to create war-time propaganda and to help educate Canadians.

The collapse of the stock-markets in 1929 plunged Canadians into unemployment and hardship. The economic collapse was felt primarily in the prairies because of drought and a depressed wheat economy and in communities dependent on mining and forestry when commodity prices dropped. The federal government responded to the needs of the unemployed with minimum wage guarantees and unemployment insurance, but the provinces protested on jurisdictional grounds. Public work/projects were developed but too late to make a real difference. The strain in government relations during the Depression led to the establishment of a Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations in 1937. Its Report in 1940 is regarded by many as the most comprehensive study of regional disparity to date, and paved the way for shared jurisdiction in areas such as culture. For example, the *National Physical Fitness Act* (1943) permitted the flow of financial support through a ten-year cost-sharing agreement with Saskatchewan that enabled cultural, recreational and physical activities.

The first national gathering of artists, museum directors, art historians and lay people met in Kingston in 1941 to discuss the "welfare of art" and the value of the artist in a climate of free enterprise. The arts clearly had a role in enhancing democracy and nation-building but artists needed to be fairly compensated. There was tension between broad-based community support for the arts, exemplified by the *Alberta Cultural Development Act* (1946) and the Saskatchewan Arts Board (1948), and a narrower definition that eventually led to the creation of the Canada Council (1957).

A decade later, in 1951, the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences was established to survey institutions, agencies and organizations "which express national feeling, promote common understanding and add to the variety and richness of Canadian life." The Massey

Commission identified the basic problem: a small scattered population in a vast area clustered next to a much more populous country of far greater economic strength. The exclusion of cultural influences from abroad, the Commission stated, is both impossible and undesirable. Canada needed proactive measures: a strengthening of the arts and letters, and a deepening confidence in what Canadians could do themselves.

The Massey Commission identified the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as its most complicated problem: Its “importance as an instrument for the promotion of Canadian unity and the strengthening of Canadian identity [can] hardly be overstated.” A continuing worry, Massey argued, was that attacks on the CBC by the ill-informed and those who would gain financially from its failure would undermine Canada’s public broadcaster.

The question of jurisdiction in cultural policy-making raised by Quebec delayed the implementation of the Massey Commission’s recommendation that a Canada Council be created. Two questions demanded answers: What public interest is served by allowing the involvement of government in culture? What level of government should be involved and would jurisdiction be shared? The report of the Bilingualism and Bicultural Commission (1967-70) made clear that Canada was no longer made up of people who were of either British or French heritage. A policy of multiculturalism in a bilingual framework was announced in 1971. Manitoba established Canada’s first Advisory Committee on Multiculturalism in that year and in 1974 Saskatchewan passed Canada’s first *Multiculturalism Act*. A federal Multicultural Directorate was established by the Secretary of State in Ottawa in 1972. The *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* was passed in 1985. It’s not surprising that tension and competition existed between provincial and federal governments about which level should act on a perceived need in the cultural sector.

After the Canada Council was entrenched, staff met regularly with their provincial counterparts. Ontario and Quebec had a special relationship with the Council. Provinces without a cultural department or ministry responded by creating arts councils with various levels of independence from the government and new departments responsible for culture and related community activities. But not all provinces

believed the work of the Canada Council was in their best interest or met their particular needs. Quebec had protested the very establishment of the Council and continued to object to the intrusion of the federal government in the communication and cultural sector; they regarded it as the province’s jurisdiction. The Ontario Arts Council included among its objectives the ability to fund artists and organizations elsewhere in Canada who focused on the arts in Ontario. The legislation establishing the Manitoba Arts Council directed that body to cooperate with the Canada Council.

Another significant change took place in 1979, when the federal government ceded responsibility for lottery management to the provinces. In one province, Saskatchewan, the not-for-profit community assumed responsibility for the operation of the lottery and the net revenues were delivered to the arts and culture, sports and recreation sectors. Other provinces assigned the revenues to the general budget. Ontario and Manitoba, for example, contributed a share of these revenues to the cultural sector but also spent the funds on other provincial needs. The maturing of the cultural bureaucracies resulted in the recognition of the need for intergovernmental co-operation.

In the summer of 1971, the federal government announced a new funding program, Opportunities for Youth (OFY) to provide young people with employment. Community-based arts, culture and heritage projects undertaken by students resulted in a significant change in the demand for financial support from federal and provincial cultural organizations when the OFY and the Local Initiatives Projects (LIP) programmes were discontinued. The Canada Council and the provinces were ill-prepared for the dozens of new organizations, such as the Mummery Troupe in Newfoundland, that OFY and LIP helped to establish across Canada.

In the 1970s, the federal government began to pay more attention to tax issues related to cultural industries. The Cultural Statistics project at Statistics Canada, established in 1973, encouraged research in the cultural sector but few provinces could match its capacity to gather information until later. The result was an understanding of how tax base and other revenues influenced practices in the cultural sector throughout Canada. Although there was remarkable growth in government expenditures

on culture and the labour force that supported it during the 1970s, in the 1980s the economy took a down turn. In 1980, the federal government transferred responsibility for cultural affairs from the Secretary of State to the Minister of Communications, who oversaw radio, television and telecommunications. The department's industrial focus led to a growing expectation that cultural expenditures would have a role in the economic well-being of the nation.

Until now, arts administrators met at the national level, but in 1980 meetings of federal and provincial ministers responsible for culture began to be held. The call for an umbrella federal cultural policy led to the creation of a short-lived advisory committee in 1979. In 1980, the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee was established. Its Report (1982) focused on the need to support the role of the creator. It distanced itself from the perceived anti-Americanism of earlier years and promoted choice, in part because of the growth of the cultural workforce and the benefits changing technologies were bringing to the cultural sector. The changes the Report proposed for the CBC, NFB, Canada Council and Telefilm sent shockwaves through the federal agencies.

In 1980, Canada signed a UNESCO recommendation on the Status of the Artist. It was followed by Status of the Artist legislation in Quebec in 1988, four years later by federal legislation, and in 2002 by Saskatchewan legislation. Visual artists won the right for payment for exhibiting their work in galleries in 1976. The Public Lending Right Commission was established in 1986 to pay authors for the use of their work in libraries. In 1988, CanCopy, a copyright licensing agency, was established to benefit rights holders. Culture as an industry had come of age.

A significant change took place during this decade in the way the cultural sector was funded by both the federal and provincial governments. An Economic and Regional Development Sub-Agreement on Communication and Culture

between Canada and Manitoba was signed in 1984. The Agreement was funded by monies set aside for economic development rather than cultural expenditures. The economic benefits of culture became the measure for spending under the Agreement but the priorities were negotiated by the two parties. This model was followed elsewhere in Canada. Employment strategies to encourage cultural industries were adopted and from then on, the cultural sector found itself arguing the economic benefits of cultural activity. Museums and the performing arts, as well as heritage events, were included as parts of cultural tourism. The result strengthened the capacity of the regions to tell their own stories.

By now, the changes that were predicted in the early 1970s resulting from new telecommunications and information technologies had found a place in policy-making. Telidon, a Canadian improvement in two-way TV technology, was overtaken by personal computers and was a wake-up call for the cultural industries and communications sector. Attention to the structural problems of production, marketing and distribution was renewed. At the provincial level, film-making and publishing began to be promoted as viable regional cultural industries. A demand for federal resources to be spent equitably throughout the country resulted in reassigning some resources claimed by central Canada and in particular Toronto and Montreal's cultural commu-

nities. The two cities, the cultural engines of Canada, now faced domestic competition for limited resources, while cultural tourism was to become a Trojan horse failing to deliver on the promise of new and stable markets.

In 1990, the Business Development Bank of Canada established the Cultural Industries Development Fund, one of many measures taken by the federal government and provincial governments to strengthen an industrial approach to supporting culture. Film, video, multi media and information technologies

Early governments were engaged in aggressively building an infrastructure to support a resource-based economy. The new economy demanded settlers and workers. In turn they required transportation to natural resources, agriculture, fishing, and their markets, in addition to employment opportunities and access to retail.

including broadcasting, magazine and book publishing were pre-eminent. Professional training in cultural administration and the various skills demanded by the sector was supported by both industry and postsecondary institutions. International agreements and initiatives such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) exempting cultural services but not goods and SAGIT (Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade) demanded greater understanding of the world of business on an international level than had ever faced the cultural community.

A series of amendments to the *Copyright Act* helped Canada address changes in the new technologies environment by, for example, bringing it in line with the North American Free Trade Treaty (1994) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (1997) as well as the earlier the 1961 Rome Convention and the 1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Again a series of studies of the economic, social and cultural needs of cultural industries were initiated by federal and provincial governments. But as in the past, the timing of change and the changes themselves have been controversial in part because of the conflicting objectives of the not-for-profit and profit-making communities.

Canadians have adapted to changing needs throughout the country's history. Early creative industries included making and selling cultural artifacts. Communication technologies have played a pivotal role in nation-building. Governments responded to the need to build the cultural infrastructure expected of a maturing nation. Over time, intergovernmental co-operation has grown. Competition from the health, education and other sectors has limited the response of the public sector to the needs and demands of the cultural sector. The growth of the cultural sector, especially in communications, has been significant; it now makes up a measurable portion of Canada's labour force. The early role of cultural institutions and cultural policy as instruments of nation-building has been supplanted by the assumption that cultural policy is an economic tool as well as an instrument for social cohesion.

POLITIQUES CULTURELLES ET IDENTITÉS NATIONALES

RÉSUMÉ

L'identité nationale a été et demeure un enjeu central de toute intervention des gouvernements dans les domaines des arts et de la culture. Seuls changent les modes d'intervention : de la propagande aux programmes de subventions en passant par diverses formes de mécénat public (commandes publiques). À la suite d'une introduction dans laquelle il formule quelques réflexions théoriques sur des liens entre culture et politique, l'auteur distingue trois âges des politiques culturelles qui correspondent à trois grandes périodes du développement des technologies de communication : la presse, la télévision et le cinéma et l'internet. S'appuyant sur une expérience personnelle de participation à l'élaboration de *L'Énoncé de politiques culturelles de la Ville de Montréal*, il se pose la question : Tout se joue-t-il au niveau municipal?

Introduction : Culture et politique : Quelques réflexions théoriques

Parlant d'identité collective (ou de conscience collective), Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), le fondateur de la sociologie française, disait que les collectivités et les groupes ont toujours recours, aujourd'hui comme hier, à des choses pour affirmer leur identité, qu'il s'agisse de pierres (des monuments), de chiffons (drapeau) ou d'emblèmes. Dans les sociétés dites primitives (que Durkheim a étudié), chaque clan avait son totem. Tout cela n'a guère changé : les États Unis d'Amérique ont l'Aigle et le Canada, le petit castor bricoleur. Et que dire de la fameuse querelle sur le « petit bout de chiffon rouge » (que serait le drapeau canadien)?

Le plus proche collaborateur et neveu de Durkheim, Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), a montré que les identités sont des constructions collectives. Hier ces constructions se faisaient inconsciemment, des souvenirs transmis de génération en générations. Aujourd'hui elles se font de plus en plus consciemment, que ce soit par l'entremise de romans, ou même par des travaux en sciences humaines. À chaque fois qu'un sociologue ou un historien consacre une étude à une population, une région ou à un pays, il contribue à constituer ou à consolider l'idée que ses membres se font d'eux-mêmes. Chaque collectivité développe le sentiment de ses différences qui se transforment souvent en esprit de supériorité : l'esprit de clocher, le chauvinisme, le nationalisme. Les identités sont, disait Marcel Mauss, d'abord ethno-culturelles (langue, institutions, etc.), pour devenir, avec la constitution des États nations, nationales. D'ethnoculturelle, une collectivité se donne une unité, par exemple avec unification de la langue ou l'établissement de frontières, pour devenir, comme le montre Dominique Schnapper, dans *La Communauté des citoyens*, une communauté de citoyens (avec ses droits et devoirs, ses institutions, ses lois). Dans cette perspective, l'identité d'une nation est avant tout civique.

S'agissant d'identité, on connaît le rôle que joue tout gouvernement ou État et la culture est de plus en plus au centre de dispositifs de mise en valeur de villes, régions ou pays. Selon la conjoncture, cette action s'apparente, s'il s'agit de faire connaître une collectivité et son territoire, tantôt à de la publicité, tantôt à de la propagande.

Pendant les deux Grandes Guerres, 1914-1918 et 1939-1945, on a assisté à des mobilisations sur les fronts avec des millions d'hommes et des tonnes d'armements

et à l'arrière des fronts, avec les médias (journaux, radio, puis cinéma). Information ou désinformation? Face à l'Allemagne, Durkheim n'a pas hésité à faire œuvre de propagande et à écrire, avec des collègues, des Lettres aux Français qui furent diffusés à plus de 3 millions d'exemplaires. Pour sa part, Marcel Mauss n'a pas caché, au moment de la montée du fascisme au milieu des années 1930 de l'organisation en Allemagne de grandes manifestations publiques, de la réinvention des mythes germains et de l'instrumentalisation de la culture (musique, architecture, théâtre, cinéma, etc.). La culture est devenue propagande au service d'un projet politique démoniaque... La France occupée a aussi, dans un esprit de collaboration avec l'ennemi, instrumentalisé la culture, comme on le voit avec le Musée des arts et traditions populaires, alors dirigé par G.-H. Rivière. Le slogan du régime Vichy était Patrie, Travail et Famille. L'ethnologie a alors été mise à contribution pour mettre en valeur le patrimoine, les mœurs et les coutumes paysannes, etc.

Cas d'exception? Oui, mais qui, peut-on dire, confirme la règle : la constitution des identités collectives passe par l'art et la culture (au sens restreint du terme : littérature, beaux-arts, etc.), et les gouvernements et les États n'hésitent pas à montrer les œuvres et à mobiliser les artistes pour élever l'«âme» du peuple : hymnes nationaux, monuments, fresques, spectacles sons et lumières, musées, etc. Il y a donc fréquemment aujourd'hui comme hier, des commandes qui sont faites directement aux artistes (sans que ça ne soient des «commandites», au sens péjoratif du terme) : Clarence Gagnon et sa série «Maria Chapdelaine» pour le 350^e anniversaire de la Ville de Montréal ou Robert Lepage et son spectacle «Samuel de Champlain» pour le 400^e anniversaire de la ville de Québec. L'action culturelle de l'État passe enfin par les grandes institutions publiques de diffusion de l'art et de la culture (musées, bibliothèques, etc.) et aussi par les divers programmes de subventions mis en place par les gouvernements, habituellement dans le respect de l'autonomie de l'acte de création. La Grande Bibliothèque Nationale du Québec s'est voulu, à la fois une grande «vitrine du livre québécois» et un formidable instrument de diffusion et de démocratisation de la culture.

Les trois âges des politiques culturelles

Le mode d'intervention des gouvernements dans les domaines des arts et de la culture a changé dans le temps : tout ne repose plus sur le seul goût

(arbitraire) du mécène public, d'un Louis Saint-Laurent par exemple (qui appuie la carrière de jeunes artistes), aussi éclairé soit-il.

Il faut maintenant recueillir l'avis de commissions de spécialistes, ou organiser, comme c'est de plus en plus souvent le cas, des concours, surtout en architecture : Grande Bibliothèque de Québec. Par ailleurs les milieux des arts ont été l'objet d'une plus grande autonomisation des milieux artistiques et les carrières en arts se sont elles-mêmes plus professionnalisées. Et dans le même mouvement, les gouvernements se sont dotés, comme on l'a vu en Angleterre et au Canada, d'organismes relativement indépendants de subventions aux arts et lettres : Les Conseils des Arts.

Même si toute forme de périodisation ou de typologie risque de «forcer les traits», on peut identifier, pour ce qui est des politiques culturelles au Canada, trois âges ou grandes périodes¹ :

1. Fin du XIX^e-1950 : La conservation et la mise en valeur du patrimoine, avec la création de musées, de parcs, etc. Rôle de l'État mais aussi de la philanthropie (exemple Musée des beaux-arts de Montréal). C'est la belle époque de la grande presse et aussi le développement de l'école publique.
2. 1950-1980 : La démocratisation, i.e l'accès à la culture de la population (bibliothèques de quartier, Maison de la culture à Montréal, etc.). Les musées se donnent, par exemple, une vocation éducative. Cette période est aussi marquée par l'expansion de l'école (avec les universités dites de masse), par le développement de la télévision et du cinéma et de la chanson populaire, comme industries culturelles et, depuis le Rapport Massey, par la mise sur pied de programmes de subvention aux arts et à la culture.
3. Depuis vingt-cinq ans, les choses bougent : les arts et la culture sont considérés à la fois comme des créations (recherche, etc.) et, comme des marchandises. Même les musées sont des entreprises pour ne pas dire des industries culturelles, et les films, s'ils veulent recevoir des subventions de Téléfilm Canada doivent être «populaires» (en fonction du nombre des entrées). Le public et le privé sont plus étroitement imbriqués, avec la mise en

place de diverses formes de partenariat. L'impact de nouvelles technologies de communication et en particulier de l'internet devrait se faire sentir...

Cette périodisation appelle quelques nuances : 1) les phases sont cumulatives, et 2) il y a toujours tension entre diverses «finalités» des arts et de la culture : la culture comme création (et comme bien commun) vs la culture comme marchandise (et comme bien privé); et la culture comme expression créative (des artistes) vs la culture comme identité culturelle d'une population. S'agissant des politiques culturelles, tout gouvernement se trouve aujourd'hui devant la quadrature du cercle suivant:

- A) identité culturelle
- B) expression créative (artistes)
- C) démocratisation
- D) marché et industries culturelles

Les rapports entre le marché et les entreprises d'un côté et les institutions artistiques et les artistes de l'autre peuvent prendre deux formes, dont le mécénat et le partenariat.

Tout se joue-t-il au niveau municipal ?

Tout porte à croire que le niveau d'intervention le plus «efficace» en matière de politiques culturelles est aujourd'hui la municipalité, la ville. Il est vrai que les milieux urbains jouent, au plan culturel, un rôle très important. Richard Florida vient le rappeler avec son livre sur *The Rise of the Creative Class*, qui suscite un vif intérêt auprès des administrateurs et des médiateurs culturels de chacune des grandes villes nord-américaines. Faut-il en conclure que, si tout se joue au niveau municipal, tout dépend maintenant, des gouvernements municipaux et de leur capacité à se doter de politiques culturelles?

À quoi servent les énoncés de politiques culturelles que se donnent les villes? Les discours se renouvellent, donnent quelques inflexions aux politiques, mais les choses changent-elles? Les organismes et les programmes ne changent pas. Le poids des contraintes est toujours lourd : budget, organisation administrative en place, relation avec les autres intervenants, etc.

Pour répondre à ces questions, je voudrais revenir sur une expérience personnelle : ma participation à l'élaboration en mai 2003 de l'Énoncé de politiques culturelles de la Ville de Montréal. Mme Helen Fotopoulos, alors respon-

sable de la culture à la ville, a créé un Groupe-conseil dont la présidence fut confiée à Raymond Bachand et le secrétariat à Michel Ignatieff. Parmi les membres, on retrouve des universitaires (Georges Adamcyk, Mair Verthuy, Claude Corbo, Marcel Fournier), des artistes et des médiateurs culturels (Chantal Pontbriand, Lorraine Pinal, Mustapha Terki, David Moss), des représentants du monde de l'industrie culturelle (André Ménard du Festival international du jazz de Montréal), des affaires (Manon Forget, Michèle Courchesne) et du monde associatif (Louise Lemieux-Bérubé). On a aussi cherché à respecter la diversité : hommes, femmes et communautés culturelles. Le Groupe-conseil a aussi bénéficié de l'aide de Rachel Lapérierre, directrice du Service de développement culturel et de son adjoint, comme «consultants» : statistiques, etc. Une façon aussi pour le Service de développement culturel de protéger «ses intérêts».

Le Groupe-conseil a aussi effectué diverses consultations auprès des divers organismes de subvention (Conseil des arts de la ville de Montréal, Conseil des arts du Canada, Patrimoine Canada, CALQ), et aussi divers intervenants dans le domaine des arts et de la culture : le Cirque du Soleil, etc.

L'Énoncé de politiques culturelles s'ouvre par une référence au contexte de la mondialisation et présente Montréal comme la grande ville francophone en Amérique et comme une métropole culturelle, dont les activités culturelles génèrent chaque année 5,5 milliards \$ et 90 000 emplois.

Les objectifs qu'identifie le Groupe-conseil sont nombreux et divers :

1. Soutien au rayonnement international. Montréal comme pôle international de création et diffusion.
2. Développement des publics et diffusion des connaissances.
3. Soutien à la création. Développer de la créativité et favoriser l'effervescence intellectuelle.
4. Dialogue des cultures et renforcer l'apport des communautés culturelles.
5. Qualité du cadre de vie (embellissement, signalisation, affichage, design) et patrimoine.

Ces principes s'articulent autour d'un certain nombre de grandes valeurs : démocratisation, tolérance, liberté d'expression et liberté de style de

vie, convivialité et dialogue des cultures et ouverture au monde.

À ces grands objectifs, s'ajoutent tout un ensemble d'autres objectifs plus précis : inscrire Montréal dans la cyberculture, y compris intégrer des oeuvres cyberculturelles dans le paysage urbain, miser sur la culture pour le développement solidaire, développer le loisir culturel et favoriser la pratique artistique amateur de qualité, soutenir les grandes institutions culturelles. Une préoccupation se fait enfin sentir avec plus d'insistance : l'aménagement de l'espace urbain. C'est une question d'urbanisme, la qualité de vie des citoyens et aussi d'embellissement. Côté urbanisme, l'une des grandes préoccupations du monde des arts et de la culture, en particulier médiateurs culturels (directeurs de théâtre, propriétaires de salle de spectacle, etc.), est la création au centre-ville, d'un Quartier des spectacles. Il s'agit, par la consolidation de pôles culturels tant au centre-ville que dans les quartiers périphériques, de faire de Montréal une métropole culturelle. Le Comité des politiques culturelles fait sienne cette proposition.

Enfin viennent les moyens. Il n'est pas question de remettre en question les divers organismes en place mais plutôt de les consolider et de chercher à coordonner leurs actions :

1. Le Conseil des Arts de la Ville de Montréal,
2. Le réseau municipal des bibliothèques,
3. Le Conseil du patrimoine de la Ville de Montréal, et
4. Le réseau des Maisons de la Culture.

On s'interroge évidemment sur l'impact qu'aura la Nouvelle Grande Bibliothèque autant que les petites bibliothèques locales. On note aussi le conflit qui peut exister entre les Maisons de la culture et d'organismes de diffusion (théâtre). Enfin, toute la question de la coordination ou de la complémentarité entre le Service de développement culturel de la ville et les autres divers organismes (dont le Conseil des Arts de la Ville de Montréal) apparaît fort complexe. Plusieurs des recommandations relèvent des vœux pieux.

À cette question de la coordination au seul niveau municipal s'ajoute celle, tout aussi complexe, de la conjugaison de l'action de tous les intervenants : Montréal, Québec, Ottawa. Qui est le véritable maître d'œuvre des politiques culturelles sur le territoire métropolitain? Quelle

cohérence y a-t-il entre les actions des uns et des autres? Le monde des arts et de la culture, y compris les artistes eux-mêmes, accepte relativement bien de la triple structure de financement, qui permet une diversification des sources de financement public.

Quatre ans plus tard, qu'en est-il? Mme Fotopoulos n'est plus responsable du dossier de la culture... Une première décision a été prise par la Ville de Montréal : l'augmentation du budget annuel du Conseil des Arts de la Ville de Montréal. Mais au même moment surgit une proposition qui avait fait l'objet de discussion au sein du Comité des politiques culturelles mais qui n'avait pas été retenue : la création d'une sorte d'agence municipale de développement culturel qui viendrait chapeauter le Conseil des arts et le Service de développement culturel. Le débat est lancé et soulève la controverse. Enfin, lors du récent grand Forum sur la culture tenu à Montréal, le grand événement fut l'annonce de la création du fameux Quartier des spectacles avec la participation financière substantielle des trois gouvernements. Tout le monde a un peu oublié *L'Énoncé* qui est maintenant remis sur une tablette.

Conclusion

La question de l'identité se pose évidemment au plan local ou municipal, mais d'une façon moins exacerbée, car une grande ville qui se veut une métropole culturelle doit mettre en évidence sa diversité culturelle et aussi valoriser le cosmopolitisme. On se veut aussi la vitrine d'un pays : Paris pour la France, Londres pour l'Angleterre, New York pour les États-Unis. Mais New York c'est l'Amérique, pas tous les Américains. On peut parfois désespérer de la politique au niveau municipal (lobbying des uns et des autres, petits commerçants, entrepreneurs de toute sorte, etc.). Cependant, sur le plan culturel, la grande ville offre la possibilité non seulement de réunir un grand nombre de créateurs et d'institutions culturelles, mais aussi de donner à chaque consommateur une expérience culturelle riche et diversifiée, de telle sorte que l'identité nationale, aussi forte soit-elle (langues, fierté, coutumes, etc.) n'enferme pas l'identité de chaque citoyen sur la seule nation (ou l'ethnie). C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle la grande ville offre toujours un grand potentiel d'innovation et de création. Toute la question est de savoir quelles sont les conjonctures qui peuvent donner à une grande ville

une grande effervescence et lui assurer un véritable dynamisme culturel.

Identité culturelle (francophonie et diversité), expression créatrice, démocratisation et développement des industries culturelles : tous ces enjeux sont présents, plus que jamais en tension ou en conflit les uns avec les autres. On le voit bien à Montréal, où l'on tente tout à la fois de maintenir un Conseil des arts pour subventionner les institutions et les artistes, consolider le réseau des bibliothèques et des maisons de la culture pour rendre accessible la culture partout à Montréal et d'organiser un Quartier des spectacles pour les salles et les théâtres, etc. La politique est, dit-on, l'art du possible, mais comment intervenir simultanément sur les quatre plans sans programme d'ensemble cohérent alors même que les élus sont confrontés à des demandes nombreuses et diverses et «pressés» par divers groupes d'intérêt (ou lobbyings)? On se retrouve en quelque sorte, pour reprendre à la géométrie une formule ancienne, devant la quadrature du cercle.

Références

- ¹ Voir aussi FOURNIER, Marcel et Guy BELLAVANCE, *Rattrapage et virage : dynamismes culturels et interventions étatiques dans le champ de production des biens symboliques* : dans Gérard Daigle, *Le Québec en jeu. Comprendre les grands défis.*, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, pp. 511-545.

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THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT CANADIAN CULTURE

Interview with Will Straw

This paper grew from a bundle of anecdotes and observations I took with me to the Association for Canadian Studies forum “Canadian Culture and Digital Technology” on October 26-27, 2007, in Gatineau. That raw material was distributed across three broad topics for discussion, which I posed as three questions. These questions, and some of that raw material, are provided here, in the hope that these discussion may go on.

Where are interesting ideas about culture to be found?

In early October, 2007, two weeks before the ACS forum, I participated in the third “How Canadians Communicate” conference at the Banff Centre in Alberta. This event, co-sponsored by the University of Calgary and Athabaska University, brought together Canadian scholars working on a range of topics, from contemporary Canadian art through the success, in the United States, of Canadian television programs like *Da Vinci’s City Hall*. The papers delivered at this conference were, without exception, compelling and well-researched, but there came a point where we realized that few of us were talking about the dilemmas of national cultural identity in the grand synthesizing terms of a few years ago. There are readily available reasons for this: a welcome hesitancy to speak, anymore, of a national culture in unitary, essentializing terms, and the ever sharper realization that Canadian cultural artefacts circulate elsewhere in the world as part of what is sometimes called a global cultural system. What seemed clear, in any case, was that the virtue of current research on Canadian culture is in the details, and in the solidity of its findings and analysis. There is little passion for the development of larger models within which all these case studies might find their place.

In fact, however, there is a lot of excitement in cultural scholarship these days, and much of it concerns developments unfolding in Canada. However, the level at which this work operates is less and less that of the nation. For at least a decade now, we have seen cities take over from nations as the object and incubator of compelling new ideas about culture. Over a decade ago, the proceedings of a conference on the “24-Hour City”, held in Manchester, England (Lovett et al, 1994) seemed like one of the most truly innovative contributions to our thinking about culture that I had seen in some time. The “24-hour city” conference asked us to think about cultural regulation and policy in genuinely new ways – by treating commercial night-life as an urban industry, for example, rather than as simply a service sector which replenished the energies of those who returned to “real” jobs in the morning. By now, the economic and social value of nightlife and the cultural sector are widely recognized at all levels of municipal government. Cultural and leisure activities in cities are cherished as “amenities”, invested in because they seem necessary to attract a creative workforce, and publicized as lures for tourists. Much of the interesting cultural activism of the past two decades has taken cities as its natural domain of expression, and municipal cultural plans now attract the sorts of public attention which once was directed at Royal Commissions on culture and media at the national levels.

There are a variety of possible reasons for this shift in emphasis, from a discourse on culture concerned with building a national imaginary to one pre-

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occupied with the cultural textures of urban life. In the professional realm of cultural policy-making, we can trace a line of development in which culture moved from being a *scarce national resource* requiring policies and institutions for its development, to the still controversial shift in the 1980s to an emphasis on *cultural industries*. In the 1990s, and most notably in Great Britain, an expanded definition of the cultural industries took shape, one which studied small-scale creativity and entrepreneurship in such industries as those producing clothing fashions or specialized music genres (e.g., McRobbie, 1998; Du Gay and Pryke, 2002). These industries (now called the *creative industries* in government reports and scholarly treatments) very often took cities as their natural field of activity, and it is in thinking about cities that their importance has been most widely acknowledged.

In a slightly later, but nevertheless overlapping development, we may point as well to a shift among those policy-makers concerned with citizenship and social development. Here there has been an observable movement from an emphasis on *cultural capital* (access to cultural resources of various kinds) to a concern with *social capital*, in which culture in its specific sense (as a sector of economic and creative activity) is dissolved within a broader notion of social textures and of what the French call the *lien social*, the social bond (Bouvier, 2005). Culture has become much more about the quality of lives lived in close proximity than about the building of a national cultural sphere in which Canadians might see themselves reflected.

A rhetoric of scarcity, which points to the lack of Canadian cultural goods and decries that lack, seems to resonate less and less at the level of a national culture, now seemingly full of Canadian-made feature films and music CDs we have no time to experience. Claims about a scarcity of cultural amenities may seem more persuasive at the municipal level, where the effects of policy and investment are more directly visible; anyone who travels within Canada makes informal comparisons between different jurisdictions and the cultural resources they offer.

In what corners of our culture is cultural memory accumulating?

In the street markets of Mexico City, I've noticed a change over several years in the ways in which pirated music is packaged and sold. Pirated CDs were once copies of official releases; an album

and its cover were replicated, and street stalls were full of a broad repertory of music past and current. At some point in the middle of this decade, street vendors began filling CD-ROMs with MP3 files rather than CD tracks, offering up to 100 MP3's on single discs. One could buy all the works of Radiohead or REM on single discs. As the table space devoted to CDs was more and more given over to DVDs, video games and computer software, the music that was left for sale tended to consist of a limited number of CDs offering the entire *œuvres* of a few canonical artists.

We should think of these vendor tables as cultural archives of a sort, in which music is gathered up, stored for a while, and then allowed to move into personal collections. As music moves from official CDs to pirated discs filled with MP3s, diversity has been reduced, even if that diversity has expanded immeasurably elsewhere, on the internet and individual hard discs or IPODs. This question of the migration of culture from old to new technological formats is the key question, in my view, facing cultural policy at the national level. The survival of the cultural past in new technological storage systems is what gives depth and "ballast" (McCracken, 1998, p. 131) to national cultures, determining the usefulness of that past in the present. One can teach an entire history of Brazilian popular music using clips available on *Youtube*, and do reasonably well with Quebec music since the 1960s using the same source. Only scattered, unconnected bits of the audiovisual history of English-Canadian pop music have made it there, though the situation seems to be improving, however slowly.

The migration of culture across technological platforms is happening in a variety of ways and for a multiplicity of motives. Canada's Audio Visual Preservation Trust was established in response to "Fading Away," the report of the Task Force on the Preservation and Enhanced Use of Canada's Audio-visual Heritage (1995). The AV Trust typically produces new versions of films (both commercial and non-commercial), sound recordings, and radio and television programs which are threatened with decay or neglect. Its activities, one might say, are devoted to the restoration and circulation of works of Canadian culture whose canonical importance has been established but not fully exploited. It makes such works available in new editions which may involve commercial reissues and elaborate educational programs. The DOCAM (Documentation and

Conservation of Media Arts) was initiated in 2005 as a partnership between the Montreal-based Daniel Langlois Foundation, several universities and representatives of major Canadian museums and art galleries. DOCAM's key objective is that of building expertise among those who deal with media-based artworks (such as video, installation or computer-based art) whose continued exhibition is threatened by the technological obsolescence of the platforms and technologies involved in their original creation. (How does one show a computer-based artwork from the early 1980s when its operating systems, processor performance and storage medium are no longer to be found.) DOCAM is not exclusively concerned with Canadian works of media-based art, but several of its key case studies are Canadian, and the professional and technological expertise it hopes to build within the museum and art communities will certainly help to ensure that the historical depth of Canadian contributions to media artworks will be protected.

Alongside these initiatives, significant levels of cultural migration occur within low-level commercial markets. *Ebay* has arguably done more than any other internet resource to send back into circulation the images from millions of old postcards, movie posters, fashion items, magazines and other kinds of cultural ephemera (Straw, 2007). Items are traded between individuals on Ebay, but as an on-line gallery of images it is something of a public resource. Students, antique dealers and fashion designers use Ebay's images in their everyday work; it has endowed all kinds of minor cultural commodities with the historical depth which thousands of examples serve to create.

More generally, the migration of culture across technological patterns takes place in the constant movement between low-level commerce and the non-institutionalized collector cultures which have taken shape around innumerable kinds of cultural phenomena. The historical depth of Mexican film culture is reinforced when collectors deal in movie posters and promotional photographs, accumulating and cataloguing these and pulling them from the places in which they were stored or discarded. As collectors gather these artefacts up and annotate them, they make of them a form of cultural ballast.

One of the most interesting examples of this migration, in my view, is the 2006 release of the compact disc collection *From Jamaica to Toronto*. This collection gathers up the rich legacy of soul and reggae music produced in Toronto in the late

1960s and early 1970s by musicians such as Jackie Mittoo, who produced substantial work in both Toronto and Jamaica. The CD is richly annotated, building a strong context for this music, and it is all the more remarkable for having been released by a Seattle-based label (Light in the Attic Records), who have followed it up with more collections of Toronto soul music from the same period. From Jamaica to Toronto is a long overdue memorialisation of this important moment in Canadian musical history. It is, at the same time, an example of the way in which a newer technology (the CD) authorizes the rescuing of cultural artefacts produced in an older technology, gathering them up in a media form which stimulates their renewed circulation and valorization.

How "virtual" is our media-based culture at the present time?

The third question I wish to raise was prompted by two very different trends which invite us to reconsider culture's relationship to physical locations. The first was Madonna's decision to leave Warner Brothers, her record label throughout most of her career, to sign with concert promoter Live Nation for a fee of roughly \$120,000,000 over ten years. This event was widely received as symptomatic of a reordering in the music industries; with CD sales in decline, concert tours had become the only viable means for performers to generate large revenues. In September, 2007, the high-profile Canadian music manager Bruce Allen predicted the death of the compact disc by Christmas, 2008, and noted that live performances were the only way for musicians to make money anymore (*Globe and Mail*, 2007).

The second trend has received less notice outside of its immediate spheres of influence. This is the movement of "art-film" directors away from producing films for theatrical release and towards the production of works which are shown in art galleries or other more traditional cultural institutions. German documentary filmmaker Harun Farocki, and Canadian Guy Maddin are among those who have begun to produce large-scale works for art gallery or ballet settings. Canadian visual artist Stan Douglas has turned to cinema as a form which now lends itself to large-sized installations in art galleries. These "moves" are often short-lived, and they take a variety of forms, but they suggest ways in which the current boom in visual arts, gallery building and art-based tourism has drawn, into the gallery space, a wide range of cultural forms.

Arguably, the enormous growth of large-scale galleries in the world today is just as important for contemporary art as is the internet. Filmmakers have spoken of how, amidst the closing of repertory cinemas and the reluctance even of public television networks to show experimental works, the art gallery exhibition has opened its arms to innovative works of cinema. (This was a key theme in a discussion of Harun Farocki's films at the Goethe Institute in Montreal on October 19th 2007.)

Both these examples point, I would suggest, to the renewed importance of punctual, live events cultural institutions which draw people to physical, specific places. Music and the visual arts may need the spectacle of physical presence to counter the disappearance of music and image into electronic virtuality. Indeed, the exaggerated scale of stadium concerts and wall-sized films may make sense principally as a counterweight to miniaturization and digitization.

Nevertheless, I want to offer another hypothesis. The rise of electronic media, in the early 20th century, coincided with widespread urbanization, so that the two seemed inseparable. In the present day, the migration of cultural expression to digital forms has unfolded just as cities have come to think in serious ways about the relationship of cultural to place and the physical environment. The shift to cultural economies in bohemian neighbourhoods, debates over public art, the ascendance of monumental, tourist-oriented art galleries and museums have all reasserted the grounded, material character of culture as a social resource. In artistic practice, notions of site-specificity continue to resonate widely, just as curators and critics have spent much of the last decade entranced by notions of "relational aesthetics" (Bourriaud, 2000), which see the role of art as that of creating concrete situations in which breaches in the social bond are healed.

Tensions between the material and the immaterial, the virtual and the site-specific, the physical artefacts of our past culture and the new media to which such artefacts may migrate – these, I would argue, are the key tensions shaping present-day cultural life. They have displaced older tensions between the global and the local, or between an officially-sanctioned culture and another which is genuinely popular in either commercial or anthropological terms. Cultural life unfolds now in a space between the city and the

digital storage medium, and our difficulty as scholars is that of offering a perspective which encompasses both.

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THE CULTURE OF TECHNOLOGY IN CANADA

“The spirit of innovation has made a good lodgment, and committed sad ravages even in this secluded corner of the world.”

Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, March 22, 1834.

ABSTRACT

The relationship between technology and culture in Canada is typically approached as a question about the impact of new technologies on cultural production, distribution and regulation. Without detracting from these important issues, this article explores an alternative possibility: that Canadian culture is itself technological. Focussing upon the federal innovation agenda, the article examines the development of a public pedagogy surrounding innovation, the outcome of which has been a depoliticization of the political economy of technology in Canada.

Faced with the daily emergence of new applications of digital media technologies, it is difficult to avoid puzzling through the “impact” these emerging forms, and the practices they sponsor, have on our activity across a range of categories – politics, community, education, culture. In many respects, the various challenges and opportunities that these technologies present for people who fund, produce, distribute, regulate and consume cultural products in Canada are understood exclusively in terms of such impacts. This is not entirely regrettable: the opportunities and challenges for cultural practice and production presented by new media technologies are serious and formidable. Much hangs in the balance. The decisions that we make (or don’t make) about how to design, use and regulate these technologies will one way or another, have dramatic implications for cultural industries, cultural practices and cultural consumers in Canada.

Still, there are other ways to think about technology and its relationship to culture in Canada. In what follows, I will not focus upon the question of the impact of technology *on* culture in Canada, but rather on the proposition that technology *is* culture in Canada, and on the stakes of imagining Canadian culture in this way. I want to draw attention not just to the technologies of culture in Canada, but to the culture of technology. What is at stake in the culture of technology is politics, which are understood as participation in a diverse array of possible modes and forms, in public opinion regarding what is just and what is beneficial.

The culture of technology is doubly depoliticizing: first, it is a culture in which the politics of technology itself – the manner in which technologies encode and materialize prohibitions and permissions, and reproduce particular distributions of resources and power – is generally exempt from democratic political judgment; and, second, it is a culture in which the perceived imperatives of (falsely) depoliticized technology can be mobilized in order to remove other, non-technological controversies from the sphere of democratic political judgment. An excellent example of the operation of the depoliticizing culture of technology in Canada is

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what has come to be known in recent years as the “innovation agenda.”

Innovation does not only mean doing new things in new ways, it also describes a particular political-economic formation that has emerged in Canada over the past several years. The “innovation agenda” comprises a suite of federal government policy initiatives ostensibly aimed at making Canada more competitive in the global knowledge-based economy. Industry Canada’s Innovation Strategy, published in 2001 in a pair of documents entitled *Achieving Excellence* and *Knowledge Matters*, established the following three priorities: promoting “the creation, adoption and commercialization of knowledge”; “ensuring the supply of people who create and use knowledge”; and building regulatory and market environments that provide “incentives to innovate.” The restructuring carried out under the auspices of the innovation agenda has relied heavily on a massive commitment to the development and deployment of new technologies across all sectors and to the cultivation of an economic climate of enterprise and flexibility. Crucially, it has also relied upon the legitimization of a particular relationship between the state and the market vis-à-vis technological innovation and development, in which the state’s role as a regulator and redistributor of resources is reduced, and its role as a facilitator, sponsor and promoter of capital accumulation is enlarged. This role has the state investing massively in research and development, particularly in science and technology research oriented to commercialization, and in education aimed at the generation of “highly qualified people”. It also sees the state as playing a key role in securing the sort of competitive fiscal and regulatory environments that provide incentive for investment in innovation by ensuring that such investments can be converted into profit without undue burden.

In other words, the innovation agenda imagines the culmination of the restructuring of the Canadian economy along neo-liberal lines. If this was at all in doubt, it has been dramatically confirmed in the version of the innovation strategy recently promoted by “Canada’s New Government” in a document published earlier this year under the title *Mobilizing Science and Technology to Canada’s Advantage* (2007), which follows on the government’s broader economic blueprint, *Advantage Canada* (2006). The document starts out by affirming that “Science and Technology comes into almost every aspect of our

lives, helping us to solve problems and create opportunities.” Accordingly, “Canada can and must do more to turn our ideas into innovations that provide solutions to environmental, health, and other important social challenges, and to improve our economic competitiveness.” As is the way with neo-liberal strategies for the state, doing more sometimes means doing less:

“This Science and Technology Strategy recognizes that the most important role of the Government of Canada is to ensure a free and competitive marketplace, and foster an investment climate that encourages the private sector to compete against the world on the basis of their innovative products, services and technologies. The government also has a role in supporting research and development which is the basis of new discoveries that lead to improved lives, better jobs, and new business opportunities. To achieve world excellence in science and technology, Canadians must promote and defend two complementary and indivisible freedoms: the freedom of scientists to investigate and the freedom of entrepreneurs to innovate and market their product to the world.” (*Mobilizing Science and Technology to Canada’s Advantage*, p. 19).

Despite its rhetorical presentation as necessary and straightforwardly self-justifying, the innovation agenda is, in fact, a deeply political project, in the sense that it contains a vision of the good life and an account of the means to achieve it, and in that it represents a particular configuration of interests and power. It is also political insofar as the benefits and burdens of its institutionalization and realization are not evenly distributed among those who occupy the various positions of security and insecurity characteristic of highly-polarized post-Fordist economies. A political project on this scale cannot proceed without legitimacy. In a democratic context, legitimacy can be generated in a couple of ways. It can arise politically, from an expression of consent that follows informed public deliberation about the ends in question and the means proposed to achieve them. If that is too risky, it can be accomplished culturally, by cultivating a tacit endorsement for these ends and means that obviates the need for political legitimization.

In a technological society, the ground for this sort of cultural legitimation in relation to the innovation agenda is well-prepared. Whatever else you may wish to call it, ours is a technological society. A technological society is one that is saturated by technological devices and systems, many of them functionally integrated, and which experiences technological dynamism as a constant condition. It is a society in which an expansive range of human activity and attention, both individual and collective, is mediated by these devices and systems. As such, a technological society is one in which social organization and, especially, economic life is bound up tightly with technology. It is a society in which technology is culturally identified with material prosperity and moral progress, and in which modes of practice and reasoning associated with technological systems – in particular the priority placed on efficient means relative to worthwhile ends – cross over into other, non-technological, spheres of activity. In a technological society, technologies are not just tools or instruments; they are a way of being in the world, they are “forms of life.” It is in this sense that we might say that technology *is* culture.

A technological culture like ours is well-suited to provide the sort of cultural legitimation that something like the innovation agenda needs if it is to successfully evade the sort of robust *political* legitimation we might otherwise demand of such a clearly political project. However, a technological culture does not just arise and persist on its own, as if it were some sort of essential characteristic of “being Canadian.” Such a culture must be cultivated. It has been cultivated in Canada, I would suggest, by means of a sustained public pedagogy – what Raymond Williams once described as “permanent education” – carried out not solely or even primarily through the formal institutions of schooling but, rather, via a wide variety of other means and venues. Interestingly, the core aim of this pedagogy has been precisely to normalize the idea that Canadian culture is, *essentially*, technological, and that to be Canadian is necessarily to be an innovator.

A good example of this public pedagogy is the 2004 centenary edition of *Maclean's* magazine. The special edition, intended to capture the spirit of 100 years of Canadian history, is themed “Leaders and Dreamers: Canada’s Greatest Innovators and How They Changed the World.”

Here, the history of the 20th century in Canada is styled as a history of successful innovation – not just in science and technology, but also in politics, philosophy, commerce, fashion, the arts, and sports. In every conceivable area of endeavour, distinction is rendered in the vocabulary of innovation. Macdonald, Douglas, King, Pearson, Trudeau – not just politicians and statesmen of varying degrees of acumen and virtue, but bearers of the twin spirits of innovation and nation-building. Harold Innis, Charles Taylor and Northrop Frye, were not just deep thinkers, but innovators. Wayne Gretzky – handy with the puck behind the net? Heck no, an innovator! And Shania Twain – the latest in a somewhat alarming line of female Canadian pop icons, manufactured in a secret facility north of Newmarket? No! An innovator! Here, *all* success, and even mere *celebrity*, no matter what the field and no matter how banal, is rewritten as innovation, the spirit of which belongs to our very national fibre. As Anthony Wilson-Smith, former editor of *Maclean's* puts it in his introduction to the centenary edition: “The ability to innovate isn’t just one of the qualities that define what it is to be Canadian; rather, it’s an integral part of our collective soul”.

It goes without saying that scientific and technological achievements receive special notice in the magazine. Medical breakthroughs, the railway, the Canadarm, Canadian contributions to telegraphy, telephony and radio, the Blackberry, video games, the zipper, the Wonderbra, the Arrow, the snowmobile – all receive the typical treatment as unambiguously positive gifts from the past to be present, bestowed by heroic inventors who battled against the odds and the doubters to see their visions through to fruition, emblems all of the national spirit of innovation. There is even a highly personalized chapter of the story in an article celebrating the invention by Edward Rogers Sr. of the alternating current radio tube. The article is written by Ted Rogers, president and CEO of the Rogers Communications empire and publisher of *Maclean's* magazine. Rogers the younger writes: “Over the years, I have been fortunate to build strong companies based on emerging technologies such as FM radio, cable television, wireless telephones and high-speed internet, but my success could never have been achieved without the pioneering innovation of my father and the determination of my mother to instill his legacy in me.” His good

fortune may indeed be related to his mother's determination and his father's inspiration, but he has profited even more from a neo-liberal state whose approach to the regulation of new media encourages the sort of cross-ownership and concentration that has made him multiple millions as an "innovator". This, too, is what is meant by "a culture of innovation in Canada."

This is just one example of the cultivation of a technological culture of innovation through a public pedagogy that serves to depoliticize what is otherwise a potentially controversial political project. The rhetorical strategies of this public pedagogy map perfectly onto the state rhetoric as presented in the primary documents of the innovation strategy spanning the Chretien and Martin Liberal governments and the Harper Conservative government. In his message introducing *Mobilizing Science and Technology*, Industry Minister Maxime Bernier encourages Canadians to "create a new culture of scientific and technological achievement in our country, and bring new ideas and innovations to the world." A few years earlier, in his preface to *Achieving Excellence*, then Prime Minister Chretien reminds us that we have always been an innovation nation: "Thanks to the hard work, ingenuity and creativity of our people, we enjoy extraordinary prosperity and a quality of life that is second to none. Ours is a history of adaptation and innovation". This construction places the cultural rhetoric of the innovation agenda squarely within the well-established tradition of technological nationalism in Canada, whereby technology overcomes not just the geography that divides the nation but also – as an idea, as a collective project to which we might all commit despite our differences – effaces the politics buried within such projects themselves. In 2004, Peter MacKinnon, then Chair of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, made this connection explicit in a remark that was quoted in that year's federal budget, when he said that the federal focus on knowledge and innovation could "be in the 21st Century what the construction of the transcontinental railway was in the 19th Century. It can be a new National Dream."

In his magisterial 1934 book, *Technics and Civilization*, Lewis Mumford wrote that "Every culture lives within its dream." Ours is the dream of a nation made strong and whole by technology. And so long as we live within this dream, it will be very easy for the captains of commerce and industry, and their representatives, to invoke

technology as a reason to exclude from the democratic judgment of citizens political questions about technology itself, and about the relationship of the state to its development and regulation. The New National Dream is the collective project of economic restructuring to which capitalist and state elites in Canada have been committed for at least the past two decades. In presenting the innovation agenda as a technological project, connected seamlessly with Canada's historical destiny as a technological nation, Canadian elites have more or less succeeded in effacing the deeply political nature of this project, insulating it from contest and opposition. And they have succeeded because a technological culture such as ours is highly susceptible to such claims. For whom among us, after all, would stand up against innovation? Against a strong and globally-competitive economy? Against the imperative for Canada to be a leader in technological development? Against our own history as a nation of innovators? Very few of us. And so depoliticization is smuggled in by the culture of technology, a problem that would seem to bear consideration alongside the various challenges presented by the new technologies of culture.

Notes

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING POLICY FOR A WORLD OF ABUNDANCE

ABSTRACT

Canadian broadcast regulation was designed for a world of scarcity where broadcast spectrum and consumer choice was limited. Yet today's broadcasting environment is no longer one of scarcity, but rather one of near limitless abundance as satellite, digital channels, and the Internet now provide instant access to an unprecedented array of original content. Broadcasters have been forced to adapt by shifting from their reliance on protective regulations and inexpensive U.S. content to instead competing on the unregulated global stage with their own, original Canadian content delivered to an international audience on conventional and Internet platforms. Adapting to the changing environment requires action from more than just the broadcast community. There is an important role for government and the CRTC as well. It must launch its own assault on a regulatory environment by rejecting the conventional "walled garden" approach, re-imagining cultural support programs, and emphasizing network neutrality.

Given our easy access to Hollywood movies and U.S. television programming, it is unsurprising that Canadians have long placed great emphasis on cultural policies. To avoid marginalizing homegrown talent, Canada has set Canadian content as a key objective in the *Broadcasting Act*, established foreign ownership restrictions within the cultural industries, and safeguarded cultural policies in its international trade agreements.

Canadian broadcast regulation was designed for a world of scarcity where broadcast spectrum and consumer choice was limited. As a result, Canadian television and radio broadcasters must be Canadian-owned and comply with Canadian content requirements, while funding programs at the federal and provincial level help the Canadian cultural sector compete on the global stage. This has led to a highly regulated environment that uses various policy levers to shelter Canadian broadcasters from external competition, limits new entrants, and imposes a long list of content requirements and advertising restrictions.

As a result, a dizzying array of regulations have kept the entry of new broadcast competitors to a minimum, enshrined genre protection so that Canadians are treated to domestic versions of popular channels such as HBO and ESPN, and firmly supported simultaneous substitution, a policy that allows Canadian broadcasters to simulcast U.S. programming but substitute their own advertising.

Given that framework, it comes as no surprise to find incumbent broadcasters averse to significant change. Media consolidation has left the market with a handful of private Canadian broadcasters who fill their broadcast schedules with profitable U.S. programming, relegate most original Canadian content to undesirable timeslots, and generate an estimated \$200 million annually from the simultaneous substitution rules alone.

Yet today's broadcasting environment is no longer one of scarcity, but rather one of near limitless abundance as satellite, digital channels, and the Internet now provide instant access to an unprecedented array of original content. Spectrum limits have given way to broadband pipes that carry everything from original television networks to YouTube videos. Fledgling broadcasters rely primarily on Internet distribution, while conventional broadcasters make their programming freely available online on multiple sources and give users the ability to embed clips of their shows anywhere they choose.

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The Internet offers the promise of global distribution of content, a welcome opportunity for Canadian creators who have often suffered from a lack of shelf space or room on the dial in foreign countries. Moreover, technology has leveled the creative playing field, as evidenced by the explosion of user generated content that requires little more than a camera, a computer, and a great idea.

Canadians are a growing part of this story. From video sites (TonClip.com) to video creators (Galacticast.com) to hundreds of Canadian podcasters (Canadapodcasts.ca), the emergence of Canadian new media has blossomed largely without any reliance on longstanding Canadian cultural policies.

In light of these developments, it is increasingly clear that Canada should re-examine the foundational cultural policies with the goal of ensuring that the regulatory environment has kept pace with recent technological developments.

Rethinking the foundation – walled gardens

The “walled garden” approach that promotes Canadian content by limiting access to foreign content is increasingly being surpassed by technologies that provide universal access to near-unlimited content regardless of the country of origin. In response, some conventional broadcasters rely on “geo-gating” technologies that seek to replicate offline borders on the Internet. The re-emergence of geographic borders on the Internet coincides with broadcasters finally jumping on the Internet bandwagon as they race to make their content freely available online. Some U.S. broadcasters are selling downloads through services such as Apple iTunes or Amazon.com, yet the unmistakable trend is toward free, ad-supported streaming of content mere hours after it first appears on commercial television.

Each major U.S. broadcaster already offers a handful of shows in this manner with ambitious plans to expand their services in the months ahead. NBC and Fox recently unveiled Hulu.com to some critical acclaim, while Comedy Central created a new site for the popular Daily Show that features a complete archive of eight years of programming.

Canadians, alas, are generally locked out of these sites due to licensing restrictions. Canadian broadcasters have been scrambling to buy the Internet rights to U.S. programming, both to protect their local broadcasts and to beef up their online presence.

With the growing popularity of Internet streaming, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters fears that U.S. broadcasters may ultimately stream their programming into Canada and thereby diminish the value of those programs on Canadian television networks.

In response, the CAB seemingly wants the CRTC to erect barriers to Internet streaming, concluding that “all reasonable public policy measures and instruments will be needed to maintain the integrity of a separate and distinct Canadian program rights market.”

While the CAB is right that the Internet is erasing the distinction between geographic markets and that U.S. broadcasters are likely to stream on a global basis in the near future, the likely impact on Canadian content is precisely opposite of what it suggests.

Rather than reducing the production of Canadian content, Internet streaming and new media create incentives for more Canadian productions since profitability in the emerging environment will depend upon original content that can be distributed across all platforms, old and new. If Canadian broadcasters are unable to rely on cheap U.S. programming, they will be forced to compete by investing in their own original content. This will dramatically alter Canadian content production from one mandated by government regulation to one mandated by market survival.

Rethinking the foundation – supporting Canadian content creation

The emergence of the Internet as the cheapest and most effective distribution platform in the world points to the need to rethink Canadian funding programs. Many programs and policies (foreign investment restrictions, tax credits, movie co-production treaties) are geared chiefly to support either the production or distribution of Canadian content, which was once viewed as the primary barrier to global success for the culture industries. To date, far less attention has been paid to creation, marketing, and access side of Canadian content, yet in the Internet world that is precisely where support is most needed.

Canadian content requirements will unquestionably remain relevant for conventional television and radio for the foreseeable future, however, the more challenging question is whether – or for how long – conventional television and radio will itself remain relevant,

particularly in light of Statistics Canada data that indicates that younger Canadians are abandoning radio en masse.

As the importance of the Internet and new media grows, the Canadian cultural strategy must surely adapt to this new reality. The CRTC showed signs of recognizing this with its 2005 satellite radio decision that implemented Canadian content safeguards better suited to the technology. Internet-based content presents an even greater challenge since there is no hope – nor any need – to bring Canadian content requirements to the likes of Joost or YouTube. The policy emphasis must instead shift toward creating Canadian content and touching as many people as possible involved in the creative process.

Funding for new media is an important part of the equation. In 2007, the Department of Canadian Heritage committed \$29 million over the next two years to the Canadian New Media Fund, as then Minister Bev Oda warned that Canadians were falling behind in the new media arena. That funding will help, yet it pales in comparison to the \$1 billion invested in television production by federal and provincial governments.

Moreover, there are other fiscal possibilities, such as tax incentives that place new media on an equal footing with newspaper and broadcasting advertising as well as funding programs that recognize that Canadian creative opportunities extend well beyond the large production companies.

Rethinking the foundation – media consolidation and Net neutrality

The Canadian market has featured creeping consolidation in recent years, leaving four companies – CTVGlobemedia, Canwest Global, Quebecor, and Cogeco – with dominant control over the television market (Rogers is rapidly emerging as the fifth player and Astral is a key player in specialty channels). Four companies similarly dominate the radio market (Corus, Astral Rogers, and CTVGlobemedia) and five companies lead the newspaper market (Canwest Global, Quebecor, Torstar, Power Corp., and CTVGlobemedia).

Since many of these same companies also control some of Canada's most trafficked websites, regulators must consider the impact of cross-ownership of conventional broadcast platforms and new media. Indeed, many of the dominant

media companies play a key role in the Internet service provider market, which is also highly consolidated with the six leading Canadian ISPs (Bell, Telus, Rogers, Shaw, Quebecor, and Cogeco) controlling well over 70 percent of the market.

Many of the major media companies argue that new media, particularly the Internet, provides a strong counterbalance to consolidation in the television, radio, and newspaper sectors since Internet video, podcasting, and blogging deliver similar content from a diverse array of sources. Yet the companies fail to acknowledge that the counterbalance is dependent upon Canadians' ability to access new media content without interference or prioritization. Indeed, in a world where the same companies, such as Rogers, Quebecor, and Cogeco, control both content and carriage of content, there is a real danger that the carriage side of the business may prioritize its own offerings at the expense of the diverse, third-party content.

Indeed, leveraging their dominant positions, Canadian telecommunications companies have been embroiled in a growing number of incidents involving content or application discrimination. In recent years, Telus blocked access to hundreds of websites during a dispute with its labour union, Shaw attempted to levy surcharges for Internet telephony services, Rogers quietly limited bandwidth for legitimate peer-to-peer software applications, and Videotron mused publicly about establishing a new Internet transmission tariff that would require content creators to pay millions for the privilege of transmitting their content.

Canada is not alone in this regard. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. counterpart to the CRTC, has ordered at least one ISP to stop blocking access to third-party Internet telephony services, while major carriers such as Verizon and Bell South have unabashedly promoted their vision of a fee-based higher-speed Internet that would run alongside a slower, free public Internet.

Europe and Asia have similarly not been immune to net neutrality concerns. This summer, Norway's public broadcaster, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, learned that Nex-GenTel, one of the country's largest broadband providers, was limiting bandwidth to its content. The ISP dropped the practice only after public disclosure and customer complaints. Meanwhile

in South Korea, three million broadband Internet subscribers were recently denied access to HanaTV, an Internet-based video-on-demand service. The ISPs engaged in the blocking were evidently concerned that the service would harm their own video offerings.

Safeguarding against this form of content discrimination requires considering structural separation of carriage and content as well as network neutrality rules that would require carriers to treat all Internet content and applications in an equal manner regardless of its source.

Conclusion

The changes to the Canadian broadcasting environment has been dramatic, forcing broadcasters to shift from their reliance on protective regulations and inexpensive U.S. content to instead competing on the unregulated global stage with their own, original Canadian content delivered to an international audience on conventional and Internet platforms. This should alter Canadian content production from one mandated by government regulation to one mandated by market survival.

Adapting to the changing environment requires action from more than just the broadcast community however. There is an important role for government and the CRTC as well. It must launch its own assault on a regulatory environment designed for a bygone era of broadcast scarcity by crafting new regulations tailored for the world of abundance.

THE ONTOLOGY OF FACEBOOK: POPULAR CULTURE AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

ABSTRACT

Popular culture now offers the opportunity to Canadians to communicate online in large, loosely coupled social groups. Through social-software technologies such as Facebook, some aspects of individual identity are exchanged for the “total involvement” in an environment that allows for high-speed sequences of episodic service encounters. In both synchronous and asynchronous time and with potentially great frequency, participants post and respond to notices and exchange photos. In this article, the work of George Grant, Marshall McLuhan, and Jacques Ellul, is used as a lens on the philosophy of being constituted by the use of social software. In particular, social software is examined in relation to an ontology characterized by speed, universality, and instrumentality. Some implications for the potency of propaganda are considered.

Large, virtual gatherings of loosely coupled individuals are now commonplace methods for beginning and maintaining social relationships. Social software and other new communications technologies are changing the proportion and quality of what we perceive in our social environment. This article considers the underlying communication of social software in order to provide a basis for a better understanding of the meaning of new social practices in the context of technological change.

First, what is social software? In keeping with a social constructivist view of technology, an approach in which we can observe historical moments in which technology is shaped by users, a useful definition of social software would refer to how individuals and group create, use, and popularize a new technology. Social software refers to web-enabled products that support the formation of a community and feature design principles emphasizing two or more modes of communication, that is, one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many. A prominent example of social software is Facebook, in which participants post and respond to notices, engage in discussion in dyads or small and large groups, and “poke” others (virtually hug, pinch, or bite them, for example). If you want to imagine the activities in Facebook, it is similar to having a personal bulletin board on which may be posted photos, videos, notes, and conversations. Facebook then allows this bulletin board to be linked to any of the millions of other bulletin boards that already exist. There are as of this date some 48 million users of Facebook, and it is reputed to be the site with the most photos in the U.S. (Facebook expands 2007).

Previous technologies have been establishing the social “ground” for Facebook over the last couple of centuries. Print allowed individuals to read discrete pieces of information without committing to a long apprenticeship in a monastic order (Innis 1951). In our era, social software as a set of design principles has its roots in the work of scholars of communities of practice (Wenger, 1998). In the 1980s, organizations began to use online and database technologies to support the work of groups within the organization. The task was especially important for large organizations, which were looking for ways to reduce the number of people working on a long-term basis in the organization, without losing the large body of strategic knowledge held by individuals. At the same time, Wenger and others studied organizational and other kinds of learning that could take place within a social context. Rather than learning in classrooms, Wenger wanted to encourage learning

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that was engaged in applied social contexts and whose subjects were the messy situations and relationships in the same places and times in which people experienced them. This has been called situated learning.

The service environment of social software

Social software in its early stages, before Facebook, was therefore created for the purpose of increasing organizational effectiveness. Online tools were intended to provide opportunities for gathering information, engaging in conversations, and expressing acquired knowledge at the time and place that these opportunities would best support learning, with learning devoted to articulating and expressing knowledge that otherwise might remain tacit. Because these times and places were not likely to coincide with the schedules and locations of formal classrooms in schools and universities, social software (or *groupware*, as it was called in business) would be used on a continuous basis for supporting learning whenever and wherever individuals and groups would choose. Learning was viewed as occurring episodically, and the normative principle was developed that it should be made available – as a service – on an as-needed, when-needed basis (Brown and Duguid 1991). For some time, then, communications technologies have been increasing the extent to which *episodic service encounters* can be arranged.

Facebook and other social software are new only to the extent that it represents an intensification of this type of encounter, and on an unprecedented scale. Social software in this sense provides what McLuhan called, in a speech to University of Florida students in 1970, a service environment. Following this insight, medium theorists have argued that media create social and psychological environments, in which large-scale changes in patterns of behaviour may be discerned. These changes are not directly caused by technology but are more likely to become potent in the new

environment than they were before the introduction of the new technology. A new medium favours some changes and discourages others. For example, the almost universal use of television has served to increase the permeability of divisions in the stages of child development. Through television, children now witness (previously private) adult conversations (Meyrowitz 1985). The

institution of a primetime viewing period in the evening has served to reduce, albeit not to eliminate, differences in what is viewed as properly belonging to childhood and what is considered to be associated with adulthood.

Ronald Deibert of the University of Toronto points out that the bias or favouring aspects of a technology do not appear spontaneously as individuals and groups abruptly drop certain social preferences and adopt others. Instead, the “web of social preferences” changes over time (Deibert 1997). The changes in question are therefore intergenerational changes, not intrapsychic, because social preferences are relatively intractable in the short term. Furthermore, over longer periods of time technologies that are used intensively may reverse their effects, helping to create a shared sense of identity and a shared purpose in one historical era, but encouraging atomism and anomie in another (McLuhan & McLuhan 1988).

So what sort of community develops in Facebook? Scholars examining the use of the Internet in daily life have something to say

about this. The use of the Internet for mediating a community’s activities corresponds to either of two basic models described by Feenberg and Bakardjieva (2004). These are the “consumption” and “community” models. The consumption model involves searching for and retrieving information, which is made available for a market price. In the consumption model, users rarely talk to one another, because price is the medium of communication:

Privacy, anonymity, reliability, speed, and visual appeal are desired properties of

If you want to imagine the activities in Facebook, it is similar to having a personal bulletin board on which may be posted photos, videos, notes, and conversations. Facebook then allows this bulletin board to be linked to any of the millions of other bulletin boards that already exist. There are as of this date some 48 million users of Facebook, and it is reputed to be the site with the most photos in the U.S.

this virtual space, mobilizing armies of designers in search of competitive technical solutions (1).

By contrast, the community model represents “relatively stable, long-term online group associations mediated by the Internet”(2). These associations are largely uneconomic, providing returns that are connected to the community’s values, norms, and meanings (Etzioni & Etzioni 1999). The community informatics ideal is based on the community model of Internet use (Schuler & Day 2004). It seeks what Kellner calls more *ludic* uses of technology, that is, the more playful kinds of uses representing a “more ecological mode of social organization” (Kellner 1998, 14). Such an ecology is decentralized, immersed in humanistic concerns, and responsive to direct human observation and concrete social action.

It is this tension between consumption and community that makes social software interesting in relation to Canadian identity because interactions are carried out at great speed and through a series of interactive episodes rather than through organic development. Social software is used to establish and build communities, but it is also used for consumption. In fact, the most recent innovations in Facebook involves the production, sale, and consumption of virtual gifts.

The speed, universality, and instrumentality of social software

I would argue that the ontology, or philosophy of being, of social software may be understood by considering the dimensions of speed, universality, and instrumentality. These dimensions of the experience of using social software have been extended from previous media innovations but find their most intense expression in the episodic service encounter of social software.

The French medium theorist Paul Virilio (2006) sees technology as the most profound of influences on human perception and speed as the organizing principle for technological development. He regards media innovation as invoking the same effects on perception as that of the larger category of technology. As with other media, speed is the means by which space is reduced or eliminated in the use of social software. Users of social software have access to an unprecedented level of speed in completing one transaction and beginning another.

Speed in media technologies is accomplished through two mechanisms: switches and directories, neither of which is new. They were first used in connection to the invention of the telephone. The first telephone switchboard began operating in the 19th century in New Haven, Connecticut, a couple of years after Bell’s invention. About a month later, the first telephone directory was published, also in Connecticut. It had only fifty names. But these two add-ons to the basic hardware of the telephone set, the switchboard and the directory, are innovations that became part of each communication system developed since then. The Internet, for example, relies on what is called packet switching, which allows for shorter delays in connecting users than the telephone switchboard did. We can see the power of directories in the rise of Google. Google provides a kind of directory on demand to information that can be found on the Internet. The unprecedented speed with which users can gain access to the services they require and request is what sets social software apart from previous technological innovations. Many of these interactions can take place simultaneously, because users are linked within networks and across networks.

Social software provides the fastest switching and directory capabilities we have ever seen. It also provides a universality of experience that is unprecedented. Universality is achieved through the myth of the elimination of time and space. Episodic service encounters are provided for any and all individuals and groups. The universality of the social-software experience is created by reference to myth and attention should therefore be given to the universality of experience as the second primary dimension of social software, after speed.

Lévi-Strauss refers to music and myth as “machines for the suppression of time” (Leach 1989). Social software allows people to carry out many social transactions without the time required to develop a relationship with someone else. The suppression of time is based in the attempt to achieve a universality of experience in time and space. The speed of social software allows and the consequent negation of geographical space suggests a transcendence of the limits of time in the sense that Lévi-Strauss discusses in relation to music and myth. The myth of transcending time and space allows for a universality of experience that art has always provided and which the

Internet now claims. The universal experience of religion, art, and then technology are the successive stages of social paradigm described by Grant (1969). In the universal experience offered by social software, the opportunity is also created for flexible symbolic accumulation. This means that if a poke is only available at a particular time from a participant in whom one is only marginally interested, the poke may be valued nonetheless.

If the ontology of social software is based on speed and universality, the implications for those seeking to disseminate propaganda are significant, because the instrumentality with which propaganda is concerned, but which may not be approached directly and explicitly, is revealed in the meeting of production and consumption. The instrumentality of social-software practices is reflected in the continuous meeting of the acts of production and consumption in the virtual world. The instrumentality of social software is therefore directed towards solving the problems of advertising and propaganda.

Propaganda is not necessarily false information, but information provided for questions that have not been posed by recipients. Jacques Ellul (1973) describes propaganda a particular effect, not a cause, of technological society. Ellul argues that in the twentieth century, the relationship between ideology and propaganda changed irreversibly. Previously, ideology gave rise to propaganda. Afterwards, propaganda became a relatively autonomous system, by which ideology could be revised to serve the needs of the propaganda system: “Propaganda’s task is less and less to propagate ideologies; it now obeys its own laws and becomes autonomous” (Ellul 1973, 196). Ellul sees propaganda as necessary to the functioning of the state even in democratic countries. Integration propaganda seeks to create unity of sentiment, thought, and action. At all times, individuals and groups are encouraged to think and act together, because propaganda “is called upon to solve problems created by technology, to play on maladjustments, and to integrate the individual into a technological world” (Ellul 1973, xvii). Rational propaganda, on the other hand, provides facts but in an incomplete or misleading context.

Technology creates problems that propaganda is intended to solve. Propaganda institutions include corporations, lobby groups, and so on. The two are always in association with one another. Gouldner argued that ideology was in a dialectical

relationship with technology. McLuhan, in reviewing the sociologist Alvin Gouldner’s book, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology*, used the analogy of figure and ground to note that as new communications technologies, such as the newspaper and then the telegraph, were invented, the figure of the new technology appeared on a ground of what he called “electric information.” This was because, McLuhan noted, “Western man always has his eye on the figure and not the ground” (1979, 246).

Harmonizing the rational practices of propaganda with the social practices of the large virtual group

Ong (1982) has characterized the transition from orality to literacy the “technologization of the word.” Technologization in this sense means the creation of a new set of social practices. I noted that the social constructivist approach to technology would define social software, not in terms of its characteristics as a combination of hardware and software, but as a set of social practices. In the same way, propaganda in Ellul’s terms is a set of practices that is synthesized within the larger practices of technique. Community life is replicated as a sped-up series of episodic encounters for users of social software. In this way, propaganda as a set of social practices is in harmony with the social practices of social software:

Ideally, advertising aims at the goal of a programmed harmony among all human impulses and aspirations and endeavors. Using handicraft methods, it stretches out toward the ultimate electronic goal of a collective consciousness. When all production and all consumption are brought into a preestablished harmony with all desire and all effort, then advertising will have liquidated itself by its own success (McLuhan 1964, 202).

McLuhan’s insight into the creative practices of advertising was that advertising had discovered Freud. His view of advertising was that of a dream world, intended to appeal to subconscious desires. Rational propaganda provides factual information, but in a misleading context and framed within implications for action that, if taken in context, would be irrational – as irrational as the human subconscious. This, then, is Facebook’s philosophy of being – that of the unlimited

capacity of technology to bring together the potential vagaries of demand and consumption, with the hyper-speed of symbolic production.

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INTERNET USE AND CANADIAN CULTURAL CHOICES

ABSTRACT

The desire to protect national identities often assumes a threat from either within or outside the boundaries of the national culture, however it is defined. Indeed, sometimes the threat from within is considered to be from “outsiders”. The author analyzes a series of public opinion surveys on access and availability to arts and culture in Canada to provide insight into the impact of advance in technology on cultural consumption. Presumably, by rendering cultural boundaries more elastic, the internet is a threat to national culture. He questions whether global access to cultural expression via the internet is indeed diminishing such consumption as some fear. He contends that to date, there is no strong evidence to support this assertion. He concludes that underlying concerns are the evolving notions of national cultures.

1. Introduction

Increased global access to information and cultural products via the internet has led some to fear that natural cultural expression is in jeopardy. In short, it is felt that enhanced global connectedness results in weaker national attachment as Canadian cultural products are increasingly in competition with the content in other countries that is available over the internet. If such connectedness does not result in diminished Canadian consumption, it may undercut support for mechanisms aimed at protecting Canadian culture, as “internauts” presumably favor fewer barriers. However, are we asking the right questions when it comes to framing the concerns of policy-makers and the private sector around the future of Canadian culture? After all, the internet can just as easily help expand interest in Canadian culture and in that regard make its multiple expressions more easily accessible. Moreover, it is unclear to what degree internet use acts alongside various demographic characteristics that traditionally influence cultural choices. Language background, age, income, education, ethnicity, region and gender need to be taken into account in an examination of the relationship between internet use and cultural choices.

To properly understand the impact of increased internet use on Canadian culture, we need to consider the following matters. First, the degree of internet use with cultural consumption requires some assessment of the initial knowledge and interest in Canadian culture. It is necessary to look at patterns of internet consumption to determine whether those most frequently listening to Canadian music also frequently consult websites for information on Canada and Canadians (few enquiries have explored the pattern of consumption in this horizontal manner). Yet another issue that merits investigation is the relationship between attitude and behavior when it comes to choosing things Canadian. In effect, are those who say that Canadian culture is important indeed the most avid consumers of Canadian products?

Is it fair to assume that the internet is an extension of established practices where interest in Canadian culture is reflected in reading, listening and viewing habits? There is also the question of the degree to which people are aware that a cultural product is indeed Canadian? In that which follows, we examine the attitudes and

behavior of those with computer access – the connected or digitally literate – and those without access – the unconnected or digitally illiterate. The focus is on music and film and the extent to which computer access has a possible bearing on opinion on Canadian content and the choices made by consumers. Some preliminary insight into these questions will be offered on the basis of an analysis of surveys commissioned by the Department of Canadian Heritage over the past five years on the access and availability to the arts in Canada.

Liss Jeffrey, director of the McLuhan Global Research Network, says the “World Wide Web is increasingly being integrated fully into the lives of most people in Canada.” He adds that: “This is news to a lot of people who, I don’t think, thought things were going to move this far this fast” (Canadian Press, August 26, 2006). A 2005 Statistics Canada survey found that 68 per cent of adult Canadians use the Internet for several purposes and over 15 million adult Canadians used the Internet at home in 2005. Almost two-thirds of them used it every day during a typical month. However, not everyone is online. Nearly ninety percent of those between the ages of 18 and 34 used the internet, compared with less than one in four over the age of 65. Income and education are also areas where the divide in internet use is especially pronounced. And some 58 per cent of residents living in Canada’s small towns or rural areas accessed the internet in 2005, in contrast to some 77 per cent in many urban areas. The divide is attributable in part to the fact that cities have younger populations and more residents with higher income and education. But the gaps in internet use will inevitably decline.

II. The Net threat

Often the desire to protect national identities assumes a threat from either within or outside the boundaries of the national culture, however it is defined. Indeed sometimes the threat from within is considered to be from “outsiders”. Presumably, by rendering cultural boundaries more elastic, the internet itself can be viewed as a threat to national culture. For several decades, cultural industries in several countries were concerned with the influx of American cultural products through, amongst other things, music and film. In terms of national culture identity and consumption habits, America was the “other” from which some degree of protection was essential if the domestic product was to remain viable. This view is widely held in

smaller markets like Canada, where some worry about geographic and cultural proximity, making Canada less distinctive. That said, respected pollster and author Michael Adams has successfully demonstrated that there are important distinctions in the respective expressions of Canadian and American identities and values.

American culture, however widely it is consumed on an international scale, is still viewed as threatening. However, there appears an increasing tendency in many countries to describe the globalization as the principal threat to national identity and the requisite cultural expression. Some may regard the perceived threat to culture from Americanization and globalization as interrelated. A 2004 survey conducted in some 32 countries reveals that Canadians are less inclined than most other nations polled to agree that increased exposure to foreign cultures damages the national or local product.

As illustrated below, only one in five Canadians agree with the view that “increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures”, compared with forty percent of the global sample.

Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
1. Russia	45.0%	27.8%	12.7%	9.7%	4.8%
2. Bulgaria	27.3%	32.3%	14.7%	14.3%	11.5%
3. Latvia	22.7%	32.0%	21.4%	21.6%	2.3%
8. France	19.4%	23.5%	19.5%	24.7%	12.9%
Total Universe	13.8%	26.6%	19.3%	30.0%	10.3%
18. Australia	7.9%	16.2%	21.7%	42.4%	11.9%
19. Great Britain	7.6%	19.2%	24.3%	38.6%	10.3%
22. Canada	5.1%	14.5%	20.1%	48.0%	12.2%
25. United States	3.7%	10.8%	21.8%	45.3%	18.4%

Source: International Social Survey Program, 2003.

Although they are much less protectionist than most as revealed below, 43% of the Canadian population surveyed agree that Canadian television should give preference to domestic films and programs. This is in contrast with half of the global sample who supports preferences being extended to domestic programs.

[Country's] television should give preference to [Country] films and programs

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
1. Russia	55.8%	20.4%	12.1%	8.7%	3.0%
2. Bulgaria	41.3%	31.3%	13.7%	8.4%	5.3%
3. Philippines	32.1%	39.8%	18.2%	7.8%	2.2%
Total Universe	19.6%	30.8%	21.6%	20.4%	7.5%
15. France	16.6%	23.4%	22.5%	19.7%	17.8%
21. Australia	14.7%	32.6%	28.2%	21.2%	3.3%
22. Canada	13.1%	30.2%	24.3%	26.4%	6.0%
26. Great Britain	11.4%	20.4%	32.1%	29.9%	6.2%
29. United States	8.8%	24.6%	29.5%	30.5%	6.6%

Source: International Social Survey Program, 2003.

Regarding the relationship between pride in cultural achievement and cultural preferences, as revealed below just over one in two Canadians that are proud of the country's arts and literature agree with giving such preferences to Canadian programs. This is in marked contrast to those who are not proud and are less disposed to support such preferences. Elsewhere in the world, the link between pride in cultural achievement and preference is also apparent. In the United States however, the link between the two is not as strong as a lesser percentage of those who are proud of that country's cultural achievements are favorable to cultural preference.

How proud: Country's achievements in the arts and literature

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
United States					
Very proud	11.8%	23.0%	26.0%	32.6%	6.7%
Somewhat proud	6.8%	25.5%	33.7%	27.8%	6.1%
Not very proud	2.8%	25.4%	25.4%	39.4%	7.0%
Not proud at all	10.0%	30.0%	30.0%	10.0%	20.0%
Canada					
Very proud	23.2%	28.1%	20.0%	24.6%	4.2%
Somewhat proud	10.2%	34.8%	24.8%	26.2%	4.0%
Not very proud	12.6%	20.4%	34.0%	22.3%	10.7%
Not proud at all	8.3%	8.3%	20.8%	16.7%	45.8%
Rest of World					
Very proud	28.1%	31.7%	17.3%	16.5%	6.4%
Somewhat proud	17.3%	32.8%	22.6%	20.6%	6.7%
Not very proud	15.0%	28.7%	24.2%	23.4%	8.8%
Not proud at all	19.5%	23.5%	20.6%	22.0%	14.4%

Source: International Social Survey Program, 2003.

III. Internet use and Canadian identity

It is widely held that the increase in the number of television channels has resulted in a decline in the degree of Canadian consumption by viewers. As the internet offers a much wider opportunity for global surfing, it is equally widely

assumed that Canadian consumption will further decline in the individual's broader intake. However, the extent to which this entails a weakening of Canadian identity requires some causal demonstration of the relationship between cultural consumption patterns and attachment to Canada. Before further examining these issues, it is worth testing the underlying assumption that access to the internet may be undercutting Canadian identity. Surveys conducted to-date provides limited support for this idea as revealed in the table below. Based on the results of surveys commissioned by the Department of Canadian Heritage, the degree of internet use does not appear to have a significant impact on attachment to Canada. Indeed, it is the highest users of internet in the 16-21 age group that are most inclined to say they are proud to be Canadian. In the 22-30 age group, internet use appears to have no bearing on expressed pride in being Canadian.

On average, how many hours per week do you use the Internet?

	16-21	22-30
1-4 hours	84	84.8
Between 5 and 10 hours	86.5	85.3
More than 10 hours	92.0	85.7
Total	87.8	85.3

Source: Ekos Research, Rethinking Canada, 2004.

Access is important in the desire to consume cultural products. As observed below, persons with computer access are more likely to agree that they can find music by Canadian artists. About 18.4% of persons with no computer access estimate that they spend the majority of their time listening to Canadian music. This is slightly greater than the approximately 14.5% of persons with computer access that spend most of their listening time with music by Canadian artists. Those with computer access are only slightly more inclined to agree that the stories in Canadian movies relate to them with more than one quarter respectively expressing such views.

Nearly half of the respondents with computer access rate the quality of Canadian music as better than that of foreign artists. This compares with 44% of persons that do not have access to a computer. Those with computer access were just as likely to report that they have seen a Canadian feature film over the past year as those without computer access. Those with computer access are just as inclined – six in ten – to think that the acting, directing and production quality of Canadian movies is as good as movies made in

other countries. And two-thirds of Canadians agree that “recently the Canadian movie industry has begun to make better films” providing yet further evidence that the digital divide has not significantly influenced perceptions about the quality and competitiveness of Canadian films.

IV. Internet use and Canadian cultural choice

Our focus henceforth is not on Canadian identity per se, but rather on the degree to which internet use is either enhancing or diminishing Canadian cultural consumption. Consumption of Canadian culture is not always a function of strong Canadian identity. Listening to music by such popular contemporary Canadian artists as Avril Lavigne, Nelly Furtado or Nickelback isn’t likely done to affirm Canadian patriotic sentiment. Hence any conclusions about Canadian identity need to be made with caution as there is a built in assumption that those persons that either consume more cultural products or indicate a stronger interest in them also possess stronger Canadian identity.

Of the nearly 500 respondents in the 2005 Decima Canadian Music and Film Survey that admit to downloading music for free from the internet, more than one third were between the ages of 15 and 20. Those above the age of 45 accounted for just over ten percent of downloaders. In examining the musical choices of three age cohorts, in the 15-20 group those who downloaded less than 50 songs (call them the “lighter” group) for free appear less inclined to have selected songs by Canadian artists than those who downloaded more than 50 songs (the “heavier” group). In the lighter group, nearly one third of the songs that they selected were not by Canadian artists and this is the case for just over 5% of the heavier downloaders. Hence the more downloading that occurs the more likely Canadian artists will be included in their choices.

The pattern appears to change with age as the lighter downloader in the 25-34 category are more likely to include Canadian artists amongst their choices than the 15-24 group. Some 13% of the lighter downloaders in the 25-34 categories did not include Canadian artists within their choices versus fewer than 10% amongst the heavier group.

Curiously, the downloading pattern in the 35-44 group as regards to the inclusion of Canadian artists resembles that of the 15-20 age cohort, with lighter users much less inclined to make them part of their selection than the heavier downloaders. Of

those between the ages of 35 and 44 that downloaded less than 50 songs, some one-third report not including Canadian artists amongst their choices. All of the heavier downloaders in that category did include some Canadian artists amongst their choices.

How many of these songs were by Canadian artists?

How many songs did you download for free from the Internet last year?		None	1 to 9	10 to 50	51 or more
1 to 50	15-20	30.5%	48.2%	—	—
	25-34	12.9%	46.2%	40.4%	—
	35-44	33.9%	46.4%	14.2%	—
51 and over	15-20	4.3%	16.3%	52.1%	23.9%
	25-34	9.5%	23.8%	40.4%	11.9%
	35-44	—	24.0%	44.0%	24.0%

Source: Decima Research for the Department of Canadian Heritage, Canadian Music and Film Survey, 2005.

In the 15-20 age group, those who reported not downloading any songs from the internet were slightly more likely to have spent the majority of their time listening to music by Canadian artists (15.1%) than the moderate downloaders (12.1%) and the heaviest downloaders (6.8%).

What percentage of your total music listening is spent listening to music by Canadian artists. Age 15-20.

How many songs did you download from the internet last year	None	1 to 50	51 or more
Less than 10%	29.2%	28.0%	28.4%
10-50%	54.8%	59.7%	64.7%
51-100%	15.8%	12.1%	6.8%
Total number of respondents	82%	82%	88%

Source: Decima Research for the Department of Canadian Heritage, Canadian Music and Film Survey, 2005.

However, in the 25-34 age group, about three-quarters that did not download songs spent at least 10% of their time listening to music by Canadian artists. Amongst the light downloaders, nearly 88% spent at least 10% of their time listening to music by Canadian artists, which is more than the heavy downloaders whose listening habits resemble those of persons that did no downloading. As to the 35-44 group, some 84% of those not downloading spent at least 10% of their time listening to Canadian music, compared to 94% of the lighter users. It is the heaviest downloaders in this age group that report the lowest share of such consumption, with some three-quarters spending more than 10% of their listening time on Canadian artists.

V. Internet demographics and Canadian cultural consumption

At the outset we discussed the importance of various demographic characteristics that influence the consumption of Canadian culture. Earlier, a distinction was made between those with or without internet access to permit some preliminary observations about the degree of Canadian cultural consumption on that basis. But in order to understand the effect of internet access and its use on cultural consumption, other population characteristics need to be taken into account. Language background is a critical feature in the consumption of Canadian cultural products. Francophones have a higher rate of what is defined as Canadian cultural consumption (in large part because of language capacity and preference) and yet the strength of attachment to Canada does not logically follow the notion that such consumption leads to stronger Canadian identification. More than one-third (36.7%) of francophones surveyed agreed that the stories in Canadian movies relate to them, compared with just over one-fifth (22.7) of anglophones (rank 7-10 on the scale). Less than ten percent of anglophones say that they listen to a majority of their music in English compared with nearly one-quarter of francophones.

What percentage of your total music listening is spent listening to music by Canadian artists? – Access Internet at Home

Home Language	English	French
Less than 10% (and DK)	33.6%	21.4%
10-50%	57.6%	54.4%
51-100%	8.8%	24.2%
Total	91.0%	42.4%

Source: Decima Research for the Department of Canadian Heritage, Canadian Music and Film Survey, 2005.

VI. Quantity, quality, Canadian consumption and identity

Yet another issue that requires examination involves the relationship between the quantity of Canadian cultural consumption and internet use. In short, whatever their attachment to Canada, the sheer volume of people’s cultural intake may result in higher overall consumption of Canadian products than for people with a higher identification with Canada. As noted, the volume of Canadian consumption amongst many Quebecers is often higher despite a proportionately lower attachment to Canada.

Nationally some 10.7% of people who disagree when asked whether the stories in

Canadian movies relate to them listen to Canadian music a majority of their time. This compares with 21% of Canadians surveyed who agreed with that statement and consume Canadian music a majority of their listening time. On the other hand, 12.7 percent of those disagreeing that the stories in Canadian movies relate to them downloaded more than 50 songs by Canadian artists compared with 7% of persons agreeing with that statement that say they downloaded a similar quantity of Canadian songs. It is clear that the more one regards the quality of music by Canadian artists as superior the more likely that the respondent will consume music by Canadian artists as reflected below in the data on downloading music by Canadian artists.

How would you rate the quality of music by Canadian artists as compared to foreign artists?

Over the past year, how many songs did you download by Canadian artists?	None	1 to 9	10 to 50	51 to 100	More than 100
1 - Not as good	35,3%	52,9%	11,8%	—	—
2	100,0%	—	—	—	—
3	38,5%	46,2%	15,4%	—	—
4	8,3%	50,0%	33,3%	—	8,3%
5 - Equal	22,6%	31,3%	31,7%	5,3%	3,8%
6	13,9%	41,7%	33,3%	—	—
7	10,5%	34,2%	38,2%	10,5%	3,9%
8	15,6%	37,8%	31,1%	8,9%	4,4%
9	5,9%	29,4%	29,4%	23,5%	—
10 - Much better	10,1%	31,9%	33,3%	10,1%	10,1%
Total	18,4%	34,2%	31,6%	6,8%	4,2%

Source: Decima Research for the Department of Canadian Heritage, Canadian Music and Film Survey, 2005.

On issues of the consumption of Canadian cultural products across the spectrum, the data reveals for example that of those reporting that they had seen a Canadian feature film in the past year, some 23% said that the majority of the music they listened to was by Canadian artists, compared with 14% of those who said that they hadn’t seen a Canadian feature film in the past year.

When it comes to patterns of consumption that may reflect attachment to Canada, again francophones are more likely to exhibit a greater degree of convergence in the “Canadianess” of the choices they make. For example, some 31.7% of the francophones who strongly agree that the stories in Canadian movies relate to them say that the majority of the music they listen to is by Canadian artists. This is compared with 15.1% of the country’s anglophones surveyed that make the same claim. Assessing the relationship between their estimated Canadian listening and the volume

of songs they downloaded in a year by Canadian artists amongst anglophones, one finds that high consumers of Canadian music that engaged in downloading were most likely to include 51 or more tunes by Canadian artists in their consumption.

VII. Purchasing and downloading Canadian music

In this part of the study, we explore the relationship between consuming music through either purchase or downloading and the extent to which the choices made includes Canadian content. Less than 10% of survey respondents reported purchasing songs on the internet in the 12 months prior to the inquiry. Of those who did purchase songs on the internet, some 70% included some Canadian music in their choices.

With respect to free downloading of music, one-third of respondents consumed music that way. Canadian music was included in 80% of the downloading that was conducted. Only a small share of the heaviest downloaders included a large amount of Canadian music within their overall selection. As to the purchase of music CDs, some 88% of respondents did purchase a music CD in the previous twelve months. And within their purchases, some 86% did include Canadian artists. Again the largest volume purchasers did not engage in massive Canadian purchases.

Music purchase from the internet is clearly the least frequent form of music consumption and consuming in volume via this medium is less common than is the case for the free downloading and the purchase of CDs. CD purchase remains dominant and there is a slightly greater likelihood of including Canadian artists through this medium. Given the scale (songs versus CDs) the volume of Canadian material appears more likely to occur amongst downloaders.

Total	How many songs did you purchase from the Internet last year by Canadian artists?	How many songs did you download for free from the Internet last year by Canadian artists?	How many CDs did you purchase in the last year by Canadian artists?
None	29.2	18.4	14.1
1 to 9	42.0	34.2	74.1
10 to 50	23.7	31.6	9.4 nb
51 to 100	3.6	6.8	–
More than 100	–	4.2	–
Don't know/refuse to answer	1.2	4.8	40
Total	164	500	1729

Nb Represents more than 30 in the case of CDs purchased.

Source: Decima Research for the Department of Canadian Heritage, Canadian Music and Film Survey, 2005.

On the basis of age when it comes to the purchase of music on the internet, the youngest cohort was more likely to do so than those over the age of 21. Indeed the gap was quite important in this regard, with nearly one-quarter in the 15-20 age group purchasing music over the net while the percentage dropped to just over one in ten for the 21-24 and 25-34 group respectively. As to the percentage of Canadian artists consumed on this basis, it was similar across the age spectrum with about three-quarters doing so in the 15-20 and 25-34 age groups respectively.

When it comes to downloading for free, some two-thirds of the group under 25 did report doing so, compared with approximately one-third of persons surveyed between 25 and 34 years of age. There were some gaps in the Canadian consumption across the age cohorts examined here with 83% of the 15-20 group including Canadian artists when downloading, 78% of the 21-24 group and 88% of the 25-34 group.

When it comes to the purchase of CDs by Canadian artists, again there is a pattern similar to the downloaders with the youngest cohort at 81% including Canadian choices, the 21-24 groups at 75% and the 25-34 at 90%. In each instance, over 90% of respondents did report purchasing CDs in the previous 12 months.

	What percentage did purchase from the Internet last year?	What percentage included some Canadian artists in purchases?	What percentage did download for free from the Internet last year?
15-20	24.0%	74.6%	68.4%
21-24	11.3%	92.9%	64.7%
25-34	15.2%	72.1%	34.1%
	What percentage included some Canadian artists in purchases?	What percentage did purchase music CDs in the past year, either for your own use or for someone else?	What percentage included some Canadian artists in purchases?
15-20	83.1%	33.6%	81.2%
21-24	78.5%	14.3%	75.6%
25-34	88.6%	36.0%	87.9%

Source: Decima Research for the Department of Canadian Heritage, Canadian Music and Film Survey, 2005.

VIII. Conclusion

There remains much research to be done in order to properly understand the relationship between advances in technology, the strength of Canadian identity and the consumption of Canadian culture. Indeed to begin with, there is a need to better understand the way in which access to ever changing technologies and increasing global connectedness influence Canadian identities and the expression and transmission of

Canadian culture. While some may choose to focus on the possible threat that internet access represents to Canadian identity and culture by stressing the idea that the more global choices available to people the more likely the Canadian cultural product risks being diluted in a medium where the opportunity for controls is very limited. To-date however there is little evidence to support the idea that the internet has had that affect on the Canadian population. On the other hand the internet can also be used to reach the population with more Canadian then ever in the very competitive environment that the internet represents. It also potentially permits unprecedented opportunities for the export of Canadian culture abroad. Underlying much of this debate is the way in which we define Canadian culture and whether increased global connectedness and transnational ties will influence the definition of cultural expression. We also need to look at by whom Canadian culture is being defined and the role of the state in this regard. These are just a few of the issues that require consideration if we are to better understand the impact of changing technologies on Canadian culture and craft effective public policies to address fast evolving challenges.

Notes

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DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION

Interview with Kaan Yigit

How do you define Canadian culture? How would you assess the state of Canadian culture? In what ways has the growing diversity in the composition of Canada changed the definition of Canadian culture?

We need to define culture broadly. It is the sum of all the elements that make up our Canadian lifestyle – our work ethic, our play ethic, art, music, literature, but also our attitude towards our fellow Canadians – be they our children, our elders, our neighbours across the country, and our attitude towards the environment we inhabit and other cultures around the world.

At the same time, we need to avoid elitist clichés that define culture, such as defining culture as opera or theatre and hip hop or video games as marginal youth noise.

Canadian culture is in transition in a more substantive way than it has ever been for a long time – and of course one major reason for this is the sustained immigration levels of nearly 1 million new Canadians every four years since the early 90s. Canada is a nation of immigrants but we have not experienced such significant numbers before. The second driver of this transition is new technology that allows young Canadians to become their own programmers of cultural content.

The growing diversity of Canada is changing the definition of Canadian culture from an anglo/franco colonial lens to a culture of *fusion* – taking the best elements from a range of different cultures and making something new. To me, this is the essence of the Canadian story going forward. On the world stage, we are known for working cooperatively – and with our experience of dealing with different cultures comes an ability to manage change in a relatively embracing manner.

Has Canadian culture successfully responded to the challenge of the diversification of Canada's population?

Culture is responding at its own pace as it blends and morphs – the pace of change is faster at the street level and slower in Canada's cultural institutions. Much of what passes as cultural discourse is unfortunately the old Canada talking to itself.

What are the particular areas in which cultural expression is strongest in the country and where do you think that it is weakest? In the areas of weakness, what do you think needs to be done to improve things?

Cultural expression is strongest in the areas relating to pride and support of heritage identity. We have become sophisticated in our understanding that the validation of a person's identity is important to their well being. This is reflected in our policy of multiculturalism.

While there is definitely a Canadian music, film and design sensibility – and while Canadian artists and creators on the world stage have been able to harness the fusion elements of Canadian culture – we are weak in incorporating the importance of the aesthetic in our education system. There is limited inclusion – let alone emphasis – on all of the subjects that support it past grade school. Since creativity, design and *aesthetics* are what distinguishes exemplary products in this day and age (think iPod), we are not supporting our ability to compete globally if we do not properly support this aspect of education.

KAAN YIGIT is President of Solutions Research Group.

To also touch on an area of imminent impact, we have also been tremendously weak in developing our Internet *content* infrastructure, and by default our citizens are consuming content from elsewhere because little is available at home.

Who should take the lead role in promoting the growth and development of Canadian culture?

Given the economics of Canada (small market next to the world's leading producer of cultural products), the government should continue to take an active role in piloting new ways for school boards, private sector interests and public organizations to participate in cultural projects. In regions and situations where public participation is limited (where poverty consumes energy and effort, for example), the government should step in and lead. However, currently government is not accessible in a meaningful way at the grassroots level. For example, the time and energy required to fill out all of the paperwork for government grant/support programs is often staggering.

How can the Government of Canada best support the efforts of organizations that contribute to culture?

The government can best support contributions to culture as an *enabler*. Seed money and financing should be made available with the input of a panel of representatives from across the country but with a process designed to be more accessible and less bureaucratic than what is available currently. The Internet provides a way to distribute the materials required in a timely manner and can also help with the administration of the evaluation and grant process in a cost-effective and time-efficient manner.

Priority support should be available to new forms of creative expression unleashed by the emerging *broadband culture*, which is increasing in importance exponentially in Canadians' lives.

DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION

Interview with Minelle Mahtani

How do you define Canadian Culture? How would you assess the state of Canadian culture? In what ways has the growing diversity in the composition of Canada changed the definition of Canadian culture?

Canadian culture remains difficult to define primarily because it is continually morphing and changing shape. It is an amorphous concept, rife with ambiguity, ambivalence, irony and contradictions. Some have jokingly referred to Canadian culture as an oxymoron, but I don't see it that way. In fact, I believe that it is the very nebulous nature of Canadian culture in which its strengths lie. Canadian culture includes, but is not limited to, the wide array of representations produced to comment on our multi-faceted relationship to the nation-state, from the local to the municipal to the provincial levels, through images, texts and productions that explore the nexus between home, nation and identity. It is high-brow, and low-brow culture; ranging from the chalk drawings of children on the sidewalk to graffiti on abandoned buildings to the glitzy, multi-media shows at the Canadian Opera Company. Canadian diversity in all its forms – particularly demographically – has strongly influenced the blossoming of new forms of Canadian culture. For example, the growing population of “mixed race” people in this country has allowed for a metissage – or mixing – of cultural representations to emerge in the social landscape, where we are witnessing more postmodern, playful and parodic representations of what it means to be a “mixed race” Canadian – exemplified through films like “Domino” that both celebrate and critically examine the “mixed race” experience.

Has Canadian culture successfully responded to the challenge of the diversification of Canada's population?

Yes – and no. I think individual artists scattered across the country do a remarkable job on commenting in insightful and innovative ways about the complicated relationship between culture and nation, and here I am not just thinking of quintessentially Canadian artists like director Atom Egoyan or musicians like the Tragically Hip, but I am also referring to less mainstream artists – individuals like Piers Johnson (see www.piersjohnson.ca) who offer complex commentaries on Canadian identity by juxtaposing paintings of Canadian icons against sections of maps, providing a “nest” for various forms of mixed media, images and text and successfully challenging how we think about borders, boundaries and cartographies more broadly. It is our mainstream media organizations and institutions who support them – Telefilm, the National Film Board, the CRTC etc – who can more successfully respond to the needs of our rapidly changing population by focusing on the fact that our audience is no longer monolithic and that there is an appetite for new forms of representation on our cultural landscape. This is where we have much work to do.

MINELLE MAHTANI is Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Toronto.

What are the particular areas in which cultural expression is strongest in the country and where do you think that it is weakest? In the areas of weakness, what do you think needs to be done to improve things? Who should take the lead role in promoting the growth and development of Canadian culture?

I don't envision this as one particular group's responsibility – rather, it becomes a challenge for all of us in the policy sector, those of us in the ivory tower and those who work to produce media images to work together to consider and develop viable economic strategies to promote new representations of what it means to be Canadian in this country. This way, more and more Canadians will see their own experiences reflected. Unfortunately, minorities are rarely invited into to contribute to the mainstream discourse of Canadian mainstream culture. When they are, they are seen as wholly representative of their entire group and often used as window-dressing as a exemplary token. We need to diversify our images and representations.

How can the Government of Canada best support the efforts of organizations that contribute to culture?

I would recommend a focus on diversifying the production of capital-c “Canadian Culture” in all its myriad forms by funding a larger range of artists. We need to give these artists greater access to both resources and social networks. We need to consider the role of mentoring. Would a formal mentoring programme for new artists be useful, where they could learn about both the creative and the business side of cultural production from those who have been successful in the past? It is important not to underestimate the role of social networks in the arena of cultural production. Moreover, as a journalism professor, I am most concerned the ways the ideology of “Canadian Culture” is represented through current-affairs documentaries produced in mainstream newsrooms across Canada. We can't think of Canadian Culture as a static concept. All mainstream media organizations in Canada are interested in stories that examine the relationship between nation, culture and society through their programming. Unfortunately, marginalized groups in Canada, including people with disabilities, immigrants and

youth, among other groups, regularly witness their misrepresentation and underrepresentation in mainstream Canadian media. Yet, they have much to contribute to capital-C “Canadian Culture.” It has been said that the internet provides a democratic site through which these groups can see themselves reflected. While this has indeed been a remarkably successful place for more equitable images, helping up develop a more diverse set of representations that comprise Canadian Culture, I worry that by focusing on the euphoria of the internet as a site of resistance, we take the responsibility away from mainstream media organizations to provide a mirror through which these groups can see themselves reflected. I suggest that we take a hard, long look at who is being hired in newsrooms and make serious efforts to diversify our staff, who in turn provide alternative outlooks on what it means to be Canadian.

CULTURE AND ECONOMICS

Interview with Michael Rushton

How can we help Canadians better understand the economic benefits of culture?

I would like to begin by looking at how the economic benefits of culture have been *misunderstood*.¹ Arts advocates in Canada have followed the lead of Americans in promoting so-called “economic impact” studies of the arts. These studies purport to show the effects of the production and consumption of cultural goods and events on regional total employment, incomes, and generation of tax revenues. Here are some claims that have been made based on economic impact studies:

- “In the Central Okanagan, arts and culture accounts for a total of 2,368 full and part-time jobs (or 1,896 full-time equivalent jobs). Of this total, 1,592 jobs (or 1,198 full-time equivalent jobs) are created directly through expenditures made by the cultural sectors. The remaining 776 jobs result from the “ripple effect”: the induced impact of arts and culture on employment in other sectors through the spending and re-spending of incomes earned by cultural workers, and by workers in other supporting sectors. All told, 3.8 percent of regional employment is due to the cultural economy.”²
- “Activities in the cultural sector in the Greater Montreal region have an impressive economic impact. They generate \$5.6 billion in gross total spending, 89,916 direct and indirect jobs, calculated in person-years, and \$1.181 billion in government revenue, or \$670 M for Quebec and \$511 M for the federal government. This includes a direct impact of \$3.5 billion, resulting from spending by cultural enterprises themselves, and an indirect impact of \$1.2 billion, resulting from spending by the suppliers of cultural enterprises and the suppliers of these suppliers.”³
- “Patrons spent an estimated \$57.7 million in Edmonton during their trips to participate in Edmonton’s “Arts and Culture” activities. The “Arts and Culture” organizations themselves spend approximately \$40.3 million annually on local goods and services. These expenditures and the expenditures of visiting patrons result in a total net impact of \$82.5 million on the Greater Edmonton Region. When spin-offs to other parts of Alberta are included the total impact that Edmonton’s “Arts and Culture” has on the province of Alberta grows to approximately \$116.6 million.”⁴

How could we know the economic impact of the arts in Greater Montreal is \$5.6 billion? The total is typically calculated as follows: Direct Spending + Induced Spending + Indirect Spending = Economic Impact

Direct spending is actual spending by arts organizations on wages, equipment, utilities, rentals, and other expenses. Note this is typically greater than ticket revenue for arts nonprofits, since they also receive income from donors and arts councils. Direct spending is usually measured by surveying arts organizations. Induced spending is spending by arts patrons that only occur as a result of arts consumption, for example spending in restaurants, hotels, or for babysitters, and this is found by surveying audience members. Indirect Spending represents the estimated further increases in aggregate demand that arise from direct and induced spending. It is

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calculated through the use of the standard textbook Keynesian multiplier (sometimes the calculation of indirect spending is refined by breaking it down according to sector to obtain a more precise estimate, but the Keynesian principle is the same).

All this sounds very scientific and objective. However, the truth is that economic impact studies tell us nothing about the importance of the sector to the economy, the rationale for government support for the arts, or the return to increased government support.

In fact, the numbers generated in economic impact studies do not help us understand *anything* interesting about the arts economy.

First of all, *every* sector has conceivable induced and indirect effects; *every* sector of the economy involves some direct spending by firms and spending by consumers on products that are complements, which could then be combined and inflated by a “multiplier”. There is nothing special about the arts in that respect. Although the studies are used as an advocacy tool, they provide no indication of why public support of the arts is beneficial, either to cultural life or even in purely economic terms.

Second, the figures themselves are wrong, calculated on the assumption that without the direct spending on the arts, *no* other spending would take its place, and all incomes produced through induced and indirect spending would be lost to unemployment. This is simply incorrect, and results from a misreading of the sort of simple macroeconomic models we find in introductory textbooks.

I believe that the very question asked in this instance is at the root of the problem: why would one want to persuade Canadians of the *economic* benefits of culture? Economic impact studies represent a poorly formulated answer to what is in fact the wrong question. The benefits of culture lie elsewhere, in the responses we have as individuals to literary, musical, visual and cinematic works, and the conversations and insights that arise from those responses. The benefits of the arts are not in job creation or tax revenues, but are in our engagement with the art itself.

What will help Canada compete more effectively on the world stage in the area of culture?

As with the first question, we have to take care that we are directing our attention to the right

things. The most important cultural question is the ability of Canadians to have access to, and to be able to enjoy, artistic creation that is interesting, stimulating, innovative, and diverse. This question focuses on the *production* of the arts, and the ability to market culture internationally, but let us not lose sight of the greater importance of *consumption* of the arts by Canadians.

That being said, the answer to the question is straightforward: produce cultural goods that the world wants to read, see, and hear. Writers, painters, songwriters and singers will gain a place on the world stage according to the quality of their work; that has always been the case.

Of course we must qualify the answer by noting that it is not always the case that works travel well – not all cultural goods are meant for a large international audience. Only certain types of films travel well to other parts of the world (which is why Hollywood devotes so much of its efforts to easily exported action films, laden with special effects, or comedies that rely on broad physical humour rather than subtle wordplay). And if some Canadian cultural production is mostly appreciated by people at home, due to local references that are hard for others to understand, that is not something to be seen as a concern.

What potential challenges or barriers do you see to the implementation of a cultural policy?

The main problem I have seen in the implementation of cultural policy in Canada, whether in the realm of copyright and associated rights, international trade, restrictions on ownership, television and film, and so on, is that because established producer interests are so entrenched, and have so much influence in Ottawa, policy is consistently skewed to reflect the interests of existing producers of cultural goods rather than consumers.

This situation is not unique to the arts. It is typically the case that sectors of the economy are characterized by a small number of big firms. These firms are able to coordinate their lobbying efforts, while consumers number in the millions, each with a small individual stake in policy, and so are unable to effectively organize.⁵

In the face of new technologies, or new competition, existing firms with a large stake in their position will do everything they can to obtain public policies that protect their current status. This is not news to cultural policy makers. But it

would be a good thing for all Canadians if the interests of those who listen to music but do not record it, who read books but do not publish or sell books, who watch television and movies but do not work in film production, were recognized as – to use the language of bureaucracy – the “key stakeholders” in cultural policy.

What are the most effective ways of protecting Canadian culture? How much protection is too much?

We should answer this question in light of our answer to the previous question: what is it that we are trying to “protect”, and in whose interest? In the agricultural sector, in manufacturing and services, and in the cultural sector, it is *invariably* the case that (1) trade protection is implemented to satisfy the interests of producers rather than consumers, and (2) the rationale for the protectionist policy is expressed by policy-makers as being in the “national” interest.

Is the goal to protect “Canadian culture”, or is it to insulate Canadian cultural industry firms from competition that would in fact be beneficial to Canadian listeners, readers, or film-goers?

Note that protecting Canadian firms in the creative industries is no guarantee that there will be a particular “Canadian-ness” about the cultural content. In addition, why don’t we recognize that culture is global, and that most interesting cultural goods involving Canadians are in fact international in nature?

I will give two examples. First, recently we were presented with a list of the top 100 Canadian albums of all time.⁶ The top four albums – Neil Young’s *Harvest* and *After the Gold Rush*, Joni Mitchell’s *Blue*, and The Band’s *Music from Big Pink* – although made by Canadians, all have significant American influences. Young and Mitchell had moved to California by the time these albums were made, and that is reflected in the music. The Band worked most closely with Bob Dylan, “Big Pink” itself is a house in New York State, and singer Levon Helm’s voice is quite definitely more Arkansan than Canadian. Yes, the albums are Canadian, but that is a narrow way to think about them.

Second, consider some of the most important Canadian films. Director Atom Egoyan set *The Sweet Hereafter* (1997) in British Columbia, but the novel on which it is based, by American Russell Banks, is set in upstate New York. *The English Patient* (1996), based on the novel by Canadian

Michael Ondaatje, was filmed on location overseas (for obvious reasons), directed by the Englishman Anthony Minghella, and starred the French Juliette Binoche in the role of the Canadian nurse. And perhaps the finest movie about Canada’s early history, *Black Robe* (1991), based on the novel by Brian Moore of Northern Ireland, was directed by Australian Bruce Beresford. Which film is most “Canadian”? Importantly, as we set cultural policy, does it even matter?

Canadians ought to give careful thought to the long-standing assumption that Canadian culture is something requiring protection. Canadians, alone and in collaboration with others from around the world, produce great things. Who needs protection?

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- ⁴ Edmonton Arts Council, *Economic impact of the arts and festivals on the Edmonton region*. Retrieved November 3, 2007, from <http://www.lin.ca/lin/resource/html/David0002.pdf>.
- ⁵ The classic treatment of this problem is by Olson, M. Jr. (1965). *The logic of collective action*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
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THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

ABSTRACT

This paper considers transmission as a model for cultural relations, rejecting it as a 20th century paradigm predating the ICT revolution. It proposes an alternative way of looking at Cultural Relations, focusing on the nature and quality of the relationships built rather than the 'sector' or commodity that is the vehicle. Public Diplomacy, as a concept, can at times bring the business of Cultural Relations closer to government than is comfortable: but it also itself requires the future-orientated relationship-building that is not always easy for officials, particularly in controversial sectors. New Technology is a vital part, but a part only, of the business: once internalized (by a younger generation) it is itself relationship-orientated, as witness the current rise of social networking technologies. For CR practitioners, there will always be a need for human contact at the core: the e-world is an echo box – vital, but in isolation, dead. Migration and globalization have subverted the vertical silos that defined the modern world: transnational, horizontal networks are typical of the early 21st century, and they are wired as well as human. These – diasporic and young – networks are the stuff of future Cultural Relations; and success will be judged on how they and we conduct ourselves (the ethics of communication) even more than on what we communicate (the substance).

Transmission – that's not what we do

I have many problems with the phrase 'the transmission of culture'. I don't believe culture can really be transmitted. I'm not sure that a projectile approach to Cultural Relations is very useful, even if culture can be transmitted. I doubt that there are many Cultural Relations agencies these days which see their mission as the transmission of their national culture. Transmission, in terms of my business, is a concept that pre-dates the age of modern ICT: the image is one of broadcasting, suggesting competing offerings to a passive and undifferentiated audience. The implied invitation is 'turn the dial: switch from that other old culture you're paying attention to, to *our* culture.' Culture is envisaged as a coherent series of (largely high) cultural phenomena that can be packaged, and can represent a nation.

Culture

But culture isn't like that. It isn't limited to the self-conscious artefacts of high culture, and it is less and less confined by national boundaries. It is an anthropological-historical phenomenon, a series of relationships, ways of seeing and ways of doing. I recently came across a definition of culture I rather liked as 'the adaptations of human neurophysiology to a changing post-Lithic environment'. In this sense, our culture is not simply what we consciously produce, but the largely unconscious ways in which we produce.

What we do

This is not to say, of course, that the British Council doesn't *do* culture in the high cultural, traditional sense. We do, though much less than we used to:

some of you will recently have seen Margaret Atwood's *Penelopiad* at the NAC, with which we were heavily involved. But we certainly don't see the movement of British cultural artefacts as our ultimate rationale. Our job is the building of relationships.

Changing nature of PD/CR – audiences

In the last few years, the phrase 'Public Diplomacy' has insinuated its way into the business of Cultural Relations. It has dangers and virtues. Its dangers lie in the close association with government implied in the idea: Public Diplomacy is often defined as the way governments speak directly to mass audiences in other countries. Its virtues lie in making us think clearly about *why* we do our work, what are our ultimate long-term objectives. It is no longer sufficient, if it ever was, to export a nation's cultural productions in the hope that this will raise profile and create sympathy. We are investing, pragmatically, in the future.

I recently heard a senior State Department official say this: 'There are three phases of Public Diplomacy. The first is dealing with today's press. I call this *reactive* Public Diplomacy, and it's about 80% of what we do. The second is anticipating tomorrow's press, and the next day's, and that's about 20% of what we do: I call this *proactive* Public Diplomacy. The third phase, *preactive* Public Diplomacy, is about building the relationships that will cushion us from the impacts of the day after the day after tomorrow. We don't do any of that.' Well, speaking for the British Council, *we* do – and I have little doubt that this is the core business of Cultural Relations.

Millions more

The ICT revolution of the last couple of decades is apt to leave us a little breathless at the possibilities of scale that it offers. Suddenly all sorts of new vehicles are available to us – an accelerating array, at first from e-mails and databases to the internet and then (today) podcasts, blogs, vlogs, social networking tools, web 2.0 and all sorts of other things which I am too old to understand properly. That's not *just* a self-deprecating joke: there is much in this e-universe that my generation can learn to *use*, but will never *internalize* as our children do, effortlessly. And this is my point: 'transmission' as a concept is my generation's dinosauric reaction to the possibilities of today's ICT. But our

children don't transmit – they relate. And while I may think the relationships they make purely in their virtual worlds to be poor, thin things, they are real enough in their way. They constitute a culture – and a culture which is alive because it is relationship-based.

E a substitute for real?

Some of our kids think e-relationships are enough by themselves. This is a snare, too, for Cultural Relations practitioners. They may be relationships, but they are meagre ones, with a tendency to entropize into transmit-mode. Onora O'Neill, the British philosopher, once put it like this: 'It is a typical modern fallacy to think that putting information in the public sphere constitutes communication. It doesn't.' And for Cultural Relations practitioners, the e-world is never more than an echo-box, an extension of our activities. At the core is what Ed Murrow called 'the last three feet', the moment of human contact.

Horizontality

One of the defining characteristics of our age is what I think of as 'horizontality' – the subversion of the silos of nationality, hierarchy, race and habit which have 'fixed' humanity in discrete intra-communicating groups for millennia. Today these walls, once largely impermeable, are diaphanous, and the combination of globalization and its ICT outriders are largely responsible. The nation state may have more life left in it than some commentators suggest, but it is very far from being the defining cultural unit of our time. The pretence that it is defining in this way belongs in the age of bakelite telephones and newspapers printed on India paper, arriving in distant countries a week after publication. Quite other communicative patterns are establishing themselves. Horizontality describes the relationship patterns of diasporas, plane-spotters, 419 fraudsters, pornographers, MMORG on-line game players, academics, Chinese gay men, Sa'udi women poets, supporters of democracy in Burma or Iran, terrorists and police forces. It is neutral, and astonishingly potent. And it has huge implications for Cultural Relations.

Thinking about diasporas

At a human level, the movement of people has become an enormous, global phenomenon. It has several new characteristics, the most salient of

which seems to me to be its stickiness: where once people moved and assimilated naturally over two or three generations into their new physical and human environment, this is no longer automatically the case. Arguments (all too common in Britain and in Canada) about whether ‘non-assimilation’ should be ‘allowed’ or ‘encouraged’ are beside the point: it is the nature of migration today that the degree to which one enters into a new environment and a new identity is a matter of conscious choice.

To take an example close to my home, a Bangladeshi or a Pole in London will watch Bengali or Polish satellite TV; communicate by e-mail; use virtually free fixed telephony, or Skype, to speak to family and friends in Sylhet or Krakow; remit money by orthodox or heterodox electronic routes; keep in physical contact with cheap air travel; visit Bengali or Polish websites and chatrooms, download the national press – and so on. It would be foolish for us as Cultural Relations practitioners to think in old silos when the world doesn’t. A British diplomat commented recently that an interview he gave at Lahore airport as he left to return home after a visit was all over the London Urdu press before he reached Heathrow: home and abroad are no longer hard distinctions, either.

Thinking about the young

As for the young, we are seeing an evolutionary leap – the emergence of a cyborg generation which thinks *with*, not *about*, IT. Even the phrase ‘IT’ is a bit of a puzzle to my children, who see it not as an external phenomenon, but more like the air we breathe. It is often funny to see non-IT professionals over the age of about 20 struggling with youth communication. We just (as they’d say) don’t get it. However deft and clever my generation becomes with applications and tools, they remain external and self-conscious: we are like that long genealogy of mediaeval and early modern readers who moved their lips and murmured quietly to themselves as they read. This says to me that we are likely to get it wrong unless we let go and rely on our audience to make the running – a surprisingly difficult thing to do, if we can judge by the sheer woodenness, the static nature, the obsession with design and discipline, of the internet offerings of most Cultural Relations institutions. The young are our prime audiences, and on the whole they talk to each other, not to us.

New shapes of competition

So where does this take us? At a banal level, it means that we do things like opening a British Council office in Second Life (which we have recently done, and quite successfully), and these are in their way very useful developments. But the bigger challenges are not in following visible trends like this, usually a little after the leaders; but in letting go. In moving from a Command Culture to a Permissive Culture – because this is where culture is going, and if we don’t follow, we are irrelevant.

By this I mean that we need to shift our sights away from controlling the outcomes of conversation, towards facilitation, participation and being prepared to be surprised by the destination. Away from the nationalization of culture towards an understanding of the transnational networks in which culture actually lives and thrives. Away from understanding our culture as a commodifiable export, towards understanding that our culture lies in *the way we conduct* these, and any, conversations. The tools – social networking is today’s vogue, of course – are important; but the ethic is what matters.

This then is my final and most important point. Technological change is making us face up to the fact that we have understood culture in a very narrow sense. I see cultural relations organizations in general (and the British Council in particular) as pushed, inexorably, by a changing world into new and constructive roles which we are only beginning to understand. These roles are about empowering and stimulating those who wish to converse, often in places where access to the tools is difficult; listening to what they say; and understanding with a certain humility that our culture is about how we listen, not just about how we talk.

It’s just another (to return to Daniel Smail’s definition of culture which I quoted above) in a long series of ‘adaptations of human neurophysiology to a changing post-Lithic environment’.

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES

ABSTRACT

This paper sets out to bridge my experience in Canada working in the intersecting space between culture and technology and my more recent experience in Europe as the Canadian director of a European initiative called LabforCulture. The experiences in Europe with respect to the impact of digital technologies on culture and the development of cultural policy are not so different from those in Canada. The issues of culture and technology are decidedly similar and the challenges are shared. What follows is a reflection, briefly and randomly, on overall policy trends across Europe and their similarities to the Canadian situation.

European perspectives on culture and digital technologies

At the outset, it should be noted that I do not represent a particular government perspective – nor even a particular national perspective. LabforCulture is based in the Netherlands, hosted by a private foundation with over 50 years of history – the European Cultural Foundation www.eurocult.org. The interests of LabforCulture and those of the European Cultural Foundation transcend country borders.

The European Cultural Foundation (ECF) is one of the leading independent organisations in Europe devoted to cultural development, and is a passionate advocate of cultural cooperation.

The ECF:

- campaigns for, initiates, develops and supports cultural cooperation activities across the broader Europe;
- develops new cultural experience and media activities by offering grants and by initiating and coordinating programmes for organisations and individuals;
- is actively involved in cultural policy development, particularly for the integration of European society;
- strives to give culture a stronger voice and profile at all levels; and
- works in partnership with other leading European cultural organisations.

The European Cultural Foundation's approach is to focus its work through themes which have a contemporary relevance for culture and civil society. Over a period of three years, from 2006 to 2008, their work focuses on "*the experience of diversity and the power of culture*".

LabforCulture is an autonomous project within the European Cultural Foundation that seeks to bring policy, research and practice together – to work with the cultural sector in facilitating cultural cross-border activity and to be a conduit connecting the policy makers with work in the field.

One of our current research interests focuses in the uptake of online tools within the cultural sector. Is the sector online and where? If not, why not? Within the sector, there certainly have been and continue to be leaders and innovators – one only need to look to new media artists who not only use, but develop tools and technologies. However, many believe that the cultural sector lags behind, and this becomes most evident in relation to the development of tools such as LabforCulture.

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How are they used and what is their future? We are currently working with the Institute of Network Cultures in Amsterdam (<http://www.networkcultures.org>), to map out the research in this area and then to consider what gaps can be filled in research and in service provision in order to facilitate the use of digital tools more broadly across the sector.

LabforCulture and the European Cultural Foundation work across Europe, encompassing an area wider than the 27 countries of the European Union. It is a picture of diversity that encompasses countries like Albania to the UK and which presents not only an alphabetical spread, but also a cultural and linguistic diversity and economic, social and developmental extremes. Policies are developed and debated on a local, regional, national and international levels (such as through the European Commission or the OECD). However, even a quick overview of the policy development in individual countries as well as in the European Commission shows clearly that there are similar challenges and opportunities.

If we reflect back to the early 90s, initiatives and incentives of the first “culture and technology” projects focused primarily on:

- digitalisation of national heritage;
- access to technology by citizens; and
- competitiveness of national economies with respect to ICTs.

These areas are general and intersect as well as are interdependent. However, they also often have conflicting or diverging objectives.

No nation wanted to lag behind – and this is still the case. Policies and programmes have been developed to specifically meet these three areas. However, the policies have tended to focus on development and growth of ICTs – not on the impact and effect of ICTs.

The 1998 European Commission Green Paper¹ addressed the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sector and the implications for regulations towards an information society approach. This was followed by the Lisbon Strategy in 2000² and eEurope 2002 – An Information Society for All³ – which integrated the three pillars of the Lisbon Strategy: growth and competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability. eEurope 2002 aimed to “*secure equal access by all of Europe’s citizens, to promote computer literacy and, crucially, to create a partnership environment between the users and*

providers of systems, based on trust and enterprise.” Following shortly thereafter was eEurope 2005 and now i2010 – “a European Society for growth and employment”⁴.

This most recent plan sets out to address what it identifies as the four main challenges posed by digital convergence:

- speed: faster broadband in Europe services to deliver rich content such as high definition video;
- rich content: increased legal and economic certainty to encourage new services and on-line content;
- interoperability: enhancing devices and platforms that “talk to one another” and services that are portable from platform to platform; and
- security: making the Internet safer from fraudsters, harmful content and technology failures to increase trust among investors and consumers.⁵

Programmes such as eLearning and eContent have responded to these directions. Their objective being to achieve an information society that is inclusive, they provide high quality public services and promote quality of life, cultural diversity and digital libraries. With reference to digital libraries, the commission states that “*It will build on Europe’s rich heritage combining multicultural and multilingual environments with technological advances and new business models*”.

On a European-wide level, two initiatives of the Council of Europe⁶ should be mentioned that are excellent sources of statistics, research and policy information:

1. The European Audiovisual Observatory

The European Audiovisual Observatory was established in December 1992 and is the only centre of its kind gathering and disseminating information on the audiovisual industry in Europe. The Observatory is a European public service body with 36 member States and the European Community, and is represented by the European Commission. It owes its origins to Audiovisual Eureka⁷ and operates within the legal framework of the Council of Europe.

The Observatory publishes directories and an annual yearbook which provides a synthesis of the basic data in the sector including trends such as the situation in European television, issues of convergence and new technologies etc. Data collection

focuses on “*independence and reliability and is carried out in conjunction with a number of specialist partners.*”

2. The Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe

The Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe describes itself as “*An expanding Europe-wide information and monitoring system on cultural policy measures, instruments, debates and cultural trends. It is a joint venture between the Council of Europe and the ERICarts Institute realised with a community of practice of independent cultural policy researchers, NGOs and national governments.*”⁸

These are two instruments and indispensable tools that do not make policy, but that track policy across an area wider than the European Union and provide information to inform policy development. The Compendium website provides country by country overviews in a broad range of themes, including that of “new technologies and cultural policies”.

When moving from European-wide policies and programmes, to a consideration of national approaches, it is perhaps wise to note again from the European Commission’s communication that “*ICTs are becoming more widely used and are benefiting more people. But today over half of the EU population either does not reap these benefits in full or is effectively cut off from them.*”⁹ As earlier mentioned, the variances from country to country, region to region are influenced by a wide range of factors.

Nevertheless, some common and shared concerns by national policy makers in the area of culture and digital technologies are evident with respect to:

- Languages (a commitment to an internet that is not only English)
- Heritage
- Identity
- Access
- Education
- Competitiveness, in ICT and other industries and also in areas such as tourism
- e-Services
- Support for creation
- Legislation to combat misuse
- Copyright

These areas receive greater or lesser emphasis from country to country and some countries are of course much further ahead in developing policy. As previously noted, others are simply trying to connect their citizens – access and education being their primary interests. For many, the policies reflect the EU Lisbon Strategy and others have been assisted and influenced by outside resources, projects and programmes, from the UN, EU and non-governmental bodies.

For instance, here a few diverse examples drawn from the country profiles provided by the Compendium:

- Austria agreed to an initiative “e-Austria in e-Europe”, the main focus being digitalisation of cultural heritage.
- Electron Azerbaijan is a state programme which, along with digitalisation, is paying special attention to the development and establishment of regional information/training centres and Internet stations in local libraries, post offices and schools, so as to widen the access to information resources.
- E-culture Flanders published “E-culture: building stones for practice and policy”.
- In Estonia, the enhanced use of new information technologies has belonged to the top priorities of government since the mid 90’s.
- In its document “Culture in the Information Society”, Finland proposes to strengthen the cultural policy aspects within information society policies in the domains of content industries, cultural heritage, citizen’s access to information and cultural services and in international and EU cooperation. Following the proposed plans and strategies, the Ministry has assigned special funding for the development of a “cultural” information society.
- In Greece, the development of the cultural domain in the context of the information society is one of their stated objectives. Notably, they raise the issues of heritage vs creation; industry vs culture and education and the “reluctance” of the cultural sector to embrace information technology and new media (despite sporadic exceptions).

- Ireland notes that policies have had far-reaching effects especially in the field of education. As of yet there has been little or no debate on its implications for the arts.
- Macedonia has proposed a computer for every pupil and internet in every home.
- Poland reduced the VAT on Internet service provision to 7% from 22%.
- Malta is looking for “quality Maltese content on the internet”, noting that in 2006, Malta had gained the top position in the world in internet penetration and growth rates.

And of course things happen, across the board and around the world, without national government intervention or incentives. In many European countries, the policies have been driven by external forces, be they private foundation interests such as the Soros Foundation in Bulgaria (for the networking of the Chitalishte libraries) or development initiatives out of the UN such as the e-Moldova programme. There are very interesting models of public/private partnerships that can be investigated and the European Commission recognizes fully the three “players” that it considers in policy and programme development: the Commission, member states and “stakeholders” – industry and civil society partners. Another area that warrants further investigation – and hopefully then action – is a need to work horizontally – to connect the dots – ensuring that culture is “mainstreamed” to use some European Commission language. Where better than in this area of digital technologies?

I would like to close with where I began – with this notion of linking policy and practice and a reflection on what is happening on the ground. In May 2007, the Virtueel Platform organized a conference entitled “Cultuur 2.0” and in the introduction to the recent publication stemming from the conference, they posited:

“Web 2.0 is a term that is often bandied around but not always understood. Virtueel Platform took on the challenge of looking at its impact on the arts and culture sector. The aim was not so much to “teach” the cultural sector about web 2.0 as to introduce the “web 2.0 mindset” into the creative processes and strategies of cultural and art institutions and artists. Why is this

important? Currently very little use is made by arts organisations in the Netherlands of new software applications that are primarily focused on user-generated content, social software. At the same time, the Dutch new media culture sector has long been at the forefront of developing user-centred software and interfaces and the arts sector is a key source of valuable content that lends itself to web 2.0 type applications.”¹⁰

Cathy Brickwood, Director,
Virtueel Platform

The implications of Web 2.0 and specifically user generated, or user created content is perhaps the most active area of debate and discussion. The “Participative Web” is the title of a major study that was published by the OECD in early 2007.¹¹ The significant shifts in the way that work is created, produced, distributed and experienced (or consumed) have had a major impact on the sector – positively in some areas and to great complaint in others. The cultural sector will just get on with it I think – or at least some of the sector will and policy makers will try to make sense of it. However, it is difficult to keep up and it will not get easier – the document referred to was written, after months of research, in late 2006 and was made public in April 2007 – by which time Web 2.0 was already being referred to as “a myth” to be debunked in some quarters – and some were moving on to Web 3.0 – whatever that entails!

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- ² See http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/lisbon_en.pdf.
- ³ See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2002/index_en.htm.
- ⁴ See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/index_en.htm.
- ⁵ See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0229en01.pdf, page 4.
- ⁶ See <http://www.coe.int>.
- ⁷ See <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/PartialAgr/Html/Observ9270.htm>.
- ⁸ See <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/index.php>.
- ⁹ See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0229en01.pdf, page 9.
- ¹⁰ See <http://www.virtueelplatform.nl/article-5716-en.html>.
- ¹¹ See <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf?contentId=38393116>.

SOFT POWER ET SCIENCES DURES : VERS UNE INGÉNIERIE DE L'INFLUENCE

RÉSUMÉ

Le développement de l'économie du savoir, en particulier pour les pays du G8, appelle l'émergence d'une culture scientifique dans le périmètre des stratégies de coopération bilatérale et multilatérale. Si l'influence culturelle a longtemps constitué un axe fondamental en matière de rayonnement international, et si cet axe demeure valide aujourd'hui, une culture scientifique (pragmatique, instrumentale et appuyée sur l'essor technologique) est aujourd'hui mieux à même de développer et d'articuler les thématiques d'excellence qui redessinent l'image de nos pays dans un environnement mondialisé, numérique et de plus en plus concurrentiel. L'université se trouve ici à la croisée des chemins, inscrivant désormais la problématique de la culture et de la technologie dans une logique d'ingénierie universitaire mieux à même de promouvoir l'image, les intérêts et, à terme, la culture de nos pays.

La plupart des pays développés se trouvent aujourd'hui engagés dans des processus d'internationalisation de leurs dispositifs d'enseignement supérieur ou projettent de s'y engager. Cette préoccupation internationale et l'ajustement des politiques publiques qui en découle répondent à des contraintes sociopolitiques internes ainsi qu'aux enjeux externes du marché mondial de l'enseignement supérieur. La logique concurrentielle qui informe cette sorte de néo-marketing universitaire se déploie sur des modes divers et variés : les rivalités se développent entre laboratoires dans le périmètre de la recherche scientifique; entre universités dès lors qu'il s'agit d'attirer des flux d'étudiants internationaux et les budgets qui s'y rattachent parfois; entre les États dès lors que l'enseignement supérieur est identifié comme facteur de développement économique ou de rayonnement national. Inversement, l'image de marque d'un pays peut également constituer un avantage concurrentiel pour attirer des flux d'étudiants étrangers. Au-delà des considérations strictement mondialistes et économiques, la question de l'influence des États-nations sur la scène internationale mérite une attention particulière. Adossé pour une part au rayonnement spécifique des États, le plus souvent culturel et patrimonial, mais parfois géographique, comme dans le cas de l'Australie, le concept d'influence s'inscrit désormais dans le sillage de l'économie du savoir et, comme nous allons l'évoquer, d'une montée en puissance, au sens propre comme au sens figuré, du concept de culture scientifique.

D'un point de vue définitionnel, le terme « culture » demeure assez insaisissable et, eu égard aux multiples références dont il fait l'objet dans les grands débats contemporains, renseigne finalement moins sur le concept qu'il recouvre que sur les préoccupations et les intentions des individus qui l'utilisent. Il n'est ainsi pas rare que la « culture » soit brandie en réaction à des évolutions de la mondialisation perçues comme excessivement libérales, sans qu'il existe pourtant d'antinomie intrinsèque entre le libéralisme et la culture. Sans entrer ici dans un quelconque débat philosophique sur la nuance entre « nature » et « culture », pas plus que dans une improbable mesure de la suprématie de tel ou tel champ de la connaissance sur un autre, tout le monde pourra convenir assez aisément qu'une personnalité comme Bill Gates, par exemple, s'inscrit au cœur de ce qu'on peut, à titre générique et relativement consensuel, qualifier de « culture » contemporaine. Quiconque a observé les adolescents de notre temps se rangera sans peine à l'idée que notre

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culture se décline aujourd'hui également en DVD, iPods, Messenger, MP3 et autres Podcasts. Sciences et technologies se trouvent par conséquent déjà au cœur et à l'avant-garde de la « culture » contemporaine. Les Nouvelles Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication, qui, incidemment ne sont plus réellement « nouvelles » puisqu'on ne parle aujourd'hui quasiment plus que de TIC, et c'est là tout le signe de leur succès, sont parfaitement identifiées et sont le plus souvent plébiscitées par le grand public. Elles seront demain rejointes, si ce n'est supplantées, par les nanotechnologies, les picotechnologies ou encore la cryptographie.

La relation de cause à effet entre les avancées scientifiques et la culture contemporaine telle que nous la percevons au quotidien est également très perceptible dans le discours politique. Le Premier ministre français François Fillon s'exprimait par exemple en ces termes dans un communiqué du 9 octobre 2007 pour féliciter Albert Fert, universitaire et chercheur français, qui venait de recevoir, avec Peter Grünberg, un collègue allemand, le prix Nobel de physique pour la découverte de la magnétorésistance géante et pour sa contribution au développement de l'électronique de spin :

Son parcours montre qu'un travail de recherche en physique du solide peut trouver des applications dans la vie quotidienne, comme les têtes de lecture des disques durs de nos ordinateurs. Cette très belle réussite de la recherche française illustre tout l'intérêt d'une alliance étroite entre recherche et développement technologique.'

Au-delà des laboratoires de recherche scientifique, au-delà de l'abstraction que peut représenter la magnétorésistance géante pour des non initiés qui, pourtant sont presque tous concernés par les performances des têtes de lecture des disques durs de leurs ordinateurs, notre culture se trouve directement conditionnée par notre environnement et par notre mode de vie. Ce constat de bon sens est néanmoins lourd d'implications dans la mesure où il implique que la culture contemporaine est aujourd'hui plus que jamais scientifique et technologique. En d'autres termes, et pour faire implicitement référence, sous forme de boutade, à un stéréotype ancien et persistant, la notion de culture scientifique n'est plus un oxymore. Même la culture classique, traditionnelle, ou patrimoniale, est aujourd'hui accessible au grand public via les

technologies de l'information et de la communication, en particulier les technologies numériques, et devient de plus en plus tributaire, y compris pour sa propre pérennité, du développement de la science, par conséquent de celui de la recherche et de l'innovation. Le récent accord, en date du 17 octobre 2007, entre l'UNESCO et la Bibliothèque du Congrès des États-Unis, pour construire une Bibliothèque numérique mondiale est un exemple parlant : cette Bibliothèque numérisera des documents uniques et rares (manuscrits, cartes, livres, partitions, enregistrements sonores, films, imprimés, photographies) provenant de bibliothèques et d'institutions culturelles du monde entier et les mettra à disposition gratuitement sur Internet. Seule l'accessibilité peut aujourd'hui valider une portée culturelle.

La mondialisation est indissociable de la culture contemporaine : elle l'englobe pour une part, dans une perspective supranationale, mais en fait également partie intégrante, ne serait-ce que dans la mesure où elle informe les grands débats de notre temps. C'est donc à double titre qu'elle doit faire l'objet de toutes les attentions des gouvernements. Là encore, la technologie occupe une place centrale, ce que confirme immédiatement l'approche comparative des deux concepts voisins mais bien distincts que sont « internationalisation » et « mondialisation ». Le phénomène d'internationalisation existe depuis des siècles et peu par conséquent être qualifié de conventionnel. L'internationalisation postule des relations ou des échanges entre deux ou plusieurs pays, dans une configuration bilatérale ou multilatérale. Cela étant, alors que l'on parle spontanément et généralement de l'internationalisation de l'enseignement supérieur, très peu d'entre nous songeraient par exemple à parler de « mondialisation » de l'enseignement supérieur. Et s'il existe bien des divisions de relations internationales (*international relations*) dans les universités, il n'existe pas, ou pas encore, de services de relations « mondiales » (*global relations*). Les deux concepts, par conséquent, ne sont pas superposables. Les exemples ci-dessus tendent à opérer une symétrie entre « mondialisation » et « universalisation » plutôt qu'entre « mondialisation » et « internationalisation ». Parler de mondialisation revient certes à évoquer la distribution de divers produits, parfois le vécu de certaines expériences, aux quatre coins du globe (la télévision et l'informatique sont des exemples caractéristiques), mais pas dans une simple

dynamique d'internationalisation. Dans la plupart des cas, le terme « mondialisation » implique également que le phénomène décrit se produit de manière simultanée ou immédiatement consécutive à l'échelle de la planète. Or, sauf dans les cas où ledit phénomène n'est pas directement de facture humaine, ceci n'est possible que par le truchement des technologies de l'information et de la communication et des récentes avancées scientifiques.

Cet aspect se vérifie tout particulièrement dans le secteur de l'économie. Il y a encore quelques années, la formule « import-export » était très couramment employée et il n'était pas rare d'entendre des cadres expliquer avec une certaine fierté qu'ils étaient « dans l'import-export » pour faire valoir qu'ils faisaient une brillante et enviable carrière à l'international. Si la formule est encore usitée aujourd'hui, l'« import-export » fait désormais référence à une internationalisation conventionnelle de l'activité économique, contrairement à la « mondialisation de l'économie » dont tout le monde parle de nos jours. Ce que l'on entend par « mondialisation de l'économie » est le caractère à la fois mondial et quasi simultané de l'activité, des flux et des crises économiques. Cette immédiateté planétaire est directement tributaire de la technologie, tributaire au point que le monde entier redoutait par exemple un dérèglement informatique et ses conséquences désastreuses au 1^{er} janvier 2000 : un simple problème de programmation lié au format de la date dans les mémoires des ordinateurs aurait pu, théoriquement en tout cas, affecter la distribution de l'eau et de l'électricité, les transports aériens, les services financiers et même les fonctions des gouvernements à l'échelle de la planète. Les conséquences dépassent largement les confins de l'économie : notre culture, notre civilisation au sens large, sont devenues tributaires de la science. Notre avenir dépend du développement scientifique, par exemple de celui du nucléaire, ou de la chimie, et les périls ne sont plus « internationaux » mais « mondiaux », voire « mondialisés » : le réchauffement climatique, bien entendu, mais aussi la grippe aviaire, autre exemple, se déploient dans une immédiateté qui ignore et dépasse les frontières et les échanges internationaux. Les clivages anciens se fissurent peu à peu sous les effets conjugués du développement scientifique et de la culture contemporaine : même les sciences humaines se

trouvent aujourd'hui propulsées par les sciences dures, par exemple par la recherche en biologie, notamment par les récentes avancées sur le fonctionnement du cerveau, lesquelles confèrent une portée renouvelée à des questions aussi fondamentales qu'existentielles : la conception de l'Homme, la liberté, la responsabilité ou encore l'autonomie.

Dans un tel contexte, les gouvernements sont plus que jamais appelés à repenser leur propre rôle : à l'intérieur de leurs frontières pour assurer et promouvoir des synergies suffisantes entre science et culture, entre patrimoine et recherche, entre tradition et innovation ; à l'extérieur de leurs frontières pour revisiter le concept d'influence, cette puissance douce par laquelle ils peuvent rayonner sur la scène internationale et influencer sur l'attitude d'autres États. La formule *soft power* (« puissance douce »), introduite en 1990 par Joseph Nye² dans un ouvrage destiné à contredire la thèse d'un déclin de la puissance américaine, est fondée sur l'idée que le concept de puissance a considérablement évolué, que l'influence d'un État sur la scène internationale se déploie aujourd'hui grâce à des moyens non coercitifs, tels la culture. Elle le devrait en tout cas, puisque les événements en Irak ont démontré que le recours au *hard power* demeure d'actualité dans le périmètre des relations internationales. Indépendamment de la question irakienne, il convient de prendre conscience que des dynamiques aussi fortes que l'internationalisation et la mondialisation, en ce qu'elles instaurent des logiques concurrentielles entre États sont parfois susceptibles de déclencher des phénomènes d'exclusion (politique, économique, idéologique, etc.) et, dans des configurations extrêmes, de raviver des sentiments voire des mouvements nationalistes. La mondialisation n'est pas simplement une métaphore, elle n'est pas simplement un concept protéiforme qui, parce que nous sommes incapables de les conceptualiser, engloberait toutes les modifications profondes de notre civilisation depuis les dernières décennies du XX^e siècle. La mondialisation est aujourd'hui rien moins qu'une idéologie. Il est par conséquent essentiel que le concept d'influence demeure parfaitement en phase avec l'évolution de nos sociétés et de nos cultures. Dans certains cas, l'influence culturelle peut, à elle seule, rester un excellent vecteur, mais elle tend à révéler ses limites, voire ses insuffisances pour ce qui concerne les pays du G8. L'importance d'un État sur la scène internationale est de nos jours directement et indirectement liée à son potentiel

de recherche et d'innovation et à ses parts de marché dans l'économie du savoir.

Ce que nous qualifions de manière très générique d'«économie du savoir» n'est autre qu'un ajustement de la culture contemporaine aux normes du marché liées à la mondialisation, à une mondialisation portée par la révolution technologique et numérique. L'omniprésence du fait technologique et son développement exponentiel placent la production du savoir et le traitement de l'information à la croisée de toutes les logiques concurrentielles. La révolution numérique a également joué un rôle décisif dans la modification des besoins en matière de capital humain : le travail manuel, et l'avenir dira si c'est un bienfait ou non, a été supplanté par une demande massive de main d'œuvre flexible et hautement qualifiée. Les dispositifs éducatifs, en particulier les institutions d'enseignement supérieur ne peuvent qu'en tirer des conséquences, sauf à risquer d'être perçues comme déconnectées du marché de l'emploi et à faire face à un éventuel réajustement défavorable des subventions publiques lorsqu'elles existent. A l'heure où la mission des institutions d'enseignement supérieur se trouve en mutation, la culture scientifique devient la contrepartie indispensable de l'influence culturelle. Elle est à présent une condition de l'influence, la condition de tout avantage concurrentiel dans l'économie du savoir. Les corrélations entre l'économie du savoir, la mondialisation et la «révolution» technologique sont très perceptibles dans l'enseignement supérieur : déjà, la formation initiale des étudiants est perçue comme insuffisante lorsqu'elle ne comporte pas d'orientation, voire de mobilité internationale. Les diplômes obtenus dans des institutions dépourvues de politique internationale seront de moins en moins compétitifs sur le marché de l'emploi.

Dès lors, les échanges, structurés et équilibrés, entre chercheurs, scientifiques et universitaires sont devenus une nécessité, un facteur d'influence, de développement et de stabilité internationale. L'université se trouve au cœur de ce dispositif et à la croisée de tous les chemins : elle est le creuset à la fois de la culture contemporaine et des échanges scientifiques. Elle est l'endroit où germent les facteurs d'influence de demain, a fortiori au Canada, où s'y concentre l'essentiel de l'activité de recherche. L'université, par conséquent, est un élément clé de l'identité canadienne de demain. L'internationaliser et développer les partenariats et échanges scientifiques est essentiel à la culture

comme à l'identité canadienne. Le Service Scientifique de l'Ambassade de France s'applique précisément à intensifier les échanges scientifiques, dans les sciences dures, bien entendu, mais également dans les sciences humaines, car il ne peut exister de balkanisation de l'excellence scientifique. C'est là un premier élément de résolution de la problématique retenue pour ce congrès : science et culture ne s'excluent pas mais se nourrissent mutuellement. La culture scientifique doit désormais nourrir les générations futures et c'est précisément pour cela que l'Ambassade de France sélectionne prioritairement les projets qui mettent en avant de jeunes chercheurs. Il est essentiel, au-delà des problématiques d'aujourd'hui, d'avoir une vision pour demain et d'élaborer les outils adéquats : les doubles diplômes de Master doivent s'inscrire au cœur de nos préoccupations et de notre action, dans l'intérêt des étudiants français comme des étudiants canadiens : les titulaires d'un diplôme obtenu conjointement avec une université étrangère disposeront demain d'un redoutable avantage concurrentiel sur les marchés de l'économie du savoir.

Par-delà de l'ingénierie universitaire se dessine rien moins qu'une ingénierie de l'influence qui, déjà, laisse entrevoir de nouvelles perspectives identitaires.

Références

- ¹ Communiqué du Premier ministre, Portail du Gouvernement – site du Premier ministre. Consulté le 9 octobre 2007, de http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/acteurs/communiqués_4/premier_ministre_adresse_ses_57701.html.
- ² NYE, J. (1990). *Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power*. New York: Basic Books.

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
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