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Multicultural Futures? International Approaches to Pluralism

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LETTERS/LETTRES

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Interview with Minister Raymond Chan

Canadian Minister of State (Multiculturalism)

1) In September, leading experts from around the world met in Prato, Italy for a seminar entitled “Multicultural Futures.” They discussed whether multiculturalism remains the pre-eminent strategy to ensure the integration of newcomers and minorities in pluralistic societies. They considered the dramatic shifts in policy away from multiculturalism that have been occurring around the world following specific, often political events. Is the Government of Canada also revisiting its commitment to multiculturalism as an approach to integration and a way of framing the expression of citizenship in Canada?

This is a good question to begin the interview because it gives me the opportunity to touch in general terms on multiculturalism in Canada, especially in the post 9/11 context that I believe you are referring to. First of all, it is important to recognize that different countries have unique traditions and institutions and therefore different ways of responding to issues of integration and racial and ethnocultural diversity within their borders. In Canada, we have a policy of multiculturalism that has been articulated and implemented taking into account the changing needs and concerns of society, over time. For this reason it is inappropriate to suggest, simply, that we revisit our commitment to multiculturalism. It would be more accurate to say that we are committed to multiculturalism and we periodically rethink the priorities of multiculturalism to keep pace with the changing social, political, and economic challenges that Canadians face.

In the context of the events of 9/11 and its aftermath, one aspect that you mention is indeed how to articulate multiculturalism better as a way of supporting integration which directly and indirectly assists in framing citizenship. In other words, we need to find a way to address diversity and integration issues, including the ongoing challenge of combating racism and discrimination, within the context of the day-to-day, practical expression of citizenship in our communities for both ethnocultural groups and society at large. Ideally, we want to get to the point I think where multiculturalism is associated with our shared interest, as Canadians, in institutional inclusion and equality of opportunity. The idea is that we need to be able to respect diversity and at the same time recognize one another as equal citizens. We want to achieve full contribution of people of all backgrounds to Canadian society where multiculturalism, as a policy and a program, supports the integration while at the same time fostering communities that strengthen this integration.

2) Recently, there has been some media coverage on the nature of racism and discrimination in Canadian society as indicated by the Ethnic Diversity Survey. What is the Government of Canada in general and the Multiculturalism Program in particular doing to address this situation?

The Ethnic Diversity Survey provided us with data that shows discrimination remains a problem in Canada. While only 14% of Canadians experienced discrimination or unfair treatment based on ethno-racial characteristics, 36% of visible minorities, representing more than one million people, experienced discrimination.

The Government’s approach to fighting racism is multifaceted including elements of human rights, civil society, and public education, mechanisms to ensure justice and a comprehensive approach to social change: this is supported at the federal level by the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, the *Employment Equity Act*, the *Official Languages Act*, the *Pay Equity Act*, and the *Multiculturalism Act*.

Most recently in the October 5, 2004 Speech From the Throne, the Government of Canada pledged to recognize Canada’s diversity as a source of strength and innovation, to remove barriers to opportunity, and to “take measures to strengthen Canada’s ability to combat racism, hate speech and hate crimes, both here and around the world”. This commitment will be implemented through forward-looking measures undertaken by government departments to combat racism.

The Multiculturalism Program works collaboratively with community organizations to support activities that break down barriers to full participation for all Canadians, enhance the implementation of Canada’s human rights framework, and demonstrate federal government leadership in eliminating racism and promoting equal citizenship. The Government of Canada will continue its efforts to develop a multi-faceted approach to combating racism, which is based on partnerships with other government departments and community groups. The intent is to attack racism at all levels and all forms.

3) In recent years there has been a heightened interest in policing and security and its impact on minorities. What actions has the Multiculturalism Program taken to address concerns by ethnocultural groups related to discriminatory

practices, including racial profiling? What has the Government of Canada done to ensure that public safety and anti-terrorism measures have not disproportionately affected minority Canadians?

On the issue of security and racial profiling, the Multiculturalism Program is working in partnership with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, other levels of government, police services, and institutions, to improve collaboration between ethno-cultural communities and law enforcement agencies across Canada, and to facilitate sharing of best practices. The Program has also hosted a *National Forum on Policing in a Multicultural Society* and helped to fund a Law Enforcement Aboriginal Diversity (LEAD) Network to establish a template for law enforcement agencies to monitor their progress in serving ethnocultural and Aboriginal communities. As such, the Multiculturalism Program facilitates the dialogue between law enforcement agencies and ethnocultural communities in view of assisting police officers to be better equipped and trained to serve Canada's multicultural population.

Since the proclamation of the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, the Multiculturalism Program has fielded various concerns about the impact and perception of the *Act* among ethnic minorities in Canada and has met with the representatives of various Canadian religious and ethno-cultural organizations over the past few years.

It is also worth mentioning that a key element of the federal government's national security policy is the establishment of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, created to engage Canadians and the Government of Canada in an ongoing dialogue on national security in a diverse and pluralistic society. I have participated actively in the announcement of this policy and in urging members of ethnocultural communities to submit nominations to the committee which will provide an opportunity for dialogue on security matters.

Beyond these measures the Multicultural Program will continue to work with communities to ensure that national security is a complementary component to our Canadian values of individual rights and freedoms.

4) Le plus récent discours du Trône engage le gouvernement du Canada à l'égard d'une politique d'égalité des chances « de sorte que la prospérité puisse être partagée par tous les Canadiens et Canadiennes ». En même temps, il engage le gouvernement « à faire valoir les intérêts du Canada et à projeter nos valeurs dans le monde ». Comment le multiculturalisme règle-t-il la question d'égalité des chances et comment influence-t-il ce qu'on appelle communément nos intérêts et valeurs en tant que Canadiens et Canadiennes ? Les valeurs, les responsabilités et les intérêts sont-ils différents

pour des personnes différentes - par exemple, les groupes minoritaires et majoritaires respectivement ?

Ce que nous pouvons dire, c'est que travailler à établir un terrain d'égalité ou l'égalité des chances, comme vous dites, nécessite de sensibiliser davantage le public au fait que l'inclusion et la citoyenneté égale sont parmi les « valeurs » et les « intérêts » les plus importants de notre société. Ainsi, l'égalité des chances en soi devrait être promue comme une valeur canadienne commune ainsi que comme une responsabilité canadienne partagée.

Le Programme du multiculturalisme a contribué à l'objectif d'égalité des chances de plusieurs points de vue, mais, en fait, deux principaux moyens ont permis de diriger cette contribution. La première approche a consisté à promouvoir les identités de diverses communautés du Canada. La deuxième approche a consisté à influencer l'intégration positive des Canadiens et Canadiennes de diverses origines dans la vie économique, sociale, culturelle et politique dominante du pays. De plus en plus, cette question d'intégration est devenue la plus pertinente à l'appui de l'égalité des chances. Il va sans dire que la question d'intégration comprend un programme pour lutter contre le racisme et la discrimination.

Quant à votre question sur les valeurs et responsabilités différentes pour des groupes différents, je pense qu'il est évident que les personnes d'origines ethniques, raciales et religieuses différentes ont des points de vue divergents selon la question – la définition même du pluralisme. Cependant, en ce qui concerne notre identité collective en tant que Canadiens et Canadiennes, nous sommes tous responsables de valeurs publiques ou canadiennes comme l'inclusion et la citoyenneté égale. Autrement dit, nous avons tout à gagner de promouvoir ces intérêts.

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5) How does the Multiculturalism Program and the Government of Canada ensure that newcomers and minority Canadians are able to participate fully in each of the social, economic, cultural and political facets of Canadian society?

This is a very important question and the issues raised are very close to my heart. In the Multiculturalism Program, we focus on these exact issues and we would like to increase our efforts to achieve even greater results for newcomers and minority groups.

In terms of economic participation the Multiculturalism Program influences the Foreign Credentials Recognition agenda by participating in multilateral initiatives with federal partners, provincial and territorial governments, professional accreditation bodies, licensing boards and employers. The program also supports immigrant-led organizations and associations. In the recent past, the Department of Canadian Heritage announced two projects funded by the Multiculturalism Program that have

successfully built two provincial networks of organizations of immigrant professionals, one in Ontario and the other one in British Columbia.

With respect to the social participation goal, the program is funding initiatives that bring different ethno-cultural communities together to address shared issues. We continue to work with established organizations and groups as well as assist newer emerging communities to increase their capacity to participate. We have also supported initiatives that examine the issues of the intersectionality of ethno-racial background and identity.

We continue to ensure that multiculturalism as a philosophy, ideology and reality is well understood at all levels. The Program works closely with other government departments and supports them in ensuring that the principles of multiculturalism are promoted. We continue to support community action initiatives to improve inter-cultural understanding and cooperation. Support is provided for research and policy planning in the area of economic participation, labour market inclusion and working with other government departments to develop partnerships on how to best address gaps and shortcomings faced by certain at-risk groups. The program also supports full participation of visible minorities and other groups in all aspects of Canadian culture.

It is my goal to continue to support and increase activities aimed at full participation of social, economic, cultural and political facets of Canadian society.

6) Le Canada est réputé pour sa politique de multiculturalisme, mais certains critiques soutiennent qu'elle semble seulement favoriser des groupes minoritaires ethniques et raciaux. Est-ce vrai? Sinon, pourquoi les Canadiens et Canadiennes sont-ils confus quant aux objectifs du multiculturalisme? Par ailleurs, comment le gouvernement assure-t-il la promotion du multiculturalisme comme identité pour tous les citoyens et citoyennes, et pas seulement pour les immigrants qui sont arrivés récemment au pays?

Le multiculturalisme, c'est pour tout le monde. C'est le message que nous voulons promouvoir et répandre dans l'ensemble de la population canadienne. Ceci étant dit, je suis cependant conscient que les sondages d'opinion publique montrent que les Canadiens et Canadiennes sont perplexes quant au but de la politique. Cette confusion peut être le résultat des priorités du multiculturalisme en évolution au cours des 30 dernières années. Les premières années, le multiculturalisme cherchait davantage à préserver l'identité culturelle minoritaire ethnique – ce qu'on pourrait qualifier d'interprétation « folklorique » ou « artistique ». Toutefois, depuis le milieu des années 1980, le multiculturalisme s'est de plus en plus réorienté sur les questions d'égalité, d'intégration et de participation ainsi que sur ce qui touche la lutte au racisme et à la discrimination. Par conséquent, je crois que nous devons faire connaître l'évolution du multiculturalisme. Nous devons continuer de promouvoir les changements qui y ont été apportés.

Néanmoins, les sondages d'opinion montrent régulièrement que le multiculturalisme est populaire et que les Canadiens et Canadiennes considèrent de plus en plus le

multiculturalisme comme un élément positif et essentiel de notre identité nationale. Ainsi, nous devons nous efforcer de combler le fossé entre le soutien général apporté à la politique et une véritable compréhension de ce qu'elle vise à accomplir. Cela me ramène à ce que j'ai dit au début de l'entrevue au sujet de la nécessité de promouvoir le multiculturalisme en termes d'inclusion et de citoyenneté égale. Le multiculturalisme signifie la promotion de la pleine participation de tous les Canadiens et Canadiennes à la vie de notre société, sans toutefois enfreindre leur droit à leur identité individuelle et culturelle.

7) Do you believe multiculturalism has a future as a concept to guide Canada's shared citizenship model?

Absolutely. Multiculturalism is at the heart of Canada's fundamental values and Canadian identity. The very notion of shared citizenship calls for a clear balance between rights and responsibilities, and this concept applies to all, that is, multiculturalism as ideology, as philosophy, and as government program is for all Canadians.

The future lies in finding ways for Canadians to connect with one another as individual citizens and this can only occur where they view each other as sharing similar interests and goals. Multiculturalism is there for all – to articulate and advance those shared interests and goals. Multiculturalism *does* have a future: a future which provides Canadians with the capacity and the opportunity to participate in Canadian society regardless of race, ethnicity, cultural or religious background; a future where Canadians share a sense of pride and civic life; a future where Canadians can live in an inclusive society built on inter-cultural understanding and citizen participation.

The Australian Government Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the Hon. Peter McGauran, MP



1) Multiculturalism was officially adopted as a strategy in Australia in 1987 with the National Agenda. Under the Howard Government this strategy has undergone a series of assessments, including Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness in 1999, followed by the New Agenda for Multicultural Australia in 2000 and updated in 2003. Today, as governments around the world rethink their position on multiculturalism, is it time for Australia to also reconsider this strategy? In other words, nearly 30 years later, is the Government still committed to multiculturalism?

The Australian Government is committed to policies and services which enable all Australians to reach their full potential and contribute to the development of Australia.

What is important is not the label or the terminology, but the principles that lie behind multiculturalism.

There is a tendency to use the word multiculturalism as shorthand for a range of concepts, policies and services without thinking what lies behind the term.

Multiculturalism as a term is in some ways irrelevant – what we need to focus on are the values it represents, such as opportunities for everyone to reach their potential, commitment to the rule of law, freedom of speech and religion and acceptance that everyone has the right to their own beliefs.

This is the focus of the Australian Government.

The Government is committed to developing an environment that fosters a productive and harmonious society providing opportunities for people to realise their potential as well as work together for the benefit of Australia.

In addition it has continually emphasised the importance of educating Australians about the benefits of acceptance, respect and harmony. This focus has developed a cohesive society in which people are able to harness the benefits of cultural diversity.

Australia has a long history of cultural diversity and we have learned to accept people from different backgrounds, whose skills, commitment and hard work benefit Australia socially, culturally and economically. Our diversity is a strength the Australian Government will continue to capitalise on and support.

To maximise the benefits this diversity offers to both the individual and the community, Australia has developed what have become internationally respected settlement services for migrants.

These services help migrants quickly participate in their community, build new lives and contribute to their new country. In supporting and helping people participate fully and equitably in our society I am confident that we are reducing the risk of overt forms of racism and racial violence.

This is the direction that I propose to follow and it is these policies and their ongoing evolution that the Australian Government is committed to, rather than particular terms or labels.

2) Do we need to change the term “multiculturalism”? Should we look at using a word that implies the integration of different cultures and people?

The term multiculturalism has been useful in helping to reflect Australia’s diversity and as a means for explaining many of the benefits and advantages that living in a diverse society brings.

The term has also been an effective umbrella under which we have been able to bring together a range of policies aimed at helping people quickly settle into the community and become more productive.

But the term has also become a distraction. Instead of being associated with a range of policies aimed at benefiting all Australians, it has started to take on its own particular meaning.

Unfortunately some people consider the meaning involves providing special treatment to people from non-English speaking backgrounds.

It has developed some negative connotations despite this Government's commitment to ensuring the term multiculturalism applies to all Australians, whatever their religious or cultural background, and that the policies it represents benefit all Australians.

This is the danger of using any label. People stop thinking about what it represents.

In fact the values and principles multiculturalism represents are so much a part of our everyday lives that in a sense we 'live' multiculturalism.

The diverse nature of our society impacts on all aspects of our way of life, social, economic and cultural – and because it is such an integral part of who we are, does it require a label?

What are more important than labels are policies and services that allow Australians to reach their potential and develop a commitment to Australia.

3) You were recently appointed Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, following many years as Minister for Science and Minister for the Arts. What will you bring to the portfolio? What do you see as the major issues facing multicultural Australia?

I grew up in what is sometimes called the engine room of Victoria – the LaTrobe Valley – which provides power for the state. I saw at first hand the contribution that migrants make to the vital power industry and, just as importantly, what they needed to take advantage of the opportunities their new home had to offer.

I want to make sure that Australia has in place arrangements that will help migrants settle successfully in both metropolitan and regional Australia.

Attracting migrants to rural and regional areas is just the first step.

For migrants to succeed and permanently settle in these areas we must make sure they feel a sense of belonging, have the opportunities to achieve their goals and develop a commitment to Australia.

It is also important for us to have in place policies that encourage community cohesion and harmony.

I believe Australian citizenship has a major role to play in this area, as it can unite all Australians by fostering a commitment to the democratic principles of freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the rule of law.

Achieving these goals will help us remain a productive and successful democracy, free from racial and religious tensions. The Australian Government has done a lot in these areas, but in these changing times there is always more to be done. I look forward to the challenge.

4) Does multiculturalism include indigenous Australian people? In what way? Has multiculturalism as a strategy helped or hindered indigenous people?

Australian multiculturalism is an inclusive policy relevant to all Australians. The Australian Government recognises the unique nature of indigenous culture and the contribution it makes to Australia.

My portfolio has a number of programs that promote understanding of indigenous culture. In the particular area of the portfolio I administer there is the *Living in Harmony* program which, among other things, provides money to organisations to help them develop ways of encouraging and supporting harmony between different groups in the Australian community.

Indigenous groups have been recipients of a number of *Living in Harmony* community grants which address racism at the local level.

5) The events of September 11 and the Bali bombings triggered a spate of attacks on religious communities in Australia, especially toward Muslims. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission noted that a number of people identified as Arab or Muslim have been physically assaulted, spat on and abused; have received hate mail; and there have also been instances where women's hijabs have been pulled off. Since S11, two Islamic mosques have been burnt down, while other mosques and Islamic schools have been vandalised. How has the Government responded? What have you put in place to help protect the Australian Islamic community? And more generally, how are you countering other forms of racism, negative stereotypes and discrimination in Australian society?

Any issues that affect the ability of Muslims, or any Australians, to participate fully in society are of concern. While there have been some incidents in Australia, we have nonetheless remained largely free of the violence that has plagued other countries.

The Australian Government utterly condemns attempts to intimidate and vilify members of the Australian community. It responded quickly to September 11 and the Bali bombings, making it very clear that attacks on any Australians at home or abroad would not be tolerated.

Meetings were held between community leaders and my ministerial colleagues, as well as the Prime Minister, to show solidarity and support for the Islamic and other affected communities.

The Australian Government has also been working very closely with federal and state law enforcement agencies to prevent any attacks on community groups, individuals and places of worship.

The diverse nature of our society impacts on all aspects of our way of life, social, economic and cultural – and because it is such an integral part of who we are, does it require a label? What are more important than labels are policies and services that allow Australians to reach their potential and develop a commitment to Australia.

It has, for many years, also funded the *Living in Harmony* program, which encourages community cohesion and aims to counter racism and discrimination. The Muslim community has received a number of grants through this program.

The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission has recognised the strategies the Australian Government has put in place to address anti-Muslim prejudice.

6) Do you think that multiculturalism should be formally enshrined in the legislation? Should there be a Multicultural Act, like the one in Canada and, locally, in the state of Victoria? Could this be a way to provide safeguards and accountability in relation to the delivery of services?

Australians live in a community formed by many different cultures. This diversity is inherent in everyday life in Australia, from the foods we eat to our ability to operate successfully in the international market place.

It is who we are and legislation will neither stop us being a diverse community nor protect its existence – so we have to ask ourselves what would be gained from writing multiculturalism into legislation.

In fact legislation that safeguards the principles which underpin multiculturalism, such as the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975*, already exists.

Multiculturalism is based on people valuing tolerance, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the rule of law. These are what help make a democracy and are already enshrined in existing laws and institutions.

We don't need more legislation to ensure these things continue; rather we want citizens to believe in and commit to these principles. I believe the most effective way to change attitudes is not by legislation but through education and responding to people's needs and experiences.

7) In December you launched a report for the Australian Multicultural Foundation' on multi-faith Australia, which examined the country's 28 largest religions as defined by the census. The report contained a series of recommendations, including that both Houses of Parliament begin each parliamentary day with a prayer or reading selected by Australia's faith communities on a rotational basis, and conclude, as per usual, with the Lord's Prayer. What are your thoughts on this recommendation?

Australia is a secular society which has proved to be one of our strengths. Unlike many other countries, Australia – although predominantly Christian – does not style itself as a country adhering to a particular religion. This has allowed for a harmonious multifaith society without the tensions and biases that exist in other systems such as theocracies.

The Lord's Prayer recited at the beginning of parliament is primarily a reflection of the Westminster system and traditions, which Australia's parliament is based on, and is part of Australia's history.

8) Are you concerned that there are so few people from ethnic minorities and communities in federal parliament? How representative are our Houses when there are no Muslims or Aboriginals and only one Jew? How

do we increase political participation of people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds?

Parliamentarians are elected to government by the Australian people.

I do not think voters would tolerate the Australian Government engineering any type of election result that guaranteed minority groups had what in effect would be disproportionate representation in the parliament.

Where I think the Government can play a role is educating people on their rights, responsibilities and privileges as Australian citizens.

When migrants take out citizenship they are committing to a core set of civic values and responsibilities, including free and fair democratic elections.

I would encourage all citizens to take an active interest in Australia's political system and stand for parliament. This will certainly lead to more diverse representation.

If you look at the current range of elected representatives you will see an increasingly diverse group of people in the parliament, reflecting the Australian populace.

I hope that through educating people about their civic duties and responsibilities we will see still more people from diverse backgrounds entering politics.

Questions posed by Hass Dellal, Executive Director of the Australian Multicultural Foundation, Professor John Nieuwenhuysen, Director, Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements, and Kate Latimer, Editor, *Around the Globe*, Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements.

Note

¹ *Religion, Cultural Diversity and Safeguarding Australia* by Professor Desmond Cahill, Professor Gary Bouma and Mr. Hass Dellal, Australian Multicultural Foundation, 2004.

Dutch Nightmare? The End of Multiculturalism?

Once upon a time, the Dutch republic had been rightly famous, comparatively speaking, for its advanced regime of toleration. Centuries later, in the 1970s and 80s, Dutch multiculturalism served, together with Sweden in Europe and, obviously, Canada and Australia, as a model for incorporation policies. Already during the 1990s things had changed considerably, but since 9/11 the right-wing populist campaign of Pim Fortuyn, his assassination, and recently that of Theo van Gogh, a dramatic change occurred first in political rhetoric and increasingly also in policy recommendations and actual implementation of new policies.

Now the government of the Netherlands (see Doornik)¹ is a forerunner of *restrictive immigration policies* in all dimensions: applicants for *asylum* (strict implementation of Dublin agreements, making air carriers responsible for rigged documents, 'short' procedures, abolishing rights of appeal by rejected asylum seekers, expelling 'non-expellable' asylum-seekers from retention-centres); *family-reunification* (higher age requirements for spouses, 21) and required income-guarantees (120% of minimum wage) following the Danish example (Bird), together with such outlandish proposals as language and integration courses on CD-ROM in the 'Rif' (on their own costs) and multiple choice tests via Internet or by long distance calls; getting at and expelling long-term 'white illegal residents' (*koppelingswet* 1998, extremely restrictive legalization, denying education and medical assistance to their kids); policies of zero labour-immigration combined with a new guestworker regime for highly skilled professionals.

In addition Dutch *incorporation policies* are increasingly dominated by these restrictive immigration concerns as well as by security and loyalty: making denizenship-status more insecure – e.g. by requiring obligatory integration courses for long term, 'non-Western' (so-called '*allochtoon*') permanent residents (minister Verdonk in June 2004 in parliament: till the age of 75 or 80, recently changed: for all residents till 65, including 'Western' ones) on their own costs and threatening expulsion in case of not passing the tests (as in the case of committing serious crimes); sharpening naturalization-requirements, restricting dual nationality and threatening to withdraw Dutch nationality in cases of presumed 'crimes against the state'. Both policies (are explicitly meant to) reinforce each other in a malign spiral. They are aggressively promoted in the EU, turning the Dutch government from a forerunner of fairly decent integration policies into a coalition partner of Austria, Denmark and other countries in the threatening race to the bottom. What happened to the Netherlands, and how can it be explained? The predominant answer

inside NL, like in Germany and other countries is simple: a broad coalition of 'politically incorrect' politicians (in the tradition of Bolkestein and Fortuyn), political journalists (Paul Scheffer) and even social scientists (Ruud Koopmans) make multicultural policies (MCP) in all varieties, not only the rigid, 'corporatist polder' version, responsible for the 'multicultural drama' (recently even for the murder of Theo van Gogh). In addition, they are joined from abroad by *French republican assimilationists* like Kepel and *English liberal assimilationists* like Trevor Phillips selling their preferred, biased models of incorporation informed by an idealized picture of their countries' policies.

Obviously, the retreat of MCP is neither an exclusively Dutch phenomenon (see Lithman for Norway, Bird for Denmark, Ricucci for Italy) nor an exclusively European one (Jakubowicz for Australia) though it might have happened here faster and, at least in political rhetorics, more drastically. In addition, MCP are not in retreat "across-the-board" (see Biles/Ibrahim/Tolley, Kymlicka, and Jedwab for Canada), not in all policy-fields (see Kymlicka for Dutch military and, one could add, police), not in the same way at the local level (Lithman) and, obviously, not as quickly and drastically in actual policies compared with predominant political talk that might only send signals to voters rather than scrapping MCP (Bauböck). Yet MCP have a hard time in most countries, even if there is no general roll-back and no 'general backlash against diversity'. The reasons for this are too complex to be dealt with in a short introduction. Apart from global changes in the economic and political opportunity-structure, (war against) terrorism in particular (Bader), processes and policies of *immigration* and processes and policies of *incorporation* are crucial.²

Successful adoption and implementation of MCP depends on processes and policies of *immigration*, the selection of the 'right or wrong' immigrants, on three conditions in particular (Kymlicka); whether states are able to prevent (i) massive illegal migration (due to good geopolitical luck and/or to prudent immigration policies); (ii) massive immigration of groups that are (perceived as) "carriers of illiberal cultural practices that violate norms of human rights"; (iii) massive immigration of people that are (perceived to be) an economic burden. In all three regards, the traditional distinction between classical immigration countries like Australia, Canada and the U.S. and European countries is still important for two reasons. First, they are either surrounded by huge oceans or land borders that can be controlled (the American-Mexican border is, in contrast to the predominant rhetoric, in my view, as open or closed as it fits the U.S.) so that they are

able to prevent large-scale illegal immigration, whereas European States have many more geo-political problems in this regard (several states with different capabilities and policies to control land-borders even after attempts to homogenize policies in the enlarging EU; the Mediterranean Sea). Second, most *European countries* are confronted with the medium- and long-term consequences of post-colonial and/or guest-worker regimes selecting people that have been perceived as unwelcome and, eventually also as an economic burden (Lithman for Norway, Bird for Denmark). When they finally learned that ‘guestworkers’ came to stay and, grudgingly, declared themselves to be immigration countries, the economic tie had completely changed and no space has been left or created for new ‘wanted’ labour-migrants.

With or without (extremely restrictive) immigration policies they continue to select the ‘wrong’ migrants (largely by family reunification). *Classical immigration countries* had official immigration policies right from the start. Only after WW2 they, grudgingly, revised their racist policies, redefining the ‘unwelcome’ and, at the same time, their predominant conceptions of national culture and identity (officially in Canada and Australia, not in the U.S. that never embraced MCP). Yet they continued to select the economically ‘wanted’. To the degree that these policies have been successful, they took a lot of pressure from processes and policies of incorporation. MC policies had comparatively better chances because they were not confronted with much higher (perceived) risks that are “unlikely to change in the near future” (Kymlicka). Better chances, however, are no guarantee for long-term success of MPC, as the Australian retreat (neglected by Kerkyasharian) demonstrates.

Processes of incorporation of immigrants run more smoothly to the degree that states succeed in selecting the ‘wanted and welcome’ migrants. Nevertheless, *incorporation policies* are faced with more or less serious dilemmas and trade-offs (Bader) whether they are traditionally assimilationist, newly ‘liberal assimilationist’, multiculturalist or ‘diversity’-guided. Again, the distinction between traditional immigration countries and European nation-states has not lost all importance, despite how often this might be claimed and repeated. *Immigration countries* traditionally have easy naturalization procedures whereas *European states* needed quite some time, and some like Germany much more than others, before achieving this. In immigration countries, the core definitions of national culture and identity have been less narrowly ethnocentric though it took much time and protracted struggles to make them less WASP. All *European states*, given the important differences between

them, long resisted such processes of cultural pluralization even (or maybe even very strongly) in the case of France (Wenden) where the official declarations of a purely civil and political culture and national identity have easily been deciphered as ‘chauvinist universalism’. Some countries reluctantly embraced MC as official policy but clearly failed to root these policies in a more culturally plural and relationally neutral political culture, in common civic-political activities and identities (Bauböck, Lithman for Norway).

Responses to 9/11 and to dramatized problems of ‘integration of immigrants’ showed that MCP lacked strong majority support (certainly compared to the broad public support in Canada: Jedwab, Biles et al.) and renewed attempts to create a thick ‘national *Leitkultur*’ (Lithman for Norway; Bird for Denmark, see Austria, Germany, NL) demonstrate that ethnic nationalism has been barely hidden under the surface of MC-rhetoric. Australia, again, shows that this is not confined to European countries (Jakubowicz). The lack of such deeply rooted public support, in combination with drastic changes in predominant political talk – making MCP responsible for all failures of actual incorporation processes – has a huge impact on the *perception* of the risks, mentioned above, even if immigration in absolute and relative terms is fairly marginal, as in Norway and Denmark. It ‘makes us see’ immigrants, even second generation immigrants, as unwanted burdens and ‘culturally remote’, ‘un-adaptable and illiberal foreigners’ that threaten the rule of law, ‘our democracy’, ‘our welfare states’, ‘our culture’, and ‘our security’ (all over Europe that means nowadays: ‘as Muslims’).

Against this background, the ‘diagnosis’ and ‘explanation’ of the perceived disaster of *Dutch integration policies* as caused by MCP is at first sight really astonishing because it is so obviously wrong. It neglects (i) common integration problems in European countries that result from post-colonial and guest-worker regimes, and (ii) differences in the socio-economic contexts of these countries. (iii) It dramatically overestimates the impact of all possible varieties of incorporation policies, and (iv) neglects the unintended negative side-effects of (old and new) republican and liberal assimilationist policies that are presented as the optimal alternatives. In addition, it also neglects the continuing success of MCP in Canada. (v) It does not compare the actual processes and results of incorporation in different fields and countries in a fair and detached way. Though we urgently need more quantitative and qualitative comparative research in this regard³ – we simply do not know right now all we want and need to know – we

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know enough to reject this biased, simplistic and myopic answer. Here is no place to discuss whether Dutch incorporation policies performed better or worse in terms of labour market participation and/or self-employment, housing, education, political participation, 'social' integration (e.g. friendships, rates of inter-marriage), legal incorporation, cultural toleration, transformation of public culture, etc. according to (contested) standards, compared with (which) other countries and their respective mix of integration-policies, policies that, by the way, are nowhere consistent, neither in a temporal perspective nor regarding the different levels and agencies of government.

At the zenith of the *moral and political 'integration panic'* in NL, a parliamentary commission was installed. When this commission (named after its chairperson, the VVD-MP Blok) presented its report last summer showing – as could be expected by any social scientist – a mixed picture of incorporation processes and policies clearly at odds with the now 'politically correct' MCP-bashing, the report was honed away in predominant parliamentary politics and media, and the integrity and independence of scientific institutions and advisors has been challenged. Social scientific knowledge is clearly the least welcome and has the least impact if issues are already highly politicized in the policy cycle. If Dutch incorporation processes and policies have neither been a complete success-story nor a full disaster, what went wrong with Dutch politics, politicians and may be even 'the Dutch people'?

Dutch politics has been known for its *consociational* style of policy-making (elitist moderation and compromises, negotiation cum deliberation). This style did not survive – at least at the level of politics of symbolic action – the highly 'incorrect', antagonistic and populist onslaughts by Fortuyn and its numerous self-proclaimed followers or newly emerging leaders in many parties. Reckless 'competition' by increasingly personalizing political parties for the perceived right-wing and increasingly foot-loose electorate (and their assumed fiery emotion – or '*onderbuikgevoelens*') resulted in a break through the dykes of 'political correctness' and moderation. Everything can and also has to be said now by leading politicians and journalists. A well-known and in this case clearly intended side-effect is that predominant political talk and publicized opinion has a huge impact on opinions, on what can be said now by everybody, by 'the man on the street'.

Have not only Dutch politicians and journalists gone mad but 'the Dutch' as well? Have the '*autochthonous*' Dutch changed in no time from virtuous and tolerant people (NL the famous 'wonderland of toleration') into an intolerant mass, burning mosques and Muslim schools? This is obviously ludicrous. They were not emphatically tolerant in the first place, as I as a long-term resident can tell you. They were no exception to the fact that all over

Europe between 10-20% can be mobilized to vote for right-wing populist and/or anti-immigration parties depending on circumstances. What has dramatically changed, though, is the style of politics, the predominant political 'discourse', the type of political leadership, and the party-landscape on the right. The new 'politically correct madness', however, has a serious impact on actual policies and available long-term institutional options. Events like 9/11 and the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh can trigger changes in the path of nested institutional structures. For me it is clear that there is nowadays not only, and rightly so, no way back to old corporatist, '*pillarized*' MCP, but unfortunately also no way forward from rigid, 'apartheid-like' (*Parallelgesellschaften*) to liberal, flexible and open models of incorporation like that proposed by associative democrats. Dutch politics is now under the spell of republican or liberal assimilationism and aggressive secularism. And it seems at least difficult to go back to the old regime and its 'gritting teeth toleration' that, in our dark times, has to be seen as an important virtue.

More generally speaking, I think we should stop repeating generalized success stories of the principles and official declarations of MC. We have to focus on actual risks and policy dilemmas all different varieties of incorporation policies are confronted with. We have to 're-think' MC policies under the new conditions of skilfully managed emergency and security threats. MC-policies are certainly not without serious rivals today, not only old-style assimilationists amongst them but also recently propagated 'liberal assimilationism' and fashionable 'diversity' policies that all propose to return to homogenous and unitary citizenship.

Proponents of multi-cultural citizenship and of democratic institutional pluralism should neither underestimate the public appeal of the new political discourses nor the dangers that they initiate actual policy change, eventually also on local levels.

Veit Bader, Guest Editor

Notes

- ¹ All references: this volume.
- ² Though incorporation of indigenous people and national minorities are often subsumed under MC and MCP (Wang for China, Bhattacharyya for India, Huat for Singapore, Bekker/Leildé for S.A., Pena for Mexico) I prefer a more narrow understanding that focuses on immigrants and accompanying ethno-religious cultural diversity because accommodation of First Nations and National Minorities requires different policies (e.g. 'bi-' or 'multi-nationalism' instead of MCP) that are not easily combined with MCP (Spoonley for NZ, Castles for Australia, Juteau and Biles/Ibrahim/Tolley for CA).
- ³ The huge IMISCOE program, funded by the EU promises to deliver these data.

Multiculturalism: Still a Viable Concept for Integration?

Howard Duncan

Howard Duncan is Executive Head of the International Metropolis Project.

ABSTRACT

In this paper, Duncan examines whether multiculturalism remains a viable model for thinking about integration, or whether contemporary forms of diversity and its accompanying conditions threaten the theory and require us to re-think how we manage social relations characterized by cultural, ethnic, and religious difference. Various criticisms are addressed and solutions put forward by the author.

After a few years during which countries of immigration were showing convergence in their thinking on the integration of immigrants, many countries in the west, now experiencing some of the most serious integration challenges they have witnessed in decades, are taking harder and diverging lines. To a significant degree, the contemporary issue is over the integration of those with sharply different cultural backgrounds, perhaps especially those with strong religious views that are not shared by majority populations. Tensions between, for example, Muslim minorities and non-Muslim majorities have been rising in some parts of the world, and this has in some cases produced calls for measures to ensure that minority religious and cultural views do not threaten majority interests. Some of these propositions come from the far political right; however, the mainstream is far from exempt in calling for strong action.

It can seem that the debate today is taking place without the help of a shared view of how to best manage integration. What had been used as a guide in many countries, the theory of multiculturalism, has lost favour in many societies, but no widely supported alternative has yet come forth. Societies that face integration problems are now in a position where there is no longer a dominant conceptual standpoint from which to take their cues. This is because the conditions that are now giving rise to integration problems are simultaneously the conditions that have undermined our dominant integration conceptual framework, the theory of multiculturalism. Integration failures are commonly seen as failures of multiculturalism policy.

Some recent criticisms of multiculturalism

Multiculturalism has been the dominant model for the way in which we manage integration for roughly 30 years. In my country, Canada, not only do we have this as a basic conceptual framework, but we have a Multiculturalism Act and a Multiculturalism Program in place at the federal government level as well as related policy instruments at lower levels of government. These policy instruments try to implement the general ideas of multiculturalism in specific ways. However, we in Canada and decision-makers elsewhere in the world are going to need to think deeply about how we go about the business of integration should contemporary criticisms of multiculturalism be sound. I would like to sketch these criticisms and outline a possible answer to them. It is important that we clarify our thinking on what 'integration' means, what we expect integration policies and programs to accomplish, and what an integrated society looks like. Again, in many countries, we are seeing former integration paradigms shattered, leaving behind only confusion as to how their people and political leaders understand social integration.

I will look briefly at two kinds of criticism of multiculturalism here, conceptual criticisms and practical criticisms. In brief, the conceptual criticisms say that due to the nature of the concept of 'multiculturalism' and the nature of what we mean by 'integration', the two simply do not cohere. It doesn't matter how a society tries to put it into practice, multiculturalism is bound to fail because of a fundamental inconsistency between that concept and the concept of integration. The practical criticisms recognize that the concepts might in principle cohere with one another, but argue that in reality multiculturalism yields seriously undesirable results.

Before I go further, I think it is important to recognize explicitly that multiculturalism in this context is an instrument for integration. One is used as a means to the other; the two concepts are not, as some seem to think, synonymous. Multiculturalism programs in Canadian and Australian societies are often regarded as *automatically or necessarily* integration policies; such is the history of social integration in these countries. In fact, the two concepts are entirely different.

One can see their difference – their conceptual independence – by noting that one can consistently imagine a society, perhaps an odd society, which regards multiculturalism as a device, not for bringing about integration but for maintaining *segregation*. If you were to imagine a society that had as a primary goal to maximize diversity and to avoid all forms of homogeneity, then you could imagine its policy-makers using the theory of multiculturalism as a way to maintain segregation and as a way to maximise and preserve diversity. You could even imagine such a society having a very strong immigration program as a way to increase diversity.

Hence, multiculturalism need not be only a device for integration; it could just as well be used as a device for segregation. This implies that a society must be thoughtful in *how* it applies multiculturalism in order to bring about integration and not some other, less desirable, result. The question then is, if we are going to use multiculturalism specifically as a policy for integrating newcomers, how should it be thought through? How should a society actually bring the policies or the ideas of multiculturalism to bear on the issue of integration?

The conceptual criticisms assert that it cannot be done. To shorten enormously one line of reasoning, integration, no matter which society one considers, is always integration *with respect to something*, say a central set of cultural values. Philosophers have referred to value universals around which a society conceives itself and in terms of which a society is integrated. The presupposition of this set of values, some of multiculturalism's critics say, immediately clashes with the fundamentals of multiculturalism which put a premium on respect for and celebration of difference. Diversity brings with it different points of view and values, some of which will not be consistent with the value universals of western liberal democracies or other types of society that might embrace multiculturalism. Therefore, in principal if you are going to encourage diversity at a fundamental and cultural level and at the same time try to integrate your society, which of necessity requires a common integrating principal, you find yourself face to face with a contradiction.

The practical criticism entails something quite different, although it also rests on the assertion of conflict. From the political right, loosely-speaking, people will often say that the end result of years of multiculturalism as a model for social integration has been divided societies. Instead of working towards integration or cohesion, multiculturalism has produced social division. Rotterdam City Council recently argued that what has happened as a result of multiculturalism is simply an integration failure

and a city so divided that the inner core has become home to a disproportionate number of immigrants, with the native-born Dutch moving to the suburbs, something similar to what has been called 'white flight' in the United States. Social tensions have risen and different ethnic groups live in fear of one another. Thus, it is argued, a divided city is the direct result of implementing multiculturalism, which, as it encouraged diversity, discouraged the promotion of a common way of life, a common set of core values, a common good for all residents of the city. Emphasis was placed on maintaining difference instead of finding common ground.

And, from the political left, again loosely speaking, people will say that what multiculturalism has resulted in is another form of division where you have a mere toleration of difference within the context of a social hierarchy based on the core values of the original members of the society. Such an argument is eloquently urged by commentators such as Bhikhu Parekh, who has argued that multiculturalism has not been embraced deeply enough with the result that members of cultural or ethnic minorities find themselves less than equal members of the society. Instead of a celebration of difference, the actual implementation of multiculturalism has often produced a near-perfunctory tolerance of difference within a deeply-rooted inequality amongst minority groups. So at a practical level, what you have, both the right and the left argue, is a divided society from the actual application of multiculturalism.

Solutions to problems

I will now try to sketch possible answers to these arguments. Let me begin with the conceptual arguments, which from a logical point of view are the most powerful, as their soundness would imply that it is impossible for multiculturalism to succeed as a device for social integration. From this point of view, we are talking about a fundamental clash between the idea of multiculturalism and the idea of integration.

All too briefly, I would like to propose that the core ideas with which our societies think about integration, the ideas around which members of our societies are to be integrated, specifically the ideas of liberal democracy in general, are in fact a *foundation for* multiculturalism itself and function as a prerequisite to the application and very formulation of multiculturalism theory. My view is that these two concepts work at different logical levels, one being a precondition for the other. *Simply put, if you don't have liberalism you are not going to have multiculturalism.*

Try to imagine societies that are not liberal, but that are multicultural; try to imagine how they would even work. What I would argue is that we can resolve the conceptual

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conflict by seeing that, in order to even have the possibility of a multiculturalism policy or a multicultural ethos in our societies, we need to be liberal already. The two do go together, are consistent, in that one is required for the other to be even possible. This line of argument, if found to be sound, is very powerful from a logical point of view and would, I believe, defeat the conceptual criticisms of multiculturalism. The argument that integration as conceived by liberal societies must conflict with multiculturalism, then, has an answer in outline.

The practical arguments concern how a society actually implements multiculturalism. The short answer to this sort of criticism is that one tries, as does Canada, to build social capital as one implements multicultural policies and programs. Multiculturalism programs must, I would argue, be designed explicitly to bring about social integration, the point I made at the outset, and, here I want to add, ought to be designed such that they yield increased social capital. Trust is at the heart of social capital and, if we are going to develop integrated and cohesive societies, we need it in large measures. Implementing multiculturalism in ways that develop trust between the newcomers and the rest of society is a practical way to get around the problems that people from both the right and the left speak about, whereby multiculturalism appears to result in social division and inequality.

One specific way that this can work is to implement these policies and programs so as to empower immigrant groups themselves in their process of becoming members of their new society, an empowerment that allows them to play a serious role in their own integration through which they, one might say, negotiate a partnership with the institutions of their new society. In Canada, integration and multiculturalism programs fund the many NGOs that represent and serve these groups to integrate themselves into Canadian society in a way that builds public trust with the rest of society. This is evidenced by the government providing funding for the NGOs to contribute to the integration process within a multicultural framework that is approved by Parliament and, in that sense, represents the will of the people of Canada. It is also evidenced through the NGOs accepting these funds, thereby indicating their trust of the institutions of their new society. The point of having NGOs deliver integration programs as opposed to having the government do so directly, as is often the case in full welfare states, is to empower the immigrants and their organizations. This approach gives a signal to the population at large that there is this trust between the government and the newcomer organizations and the

newcomers themselves, all of which contributes to social capital creation. There is a much fuller story here to tell, but the point is that it is in actual fact possible to design and deliver multiculturalism programs in such a way that a society can avoid the division and inequality that the critics refer to if they are implemented with the goal of social capital creation in their basic designs.

Conclusion

I began by noting that the paradigm of multiculturalism that has guided our thinking about integration for the past 30 or so years has been seriously challenged. This short piece may well be seen as a conservative and ad hoc attempt to bolster a faltering and outmoded view of how

to manage societies that accept immigrants from diverse ethnic, racial, cultural and religious backgrounds. There will be those that call out for strong and innovative measures to manage what they will consider to be a new situation brought about by the forces of globalization and, for some, a 'clash of civilizations' that has resulted from globalization. However, I reject such talk in rejecting the diagnosis of the problem that locates its source in the concept of multiculturalism. There is nothing that is fundamentally different in international migration today that would suggest a full re-thinking of what it means to have an integrated society and how one achieves it. Rather, what is required is a thoughtful examination of what multiculturalism actually requires a society to do, recognizing that it is not automatically a device for integration and facing the fact that it must be carefully implemented with integration as its clear objective. Remember, it could consistently be used as a policy device for fostering segregation.

Integration requires a continual investment in people. A society that is diverse must be prepared to remain actively engaged in building bridges over the long term. A society cannot simply declare itself to be multicultural and expect everything to take care of itself afterwards. Rather, each day we need to decide again that we will maintain the bridges we have already built, we need to decide again that we will build bridges for the newcomers who come today, and we need to decide again that we are

going to plan and design the bridges for the newcomers who will come tomorrow.

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Multiculturalism in Australia: Apogee or Nadir?

Andrew Jakubowicz

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ABSTRACT

Multiculturalism seems to have fallen out of popular public discourse in Australia. In this article, Professor Jakubowicz questions why this transformation might have taken place. Despite being very active in the immigration field, Australia is becoming increasingly defensive in the face of cultural difference. With no official legislation and no national rights framework on multiculturalism, the negative impact of this realignment on Australian society is potentially serious.

When then Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating launched the Global Diversity Conference in Sydney in 1995, he lauded Australia as having the world's best practice on multiculturalism. In the October 2004 general election, multiculturalism, though among their policies, was not mentioned by the government parties in their election promises, while the ALP opposition had not had a policy in the area since it decided in 2001 to make itself a "small target." How can we explain this transformation, in less than a decade, of mainstream political thought?

Some critics have argued that multiculturalism was never more than a rubric to disguise the buying of ethnic votes (Australia has a system of compulsory voting), while others have argued that its "hard version" (separate development and inter-generational maintenance of cultural and social values) was never an accurate description of the rapid integration of immigrants into the Australian mainstream. On the other hand, proponents of various Australian versions of multiculturalism (it has its own Australian flavour and connotations) have argued that its fairly modest goals had been actively undermined by conservative and racist forces (not necessarily the same people).

In its mainstream usage, multiculturalism describes a policy perspective that seeks three outcomes in relation to social development:

- a) it looks to ensure social cohesion in a society marked by cultural and social differences induced by immigrants from over 100 countries and 200 ethnic groups;
- b) it seeks to utilise the cultural capital represented by this diversity through its exploitation in the economic realm ("productive diversity");
- c) it recognizes and seeks to promote a global consciousness in which inter-cultural communication based on mutual respect characterizes public discourse.

Are we looking, then, at the end of Australia's endorsement of multiculturalism? If so, why is this occurring? If not, what does the current debate or lack of it presage for the future of diversity policies? It is helpful to place the immediacy of contemporary events within a longer term take on how the Australian polity views diversity, and the dynamics that form these views. Consider Australia, then, as an empire project.

Empire

While "empire" has become a popular term for discussions of global power and the restructuring of worldwide economic and political relations, it is also a useful term for investigating specific nation states with their empire-like characteristics. For example, Australia was claimed for the British crown in the late eighteenth century, against the possible claims of other metropolitan empires, France in particular.

Australia then became an imperial project of British cultural expansion, linked closely to economic expropriation by the founding state. Over the first century a local cultural project took form, its goal to sustain British cultural, political and economic hegemony. Such a hegemony required exclusion of other empires, subordination of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of immigrants into the pre-existing and self-reproducing hierarchy of cultural power. Thus the Commonwealth of Australia, formed in 1901, was the political expression of this cultural project, a cultural political economy of empire. It would confront the three imperatives outlined here as a continuing well-spring for its political life. Each imperative had its own trajectory, and they inter-connected throughout the society, creating an always unstable yet often creative set of social, economic and political relationships. In the post-WW2 world of globalization, these imperatives interact to determine the boundaries within which multicultural Australia is developing.

Population Demographics

Australian political processes are affected by both geography and history. Over 90% of Australians live within 100 km of the ocean, making it a society based on its littoral majority (and thus very aware of the vulnerability of its coastline). Much of its primary production wealth is drawn from the vast hinterlands, thousands of square kilometres of often parched and arid land, watered by a few major rivers, many now in ecological crisis.

While the first settlers were primarily British (English Scots and Welsh) with a significant minority of Irish (either as convicts or as survivors of the Great Famine), the immigrations of the nineteenth century brought Chinese, Pacific Islanders, Indians, Africans, and Black Americans, as well as tens of thousands of non-British Europeans. By 1900, under the influence of Social Darwinism and fear of the other European empires (now Russia and Germany), the colonies federated, and passed as their first major legislation the Immigration Restriction Act, creating what was known then and now, as “White Australia.” White Australia was designed to prevent the immigration of Asian, African, Pacific Islander and other people of colour, while expediting the removal of Pacific Islanders who had been recruited as quasi-slave indentured labourers.

White Australia developed deep roots in popular consciousness over the next half-century, intensified by the war against the Japanese in the Pacific, and the recognition that Britain was no longer a secure guarantor of Australia’s integrity – it was now the USA that provided whatever military mantle that was still available. With the awareness of the need for a bolstered population for defence, Australia also began a major process of industrialization, drawing in hundreds of thousands of European immigrants for the huge infrastructure projects of power, transport and housing.

By the late 1960s changing world conditions, the widespread end of colonial rule in the region, and a rising antipathy to racism within Australia had begun to undermine the three-generations of White Australia. Australia signed the UN Convention to eliminate Racial Discrimination, and began to accept “non-White” immigrants. By the early 1970s the new Labor Party government abolished “White Australia” (it had been dropped from the ALP platform in 1965 after a difficult internal debate), and opened immigration to the population of the world that met other non-racial criteria. Government expectations were that the emerging global middle class would come to Australia, as would the skilled workers needed by industry. However in 1976, with the end of the Indochina wars, Asian refugees began to arrive in their thousands, generating both a spreading grass-roots racism, and a varying anti-racist position by government and community leaders.

Yet a century after White Australia was established, and a generation after it was abolished, Australia appeared to have reconciled history and geography. In 2002-3 immigration totalled some 94,000, made up of 28,000 family reunion applicants, 38,500 skilled category, 16,300 New Zealanders (who have easy access) and 9,500 under humanitarian schemes (as refugees etc.) Family reunion was dominated by China, the UK and Vietnam, skilled by the

UK, India and South Africa, and humanitarian by Sudan, Iraq and Serbia/Montenegro.

While the overseas born have been steady as a proportion of the population at the 2001 Census, the use of languages other than English in the home has been growing – though slowly. In the period 1996-2001 a further diversity characterized Australia, as new communities, often of refugee origin, began to form. Australia’s fastest growing immigrant language group is the Shona-speaking people from Africa, followed by Afrikaans-speakers and Somalis. Four of the six language groups whose numbers doubled are from Africa.

In the most recent Census period, the following religious groups have more than doubled their numbers: Maronite and Melkite Catholics, and Albanian Orthodox. Antioch Orthodox has increased by 90%, Buddhism by 80%, Hinduism by 42% and Islam by 40%. In the 2001 Census 6.7 million people identified their ancestry as Australian, 6.4 million as English, 1.9 million as Irish, while Italian, German, Chinese and Scottish each had over half a million descendants.

Legal Structures and Approaches

Australia, a federation of former colonies with territories, divides powers and responsibilities between states and the central government. The centre broadly controls taxation, defence, foreign policy, social security, immigration and communication, while the states are involved in the delivery of welfare, education, police, transport and health. Many areas are jointly run, such as human rights and cultural development.

In the past the Commonwealth has used its foreign affairs powers to advance human rights initiatives (as signatory to international conventions) thus overwhelming more conservative state governments. In recent years with a conservative (Liberal/National) government at the Commonwealth level, the states have tended to be more pro-active on human rights issues.

At the national level the various human rights laws are administered primarily through the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC). It has developed a strong consultative and educational focus as its judicial powers have been reduced. The federal law relevant to multiculturalism is primarily directed at the prevention of discrimination against individuals on the basis of race and ethnicity, and at providing civil remedies for groups or individuals harassed by hate speech. The conservative parties have opposed criminal sanctions against hate speech, and have prevented their passing in the 1970s and the 1990s.

Unlike Canada there is no multiculturalism legislation, and no national rights framework for the retention and expression of cultural differences. There are however, a number of institutions concerned with multiculturalism – the most well-known of which is the multilingual radio and television broadcaster, the Special Broadcasting Service. SBS offers a wide range of radio programs on its own network in 68% community languages, programming for 650 hours each week, and also delivering programs through local community stations.

Each state also has its own human rights and ethnic affairs legislation – New South Wales for instance has a

“Community Relations Commission for a Multicultural NSW”, while Victoria is now exploring the potential for a multiculturalism act, modelled on the Canadian system.

Public opinion and discourses

If multiculturalism is endeavoured to be erected into an all-embracing national cement, for all Australians, then I believe that it is inadequate to the task, and that is my reservation, and there is my criticism...

John Howard, leader of the Liberal Party, FECCA annual conference, Canberra, (1988).

The term ‘Australian multiculturalism’ could be redundant in 25 years as more and more Australians adopt it as a way of life...

Gary Hardgrave, Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (July 2003)

Most Australians no longer see the need to prove our ethnic diversity... They are too busy practising it and enjoying its benefits. They are already living a life of many cultures. ... I think it’s very important that we maintain our Australianess and all the other people who come from fascinating parts of the world can add to the blend, but we must maintain the fact that we are basically a Christian, English speaking country

Mark Latham. Leader of the Australian Labor Party (April 2004)

The debate over multiculturalism has both heated up and dissipated in recent years. The Labor Party has essentially abandoned its historic commitment to the concept, leaving its current status undefined and without any policy articulation. The government parties have accepted a version of multiculturalism that reinforces the existing cultural hierarchy, reduces government support for cultural preservation, and pushes integration and inter-faith dialogue as the way forward.

“Multiculturalism” was adopted by the Australian government as a policy label in the mid-1970s. It was used to summarize the set of responses constructed to deal with the burgeoning social issues that the 1960s had generated in the process of trying to normalize or assimilate the immigrant population. On the other hand, multiculturalism never sought to encompass indigenous societies, while indigenous leaders saw multiculturalism as a problem for the invaders and settlers – not for the original peoples. Indigenous rights were political and economic questions, locked into land and ownership, whereas multiculturalism was essentially a struggle over hierarchies of culture.

The collapse of the Asian Tigers, the overthrow of Suharto in Indonesia, the revolution in East Timor, and civil wars in Yugoslavia, and the meteoric rise of the anti-multiculturalist One Nation party under its leader Pauline Hanson, all tended to erode public confidence in any ‘non-Anglo’ directions. In 1999 the national government adopted the term ‘Australian multiculturalism’, stressing the adjective, and asserting the critical role of social cohesion, and allegiance and responsibility to Australia.

Major Issues and Challenges

Cultural preservation

Multiculturalism in Australia has reflected a historic accord between the dominant society and the incoming minorities, that in exchange for the right to live, work and prosper in Australia immigrants would owe their primary allegiance to the Australian polity. The polity in recognition would validate their communal values and linguistic choices, within an agreed pattern of acceptable diversity. During the 1990s governments directed small but significant sums towards cultural preservation, and accepted the political nature of much cultural practice (e.g. Croats preparing to re-assert ethnicity over confederation in the post-Tito debacle of Yugoslavia). In recent years such support has dropped, reflecting the view that communal matters were issues of choice, not policy, and that communities could raise and commit their own resources to such affairs.

Religion and public life

Religion, however, has emerged to the forefront of the multicultural debate. A decade ago religious differences were a significant but essentially ethnographic dimension of multiculturalism. While some religious conflicts disturbed local social cohesion, they had few ramifications for the wider society. Since the rise of global Islamist terror groups, religious dimensions have come to stand for cultural differences. In Australia the 400,000 Muslims have experienced a growing wave of social hostility, much of it focused on Muslim communities from the Middle East and those who wear distinctive apparel. The New York bombings, the Bali bombings and increased tension of national loyalties have exacerbated purely local problems of violent and organized crime.

These issues have focused policy attention on inter-faith dialogues, and government and community sponsored symbolic displays of inter-cultural collaboration and unity. One outcome has been a much closer liaison between various levels of government and religious and communal organizations, generating some attention to the more deep-rooted and difficult questions of economic inequality.

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Economic transformation and human capital

Multiculturalism had as its central promise to both immigrants and the host community that it would fracture any sedimentation of inequality along ethnic and class lines – that is, it would ensure opportunity for economic mobility was not constrained by ethnic discrimination. Over the past decade this focus has waned, with governments more prone to adopt libertarian free-market approaches, and allow the sticks to fall where they may. One effect has been to corral some ethnic groups that entered the country with limited human capital – especially those from war-torn regions with poor schooling – into long-term ghettos of low income and poor prospects.

The layering of certain ethnicities into inter-generational unemployment has begun the creation of urban underclass enclaves, which are apparently unsusceptible to government exhortation. Only in those localities where religious or ethnic violence has emerged have governments addressed the economic issues – and in places, to quite good effect. Other communities with less public presence have missed out on this attention, intensifying alienation, and reducing the future possibilities for creating strong social bonds and innovative economic development.

Three pillars of immigration

In the global arena Australia has become renowned for its tough if not brutal immigration control regime. In the name of border defence Australia has created a series of off-shore internment camps, where hundreds of people have been held for years in atrocious circumstances, their only hope if their refugee bids are recognized a temporary permit to enter Australia. Yet Australia is a major player in the immigration field, articulating a three-pillar model of immigration. It seeks to recruit immigrants with high levels of human and cultural capital, accept – if grudgingly – the direct family members of those already in the country if they are not so highly valued, and selectively accept refugees applying through “proper channels.” In order to sustain this strategy the government penalizes, excoriates and intimidates refugee applicants who seek to arrive outside the orderly schema. Australian public opinion is widely divided over this strategy, but it is sufficiently popular for the government to only need to fine tune it from time to time, and for the opposition to critique only minor elements of the package.

Conclusion

Multiculturalism has declined as a desired social policy, though there is significant majority support in favour of ethnic diversity within a commitment to national core values and allegiance. For those at the edges of the social plane, these changes have resulted in greater inter-group hostility, higher levels of social tension and disadvantage, and a reduced willingness to interact across cultural boundaries for fear of rejection.

The Australian empire project has moved to a more systematic recognition of its imperatives, and a more cautious, conservative and controlling orientation to cultural difference. Such a closing-in and defensiveness against cultural difference marks the onset of a more tense

and socially disconnected polity, based on policies argued for in the name of social cohesion. The empire generates such contradictions and then finds ways to handle the consequences – through ideological reframing and increasing control of dissidence and deviance.

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Multicultural Challenges in a Bicultural New Zealand

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ABSTRACT

As one of the classic immigrant receiving societies, New Zealand has not been, in demographic or policy terms, particularly multicultural. But it has explored bicultural options, especially given a significant indigenous population. The diversification of immigration sources since the 1980s has put multiculturalism on the political and policy agenda, but in conflict with some aspects of biculturalism. In this context, a localized and biculturally-compatible multiculturalism might emerge.

New Zealand is a settler society and shares a colonial history which has many similarities with Australia and Canada (Belich, 1996). European explorers arrived from the late 1700s and a British colonial government was established through the early and mid years of the nineteenth century. What was significant was the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 between representatives of the British Government and a number of local Maori chiefs. From this point through to the 1960s, the overwhelming majority of the immigrants who arrived in New Zealand came from the UK and Ireland. Some immigrants did come from Dalmatia, China and India but these were small in number and all faced significant racism and discrimination. The result is that until the second half of the twentieth century, those born overseas and their descendants were British. Connections with the UK were strong with local institutions modelled on their British counterparts and strong trading and cultural links. New Zealanders were British citizens until 1948 with full New Zealand citizenship emerging with legislation in 1977.

Maori, however, constituted a significant and growing proportion of the New Zealand population. Traditionally located in a rural and provincial hinterland, Maori began to migrate to the expanding urban industrial centres after 1945 and within two decades, the majority had shifted to become urban dwellers. Their numbers had also increased, so that by the turn of the century they comprised almost 15% of the population with forecasts of further growth to 20% by about 2031 (see Didham and Bedford, 2005).

The monoculturalism of immigration began to change in the 1950s, especially with the arrival of migrants from the Pacific (Macpherson, Spoonley and Anae, 2001). Citizens of the Cook Islands, Tokelau and Niue were also New Zealand citizens and they were encouraged to migrate. Tongans and Samoans were not but their labour was needed in the expanding industrial sector. Although the latter migration was curtailed in the 1970s and has been controlled since, these Pacific migrants and their descendants now make up 6% of the population. They are growing rapidly and are expected to double as a proportion of the New Zealand population by mid-century.

This first period of non-European migration was accompanied by another dating from the late 1980s. A review of immigration policy in 1986 led to the disappearance of preferred migrant source countries. This led to a significant increase in the numbers arriving from Asia. The first group came from Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan in the early 1990s, and more recently, migrant flows have been dominated by Chinese and Indian arrivals (Trlin and Watts, 2005). There were also large numbers arriving from South Africa and an ongoing migration from Britain. Asian peoples constituted 5% of the total population by the 1996 Census and this is expected to double in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The presence of an urban Maori population, combined with Pacific and Asian peoples, especially in Auckland, provides contemporary New Zealand with a much more Pacific and Asian feel. The policy implications are complex.

Constitutional and Policy Approaches

Urban and rural Maori began to articulate a series of political and cultural concerns from the late 1960s, especially in relation to the preservation of the Maori language, the resolution of historical grievances and the economic participation of Maori, both in mainstream institutions such as the labour market and in relation to their own *iwi* (tribal) institutions. The result, especially with a reforming Labour Government in the 1980s, was to radically alter the constitutional and policy environment.

In constitutional terms, the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi was included in legislation and it was recognized politically as a key document in a modern nation-building process. It gave Maori rights as members of *iwi* (tribes) and *hapu* (extended families) that were not shared by other New Zealanders, effectively creating an indigenous citizenship. This citizenship was

exercised in relation to the ownership of major resources (land, minerals, fishing) and became the subject of court cases when the government did not consider the Treaty of Waitangi and the rights it bestowed on Maori. The Labour Government also made it possible to consider historical grievances (back to 1840), especially concerning land, by the Waitangi Tribunal, a semi-judicial body which heard evidence and then made recommendations to the government.

Alongside these constitutional changes, the Labour Government also implemented a policy of biculturalism. This related to social service delivery but also became apparent in relation to Maori language (it became an official language and a Maori-based education system was introduced that went from pre-school to university) and public rituals and practices (the use of the haka by practically all national sports teams, the singing of the national anthem in both Maori and English). Government services were now required to be aware of the needs of Maori as clients, to consult Maori on policies that related to them and to include Maori in decision-making and delivery. Devolution saw a range of services involving education, health, employment and the justice system transfer to Maori organizations, both traditional and those that represented urban Maori. The state contracted these organizations to deliver Maori services to Maori populations.

Subsequent governments, including conservative ones, have continued to resolve historical grievances, to recognize the Treaty of Waitangi and to adhere to bicultural policies. By the 1990s, biculturalism had become part of the constitutional and policy environment in New Zealand. Aspects of the process were subject to complaint, especially when it was felt that government interests prevailed over those of Maori, and there were still some Maori who had ambitions for *tino rangatiratanga* (Maori sovereignty).

The other significant policy change which occurred at the same time as the above was to move away from racial preferences in immigration policy. By the 1980s, the umbilical cord with the UK was well on the way to being cut, and it was felt important to establish trading connections with Asia. One way to do this was to encourage migrants from the region, and migration flows were rapidly diversified after 1986. In 1987, migrants from traditional countries, notably the UK, still comprised 76% of permanent and long-term arrivals. By 1996, it had dropped to 37.5% while the remainder were now coming from non-traditional source countries, especially Asian. Between 1981 and 1996, the overseas-born working age population grew by 32% and the skills and business categories were dominated

by migrants from China, India, Taiwan and Korea by 2000-01. The size of the overseas-born population meant that New Zealand had levels similar to Canada and Australia (and double those of the USA), but this population was also much more culturally and linguistically diverse.

Policy changes were particularly focussed on immigrant recruitment and selection, and remain so. New Zealand does not have a comprehensive post-arrival set of policies, and certainly no equivalent to the multicultural policies that were implemented in Canada and Australia in the 1970s. There has been growing recognition of Pacific communities, especially as they are now dominated by New Zealand-born. Pacific peoples have begun to play an important and very public role in arenas such as sport, music and fashion design.

The government have also developed some programmes and policies to deal with cultural issues (eg language retention) and employment and educational difficulties. However, both the government and Pacific communities have been very aware of the status of Maori and the pre-eminence of biculturalism. Resourcing for these initiatives is very different to those provided to Maori, and they have a quite different place in the political spectrum. Policy in relation to Asian communities is less obvious or well-developed, although these communities are being recognized as an important political constituency.

Public Debates and Discourses

All of these policy developments have attracted opposition. The shift to recognize the Treaty of Waitangi, to settle historical grievances and to institute biculturalism marked a particularly important moment as the coloniality-inspired institutions and the values which underpinned them were supplemented or replaced by post-colonial options, especially in terms of Maori (Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). What also occurred was a recognition by Pakeha, the European descent population, of their own local identity and the need to relate to Maori and a colonial history. These shifts were particularly unsettling for older generations who had been brought up to regard Britain as 'home' and who had participated in world wars in defence of empire. For many in these generations, a lot was being discarded and not a lot gained. However, govern-

ments pressed on with change, and much of it had become accepted as important by the late 1990s. But this did not end the opposition. A number of minor political parties began to represent the concerns of some New Zealanders that the changes had gone too far.

In 2004, the leader of the conservative opposition used a major speech to articulate his (and that of his party)

These shifts were particularly unsettling for older generations who had been brought up to regard Britain as 'home' and who had participated in world wars in defence of empire. For many in these generations, a lot was being discarded and not a lot gained. However, governments pressed on with change, and much of it had become accepted as important by the late 1990s. But this did not end the opposition.

opposition to what he described as the 'privileged' place of Maori. This concern has some explicit elements. One is the feeling that racism towards Maori has been replaced by racism towards Pakeha. Maori are deemed to have special consideration and anything which questions this position or which seeks to 'defend' Pakeha values and institutions is defined as politically incorrect. Associated with this complaint about the special standing of Maori is the feeling that they have gained more than enough resource. There is a lobby to end the deliberations of the Treaty of Waitangi and the settlement of historical grievances. In this rhetoric, Maori and liberal Pakeha fellow-travellers are seen as the primary racists in contemporary New Zealand. In the wake of this speech, the National Party gained significantly in political polling and the position of Maori and bicultural policies are now back on the political agenda in a much more significant way.

Alongside this set of politics are a very different set. The 1999 Labour Government initially sought to address what was identified as the 'gap' (primarily socio-economic) between Maori and Pakeha but the party's own polling as well as public comment indicated that this way of identifying the policy issue was not popular. Since then, they have abandoned this terminology but have continued to institute policies that are concerned with addressing Maori need but which are now more carefully explained in the public domain. But they have also faced a difficult task in terms of the seabed and foreshore. Maori have sought to establish ownership rights based on traditional use to parts of the seabed and foreshore, supported by court decisions. But the Labour Government has moved to introduce legislation to affirm public access and Crown ownership. This has angered many Maori, leading to major public demonstrations and the formation of a new Maori Party. This has split New Zealand, and highlighted the issues of indigenous ownership typically contrasted with public/national ownership. The ongoing development of biculturalism has encountered significant Pakeha opposition which, in turn, is reflected in political party positions and campaigns. Alongside the emergence of these positions, the arrival of a new form of political representation has seen a more equitable representation of Maori, and Pacific and Asian peoples in Parliament and the emergence of ethnic-based political parties. The changing demographics of New Zealand give the latter an obvious power base, and Pakeha opposition, while significant, has encountered powerfully articulated and strongly supported positions that reflect Maori interests in a way that would have been inconceivable two decades ago.

If bicultural issues are fraught, although still very dominant, anything which might represent a local multiculturalism is

not yet apparent. Pacific peoples faced major opposition to their arrival through the 1970s. They were seen by agencies such as the police and political parties as contributing to public law and order issues, growing unemployment and the decline of inner city areas. They were cast as 'overstayers' (being in New Zealand illegally) and their presence was extensively problematized. This demonizing of them lasted for several decades, and has only begun to wane in the last decade. A similar demonization of immigrants occurred again with a moral panic about the arrival of Asian migrants in the 1990s. An article in a community newspaper in Auckland in 1993, titled "Inv-Asian," marked the beginning of this period and led to an explicit anti-immigration stance in the 1996 General Election by a minority

party, New Zealand First. Asians were seen as contributing to problems: placing pressure on education; increasing the demand for 'monster houses'; poor driving habits in expensive cars; and a reluctance to 'fit in'. According to public opinion polling, opposition reached a peak in the mid-1990s and began to decline. Opinion was affected by the decline in Asian arrivals at the time of the Asian economic crises in the late 1990s, and their economic contribution to domestic growth was imperilled. There is still opposition and a problematizing of Asian immigrants by some political parties, but the level of opposition is much less obvious or politically significant. Further, when asked to identify who is most likely to experience racism or discrimination in New Zealand, New Zealanders will identify Asians as the main target, suggesting some sympathy.

The rapidity and radical nature of some of the changes of the 1980s has raised some important questions about what it means to be a New Zealander, the way in which ethnic and immigrant identity ought to be treated, especially when public resources are involved, and the balance between recognizing Maori and biculturalism, and what is required by way of a multiculturalism that addresses the nature of contemporary cultural diversity. New Zealand has gone from being a devotedly monocultural, Anglo-

phile community to one that has significant proportion of its population who are Maori and who are recognized in various ways that would have been unthinkable in the 1960s, plus thriving and increasingly important Pacific and Asian communities.

Challenges in Aotearoa

Biculturalism is unlikely to be dislodged in any significant way given the demographic base of Maori and their political sophistication in ensuring that the systems of the modern state recognize their position and need. Some of the easier aspects of the transition to biculturalism might

Alongside the emergence of these positions, the arrival of a new form of political representation has seen a more equitable representation of Maori, and Pacific and Asian peoples in Parliament and the emergence of ethnic-based political parties. The changing demographics of New Zealand give the latter an obvious power base.

have been addressed, and that what is left are more difficult and enduring issues: complex historical grievances, embedded socio-economic disadvantages which are inter-generational, and urban Maori who are at odds with traditional *iwi* (tribal) institutions. What these developments have illustrated are some specific as well as generic issues, including:

- Defining group membership, especially when there is significant levels of intermarriage and a move away from traditional forms of group membership and practice;
- The balance between national systems and institutions, and participation in these as a requirement of citizenship; and the development of Maori specific institutions, which are critical to preserving cultural traditions and identity but which are often invisible to non-Maori;
- The limits of tolerance from Pakeha, and other non-Maori, in relation to resolving historical grievances and the transfer of resources to Maori.

Alongside these issues are those which pitch biculturalism against multiculturalism. Biculturalism has occupied the pre-eminent place of political and policy debates, and there has been little room for multiculturalism. Further, there is a suspicion voiced by Maori that multiculturalism, especially a 'soft' form, would enable Pakeha and the state to escape its responsibilities towards Maori. There is some evidence for this, as the multiculturalism that is often talked about in the public domain does not involve major public resources, it does not make Pakeha uncomfortable and tends to leave much of the responsibility for cultural maintenance with the community responsible. Some moves have been made to develop a multicultural framework, especially from the Office of Ethnic Affairs and the Race Relations Commissioner. But there is often a first principle involved: Maori as *tangata whenua* (first people of New Zealand) are acknowledged as such and the multiculturalism that is proposed would not disturb this position. In reality, the multiculturalism that does emerge will need to sit alongside biculturalism, rather than in competition with it. Some of us have suggested that this might be cast as a bi-nationalism (Maori and Pakeha) alongside a system of collective rights which encompasses multiculturalism (see Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). One thing that does occur as a result of the emphasis on biculturalism is that immigrants and their descendants feel left out – they are neither Maori nor Pakeha, they are not included in conversations about biculturalism and the state seems pre-occupied with Maori. This situation is unsustainable in the long term and a form of multiculturalism which does not displace the biculturalism in place but which includes various ethnic minorities in an inclusive nation-building process and framework is required.

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Does Canada Have a Multicultural Future?

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ABSTRACT

This article explores Canada's diversity model. The authors begin by situating the Canadian approach in a discussion of our demographics, public opinion and discourse related to diversity. Next, they explore some of the challenges to Canada's approach, and conclude by examining whether Canada does, in fact, have a multicultural future.

Countries with diverse populations must develop approaches to tackle the challenges that will undoubtedly arise. The Canadian approach has been honed to its present sharpness on the whetstone of several hundred years of experience. Most notably, Canada has the world's first officially sanctioned multiculturalism policy, as well as a history of accommodating two official language communities, negotiating an appropriate place for the heterogeneous Aboriginal population, and constantly adapting to increased ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious diversity². Our efforts to create an inclusive Canada, while far from complete or perfect, are perhaps best summarized by the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), the core document establishing how the various diversities of the Canadian population contribute to the whole. There are separate sections that recognize Aboriginal peoples and official language minorities, as well as sections that recognize religious freedom and acknowledge the multicultural heritage of Canadians. The *Charter* is supported by a suite of legislation that recognizes, protects and promotes the rights of diverse groups.

For example, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1988) commits the Government of Canada to support the full participation of all Canadians regardless of race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society in its various social, cultural, political and economic facets. The *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2002) builds on this model and explicitly details the importance of the "two-way street" approach to integrating immigrants and refugees in Canada. That is, while newcomers are expected to adapt to Canada and Canadian norms, Canadian society and its institutions are expected to adapt to a diversifying population. The responsibilities of both lanes on the street have been explored in recent years in various articulations of what has most recently been called the "Canadian Diversity Model."³

Two key considerations should be kept in mind when exploring diversity in the Canadian context. The first is the on-going commitment to engage in free and open discussion on a wide range of issues. The second is ensuring that the full range of voices representing Canadians of diverse origins can participate in these discussions on an equal footing. At first blush this may sound simple, but a glance at Canada's demographics and a scan of its public opinion and discourse suggests this is no simple feat.

Diversity in Canada: Demographics and Discourse

Canada is home to approximately 30 million people, more than half of whom live in urban areas; this is significant because immigration to the country is today a largely urban phenomenon (a departure from the early 1900s when waves of predominantly European settlers entered the country to populate and develop the rural West). Although present-day Canada is best known as a country of immigrants, immigration levels have risen and fallen, often in response to the country's economic position or to international pressure to accept refugees, such as the so-called Vietnamese boat-people in the 1970s. Nonetheless, immigration levels have been relatively consistent for several years, averaging roughly a quarter million newcomers annually. They have contributed to the highest proportion of foreign-born residents in 70 years; in 2001, 18% of Canadians were born outside of the country.

The trend toward immigration from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa has resulted in an increasingly diverse population. Indeed, more than 200 ethnic origins were reported on the 2001 Census. Canadian, English and French were the most commonly reported, followed by Scottish, Irish, German, Italian, Chinese, Ukrainian and North American Indian. This is a reflection of Canada's history and traditional immigration patterns, but change is expected as a result of immigration of ethnic groups from new source countries and the rapid growth of the Chinese, Indian and Pakistani communities driven by both immigration and a high birth rate.

Canada's growing diversity is seen in other ways, including increased racial, religious and linguistic diversity. When discussing racial diversity in Canada, the term "visible minority" is typically used. This describes, according to the

Employment Equity Act (1995), all individuals, apart from Aboriginals, who identify as non-white in colour or non-Caucasian in race. Today visible minorities make up 13% of the Canadian population and, in some cities, visible minorities are actually in the majority. The visible minority population is growing quickly; between 1996 and 2001, the visible minority population grew six times faster than the rest of the Canadian population.

Religious diversity is also increasing. While Canadians have historically identified primarily as Catholic (43% in 2001) and Protestant (29% in 2001), the Protestant population has been decreasing for some time, and the proportion of Canadians who report they are Muslim, Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist has increased considerably. The largest growth was seen in the Muslim population, which doubled between 1991 and 2001. Religious diversity is expected to increase because these new religious groups⁴ are relatively young compared to other religious groups and the general population. The most recent Census shows that while the median age in Canada is 37 years, it is 42 years among Protestants, 28 years among Muslims, 30 years among Sikhs, and 32 years among Hindus.

Finally, we are seeing greater linguistic diversity. Although English and French are Canada's official languages, in the 2001 Census more than 100 languages were reported as a mother tongue, which is the first language learned and still understood. While 90% of Canadians speak English or French most often in the home, the proportion of people for whom English or French is not a mother tongue has increased to 18% (59% of Canadians speak English as a first language; 23% speak French).

In addition to being a demographic reality, diversity is now a part of the Canadian consciousness. We are proud of our reputation as an open and inclusive country and, when compared to other countries, Canadians do express markedly more positive attitudes toward immigration and diversity (Pew Research Center 2002). Indeed, 81% of Canadians agree that multiculturalism has contributed positively to the Canadian identity, and these numbers have been fairly consistent over time (Jedwab 2003).⁵ Importantly, Canadians do not just support the ideals of multiculturalism, but also its institutionalization through various policy levers, such as the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (Dasko 2004).

However, when asked about various facets of diversity, Canadians do make distinctions. To borrow from Orwell, some, it appears, are more equal than others. For example, questions on intermarriage (such as those from the Bogardus scale of social distance) reveal some level of discomfort, with religion being one of the most divisive characteristics. One-third of respondents (31%) would be uncomfortable with a close relative marrying a Muslim or an atheist, while 36% would be uncomfortable if a relative married a fundamentalist Christian (Parkin and Mendelsohn, 2003). When asked about close relatives marrying someone who is Jewish, Black, Aboriginal or Asian Canadian, between 11% and 12% said they would be uncomfortable. Moreover, 86% of Canadians would be uncomfortable if a close relative married a white supremacist, although we would suggest that the 14% who admit that they would be comfortable in this situation merits some exploration.

On the bright side, only 10% of Canadians believe that people of different races should not marry (Mendelsohn, 9 June 2003), and young people are more comfortable with diverse marriages than older people (CRIC, 1 July 2004). This is borne out in the last Census, which saw an increase in intermarriage. Unions between visible minorities and non-visible minorities, as well between visible minorities from differing groups, now make up 3% of all unions in Canada. We also saw an increase in the number of Canadians who report multiple ethnic origins; this is partly the result of increased intermarriage (Milan and Hamm 2004).

Canadians not only support diversity and multiculturalism, but also the process – immigration – that typically leads to it. Support for immigration can manifest itself in a number of ways. Two common barometers used in public opinion polling are (1) support for current immigration levels; and (2) perceptions of the contribution that immigration makes to one's community. Support for current immigration levels has been relatively stable over the last five years. One recent poll suggests that 47% of Canadians believe that about the right number are coming to Canada, while 10% believe the number is too few; 37% believe that there are too many immigrants coming to Canada (CIC, September 2004). Tracking also suggests most Canadians view immigration as having a positive effect on their community; 55% agree with that statement, and there is a trend toward more positive assessments (CIC, November 2004).

This is not to say that Canadians have always opened their arms wide to immigrants. Indeed, prior to 1967, Canada's immigration policy was unmistakably race-based,⁶ and many people supported it. For example, 46% of Canadians said in 1946 that we should prevent Jews from immigrating to Canada, while in 1961, 40% said that we should prevent non-whites from immigrating (Mendelsohn, 9 June 2003). Even today, while 65% of Canadians say that they would not prevent particular groups from immigrating, 7% would like to keep out Muslims, Arabs, Asians and visible minorities (CRIC, June 2004). In addition, when asked whether Canada should prohibit people from Islamic countries from immigrating to Canada "to reduce the threat of terrorism," 18% agreed (CRIC, June 2004).⁷

Since the replacement of the race-based policy,⁸ Canada has become a more diverse society. Subsequently, discussion has focused on constructing a more inclusive national identity.⁹ Traditionally, identity was tied to institutions – particularly those developed and maintained by the federal government – such as the national railway and the national broadcaster, which connected Canadians and fostered a sense of national achievement. The adoption of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* was a visible departure because it encouraged Canadians to think about their identity in a new way. No longer were Canadians to perceive their identity as being tied to institutions, but rather as something that is tied to concepts like multiculturalism, bilingualism, equality, human rights and rights and freedoms. By and large, this approach has worked, and Canadians express strong feelings of attachment to their country, feelings that strongly reflect these concepts.

Part of this national identity is the perception that Canada is the most open, inclusive and accepting country in the world. This is an idea exported by countless Canadians. It has also been affirmed by international observers as diverse as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and U2 frontman Bono (who both declared that “the world needs more Canada”), as well as the Aga Khan who recognized Canada as “the most successful pluralist society on the face of the globe.” Canada, it is suggested, is a model that other countries could, and should, emulate.¹⁰

Challenges

Despite the apparent success of the Canadian model, there are some worrying signs that it may be threatened. We discuss three such threats here. This first threat is challenges to the two-way street approach. The second is an unwillingness to tackle religion. Finally, we look at the discomfort with complex or intersecting diversities.

Challenges to the Two-Way Street Approach

The two-way street approach sets out responsibilities on the part of newcomers as well as on the part of Canadians and Canadian institutions. Challenges to the approach arise on both sides. We look first at newcomers, and then at Canadians and Canadian institutions.

Responsibilities of Newcomers

There is a perception among some that newcomers are not living up to their responsibilities. Much of this is borne out in a discourse of shared values, limits of diversity and an eventual – and unavoidable – “clash of civilizations.” Generally, the thinking goes like this:

In a country, such as Canada, where there is no single culture, religion, or language, something is needed to hold it all together. In the absence of homogeneity, values are the only thing that we have. We can see, however, that newcomers’ values are radically different than our own. We need to set some ground rules because if we don’t put some limits on all of this, it’s going to go ‘too far.’ Our values will conflict. There will be, in Huntington’s words, a ‘clash of civilizations.’

Forced marriages, female genital mutilation, and even dog-eating are held up as practices supported by minority cultures, but which conflict with Canadian values and our limits (Stoffman 2002). What is often ignored is that a minority of immigrants subscribe to these so-called “cultural practices,” and many immigrants come to Canada because they are escaping from or disagree with such practices and beliefs. Nevertheless, there is still a popular perception that we are importing illiberal practices and ideas that threaten Canadian society.

This discourse has been the subject of much criticism. Here, we touch on three objections. First, critics contend that the argument is based on a false premise: that Canada, or any country for that matter, actually has a set of shared values. Many argue that this is simply untrue (Heath, 2003). Indeed, many of Canada’s so-called shared values do not differ from those of other countries, such as equality, democracy or mutual respect. Moreover, this fear that immigrants threaten some perceived set of shared values is unfounded; research suggests that “within one generation, the children of immigrants and the children of native-born Canadians share the same values and sense of Canadian identity” (Mendelsohn, 2 July 2003). This can be seen by the active involvement of immigrants and minorities in achieving broader social justice goals. Thus, to the extent that some set of shared values does exist, these are shared by immigrants and native-born Canadians alike.

Moreover, the values and limits discourse implicitly assumes that there are no limits in society, which is also simply untrue. The Canadian approach already outlines the “rules of the game” and these set the framework by which we live. The *Charter*, for example, notes in its preamble that the rights and freedoms set out in it are subject only to “such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Moreover, the Criminal Code protects against many of the practices that critics fear. Similarly, Canada is a signatory of many international conventions like the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that further codify the limits. In other words, there are already well-defined limits.

The second criticism is that the values and limits discourse conflicts with the two-way street approach that is the basis of Canada’s approach to accommodating diversity. The discourse presumes that there is some existing set of Canadian values and some finite limits to which Canadians – newcomer and native-born alike – adhere. There is no framework for discussion. This flies in the face of the two-way street approach, upon which Canada’s approach to diversity is founded. The multiculturalism policy marked a shift from straightforward assimilation to a negotiated integration. The two-way street approach works, for the most part, because of this and because there is some expectation that Canadian society will adapt to this newfound diversity. Moreover, it allows immigrants to integrate by respecting the basic principles that structure society, not necessarily by abandoning their values or coming to share the values of other Canadians (Heath, 2003, p. 22-23). The values and limits discourse views conflict as inherently problematic, rather than as an opportunity for discussion to renegotiate and reconcile our differences. As a result, it undermines the two-way street approach.

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The third criticism of the values and limits discourse, and perhaps the most disquieting, is that it tends to single out particular groups of immigrants. It frequently points to immigrants from the Middle East or with Muslim backgrounds as being the source of our problems because their values are perceived to be so much different than our own. This leads neatly into a feared “clash of civilizations,” which is the almost predictable outcome of the values and limits discourse.

While the fears expressed by the proponents of the values and limits discourse may be overstated, we can, nonetheless, legitimately expect newcomers to live up to certain responsibilities. These include making a contribution to Canadian society, speaking one of Canada’s official languages, having some sense of attachment to the country, participating in politics and Canadian institutions, and learning about our history. These are the responsibilities of immigrants on the two-way street.

Responsibilities of Canadians and Canadian Institutions

On the other side of the two-way street are the responsibilities of Canadians and Canadian institutions. These responsibilities include facilitating the integration of newcomers, adapting to this new diversity, and welcoming newcomers as full and equal participants in all aspects of Canadian society. Although public opinion data suggest that Canadians view the inclusion of newcomers as important, belief does not necessarily translate into action. We provide two examples of increasing disparities between native-born and majority Canadians and newcomer and minority populations. The first concerns labour market outcomes, while the second concerns educational attainment. These disparities suggest that Canadians and Canadian institutions are not living up to their responsibilities.

The disparity that has garnered the most media attention of late concerns the increasing incidence of low-income among newcomers to Canada. Although the revised points system in the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2002) focuses more on human capital (including education, language, experience and adaptability factors), economic outcomes for recent newcomers to Canada are disturbingly low. A recent study by Statistics Canada found that 47% of recent newcomers live below the Canadian poverty line, which Statistics Canada calls the “low-income cut-off” (Picot and Hou 2003). The decline in earnings among immigrants may be the result of several factors including the under-valuing of foreign experience, accreditation issues, demographics (especially language skills) and discrimination (Grant and Sweetman 2004; Biles and Burstein 2003). Moreover, research that looks specifically at the labour market outcomes of visible minorities suggests that race is important. Some

studies have found a wage gap between visible minority Canadians (Canadian and foreign-born) and others (Pendakur and Pendakur 1995). Others have looked at unemployment and have found that visible minorities in general, but Black Canadians in particular, experience nearly double the unemployment rate of others (Mensah 2002: 144). Another set of research considers representation of particular groups in positions of power; here researchers found that Black Canadians were 3.5 times less likely to be found in senior management positions in the labour force in 1996 than other Canadians (Mensah 2002: 145). This is cause for concern.

Muslim Canadians are not faring very well in the Canadian labour market either. Indeed, in 2001, less than one half of Muslim women in Canada (49%) participated in the labour market, while the rate for all Canadian women was 61%. The unemployment rate for Muslim women was nearly double the national rate, and Muslim women who are employed full-time earn 10% less than the national average for women with similar employment. Moreover, Muslim women are under-represented in particular fields even when they possess the required education (Hamdani 2004: 16-22). Muslim women who wear the hijab face additional challenges. In a survey of Canadian Muslim women in the manufacturing, sales and service sectors, 41% of those who wore the hijab were told they would need to remove it if they wanted a job (Persad and Lukas 2002).

Although some researchers suggest that the influence of discrimination on labour market outcomes has, in the past, been overstated, results from the Ethnic Diversity Survey suggest that discrimination remains a concern for visible minorities. Twenty percent of visible minorities reported they had experienced discrimination often over the previous five years, while 15% said they had experienced discrimination, but only rarely (Statistics Canada 2003: 21). Incidents of discrimination are higher among some visible minority groups, including Blacks and South Asians. Discrimination is most likely to occur in the workplace with 56% of incidents occurring there.

The educational attainment of Portuguese Canadians is a second example of disparity. The educational attainment of Portuguese Canadians is one of the lowest in the country; only Black Caribbeans and Aboriginals have levels of education that compare to those in the Portuguese community (Nunes 1998). While programs exist to tackle low education rates among Aboriginal peoples, and employment equity initiatives seek to ameliorate similar issues for Black Canadians, no such initiatives exist for Portuguese Canadians. Indeed, Portuguese Canadians are not considered “visible” enough to benefit from employment equity policies.

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Religion: The Ignored Diversity

Challenges to the Canadian model extend beyond each of us living up to our responsibilities. Like just about every other country profiled in this magazine, religion poses a challenge to Canada. This is primarily because of our unwillingness to tackle religion head-on. Religion is nominally addressed under the aegis of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, which explicitly mandates the Multiculturalism Program to address religion. However, in reality, little attention has been paid to religion and religious communities in Canada (Bramadat 2004, Biles and Ibrahim 2005).¹¹

This is particularly true for Muslim Canadians. While other religious minorities have traditionally been addressed under categories of ethnicity or race, no ethnic, racial, or linguistic category can adequately capture Canada's heterogeneous Muslim population (Ibrahim and Janhevich 2004). The result is an uncomfortable confrontation between the religious identity of Muslim Canadians and the government apparatus established to address minority concerns. This is a fairly surprising oversight given the rapid growth of the Muslim population in Canada. At present, the best example is the desire of some Muslims in the province of Ontario to have a sharia tribunal, based on Muslim Personal Law, established under the *Arbitration Act* (1991). Although Orthodox Jews in the province have a similar system in place (Beit Deen), public response to a sharia tribunal has been far from receptive. The former Attorney General of Ontario was commissioned to explore the ramifications of allowing sharia. When she issued her final report, *Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion* (2004), she concluded that with the right safeguards in place¹², sharia should be allowed. The opposition of some of the more liberal Muslim women's organization has been picked up by proponents of the limits of diversity discourse as evidence that multiculturalism conflicts with Canadian "values" such as gender equality (Okin 1999).

Intersections of Diversity: A Post-Modern Challenge

A final challenge is the inability of our existing approach to deal with complex and intersecting identities. This is primarily because the legislation that recognizes and protects diverse groups protects specific groups or identities, making it difficult to address multiple challenges or intersections at once. Although this stove-piped approach evolved as a response to the interests and needs of specific groups of Canadians, it may have less utility in the future than it has had in the past. Increasingly there is a recognition that identities are not clear cut, and the lived reality of Canadians is far more complex. Moreover, the increasing complexity of identities is exacerbated by high levels of intermarriage across ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic lines. Policy needs to address these intersections of diversity, and the Canadian approach needs some mechanism for understanding and including them.¹³

Conclusion

In light of these challenges, we return to the question posed at the outset: "Does Canada have a multicultural future?" We would argue for several reasons that it does. First, younger Canadians who have grown up with the *Charter*, a multiculturalism policy and increasing diversity

express more positive attitudes to multiculturalism than older Canadians. This suggests that we will see more general attitudinal changes over time. Second, given the demographic weight of the newcomer population, there is reason to believe that their concerns will be taken more seriously in the future, especially as they become more active in all aspects of Canadian society. Third, there is a growing recognition of the incongruity of promoting ourselves as a country of tolerance, diversity and acceptance when there is evidence of inequality, discrimination, and differential outcomes. Finally, we have seen, in recent years, much research and policy work on the subject of the Canadian model. This suggests a willingness to examine, refine and ensure our approach continues to be open to diversity – in all its guises – while permitting the renegotiation and reconciliation of difference that is not only the heart of the Canadian model, but of our national identity.

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- ² This complex history requires a longer exploration than can be provided in a magazine article. For more, consult Biles and Panousos (1999) or Richard Day (2000). Accordingly, we will set aside the complexities of official language communities and Aboriginal peoples and focus instead on immigration-fueled diversity of more recent origin.
- ³ The "Canadian Diversity Model" is an evolving descriptor in government discourse to describe how the Government of Canada tackles a wide range of diversities and the issues that arise from them in the public policy context. Over the last few decades it has variously been described as national identity, national unity, social cohesion, diversity, inclusion or shared citizenship. Despite the evolution in vocabulary, the objective has always remained constant – the quest for forging unity from diversity (Government of Canada 2000; Jensen and Papillon 2001; Lloyd 2001, Tolley 2004).
- ⁴ While Bramadat and Seljak (2005) includes chapters chronicling the long history of these religious traditions in Canada, the majority of their adherents are relatively recent arrivals.
- ⁵ For a discussion of the factors that influence support for multiculturalism, see the article by Will Kymlicka in this volume.
- ⁶ It should be noted that historically in Canada, as well as in most other countries, race was used to distinguish groups not just on the basis of skin colour, but also ethnicity, religion, and language.
- ⁷ This question is problematic, however, because it explicitly links Islam with terrorism. In so doing, not only does it reinforce negative stereotypes, but it does not allow the respondent to distinguish between their attitudes toward immigration from Islamic countries and their attitudes toward immigration by terrorists.
- ⁸ Changes to the immigration regulations in 1967 introduced a universal points system applied to all newcomers regardless of country of origin, race or ethnicity. Points were awarded for education level, market demand for specific occupations and age (Li 2003: 23-4).
- ⁹ For a series of articles on this, consult *Canadian Diversity/Diversité canadienne* Volume 3:2 Spring 2004.
- ¹⁰ Some suggest that Canada's approach does not differ much from approaches in other countries. Kymlicka argues that Canada owes much of its success not necessarily to its unique model, but to contextual, geographic and political circumstances.
- ¹¹ There are hopeful signs that this may begin to change. For example, the University of Victoria's Center for Studies in Religion and Society has embarked on an ambitious three book project exploring religion and diversity in Canada. The first, *Religion and Ethnicity in Canada* (Bramadat and Seljak eds. 2005), has just been published, and the second, *Christianity and Ethnicity*, has just gotten underway. On the policy front, religion became a more significant issue after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Biles and Ibrahim 2002). For example, the national security policy announced in April 2004 calls for the creation of a cross-cultural roundtable comprised of ethnocultural and religious communities across Canada.
- ¹² These safeguards are spelled out in the 46 recommendations of the report and include the importance of ensuring that women genuinely have a choice when this route is taken, and that there are means to appeal decisions through the regular judicial process.
- ¹³ The best catalogue of these intersections has been captured by the "Intersections of Diversity Project" that was supported by a wide cross section of Government of Canada departments, agencies and programs mandated to address the concerns of specific components of the Canadian population. Ten literature reviews and ten policy challenge papers can be found on-line at http://canada.metropolis.net/events/Diversity/diversity_index_e.htm.

Notes

- ¹ The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Canadian Heritage, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Government of Canada, or the Metropolis Project.

Multiculturalism in Singapore

CHUA Beng Huat

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ABSTRACT

The author gives a brief history of Singapore as a multiracial nation. Despite being very rigorous in its implementation of multicultural policy, certain uneven outcomes result. The following topics are addressed: language and education, public housing, political representation, and religion (Islam).

A little known fact within the growing academic and policy discussion on multiculturalism is that Singapore was the first nation in the world to constitute itself as a multiracial society in the nation's Constitution, at the point of its political independence as a city-state in 1965. This constitutional multiracialism was a consequence of its historical, demographic and geopolitical location at the time of independence. Shortly after the establishment of a trading post and free port by the Anglo East India Company in 1819, waves of immigrants from impoverished southern China began to arrive. Within a short decade, Chinese immigrants already constituted the demographic majority of the population. Although immigrant waves declined after the Second World War the Chinese majority grew, augmented by local born. At the time of independence, ethnic Chinese constituted an overwhelming 75% of the population, with approximately 15% Malays and 7% South Asians, who are generically classified as 'Indians', and a small percentage of non Asians. These three visible ethnic groups are locally known both officially and informally as three races; race instead of ethnicity will therefore be adopted in this essay.

Geographically, Singapore is a small island which is contiguous to the Malaya peninsula, separated by a narrow straight of less than one mile wide. Both are, in turn, part of the Southeast Asian archipelago, which is divided into Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Philippines, where Islam and the Malay language are the identity markers of the people. Being an island nation with a majority migrant stock, ethnic Chinese population within this region of Muslim and Malay language majority, to remain silent on the nation's 'ethnic' character would, undoubtedly, caused it to be read as a 'Chinese' nation. This would not have been received with equanimity by the neighbours. Furthermore, the time was during the Cold War, with the People's Republic of China actively promoting communist ideology regionally; a de facto ethnic Chinese nation, no matter how small, would therefore likely be received as a potential bridgehead for the spread of communism. Consequently, the founding political leadership could be said to have made a virtue out of necessity and declared Singapore a constitutional multiracial nation.

Language and Education

From the beginning, four official languages were adopted: English, Mandarin, Malay and Tamil, the language of the majority of the South Indian citizens. English, the colonial language, was retained as the language of commerce, public administration and the primary medium of instruction of state-run schools on account that it was the world language of enterprise, science and technology. However, every student was, and continues to be, compelled to take one's 'mother tongue', namely the father's ethnic or 'racial' language, as a second language throughout primary and secondary education. Obviously, the 'race' of an individual is assigned by patrilineal descent, regardless of the mother's ethnicity; offspring of inter-ethnic marriages are assigned the father's ethnicity. Through such a mechanical assignment, everyone in Singapore is racialized by the state.

Due to colonial neglect, local ethnic communities had developed vernacular schools to cater to their own community needs during the colonial days. As the financial advantages of the English language became increasingly apparent after independence and as the state rapidly expanded the opportunities for English language-based education, more and more parents began to enrol their children in state schools. Ethnic language schools atrophied from the early 1960s onwards. By 1974, all schools were state-funded or state-subsidized and English was made the primary language of instruction for all education levels.

Adoption of English as the language of government and economy has an additional ideological advantage for the state. English can be rendered as the 'ethnically neutral' language with reference to the local Asian populations, providing no advantages to Chinese, Malay and Indian in its acquisition. To the extent that economic competition is highly dependent on facility with the English language, English became by default the 'guarantee' of meritocracy in both the education institutions and the marketplace. Indeed, the economic dominance of English has become a point of irony, if not contention, and is often parodied in local entertainment, in which a non English-speaking Singaporean would lose out, such as in

employment, to an English-speaking one. However, with ample opportunity to learn English in public schools, the issue of economic advantages has become, over time, less about race and increasingly a question of social class. Children of middle class professional households, with English as the domestic language, would have a head-start, and thus cultural advantages over those from working class families who continue to use their respective racial languages.

By now, English has effectively become the 'public' language of Singaporeans. The government and some in the population are left in belated lamentation about the demise of the 'mother tongues' within a population who used to be polyglots in Asian languages, including several Chinese languages. In vain attempts to recover some of the linguistic competences, one month every year is designated as a language month for the three official Asian languages with dubious results. Furthermore, the emphasis on 'mother tongue' acquisition in primary and secondary education has been sharply reduced. Until early 2000, a minimum grade for the mother tongue was necessary for admission to the local universities, but this qualification has been removed and competency of the language no longer matters in gaining entrance.

Public Housing and Racial Redistribution

One of the most impressive achievements of the long ruling government in Singapore – the People's Action Party (PAP) has formed the government, through periodic general elections, since 1959 without any interruption – is the national public housing program. The less than desirable housing conditions of the colonial days have been completely erased. Except for the highest 10% income households who live in private housing, the rest has been resettled into state-subsidized, high-rise apartments in comprehensively planned housing estates. This national rehousing program provided the government with an opportunity to break up racial enclaves of the colonial era and redistribute their residents into the new housing estates.

Public housing is allocated on a first-come-first-serve basis. This would already have an effect in diluting possible concentration of the demographic minority groups, the Malays and Indians, in a particular housing estate. However, fearing that these groups may re-concentrate themselves through purchasing flats in particular housing estates, a quota system was imposed in the early 1980s; the presence of each racial group in a housing estate is maintained relative to their proportion in the total population. This control is possible because each property transaction has to be processed and approved by the public housing authority, the Housing and Development Board.

Quota has apparently been fairly applied to all three races. However, as in all race-based policies in Singapore, the effects are unavoidably unevenly distributed through the racial groups. For example, even with the quota, with an overwhelming 75% majority population every Chinese household is likely to find Chinese either as immediate neighbours or on the same corridor of the housing block. The same is not true for the Malays, and even less like for Indians. It could be surmised that there are, therefore, greater demands on the latter two groups in terms of tolerance and integration than for the Chinese in any housing block and estate.

Political Representation

With the radical disruption of racial enclaves and the overwhelming majority of Chinese, it is entirely conceivable that Malay and Indian candidates would not be elected in a parliamentary election, if the electorate were to vote along racial lines. In an attempt to avoid the complete shutting-out of Malay and Indians in parliament, the electoral process has been modified to guarantee 'minority' representation.

As a post-British colony, Singapore had a parliamentary system of single constituencies, in which the candidate who garnered the most votes got to represent the constituency. In the early 1990s, a new form of constituency was established by the PAP government. Some constituencies were regrouped to form a 'group constituency', called the Greater Representative Constituency (GRC). In a general election, each of the contesting political parties has to put forth a slate of candidates equal to the number of constituencies in the particular GRC, of which one of the candidates must be non Chinese. The slate that garners the most number of aggregated votes wins all the seats of the GRC. With such machinations, a 25% presence of non Chinese, being their proportion in the total population, in each elected parliament is guaranteed. This has effectively ensured the presence of Malays and Indian members in parliament (MPs); however, it has also simultaneously guaranteed a 75% permanent majority of Chinese members.

If MPs were to vote along racial lines on issues, it would become obvious, very quickly, that the Malay and Indian representatives could be reduced to mere token presence. The cost of guaranteed representation along racial lines appears to exceed its convenient attainment, if Singaporeans were to behave politically, exclusively along racial lines.

The Particularity of Islam

As mentioned above, the Malays in Singapore is part of the largest regional Islamic community of the world constituted by Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern Philippines. This has resulted in the Singapore Constitution recognizing

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Malays as the indigenous people of the nation and accorded certain special privileges. Additionally, as a legacy of its two-year (1963-65) membership in Malaysia, where all Malays are constitutionally Muslims, Malay ethnicity is similarly conflated with Islam in Singapore. As a consequence, perceptions and management of Malays issues are closely tied to issues with Islamic religion. This has several significant consequences.

First, the Muslim community is governed by a separate legislation, in addition to the civic laws of the land. The British colonial administration gave in to pressures from the Muslim community and enacted the Muslim Ordinance in 1957 which provided for, among other institutions, the setting up of an Islamic court, the Shariah Court, and a separate Registry of Muslim Marriages. The Ordinance was replaced by the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) in 1965, by the independent government. The most important cases dealt with by the Shariah Court concern divorce and its attendant settlements. There have been complaints from Malay-Muslim women that judges of the Court are too conservative in preserving male privileges. More often than not, they have refused to use both more liberal interpretations of the Islamic legal provisions derived from elsewhere in the Islamic world and the wider berth provided by the AMLA itself, in their judgements.

AMLA also instituted an Islamic Religious Council and an office of the Mufti. The Council has become the central religious administrative agency which oversees the *zakat fitrah* (annual obligatory tax), administration of *wakaf* (donated) land, the centralization of the Haj pilgrimages and the management of all mosques. The Mufti presides over the Fatwa Committee, and is responsible for religious rulings pertaining to Islamic law. The centralizing tendencies of these institutions have generated contestations between themselves and those who have different interpretations of the religion. Individual preachers would often add their commentaries on the edicts provided by either the Council or the Mufti, demonstrating their religious independence. The centralization tendency is therefore not without its critiques.

Second, the Malay-Muslim community has direct representation and access to the highest level of government institutions in the office of the Minister for Malay-Muslim Affairs. Along with the other Malay-Muslim MPs, they constitute together the political leadership of the community. However, as members of the ruling government, they cannot represent Malay-Muslim interests exclusively but rather have to dilute these interests relative to the nation's interests as a whole. This has resulted in complaints that see the Malay-Muslim PAP members as obstacles to the full articulation of the community's interests. The Association of Muslim Professionals had proposed an alternative

community leadership formation process which was rejected by the ruling party as potentially racially divisive.

One area in which the community's interest and the government's interest are at odds is that of the use of head-dress for female Malay students in schools. All Singapore schools require students to wear a uniform. The community would like the schools to allow female Muslim students to wear headdresses. This has the support of the Malay-Muslim MPs. However, the request has been denied by the Ministry of Education, again, on the ground that such sartorial practices will lead to exclusion and divisiveness among students. When the uniform rule was challenged by some parents on the first school day of 2002, the students were promptly denied entry to the schools and suspended until they relented to abide by the school uniform. The issue has subsided but not disappeared.

Conclusion

Among the nations which espouse multiculturalism as a national policy, such as Canada and Australia, the Singapore government is possibly the most rigorous in carrying out the logic of state multiculturalism. It officially racializes every citizen, broaching no hybrids. It imposes similar language requirements on all students in primary and secondary education. It imposes quotas on every racial group in housing allocation. It provides an equal number of public holidays to each racial or religious group, which is often co-extensive. It rigidly maintains 'meritocracy' in the economic sphere, refusing any form of affirmative action on the basis of race or religion. Yet, as I have shown above, in many of the areas of social life, such apparently 'fair' policies for all frequently produce uneven effects and thus uneven disadvantages. Furthermore, the Singapore state is compelled by history and geopolitics to pay particular attention to the Malay-Muslim community, which constitutes

less than 20% of the population. These additional attentions have not always been read as privileges, and thus welcomed, by the recipients. Nevertheless, political argument for maintaining racial harmony seems to hold sway; this is hugely significant in accounting for the economic success of the past forty years of Singapore's nationhood.

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The State of Multiculturalism in the Netherlands

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ABSTRACT

This article provides an overview of immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands. Whereas these were once relatively lenient, recent developments give cause for concern. Changing attitudes are reflected in the popularity of such political figures as Pim Fortuyn who publicly criticized Islam and championed the rejection of multiculturalism. In conclusion, Doomernik asserts that multiculturalism in the Netherlands has now been “relegated to the dunghill of political history.”

Much like most other European countries, The Netherlands does not consider itself to be a country of immigration in the sense that it offers opportunities to adventurous people from abroad. The government did, however, acknowledge by 1980 that the presence of immigrants in the country was a reality requiring adequate policy responses. This was after a period in which the country had pursued ‘guest worker’ policies, whereby it was assumed that these workers were to stay as long as their presence was of economic value and would return home once their services were no longer required. For certain nationalities this was precisely what happened, for others it was not. When the need for unskilled labour drastically went down after the oil crises of the 1970s, especially ‘guest workers’ from poorly developed states like Turkey and Morocco turned out to have settled. Subsequently, a process of family reunification set in; in this way a moderate stock of several tens of thousands of ‘guest workers’ turned into ethnic communities of considerable size. The Turkish community now comprises 341,000 persons and the Moroccan community amounts to 295,000 people¹ (CBS 2003).

Another type of immigration took place from the (former) Dutch colonies. When Indonesia gained independence in 1949, this caused an outflow of persons who – often of mixed descent – had been associated with colonial rule. Even though most of these persons were born in Indonesia, they were considered as repatriates who ‘returned’ to the Netherlands. The Indonesian community gradually increased in size and now numbers just over 400,000 (Ibid.). Colonial immigration of a more recent date stems from Surinam. The country became independent in 1975, forcing the Surinamese population to remain Dutch nationals (implying resettlement in the Netherlands) or becoming Surinamese nationals. Today the Surinamese community numbers 321,000 (Ibid.). Since then, immigration to the Netherlands has greatly diversified. Especially since the end of the 1980s, immigrants – oftentimes refugees and asylum seekers – from many countries near and far have found their way across the Dutch borders. To give a few examples: in 2003 the country was home to 42,000 people from Iraq, 28,000 from Iran, 28,000 from Somalia; all populations virtually unheard of a decade earlier. Between 1995 and 2003 the total population of non-western origin in the Netherlands increased by 44% (to 1.6 million or 10% of the total population), whereas that of western immigrant origin the increase was limited to 7%. Arguably, this diversification in immigration is to be understood as an integral – and hence ‘normal’- part of the globalization process (Doomernik et al. 1997, Doomernik & Axtmann 2001). Yet, this was an unforeseen consequence and one which gave policy makers a sense of being ‘out of control’ and politicians an easy issue for debate. It is in this light that recent developments in Dutch immigration and integration policies should be understood.

Immigration policies past and present

The sense that immigration needs to be strictly controlled is a relatively new phenomenon in the Netherlands. In the 1950s and 60s the country was considered to be one of *emigration* and the government actively promoted the resettlement of Dutch nationals abroad. After 1960 shortages started to make themselves felt on the labour market and these were addressed by importing guest workers. Recruitment took place, but to a large extent vacancies were filled with workers who turned up “spontaneously” (Penninx et al. 1994). In case these immigrants had no residence and/or working permit these could be arranged *post factum*. Few if any policy concerns were caused by this.

After 1974 this period ended. As we know now, this did not mean an end to actual immigration – on the contrary. Yet no serious attempts were made to curb the arrival and settlement of family members of the former ‘guest workers’. The main challenge for policymaking that was identified was to integrate these newcomers into Dutch society (see further down).

Since then, the Netherlands has pursued restrictive immigration policies, meaning settlement is only allowed in cases where a) this serves the national interest, b) international obligations leave no alternative, c) there are compelling humanitarian

grounds to allow it. Obviously, these grounds stand open to interpretation. The meaning of “serving the national interest” has never been established by parliament and has been interpreted according to economic urgency and the political influence of the applicant (which always is the employer) (Koopman 2002). Some international obligations are clear-cut in nature (e.g. European Community Law) while others are much less so; e.g. as far as the compelling humanitarian grounds for granting a residence permit are concerned, the government has certain discretionary powers within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights (article 8).

Until the mid 1980s admission usually took place on the grounds mentioned under c) and, to a smaller extent a), and the interpretation tended to be generous towards the immigrant. After this period, this started to change. More and more immigrants were asylum seekers and refugees hoping to be admitted on grounds following from the Geneva Convention. Traditionally the interpretation of the Geneva Convention was such that an applicant stood a good chance of being allowed to stay – if not with full refugee status at least with some other type of residence permit. The emerging sense of losing control following a sharp increase in asylum requests during the early 1990s led to numerous changes in practices and laws all over North Western Europe, including the Netherlands, in hopes of reducing the number of asylum requests. During the entire decade the Netherlands remained one of the European Union countries that received the highest numbers of asylum requests (not just in relative but also in absolute numbers). By the second half of the 1990s, the government had become convinced that further restrictive use of the current Aliens Law no longer held much promise and decided to enact an entirely new law. This came into force in April 2001 and by virtually abolishing the possibility of appeal for rejected asylum seekers indeed managed to reduce the number of successful claims quickly by half or more. This led to a significant reduction in asylum requests.

Furthermore, the present government decided to make admission on grounds mentioned under c) more difficult or even impossible by imposing conditions regarding income (120% of the minimum wage) or age of the person wanting to import spouse or partner from abroad (from 18 to 21 years of age). And so in general it can be concluded that the discomfort caused by the feeling of

being out of control when it comes to asylum seekers and refugees had spilled over into other areas of immigration and integration policy.

This trend is further exemplified by the way in which internal controls were developed during the 1990s. It gradually became clear that immigrants, especially those from the guest worker era, had disproportionate need for social security provisions and similar benefits.

From there the step was small towards the assumption that *illegal* immigrants might well be large-scale welfare abusers. And in any event, the possibility that a person residing in the country without permission could theoretically claim such benefits politically justified the introduction of an ‘exclusion law’ or *koppelingswet* in July 1998. This law introduced the requirement for all providers of public goods (with the exception of medical doctors and teachers) to establish a client’s residence status, and deny access in relevant cases. Even though the number of aliens affected by this law turned out to be small, their exclusion still created considerable public attention. First of all because they usually turned out to be vulnerable families with children and, secondly, because the municipalities concerned showed themselves to be very reluctant to terminate these people’s income (and if applicable, public housing). Today this reluctance is still in evidence but the focus has shifted towards rejected asylum seekers. Apart from humanitarian considerations, municipalities are also concerned about the potential risks to the civil order when vulnerable people are left to fend for themselves on the streets. Politically this stance has resulted in a deadlock between municipal and national authorities; the latter trying to force the former to implement locally their centrally planned policies. The type of resistance varies, but about a third of all municipalities have indicated that they are not prepared to fully implement government policies.

Integration à la mode Hollandaise

When it comes to integration policies a similar type of development can be seen to have taken place in the domain of admission policies: a gradual move away from *laissez-faire* and leniency towards a problem-driven and uncompromising approach to newcomers. Dutch integration policies broadly comprise three domains: the legal, the

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socio-economic and the ethnic-cultural domains. The first was partially addressed earlier (restrictionist, i.e. admit as few aliens as possible) but is complemented by the notion that those who *are* admitted should ideally become full citizens as a matter of course. Failing to naturalize, which can take place after five years of legal residence, an alien has legal rights that come very close to that of a national (the most significant discrimination being the right to vote and stand as a candidate for national elections). This principle has stood more or less undisputed since Dutch integration policies were first conceived in the early 1980s. Naturalization made relatively easy, and the presence of many post-colonial immigrants who always had been Dutch nationals, plus a desire to monitor the integration of the children of immigrants, created the need to create a new policy category: the *allochtonous* inhabitants of the country. Anyone born abroad or having one such parent comes under this heading. Further differentiation is made between western and non-western allochtonous people. Only the latter are of concern to Dutch integration policies.

The socio-economic position of non-western allochtonous persons, on average is not at par with that of the native Dutch. Indeed, among members of the first generation the average unemployment levels are high and the net-participation rates low (Doomernik 1998, CBS 2003). For the second generation the picture varies less from mainstream society, but educational attainments lag behind to varying degrees and dropout rates are higher. Labour market performance and participation rates are clearly higher than of their parents but lie behind those of native peers. Not surprisingly, crime rates appear to lie well above those for the rest of the population (though one should keep in mind possible biases in police investigation, prosecution and sentencing).

These problems have been countered with several types of policies, both of a targeted and a general nature. Among those policies were quotas for positive discrimination in the allocation of public jobs, on the local and the national level examples could be found, and additional job schemes aimed at the long-term unemployed (among whom are a disproportionate number of persons of foreign origin) and school-leavers with poor qualifications (ditto) (Choenni 2000, Doomernik 2003). On top of that, mention should be made of two instruments that are rather typical for the Netherlands.

The first came under several names and lasted for a decade (until the end of 2003). It was a legal obligation among the larger employers to register the ethnic identity of their staff members, to report these numbers annually, and to come up with a public statement as to its plans to increase (if applicable) the relative number of allochtonous staff members. The idea behind this measure was

that it would raise awareness among employers for their important role in furthering the integration process. Yet, it transpired that many employers did not take this responsibility as seriously as expected. To remedy this, the law was renamed and watered down by dismissing the reporting obligation. It is difficult to assess what these measures have contributed.

Probably more effective is the comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation (in civil and penal law) the Dutch government introduced during the 1990s. Part of this was the establishment of the Equal Treatment Commission. It investigates complaints about discrimination in the fields of work and education, or in the provision of services. Its judgments are not legally binding but have a very high standing and societal impact.

Another set of instruments is meant to equip newcomers with basic skills. Since 1998 all newcomers who seek permanent settlement in the Netherlands and who arrive from outside the European Union are subject to an integration obligation. This follows from the *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers* (WIN), or the Law on the Integration of Newcomers. Immigrants are required to follow approximately 600 hours of language training, during which they also learn about Dutch society's institutions, culture, norms and values. Until now, the sanctions in case of non-compliance from the immigrant's side were modest (an administrative fine). The present government aims to link the completion of the course and the passing of a language test to the granting of a permanent residence title. It also wants to extend the scope of the WIN to include immigrants who were in the country already before 1998, and even those who are naturalized Dutch citizens.²

Moreover, by introducing an integration requirement for prospective migrants from outside the EU (a minimal knowledge of Dutch to be tested by the Dutch consulate) before a visa is granted, integration policies meet the restrictive admission regime. A last important change pertains to the financing of the integration courses. Whereas originally the government funded the municipalities to organize the integration courses, the new system will be such that the migrants themselves must bear the full costs and the courses are to be privatized. The government explicitly retreats and puts all responsibility on the migrants concerned.

Policies towards the ethnic-cultural part of the integration process are also in flux. Based upon a tradition of denominational groups being able to live together successfully by leaving each other alone (which was the way Dutch society was organized until the 1960s) a similar attitude prevailed towards newcomers, and the tools by which they could organize themselves along ethnic and, especially, religious lines where available on the basis of equality

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(Doomernik 1995). Just as previously Dutch education allowed for Roman Catholic, Protestant and neutral school types, and similar divisions in the media, hospitals, trade unions and employers, and all other societal spheres, it now offered Muslims and Hindus the same opportunities. The Netherlands today has more than thirty of such primary schools. Moreover, there are Islamic and Hindu broadcasting corporations which receive full state funding. The government also maintains consultative bodies for seven ethnic groups that meet with the Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration on a regular basis. These bodies are made up by a variety of religious, cultural and social organizations and receive government funding. The idea of having this type of consultations goes back to the 1980s but was formalized in the 1997 Law Consultations Minority Policy (*Wet Overleg Minderhedenbeleid*), coinciding with an explicit government choice to label the country “multi-cultural.”

During the campaigns for the parliamentary elections of 2002, the populist politician Pim Fortuyn gained much support with – among other issues – his rejection of multiculturalism and sweeping statements about the “backwardness” of Islam and its assumed discriminatory stance towards homosexuals and females. Fortuyn was assassinated shortly before the elections but his party (LPF) gained a landslide victory, especially over the social democrats who had been coalition partners to the last two governments. Fortuyn’s party became part of a quarrelsome new government with liberal and Christian democratic coalition partners that soon ended with new elections. This time round other parties made clear that they had “understood Pim’s lessons”: the LPF lost many of its voters, the social democrats regained their strength, yet a new government was built on the basis of a liberal/Christian democrat coalition.

In so far as the term comes up, multiculturalism is relegated to the dunghill of political history. Apart from the developments outlined earlier, this change in perspective allows the government to question the willingness among immigrants to participate, and to propose a system by which to measure the distance (or nearness) of immigrants vis-à-vis Dutch society. Whereas previously integration was deemed first and foremost related to employment and education, presently it appears generally to be about more than this; e.g. about loyalties and making an unequivocal choice for Dutch society by giving up dual nationality. The discussions were further fuelled by the murder in November 2004 of a filmmaker and notoriously provocative columnist by a psychologically deranged Muslim (of Moroccan extraction but Dutch born) which sent shockwaves that went far beyond the national borders. Those already convinced about the backward character of Islam, found in this murder the ultimate evidence for the claim that they had been right all along.

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Notes

- ¹ This includes the members of the second generation, defined as having at least one parent born in the country of origin: the allochtonous – see further down.
- ² How this stands up to article 1 of the Dutch constitution, which prescribes equal treatment, at the time of writing is unclear.

Multiculturalism in China

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ABSTRACT

This article gives an overview of the demographic situation in China and provides an understanding of the way in which its Constitution approaches minority rights. The author discusses multicultural education policy, pointing out the various problems and contradictions which exist due to socialist ideology, economic disparity, religion, and other factors.

China has been a unified, multi-ethnic country since the ancient Han Dynasty. After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the central government officially recognized, after a lengthy nation-wide investigation, 56 ethnic groups that make up the "Chinese nation." The majority Han group currently accounts for 91.96% of the total population, while the rest of the 55 ethnic groups are customarily called "minorities" (estimated based on the 1995 census).

The distribution of ethnic groups is characterized by general mixed inhabitation and local concentration in an interwoven pattern; that is, some minorities live in a concentrated pattern in the Han areas, while some Han Chinese live in the distinctive ethnic areas. This pattern of living has resulted from contact, migrations, and exchanges over the course of a long history. Though relatively small in number, people of ethnic minorities are so widely distributed that all provinces and regions in China are multi-ethnic. However, minorities are most concentrated in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guangxi, Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Liaoning, and Taiwan, of which Yunnan Province is most ethnically plural. The major minorities are Tibetans, Mongols, Zhuang, Hui, Koreans, Manchu, Uighurs, and Miao.

This small portion of the population has occupied a crucial place on the government agenda for three reasons:

- (1) Resources – minority areas contain large quantities of untapped mineral deposits, most of the forestland, and over 80% of the country's animal products. These resources are very important for China's future economic development.
- (2) Geography – though small in number, minority groups occupy 63.7% of the land area of China. The less densely populated minority regions may provide an avenue for relief from China's overpopulation problem.
- (3) Strategic – minorities inhabit over 90% of China's border region, and so minority issues are vital for national security (He & Liu, 1995).

Constitutional and Policy Approaches

The basic policy of China towards ethnic minorities is laid down in Article 3 of the 1954 Constitution:

The PRC is a unitary multiethnic state. All the ethnic groups are equal. Discrimination against or oppression of any ethnic group, and acts which undermine the unity of the ethnic groups, are prohibited. All the ethnic groups have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways. Regional autonomy applies in areas where an ethnic minority lives in a compact community. All the ethnic autonomous areas are inseparable parts of the PRC. (Mackerras, 1994, p. 145)

Here the principles include ethnic equality and unity, anti-discrimination, freedom of cultural maintenance, and regional autonomy. The secession or independence of minority areas is to be prevented at all costs. A feature of the new 1982 Constitution is an increase in minority representation. The 1982 Constitution, besides echoing the principles of the 1954 Constitution, adds new rights, such as appropriate representation in the National People's Congress (NPC) and in the NPC standing committee (Nathan, 1986).

Ethnic unity and equality are the two fundamental principles and policies in the resolution of ethnic problems in China. The Constitution of 1982 stipulates that

The state guarantees the language rights and interests of all ethnic groups and encourages the maintenance and development of the equality, unity, and cooperative relations among all ethnic groups. Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic group are forbidden. (A collection of legal documents of PRC on ethnic policies, 1997, p. 24)

Constitutional rights and freedoms, regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, and gender, include the right to elect and to be elected, personal freedom and dignity, freedom of religious beliefs, speech, press, assembly, association,

demonstration, as well as the rights to develop one's own languages and scripts, and so on.

The legal rights defined in the Constitution and various legal documents for ethnic minorities were seriously violated during the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-76), when minority leaders were persecuted and minority customs were banned. However, since the reinstatement of the pluralistic policy in 1979, ethnic relations have been steadily improved and ethnic rights have been better protected. For example, in 1998 the members of ethnic minorities elected into the 9th National People's Congress amounted to 438, accounting for 14.37% of all the people's representatives, 5% higher than the ethnic proportion in the total population (8.04%).

Ethnic regional autonomy is a basic policy made by the government according to the special circumstances of China, and also an important political system. From 1947 to the end of 1998, China established five autonomous regions (at a level equal to provinces), 30 autonomous prefectures, and 120 autonomous counties. Altogether 44 ethnic groups have set up autonomous areas at various levels and the ethnic members in ethnic autonomous areas account for 75% of the total ethnic population (Wu, 1999).

The Law on Regional Autonomy for Minorities (The Autonomy Law), adopted in 1984, amplifies previous autonomy rights, specifies functions and rights of self-government units, and defines the relationships between the autonomous authorities and the higher-level bodies of the state. The new provision includes:

- a) The leading cadres should be the members of the ethnic group(s) that practice(s) autonomy (Articles 16-18);
- b) Instructions which are issued by higher level bodies, but do not meet local requirements, would not necessarily have to be implemented (subject to approval by the State Council) (Article 20);
- c) The right of drafting development plans for autonomous areas (Article 26), with a view to economy, protection and administration of their resources (Articles 28 & 29), foreign trade (Article 32), finance (Article 33), and education (Articles 26 & 37). (Heberer, 1984, p. 37)

The Autonomy Law stipulates that in ethnic autonomous areas, the People's Congress at all levels should be composed of members from all ethnic groups living that area.

The birth control policy for minorities in China is less stringent than that for the Han Chinese and gives a freer hand to the People's Congress of autonomous areas in making their own local policies for birth control. For example, the five autonomous regions have made amendments to the PRC Marriage Law, which lower the legal age for marriage from 22 to 20 for males, and from 20 to 18 for females. In general, each family of ethnic minorities is entitled to have two or three children, but for those living in poverty-stricken areas, border areas, or thinly populated areas, each family can have three or even more children. Peasants and herders in Tibet are exempt from any birth control regulations.

Consequently, the ethnic population growth is at a higher rate than the national average. The 5th national census (2000) showed that the ethnic population increased from 35.32 million in 1953, to 40 million in 1964, then to

67.24 million in 1982, further to 91.2 million in 1990, and finally to 106.43 million in 2000 (Wu, 1999).

The ethnic education policy has evolved around the goal of developing a strong ethnic economy, i.e. raising educational quality and training skilled workers needed by society. The new ethnic education policy includes the following elements: delegation of educational power to the autonomous government in planning, curriculum, language and script, etc.; increased special financial grants; relaxed control of religious freedom, and emphasized minority rights, especially rights related to language and script. The policy signifies a strategic shift from the limited goal of training a few minority cadres seen in the previous policy to the goal of establishing a complete minority educational system. Cowen (1997, p. 75) contends that Chinese educational policy, at the official level, recognizes and respects a range of cultures, and is officially multicultural.

In China, though the majority Han culture dictates the mainstream of education, priority is given to the educational development of all minority cultures. Therefore, the Education Law of the PRC declares that "the state shall, in accordance with the characteristics and needs of respective ethnic minorities, provide assistance to the development of educational undertakings for each ethnic minority" (Wulan, 94, p. 68).

Autonomous areas are empowered to make decisions on education and cultural development in their own areas, such as type of school, duration of study, curriculum, language of instruction, admissions, etc. The state has taken measures to support ethnic education, such as special funding and subsidies for ethnic heritage language and bilingual education, training of ethnic teachers, setting up of ethnic colleges or ethnic classes in regular universities, and lowering admission requirements. Education at all levels in Tibet is free and gets support in various forms from developed provinces.

In the press, broadcasting, publication and cinema, ethnic languages and scripts are respected. At present, over 100 newspapers in 17 ethnic languages, and 73 journals and magazines in 11 ethnic languages are published. The CCTV uses 16 ethnic languages, and local TV and broadcasting stations use over 20 ethnic languages in broadcasting. Feature films produced in ethnic languages have come up to 3,410. 4,100 kinds of books in various categories had been published in 23 ethnic languages by 1998, totaling over 53 million volumes, by 36 ethnic publishing houses across the country (Wu, 1999).

Other measures endorsed by the state to preserve ethnic cultural heritage include: sorting out and republishing ethnic precious ancient works, rescuing ethnic epics (e.g., Tibetan epic "Gesarer," and Mongolian epic "Jianggeer"), rescuing and collecting ethnic folk arts and songs, repairing major ethnic historical architectures. For example, in the reconstruction of Tibetan Potala Palace from 1989 to 1994, the state invested 53 million yuan and used 1,000 kilograms of gold.

Policy Implementation and Public Opinions

However, if the pluralistic ethnic policy and multicultural education policy are put into the wider social context, or related to other official ideologies, some

contradictions emerge. These contradictions may affect the implementation of the policy and result in ethnic inequality, which is opposite to the policy statement itself. Firstly, minority cultural rights and freedoms, as a salient feature of the policy, are in conflict with the general educational guiding principle of the state. These principles say: "Education must serve socialist modernization... and train builders and successors who are developed in an all-round way – morally, intellectually, and physically." (Inner Mongolia Education Committee, 1991, p. 40). In the conventional definition in China, "morally" implies politically correct. "Successor" means socialist successor. The guiding principle points to the dual role of education – training skilled labor to develop production and indoctrinating socialist ideology to reproduce socialist successors.

Secondly, the cultural maintenance principle conflicts with the Marxist idea of ethnicity. The official theory and practice on ethnic issues are under girded by Marxism. According to this analysis, ethnicity and ethnic distinctions will disappear when class disappears, and then a homogeneous proletarian culture will emerge. If one of the communist goals is to eliminate ethnic distinctions, then communism and ethnicity are ultimately incompatible. The expectation of China's new pluralist policy is that relatively free expression of ethnic characteristics will lead to gradual decrease in ethnic tensions and eventually to more harmonious relations.

Thirdly, the conception of rights in the Chinese tradition has emphasized collective rather than individual interest. But Zhou (1994) points out that the collective orientation of rights in China has been extended from the family and community to both the state and the international level. The state is regarded as "the large collectivity." Patriotism overrides group rights.

Finally, there is a conflict with the current national curriculum. Article 36 of Autonomy Law on education specifies a broad range of areas, which include content of curricula in which autonomy may be implemented. However, school curricula are unified all over China and are enhanced by the unified entrance examinations. The existence of the national curriculum and unified examinations makes it hard for the minority regions to exercise their autonomy rights in deciding their curricular content according to their local circumstances.

Major Issues and Challenges

Some problems arise with increasing globalization and the modernization program. Historically, ethnic groups lived disproportionately in poor, barren, or border areas. Since opening and reform, the provinces in Eastern and Southern China have stepped up economic and social development. As a result, the disparity between ethnic areas and other Han-dominant areas has been aggravated. In some ethnic areas, people still live below the subsistence level. According to Wu (1999), by the end of 1992, 80 million people in China lived in poverty; half of them were members of ethnic groups or people living in ethnic areas. How to tackle relative ethnic poverty and development disparity will pose a major challenge to the government.

Moreover, ethnic issues in China are always linked to religion. Most ethnic groups are believers of Buddhism

and Islam; some believe in Orthodox, and still a few others stick to primitive Deism. Some "ethnic entrepreneurs" are likely to take advantage of their traditional religions to raise group consciousness and resort to splinterism in order to establish "independent states." Tibetan expatriates led by the Dalai Lama have been trying to separate Tibet from China. In Xinjiang, undercurrents of a separatist movement exist with a view to changing Xinjiang into the independent "Eastern Tajikistan." Some members of the movement engineered two terrorist bombings in downtown of Beijing in late 1990s. Successfully dealing with religious issues while ensuring ethnic rights guaranteed by the Constitution is therefore another challenge.

Finally, the centrally dictated national curriculum makes it difficult for ethnic autonomous areas to exercise autonomy on cultural maintenance. Ethnic students usually must choose between instruction in their heritage language with limited job opportunities and opting to Chinese instruction with a brighter future. Therefore, a hard nut to crack is whether the government is willing to further delegate power on curriculum to local authorities or stick to hard-line attitudes to maintain ideological control through the curriculum.

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Multiculturalism in Denmark

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ABSTRACT

Denmark is a small country and one which is still new to the realities of immigration and ethnic diversity. Unfortunately, recent years have shown a growing negative response to policies of multiculturalism. In this article, the author examines various factors surrounding the debate, including strong nationalist values, a well-developed welfare state, and a tradition of universal egalitarianism that is slowly eroding.

Despite relatively modest numbers of foreigners in Denmark, immigration and ethnic diversity has become, in just the last ten years, a highly charged issue. There has been, under successive governments, a growing rhetorical emphasis on the 'problem' of immigration, a strengthening of negative immigrant stereotyping, and a deepening fear that 'little Denmark' and Danish values are under assault by those with foreign values. In keeping with this rhetoric, policy changes over the past decade have produced a continual erosion of the social entitlements and political rights of non-citizens, and have gradually legitimized differential treatment of the population on the basis of ethnic origin and identity. These developments stand in stark contrast to the traditional view of Denmark as a country of remarkable ethnic tolerance.¹ Yet the very forces that have long been the strength of Danish society – its strong collective identity, universal egalitarianism, and enviable national welfare state – are significant factors behind Danish nationalism and xenophobia today.

Immigration and ethnic diversity in Denmark

Denmark is a small country, with fewer than 5.4 million inhabitants, a strong national and collective identity, an active civil society, and a generous welfare system. As is the case throughout the Nordic countries, immigration and cultural diversity is a relatively recent phenomenon in Denmark. Before 1960, the few foreign-born residents came almost exclusively from other Nordic countries, Germany and the United Kingdom. Large-scale labour migration to Denmark took place for the first time in the late '60s, when companies were permitted to recruit significant numbers of workers from abroad – mostly from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan – in response to labour shortages.

A second wave of immigration began in 1983, after the Danish parliament liberalized the country's immigration laws and enlarged its acceptance of refugees. There was a considerable increase in the rate of immigration during this period, as well as a shift in source countries. Immigrants after 1983 came especially from Turkey, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories and, in the 1990s, from the Balkan states, Afghanistan and Somalia. The response with respect to asylum-seekers was especially generous. During the decade to 2002, Denmark ranked third among all industrialized countries (after Switzerland and Sweden, and ahead of Norway) for granting admission and refugee status to asylum-seekers, with 13.7 refugees accepted per 1,000 inhabitants.² During this period, Denmark also provided generous and immediate welfare assistance to all residents, including new arrivals.

As of January 2001, about 7.3% of the population of Denmark were immigrants or second-generation descendants of immigrants, and roughly three-quarters of these – 5.4% of the total population or a mere 300,000 people – have originated from countries outside of Europe and North America.³ Demographic forecasters project that third-country immigrants and their descendants may comprise close to 10% of the population by 2020, and almost 15% by 2040.⁴ While the Danish census bureau does not keep statistics on religion, it is clear that the majority of these second-wave immigrants are from Muslim countries. Finally, compared to other European countries, Denmark does not appear to have a significant number of illegal immigrants. One reason for this is that it has been historically easy for newcomers to receive financial assistance from the state, thus there is little economic advantage to remaining clandestine.

The welfare state and the goal of integration

One important explanation for the strong negative response in Denmark to immigrants and ethnic diversity lies in the particular Danish conceptual approach to citizenship and integration, and the key role for the welfare state within this approach. Historically, the Danish approach to citizenship has been to integrate all members of the society, and to do so through the triple mechanisms of a highly productive labour market, a strong welfare state, and a socially cohesive society. This formula worked successfully through much of the 20th century. The Danish welfare state ensured a high level of

public provisions accessible to all citizens and residents in the country. While costly (the tax rate for many Danes is around 50% of earnings), these programs were based on conceptions of social egalitarianism and universalism, and on the assumption that recipients earn their entitlements by contributing over a lifetime of active work to the maintenance and growth of the national wealth. The contributors and recipients within this system were assumed to (and generally did) behave responsibly, out of a collective orientation toward reciprocity and the long-term maintenance of the society.

Cultural belonging and political rights in Denmark have thus been conceptually entwined through the institution of the welfare state. There is one word in Danish – *lighed* – which means simultaneously: “cultural similarity” and “political sameness” with respect to civic rights. Similarity is believed to be a necessary condition for equality and one cannot, within this conceptual framework, be culturally different and politically equal.⁵ The welfare state has also provided a degree of security for those inside Denmark, regardless of events occurring in the outside world. It is thus a cornerstone of Danish pride in the political independence of their small country.

As one commentator has argued, there lies within the political life of advanced democratic societies a central dilemma: the sharing and solidarity of a well-developed welfare state can conflict with cultural diversity.⁶ This solidarity/diversity divide has been especially apparent in Denmark. While the social welfare contract proved effective at bridging class differences among workers, industrial capitalism and peasants, the arrival of unprecedented numbers of ethnically dissimilar, low-skilled immigrants beginning in the mid-1980s presented an uncomfortable challenge to the Danish welfare state and the goal of cultural integration. The relatively high level of welfare benefits has meant that many immigrants stand to gain little or nothing in terms of real income by getting a job, and the least skilled among them have been caught in a benefit trap. As well, Denmark’s rigid bureaucratic regime has prevented the development and use of informal networks among immigrants. Immigrants have largely become dependent clients of the state and have rather failed to develop autonomous community resources. Finally, the close-knit nature of Danish civic society has tended to exclude culturally distinct immigrants from the social and informational networks that are frequently the gateway to participation in both the labour market, and in civic and political institutions.

The result is one of the largest gaps (compared to other OECD countries) in work-force participation between nationals and third-country immigrants and their descendants.

Among the working-age population, just 59% of men and 43% of women who migrated from, or whose parents migrated from third countries are active in the workforce, compared to 83% for men and 75% for women among native Danes.⁷ For some very recent immigrant groups, the rate of participation in the labour-force is lower than 20%.

In addition to high unemployment rates, immigrant groups are subject to residential crowding in areas with higher than average social problems. While there may be a preference among some immigrants for settlement into areas already inhabited by their own ethnic group, Danish policies have exacerbated this problem in a number of respects. First, municipalities have primarily allocated refugees to public housing estates and to neighbourhoods

with already dense immigrant concentrations. Second, rent controls for private rented dwellings and cooperatives have kept rents under market value and produced long waiting lists and low turnover for desirable housing – making access for newer immigrants especially difficult.

Immigration and minority policy

In this environment, political actors have come to focus on, and to ideologically exaggerate, the immigrant ‘problem.’ Specifically, they have concentrated their rhetoric on the financial burden which newcomers place on the provisions of the welfare system, on the lack of contact between immigrants and Danes and their unwillingness to integrate into Danish society, and on the apparent correlation between immigrant enclaves and rates of crime. The response has been to impose tighter restrictions on immigration and to roll back the social entitlements and political rights of non-citizens.

This policy turn can be traced back to the Social Democratic (SDP) led coalition, elected in 1992. The SDP began with piecemeal tightening of the old Immigration Act of 1983, and then introduced a comprehensive new Integration Act in 1999, intended to assist immigrants’ integration into Danish society and to make them less dependent on welfare. In some respects, the goals of the policy were commendable. For example, the government introduced compulsory language courses and jobs training programs intended to facilitate integration through the labour market.⁸

And it created local Integration Councils, with significant representation of ethnic minority residents, which served to mediate local issues and to provide advice to both municipal and national governments. Yet in other respects, the government capitalized on exaggerated public fears over immigration, and legitimized differential treatment of the population on the basis of their ethnic origin and identity. Its most significant step was to introduce lower welfare benefits for immigrants. Non-governmental organizations

While the social welfare contract proved effective at bridging class differences among workers, industrial capitalism and peasants, the arrival of unprecedented numbers of ethnically dissimilar, low-skilled immigrants beginning in the mid-1980s presented an uncomfortable challenge to the Danish welfare state and the goal of cultural integration.

and the left-wing opposition criticized the new law for effectively establishing a two-tiered system of social welfare. They complained to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that the law violated the UN's 1951 Convention on Refugees, which stipulates that refugees are entitled to the same treatment as citizens. In mid-1999, the UNHCR confirmed this charge, and by year's end the government repealed its legislation on the grounds that it did not work.

But the boldest policy changes have come following the election in November 2001 of the present Liberal-Conservative government, with backing from the Christian People's Party and the far-right Danish People's Party (DFP).⁹ The election itself – held, significantly, just two months after the events of September 11th – was remarkable. The issue of immigration dominated the general election campaign, and was projected as the most imminent and serious threat to the history, culture, identity and homogeneity of 'little Denmark'. The opposition capitalized on a political climate pervaded by diffuse fears, moral panic and unspecified enemy images. They created expectations that they could not only put a virtual stop to any further inflows of undesirable foreigners, but also that they would be able to reinstate Denmark to its former status as a peaceful, ethnically homogeneous and politically sovereign welfare state.¹⁰

The government has passed a number of laws since 2001 with the effect of restricting immigration and the rights of immigrants. These include a longer waiting period for permanent residency (seven years instead of three) and a higher threshold for Danish citizenship, including a nine-year waiting period and a Danish language history exam. Signalling the centrality of immigration within its policy framework, the government removed immigration from its traditional office within the Interior Ministry, and established a whole new Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs.

In its most astonishing policy, the government introduced a rule barring any non-European applicant of family reunification through marriage who is less than 24 years of age. Even if both spouses are over 24, the law makes a visa for the spouse contingent on conditions that the couple is economically self-reliant, possesses a proper dwelling, and – a very subjective test – can demonstrate that they have closer ties with Denmark than with the country of emigration. The law also requires a deposit of about 6,500 Euros until the foreign spouse becomes a citizen. The law was intended to curb immigration through family reunification and to address the perceived problem of arranged and forced marriages among Muslims.¹¹ But, initially at least, it also caught native Danes in its restrictive web.¹²

The government has also reduced welfare benefits for persons who have not lived in Denmark for seven of the last eight years, providing these individuals with the so-called 'introduction benefit'. It has halted all national funding for mother-tongue education in public schools, though some municipalities have continued to subsidize these programs. And, in an apparent attempt to secure itself against large-scale protests and anti-discrimination lobbies, the government eliminated financial subsidies to several ethnic minority and anti-racism organizations. None of these laws discriminate exclusively between citizens and immigrants. However, it is clear that the policies are carefully targeted against immigrants and potential immigrants from third countries. The Danish newspaper, *Politiken* (18 January 2002), has criticized these policies as focusing on "ethnic purity" and on "protecting the Danish tribe", which supposedly "cannot abide being mixed with other inhabitants of the globe."¹³

Danish national values and multiculturalism

As central as the welfare state has been in the debates and policy direction concerning immigration, the growing Danish opposition to immigration cannot be reduced simply to economic concerns.¹⁴ There is, woven throughout the discourse on the immigration 'problem', a fundamental hostility toward the idea of a multicultural society, especially one which encompasses Islam. One source of this hostility is Danish nationalism. Nationalism is stronger in Denmark than in many other countries, as witnessed in Eurobarometer reports and, more symbolically, in flag-waving displays of Danish patriotism.¹⁵ Historically, the particular style of Danish nationalism – with its consensual "small-is-beautiful" emphasis – has produced a reluctance to become enmeshed in international affairs.¹⁶ The small size of the Danish state tends to produce a particularly strong sense of national vulnerability to the implications of globalization, including immigration.

The second source of hostility to immigration is Danish liberalism. Danes consider themselves to be thoroughly modern and progressive with respect to sexuality, marriage and women's rights.

In contrast, many view immigrant values as stressing dependency, obedience, and lack of individual choice, particularly for young women. Migrants and especially Muslims are thus perceived as a threat at both the national level (to the identity of the Danish nation), and on the individual level (to the sanctity of personal freedom). The Danish People's Party has been most brazen in its anti-Muslim sentiment. A major representative of the DFP and vicar in the Church of Denmark, Søren Krarup, has argued that "Danes are increasingly becoming foreigners

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in their own country... Parliament is permitting the slow extermination of the Danish people.” He continued by predicting that “our descendants” will “curse” those politicians who are responsible for increasing the “alienation of Danes in Denmark.”¹⁷ But similar rhetoric is echoed by the main parties. In one comment during the 2001 election campaign, the former Interior Minister for the SDP, Karen Jespersen pronounced that Islam could not coexist with Danish culture. A Liberal Party member of parliament, Inge Dahl Sørensen, proposed interning a portion of Denmark’s Muslim population to preserve national security. And the leader of the DFP, Pia Kjaersgaard, proclaimed that she would cross the street to avoid meeting a Muslim.

Participation in political life

One bright spot in Denmark is data suggesting that levels of political engagement among immigrants and their descendants are fairly strong, or at least not significantly lower than participation among ethnic Danes. Voter turnout appears to be somewhat lower among those of foreign origin than among indigenous Danes, but the figures vary widely from city to city, and across ethnic groups.¹⁸ In some cities – Copenhagen and Aarhus – the percentage of ethnic minorities running for and elected to local council is virtually proportionate to or even higher than the percentage of minorities among eligible voters. And the proportion of candidates of foreign origin who ran for national Parliament and for the European Parliament was also fairly close to the proportion of eligible foreign voters in those elections.

One reason why the numbers are so high within local councils (more than 14% of the City Council of Copenhagen is of third country origin) is that immigrants are eligible to vote in local elections in Denmark after 3 years of residence.¹⁹ Another explanation for fairly strong levels of political participation and descriptive representation of ethnic minorities at all levels lies in the Danish electoral system of proportional representation with personal voting. This system allows voters to alter the order of candidates on the list. They may give their vote either to the whole list (a list vote), or to a single candidate (a personal vote). Within such a system, the electoral success of an individual candidate depends critically on the candidate’s ability to mobilize eligible voters both to participate in the election and to cast their personal vote for them. Ethnic minority competitors in Danish elections frequently focus their mobilization efforts on voters within immigrant communities, and are thus seen by most parties as fairly desirable candidates.

Voting rights for foreigners and, especially, the implications of personal voting for minority communities will become increasingly important over time – as newer migrants attain citizenship and as the second generation reaches voting age. Their participation in the political life of Danish society will be crucial for influencing the framework of their lives and the development of the country as a whole.

Notes

¹ Denmark stands as an inspiring case in its efforts to protect Danish Jews during World War II. Virtually all Danish Jews survived the Holocaust, despite the

country falling under German occupation. Most were spirited to neutral Sweden, while the few hundred who were transported to prison camps remained within the protective concern of Danish authorities.

- ² UN Human Rights Commission Statistical Yearbook (2002), p. 43-44.
- ³ The Danish statistics bureau considers immigrants as persons born abroad, and of whom both parents are foreign citizens or born abroad. Descendants of immigrants are those persons born in Denmark to parents who are not Danish citizens born in Denmark. A Dane is a person born in Denmark who has at least one parent who is a Danish citizen born in Denmark. There are very few third- or fourth-generation immigrants in Denmark, but they would be considered Danes, as long as one of their parents is a Danish citizen born in Denmark. Throughout this article, the term “third country” refers to source countries of immigration outside of the Nordic countries, the European Union, and North America.
- ⁴ Deborah Roseveare and Martin Jorgensen, “Migration and Integration of Immigrants in Denmark,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 30 April 2004.
- ⁵ Thomas Hylland Eriksen makes this terminological distinction in “The Colonial and the Post-Colonial: A View from Scandinavia on Italian Minority Issues.” In Ralph Grillo and Jeff Pratt (eds.), *The Politics of Recognizing Difference: Multiculturalism Italian-style* (Ashgate, 2002), p. 219-236.
- ⁶ David Goodhart, “Too Diverse?” *Prospect*, February 2004.
- ⁷ SOPEMI report for Denmark, 2001. Reported in Roseveare and Jorgensen (2004), p. 16.
- ⁸ The Act imposed a requirement to attend a three-year introduction course on all immigrants.
- ⁹ The Liberal-Conservative bloc, led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, won 98 seats in the 179-seat Danish Folketing. Within this governing bloc, the Liberal Party holds 56 seats, the Conservative Party holds 16 seats, the Danish People’s Party holds 22 seats (though they have been excluded from cabinet), and the Christian People’s Party holds 4 seats. The Social Democratic bloc, led by departing prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen won 77 seats.
- ¹⁰ Ulf Hedetoft, “Cultural transformation: How Denmark faces immigration.” *Open Democracy* (30 November 2003). Reprinted at <http://www.amid.dk/pub/debate/uh.html>.
- ¹¹ Two ethnic groups are the focus of family reunification concerns. Estimates are that among Turks and Pakistanis, some 80-90% of young people marry someone from outside the country and seek to bring them to Denmark. However, the problem of forced marriage appears to have been highly exaggerated within ideological and political discourse. See Garbi Schmidt, “The right to choose: Patterns of partner choice among ethnic minorities in Denmark.” Paper presented at the 13th Nordic Migration Conference, Aalborg, Denmark (November 2004).
- ¹² The marriage law was revised to apply only to applicants from third countries, after strong expressions of public dissatisfaction from young indigenous Danes who fell in love with foreigners and then were unable to bring them to Denmark.
- ¹³ Cited by Ulf Hedetoft (2003).
- ¹⁴ The role of the welfare state is similar in Sweden and Norway, and those countries have also experienced significant increases in immigration and ethnic diversity over the last 20 years. Yet anti-immigrant sentiment is not nearly as strong there as in Denmark.
- ¹⁵ Danes are proud flag-flyers. Strings of the red and white Dannebrog are almost always displayed along the main streets of cities and town, in shops and advertisements. At home, the Danes typically display the flag in their gardens, in decorative table-top presentations during the holidays, and strung like garland on their Christmas trees.
- ¹⁶ Denmark remained neutral in World War I, and did not fight in WWII (it was occupied by 1940). Though a member of the EU, it voted against the Euro and has retained its own currency. Significantly though, Denmark supported the U.S. war in Iraq and sent troops to fight there.
- ¹⁷ Cited in Hedetoft (2003).
- ¹⁸ Lise Tøgeby, “Migrants at the Polls: An Analysis of Immigrant and Refugee Participation in Danish Local Elections,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 25:4 (1999), p. 665-684.
- ¹⁹ Denmark is one of just a few European countries (the others are Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium) to grant limited local voting rights to non-European nationals. Voting for national elections in Denmark is restricted to citizens and the residence requirement to acquire nationality is now, under the new immigration laws, 9 years.

Malaysia, Capitalist Modernity and Post-Ethnicity

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ABSTRACT

This article makes the case against a clear link between ethnicity and culture; in some parts of the world, multiculturalism does not figure prominently in public discourse. Where Malaysia is concerned, politics is more about issues of economic difference than cultural difference. Current problems arise not from a multi-ethnic society, but rather from class divisions and the development of capitalist modernity. The author examines the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the creation of a Malay middle class.

Although the term ‘multiculturalism’ carries no reference to ethnicity there is a tacit expectation that the plural cultures of a ‘multicultural’ society are tied to multi-ethnicity. True, in some versions of the multicultural doctrine, the cultures in search of recognition may be non-ethnic, citing identities of sex and gender. But in most of the well known applications of multiculturalism there is an equation: ethnic diversity equals cultural diversity. Two further assumptions are linked to this primary one: the first is that ‘culture’ is and should be a leading, if not *the* leading, focus of political debate and analysis. Thus the central question becomes “how can a socio-political system cope with cultural diversity?” (and revise an extant ethnocultural unity). In terms of social analysis the (assumed) starting point is that we should look to cultural difference as the source of *explanation* of political events and social outcomes. The second assumption is that, for under-recognized cultures (ethnic groups), some form of cultural recognition will be the cornerstone of social inclusion and greater social justice.

In the case of Malaysia however, for which I attempt to give an overview here, it is plausible to argue that western multiculturalism does not travel well. The word ‘multiculturalism’ can be found in (English language) Malaysian debates but it is not a central term of public discourse, nor does it offer a promising guide to either analysis or political prescription. Of course, this here is a point about Malaysia; but it is also true that multiculturalism has come to be increasingly seriously questioned in general, and not just in this particular case¹. It may turn out to be a term which betrays its particular origins², and lacks depth and cutting edge in its application to social, political and economic change. Some of the reasons for doubting multiculturalist arguments in the Malaysian case relate to the points I have just introduced. We cannot assume in the Malaysian case, nor in many other sites, that there is an equation between ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’. Some of the most troublesome cultural divides are now between Malays³. Similarly we should not assume that Malaysian politics are primarily about ‘culture’ even though ‘cultural debates’ have played a significant role in post-independence Malaysian politics. And it is certainly unlikely that a kind of ‘equal recognition of cultures’ will offer Malaysia a solution to its most pressing problems. This is so not least because a real and symbolic primacy of ‘Malayness’ is a foundation of political stability in the country.

Malaysia from independence

Malaysia (Malaya) became independent from Britain in 1957 and in 1963 formed an expanded Malaysian federation by adding Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (now Sabah) to peninsular Malaya; it is also at this point that the Brunei sultanate, squeezed between Sarawak and North Borneo, declined to join Malaysia. By 1965 Singapore had left the federation, and Malaysia then had what have remained its borders up to the present day. Relations with predominantly Chinese Singapore have been peaceful if periodically uneasy; for two years, however, relations with its ethnically Malay and Muslim neighbour, Indonesia, were distinctly unstable. In the island of Borneo, the southern (Indonesian) segment, the province of Kalimantan, has a long and largely rainforest border with the Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah. At the time of independence the Malaysian population counted as Malay was less than 50% and the independence negotiations had seemed too many of them to point to a threatened future. If the large Chinese community, approaching 30%, was to be given citizenship in a ‘universalist’ democracy the Malays feared that they would fall yet further behind their Chinese competitors in education, economy and social mobility.

In some considerable part a Malay nationalism was inspired by this fear of losing ground in ‘their own’ country. The result was a classic compromise: the non-Malays were to be granted citizenship but the constitution would guarantee a Malay primacy. This primacy was chiefly defined by Islam being the official religion (though other religions were to be

tolerated), Malay being the official language (though other languages were to be used), and broad constitutional commitments to furthering and conserving the Malays in education, land and economic security. Since the 1960s the Malay population has grown as a proportion of the total and even in simple population calculations the Malay dominance looks more secure. In the 2000 Census Malaysia reported a population of 23.27 million of whom 65% were classed as *Bumiputera*, 26% Chinese and 8% Indians. *Bumiputera* is a term, meanings 'sons of the soil' which has taken on real significance in Malaysian public discourse. Discursively it portrays non-Malays as 'not people of this land' despite the presence of Chinese and Indians in the country since at least the nineteenth century. Most *Bumiputera* could also be called 'Malays' although the term also includes a small percentage of non-Malay indigenous peoples, principally in Sarawak and Sabah.

The significance of the term *Bumiputera* is that since 1970 people classed as *Bumiputera* (i.e. mostly Malays) have been favoured by the New Economic Policy (NEP) which had the twin aims of reducing poverty and eliminating the link between ethnicity and socio-economic position. Thus Malays benefitted from, *inter alia*, privileged entry to universities, reduced housing costs, and support for business and financial development. This was ethnically based affirmative action on a grand scale that persisted for two decades and is only now being dismantled. In particular it has been announced that university entrance will henceforth be based on 'meritocratic' principles. The original introduction of the policy followed national alarm subsequent upon the violent ethnic riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969. The riots had followed Chinese celebration of election results which appeared to benefit ethnic Chinese interests. The NEP offered an economic solution to a political problem. The cause of political unrest was deemed to be Malays' relatively poor position in education and the economy, having been under-represented in what was called the 'modern sector'. The political fears allied to this economic disadvantage were to be assuaged by redressing the imbalances – in short by creating a new Malay middle class, much dependent on a Malay-dominated state.

In many respects the policy can be deemed to have been a success. To be sure a new Malay middle class was created, and some Malay footholds were established in business and financial sectors from which all but a Malay elite had been excluded. The sense of economic exclusion, which prompted fears of Chinese dominance, was largely allayed, and the violence of 1969 was not repeated. Malaysia has seen nothing

to compare with the pogroms against Indonesian Chinese in the wake of the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998. There have been costs: affirmative action perpetuated the politics of ethnicity, with Malays defending their privileges whilst Chinese and Indians had to suffer exclusions and ineligibilities which left their efforts either unrewarded – or costing more. State management of Malay benefits facilitated cronyism and what Malaysians call 'money politics'.⁴ The fact that Malaysians can take some steps beyond affirmative action and ethnic politics is in part, however, a consequence of Malay confidence. Malay (ethnic) nationalism in that sense has achieved many of its aims and for the time being at least is much less sharply articulated.

In all of these developments ethnic politics has played a significant part. The split with Singapore was partly driven by the difference in the ethnic composition of Malaysia and Singapore, the latter being predominantly Chinese. The 1969 riots were inter-ethnic, and the New Economic Policy which followed was designed to improve the economic position of Malays. But throughout this period, 1970 to the present, there have been important voices arguing that the analysis of Malaysian affairs has been over-ethnicized, the leading figure being K.S. Jomo, the distinguished political economist⁵. In addition, there has been a significantly reduced emphasis on ethnic divisions in the last decade. Even at the outset, the formation of the ruling party, an Alliance of three main ethnic parties, provided Malaysia with a multi-ethnic elite. This was the politics of ethnic compromise under Malay hegemony, persisting today in what is now the *Barisan Nasional* (The National Front).

As Malaysia's economy has become increasingly part of the new Asian capitalist advance, so new questions have been thrust on to the political agenda. Malaysia's development does not carry everyone with it, nor does it eradicate the gap between the urban rich and the rural poor. Fewer and fewer people are engaged in the rural economy, but those who are lag behind the swirl of new money in the urban centres, and modern communications makes people more aware of the economic and social distance. In the cities themselves there are persistent zones of economic failure and social disorganization. These areas erupt onto the national consciousness from time to time, the gang fighting between alienated Malay and

Indian young men being one instance.⁶

Class divisions within ethnic groups have become at least as important as solidarities across them. This is perhaps most evident among the Malays where some rural and urban poor are disaffected from the Malay middle classes

The split with Singapore was partly driven by the difference in the ethnic composition of Malaysia and Singapore, the latter being predominantly Chinese. The 1969 riots were inter-ethnic, and the New Economic Policy which followed was designed to improve the economic position of Malays. But throughout this period, 1970 to the present, there have been important voices arguing that the analysis of Malaysian affairs has been over-ethnicized.

and elites who have been the benefactors of economic development and the NEP. Similarly there is a significant Indian business, political and professional, as well as a sizeable Indian population of rural and urban poor. Most Indians who came to Malaysia over a hundred years ago were recruited into work on rubber plantations where some of their descendants still live in plantation settlements. Some of the plantation poor have left for the cities where they are among the country's most disadvantaged people.

At the same time migrant workers⁷ are increasingly being engaged in Malaysia's rubber and palm olive plantations, as well as in housemaid and service roles for which thousands of Indonesian women are hired. Malaysia's official figures for 2000 showed approximately 1.6 million non-citizens as resident in the country. Present estimates by observer groups suggest that Malaysia has a migrant labour force of three million, of whom one million may be illegals. Human Rights⁸ groups have expressed concern about the conditions under which these migrant workers live and work. Taken together, all these changes indicate that Malaysia does not face the problems of a 'multi-ethnic' society, but the multiple problems of capitalist modernity.

Some of these problems we have alluded to in reference to the rural and urban poor left. These inequalities have a moral and political component which is linked to Islamic politics in Malaysia. Among those Malays who have entered higher education are some who have turned to renewed Islamic seriousness, partly born out of a sense of unease with the very material success that Malaysia's economic revolution represents. Poorer Malays (and Muslims) look on with some distaste at the metropolitan Malays who have benefited from capitalist modernization. This growing critique of capitalism and modernization came together in the Barisan Alternatif in the 1999 election when opposition parties made significant gains. Although these gains were reversed in the 2004 elections, when the Barisan Nasional recouped lost ground under a new leader (subsequent on the retirement of Dr. Mahathir), a non-ethnic critical politics is a real presence in Malaysia and likely to remain so.

There are several key political questions facing Malaysia today. One of these is to achieve a balance between 'modernization', economic growth, and a stable social order. The new wealth of urban Malays and the vast gap between them and the poor, the evidence of 'money' politics and the sense that modernization undermines Islamic morality⁹, all these are decried by the *Parti SeIslam Malaysia* (PAS) which competes with the United Malay National Organisation for the Malay vote.¹⁰ By and large the aim of securing the position of Malay and 'Malayness'¹¹ has been consolidated. The last thing Malaysia needs now is a renewed round of ethnocultural politics.

Notes

¹ Barry B., 2002, *Culture and Equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism*, Harvard University Press

² Bourdieu P. and Wacquant L., 1999, On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason, *Theory Culture and Society*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 41-58

³ Compare Fenton S., 2004, Malaysia and Capitalist Modernisation: Plural and multicultural models, *International Journal of Multicultural Studies*, Volume 5,2, on which the current article is based. This article can be viewed at <http://www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol5/issue2/art3>

⁴ Gomez E.T. and Jomo K.S. 1997, *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

⁵ See for example, Jomo KS, 2001, *Malaysian Eclipse: Economic Crisis and Recovery*, London: Zed Books

⁶ See Fenton 2004.

⁷ For commentary on migrant workers in Malaysia see the critical magazine *Aliran Monthly*: view at <http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2004a/5.html>

⁸ See *Human Rights Watch* at <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/11/19/malays9704.html>

⁹ On ethnicity and religion as bases of Malay identity, see Frith T., 2000, Ethno-religious Identity and Urban Malays in Malaysia, *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 1, No. 2 September

¹⁰ In the 1999 election anger at the treatment of former Deputy Prime Minister (Anwar Ibrahim) was also a factor in producing a strong result for the opposition.

¹¹ On a shift from Malay to Malaysian nationalism see Case W.F. 2000, The New Malaysian Nationalism, *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 1 No. 2 September

Forms of Multiculturalism and Identity Issues in India

Harihar Bhattacharyya

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ABSTRACT

The author attempts to explain India's relative unity in the face of immense linguistic, religious, social and economic diversity. Despite being the world's second most populous country, India has managed to resist disintegration through the practice of multiculturalism. Bhattacharyya examines the ideological and political contributions of Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first Prime Minister, and the effect of federalism on minority interests.

Demographically speaking, India is the world's second largest country, and the most diverse, ethnically speaking. Despite her recent globalization and higher rates of growth, the country has remained poor and underdeveloped with massive unemployment, illiteracy, and regional imbalances in development, and is marked by large-scale social and economic inequalities and deprivations. Ethno-national conflicts, rooted in the above, have visited the country time and again (and still do), often demanding secession. The ugliest manifestations of these have routinely taken the form of communal riots. No wonder generations of scholars, both Indian and foreign, have predicted ever since her independence (1947) from British colonial rule, the country's imminent 'balkanization' and collapse. [Harrison, 1959; Kohli, 1991] Sadly though, 'balkanization' has occurred in the Balkans, and the multi-ethnic Soviet Union has disintegrated. By contrast, India's record of relative unity and integrity achieved within a shorter period of time and against many odds is remarkable indeed, particularly when viewed in relation to the various forms of lingering ethnic conflicts verging often on civil wars in parts of the so-called third world and developing nations. What is, then, the secret of India's relative unity and integrity? Kohli [2001], an authority on Indian politics, asked the question: when many less diverse and plural post-colonial states have failed, what is the secret of India's success? How does India survive as a 'nation'-state when the very national identity of the people is yet to be precisely defined? The basic argument of this article is that various forms of multiculturalism have been at work behind the country's relative success in unity and integrity as a state.

India's Diversity

India's population today is more than a billion, making it the second largest country in the world. India's diversity is proverbial. Although predominantly inhabited by the 'Hindus' (over 82%) who are regionally rooted, plural in beliefs and practices, and divided by castes, and languages, India's population also contains large proportions of Muslims (about 12%), Sikhs (1.94%), Buddhists (0.76%), Christian (2.34%), Jains (0.39%). [Census Report of India, 1991] The terms 'Hindi' and 'Hindus' should be distinguished. The term 'Hindi' refers to a language spoken by the single largest group of Indians (about 40%), while the term 'Hindu' refers to a religious community (or rather communities). Thus, all Hindi speakers are not Hindus, and all Hindus are not Hindi speakers.

Linguistically, India is no less diverse. It is the home of some hundred languages and dialects, and so far, 22 languages have been 'officially' recognized and placed under the 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The speakers of these languages are in the millions, and mostly rooted territorially. It must, however, be mentioned that due to the migration of people of one area to another in search of jobs and opportunities, millions of speakers of language reside in areas linguistically different. For instance, about 9 million Bengalis live in areas of India outside of West Bengal, and Tripura (from whence they originate and are in the majority).

Once officially recognized, the constitution provides for the protection of that language as well as the group and its culture and traditions. Although Hindi, spoken by about 40% of the population, is the 'national' language, English is retained as the link language for official communication. Hindi is spoken predominantly in states such as Uttar Pradesh (demographically India's largest state), Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana and Uttarachal. There are, however, some anomalies in this official recognition of languages. For example, there are sizeable sections of the population, more particularly the aboriginal people, most notably in the Northeast (containing seven federal units), who are a majority in their locality but whose mother tongue is not yet 'officially' recognized due to the underdevelopment of the scripts. Also, there are states like Manipur in which the officially recognized language (i.e., Manipuri) is not used for official purposes since its script is not adequately developed.

The third aspect of India's ethnic diversity is its aboriginal population (known as tribals) numbering about 100 million, and spread all over the country, but mostly concentrated in the Northeast where five (Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Manipur) out of seven are tribal states, and the tribals constitute significant elements of the population in the remaining two states (Assam and Tripura). India's Northeast contains a large presence of political insurgency and extremism spearheaded by varied groups of tribals.

The last aspect of India's diversity, which, in fact, has added complexity to its diversity, is the significant presence of minorities in each region and state of India. This has been so despite decades of territorial reorganization of the federation aiming at congruity between ethnic identity and the political association/identity (District Council, Regional Council, or statehood within the federation). Each state and region of India is, indeed, a microcosm of India.

**Multiculturalism:
Ideological and Political**

One major form that multiculturalism has taken in India and that has informed public policies of accommodation of diversity as ideological and political. The most recent federal debate in India, particularly since the late 1980s, has emphasized the multicultural underpinnings of political institutional arrangements. [Bhattacharyya: 2001] Historically speaking, India's anti-colonial nationalist leaders, by and large, swore by the country's multicultural reality, but it was Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first Prime Minister, whose thought on the issue proved decisive in giving it constitutional legitimacy, and most determined the policy framework in post-independence governance. Nehru was respectful of the traditional values and institutions of Indian society and of its contemporary diversity. He simultaneously recognized India's diversity, and emphasized 'unity in diversity'. In his own words:

'The diversity of India'... is tremendous; it is obvious. It lies on the surface and anybody can see it. It concerns itself with physical appearances as well as with certain mental habits and traits... Yet, with all these differences, there is no mistaking the impress of India. [Nehru: 1946: 61-62]

Nehru's profound concern for the cultural plurality and the specificity of the situation, and his respect for the values involved in them were also reflected in his practical approach to governance. Commenting on the problems of integration in his state- and nation-building efforts with regard to various territorial units of the country, most notably in the Northeast, he advised the Chief Ministers in his *Letters to Chief Ministers* in the early 1950s not "to treat them by some single formula because they differ greatly among themselves. It seems obviously undesirable to deny them some kind of self-government or autonomy." [Nehru: 1986:

364] He simultaneously cautioned against any attempt at homogenization of different culturally specific people.

Nehru was not, however, opposed to assimilation because without it a nation could never be built, particularly in a society like India. But his idea of assimilation was not a forced or externally imposed one. He said that such an assimilation process would be developed by itself through education and contacts without any special efforts. In such a process, he emphasized, every care should be taken to retain the individuality of cultures, much of which was, for him, retainable. Clarifying further his ideas on the issue, he said that the people living in these areas should feel that they have perfect freedom to live their own lives according to their wishes and genius, and that India should signify to

them as a protecting as well as a liberating force. He pointed out that the policy of the state was not to interfere with the affairs of the tribals but to offer them the largest measure of autonomy. [Nehru: 1985: 151-52]

Nehru's approach to the problem of the management of ethnic conflicts, and to the issue of nation and state building was thus at once democratic and multicultural. It showed an acute sense of realism, accommodation and adjustment in state approaches to communities, and was an instance of 'modernity relativized' [Bhattacharyya: 2001] in a non-western context.

Multiculturalism: Federal

Since independence, federalism, and an ongoing federalizing process – the one which politically accommodates ethnic identity – has remained perhaps the most effective method of managing and resolving conflicts. Married to this method

is democracy, which stipulates that the political association or institution (whether statehood, sub-statehood, or Tribal or Regional Councils) that ethnic groups may demand as the fulfilment of their identity needs (the constitution provides for such institutional measures) must be democratically based, and formed by the consent of the 'ethnic' electorate, and not to be something 'naturally' given. The story of statehood within the Indian federation since 1950 is the story of acquiescing to ethnic identity demands for political recognition, for autonomous powers within the federation, and for a more secure environment for the protection and maintenance of identity. It is no wonder that some scholars have tended to see Indian federalism and Indian multiculturalism as corollaries to each other. [Pant: 1998: 17] Carl Friedrich was one of the first scholars who recognized the growing strength of Indian federalism, and its capacity to increasingly differentiate itself:

India is clearly undergoing a federalizing process in the course of which federal diversity is increasing. It is... a recurrent feature of this process that in the course of democratizing of a society, regional and linguistic-cultural communities become more

Nehru was not, however, opposed to assimilation because without it a nation could never be built, particularly in a society like India. But his idea of assimilation was not a forced or externally imposed one.

articulate and demand recognition in the form of a set of political institutions, including safeguards for the identity of the particular community. [Friedrich: 1968: 135-36]

Since the ethno-linguistic communities are, by and large, mostly territorially rooted, the territorial solutions in the form of different degrees of statehood have worked. Statehood and such other demands are predicated on collective or group rights of ethnic communities.

The constitution also provides for non-territorial protection of identity. It ensures the conservation and cultivation of such rights as fundamental rights of every citizen of India. Article 29 (1) says that any section of the citizens of India having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the fundamental right to conserve the same. This means that if a cultural minority wants to preserve its own language and culture, the state can not by law impose on it any other culture belonging to the majority of the locality. Both the religious and linguistic minorities are protected by this provision. The constitution also defines a positive, directional role for the state in this regard. It directs every state (federal units) to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education of children belonging to linguistic minority groups, and empowers the President to issue proper direction to any state (Art. 350 A). [Basu: 1997: 380]

The constitution not only provides for the protection of minority interests, but seeks to ensure that individuals belonging to minorities do not suffer from discrimination. Article 29(2) forbids any discrimination against any citizen on the basis of religion, race, caste or language in the matter of admission into educational institutions maintained or aided by the state. D.D. Basu, one of the leading constitutional experts in India, believed that this was a very wide provision in so far as the protection not only of religious but also of local or linguistic minorities was concerned. [Basu: 1997: 380] As far as the institutional means of protection and cultivation of minority culture is concerned, Arts 29(1) and 30(1) stipulate that minorities can establish and administer educational institutions of their own choice, and the state cannot compel them to attend educational institutions not to their liking. The Supreme Court, in a series of judgements over the years, has expanded the ambit of those provisions. [Basu: 1997: 381] When the aggrieved but territorially-rooted minorities have found the existing provisions of the constitution ineffective in protecting their identity within the existing state, they have taken recourse to statehood demands. The three recent cases of the creation of the states of Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal in 2000 have provided further proofs of the

flexibility and adaptability of the state in accommodating newer forms of diversity. The flexible constitutional provisions for statehood (Articles 3-4) apart, the issue at stake was the political accommodation of the ethno-regional (including ecology) identity of the people rather than the linguistic one, which was the prevalent practice in state creation, in particular.

Indian Debate on Multiculturalism

Paradoxical though it may seem, the Indian debate on multiculturalism came rather late, taking shape not until the late 1990s, and the intellectual output is still meagre. [Bhargava, Bagchi and Sudarshan: 1999; Seminar: No. 484: 2002; Bhattacharyya, 2001; 2004] The most usual themes in multicultural debate, globally speaking, have also been recognized in the Indian debate: the need to have a stable identity, importance of cultural belonging, recognition and maintenance of difference [Bhargava, 1999: 1, 18]; the complex and thorny relation between the state and the community, especially the Muslim women [Bilgami, 1999: 164-211] (questioning the efficacy of liberalism when it concedes to the demands of various illiberal practices of Muslim personal law); powerlessness of the Indian secular state to cope with Muslim personal law reform [Chatterjee, 1994]; a radical critique of the Indian nation-state project of 'homogenization' and 'national integration' based on elite vision [Chandhoke, 2000: 26]; and forms of multiculturalism as state policy, and their role in nation and state building in the federal mode [Bhattacharyya, 2001; 2004], and so on. The various problems and limits of multiculturalism have also been highlighted by scholars: exclusion of 'others' from an 'essentialized identity'; over-emphasis on cultural particularity and the deepening divisions undermining the 'common foundation of a viable society'; aggressive community power over individual freedom and so on.

Though largely sociological and normative in nature, the Indian debate on multiculturalism has raised questions about the place of minorities in the nation-state, and the vexed issue of community identities, as well as the structural limitations of the nation-state project in India and its implicit 'ethnic bias', what Singh calls the 'ethnic' content of democracy [Singh: 2000]. Even though the exact nature of India's 'national' identity may be suspect, the boundaries of the political community blurred, and – often empirically contestable – what is beyond dispute is that India has been relatively successful in resisting disintegration. The Indian debate has, largely, neglected this issue. This is largely a political question calling for, ultimately, a political recognition of identity.

Conclusion

Though largely sociological and normative in nature, the Indian debate on multiculturalism has raised questions about the place of minorities in the nation-state, and the vexed issue of community identities, as well as the structural limitations of the nation-state project in India and its implicit 'ethnic bias'.

India's social and cultural landscape is dotted with various movements for statehood rooted in political identity searches for communities. There are such movements as Harit Pradesh in western Uttar Pradesh, Vindhyaachal in Madhya Pradesh, Telengana in Andhra Pradesh, Vidarbha in Maharashtra, Kodagu in Karnataka, Gorkhaland and Kamtapuri in West Bengal, and Bodoland in Assam. The political history of India since her decolonization has shown flexibility in politically accommodating the political needs of diversity. The outcome of the above is a complex political structure. Even as a federation, India has evolved complex multi-tiered federal institutions to respond to diversity. Parekh has rightly argued that "[e]very multicultural society needs to devise its own appropriate political structure to suit its history, cultural traditions, and range and depth of diversity." [Parekh: 2000: 193] The Indian multicultural debate needs to gain awareness of the political argument and rationality behind several institutional resolutions of identity issues in India since the early 1950s if it is to truly reflect on various forms of multiculturalism at work in India.

This is an abridged and revised version of the author's article entitled "Multiculturalism in Contemporary India", *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* (UNESCO), 5 (2), December 2003, 151-64 (IJMS 5-2 Bhattacharyya.pdf)

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Multiculturalism in South Africa

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ABSTRACT

The nature of multicultural policy in a 'divided' South African society is addressed by the authors in two steps. First, a short constitutional and political history of transition in South Africa, over the past decade, is given. Second, since these provisions may be viewed as state attempts to construct new identities 'from above', the identities of South African citizens that appear to be emerging 'from below' are discussed.

The term multiculturalism is used either to describe cultural diversity in a society or to refer to public policy designed to create national unity in ethnic diversity. We use this term in its second, policy sense. Before starting on this task, however, we briefly describe South Africa's cultural diversity.

There are today about 45 million South Africans. Typically, they experience their society as culturally diverse. A linguistic profile reveals a mosaic of languages. No mother tongue is majoritarian. Zulu- and Xhosa-speakers form the two largest linguistic communities, and English – the only *lingua franca* linking South Africa to the globe – is used in the language repertoire of little more than half the population. A religious profile reveals similar plural patterns. Some two-thirds of South Africans attest to the Christian faith. Most of the rest affirm to African traditional beliefs while adherents to Hinduism, Islam and Judaism form significantly smaller communities. Racial consciousness inherited from colonial and *apartheid* times permeates these and other collective identities with pernicious consequences. In short, most of the standard markers of cultural diversity (or of 'multiculturalism') continually inform the everyday experiences of South Africans. The term 'multiculturalism', however, is not used in South African highbrow circles. Rather, the term 'divided' is employed, signaling more than cultural diversity. It suggests coinciding divisions along lines of inequality – a situation of ranked ethnicity – and high potential for violence, and for continued conflict in the society.

Constitutional provisions

South Africa's historical moment bringing *apartheid* to an end was shaped through a process of domestic negotiations during the early 1990s. The 1996 Constitution – the product of these negotiations – was fashioned on the field of political battle, in cross-fires produced by forces of transformation and forces of preservation, by notions of constructing new identities and of safeguarding enduring identities. Accordingly, state – civil society issues relevant to cultural diversity were very much alive in the minds of the negotiators. A number of this Constitution's key features will be identified.

Its first striking feature is that of constitutional sovereignty. Under the previous Constitution, governance was guided by parliamentary sovereignty. Today, the Constitutional Court bears this authority. When the South African state, reflecting – as it inevitably will – certain cultural interests, is called upon to be even-handed in constitutional terms, it will be the judges of this court rather than the government who will adjudicate. The second feature is the particular territorial dispersion of political power which is constituted. Intergovernmental relations between central government, nine provincial governments, and numerous local governments are required to be 'distinctive, interdependent and interrelated', thereby constituting 'co-operative government'. This division of powers establishes multiple territorial domains of representation and participation without constituting a federal arrangement. General and provincial elections to establish a national assembly and nine provincial parliaments take place under a simple list of proportional representation. Political parties, including a large number of new interest-based parties, compete openly with one another. Expressed by South African metaphor, the political playing field has been leveled.

If a constitution is interpreted as establishing a mandate between a state and its civil society, then the 1996 Constitution defines South African civil society as constituted primarily by individuals. Non-racialism and non-sexism are two of its founding provisions. Citizenship and the franchise, equality and freedom, are rights of persons, not – as in the past – of groups, or of minorities, or of races. Accordingly, cultural, linguistic, gender and religious rights of individuals are protected from unfair discrimination by the state in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution is, in this sense, classically liberal-democratic in form.

When it goes beyond protection and obliges or enables positive state action to recognize, establish or promote such rights, new cultural constituents of civil society appear within its definition. The state is obliged to take practical and

positive measures to elevate the status of indigenous languages; to constitute a state commission for the promotion and protection of the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities; to recognize the institution of traditional leadership; and to ensure that the courts apply customary law when that law is applicable. Active state intervention is enabled in two areas – affirmative action and the political role of traditional leaders.

Finally, in a section reflecting most sharply the contested nature of its establishment, the Constitution – after confirming the right of self-determination of the South African people as a whole – recognizes ‘the notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage’ within the nation.

In a cultural sense, therefore, beyond the classically-liberal rights of the individual, new constituents of civil society are identified – *cultural, religious and linguistic communities*, the institution of *traditional leadership*, and *customary law*. Cultural constituents of civil society identified in earlier South African Constitutions, such as racial groups and ethnic groups, or in international law, such as minorities and “groups” as such, are conspicuously absent.

What of the process of institutionalizing these new constitutional provisions? A number of institutions – co-operative government, the National Council of Provinces, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the Pan South African Language Board and those defining local government roles for traditional leaders – have been established. Their track records may best be described as mixed. The large number of urban and rural local governments supposed to engage in cooperative government has recently been replaced by less than one half this number. The commissions and boards designed to address minority concerns are struggling to establish procedures and ways of carrying out decisions. A division of Traditional Affairs has been established within the Department of Constitutional Affairs. Simultaneously, though fragile and sometimes perceived to be ‘toothless’, these institutions are generally viewed as legitimate, at least within elite groupings. The Constitutional Court, in particular, has taken a number of decisions on religious freedom and on language. Controversy regarding affirmative action by the state persists. The case for remedial action in contemporary South Africa is strong; the fact that its consequences are and will remain contentious is apparent.

How have rank-and-file South Africans taken to these new institutional arrangements? We turn to this question in the next section.

Ordinary South Africans

Historically, the identities of South Africans have generally been described in terms of race and ethnicity. During the

process of transition from *apartheid* toward a democratic state, however, new questions have emerged. Have the meanings attached to the ethnic and racial labels of the ‘old’ South Africa persisted? Have South Africans developed a new national identity, or are new sub-national identities emerging? Recent qualitative research reveals two major trends in identity construction ‘from below’: while one section of the population clearly takes pride in cultural, religious and linguistic affiliations and acknowledges recognition of such rights by the new South African state, the second section seems indifferent to such issues and appears to be drawing meaning from alternative institutions and sources of bonding.

Rank-and-file discussions on national, provincial and local matters reveal no meaningful provincial identity and weak national identity. Respondents are confused by distinctions between national, provincial and local bodies and their knowledge of their separate activities is patchy at best. What does appear as particularly meaningful at the national level is citizenship and thereby the right to stigmatize alien Africans as unwanted and illegal. Race formed an integral part of rank-and-file respondents’ discussions of themselves and those around them. Nonetheless, race is rarely the primary source of meaning and indeed only becomes primary in specific circumstances: in the presence of ignorance and extended racialized socialization, in the presence of marginalization and lack of alternative sources of pride and self-esteem, and in the presence of enduring economic deprivation and of increased competition over jobs in the unskilled sector. Otherwise, it persists as one identity among many.

Minority cultural affiliation and shared meaning drawn from language, on the other hand, emerged as particularly meaningful in a number of cases. In addition, shared locality appears to provide meaning to many residents. Neighbourhood in particular provides a strong sense of community, ‘a close-knit “feel”’, in the words of one of the respondents. Accordingly, the main conclusion to be drawn from this research is the importance of the local to South Africans. Politicians and opinion-makers appear mesmerized by grand images – the nation, the province, the continent. South Africans draw meaning from humbler sources – village, suburb, language, minority group.

At this point in our analysis, an optimistic judgement of the South African state’s policy and practice regarding ethnic and race relations would appear credible – fragile though they surely are in both word and implementation, new state-civil society institutions established by the new Constitution enable expression of diverse cultural identities among the citizenry whilst starting to build a national identity. Such a judgement, however, would be premature. The identities identified thus far are situated within that part of South African society we can describe as commercial

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agricultural and urban-industrial. This section of the society comprises the state and a vibrant civil society, economic relations characterized by corporatism, and a dominant cultural ethos we may call international Anglophone. The country as a whole, however, is semi-industrialized and those addressed here comprise barely more than one half of its inhabitants. The other half – the ‘underclass’ – live out their lives largely outside this institutional framework. These are South Africans who speak little or no English and who live in dense informal settlements both on the peripheries of South African cities as well as in rural areas. Most importantly, these are people who hold down no fixed employment in the economy. Unemployment rates in South Africa are extremely high (in the region of 40%) and recent trends point to continuing absolute job losses in both the formal as well as the informal sectors of the economy.

Though this distinction between those living and acting within the new emergent South African civil society and those without is simplistic if understood in a rigorous sense – since kin ties, redistribution of income among relatives, and remittances within extended families all tend to blur such strict boundaries – evidence of the separation of populations and of the diminishing of such ties is available. We need therefore turn our attention to those ‘without’, to the South African underclass.

The South African underclass

Qualitative identity research reveals significant differences between underclass respondent groupings and other groupings. In the underclass, reference to cultural issues is rarely made and pride in cultural affiliation seems to be absent. The underclass also expresses strong local identities, but these are defined by exclusion rather than with pride. Members of this class appear to draw minimal meaning from public participation in the local sphere. Their social exclusion individualizes and marginalizes them. Their ability to complain is of little influence. These local people very rarely belong to an organized opposition movement. Though the NGO sector is well-developed in South Africa’s urban areas, it is very rarely referred to in the narratives of underclass members. Their strategy, typically expressed in individual terms, is one of opting out of civil society. One way is by developing an instrumental view of criminal activity. A related strategy motivated by perceptions of police inefficiency and racial bias and aimed at defence against local criminal activity is vigilantism. Underclass organizations accordingly are local – typically micro in scale and small in numbers of members. Gangs, informal shops and vigilante groups are examples.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this rudimentary analysis. The first is that identities constructed within underclass organizations of this type remain local, and are neither racial nor ethnic. In the second place, it would be simple to categorize elite identities as reflecting trust among the citizenry in an emergent democracy and underclass identities as being ‘anti-social’, reflecting trust in small groups the activities of which are detrimental to the wider good of society. This, however, is too simple and possibly disingenuous a categorization since most members of the underclass appear to have little or no choice

regarding their quest for a haven of survival and a badge of honour. Rather, this analysis implies that the identities members of the South African underclass are able to construct are parochial and that the institutions within which they act remain particularistic. Such constraints diminish the society’s capacity to develop a democratic political culture and a vigorous civil society.

Conclusion

It would appear that multiculturalism both as a policy and an outcome has had a measure of success in the new South Africa. Minority groups demanding recognition of their identity and accommodation of their cultural differences continue to use civil society institutions to challenge the state in search of such identities and of accommodation. The new institutions of state and of corporatism have provided policies, the implementation of which have accommodated both the new and the old elite, particularly in terms of cultural differences. Neither need to mobilize rank-and-file on ethnic or racial terms. Though race and ethnicity continue to act as significant markers for South Africans, they are rarely dominant identities.

For the South African underclass, multiculturalism appears to be an issue of no consequence. The large numbers of chronically poor and unemployed act within institutions and mobilize within organizations in which identity is local rather than racial or ethnic. The minute scale of such organizations rules out mobilization on the basis of mass ethnic, linguistic or racial markers. Moreover, these local institutions and organizations offer psychological and material rewards which are experienced as independent of racial or ethnic origins. The new state and corporatist institutions that have succeeded in establishing elite accommodation fade away before they reach the arenas of these organizations.

This analysis points to a fundamental challenge facing the deeply divided society that persists in the country. The nature of elite accommodation in the society appears to exclude the underclass who, in reaction, are developing strategies of survival beyond civil society, strategies based both upon sources of local support as well as upon anti-social behaviour. In this sense, criminal violence – a common occurrence today – is a symptom of division rather than the challenge itself. The scope of multiculturalism as policy accordingly needs to embrace the underclass by offering them both material havens of survival and cultural badges of honour within emergent civil society, rather than without.

Further reading

This chapter is based upon:

BEKKER SB, LEILDE AC. 2004 ‘Is Multiculturalism a Workable Policy in South Africa?’ In Rex J & G Singh (eds.) *Governance in Multicultural Societies*. Aldershot: Ashgate

Weblink: International Journal on Multicultural Societies 5(2). <http://www.unesco.org/most/jmshome.htm>

Multiculturalism in Norway

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ABSTRACT

What kind of society do we want to have? Is it one in which immigrants are included - or excluded? In this article, the author explains the situation in Norway and what has become a very prominent political issue in recent years. He describes what is meant by the terms "cultural disqualification" and "culturally remote" citizen.

Recently, the Minister responsible for immigration, Erna Solberg, upbraided the Trondheim municipality for being too generous with benefits to persons who had had their applications for refugee status rejected. The responsible Trondheim politician responded that it was Solberg's job to handle refugee issues, and that it was his job to ensure that no one starved or slept on the wintry streets. The Minister's retort was that if Trondheim wanted to turn itself into the second largest city in Somalia, there was nothing she could do about it. This little exchange – brutally shortened – illustrates several prominent features of the present debate about immigration and refugees in Norway. It also, of course, illustrates how globally generated issues of inequality, violence, and despair manifest themselves as local issues. In Norway, as in most or all European nation-states, immigration issues are caught in a number of contradictions. With regard to refugees, there is the tension between those wishing to protect the national (whatever that is) and those arguing a wider solidarity with people in distress. Non-western immigrants are frequently claimed to be threat against the extensive welfare apparatus, and a common notion is that people illicitly claim refugeeship. Norway and its welfare state, it is claimed, also has to counter 'social dumping' as a result of an unregulated influx of immigrants from the EU countries (especially, of course, those in recently added eastern Europe).

All in all, there is a very strong sense of making a distinction between those who belong in Norway, and those who do not. Norway has a history and a culture which bestows a particular sense of being. Norway, thus, is understood as a singularity, uniquely characterized by cultural, social, political and economic distinctions. Its uniqueness, however, is seen not just as the inter-weaving of these distinctions, but as a totality which can not be adequately reduced to language, analysis or scholarship.

This is one of the frames against which the discussion about immigration and multiculturalism displays itself. Is it different from what we recognize as a classical European nation-state self-presentation? Of course it isn't. Of course it is. Both answers are right. Its features are surely close to what could or can be found elsewhere in Europe. However, one may also suggest that the Norwegian situation in this respect is a more 'classical' nationalism than what is found in most European states today.¹ Therefore, one must also point to whatever special circumstances provide the dynamics in the present generation of this notion of Norwegian society and Norwegianness. Its tempestuous influence may perhaps be best illustrated by the fact that immigration, multiculturalism, and refugees are among the most prominent and contentious political issues in Norway – somewhat surprising to the outside observer when looking at the numbers and facts.

Norway and immigration history

For many centuries, Norway was part of the Danish kingdom, but became in the early 1800s a part of a union with Sweden under the Swedish king. This union was dissolved in 1905, and Norway became a sovereign kingdom. It was a country with considerable poverty, and it is one of the European countries which lost a larger segment of its population than most to trans-Atlantic migration. The Second World War meant occupation by the Germans. In the 1970s, the 'oil adventure' started, as the result of massive oil finds in the Atlantic. Today, Norway is counted as one of the richest countries in the world on a per capita basis, and with regard to income and wealth it may well be the most egalitarian country in the world.

There are in fact two official languages in Norway, *bokmål* and *nynorsk*. On paper, *bokmål* is close to Danish (and used by a vast majority of Norwegians), but in an assertion of nationalist, class and regional distinctions, *nynorsk* was created as a written language for dialects that were considered genuinely Norwegian.

It would be misleading to believe that Norway historically was contained within itself. Comprised largely of a coast and high mountains, it was in large measure a part of a North Atlantic culture. The Hansa presence was strong in the Middle

Ages, and later (including today) Norway has an amazing presence on the high seas. Talking to Norwegians, it is easy to believe that every man in his forties and older have spent years of their youth at sea in fishing boats or in commercial fleets. And, to speculate, it is easy to imagine that the strong Norwegian feminism in general as well as in both scholarship and family arrangements, has at least some root in a traditionally strong position of women in Norwegian history.

But there is no doubt that immigration-related debates in Norway are founded on the strong belief in a shared history and the uniqueness of the Norwegian. This translates to a strong belief in the state as a guarantor for the good life. In terms of ethos, it has been said that Norway is also a mix of social democracy and Christianity. To many, this seems like a pretty good description. In social science terms, Norwegians see their country both as a corporation (an entity in which each member has a stake) and as a nation (a unique ideological community).

Immigrants and Sami

Immigrants are not the only ones representing ethno-cultural distinction in Norway. There is a Sami population, traditionally in the more northern parts of Norway, and interesting comparisons between the policies towards them and the immigrants. The total number of Sami is impossible to estimate, but there are 11,000 registered voters for the Sami Parliament, an important vehicle for over twenty years in the development of a measure of self-determination. The traditionally emblematic economic pursuit for the Sami is reindeer herding, but in fact only some of the Sami population has a close relation to it. The official policy here is “to protect and develop the Sami way of life, language, culture and values; as an aboriginal people, the Sami will receive particular attention” (Solberg on the LRD home page). Here, then is a clear multi-cultural orientation in Norwegian policy.

Immigration to Norway is recent. The impact of the free labour movement agreement between the Nordic countries in 1954 led Norwegians to work in Sweden. It was not until the 1970s that Norway started to get a notable immigration. But here we immediately have to be careful with the words. In Norwegian debates about immigrants, what is referred to are basically non-European immigrants, perhaps with the addition of some specific issues related to other immigrants (or foreigners) from other countries (Russian prostitutes, the fear that Polish workers will undercut Norwegian wage levels).

Let us start with a comprehensive view. Norway today has some 4.6 million inhabitants. Of these, some 350,000 are counted as belonging to the ‘immigrant population.’² This category contains the subcategories born abroad without Norwegian citizenship and persons born in

Norway with two foreign-born parents. The ten largest nationality groups and their memberships are presented in Table 1. The ‘western countries’ immigration to Norway rose from some 65,000 in 1980 to some 99,300 in 2004, while the ‘non-western’ stock of immigrants rose from 29,500 in 1980 to 249,600 in 2004.

We also find, as is to be expected, that Oslo has attracted a large number of immigrants. The 114,000 persons in Oslo who belong to the total ‘immigrant population’ make up some 22% of Oslo’s population, the ‘non-western’ immigrants 18%. The largest nationality categories are Pakistanis, 19,000, Somalis 7,000, and Sri Lankans, 6,700. Oslo thus joins many other large cities in Europe as one which has been profoundly affected by international migration. It is also noteworthy, that both the Norwegian and the Oslo immigrant populations are very diverse as to national origins, with fairly small numbers from many countries.

Why do immigrants come to Norway? The answers are ‘the usual’ for small European countries. About 100,000, and with an addition of some 5,000 per year, have a refugee-related background. Three-quarters of these are themselves refugees, the rest family members of refugees. Of the refugees, some two thirds came as asylum seekers, and most of the others within ‘transfer systems’. The rest, more than two thirds of the total, are largely labour migrants and their family members, and people who have married into Norway. One should of course remember that ‘labour migrants’ is a label which denotes the official reason for being in Norway, rather than necessarily actually depicting the migrants’ motivations.

There are a number of migratory movements that we know little about.

There is little doubt that we have a ‘seasonal’ system where, for example, people from Eastern Europe come to work for three month periods (the tourist visa limit) without being entered into any statistics. The only aspect of this which has received any significant attention is the possible trafficking in prostitution.

The figures for in- and out-migration fluctuate. In 2003, there were a total of 40,000 immigrants, and some 25,000 emigrants. The largest number of immigrants came from Russia (1,600), Somalia (1,500), Afghanistan (1,300), Thailand (770), Iran (400). In most Norwegians’ minds, emigration is probably seen as comprised of Norwegians going abroad for work, not by foreigners, especially from non-European countries, who have managed to get residence in Norway. However, somewhat less than 4,000 non-Norwegians left for countries in Eastern Europe, non-European, non-North American countries of destination (the number of naturalized Norwegians returning to their country of birth is not readily known). Of *all* immigrants now living in Norway, some 100,000 have been there less than five years.

But there is no doubt that immigration-related debates in Norway are founded on the strong belief in a shared history and the uniqueness of the Norwegian. This translates to a strong belief in the state as a guarantor for the good life.

Looking at the refugee figures over time, we find the usual pattern: that these come from war zones, often with a quick climax as to numbers, and then with a dramatic drop-off. Pulling it all together, but then also 'comparing apples and pears' (immigration and emigration are mostly best dealt with separately), there was a net immigration to Norway in 2003 of 11,285 persons, representing slightly more than 0.2% of the total population.

How to deal with the migrant fact?

Oslo has changed due to migration. A stroll through its central parts demonstrates this, just as it does in many European cities. Other parts of the country are much less affected. However, immigration has been at the top of the political agenda for several years. How and why?

European and North American immigrants are not included in the Norwegian immigrant discourse. The key concept here is the Norwegian term 'culturally remote', meaning immigrants from the rest of the world. The Pakistanis were the first, in the 1970s, to have a significant presence, but it also appears that for the first couple of decades after this, the debates and political interest was fairly low. 'Integration' was a key concept in whatever debates there were, as was inter-EU labour movements if Norway became a member of the EU. (Norway is still not a member, but has an agreement with the EU that basically makes Norway a part of the open EU labour market. It is also a participant in the other EU activities regulating passports, police cooperation, parts of refugee management, etc.)

Earlier issues included helping individual migrants to get work, deal with the health care system, get migrant kids a better situation in the educational system. One of the features of these efforts was to create integration policies which meant to also build on the immigrants' own networks and communities. The goals included a freedom to choose one's identity, to become Norwegian or to be something else. Once an immigrant, all of Norwegian society was to be open to you, irregardless of how you defined yourself.

In much of this, one finds parallels to Swedish immigration policies as these were developed from the 1970s onwards. It would perhaps be misleading to call these first policy stances multicultural in the strict sense. The multicultural dimension can well be argued was seen as a vehicle for personal integration into Norwegian society, not any explicit recognition of immigrant 'cultures' or contexts as in any way having the same legitimacy or value as compared to Norwegian society. Another aspect of this orientation was also a pronounced (but perhaps not very effective) stance against racism. Here, racism was primarily

seen in terms of individuals behaving inappropriately, rather than more fundamental discussions about whether Norway contained institutional racism at a more fundamental level.

In the 1990s, however, and with increasing intensity since, the situation of the 'culturally remote' has become a major topic. The attacks on 'Norwegian immigration policy' have been formulated most strongly by a right-wing party, Fremskrittspartiet, whose approximate 20% support of the electorate is insufficient to explain why its positions on this issue have been gradually more or less absorbed by other main parties.

In the contentious situation which now exists, one's impression of what goes on will to some extent depend on where one looks. The *Stortingsmelding* of 2004, the report by the Minister to Parliament, a 200-page document entitled *Diversity through inclusion and participation* certainly contains strong orientations in a diversity direction, such as (p18): "The Government wishes that diversity, and not conformity, is the common and desirable. Who is to be regarded as Norwegian must also include inhabitants who look different from the majority, people with different family histories, everyday life, religion, traditions, habits, value orientations, and language use at home."

This *Melding* is different from earlier approaches in that it now discounts multiculturalism as a goal, which was a feature of much earlier policy-making. It should be known, though, that this multiculturalism defined a norm, Norway, and then latitude for group-wise organization. The new orientations should be seen as a reflection of a wider entrenchment of the Norwegian policy process in a wider European context. The EU and the Council of Europe's activities to create convergence in Europe are explicitly mentioned. So how is immigrant life in Norway?

How do immigrants fare in Norway?

It is quite clear that there are two conceptually different approaches to how to answer this question. One answer has a focus on social indicators, the other

on a more general discussion of what kind of context Norway represents to immigrants.

Educationally, there is a gap between immigrant children (incl. the second generation) and majority students, roughly of the same size as for many of the OECD countries. This is in stark contrast to e.g. the Canadian situation, but similar to what is found in Sweden and Denmark. The gap is more pronounced for children of non-European parents, especially for those from Africa.

In terms of employment, there is no real difference between 'Norwegians' and immigrants from Europe. However, for non-European immigrants, unemployment is three to five times as high, and the participation rate in

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the labour market is also lower, but increases over time for each cohort. Nine per cent of the recipients of social assistance (in 2002) had an immigrant background, compared with 3% of the population in general.

After three years of residence, immigrants get the right to participate in municipal elections, and after seven years they can get Norwegian citizenship. Voting rates are much lower among immigrants than for those born in Norway.

There are, as indicated above, no massive problems for immigrants to have access to the fundamentals of this kind for having a decent life in Norway. At least, many would argue that the major problem immigrants face is related to a culturally argued disqualification in Norwegian life. And this brings us to the issues of what kind of context Norway provides to immigrants. It is then only fair to make the distinction made repeatedly in Norwegian society: that between European immigrants and the ‘culturally remote’.

Discussions about the culturally remote immigrants deal with a variety of issues, such as patriarchal families, forced marriages, honour cultures (with honour killings), youth criminality, female subjugation, etc. In terms of refugees, the public perception is very much that they are basically out to become spongers on the Norwegian welfare system, and with a large number of potential criminals among them. Since 9/11, being Muslim has become emblematic for what is not wanted in Norwegian society, and we have had representatives from the Parliament quoting the Quran in TV debates to illustrate what a terrible religion Islam is. The (culturally remote) immigrants, by and large doing their jobs or dealing with schools as best they can, have become the very symbol of what Norway as seen by many Norwegians is not to be. There is a ‘cultural racism’ here, energized by a-typical and bizarre anecdotes, recently including, of course, the van Gogh murder in the Netherlands.

The Double Bind

Immigrants, and especially the culturally remote, are in large measure seen as defined by their culture. The Norwegian response to this has been various measures which generally can be seen as falling under a multiculturalism orientation. The diversity perspective now advanced certainly contains a valuable departure from a reified notion of present-day societies as containing a set of fixed cultures. At the same time, however, it creates a kind of double bind. Many immigrants, not least those with Muslim backgrounds, see this as a present-day onslaught on their existence in cultural terms (e.g. ‘Muslim culture’). If the response to this is to argue on cultural grounds (yes, we have a Muslim culture, etc.), there is in the multicultural society an opening for that argument to be treated as legitimate. If the response is to fit the diversity perspective (as outlined in the *Melding*), it has to be something like “yes, but that Muslim thing is just a part of me and of no relevance to me being a good member of Norway, otherwise I’m all right in terms of my rights and obligations.” But this doesn’t respond to the core of the attack – which is that as a *cultural* being, the immigrant is implicitly unable to be what the diversity perspective requests.

To counter the cultural disqualification, the ‘cultural’ discussion, as expressed in multiculturalism, would have

to be legitimate. To the extent that the *Melding* represents diversity as a negation of the cultural argument (and it does not quite do that), diversity policies will not be an extension of the idea of pluralism. Instead, it would launch the Norwegian (or, rather, what ideologically is seen as Norwegian) as the norm – and just somewhat widen the boundaries of the Norwegian.

Norway and the future

Norway, as all other nation-states in Europe, has significant problems related to immigration and migrants, but not of the kinds usually formulated. The basic question is, what kind of societies do we want to have? Do we want to maintain the attempts at cultural and social insularity created through the hard work of 19th and 20th centuries in the creation of the nation-states as moral universes? That capital and people in large measure now moves is at least part of the dismantling of the nation-state project. However, it is still intact in much of its political institutions. Probably one of the most crucial issues is to try to create an adherence to a ‘civic’ citizenship, à la Canada, or if we maintain a ‘cultural’ nationalism à la the European nation-states. If the civic citizenship can be created, where the inhabitants solidarize themselves with the way society actually works and not as a moral order, then we can probably make a much better place for immigrants. If we continue on the cultural nationalism/citizenship trek, and we see massive attempts at a restoration of this, in Norway and other countries (such as the huge debate on *Leitkultur* in Germany) we will continue the exclusion of immigrants – at a cost.

Table 1 – Ten largest immigrant groups in Norway

First generation immigrants	Born in Norway with two foreign-born parents		
Sweden	21,890	Pakistan	11,412
Denmark	17,922	Vietnam	5,552
Pakistan	14,874	Turkey	4,251
Iraq	14,856	Sri Lanka	3,969
Bosnia-Herzeg.	13,271	Somalia	3,420
Somalia	12,166	Iraq	2,439
Vietnam	11,862	Morocco	2,291
Iran	11,364	India	2,289
Germany	10,515	Serbia & Montenegro	2,230
Great Britain	10,325	Bosina-Herzeg.	1,945

Notes

¹ This statement is not easily verified, but reflects the author’s impression. This in spite of the rage of articles about ‘Leitkultur’ in Germany, and similar nationalistic manifestations in other European countries.

² The statistical information is basically taken from web pages of the Norwegian Bureau of Statistics, www.ssb.no; much of the material here is also in part available with table headings in English.

The Changing Face of Portugal:

Immigration and Ethnic Pluralism

Maria Lucinda Fonseca

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ABSTRACT

The author provides a complete picture of the genesis of contemporary immigration to Portugal. She describes what happened following an influx of citizens from former Portuguese colonies during the second half of the 20th century and the impact this has had on Portuguese society. She then goes on to discuss recruitment strategies and the integration of immigrants.

In Portugal, international migration constitutes a fundamental element in the dynamics of demographic and socio-economic transformation observed in the last decades of the 20th century (Table 1). In the 1960s, consistently high birth rates were not enough to counterbalance the effects of emigration, leading to a 2.6% population decline. By the 1970s, in spite of the population decline induced in part by a decreasing fertility rate, the country's population grew at a rate faster than any other over the past century. This change can be attributed to three types of factors: less emigration towards Western Europe, the return of more than a half a million *retornados*¹ from the former colonies starting in 1974, and the return of a large number of emigrants from France and Germany. The 1980s were characterized by a stabilization of the country's population, with a demographic growth rate of only 0.35%. This stability resulted from the combined effects of the marked decline in the population growth rate, revitalized emigration and the increase in labour-oriented immigration coming from Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP).

Portugal's role as a country of immigration solidified in the 1990s, with net migration being responsible for 82.8% of total demographic growth observed between the 1991 and 2001 censuses (Table 1).

	Population at the beginning of period	Population at the end of the period	Population change	Natural increase	Net migration
1960-1970	8,889,392	8,663,252	-226,140	1,072,620	-1,298,760
1970-1981	8,663,252	9,833,014	1,169,762	794,194	375,569
1981-1991	9,833,014	9,867,147	34,133	349,549	-315,416
1991-2001	9,867,147	10,356,117	488,970	84,223	404,747

Source: INE census data (1960, 1970, 1981, 1991 and 2001); INE Demographic Yearbooks (various years)

Context of the development of immigration to Portugal

Portugal's experience as a country of immigration is a recent phenomenon. Traditionally a country of emigration, it was only in the mid-1970s that Portugal changed its position in the market of international migration from being a labour force supplier for the developed countries in Europe to being a host for foreign workers.

The 1960 census counted 29,428 foreign residents in Portugal, with 19,794 being of European origin (11,713 of them from Spain) and 6,357 Brazilians. The amount of foreigners was relatively stable for some years, though showing signs of growth by the end of the '60s. The wave of immigration at this time in history was of a dual character. The reinforcement of economic relations with the most advanced European economies after joining EFTA, the opening-up to foreign investment and the development of tourism in the Algarve region all served to attract to Portugal managers and highly skilled professionals who worked in transnational corporations/multinationals, but also retirees, namely Britons settling in the Algarve region. On the other hand, industrial development and urban growth set in the context of a colonial war along with a strong labour-orientated rural exodus to developed Western European countries (mainly France and Germany) established employment opportunities in the construction sector and unskilled services for the first wave of immigrants from Cape Verde.

In the period of African de-colonization (1974-1976) approximately 600,000 people arrived in Portugal from the former colonies. Although the wave mainly comprised Portuguese-born and those of Portuguese descent, it also included a considerable number of Africans, namely from Cape Verde and Angola. Their arrival played a very important role in the growth of the number of economic migrants coming from the PALOP countries, as these "repatriates" of African origin facilitated

the development of inter-personal knowledge networks that supported the settlement of new immigrants.

The de-colonization process also led to an important change in the citizenship law as far PALOP-born individuals' access to Portuguese citizenship was concerned. Fearing a huge wave of African immigrants to Portugal after the independence of the colonies due to the political crisis and civil war in Angola and Mozambique, the aforementioned law established that all people from the newly independent territories overseas would lose their Portuguese citizenship. Exceptions were made for descendents of Portuguese citizens born in Portugal up to the third generation, as well as for those who, by 25 April 1975, had been living for more than five years in Portugal. Therefore, many Africans residing in Portugal with Portuguese passports were considered foreigners from that moment onwards.

Table 2 illustrates the growth of documented foreign citizens living in Portugal between 1975 and 2003. The number of immigrants holding a residence permit grew from 31,983 to 250,697, with the 2003 figure being eight times higher than that in 1975. If one also considers the number of immigrants holding a permanence permit or a study or work visa, there were around 450,000 immigrants legally living in Portugal by the end of 2003, accounting

Year	Number	Year	Number
1975	31,983	1990	107,767
1976	32,032	1991	113,978
1977	35,414	1992**	123,612
1978	41,807	1993**	136,932
1979	47,189	1994*	157,073
1980	50,750	1995	168,316
1981	54,414	1996	172,912
1982	58,674	1997	175,263
1983	67,484	1998	178,137
1984	73,365	1999	191,143
1985	79,594	2000	207,607
1986	86,982	2001	223,976
1987	89,778	2002	238,944
1988	94,453	2003	250,697
1989	101,011		

for 4.3% of the resident population in 2001.

* The 1994 data includes the figures from the extraordinary regularisation processes of 1992-93.

** The 1992 and 1993 data show slight variation in different tables published in official statistics.

Source: INE Estatísticas Demográficas, 1980-2001; Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (Foreigners and Borders Office)


With the arrival of new immigrants, mainly from the PALOP countries, economic immigration grew more intense. Many immigrants either entered or stayed in the country undocumented. To legalize their situation, two extraordinary regularization campaigns were organised in the 1990s – the first one in 1992-93 and the second in 1996.

In 2003, Africans were the largest group of foreign residents in Portugal holding a residence permit (47.3% of the total foreign population). EU citizens, though decreasing in absolute

numbers in the total foreign population, are increasingly keeping pace with the Portuguese economy's process of internationalization and its integration in the EU. They were the second largest group in 2003 with 69,805 individuals. Central and South Americans occupy the third position in the list of foreigners' areas of origin (13% of the total). The Asian community is still quite small, but has been growing quickly, mainly due to the arrival of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani citizens. North Americans hold a slightly smaller share compared to Asians (10,124 individuals, or 4% of the total), their presence corresponding both to the linkages generated by previous flows of Portuguese emigrants and to the immigration of highly-skilled professionals involved in American investments in Portugal.

In a more detailed analysis, by country of nationality, one can observe that 53.3% of foreigners holding a residence permit in 1993 came from the PALOP countries and Brazil, suggesting a strong association/link between immigration and Portugal's colonial past (Fonseca *et al.*, 2002). As we shall see, this migratory framework is only altered in

Figure 1 – Main Nationalities of Foreign Citizens Holding a Residence Permit in Portugal, as at 31/12/2003



the late 1990s with the arrival of immigrants from Eastern Europe. Cape Verde, Angola and Guinea Bissau are the more representative nationalities from Africa (Figure 1).

Total number of immigrants: 250,697 / Top 15 nationalities: 217,754 (86.9%)
Source: Fonseca and Ormond, 2004

The Brazilian community is the second largest, with 10.6% holding a residence permit. Among the EU citizens living in Portugal with residence permits, the three largest communities are those from the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany.

The new wave of immigrants at the turn of the century

In addition to rapid growth in immigration at the turn of the century, immigrants’ geographical origins have grown increasingly diverse, as evidenced by the emergence of a migratory wave from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that is made up of skilled professionals whose migratory process was organized by recruitment, transportation and job placement networks (Baganha and Fonseca, 2004).

The distribution of permanence permits issued in 2001, 2002 and 2003 under the regularization law for undocumented foreigners working in Portugal emphasizes the importance of this flow from Eastern Europe, namely from the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Russia. The citizens from these four countries correspond to 51.9% of the total number of permanence permits issued in 2001-2003 (Figure 2).

Besides immigration from Eastern Europe, the rapid growth in the number of Brazilians who have recently arrived in

Portugal to work is also noteworthy. This community comes in at second place in terms of the number of permanence permits issued by the Portuguese authorities in 2001-2003. Source: Fonseca and Ormond, 2004

The enlargement of international labour force recruitment areas of immigrants to Portugal is also visible in the growing number of Asian communities, namely from China, India and Pakistan, and also from North Africa, mainly from Morocco, as difficulties/barriers imposed by Spain to immigrants become more extensive.

Demographic structures and spatial patterns of immigration to Portugal


The resident foreign population in Portugal at the time of the last census in 2001 is largely male and is characterized by an age structure in which young people of working age predominate. Some 67.1% of the population is aged between 15 to 44 years.

In analyzing immigrants by geographic origin, significant differences between immigrant groups can be observed both in terms of sex ratio and age structure. EU citizens and North Americans have higher percentages of elderly people due to the international retirement migration phenomenon. As regards economic migrants, the age structure varies in function with the phase in the migratory cycle in which they find themselves. The proportion of 0-14 year-olds is greater in the case of immigrants from the PALOP than in the case of Brazilians, Asians and Eastern Europeans, as the family reunification process more greatly affects immigrants having settled in Portugal for a longer period of time.

As far as the gender composition of immigrant flows is concerned, the recent changes in requests for residence permits illustrate a tendency towards increasing the feminisation of migratory flows. New demands for residence permits illustrate this trend. Whereas women represented 36.4% of the total inflow in 1992, they corresponded to 53% of the new requests in 2002.

As regards the spatial patterns of settlement in Portugal, one can see with the large concentrations in the districts of Lisbon, Faro, Setúbal and Oporto that these districts combined were home in 2003 to 83.1% of the total foreign population holding a residence permit in the country. In addition to these areas, the remaining coastal districts of mainland Portugal and the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira are also important sites of settlement. Few foreigners are located in the country’s interior, though relatively high growth has been observed in recent years, especially due to the new wave of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

This pattern follows the employment opportunities generated by large investments in the public construction sector, not only due to the demand by labour-intensive industrial sectors, such as the textile, garment and footwear industries or agriculture in regions where the availability of Portuguese labour is clearly insufficient. The need for workers is due to the ageing of the population and also to the migration of younger workers to better paid, less strenuous and more socially-valued jobs, or even to other regions within and outside of Portugal with



higher wages.

The colonial heritage and European integration

In Portugal, immigration policy is a recent construction and is based on three essential pillars:

- Duties resulting from European integration;
- International dispositions that protect the rights of immigrants in the framework of the European Council, the International Labour Organization and the United Nations; and
- Colonial heritage.

After the post-colonial measures that limited the access of PALOP-born citizens to Portuguese citizenship, the first law seeking to regulate elements of the immigration influx was published in 1981 (Decree-Law No. 264/81 on Entry, Stay and Expulsion of Foreigners).

By the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of integration into Europe (Portugal became a full member of the EEC in 1986) and of the growth in immigration after the mid-1980s, immigration acquired relevance in the national political agenda. Important changes were introduced in the law regulating the entry, stay and expulsion of foreigners from Portuguese territory, in the citizenship law and in asylum regulation, making them more restrictive and closer to the mainstream norms applied in other EU countries. In spite of this, the legislation also contained some signs of Portugal's colonial heritage, expressed in positive discrimination measures towards immigrants coming from PALOP countries and Brazil, when compared with foreign citizens from non-EU countries (Fonseca; Caldeira and Esteves, 2002; Fonseca, Malheiros, Esteves and Caldeira, 2002).

As far as the rights of immigrants are concerned, Portuguese law can be considered extremely positive. In Articles 13 and 15 of the Portuguese Constitution, the principle of equality among citizens is recognized and Portuguese and legal foreign residents are treated equally and have similar civil, social and economic rights – except for the right to political participation. Moreover, Law No. 134/99 of 28 August forbids discrimination based on race, nationality or ethnicity.

The right to political participation is considered in the Portuguese Constitution, making it is possible to give active (the right to be elected) and passive (the right to vote in the elections for local authorities) rights, always under the condition of reciprocity. Presently, EU citizens as well as nationals from Cape Verde and Brazil can vote for local elections as long as they have legally resided in Portugal

for more than two years. Nationals from Argentina, Chile, Israel, Norway, Uruguay and Venezuela may also do so, provided they have legally resided in Portugal for over three years. European Union, Cape Verdean and Brazilian nationals can be elected to local government posts if residing in Portugal for over four years, whereas Peruvians and Uruguayans have to be living in Portugal for more than five years.

Institutionalization of immigration policy²

The increase in immigration and the heightening of social problems that immigrants, especially those coming from the PALOP countries, face (e.g. poverty, poor housing conditions, clandestine working situations, etc.) became

increasingly visible in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. In the second half of the 1990s, the first outbursts of inter-ethnic conflict as well as several racist and xenophobic protests emerged onto the scene. At the same time, the collective mobilization of immigrant associations and other agencies in Portugal's civil society that fight for the rights of immigrants and their descendents, changed gradually from a clear intervention based on immediate assistance, to a wider sphere of the social and political.

When the Socialist party came into power in October 1995, the first steps towards a more holistic and inter-related integration policy were taken:

- The High Commissariat for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) was established in February 1996, a body responsible for promoting improvements in immigrants' and ethnic minorities' living conditions;
- The Second Extraordinary Regularisation for Undocumented Immigrants was under taken in 1996;
- A series of public policies on social inclusion meant to benefit many immigrants, especially those of African origin, were developed;
- Immigrant associations were recognised as relevant partners in the definition of immigration policy, and the Consultative Council for Immigration Affairs (COCAI) was established in 1998. The COCAI, in operation since March 1999, is chaired by ACIME and includes representatives from recognised immigrant associations, NGOs, business associations and major trade unions, as well as the State Secretary for the Portuguese Communities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); and

- The issues of xenophobia and discrimination were addressed in a specific anti-discrimination law (Law No. 134/99 of 28 August) that expressly prohibited discriminatory practices based on race, colour, nationality and ethnic origin (Esteves *et al.*, 2003).

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The recent massive increase of immigration to Portugal, especially the new migratory influx from Eastern Europe, has made waves in the media and has prompted a great national debate about immigration policy. Portuguese immigration policy, from 2000 onwards, was based upon three fundamental pillars: 1) the promotion of legal immigration according to the country's labour market needs; 2) the effective integration of immigrants; and 3) the fight against illegal immigration.

In January 2001, the immigration law was changed by Decree-Law No. 4/2001 of 10 January. The new piece of legislation instituted the *permanence permit* for foreigners present in the country not in possession of legal documents yet in possession of a valid work contract. This permit enables its bearer to legally remain in the country for one year (and can be renewed annually for four more years).

In addition to this, Decree-Law No. 4/2001 also introduced a new element in the system of recruitment of foreign workers – the requirement of an annual report to be put together by the government, predicting the number of foreign workers needed in the various branches of economic activity each year.

The government that took power in April 2002, formed by a coalition between the Social Democratic Party (PSD)³ and the Popular Party (PP), brought about important changes to the juridical regime of entry, stay, departure and expulsion of foreigners from Portuguese territory, as evidenced by Decree-Law No. 4/2001 of 10 January. The new law (Decree-Law No. 34/2003) regulating the above-mentioned actions was published on 25 February 2003.

Among the concrete changes that were introduced, the following are noteworthy:

- Permanence permits, instituted in 2001, were done away with;
- The new law stressed status differences between the types of immigrants settled in Portugal, assuming that only residence permit holders were effectively “residents.” Consequently, the set of rights (established by law and effectively used as practical normative devices in the daily functioning of services and institutions dealing with immigrants) attributed to holders of residence permits is larger and stronger than the one attributed to permanence permit holders (or holders of work visas), who are clearly placed in a more vulnerable position;
- The provisions concerning family reunification have been clarified and the rights of family members somewhat widened (e.g. the possibility to work in Portugal has been extended to the family members of more categories of immigrants);
- The system providing information to immigrants has

expanded (direct telephone lines, leaflets in several languages, the establishment of national and local information points associated with or directly dependent on ACIME, etc.); and

- The formal penalties applied to traffickers, transport companies that carry irregular immigrants and employers of irregular workers have become heavier.

As far as the normative element is concerned, a few new steps have taken place in the second half of 2003 and in 2004. First, a bilateral agreement between Portugal and Brazil has opened up the possibility for the regularisation of irregular Brazilian immigrants fulfilling certain requirements. Secondly, a specific piece of legislation finally regulated that which was put forth by

Decree-Law No. 34/2003. Within its norms, a few direct and indirect advances towards the extension of immigrants' rights have taken place. For instance, irregular foreign workers who contributed to social security during a certain period of time are now entitled to regularise their situation. Another piece of legislation has facilitated the formal registration of children of irregular migrants in Portuguese public schools.

In addition to governmental institutions, different types of actors seeking to foment the discussion in order to influence political decision-making and develop action in the area of immigration can be distinguished:

- Political parties;
- Trade union organisations and professional associations;
- Immigrant associations;
- Churches and associations of a religious nature;
- NGOs that, either directly or indirectly, are involved in offering assistance to immigrants and ethnic minorities;
- University institutions that are dedicated to research in the area of international migration.

Political parties, especially those represented in Parliament, play a significant role in the discussion on immigration policy, not only in parliamentary debates and within the party structures, but also

through the contacts that they maintain with authoritative bodies, local powers (municipalities and parishes), immigrant associations, trade unions, employers' associations, non-governmental organisations, etc., as well as by way of their participation in discussion forums sponsored by other actors interested in this issue.

Both union federations (UGT and CGTP-IN) have gained a more active role in the discussion on immigration policy, as the participation of immigrant workers has grown increasingly more important in national

The increase in and the diversification of migratory fluxes towards Portugal, as observed in the last five years, have been reflected in the strengthening of the associative movement by immigrants and has fostered a growing interest in the defence of the rights of non-EU citizens and in the provision of different forms of assistance for their inclusion in the host society

employment figures, particularly in the private building sector. The UGT and the CGTP-IN have directed their energy towards ways to combat illegal employment of foreign workers and to fight against conditions of exploitation by employers and labour traffickers to whom many immigrants – especially undocumented immigrants – are subject.

The increase in and the diversification of migratory fluxes towards Portugal, as observed in the last five years, have been reflected in the strengthening of the associative movement by immigrants and has fostered a growing interest in the defence of the rights of non-EU citizens and in the provision of different forms of assistance for their inclusion in the host society – especially for those most in need – by a host of NGOs as well as welfare and religious institutions, namely those related to the Catholic Church.

In Portugal, however, the different levels of inter-institutional dialogue (NGO/NGO, NGOs/public authorities, researchers/political decision-makers/civil society institutions) remain very limited and, because of this, the effectiveness of some policy measures as well as the influence of scientific knowledge on the formulation of immigration policy is still relatively tenuous.

How immigrants are perceived in Portuguese society

The results from a 2002 survey of a representative sample of the Portuguese population on social perceptions of immigrants revealed contradictory and ambivalent imagery (Lages and Policarpo, 2003). The percentage of Portuguese people believing that immigrants are fundamental for the economic vitality of the country is equal to that of those who disagree with the statement. Nevertheless, most people recognize that immigrants do the work that Portuguese themselves do not want to do, and a very high percentage of people are aware that foreign workers are exploited and earn less than Portuguese performing the same work.

A very positive aspect that merits attention is the agreement regarding the need for protection of immigrants against exploitation by their employers. However, 60% of Portuguese people believe that immigrants should be required to return to their countries of origin if they cannot find work and that undocumented immigrants should be repatriated.

Furthermore, a large portion of the Portuguese population feels that immigrants constitute a threat towards their safety/security, particularly as regards immigrants of African origin. News about isolated acts of violence propagated by the media has played an important role in shaping collective notions about immigrants. These acts are especially emphasized by the press and on television when they have been committed by non-whites who are identified as “immigrants” though they may be Portuguese citizens and serve to spread feelings of insecurity resulting from the formation of stereotypes associating violence and aggression with behaviours characteristic of blacks.

More recently, along with the new wave of immigrants coming from Eastern Europe, the notion of immigration as threat to safety/security is increasingly connected to fears about rising organised crime, associated with the international development of illegal labour migrant traf-

ficking networks that operate from the countries of origin and are oftentimes organized by former military officers from these countries (Fonseca, 2003).

Unlike other more developed European countries with deeper-rooted immigration traditions, in Portugal there are no political parties or ultra-nationalist movements with xenophobic or racist features. However, the existence of skinheads and clashes between young Portuguese from ethnic minority groups, mainly in the Lisbon area, are clear signs of an increase in racial tension and are cause for growing concern among politicians and citizens. Moreover, in daily social practice, the association often made between immigrants and ethnic minorities, and between non-whites and foreigners, reveals a collective discriminatory attitude, mainly among the elderly and the less educated (Valente Rosa *et al.*, 2000).

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Notes

- 1 Retornados is the term used to describe Portuguese citizens having lived in the colonies that returned to Portugal once the colonies gained independence.
- 2 This paragraph is extensively based on previous works: Esteves; Fonseca & Malheiros, (2003) and Fonseca; Malheiros; Esteves & Caldeira, 2002).
- 3 Despite the name ‘Social-Democratic’, we are referring to a liberal party that is not a member of (or even a close partner to) Socialist International.



**Prato: Multicultural
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Multicultural Futures

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A special issue of the journal *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, entitled "Multicultural Futures? Challenges and Solutions," will be published in 2006, based on many of the papers presented at this event. For further information, please visit <http://www.ss.ucalgary.ca/ces/>

Multiculturalism in Italy

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ABSTRACT

This article begins with a general overview of the current immigrant situation in Italy, followed by a discussion of the legal framework. The author maintains that there is a need to acknowledge and address the issues of immigration, including the importance of fully integrating the second generation.

Italy became a country of immigration during the 1970s. The immigrant population in Italy has doubled each decade since then. At the end of 1991, there were 648,935 legally resident immigrants in Italy; by the end of 2003 these numbers had grown to 2,193,999. The composition of the immigrants changed remarkably in the 80s and 90s. The incidence of immigrants who came from the European Union declined, while the proportion of immigrants from outside the European Union increased, and in the late 1990s accounted for 86% of the total (Maciotti & Pugliese, 2003). Among the non-Europeans, in spite of the increase in Afro and Asian immigrants, their relative incidence declined in relation to Eastern European immigrants from Yugoslavia, Albania and Rumania, who became the fastest growing group.

The new immigrants tend to locate where demand for work is higher and more facilities make their integration possibilities easier and faster. According to the territorial distribution of residence permits, in 2003, 57.8% of the legal foreigners are in the North, 28% in the Centre and 14.2% in the South and Islands. The gender composition indicates a small imbalance in favour of male immigration; in fact, 51.6% (2003) of the total number of foreign residents are male. It varies greatly between national groups: data show a prevalence of female immigrants among some Asian groups (Filipinos) and Latin American groups (Brazilian, Peruvian), while male immigrants prevail among the African groups (Moroccans, Tunisians, Senegalese) and East Europeans, namely ex-Yugoslavian and Albanian. Among these two groups where the male component prevails, there are exceptions, such as Rumanians and Poles, where female immigrants are prevalent and, among Africans, Somalis and Ethiopians. 58.5% of the total immigrant population is concentrated in the age range 19 to 40 years. The proportion of minors in the foreign population (21%) also exceeds the proportion of Italian minors. There has also been a continuous increase in married people. Only a quarter have children with them, which is an indication of the difficulty involved in family reunion. Among the immigrants from outside the European Union, 66.8% hold a residence permit for work reasons, while 24.3% hold a permit for family reunion.

The sectoral distribution of the 771,813 regularly employed workers is as follows: 7.4% in agriculture (almost nine in ten with short term contracts), 21.7% in industry and 70.8% in services (43.7% in domestic service). Their employment is growing fastest in the less organized sectors (services and the building industry). Employment is highest between June and September, especially in commerce where it has increased by one third. In terms of occupational characteristics, 73% are registered as manual workers. This is due to a combination of two causes: their relatively low education level and the difficulty of finding a job on a par with their education and training. The information available regarding the education of foreigners serves little, given the educational differences which exist between schooling systems. When it is based on their declarations, there is an overvaluation of their education; when it is based upon recognition of their degrees, the difficulties in comparing different schooling systems may induce an under-evaluation of their education.

Even in an unfavourable labour market situation, the involvement of immigrants in trade unions has increased in the main Italian trade unions (Cisl, Cgil and Uil) from 200,330 (at the beginning of 2000) to 333,883 (at the beginning of 2003). These figures demonstrate a higher level of unionization among immigrants than Italians. According to a survey by IRES in 2002, the main reasons why immigrants contact trade unions are: to protect their individual rights at work 55.9%; to gain information about Italian life 24.1%; problems of regularization and family reunion, 37.8%. The latter are important in their own right, and because bureaucratic delays by the police make it difficult to gain access to rights.

The legal framework

Migration policy must promote the coexistence of different linguistic, cultural, social and religious traditions within the same society. Italy is one of the best examples of 'polycentric' migration. There is a stable population originating from every continent – no one predominates and none is insignificant. For every ten immigrants, 4 are European, 3 African, 2 Asian and 1 American. Present trends suggest that, after some Eastern European countries have joined and are joining the

European Union, the proportions will change to 4.5 Europeans and 2.5 Africans. Romania is the largest nationality, with a population of 239,426, Albania next with 233,616, following Morocco with 227,900 and then, a long way behind, Ukraine (112,802), China (100,109) and Philippines (73,847). The areas with the most consistent migratory flows have been Eastern Europe, and the Indian subcontinent. Recently, migration has increased from Latin America, as a result of serious economic crises, and from sub-Saharan Africa where demographic pressures are very high. This vast global movement of humanity has given birth to a mosaic of ethnicities, languages, cultures, social traditions and religions, and it is the task of migration policy to ensure that relations are harmonious.

An immigration policy on immigrants in Italy was first introduced only in 1998. In particular, it set itself the following objectives: to discourage illegal immigration; to develop an active policy on entries; to stabilize the foreign population present in Italy through the creation of a 'residence card' (*carta di soggiorno*); to involve countries of origin and transit in the policies for curbing irregular immigration.¹ This law created a National Fund for Immigration to promote activities and projects facilitating the integration of immigrants. Through this Fund, many local administrations provide immigrants with free advising, consulting and other services: employment advice, assistance in accessing public goods and services such as housing and health care, and Italian language lessons. Most of the public information made available to immigrants is distributed through the Agencies for Foreigners (*Uffici Stranieri*) that are located in all local, regional and state administrations. These agencies serve as the point of exchange between the immigrant community and public authorities; they regularly organize events and campaigns to promote awareness of civil rights among immigrants.

The efforts of national and local public authorities to facilitate the integration of immigrants are complemented by the activities of a wide range of civil society organizations. In fact, in many cases it is these organizations that are best positioned to provide immediate and concrete solutions to the practical problems commonly experienced by immigrants. There is frequent and effective cooperation between governmental institutions and civil society organizations concerning integration initiatives. Particularly at the local level, it is common for public administration offices and civil society organizations to collaborate closely in facilitating various aspects of the integration process. This collaboration is encouraged by the fact that NGOs which meet certain specified criteria may apply to the state for public financing (Zincone, 2001).

Current political debate does not appear to acknowledge the importance of immigration, its increasing weight in society and its likely growth. The new law on immigration, finally through parliament on 11th July 2002 (n. 189), was part of the election manifesto of the centre-right coalition and came on the wave of massive law and order campaigns and "immigration alarms." The Bossi-Fini Law (Law 189) focuses on immigrants as workers. Its provisions bear a strong resemblance to the measures contained in Italy's first immigration law in 1986 (Law 943), but they have a more repressive character. While labour migration is one of the most important aspects of immigration, it does not encompass the whole of the migratory phenomenon. Immigrants are also citizens and bearers of social and cultural needs.

This law changes the situation considerably: it exacerbates the limits of the previous legislation and reduces the rights of immigrants and the space for integration policies. The integration measures contained in the previous legislation are left more or less untouched, except for those concerning housing, which are more restrictive.² Nevertheless, the consequences for integration will probably be serious for two reasons. On the one hand the new legislation tends to make the situation of immigrants less secure, especially for new arrivals, and this by itself reduces the chances of integration. On the other hand, there is the cultural discourse on which the law is based and which accompanied its creation and first implementation. The immigrant is seen as a threat and the law is imbued with a "mercantile spirit," an extreme expression of the "subordinated inclusion" model in which the immigrant is a "worker" and not a "citizen."

Some iconic issues

The illusion of 'Islamic invasion'

It is incorrect to speak of an "Islamic invasion," first of all because of the statistics. According to the estimates of the Fondazione Migrantes, Christians constitute 48% (814,000) of immigrants, Muslims 37% (621,000) and Asian religions 7% (115,000). For every 10 Christians there are about 5 Catholics, 3 Orthodox and 2 Protestants. Second, because Islam in emigration is "revisited" in a private way. According to some research conducted in Italy on the religious behaviour of Muslims, it was concluded that men and women live their religion "in silence," where mosques become spaces to meet and exchange information useful to proceed in the integration process or where the Arabic language is taught to the second generation. Nevertheless, Muslims have experienced difficulties establishing mosques and places of worship, observing religious holidays, and exercising other religious rituals. There are a variety of

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state-supported integration programs for immigrants, many of which are developed and implemented in cooperation with civil society or religious charitable organizations. However, there is still little dialogue between the state and Muslim communities to develop a comprehensive policy to overcome the disadvantages faced by this group, or to evaluate the existing integration initiatives. The Italian legal system recognizes and grants extensive rights to linguistic or traditional minorities, and religious minorities whose rights are regulated by special law and bilateral agreements with the state (Aluffi & Zincone, 2004). As a state agreement has not yet been concluded with Muslims, their group rights are not fully guaranteed or protected.

The immigrant as victims

Every 25 hours a foreigner falls victim to an act of violence (physical attacks, pick-pocketing) and a third of these have a racist motive. Furthermore these acts are not carried out by extremist groups but by so-called “normal” citizens. The preferred victims are women, and the most dangerous places are cities (Rome and Milan are the most xenophobic) but the phenomenon is spreading into the suburbs and the provinces. Discrimination does not consist only of acts of street violence but also of unfair treatment in the work place, discriminatory treatment by banks in relation to the opening of accounts, and in difficulties experienced from landlords and agencies when seeking accommodation.

Immigrants as criminals

It is usually believed that immigrants commit more crimes than the locals. According to a recent survey conducted by the European Observatory against Racism (2002), 72% of the people interviewed shared this belief. For a more accurate analysis of the statistics, one needs to take into account the following points: that a high percentage of immigrants do not have problems with law enforcement; the need to distinguish the occasionally delinquent immigrant from the real criminal; that 78% of crimes committed by immigrants are attributed to illegal immigrants; that the majority of cases involve the following nationalities: Moroccans, Albanians, Romanians, Tunisians, Algerians, Yugoslavians, Senegalese, Nigerians and Chinese; that for a number of reasons the northern regions offer a more favourable environment for immigrants to commit crimes.

The crimes most frequently attributed to immigrants are: drug offences, exploitation of prostitution, violation of immigration laws and crimes committed in the course

of dealing with public officials. These latter involve perjury, obstruction of an officer of the law in the course of an arrest or investigation and falsification of documents, and all are closely tied to the condition of being “non citizens” and therefore to the requirement to obtain numerous documents. The presence of foreign prisoners in jails has grown (17,778 foreigners of a total of 56,572 on 31 May 2004, a little less than one third of the total³), but this is also due to the length of criminal proceedings: the majority concern people who are only under investigation or who are unconvicted.

According to a survey for the National Commission for Integration (2000), three quarters of the immigrant population consider that Italians have a distorted image of foreigners, that they see them as frightening, and that Italians accept uncritically reports in the mass media, without distinguishing between the various nationalities. Interviewers found that Italians demand from immigrants a level of respect for the law which they themselves can not claim: tax avoidance, and failure to observe other laws is common among Italians themselves. Immigrants believe that many Italians are keen to look after their own interests without getting involved with immigrants. Nevertheless, they believe that Italians can demonstrate solidarity with them, an example of trust that deserves to be reciprocated.

The future of multiculturalism: the children of immigrants

It is vital to build a space where our children and the children of immigrants can meet as equals. We continue to speak of them as “immigrants,” even though two thirds of them did not come to Italy but were born here. While the immigrant population has doubled during the last 10 years, for minors this has happened in just 4 years. Their numbers increased from 126,000 at the end of 1996 to 284,224 at the end of 2003. Including those under fourteen entering through family reunion⁴, their number already exceeds 300,000, a fifth of the immigrant population. The term “bambino straniero” (foreign child) is also incorrect, because we are often talking of children born in Italy, who talk like us, have the same tastes and can often be distinguished only by facial characteristics. Their number reached 100,000 only four years ago, and grew to 147,000 during the school year 2001-2002 and

182,000 in the following year. Six out of ten are enrolled at primary or nursery schools. They are now less than 2% of the resident population; however, by 2017, according to a government estimate, this could rise to 529,000, or 6.5% of

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the school population. An investigation of schools throughout Italy by the Ministry of Education in 2001, found that in only 7% of schools are there no foreign pupils (the percentage is about three times higher in the South), in 64% foreign children make up more than 3% of the school population, and in 28% more than 5%. This population is quite varied in relation to country of origin, and is highest in primary and comprehensive schools.

Migration policy focuses a great deal of attention on immigration flows, which is understandable since the newly arrived are, in a manner of speaking, the valve which regulates the growth of the foreign population. It should not, however, ignore settled immigration and particularly long-established immigration, since it now represents the majority of immigration and expresses the new social reality in the host country. To be concerned solely with new arrivals is to confine ourselves to emergency measures, ignoring the more profound needs for coexistence. Cultural mediation is very important in this context as a way of integrating the first generation, and even more important, the second generation.

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Notes

¹ Sciortino, p. 58, in ISMU.

² The previous government promoted the integration of immigrants into society through Law 286/98 that explicitly encourages the development of programs and policies to encourage cultural exchange. Law 286/98 also provided for the establishment of a number of official bodies to facilitate the integration of immigrants.

³ Source: Italian Justice site: www.giustizia.it.

⁴ According to Italian migration law minors under fourteen years old are registered on the residence permit of their parents and, obviously, they aren't in the statistics.

Multiculturalism in France¹

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ABSTRACT

Can the individual successfully maintain double citizenship and plural allegiances? This article discusses how multiculturalism in France may seem odd amidst French political values, and how some trends of multiculturalism have managed to impose themselves on the French model of citizenship and integration. Going back to the Revolution of 1789 and the days of Jacobins and Girondins, Catherine de Wenden traces the development of republicanism and identity in Europe.

France is, de facto, a multicultural country, but the notion has been much contested. Until the revolution of 1789, it was made up of provinces with their own cultures, languages, parliaments, systems of measures, although the compulsory use of French in administrative and judicial rules (Edit de Villers Cotterets, 1539) and the defense and unification of the French language (creation of the French Academy in 1635 by Richelieu) as well as the centralization of civil service occurred very early. The French revolution tried to change the definition of the French community, from an addition of cultures and institutions constitutive of the State, to a philosophical and political definition of national cohesion around the Nation (“Vive la Nation”, Valmy, 1792) and the citizens, free and equal regarding rights (*Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen* of 1789). During the republican periods of the 19th century (first, second and third Republic), the references to republican values embodied by an evolving citizenship, as well as the birth of ideologies canceling particularistic belongings (class struggle model, universalistic values) blurred the frontiers of communities and progressively built France on the myth of national homogeneity. The recent appeal to republican values and to national cohesion during the last presidential campaign of May 2002, along with the permanent need to redefine French identity faced with the challenge of the National Front, testify of the accurateness of the French model of the national citizen.

Multiculturalism in France has acquired some legitimacy very recently under the pressure of immigration, of Europe and of globalization, but also from the desire to assert the weight of local cultures in the patrimony of national culture. Many French are reluctant to admit it and oppose it to the exclusiveness of Jacobinist values: secularism, formal equality, legal freedom, civic values of living together (“fraternité”), with an exclusive allegiance to the Nation-State republican model (“patriotism”). The right to be different, the pluralism of allegiances, the plural citizenship model (and reality), the intercultural relations projects, the expression of groups and minorities are referring to a France of minorities which is quite a taboo. They are often opposed to assimilation, integration (more used today in official discourse), social cohesion (Jacques Chirac during the 2002 presidential campaign), republican and national citizenship (Jean-Pierre Chevènement), equality of rights (the French reference to fight against discrimination), social contract of rights and duties (*La communauté des citoyens*, of Dominique Schnapper), public order and public security for living together (Home Ministers’ definitions). An illustration of this can be found in the ambiguities of the freedom of associations and of the recognition of regionalism in France: during the revolution of 1789, corporations were prohibited (Le Chapelier Law of 1791), and the freedom of associations was acquired in 1901 while regionalism had waited for two centuries to be rehabilitated in the State institutions (1982).

But some features of multiculturalism finally penetrated the French model of citizenship, due to its evolving content since the French revolution. First confronted with the class struggle (the “question sociale,” in 1848), then by gender equality rights (since the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th), it has been more recently challenged by immigration and by Europe which brought new values such as anti-discrimination (article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997), citizenship of residence including plural citizenship, expression of ethnic and religious belongings. Multiculturalism belongs to this generation of new contents for citizenship: a multiculturalism “à la française”, included in a citizenship which is the result of a permanent compromise with communitarism in a neo-colonial management of differences.

How can France define itself as multicultural?

Before the revolution of 1789, the early unification of France remained compatible with the diversity of “provinces.” There was a distinction between the “Five big farms” having internal customs and freedom of circulation for goods – Normandy, Ile-de-France, Picardie, Anjou, Maine, Champagne, Bourgogne, Bourbonnais, Berry, Poitou – the so-called foreign

provinces, and the provinces under foreign allegiance – Alsace, Lorraine, Three bishop ships – the provinces under feudal links with the King of France – Brittany, Béarn, Provence – a small kingdom – Navarre – and a province requiring to be ruled by its own natives – Artois. Brittany and Provence were claiming for their autonomy. They spoke their own language made up of various “langues d’Oil” in the north and “langues d’Oc” in the south, had their own taxes, tribunals, parliaments and systems of measures. This diversity introduced some discrepancies into the exercise of royal power at the eve of the revolution, namely the reluctance of regional parliaments to abide by the law, the difficulty of understanding amongst the population and the obstacles to exchanges due to various customs rights. As Mirabeau said, “le royaume n’est encore qu’un agrégat de peuples désunis” (the kingdom is still but an aggregate of disunited peoples). The behaviour towards minorities was expressed by the Comte de Clermont Tonnerre: “Donnez aux Juifs tous les droits en tant qu’individus mais aucun comme communauté” (Give to the Jewish all rights as individuals but none as a community) at the meeting of the États Généraux in 1789.

During the revolution, the pluralist trend, inspired by federalism, was expressed by the “Girondins,” referring to regional identities against the centralized, authoritarian and Jacobin governance of Paris. But the Girondins lost their battle against the Jacobins, and the centralization and unification of the State was reinforced by Napoleon the First. He reformed and unified the laws, granting France a civil and penal code, and centralized the administration. His work was continued by Napoleon the Third, although along the 19th century, the defense of regional autonomy was still alive as a rightist position, represented by Auguste Comte (1851) or Frederic Le Play. The feeling of a French identity embodied by a Nation began to emerge, namely after the loss of Alsace Lorraine in 1871 (Numa-Denis Fustel de Coulanges and namely Ernest Renan in his famous essay *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?*, 1871).

The Third Republic gave to the people of France the feeling of unity, defended by universalistic and republican values mixed with patriotism, owing to a compulsory, secularized and free of charges education in primary schools. This pedagogic enterprise was illustrated by Gaston Bruneau’s famous book *Le tour de France par deux enfants*, where two young boys are traveling and discovering France, the maps of France in every school made by Paul Vidal de La Blache (although he was in favor of some federalism around several regional metropolis) and took effectiveness by the compulsory military service for each male citizen.

The celebration of republican values also became visible with the rising of statues, city halls, schools in every town and village and the invention of a national feast in 1889, for July the 14th referring to the revolution of 1789. School

and army became powerful tools of homogenization and socialization of a very culturally diversified France, recently crossed by migration flows (Germans, Belgians, Italians). However, the unification of cultures was not so easy to reach: in his book *La guerre des boutons*, for example, Louis Pergaud shows that one century after the adoption of the metric system of measures, the rural French still used the old measures, even among young children.

But some nostalgias of the former regions and regionalist trends were reemerging, such as Frederic Mistral’s movement in Provence trying to provoke a revival of the culture and language of “langues d’Oc” regions. In 1876 he created the Felibrige movement (1854) which inspired Charles Maurras and then Maurice Barres who transferred those

particularistic identities to Lorraine. Mistral also inspired Alphonse Daudet, who tried to restate the authentic and specific culture of Provence and to vulgarize it in his famous *Lettres de mon moulin* (Letters from my mill) and later Jean Giono’s novels celebrating rural and local values in *Regain* or *Un de Baumugnes*. In Brittany, the localism revival was illustrated by a coming back to the genuine Celtic culture and language. But these trends were marginal compared with the expression of republican patriotism encouraged by the First World War.

Two very different periods really gave legitimacy to the expression of cultural diversity in France: the Vichy regime, when Philippe Pétain tried to play regionalism and plurality against the leftist and unifying values embodied by Paris, the Parliament and more broadly the political milieu of the dying Third Republic (1940). He found some echoes in the regions where a tradition of autonomy

was early existing such as Brittany, Alsace and Provence. But this rightist and traditionalist trend failed after the second World War when the Fourth and the Fifth Republics fought against any remaining values and tried to reconcile the French around the Resistance and overall the “Trente Glorieuses” (1945-1974), a period of economic growth where the class struggle also blurred some other belongings.

A second revival of regionalism turned towards French internal cultural diversity promised to be more successful and appeared with the left wing with some eighty-six activists, like Robert Lafont. They claimed a regionalism mixing a culture of bottom-up diversity with the radical socialist rurality and hate of Paris. The coming back to the land of some fans with a program called “Vivre et travailler au pays” (Live and work in the land) and the successful fight for the liberation of Larzac land (a place in Cevennes dedicated to sheep herds) from army settlement (1972-1973) belongs to this move, more recently expressed by the anti-globalization mobilization of Jose Bove at the left, and at the right by the traditionalism of Philippe de Villiers. This former Minister of Culture and MP tries to give legitimacy to the counter-revolutionary past of Vendée. Brittany and Corsica go on to lead today some regionalist

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and separatist fights on the topics of cultural diversity of languages which has been accepted at schools and political autonomy made official with the settlement of a Corsican Parliamentary Assembly by Lionel Jospin in 2001.

But this last region also wanted recognition of a “people corse” in the 1990s, which was defined as contrary to the Constitution by the Constitutional Council (9 May 1991: “La Constitution ne connait que le peuple français, compose de tous les citoyens français sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion”), while an armed faction went to practice terrorism at local level. This same High Court also condemned the European Chart of Regional and Minority Languages as contrary to the republican principles of the Republic in 1999 (“indivisibilité de la République, égalité devant la loi et unicité du peuple français”). However, immigration and Islam have long been quite absent from these expressions of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism against exclusiveness of cultural identity

The turning point for the expression of multiculturalism referring to migration is mainly the eighties. The freedom of associative rights for foreigners in 1981 and the emergence of the “beurs” (Arabs in slang) gave legitimacy to the claims of cultural pluralism, intercultural projects and to the right to be different (“droit à la différence”, namely proclaimed by SOS Racisme, born in 1984). Some years before, the Council of Europe was already requiring more intercultural education for immigrants’ children and French public schools began to implement special courses added to the compulsory cursus (Langues et Cultures d’origine, settled since 1974 by bilateral agreements with the embassies of the countries of origin in order to allow an easier return of the second generations to their parents’ countries).

The return of the left to power initiated public debates on a new definition of French identity (with the book *L’identité française*, 1985) under the pressure of the National Front which tried to impose its image of French identity (“Bleu? Blanc Rouge” mixed with an ethnic approach to the nation – “les Français de souche” – contrary to the philosophical definition of French citizenship). The “affairs” – the scarf affair in 1989, the debate on the reform of the nationality code from 1987 to 1993, the Gulf war in 1991 – stressed a more multicultural definition of French identity, referring to the plurality of allegiances, the legitimacy of collective identities inside the republican frame and the dissociation between nationality and citizenship around the topic of the new citizenship launched by civic associations in 1988: so many taboos in the French assimilationist model.

While most political leaders stressed French identity, citizenship, secularization and social contract with few

variations between right and left and tried to conduct public policies of integration (with the central role of the Fonds d’Action Sociale), many civic associations born with the emerging civic movement of the “Marche des beurs” in 1983 were mixing at the local level these republican values with communitarian forms of management in inner cities. They fought against racial discrimination and social exclusion while aiming at recognizing ethnic and even religious belongings, which sometimes weakened their discourse on universalistic principles and equal rights. This contradiction was raised namely by Pierre – Andre Taguieff in *La force des préjugés. Essai sur le racisme et ses doubles*, 1988) who argued that pleading for the right to be different would lead to exclude once more the sons of immigrants, giving

arguments to the extreme right on the impossible assimilation of Islam. So other civic associations such as the very legitimist France Plus stressed the right to indifference and the respect of republican and assimilation values – secularism, rights and duties, registration and eligibility on electoral lists for those second generations having French citizenship.

Some confusion appeared on the public policy landscape of integration. Islamic associations, born with the same law of 1981 granting freedom to associations creation, rapidly understood JQ. Partnership offered by municipalities to secure social peace. The recent territorialization of integration policy (“Politique de la Ville,” settled in 1990) offered new opportunities in this regard. This positive discrimination tool was set up to fight against local discrimination at school (with the ZEP, “Zones d’éducation prioritaire” in 1981), in housing and in access to employment. Although it partly failed, it opened an exception to the republican myth of equality of rights and opportunity.

Has multiculturalism adapted to the French model of citizenship?

In France, citizenship is a philosophical concept expressed namely in the *Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen*, mostly inspired from universalistic ideals of freedom, legal equality and property, while nationality has a legal definition with the civil code. But citizenship is evolutionary: first limited to well-to-do males having financial “capacities”(the “cens”, with active and passive citizens), it was progressively extended to men (“suffrage universel masculin” in 1848) and more recently to women (1944) and to younger people (from 21 to 18 years old). Some populations were prohibited from the exercise of citizenship, such as the penally condemned, the army (“la grande muette” during all the Third Republic) and the colonies (in Algeria, a French “department,” the second college for indigenous

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voting rights survived until 1960). One could so be national without being a complete citizen.

On the contrary, some have been citizens without being nationals. During the revolution citizenship was not linked with nationality; those who did not share the values such as the priests attached to the monarchist regime (called the “prêtres réfractaires”) were considered as non citizens, traitors to the new values. But some well known foreigners such as William Payne or Anarcharsis von Clootz were elected at the Convention in 1792. This recognition of citizenship for civic activism was formalized in the Constitution of 1793 which enunciates the various forms of civism granting access to citizenship independent from the possession of French nationality.

The link between nationality and citizenship was totally sealed with the Third Republic (1875), mixing civic values (fraternity) with the exclusive allegiance to national identity (patriotism). The famous monuments to the dead (“monuments aux morts”) which, as many symbolic places for the celebration of a homogeneous and collective memory, were erected after the First World War in all villages, towns and cities of France and its colonies are one of the popular expressions of this linkage between citizenship and nationality around the celebration of patriotic and civic values. In the meantime, other forms of nationalism rapidly became anti-republican, canceling citizenship from the reference to the Nation, such as the Action Française of Charles Maurras created in 1899 and the extreme rightist leagues between the two wars (colonel de la Rocque’s *Croix de Feu*).

Concessions to minorities, differences and specificities in the French model

Since 1968, many exceptions have been introduced into the supposed assimilation centralized French model of Jacobinism. First, regional languages were authorized to be taught in public schools and universities in Brittany and in Corsica. Alsace, which never lost its German dialect, also uses it in local administration and in religious celebrations and Basques still speak their language, as well as Catalans (in the region of Perpignan, all names of villages, roads, streets and towns are in French and Catalan). In Alsace and Lorraine-Metz (the three “departments” of Haut-Bas Rhin and Moselle which were owned by Germany after the defeat of 1870 to 1918) religion is ruled by an agreement between the State and the three religions: Catholic, Protestant and Jewish (the “Concordat” of 1801) because it did not depend on France when the separation between the State and the Church was decided in 1905. One could also find other newer specific treatments, such as in the TOMS (“Territoires d’Outre Mer”) and other autonomous territories, namely regarding to religion (acceptance of polygamy, for example).

Decentralization, settled in France in 1982, has introduced much autonomy in the regional management and some subsidiary can be seen in the centralized administrative system: a debate opposing the tough republicans of left and right sides to the liberal ones of left and right. So, the specific representative assembly of Corsica granted by the socialist Government in 2001 provoked the resignation of the former socialist Home Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement (who created the Jacobin and republican “Mouvement des Citoyens”).

As for immigrants, the real debate, initiated as soon as an integration policy began to be implemented in 1974 (we were speaking then of intercultural policies), was really set up in the middle of the eighties when the visibility of Islam emerged in the cities, in the firms, at school (with the scarf affair of 1989) and raised the question of the dubious allegiances of those French having double citizenship (namely the French of Algerian descent doing their military service in France or Algeria), especially when some young of inner cities claimed their sympathy to Saddam Hussein during the Gulf war of 1991. Again a Montesquieu-like question was asked: “How can one be French and Muslim?” and this debate remains very up-to-date now in political debates, although one cannot perceive either an Arab or ethnic vote nor a penetration of external allegiances among the majority of Muslims in France.

The rule is not the same for all minority religions: Protestants and Jews are benefiting from a long tradition of living together with French monarchic and republican institutions and today, the revival of Jewish Sephardim identity is considered as compatible with them: boys can wear the kippa in public schools, be absent on Saturdays or close their shops on Saturdays and open them on Sundays. The Muslims are suffering from the rise of security feelings about their presence and mostly from their visibility in France as the religion of the poor, the former colonized, the immigrants coming from Third World countries, all the more that the oldest who practice most frequently and claim for a recognition of Islam in public life are excluded from the right to vote (demands of larger prayer rooms, special places for Muslims in cemeteries, organization of the halal meat market and slaughter).

Some expressions of dissent linked with exclusion and discrimination, such as extremist Islamism (alike terrorism practiced in Paris Metro and RER stations or on the rails of TGV by Khaled Kelkal in Lyons in 1995 or the involvement of Zacharias Moussaoui in the September 11th attacks) or the refusal of allegiance to French symbols (such as the denial of the French flag during a friendly French/Algerian football match in 2001) give weight to Jacobin arguments, even if they remain at the margins.

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However, contrary to other European countries, if religion is seen in France as a serious concern, language is not considered as a problem: in spite of globalization of new immigration trends, most immigrants and their children are perfectly French-speaking (Maghrebians, Sub-Saharan Africans, Indians from Pondichery and Vietnamese) as well as Francophile elites. An evolution of the public discourse occurred after September 11th due to the presence of four million Muslims, the most important concentration of Muslims in Europe. France did not show an aggressive discourse towards this new challenge, in contrast to Germany or the United Kingdom, while it has always been more restrictive in admitting radical Islamites as refugees who found a better shelter in these two countries. Inversely, France was reluctant to involve itself in a war in Iraq: the will to maintain a good relationship with Maghrebian regimes and a relative social peace in inner cities may explain such equilibrium in diplomacy.

Multiculturalism: new identities or neo-colonial management?

French identity is also questioned by Europe and by immigration. Europe is isolating the French assimilationist model compared with other countries that are much more open to multiculturalism and to diversity. The United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands all went very far in the recognition of communities and ethnic and religious identities, although these two last countries have seemed to abandon multiculturalism as a unique integration project for their urban areas during these last years. Furthermore, Europe imposes in a top-down method, new multicultural values as part of its identity: anti-discrimination (article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty), cultural diversity (recommendations of the Council of Europe).

European citizenship, defined in the Maastricht Treaty (article 8) is proposing an alternative model to classical citizenship, less exclusive than the national one, compatible with other belongings (including double citizenship and plural allegiances) and enriched with new concepts (citizenship of residence) giving room to multiculturalism. Since new citizens from immigrant origin have had access to French nationality, they can negotiate their difference in exchange for their vote, maintaining transnational networks and ethnic or religious identity while reasserting their allegiance to the French Nation State.

This situation is not deprived of ambiguity, an ambiguity which lies less at the bottom than at the top of French institutions. For a long time, France has managed its minorities in the colonial past with the complicity of civic and religious mediators (Caidis, Bachagas, Marabouts) who expressed communitarian identities while accepting republican values and granted social peace. This local management, formerly implemented in Algeria was then applied to

immigrant areas in collective housing for workers (“foyers”) and in French suburbs. Associative leaders and local elites from the community were appointed cultural mediators, a very up-to-date role of frontier men at the beginning of the nineties, expressing both civic universalistic and ethnic group values. Civic values (anti-discrimination, fighting against social exclusion, registration on electoral lists, cultural programs of leisure, sport) were necessary to obtain public subsidies from municipalities and national social funding (mostly from the Fonds d’Action Sociale). But the activities of associations may also be turned towards more communitarian identities and have religious inputs (such as learning Arab language).

More frequently, ethnicization comes from the representations and incentives of municipalities, political parties and public powers than from associative leaders or local elected young elites themselves: they have been chosen to give visibility to public policies as the “Arabe de service” and they are required to stick to multicultural aims in the republican frame, but not to apply for more ambitious and non ethnic jobs or goals. This game remains very assimilationist in France; it often refers to the values of the French State because Maghrebians, and namely Algerians, are the main actors. They are totally socialized in the French culture of administration and republican values which they know how to play with. They “give the tune” of all French integration policies and dialogue with the immigrant populations in France because it is us and because they are them. No other group, Chinese, Turkish, African or Portuguese can bargain multiculturalism inside the French values and is so successful with the State, which subsidizes most of its multicultural activities. The republican model is questioned by the ambiguities of multiculturalism “à la

française”, long time hidden by the public discourse on citizenship, equality of rights, and social links deprived of any ethnicity, or blurring it around the confused terms of social mix (“mixité sociale”) and diversity .

Its perverse effects lie in the creation by public powers of a multiculturalism “par défaut” (unwilling and artificial) due to exacerbated policies of recognition of ethnic visibilities in public space. However, today most political and administrative elites are conscious of the multicultural dimension of urban societies: a discourse which would have been inaccurate twenty years ago. In overseas DOM TOMs (“departments et territoires d’outre mer”), the obsession of communitarian identity also emerges in republican consensus: recently, the French Minister of DOM TOM refused to speak of “peoples” and preferred the term “population” for these peripheric regions, which choked the MPs and local representatives. The difficulties of collective identities in defining themselves faced with republican values show that French political space is poorly integrative and

However, contrary to other European countries, if religion is seen in France as a serious concern, language is not considered as a problem: in spite of globalization of new immigration trends, most immigrants and their children are perfectly French-speaking.

hardly permits the emergence of communitarian groups. Multiculturalism in France has a long way to go in order to be more explicit and acquire full legitimacy.

Conclusion

One could argue that the French model appears reluctant to implement multiculturalism because it is designed for Maghrebians who are themselves playing very republican cards in their negotiations with French institutions. They are expected to receive a delegation of competences from public powers to maintain order and assume cultural identities in the French frame. This equilibrium, which looks like a French compromise, can be defined as “multiculturalism ‘à la française’”. In this evolving model, Europe has a large play to part in order to make it acceptable in the political homogeneous myth of most French opinions. Multiculturalism is the only way to maintain a strong and vibrant French identity, open to the new challenges of globalization and of cultural identities: migration flows, diversity of religions, attractiveness of communitarian belongings, localism and transnational networks, soft and plural allegiances to political institutions, Nations and States. As France is concerned like most democracies by the rise of claims for difference, the republican model of integration has no other choice than negotiating with multiculturalism.

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Note

- ¹ This text was published in John Rex, Guharpal Singh (eds), *The Governance of Multiculturalism*, Palgrave, 2004.

Multiculturalisme, genre et migration au Maroc

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ABSTRACT

Dans cet article, Moha Ennaji nous parle de la démographie et de l'histoire du Maroc, de même que des aspects législatif et constitutionnel du pays. Elle explore aussi le multiculturalisme, le genre et la migration des Marocains, ce qui nous aide à mieux comprendre l'importance du multiculturalisme comme partie intégrante de l'identité nationale du Maroc.

L'objectif de cet article est de discuter de la dynamique du multiculturalisme, du genre et de la migration au Maroc. Le multiculturalisme au Maroc est caractérisé par ce va-et-vient entre tradition arabo-berbère-islamique et les valeurs modernes et universelles de démocratie, de liberté, d'équité sociale et des droits humains. D'autre part, les récentes réformes juridiques et institutionnelles, en particulier celles relatives au statut de la femme, aux émigrés marocains et au système de l'éducation, ont un grand impact sur l'évolution du multiculturalisme au Maroc et sur la modernisation de la société.

La situation géographique du Maroc lui assure une place privilégiée et un destin particulier de pays à la fois berbère, arabe, musulman, africain, méditerranéen et océanique. Il constitue de ce fait un trait d'union obligé entre les continents africain et européen. Il est un carrefour où se rencontrent et cohabitent des ethnies, des cultures et des langues aussi diverses que différentes.

La population du Maroc est de plus de 30 millions d'habitants (recensement général de la population de septembre 2004). Comme dans la plupart des pays en voie de développement, cette population se caractérise par sa jeunesse, puisque 37 % de Marocains ont moins de 15 ans et seulement 7,19 % plus de 60 ans (statistiques de 1994). Alors que pendant les années 60, la majorité de la population était rurale (80 %), de nos jours environ 50 % de la population vit dans les zones rurales. L'accroissement naturel de la population urbaine, l'exode rural, l'extension des périmètres des différentes agglomérations et l'intégration au milieu urbain de localités rurales remplissant certains critères d'urbanisation sont les facteurs essentiels de cette urbanisation rapide. Par conséquent, la population rurale est en nette diminution. La population active représente 32 % et le taux de chômage est d'environ 15 % selon les statistiques officielles de 2003. La population féminine compte 51 % de la population globale. Le taux global d'alphabétisation a atteint 50 %, et la plupart des femmes sont analphabètes (65 %). Voir Ennaji (2004).

Le Maroc s'inscrit dans une logique d'ouverture. Il a toujours été un carrefour et un lieu de brassage des cultures et civilisations. Le fait que le Maroc a connu à travers son histoire plusieurs colonisations et conquêtes (phénicienne, romaine, byzantine, vandale, arabe, française, espagnole) explique son multiculturalisme, son plurilinguisme et sa tolérance envers les autres cultures.

L'aspect législatif et constitutionnel

Le Maroc est une monarchie constitutionnelle, en fait la plus ancienne d'Afrique, qui reconnaît l'aspect multiculturel du pays et qui a adopté le multipartisme depuis l'indépendance en 1956. Dans la constitution, il est mentionné que l'arabe est la langue officielle du pays et l'Islam sa religion. Même si la constitution ne mentionne pas le berbère et le français comme langues nationales, la charte de l'éducation nationale promulguée et appliquée en 2000 stipule que la langue berbère est une langue nationale qui doit intégrer le système éducatif marocain. La création de l'Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh en octobre 2001 a pour objectif principal l'intégration de la langue berbère dans l'enseignement et les médias, et la sauvegarde de la culture berbère. La charte de l'éducation indique également que l'enseignement des langues étrangères, notamment le français, l'anglais et l'espagnol, sont nécessaires pour le développement du pays.

D'autre part, le Maroc a fait des progrès indéniables en matière des droits de l'homme depuis l'avènement du roi Mohammed VI au pouvoir en 1999. Le Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme et l'Instance Équité et Réconciliation créées en 2003 ont pour objectifs majeurs la réconciliation au sein de la société marocaine et la consolidation de la démocratie et des projets de modernisation. Cette approche s'inscrit dans le cadre des réformes et des mutations que connaît le pays sur les plans juridique, institutionnel et socio-économique notamment le renforcement du dispositif de protection des droits humains.

Le Ministère des Droits de l'Homme qui a fonctionné de 1998 à 2004 a également travaillé dans ce sens. Le Code la Famille nouvellement réformé donne plus de droits aux femmes et garantit l'égalité des sexes devant la loi. Étant un

pays si profondément religieux, si imprégné d'islam, société méditerranéenne et patriarcale, le Maroc profond a avalé sans broncher cette « révolution culturelle. » « Le problème du roi est simple, explique l'un de ses conseillers. Est-il possible de bâtir une société moderne et démocratique sans être taxé d'avoir une attitude agressive envers les valeurs fondamentales d'une société très religieuse ? »

Le processus de démocratisation et de modernisation au Maroc est basé sur la diversité linguistique et culturelle du pays. En plus de l'islam, les langues en usage font du Maroc un pays à la fois plurilingue et multiculturel.

Cette description résume la vie culturelle et intellectuelle au Maroc, profondément attaché aux valeurs de la civilisation arabo-musulmane et berbère. En effet, le Maroc est composé d'arabes et de nombreuses tribus berbères qui représentent plus du tiers de la population actuelle.

Historique

Les premiers Marocains qui ont peuplé le pays sont des populations venues du Nord et de l'Est à l'époque Néolithique. Ces populations très variées ont été appelées « berbères » par les navigateurs et les Romains. Aujourd'hui, le Maroc présente une société composite, où presque la moitié de la population parle le berbère, langue à l'intérieur de laquelle se distinguent trois sous-groupes : tarifit (Rif), tamazight (Moyen Atlas) et tachelhit (Haut, Anti-Atlas et Sous). La plupart des historiens s'accordent désormais pour reconnaître que, les conquérants arabes du VIII^e siècle ayant été peu nombreux, la très grande majorité des Marocains a du sang berbère. Ce qui ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'ils sont berbérophones, plusieurs tribus ayant été arabisées très tôt, en particulier le long des côtes de l'Atlantique.

Les premiers arabes n'arrivèrent qu'à la fin du VII^e siècle. Ils apportèrent l'islam, la langue et la civilisation arabe qui était l'une des plus avancées. Arrivés du Moyen-Orient, ils s'imposèrent progressivement aux berbères. Au XI^e l'œuvre de propagation de l'islam s'acheva grâce aux Idrissides qui sont présentés par les historiens comme les fondateurs du premier État musulman au Maroc et les acteurs principaux de l'arabisation du pays. Aujourd'hui, les arabes du Maroc représentent selon les estimations entre 20 et 50 % de la population, et ils sont présents à travers tout le pays (Ennaji 2004).

La présence juive au Maroc est trois fois millénaire. Cependant, depuis la création de l'État d'Israël, des milliers de juifs marocains ont quitté leur pays natal, le Maroc, pour aller s'installer en Israël. D'autres sont partis vivre en France, au Canada et aux États-Unis d'Amérique. D'après les recherches dans le domaine, les juifs marocains étaient protégés par presque toutes les dynasties marocaines qui se sont succédées depuis les dynasties berbères remontant à 210 avant notre ère.

D'autre part, la colonisation française (1912-1956) a changé la donne culturelle et linguistique au Maroc comme ailleurs en Afrique du Nord. Elle a introduit le français et la culture française ou occidentale dans le sens large du mot. Elle a en quelque sorte renforcé les bases du multiculturalisme et du multilinguisme déjà existants au Maroc. L'histoire coloniale française a traité de façon inégale les langues nationales, notamment l'arabe classique et le

berbère qui étaient marginalisés pendant toute la période de colonisation. En fait, l'arabe classique était enseigné en tant que langue secondaire dans seulement quelques lycées dans les villes impériales comme Fès, Rabat et Casablanca ; le berbère lui était enseigné uniquement au lycée franco-berbère d'Azrou. Du coup, le français est devenu la langue dominante qui pèse même aujourd'hui après 48 ans d'indépendance (cf. Bentolila 2003 : 21-22).

Ainsi les autorités coloniales françaises et les élites au pouvoir au Maroc depuis l'indépendance ont adopté/imposé un système éducatif et culturel étrangers à la réalité des populations. Les premiers ont marginalisé les langues arabe et berbère, et les seconds ont coincé les citoyens entre des langues maternelles minorées et des langues étrangères comme le français et l'anglais qui sont restées inaccessibles à la majorité du peuple, dont 50 % est malheureusement encore analphabète (voir Grandguillaume 1983).

Multiculturalisme, genre et migration

Multiculturalisme

Le multiculturalisme au Maroc, comme nous l'avons vu supra, est marqué par quatre ingrédients importants : le berbère, l'arabe, le français, et l'islam. Le berbère et l'arabe dialectal traduisent la culture populaire, tandis que l'arabe classique, le français et l'islam représentent la culture du savoir. Dans ce contexte multilingue et multiculturel, la légitimité de l'État est largement basée sur la culture écrite qui est étroitement liée au pouvoir.

Depuis l'Indépendance, le Maroc a hésité entre la modernité et le conservatisme. Dans les années 1960, 1970 et 1980, le Maroc avait opté pour la première tendance, car il était encore sous l'influence de la culture française, mais à partir des années 1990, le pendule a penché vers le conservatisme avec la montée de l'intégrisme musulman.

Durant les premières années de l'Indépendance, l'élite au pouvoir avait adopté le bilinguisme arabe-français comme option politique dans le cadre de ses efforts pour moderniser le pays. Aujourd'hui, la tension existe non seulement entre les valeurs françaises (occidentales) et les croyances arabo-musulmanes, mais également dans le contexte marocain, entre les langues et cultures berbères et arabes. Cette situation linguistique reflète des conflits d'intérêts et des tensions idéologiques qui elles-mêmes reflètent la lutte pour le pouvoir à des niveaux différents. L'interaction entre les langues et les cultures au Maroc est caractérisée par des contrastes et paradoxes.

Cette situation sociolinguistique n'est pas statique, et l'une de ses nouvelles évolutions est l'émergence de la migration comme une dimension importante sur la scène sociolinguistique actuelle. L'après Indépendance a connu la marginalisation des langues maternelles, notamment le berbère et l'arabe dialectal, qui étaient accompagnées par la marginalisation de la femme, à cause de l'illettrisme et de la migration massive des hommes vers les villes et vers l'Europe. Les femmes et les immigrés parlaient surtout les langues maternelles. En outre, les revendications concernant la sauvegarde des langues et cultures nationales, qui ont émergé avec la venue des droits de l'homme à partir des années 1990, sont accompagnées de sérieuses revendications pour l'émancipation des femmes, une des conséquences des flux migratoires de familles entières en Europe.

En d'autres termes, la construction de l'État dans les années 1960 et 1970 avait donné la priorité à l'arabe standard, langue officielle et de religion, et au français, comme langue des affaires et de l'administration. Les deux langues sont liées aux domaines publics où les hommes ont plus de voix et de choix que les femmes. Quand à l'arabe dialectal et au berbère, elles étaient relégués aux domaines du foyer et de la maison, c'est-à-dire au domaine privé dans lequel les femmes sont présentes. Même aujourd'hui, l'arabe standard est plutôt une langue « mâle » alors que le berbère est considéré comme une langue « femelle » car elle est parlée davantage par les femmes plus que par les hommes. Ce n'est pas une coïncidence si les revendications pour les droits linguistiques sont en parallèle avec les revendications pour les droits de la femme. En outre, étant lié à l'arabe standard, la montée de l'intégrisme islamique est accompagnée par une présence timide et « voilée » de la femme dans l'espace public. Par ailleurs, la promotion du berbère et de la femme est accompagnée par des revendications de la laïcité et par l'émergence des femmes dans des postes de décision (voir Sadiqi 2003).

Genre

L'émancipation de la femme marocaine a marqué des avancées depuis l'Indépendance. Le nouveau Code de la famille est une réforme de fond ; il introduit un changement concernant le statut de la femme et sa place dans la société marocaine. Il s'inscrit dans le cadre des réformes que le Roi Mohammed VI a lancé depuis son accession au trône en juillet 1999 : réforme de l'enseignement, du code du travail, de la santé, l'intégration de la culture amazigh dans les médias et l'enseignement, réforme de l'environnement, réforme du tourisme, réforme des médias, etc. Le nouveau Code de la famille confirme une fois de plus que la démocratie, les droits humains, la modernité sont un choix de société.

Garantissant le respect des droits de la femme et de l'enfant, consacrant la justice, l'équité et l'égalité en droits et en devoirs entre l'homme et la femme, les amendements contenus dans le nouveau code de la famille viennent conforter la place de la femme au sein de la société et lever toute injustice qui pèse sur elle. Les nouveautés contenues dans cette réforme qui donnent actuellement lieu à une profonde réflexion incitent tous les intervenants à une mobilisation générale. Salué à tous les niveaux comme étant « une révolution sociale calme » visant l'édification de bases saines pour une société saine, où les relations au sein de la famille sont fondées sur la justice, l'équité, l'équilibre, l'égalité des droits et des devoirs.

Au Maroc, pays de culture arabo-musulmane dominé par des pratiques traditionnelles, la femme a toujours été respectée mais n'avait jamais de statut digne de ses efforts, jusqu'à l'avènement des derniers amendements qualitatifs du nouveau Code de la famille qui consacre l'égalité des deux époux en plaçant la famille sous leur responsabilité conjointe. La femme marocaine peut dorénavant jouir des conditions d'une vie décente, empreinte de quiétude à tous les niveaux : politique, social, économique et culturel. Cette réforme tant attendue constitue sans équivoque un nouvel acquis non seulement pour la femme qui retrouve ses droits mais aussi pour l'homme qui croit à l'égalité des sexes, dans les droits et les devoirs.

Le nouveau Code de la famille aura des conséquences importantes également sur les émigrés marocains résidant à l'étranger. La plupart, surtout les hommes, devront s'adapter aux nouvelles lois qui, entre autres, interdisent la violence contre la femme, limitent au minimum les possibilités de polygamie et enlèvent la tutelle du père sur la jeune fille qui peut se marier sans l'accord préalable de ses parents.

Migration

Le Maroc connaît depuis les années soixante des flux migratoires vers l'Europe, et récemment vers l'Amérique du Nord également. Sur le plan socio-démographique, la migration internationale a joué un rôle important dans l'évolution du Maroc au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Ayant pris plusieurs formes, la migration internationale a commencé avec le recrutement d'ouvriers marocains pour participer à la reconstruction de l'Europe après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et à l'expansion de l'économie du vieux continent. La migration de milliers de Marocains a été organisée dans le cadre d'accords bilatéraux pour répondre aux besoins des entreprises françaises, belges, allemandes, néerlandaises, etc.

La crise économique des années 70 a conduit les pays européens à fermer leurs portes à l'immigration. Il s'en est suivi d'autres formes de migration, notamment le regroupement familial et la migration clandestine. Parallèlement à cette diversification des formes migratoires, se sont créés d'autres filières de migration depuis le début des années 80, comme celles de l'Espagne et de l'Italie.

La population marocaine résidant à l'étranger compte aujourd'hui deux millions et demi de personnes dont presque deux millions sont en Europe. Cette communauté marocaine continue à entretenir des liens étroits avec le pays d'origine. Les fréquents voyages au pays, les transferts massifs vers la région d'origine, l'acquisition de biens immobiliers, les investissements, les liens familiaux sont autant d'indices qui attestent d'une solidarité sociale et familiale qui est restée vivace et remarquable.

Cependant, l'évolution démographique de la population émigrée, les problèmes socio-économiques du pays d'origine ne manqueront pas de s'accompagner de changements dans les perceptions et les attitudes, et partant, dans les relations du Maroc avec les pays de destination.

Le problème épineux qui se pose dans la région est celui de l'émigration clandestine. En effet, il ne se passe pas une semaine sans que les autorités marocaines n'annoncent des arrestations massives d'émigrés clandestins, aussi bien des Marocains que des ressortissants de pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Cette tâche est de plus en plus difficile à assumer pour le Royaume chérifien qui manque de moyens pour endiguer les flux migratoires illégaux. Durant l'année 2002, les forces de sécurité marocaines ont arrêté quelque 29 490 candidats à l'émigration clandestine, dont 14 860 Marocains et 14 630 ressortissants de différents pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Les bilans des opérations de lutte contre l'émigration clandestine annoncés par les différents services de sécurité marocains depuis le début de l'année 2003 laissent croire que le nombre des émigrés illégaux est en net accroissement. Entre l'exacerbation de ce phénomène qui commence à prendre une ampleur considérable, la pression des Européens, notamment le voisin espagnol, qui

réclament des mesures plus sévères pour endiguer les flux des migrants illégaux, et le poids de la facture de la lutte contre les mafias des passeurs, les autorités marocaines ne savent plus à quel saint se vouer.

Pour lutter plus efficacement contre l'émigration clandestine, le Maroc vient de se doter d'une nouvelle législation qui durcit les conditions d'accès et de séjour sur son territoire et aggrave les sanctions contre les trafiquants d'émigrés. Selon le ministère marocain de la Justice, la nouvelle loi permettra au Maroc de se conformer aux conventions internationales relatives aux obligations et droits des migrants et des étrangers légalement établis. En substance, les dispositions de la nouvelle législation visent à codifier les délits, les infractions et les sanctions liées aux tentatives d'émigration clandestine et au trafic des clandestins à travers une qualification pénale précise. Pour mettre un terme à l'immigration clandestine, qu'elle soit subsaharienne ou non, il faut s'attaquer aux raisons qui poussent ces gens à se hasarder en plein désert. Ces raisons sont essentiellement d'ordre économique, politique et social. D'autre part, l'Union Européenne a fait signer au Maroc un accord de réadmission des clandestins marocains et de ceux qui sont devenus illégaux sur le territoire européen. Cet accord risque de faire du Maroc une immense salle d'attente. (Voir *Libération* du 15 août 2003).

Conclusion

Le Maroc a toujours été au long de son histoire une terre d'accueil et de dialogue entre les cultures et les civilisations de par son histoire riche et prestigieuse, son pluralisme linguistique et culturel, et de par sa situation géographique stratégique.

Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui a franchi plusieurs étapes dans le processus de démocratisation, de modernisation et de développement. Il met l'accent sur l'importance du rôle des femmes, des migrants marocains et leurs contributions au développement durable. Les femmes et les migrants marocains représentent un levier supplémentaire pour faire face aux défis de développement et de modernisation. Cette approche s'inscrit dans le cadre des réformes et des mutations que connaît le Maroc sur les plans culturel, juridique, économique et social.

En reconnaissant officiellement la langue et la culture berbères pour la première fois depuis l'indépendance, le Maroc réaffirme que le multiculturalisme constitue une caractéristique fondamentale de la société marocaine. Aujourd'hui plus qu'auparavant, le multiculturalisme demeure une composante essentielle de l'identité nationale du Maroc.

La politique du multiculturalisme favorise les échanges réciproques entre les groupes et aide les membres des différentes communautés ethnoculturelles à dialoguer et à surmonter les obstacles à leur pleine participation à tous les aspects de la société marocaine.

Cette approche contribue à l'égalité des chances et à la compréhension interculturelle, en éliminant les discriminations et en aidant les institutions à devenir plus attentives à la diversité culturelle au Maroc et en veillant à ce que tous les Marocains et Marocaines aient une place dans la société. Par conséquent, aujourd'hui, les Marocains sentent un attachement profond aux diverses facettes de leur

identité, qu'elles soient relatives au genre, à la région, à la langue ou à la culture.

Le multiculturalisme au Maroc constitue ainsi une richesse commune qu'il faut préserver, et où chaque citoyen et citoyenne a voix au chapitre et a la possibilité de contribuer librement à l'épanouissement collectif et au développement durable. Il s'agit d'un processus en évolution qui s'inscrit dans le cadre de l'établissement d'un État de droit et d'une citoyenneté dynamique et partagée.

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The Indigenous Quest for Cultural Rights and Political Autonomy in Mexico

Guillermo de la Peña

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ABSTRACT

The author gives a history of the indigenous movement in Mexico over the past century. Beginning with nationalism and *Mestizo* hegemony, through a period of cultural homogeneity, and then the eventual evolution of the constitution and widening of the definition of 'indigenous', Guillermo de la Peña describes a truly diverse country with a variety of languages and peoples.

In his book *Los Grandes Problemas Nacionales*, published in 1909, Andrés Molina Enríquez, a lawyer and sociologist influenced by Spencerian positivism, classified the Mexican population (at the time, a total of 12.5 million people) in three broad 'socio-racial' categories: the Indians, the *Criollos* or Whites, and the *Mestizos* (people of indigenous and European descent). He saw the Indians (35% of the population) as a collectivity fragmented into thousands of small isolated villages and weakened by poverty as well as by the lasting effects of colonial exploitation. In turn, the *Criollos* (15% of the population), descendants from Spanish colonialists and European migrants, were presented as a parasitic lot of big landholders, moneylenders and speculators. In contrast, the *Mestizo* majority (50%) was the backbone of Mexican nationality: its members were productive ranchers and farmers, middle merchants, industrialists and professionals; moreover, they had actively participated in the Independence movement and then, throughout the 19th century, in all the major political movements and the liberation wars against foreign invaders. With the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz – himself a *Mestizo* – they had reached political supremacy. However, according to Molina Enríquez, a great social revolution was still needed, which would allow for the redistribution of the big landholdings (the *haciendas*), the expansion of public schooling and the full productive use of natural resources. The Indians would become owners of their land. And, freed from caste barriers, they would mix with the other groups to be transformed into educated, prosperous mestizos. National unity and progress at last would be possible.¹

A revolution indeed broke out in Mexico in 1910. After ten years of bloody civil war the new government launched a program of agrarian reform which in the following decades effectively weakened the *hacienda* system. But the new 1917 Constitution did not even once mention the word 'Indian' or 'indigenous', although the historical rights of 'agrarian communities' over their lands were recognized. The discourse of *mestizaje* was adopted to express an ideal of nationalistic energy. José Vasconcelos, the architect of the revolutionary educational and cultural program, referred to the *mestizos* as "the cosmic race": the future of the human species, which was emerging in Mexico and Latin America.² In this context, a special policy – *indigenismo* – was designed to promote the 'incorporation' of the Indians into mainstream society and culture. The founder of *indigenismo* was Manuel Gamio, an anthropologist who had been a student of Molina Enríquez at the National Museum of Mexico and later a disciple of Franz Boas at Columbia University. As a follower of Boas – a staunch defender of cultural relativism and, at the time, one of the major figures in the anthropological world – Gamio appreciated the values of indigenous cultures, but as a positivist intellectual he also thought that these values should become a part of a comprehensive national culture, and that the Indians had to acquire a modern, scientific world view, as well as civic attitudes and feelings of loyalty towards the common fatherland.³

Another major figure of *indigenismo*, Moisés Sáenz – also trained at Columbia University, under John Dewey and Boas – became a major sponsor of bilingual education. In the 1930s, Sáenz persuaded President Lázaro Cárdenas to create the Autonomous Department of Indigenous Affairs, which was replaced in 1948 by the National Indigenist Institute.⁴ These agencies, under the leadership of noted anthropologists, promoted research among indigenous groups and implemented sophisticated development and educational programs, always with the purpose of creating national unity and achieving modernization. In addition, the General Law of Population (passed in 1936 and reformed in 1973) explicitly recommended miscegenation as a tool of social integration.⁵

The Persistence of Cultural Diversity

Meanwhile, the segment defined as indigenous, if taken as a percentage of the total population, had shown a decreasing tendency; but it never ceased to grow in absolute numbers. The 1921 National Census recorded 4,179,449 persons of the

Indian 'race', i.e. 29% of the people living in the Mexican Republic (14,334,780). However, the definition of race was not given; in practice, people were free to identify themselves according to the 'racial' categories established in the census questionnaire.⁶ In the following censuses, race was no longer the criterion to define 'Indian-ness', but language; and only people over five years of age were counted. Thus, in the 1930 Census, the percentage of speakers of aboriginal languages was 13.6: 2,251,086 out of a total population of 16,552,722. In 1950 the percentage decreased to 9.5%, and in 1970, to 6.5, but the absolute numbers of speakers respectively increased to 2,447,609 and 3,111,415.⁷

After 1970, many social scientists and indigenous organizations criticized the language criterion as too narrow, and demanded the inclusion of other indexes such as self-identification, membership of a household where the parents are speakers of an aboriginal language, and membership of a community where traditional indigenous institutions (e.g. Councils of Elders, ritual stewardships and mandatory communal work) are standing. Critics also demanded not to leave out children under five years of age. With more flexible criteria, then, the official figures for the indigenous segment have considerably increased. The estimate for 1990 was 8,550,989, i.e. 10.52% of the national population (which amounted to 81,249,645). And for 2002, the estimate was 12,707,000, i.e. 13.03% (out of 97,483,412).⁸ In spite of the discourse of *mestizaje*, Mexico remains the country with the largest Indian population in the Americas.

However, the category 'Indian' or 'indigenous' conceals the variety of the people thus defined. Most indigenous communities present similarities, insofar as they have maintained certain institutions which reflect the manner in which the pre-hispanic world was reorganized by Spanish colonization. The community structure itself has a colonial heritage. But there are also numerous differences which derive both from pre-hispanic peculiarities and the specific historical development of regions and communities. Gamio reckoned with the existence of a dozen major languages, but nowadays linguistic research has revealed the persistence of no less than 60 languages, the most important of which (in terms of number of speakers) are Nahuatl, Yucatec Maya, Zapotec and Mixtec.⁹ There is also a great diversity of religious beliefs and rituals, agricultural and medical practices, judicial norms, and everyday customs. Ethnic identities are usually defined in reference to territorial communities rather than language

groups. Similarly, traditional political organization is encompassed within the community, since in colonial times the Spanish Crown dismantled larger political units. However, a number of indigenous movements and organizations have striven to define more comprehensive identities and political units – as well as to resist policies of cultural assimilation.

Indigenous Movements and Constitutional Reforms

Several ethnic movements emerged in the 1930s, when the Autonomous Department of Indigenous Affairs organized Regional Conferences where people could express their grievances and cultural demands. Then, in 1940, the Mexican State hosted the First Inter-American Indigenist Congress, where intellectuals, government representatives and Indian spokesmen proclaimed the radical importance of 'the indigenous question'– i.e. the fact that the aboriginal peoples of the Americas were still suffering from cultural oppression, political exclusion, and social injustice – and the need to respect 'the personality of the Indian'.¹⁰

But in spite of the progressive resolutions of this Congress, which proposed social reforms and multicultural policies, Mexico (as other Latin American countries) remained committed to the idea of cultural unification. In the period from 1950 to 1970 the main theoretician of *indigenismo* was Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán (a medical doctor and anthropologist, initiated in social research by Gamio and trained by Melville Herskovits at Northwestern University), who devised a complex model for regional analysis and induced social and cultural change ('acculturation'). In this model the contemporary indigenous population was conceived of as living in inter-cultural regions, under the dominion of a White or *Mestizo* elite. The persistence of indigenous culture was not the result of isolation, as it had been thought, but of the asymmetrical relationships between the elite and the Indians, in the context of pre-capitalist ('feudal') production and weak government institutions. Therefore the task of the National Indigenist Institute (NII) was to establish Coordinating Centers in such regions which would convoke other government agencies to promote schooling, technical training, land distribution, market facilities, health services, and political participation, in order to break the structure of domination and achieve modernization, social integration and cultural homogeneity.¹¹ A key strategy would be the recruitment of young educated Indians as bilingual teachers and agents of cultural transformation.

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It was precisely these educated Indians who became major critics of 'acculturation' policies as well as leaders or advisers of militant ethnic organizations. They came together at the 1974 Congress of San Cristobal Las Casas in Chiapas, in the context of national political unrest left by the 1968 student movement. This Congress was held in honor of Friar Bartolomé de las Casas, but it became the stage for denouncing the NII as authoritarian and 'ethnocidal', and ineffective in the task of eradicating poverty. This marked the emergence of a network of organizations which convened further meetings and conferences. Their intellectual influences came from civil rights and ethnic movements in the U.S. and Canada, anti-colonialist movements in Africa and Asia, and congenial Indian actors in Latin America; they also incorporated human rights and ecologist discourses from international organisms and NGOs. However, the Mexican organizations had their own agenda, which included not only the drastic restatement of indigenist policies and the recognition of the validity of Indian cultures, but also the defense of indigenous lands, the fight against unfair economic policies and unjust structures, and the democratization of the Mexican political system – in fact, throughout the eighties, certain ethnic organizations became key political actors (for instance in the states of Michoacán, Oaxaca, and Guerrero).¹²

In 1991-92, the strength of the emerging indigenous movement manifested itself at the juncture of the 500 anniversary of Columbus's arrival in the Americas, when the comprehensive 500 Years of Resistance Front mobilized thousands of people to protest against the lasting sequels of colonialism. After 1992, a discourse of political autonomy, inspired by the recent Nicaraguan experience, was adopted by several organizations and their spokesmen. And several indigenous intellectuals from Mexico were invited to participate in discussions with the newly created UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples.¹³

The Mexican state had gradually responded to some indigenous demands. Influenced by a group of radical anthropologists, the NII changed its vocabulary: the key word in the late 1970s and '80s was 'ethno-development', not 'acculturation'. Concomitantly, during the 1980s, in the midst of a towering economic crisis, the government was forced to abandon its nationalist-populist policies in order to favour an internationally competitive market economy. New sources of legitimacy were badly needed. Both the NII and the Ministry of Education promoted a more vigorous educational policy, reinforced bilingual programs and developed new 'inter-cultural' strategies where indigenous

intellectuals would assume leading responsibilities and representative indigenous organizations would be taken into account.

Furthermore, the administration of the NII went through a process of decentralization; it became more flexible *vis-à-vis* local demands and more concerned with the defense of human rights. In 1992 the Mexican state signed the 169 Convention of the International Labor Organization, thus recognizing 'the rights of indigenous peoples' to their territories, cultures, languages, customs, norms, and forms of government. The same year, this was translated into the reformed text of Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution. For the first time Mexico was officially defined as 'a multicultural nation based originally upon its indigenous peoples',

and it was stated that the law would 'protect and promote' indigenous languages, customs, and social organization; besides, in land-related matters customary norms would be taken into account. Nothing was mentioned about political authority and representation. Many Indian intellectuals were skeptical: according to them, in spite of the reforms, indigenous issues had no real priority in the national agenda.

The armed uprising of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) in Chiapas, on precisely the same day that the newly signed North America Free Trade Agreement became effective, brought new attention to indigenous grievances, which in the following years would receive extensive media coverage. Even many people who did not sympathize with the EZLN thought that indigenous demands for cultural recognition and public representation were just. As it is known, armed confrontation ceased after eleven days, but the rebels have never signed the peace with the government. They promoted the creation of a National Indigenous Congress (NIC) which has convened three times, with the attendance of both traditional authorities and leaders of new organizations from all over the country.

In 1996 the EZLN, with NIC approval, signed the San Andrés Agreements with government representatives; these Agreements would be translated into new constitutional reforms recognizing indigenous peoples as 'subjects of public right' with full cultural entitlements and political autonomy. However, such constitutional reforms were delayed for five

years – until they were sponsored by Vicente Fox, the first President of Mexico elected from the opposition in 80 years – and what finally came out of the Congress of the Union in April 2001 was unsatisfactory for the EZLN and the NIC. There are three major disappointments: indigenous peoples are defined as 'subjects of public interest'

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(not 'of public right'); the recognition of an 'indigenous people' as such is subject to approval from the corresponding state legislature, and political representation is limited to the municipal boundaries. Yet the reforms provide a long, detailed list of cultural rights which are now constitutional rights, concerning language, intercultural education, customary norms, intercultural health systems, organization of production and development projects, protection of communal lands and natural resources. And it grants autonomy to choose internal forms of government and methods of election. It also allows for coalitions among peoples for development projects. Many doors are now open; but the search for more adequate constitutional amendments still continues.

Contemporary challenges

In Mexico, as in Latin America, the issue of multiculturalism is closely intertwined with the emergence of ethnic political actors. The very concept of 'indigenous peoples' has been adopted by them to invoke the international definition of 'peoples' as those collectivities which are entitled to free self-determination. Most aboriginal movements made clear that they do not demand political independence; instead, they have chosen to exercise the right of self-determination in terms of political autonomy within the state. Such autonomy is deemed necessary to guarantee the protection and flourishing of indigenous cultures and identities within a context of sustainable, equitable development.

The 2001 amendments to the Mexican Constitution, in spite of their shortcomings, have already prompted positive actions from the federal government, such as the adoption of a National Plan for the Development of Indigenous Peoples, the creation of the National Institute for Indigenous Languages and the replacement of the NII by the Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples, which purports to function both as a space for indigenous representation and an agency for integral planning. In turn, many state governments have launched changes in their particular constitutions which would lead to the formal recognition of indigenous peoples with limited autonomy and representation.

As for the EZLN, it has promoted the creation of self-declared autonomous municipal councils and 'Assemblies for Good Rule' (*Juntas de Buen Gobierno*) in Chiapas, which until now have not been openly rejected by the government. However, the search for adequate models of multiculturalism has only begun. The first challenge is to ensure economic viability to emerging political and administrative units – in a period when the Mexican state is committed to an economic model ruled by the market. Other challenges include the negotiated adjustments of customary indigenous norms in order to make autonomy compatible with the national process of democratization and consolidation of civil liberties;¹⁴ the extension of cultural and political rights to indigenous groups which have migrated to the cities and the United States – and which are growing fast; and the creation of links of communication, interdependence and solidarity among groups which cultivate and cherish their cultural differences.

Notes

- ¹ Andrés Molina Enriquez, *Los Grandes Problemas Nacionales y Otros Textos*, Mexico City: Era, 1978.
- ² José Vasoncelos, *La Raza Cósmica*, Mexico City: Espasa Calpe, 1960 [1925].
- ³ Manuel Gamio, *Forjando Patria: Pro-Nacionalismo*, Mexico City: Porrúa, 1960 [1916].
- ⁴ Shirley Brice Heath, *Telling Tongues. The Politics of Language in Mexico*, New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1970.
- ⁵ Angélica Reyna Bernal, "El pensamiento y la política poblacionista en el México de la primera mitad del siglo XX", in *El poblamiento de México*, Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Población, 1993, vol. IV.
- ⁶ The categories were: 'mixed', 'indigenous', 'white', 'any other' and 'foreign'.
- ⁷ Luz María Valdés and María Teresa Menéndez, *Dinámica de la Población de Habla Indígena (1900-1980)*, Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1987, p. 15-17.
- ⁸ *Programa Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas*, Mexico City: Presidencia de la República/ Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 2002, 2nd edition, p. 25.
- ⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 37-38.
- ¹⁰ *Primero Congreso Indigenista Interamericano*. Special issue of *Educación. Revista Mensual de Pedagogía y Orientación Sindical*, Mexico City, June, 1940.
- ¹¹ Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, *Regiones de Refugio. El Desarrollo de la Comunidad y el Proceso Dominical en Mestizo-América*, Mexico City: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1967.
- ¹² Guillermo de la Peña, "La Ciudadanía Etnica y la Construcción de 'los Indios' en el México Contemporáneo", *Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política*, 6, December 1995, p. 116-140.
- ¹³ Consuelo Sánchez, *Los Pueblos Indígenas: del Indigenismo a la Autonomía*, Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1999, chapter 2.
- ¹⁴ Cfr. G. de la Peña, "Social Citizenship, Ethnic Minority Demands, Human Rights and Neoliberal Paradoxes: A Case Study in Western Mexico", in Rachel Sieder (ed.) *Multiculturalism in Latin America. Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

The Uncertain Futures of Multiculturalism

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the varying success of multiculturalism across Western democracies. Whereas in Canada multiculturalism policies are generally perceived as low-risk, other countries remain unconvinced of the potential benefits. Kymlicka focuses on three factors which may affect the adoption of this type of policy: Legal vs. Illegal Migration, Liberal vs. Illiberal Practices, and Economic Contributors vs. Burdens. He emphasizes the need to study more closely the risks involved and the ways in which these risks can be managed amid public fears about diversity.

I hesitate to speculate about the future of multiculturalism, in part because I have a rather mixed record in my past predictions on this subject. Several years ago, I rashly predicted that we were witnessing a growing convergence within the Western democracies on the ideal of “liberal multiculturalism.” According to this ideal, public institutions have a duty to accommodate ethnic diversity, guided and constrained by the larger framework of a liberal-democratic constitution, with its firm protection of individual rights and non-discrimination. I acknowledged that some countries were moving more quickly in this direction than others, and that there were bound to be temporary setbacks along the way, but I confidently predicted that the overall trend across the West was clearly towards liberal multiculturalism.¹

Today, however, it is clear that this prediction was false. Critics have rightly accused me of premature triumphalism regarding liberal multiculturalism, and perhaps also of wishful thinking. Indeed, some commentators argue that we are witnessing the very opposite trend: namely, an across-the-board retreat from multiculturalism. According to this view, multiculturalism will come to be seen as simply a passing fad of the 1980s and 90s, replaced by a return to more traditional ideas of homogenous and unitary republican citizenship, in which ethnic diversity is banished from the public realm.²

However, on closer inspection, what we actually see is an incredible variability of these trends across the different Western democracies. Consider the very different fate of multiculturalism in France and Canada. Indeed, there is considerable variation even within specific countries. For example, while Netherlands is generally seen as the paradigm case of a country that has retreated from multiculturalism since the 1990s, it has actually strengthened its multiculturalism commitments within certain domains, such as the military, which had previously resisted ideas of accommodating diversity.³

What explains these variations? I will focus on three conditions that I believe facilitate the successful adoption and implementation of multiculturalism.

Legal vs illegal migration: It is very difficult to gain public support for multiculturalism if the main beneficiaries are people who entered the country illegally. The presence of large numbers of illegal immigrants has several implications. First, it implies that the country is unable to control its borders, and this quickly generates fear about being “swamped” by unwanted migrants. By contrast, where illegal migration is minimal, the temperature of debates is lowered, and people feel secure that they are in control of their own destiny.

Second, in most Western countries there is a strong moralistic objection to rewarding migrants who enter the country illegally or under false pretenses (ie., economic migrants making false claims about escaping persecution). Such migrants are seen as flouting the rule of law, both in the way they entered the country, and often in their subsequent activities (eg., working illegally). Most citizens have a strong moral objection to rewarding such illegal or dishonest behaviour. Moreover, they are often seen as “jumping the queue,” taking the place of equally-needy or equally-deserving would-be migrants who seek entry through legal channels. There is also a prudential objection to providing multiculturalism policies for illegal immigrants, since this may encourage yet more illegal migration.

If we put Western countries on a continuum in terms of the proportion of migration that is illegal, I suspect that this provides a fairly good predictor of the level of public antagonism to multiculturalism. At one end of this continuum would be a country like Canada, which has probably the lowest level of illegal immigration amongst the Western democracies (primarily because of its geographical position) and the highest level of public support for multiculturalism (close to 80% according to recent surveys).⁴ This is not a coincidence: I have no doubt that support for multiculturalism would

rapidly and dramatically decline in Canada if we started confronting large numbers of illegal migrants. Consider the hysteria that accompanied the appearance off the Canadian shore of four boats containing just under 600 Chinese migrants in the summer of 1999. There was overwhelming support in the Canadian public for forcibly repatriating them to China, without allowing them to land and make asylum claims (which most Canadians assumed would be bogus).⁵ I believe that Canadians are as opposed to illegal immigration as the citizens of any other Western country. If such boats appeared on Canadian shores every week, as happens in Italy or Spain or Florida, I have no doubt that there would quickly be a powerful anti-immigrant and anti-multiculturalism backlash.⁶

Liberal vs Illiberal Practices: A second important factor concerns the sort of “culture” that is being recognized and accommodated by multiculturalism policies. It is very difficult to get public support for multiculturalism policies if the groups that are the main beneficiaries of these policies are perceived as carriers of illiberal cultural practices that violate norms of human rights, and if they are seen as likely to invoke the idea of multiculturalism in order to maintain these practices (eg., practices such as coerced arranged marriages of underage girls, female circumcision, or honour killings). The general public in most Western democracies is unwilling to accept the risk that multiculturalism policies can be used to perpetuate these practices.

The extent to which immigrants are perceived as raising this risk varies considerably. White European immigrants to North America, such as the Italians or Poles, are not typically seen as carriers of illiberal practices. They are seen sharing a common “Western” and “Judeo-Christian” civilization. The same applies to immigrants from the Caribbean and Latin America, who are overwhelmingly Christian. Although they are seen as non-white, and are often subject to racial discrimination and stereotypes (eg., about criminality, laziness, irresponsibility, lack of intelligence, and so on), they are not seen as bringing “barbaric” practices with them. And while Japanese and Chinese immigrants from East Asia are neither white nor Christian, they are not widely seen as having a religious or cultural commitment to offensive practices. In the West today, therefore, it is primarily Muslims who are seen as raising this risk. Muslims are not only seen as potentially bringing with them illiberal practices, but also as having a strong religious commitment to them, and hence as more likely to try to use the ideology of multiculturalism as a vehicle for maintaining these practices.

As a result, the fear that multiculturalism is a vehicle for perpetuating illiberal practices is linked to the size or proportion of the Muslim population. If we put Western democracies on a continuum in terms of the proportion of immigrants who are Muslim, I think this would provide a good predictor of public opposition to multiculturalism. Here again, Canada is at one end of the continuum. In Canada, Muslims are a small portion of the overall population (less than 2%) and form only a small fraction of the recent non-white immigrant intake (90% of our recent immigrants are not Muslim). Moreover, the Canadian multiculturalism policy was in fact adopted before the arrival of significant numbers of Muslims, and was initially designed in response to the demands of older white ethnic groups, such as the Ukrainians and Italians. In most of Western Europe, by contrast, the largest group of immigrants is Muslim – up to 80 or 90% in countries like France, Spain, Italy, and Germany etc. – and multiculturalism is understood first and foremost as an issue of how to accommodate Muslims. Moreover, many of these Muslim immigrants are from parts of Africa or South Asia where traditions of FGM or arranged marriages persist, or where Islamic fundamentalism is strong.⁷ The numerical predominance of Muslims, combined with racism and Islamophobia, generates a general perception of immigrants as illiberal, and hence of multiculturalism as morally risky.

Economic Contributors vs Burdens: A third factor concerns perceptions of the economic impact of immigrants. It is difficult to sustain popular support for multiculturalism where the immigrants who would benefit from multiculturalism policies are seen as a burden on the welfare state – ie., as taking more out of the welfare state than they put in. This is partly a matter of economic self-interest, but there is also a moral component. The welfare state is seen as something that has been built up by the sacrifices that each generation has made to protect the next. If newcomers who have not contributed to the pool take away resources, that will leave less for our children.

By contrast, in some countries, like Canada, immigrants have been perceived as net contributors to the welfare state. Historically, this is due to the fact that immigrants to Canada have in fact put more in than they have taken out, and that historical pattern is today further strengthened by the perception that immigrants are needed to offset our ageing population structure.⁸ Without new working-age immigrants, we would have trouble sustaining health care spending or pensions as the population ages.

Whether immigrants are perceived as net contributors or net burdens depends on a number of factors. In the Canadian case, the perception that they are contributors is largely the result of the pro-active system of recruiting immigrants based on their education, skills and experience. Since immigrants are chosen precisely for their employability, it is not surprising that they tend to have relatively high rates of employment.

Whether immigrants are perceived as net contributors or net burdens depends on a number of factors. In the Canadian case, the perception that they are contributors is largely the result of the pro-active system of recruiting immigrants based on their education, skills and experience. Since immigrants are chosen precisely for their employability, it is not surprising that they tend to have relatively high rates of employment. In many European countries, by contrast, most immigrants are not selected or recruited for their potential economic contributions. They may be ex-colonial populations who had the right to enter the imperial metropole, or refugee claimants, or illegal migrants. They often have low levels of education, and few job skills. As a result, they may suffer from high levels of unemployment, and depend on social benefits, and hence are seen as burdening the welfare state.

I believe that these three factors explain much (though not all) of the variation in public support for multiculturalism. To oversimplify, in countries where immigrants are seen as legally admitted, as complying with liberal norms, and as net economic contributors, adopting multiculturalism will face the fewest obstacles. In countries where immigrants are primarily illegal, Muslim, and low-skilled, multiculturalism will face the greatest obstacles.

We can make the same point in terms of perceptions of risk. In countries like Canada, where immigrants are predominantly legal, non-Muslim and skilled, adopting multiculturalism is perceived as posing few risks either to people's economic well-being or moral principles. Of course, even here multiculturalism is not seen as entirely risk-free: some people will worry that by recognizing and institutionalizing ethnic identities, multiculturalism will erode feelings of national solidarity, and make it more difficult for everyone in the country to work together for the common good. In every society, there is always some free-floating anxiety about "the other," and nostalgia for a time when everyone was assumed to share thick bonds of common history and identity. But these free-floating anxieties about diversity, when not tied to more specific fears about border control, illiberal practices and economic burdens, are often too diffuse to generate effective public opposition to multiculturalism. In modern Western democracies, there is a powerful presumption in favour of tolerance, equality and individual freedom, and these public values and constitutional norms all push in the direction of multiculturalism, even in the face of diffuse anxiety about diversity. Moreover,

these diffuse anxieties can often be reduced by linking ideas of multiculturalism with broader policies for promoting citizenship and national identity.⁹

In many countries, however, multiculturalism is seen as raising much more specific risks. This is particularly true where immigrants are seen as predominantly illegal, as potential carriers of illiberal practices, and as net burdens on the welfare state. In these cases, multiculturalism poses perceived risks to both prudential self-interest and moral principles.

The link between the free-floating dislike of diversity and the more specific fears about border control, illiberal practices and economic burdens is complex. To some extent, the latter can be seen as simply attempts to rationalize the former. People may have an intrinsic and irrational fear of diversity, but they do not want to appear as racists or xenophobes, so they look around for some more "acceptable" reason to oppose immigration, such as fears about the illegal entry, illiberal practices or economic burden of certain migrants. If necessary, people invent or exaggerate these risks, even when there is little or no evidence for them, in order to hide the true nature of their opposition to immigrants. Insofar as this is true, my argument that opposition to multiculturalism can be explained in terms of varying levels of public fear about border control, illiberal practices and economic burdens is potentially misleading. Some commentators would argue that these fears are just the surface manifestations or rationalizations of deeper forms of public racism and xenophobia that are quite independent of contingent facts about the legality, liberality or economic impact of particular migrant groups. If racists and xenophobes could not invoke these specific fears, they would simply find some other rationalization for opposing immigration and multiculturalism.

This is undoubtedly part of the story, and it is surely true that wholehearted public acceptance of multiculturalism will never be achieved simply by dealing with issues of border control, illiberal practices and economic burdens. We must also reduce the public's free-floating anxiety about diversity, by tackling the racism and xenophobia that feed it. However, I do not believe that public fears about border control, illiberal practices and economic burdens can be dismissed as simply rationalizations of a deeper xenophobia. Free-floating anxieties about newcomers are undoubtedly strong throughout the Western democracies, but they cannot explain the variation in support for immigration and multiculturalism

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between countries, or over time within countries. They cannot explain why some countries adopt multiculturalism policies while others do not, or why some countries start down the road of multiculturalism and then retreat. These variations suggest that in the enduring struggle between the public values of tolerance/non-discrimination and public fears about diversity, the outcome often depends on specific and contingent assessments of the risks involved. The varying fate of multiculturalism across the Western democracies suggests that many citizens are willing to accept multiculturalism policies when they are perceived as low-risk, but oppose them when they are perceived as high-risk.

What does this imply for the future of multiculturalism? On the one hand, these basic risk factors are unlikely to change for most countries in the foreseeable future. In countries where the risk factors are low today, they are likely to remain so in the years to come, and vice versa. There is no chance in the next 10 or 20 years that Canada will suddenly be confronted with large numbers of illegal, unskilled Muslim immigrants. Conversely, it is virtually inevitable that Italy will continue to be confronted with large numbers of unskilled, illegal Muslim immigrants for the next few decades (North Africa is not likely to become a region of democracy and prosperity in the near future).

So the future of multiculturalism depends on whether states can persuade their citizens that the benefits of multiculturalism are worth the risks, and that the state has the capacity and determination to manage these risks. The experience to date suggests that this is a hard sell. In many countries, citizens are unconvinced that multiculturalism has significant benefits, and are also unconvinced that states have the capacity and commitment to tackle the prudential and moral hazards involved (eg., to tackle issues of border control, to clamp down on illiberal practices, and to prevent abuse of the welfare state). Viewed this way, the future of multiculturalism in many countries looks rather bleak.

On the other hand, one could also argue that these very same factors also make the *rejection* of multiculturalism a high-risk move. It is precisely when immigrants are perceived as illegitimate, illiberal and burdensome that multiculturalism may be most needed. Without some proactive policies to promote mutual understanding and respect, and to make immigrants feel comfortable within mainstream institutions, these factors could quickly lead to a situation of a racialized underclass, standing in permanent opposition to the larger society.

Indeed, I would argue that, in the long-term, the only viable response to the presence of large numbers of immigrants is some form of liberal multiculturalism, regardless of how these immigrants arrived, or from where. But we need to accept that the path to liberal multiculturalism in many countries will not be smooth or linear. Moreover, we need to focus more on how to manage the risks involved. In the past, defenders of multiculturalism have typically focused on the perceived benefits of cultural diversity and inter-cultural understanding, and on condemning racism and xenophobia. Those arguments are sound, I believe, but they need to be supplemented with a fuller acknowledgement of the prudential and moral risks involved, and with some account of how those risks will be managed.

Notes

- ¹ "Liberal Culturalism: An Emerging Consensus", originally published in 1998, and reprinted in my *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship* (Oxford University Press, 2001), chap. 2.
- ² For representative discussions, see Han Entzinger, "The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism in the Netherlands" in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (eds) *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* (Palgrave, London, 2003); Rogers Brubaker, "The Return of Assimilation?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 24/4 (2001): 531-48; Christian Joppke, "The Retreat from Multiculturalism in Liberal Nation-States" (Russell Sage Foundation, 2003).
- ³ See Rudy Richardson, "Multiculturalism in the Dutch Armed Forces" (presented at the International Seminar on "Leadership, Education and the Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities", La Paz, Bolivia, 13-15 September 2004).
- ⁴ Andrew Parkin and Matthew Mendelsohn, *A New Canada: An Identity Shaped by Diversity* (Centre for Research and Information on Canada, Montreal, CRIC paper No. 11, October 2003).
- ⁵ Sean Hier and Joshua Greenberg, "Constructing a Discursive Crisis: Risk, Problematization and Illegal Chinese in Canada", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 25/3 (2002): 490-513.
- ⁶ The same hysteria accompanied the arrival of 174 Sikhs on the shore of Nova Scotia in 1987. In response to this "crisis", the federal government recalled Parliament in an "emergency session".
- ⁷ The popular view in the West that FGM is a "Muslim" practice is doubly incorrect: FGM is practiced by Christians, Jews and animists as well as Muslims in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and is strongly disavowed by many Muslim leaders. Yet this popular perception is very strong.
- ⁸ Whether immigration in fact substantially changes the age structure is debated by experts: most working-age immigrants quickly sponsor their parents, thereby reproducing the same age structure as the native-born population.
- ⁹ For the way that multiculturalism policies work hand-in-hand with citizenship policies in Canada, see my "Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links", in Sarah Spencer (ed) *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change* (Blackwell, Oxford, 2003), p. 195-208.

Dilemmas of Multiculturalism:

Finding or Losing Our Way?

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ABSTRACT

At present we are witnessing a backlash against Multiculturalism Policies (MCP) together with the aggressive promotion of old or presumed new alternatives like liberal or republican assimilationism and policies of diversity. In defending MCP it is more convincing to address the moral conundrums and the many practical dilemmas all incorporation policies are confronted with than to repeat cherished principles. To achieve this, an institutional turn is required in political theory. In this paper, some policy dilemmas are sketched and alternative solutions are presented for the 'immigration/welfare paradox' as one example of how to rethink MCP in order to find new ways better adapted to recent changes in global contexts and socio-economic and political opportunity structures.

Multiculturalism (MC), as is well known, means many things. It is used to designate culturally diverse societies, a specific set of policies and institutions, and their respective legitimation in public talk by a plurality of actors like politicians, administrators and judges, as well as (political) philosophers (see Vertovec 2004:4-7). In all respects MC has been contested right from the start, but the same charges have been raised much more loudly and aggressively since 9/11.¹ We see something like a "general backlash against difference" (Grillo 2004), against multiculturalism policies (MCP) and institutions in particular. Pressures to avoid implementing MCP are increasing all over the globe, though clearly not in the same way in all countries, in all fields, and to the same degree.² MC is dead or dying, so we are told.

In this paper, I take it as a plain fact that living in *culturally diverse societies is without any alternative*. Like migrants, cultural diversity is 'here to stay' whether we like it or not and whatever politics we may adopt. It may remain an open question, however, whether ethno-national and religious diversity inside the state increases as a result of immigration, or whether it decreases on a global scale and eventually also internally as a result of 'MacWorld'-globalization. Not only are MCP and institutions as well as their *political and theoretical* legitimation increasingly under siege, but it is said that old or renewed *liberal assimilationism* (LA, see Brubaker, Joppke/Morawska, Trevor Phillips) and/or *republican assimilationism* (RA, see Hollinger, Lind, Schnapper, Kepel) and *policies of diversity* (D)³ are better alternatives in the sense that they are both morally superior – or even stronger, that they are the only options compatible with liberal democratic constitutions – and realistically superior.

Before discussing these claims, we have to indicate the *differences between these alternatives*: (i) MC claims that *cultural inequalities* are a special problem that has to be addressed instead of being neglected by an exclusive focus on socio-economic, legal and political inequalities characterizing LA, RA and D. (ii) The diversity and, more importantly, the unequal treatment of cultural practices requires some form of *public recognition* (MC) and should not be individualized or confined to a so-called 'private' or non-political 'civil' society opposed to a presumed culturally neutral 'public sphere' and the state. (iii) Ethno-religious diversity cannot be sufficiently accommodated by special exemptions only (LA, D)⁴ as it also requires specified and circumscribed forms of *collective political representation and rights* (MC). (iv) MC claims that a fair treatment of some (ethno-national and religious) minorities requires a variable amount of *institutional autonomy and institutional pluralism* whereas RA is fiercely opposing this and LA and D are at best extremely reluctant.

Here, I take it for granted that philosophical defenders of liberal MC like Kymlicka 1995 (opposed to communitarian or conservationist MC) are able to refute moral criticism by egalitarian liberals like Barry. I am even convinced that egalitarian-liberals should not reject but rather endorse liberal MC as soon as they clearly realize cultural inequalities in all their consequences (Bader 2004). Refuting the general philosophical charges against MC does, however, not entail ignoring the *serious moral and legal tensions*, the difficult trade-offs and the *unintended negative consequences* known from debates on affirmative action (Bader 1998:444ff) long before MCP were launched at the end of the 1970s. Undifferentiated and imprudent MCP may impose involuntary 'ethnic categories' on all individuals; contribute to 'ethnicize' or 'religionize' minorities, to 'reify', 'purify', or 'conservatize' and 'essentialize' culture and ethnicity; facilitate undemocratic organization and leadership of minorities; freeze existing institutionalized relationships of interest-intermediation and exclude new organizations and (second generation) leaders; make minority-organizations dependent upon public money and make

minorities depend on welfare; ‘balkanize’ societies, and so on.⁵ Even if MCP would have morally permissible, ‘good intentions’, they would inevitably include such counter-productive consequences, so it is said.

My intention cannot be, and has never been, to ignore the existence of serious moral and legal dilemmas and difficult trade-offs or to debunk unintended effects of MCP. What I claim is, first, that not only MCP but all possible policies of immigration and incorporation are faced with these problems. In this regard, critics of MC should be more honest and also scrutinize their own preferred institutional and policy options. Secondly, recognizing these dilemmas, trade-offs and unintended consequences may help to find ways to deal with them that are morally and prudentially superior. In particular, it may contribute to the design of more balanced, flexible, context-sensitive policies of MC. In order to achieve this, an institutional turn in political theory is required.

Dilemmas of immigration and incorporation policies

Processes of immigration and incorporation depend on structural, contextual, conjunctural variables and on institutional and field-specific ‘logics’ that are, to start with, beyond the direct or immediate influence of any policies. For this reason alone, ‘politics’ cannot determine the course and outcome of immigration and incorporation. Still, politics matters. Yet all policy options, whether MC or RA, LA, or D, are confronted with a veritable mine field of dilemmas:⁶

- (1) If policies of *first admission* are fairly open and non-restrictive, this puts pressure on fair incorporation processes in all its dimensions, particularly on welfare arrangements (see below for this immigration/welfare paradox). If they are strongly restrictive they may be morally indefensible and create intended or unintended stereotypes about ‘foreigners’ backfiring on the integration of resident immigrants.
- (2) If policies of *legal incorporation* are fair and inclusive (safe and secure denizenship status and easy naturalization) they may serve as important ‘pull’ factors for immigration (in all forms). If they are restrictive and exclusionary they may be morally indefensible and they seriously hinder integration processes in all other dimensions.⁷
- (3) If policies of *socio-economic integration* are weak (neoliberal) or absent, they contribute to the development of ethnic under-classes, ghettoization, structural educational under-achievement, crime, and so on, thereby reinforcing ethnic stigmatization. If they are strong – either *general* ‘republican’ or ‘socialist’ policies of equalizing socio-economic opportunities or *affirmative action* policies – they tend to reinforce restrictive immigration policies or dramatize the dilemmas of affirmative action: as *morally* unjust or *legally* suspect (undermining equality before and in the law); ‘essentialist’ categorization and stigmatization, bureaucratization, undermining social cohesion, stimulating ‘ethnic’ conflicts, and so on.⁸
- (4) If policies of *cultural integration* are strongly assimilatory they are morally illegitimate and create or stimulate much resistance. In addition, they reinforce

stereotypes of immigrants as ‘unwelcome’ and ‘unadaptable’. If they are pluralist they may be conceived as obstacles to ‘integration’, as a threat to ‘our common culture’, ‘our shared values’ etc.⁹

- (5) If integration policies have a strongly *unitarian institutional* bias (RA) they may be in conflict with important freedoms (of education, of association and organization) and they may reinforce the overload of state-run public services. If they allow for a fair amount of institutional separation they may be perceived as a threat to minimally required political unity, social cohesion and stability, and they may stimulate the unchecked strategic particularism of ‘ethno-politics’.¹⁰
- (6) If policies regarding the predominant *public or political culture* are open and accommodating, stressing its civil or political character (like in LA and Associative Democracy) they may reinforce ethnocentric or nationalist reactions (the recent constructions of German, Dutch or Australian ‘*Leitkultur*’ defended by RA). If they are outright ethno-nationalist and assimilationist they create ‘fundamentalisms’ on both sides.

Whatever (mixes of) policy options one chooses, one is confronted with hard *trade-offs* and serious *policy dilemmas* that have to be clearly recognized and then confronted, though in different ways, by moral and political philosophers, by political theorists, by social scientists, and by politicians and civil servants.

Finding our Way

Finding new ways out of these dilemmas is very difficult for at least three reasons: *Firstly*, we have to recognize that both the absence and the presence of determined, culturally sensitive minority policies may cause and stimulate *right wing populism and extremism*; the former by not fighting high unemployment of (second generation) immigrants, ethnic ghettos, educational underachievement, high crime rates, and so on; the latter by creating backlashes against decent immigration policies, against equal rights for ‘foreigners’ and certainly against ‘more than equal opportunities for foreigners’, by nursing ‘balkanization’ claims (‘their’ own schools or even political parties), by nursing claims that determined attempts to transform predominant ethno-religious public cultures into more civic-political directions would undermine ‘our shared norms and values’. As long as societal and cultural racism and ethnocentrism are strong, we have to expect that even successful immigration and incorporation policies may stimulate, in the short term, these backlashes. In such a context, all policies depend crucially on determined efforts to build broad public acceptance and political legitimacy (Bauböck, this volume).

Secondly, the recent context of skillfully managed *security-emergency and of economic zero-sum games* is, obviously, inimical to cultural pluralism and toleration, and also for chances to develop varieties of democratic institutional pluralism. As a sociologist I am afraid that the windows of opportunity for retaining existing and, particularly, for developing new forms of MC-institutions and policies is rapidly closing for some time to come.

Thirdly, such skepticism does not mean that ‘politics don’t matter’. The hope of political philosophers and all

political actors is that we can shape processes of migration and incorporation and also, eventually, the structural and institutional conditions of contexts that are now beyond our reach. The biggest bottleneck in this regard, in my view, lies in the fact that we (as political theorists) have not been imaginative enough to *design new institutions and policies that provide 'third ways'* out of the outdated and counterproductive opposition between old and renewed versions of RA or LA and fixed, rigid, *corporatist models of MC-institutions* and policies like the 'pillarized' Dutch model. Instead of inventing or selling new buzzwords like the increasingly fashionable 'diversity-policies' we should now confront this demanding task head on. The proposals in the tradition of associative democracy are at least a good start: they provide such a 'third way' and are highly contextual, resisting all claims that one definite institutional model or one set of policies would fit all minorities in all circumstances, countries, and fields.

In conclusion, I sketch the outlines of such alternatives with regard to one dilemma only, the *'immigration/welfare paradox'* (Brochmann 1999:15). To start with, this paradox only arises if countries follow immigration policies selecting migrants that are – or are perceived to be – a burden to the welfare state (as is the case in most European states with their post-colonial and, particularly guest-worker regimes and their long-term consequences).¹¹ More in general, there seems to be an *elective affinity* between relatively *open immigration* and deregulated labor markets, *liberal welfare regimes*, and quasi-autonomous incorporation trajectories (no specific incorporation-policies) on the one hand, and *restrictive immigration* policies and regulated labor markets, *social-democratic/corporatist welfare-regimes*, and *active incorporation policies*, on the other hand. There is a serious tension between protection for insiders and fair chances for outsiders. Are we, again, confronted with 'tragic choices' or can we think of smart institutional solutions? "How to combine openness and protection?" (Engelen 2003)

All immigration countries have at least some experience with a *stepwise, temporally differentiated regime of legal incorporation* of immigrants at the 'three gates of entry' – first admission, temporary or permanent residence (denizenship), naturalization (full citizenship or dual/multiple citizenship). Immigrants have guaranteed civic rights, and increasingly acquire specified social and political rights, the full package of rights (and the corresponding legal duties) normally reserved for full citizens.¹² These practices already presuppose multi-dimen-

sional (citizenship as a bundle of different statuses, rights, and duties), multi-layered, and multi-level models. Engelen applies such models to the trajectories of *economic incorporation*, accepting that many smaller trade-offs (e.g. between transparency and effectiveness) are unavoidable, and that the balancing of the involved "moral costs" may be easier if one compares the lower standards in terms of payment, working conditions, etc. from the perspective of migrants with those in the sending countries.

Differentiated inclusion is defined by an "emphasis on upward mobility and empowerment, both in the traditional socio-economic sense and in the sense of providing a stairway of citizenship rights" and, at least in theory, clearly opposed to differential exclusion of guest-worker regimes

(low threshold, dead-end markets and jobs, blocked mobility and blocked naturalization). *Economic* empowerment by means of differential treatment of migrants may combine the creation of empowerment zones (in order to stimulate immigrant self-employment) with empowering forms of affirmative action (in order to stimulate employability and upward mobility on labor markets). Differentiated *social* inclusion is much easier in mixed welfare-regimes like the Dutch (Engelen 2003). Regime-pluralism, in this like in other cases, provides the building blocks for new versions of differentiated, inclusionary citizenship better equipped to find intelligent ways to tackle the big trade-off between inclusion and motivation. Exclusively universal welfare regimes generally know higher levels of redistribution than contributory ones. The stronger solidarity required has been very difficult to achieve and uphold even for 'co-nationals', and it may be even more difficult to extend to all residents (see Bird, this volume, for the solidarity/diversity divide in Denmark). Exclusively contributory regimes do not provide a fair minimum of subsistence even for 'compatriots' but they may create stronger solidarity among contributors, immigrants amongst them. The combination of universal and contributory elements in mixed regimes "might allow states to keep the required solidarity at a minimum"⁽²⁵⁾.

Though the proposed regimes of differential inclusion and empowerment as well as proposals for positive 'flow management' (Veenkamp et al. 2003) are clearly demarcated against old and new guest-worker regimes of differential exclusion and disempowerment recently gaining new prominence in Australia,

Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, and against the malign trap of thoroughly restricted immigration that only continues to select the 'wrong immigrants', it is ironic and highly instructive that both proposals have

Instead of inventing or selling new buzzwords like the increasingly fashionable 'diversity-policies' we should now confront this demanding task head on. The proposals in the tradition of associative democracy are at least a good start: they provide such a 'third way' and are highly contextual, resisting all claims that one definite institutional model or one set of policies would fit all minorities in all circumstances, countries, and fields.

been picked up in politics in the old, wrong and unfeasible way.¹³

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Notes

- ¹ I can't discuss changes in context, general socio-economic and political opportunity structure, that are used to explain this presumed 'general backlash against difference', against MC in particular: (i) *economic* downturn and crises, high rates of unemployment. Zero- or negative sum games and pressure on all redistributive policies, but particularly on those seen to defend 'particularist' privileges for targeted minorities. (ii) *Neo-liberal policies* and contradictory processes of de-regulation. (iii) *Migration-pressure and restrictive immigration- and asylum policies* backfiring against MC policies (or explicitly combined with internal assimilation policies). (iv) Organization and *mobilization of minorities* and counter-mobilization by 'threatened silent' majorities stimulated by right-wing populism. (v) *Terrorist attacks and declared wars against terrorism*. Situations of (perceived) *emergency* put a premium on unity and social cohesion of 'the nation' against all external and internal enemies (MC amongst them).
- ² As Kymlicka (this volume) shows: issues, fields, countries matter. Obviously, countries respond differently to similar pressures. Some countries, like the Netherlands recently, engage in rhetorical and, increasingly, practical rejection of their institutionalized MC-policies, others revise them, like Australia, and at least one country, Canada, is resisting these pressures (see Hiebert et al. (2003) for an interesting explanation of the Canadian exceptionalism).
- ³ D is the new buzzword not only in 'management of corporate diversity' but increasingly at the level of municipal (e.g. in Amsterdam) and national policies (e.g. in Norway, see Lithman). The common core of these alternative options is 'integration into one universalized citizenship' and into presumed

neutral 'common institutions'.

- ⁴ French RA combines aggressive secularism with institutional unitarianism and vigorously opposes exemptions that are allowed by Anglo-Saxon LA.
- ⁵ See my criticism of the myopic anti-elitism of these critics: Bader 2001a: 264ff, see 2003 for a more general treatment of realist concerns.
- ⁶ For a more disaggregate model of fields of incorporation see Bader 1997, 1998a.
- ⁷ Stepwise, temporally differentiated regimes of legal incorporation are in place in almost all immigration-states. Achieved results like fairly save denizenship and dual nationality, however have to be vigorously defended against recent attempts to subsume them again under 'security', 'loyalty' and 'restrictive immigration' policies (see Guiraudon/Lahav 2000, Bird (this volume) for Denmark).
- ⁸ See my six rules of thumb for flexible and wise policies of affirmative action: Bader 1998:462ff. The recommended *general* policies to fight structural disadvantages of 'minorities' in an indirect way depend on well-functioning welfare-arrangements that, paradoxically, are recently under attack, under 'reconstruction' or in serious decline in all European states without viable powerful alternatives. Without such safe institutional backings it is incredibly difficult to prevent strategies of *divide et impera* particularly under conditions of negative sum games
- ⁹ States are obliged to *strong anti-discrimination policies* by their national laws and constitutions, by EU-law and regulations, and by international covenants. They have to be *combined with instead of opposed to flexible MC- policies* to address all cases of serious cultural inequalities.
- ¹⁰ In this regard, *associative democracy* provides a flexible alternative to the opposite models of unitary republicanism and old-fashioned, rigid (neo-) corporatism that is responsible for much of the unintended effects of MCP mentioned above (see Hirst/Bader 2001, Bader 2003). Here we are faced with another, fairly general dilemma: The most common tension and the most often recognized trade-off exists between *policies of equal socio-economic opportunities* – even if the egalitarianism is moderate and minimalist – on the one hand, and actual *cultural recognition and institutional pluralism*, on the other hand. Egalitarian policies seem to demand a fairly strong and unitary state and fairly thick national commitments and solidarities inimical to institutional pluralism and wide ethno-religious cultural diversity (see however Banting/Kymlicka in this volume). This trade-off is either neglected or simply 'resolved' by defenders of RA and LA in favor of the former policies only.
- ¹¹ See Kymlicka (this volume) and my introduction. Canada had 'good geo-political luck' (a good hand) together with fairly good policies (plaid well).
- ¹² See Bader 1995 and 1999b.
- ¹³ Differential exclusion policies are proposed by the VVD and even the CDA in NL. See Tony Blair's and Buttiglione's proposals (also defended by Schilly) for EU *detention-centers* in Northern Africa in order to keep migrants of all sorts out. Buttiglione has not been rejected as European commissioner for this proposal!

If You Say Multiculturalism Is the Wrong Answer,

Then What Was the Question You Asked?

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ABSTRACT

In this article, the author poses some crucial questions about multiculturalism as the solution to a persistent 'problem'. He writes of those countries that have entrenched minority rights in their constitutions, and those that have not. He examines the elements of sustainable multicultural policy, contrasting the European with the North American approach. He argues in favour of cultural diversity and shared citizenship.

The idea of multiculturalism was probably born in New York in the 1960s amidst proclamations that the fire had been extinguished under the melting pot in which the American nation had been amalgamated from heterogeneous origins. And many say it has been buried in the same city under the rubble of the collapsed WTC twin towers. In the 1970s Canada and Australia officially declared themselves multicultural nations whose diverse ethnic groups were encouraged to maintain their heritage. By the end of the 1980s multiculturalism had reached Western Europe, where Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden developed their own models of recognizing cultural diversity as a permanent feature of societies shaped by immigration. In the academic sphere, literary studies, sociology and cultural anthropology quickly grasped the importance of this theme. Postcolonial and cultural studies emerged as new academic fields whose central focus is the interplay between diversity and dominance. As usual, political theory was a latecomer and joined the debate only in the 1990s, but the works of Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young and Bhikhu Parekh have exercised considerable influence beyond their discipline. By the end of the decade, the American sociologist Nathan Glazer could declare that “we are all multiculturalists now” without raising many eyebrows.

All this has changed quite dramatically in the new millennium. Now cultural diversity is once again associated with risks of societal disintegration and violent conflict. The new mainstream's Cassandra is Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, whose prediction of a 'clash of civilizations' has conjured up the danger of persistent war along the frontiers of global cultural blocs. Huntington recently added similarly dire forecasts about the impact of Hispanic immigration in the US, which “threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages.”

Before we join the funeral chorus for multiculturalism we should pause and consider some simple questions: If multiculturalism was the wrong answer, then what was the problem that it was meant to respond to? Was this problem merely imaginary or real? If real, will it somehow fade away under the new circumstances? If it persists, are there solutions available that are fundamentally different from multicultural ones?

So let's start with defining the problem. At its heart is an irresolvable tension between a liberal commitment to individual autonomy and equality and the fact that all modern state-building involves nation-building. Nation-building is an attempt to impose particular historical traditions, languages and symbols of collective identity on a large and heterogeneous population. This attempt generates different kinds of linguistic, ethnic, or racial minorities who are seen as not belonging to the nation. In order to realize national unity these minorities must either be kept apart or be assimilated. Prior to World War Two most liberals and socialists agreed with nationalists in endorsing one of these two solutions. Some believed in a Darwinian struggle between national cultures for survival of the fittest. Others thought that states with a well-established national culture had a mission to civilize backward minorities by assimilating them.

The human rights revolution of the post-war period and the civil rights struggles of the 1960s thoroughly discredited these ideas. Cultural minorities acquired legal claims to protection against discrimination and, “in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language” (Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). In liberal states, rights to free speech and association enabled minorities to mobilize and put their demands on the political agenda. The democratic process strengthened these claims through incentives for political parties to catch minority votes and incentives for political institutions to co-opt minority elites in order to diminish their potential for disruptive mobilization.

All such moves, however, only served to further discredit the myth of colour-blind and culture-blind public policies. The presumption that a liberal state could treat all its citizens as equals by ignoring their cultural differences was questioned by pointing out the many ways in which official languages, educational curricula, public religious holidays, dress

codes and many other laws and policies were not neutral. The greatest challenge was raised by indigenous peoples and national minorities who did not merely claim that their ways of life and languages were disadvantaged, but that the dominant nation-building project itself had been realized at the expense of their own historical traditions and persistent aspirations of self-government. From their perspective, the very constitution and boundaries of the polity reflected a history of oppression that undermined their status as equal citizens.

Achieving strict cultural neutrality would be possible only if liberal states abstained from any activity that has a differential impact on the reproduction of cultural identities and practices. This is a libertarian fantasy that would require scrapping not only public education but all kinds of public services. The alternative solution is what Charles Taylor has called the “politics of recognition” with its proliferation of minority claims for exemptions, support, special representation and public symbols. The multicultural response to the claims of indigenous and national minorities was to involve them in a constitutional dialogue about regional autonomy and power-sharing in central government institutions.

The politics of recognition can create all sorts of perverse and undesirable effects and must therefore be firmly constrained by principles of human rights and equal individual citizenship. It also needs to be counterbalanced by fostering a shared public culture and civic identities that fully embrace cultural differences. However, this does not undermine the basic insight that liberal democracy must respond to cultural heterogeneity in society with multicultural policies. As Joseph Carens has suggested, a hands-off approach to cultural difference must be replaced with evenhandedness in judging the legitimacy of claims.

If all this is accepted, the answers to two of the questions I have raised seem to be pretty straightforward. First, the problems that multiculturalism responds to may be described as imagined, but not as imaginary. They become real because imagined collective identities are real in their consequences once people mobilize to defend them. Second, these challenges might temporarily “disappear” under certain circumstances. If western states decided to use all available means for stopping new immigration and returning to a policy of coercive assimilation similar to the one that prevailed in the U.S. in the last century’s interwar period, then many current multicultural claims would vanish. If authoritarian regimes, similar to those that ruled over Eastern Europe until the 1980s or in Portugal, Spain and Greece until the 1970s, replaced liberal democracy, then national and indigenous minorities could be effectively silenced, too. Pessimists may think that the new

security concerns in western democracies may eventually trigger such developments. But I hope they agree with me that multicultural policies should not be scrapped in anticipation of such disasters.

Finally, if the problems persist, are there better answers than the ones given by multiculturalism? Certainly yes, if we describe multiculturalism as a quasi-apartheid policy of segregating citizens into cultural groups with different sets of rights for each of them. Those who claim that this is what multiculturalism is all about must then provide empirical support for this charge. The answer is less easy if we accept the above description of how liberal democracies have actually reacted to cultural minority claims. It can’t be a resounding “no” because in dramatically changing circumstances multiculturalism can only be defended if it is revised and reformulated.

There is no way of denying that multiculturalism has come under attack. These attacks have been triggered by events such as 9/11 or the murders of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands. They have also been fuelled by long-term trends of rising poverty, unemployment and urban segregation among certain ethnic minorities. It is disingenuous to blame multiculturalism for causing terrorist acts of religious fanatics or for the dismantling of public welfare policies, but the celebration of cultural diversity is certainly no answer to these issues, which must be addressed when defending religious toleration or differentiated citizenship. Still, the complaint that multicultural policies have distracted attention from weightier concerns about security or social equality is not entirely sincere since the same could be said about gender mainstreaming, gay rights, environmental issues and many other pieces of liberal policy.

Yet there is a deeper concern that multiculturalism might be self-subverting or, to put it more cautiously, that multicultural integration might require preconditions that the policies of the last four decades have often failed to create. What I have in mind is that successful multiculturalism consists of three different elements that should be seen as complementary and mutually supporting: constitutionally entrenched rights, accommodationist policies, and a shared public identity.

The first element contains the basic cultural liberties listed in human rights conventions, protection against discrimination on ethnic, racial and religious grounds, as well as positive minority rights to exemptions, recognition, support, representation and autonomy. In Ronald Dworkin’s words, all such rights are conceived as trumps over majority preferences. They protect autonomous individuals and vulnerable minorities against the tyranny of the majority that is always a potential danger in democratic regimes.

It is disingenuous to blame multiculturalism for causing terrorist acts of religious fanatics or for the dismantling of public welfare policies, but the celebration of cultural diversity is certainly no answer to these issues, which must be addressed when defending religious toleration or differentiated citizenship.

Since the force of moral argument is rather weak in daily politics, such rights must be entrenched in constitutions that cannot be easily amended and must be interpreted by constitutional courts that are shielded against political pressure from the legislative and executive.

Yet multicultural politics is not merely about fleshing out the rights of minorities, it is also about designing institutions and implementing policies that allow cultural diversity to flourish and conflicting claims to coexist peacefully. These are areas of policy-making in which minorities have a claim to be involved but that will generally be decided by representatives of parliamentary majorities. Often, multicultural policies involve decisions about the allocation of public funds that must always be weighed against alternative policy goals. Rights to the protection of minority languages cannot determine how much money should be spent on bilingual education in public schools. And bilingual education for immigrant minorities may be better defended as part of a general policy of social and cultural integration rather than as a minority right. Yet this means that sustainable multiculturalism will need majority support within legislative institutions, in the public administration, and ultimately also among voters.

The third element is policies that shape and promote common civic identities within a diverse society. Some liberals have suggested that a shared commitment to constitutional principles and their underlying values is all we need. Others have pointed out that this is not nearly enough. Why should majorities not merely accept minority rights as constraints but also support policies that promote diversity? Why should national minorities respect the territorial integrity of a state that grants them autonomy, but denies them the sovereignty enjoyed by independent nations? Why should immigrant minorities be satisfied if they can freely practice their languages and religions but cannot establish them as official ones?

A plausible answer to these questions is that mutual acceptance of multicultural rights, arrangements and constraints requires a shared sense of belonging, of common stakes and equal membership in a polity. This cannot, however, justify a return to assimilation into a single national identity, however generously defined. Discourses about national identities are never fully compatible with recognizing claims of internal minorities that regard themselves as nations in their own right, or with transnational affiliations of migrants to external homelands. And even if a liberal conception of national identity may tolerate linguistic and religious diversity, demands for national loyalty override all other affiliations in case of conflict.

A politics of integration in a multicultural society must pose the question what it is that all citizens and communi-

ties are supposed to integrate into. On the one hand, an open civil society is essential for mutual tolerance and respect but it is not enough for sustained support for multicultural policies. On the other hand, national identities are too thick and exclusive to accommodate deep diversity. A shared political identity should instead emphasize the composite nature of the polity and highlight diversity as a basic feature of its history and as an asset for its future. The success of such policies can be measured by the extent to which a native majority population accepts minority narratives as part of their own collective identity and the extent to which minorities combine group affiliations with a sense of belonging to the larger polity. Such a transformation of identities can only be brought about if the inevitable conflicts over cultural claims are debated openly so that all citizens feel they have a stake and a voice in this dialogue.

The record of how well liberal democracies have managed to balance the three elements of sustainable multiculturalism is mixed and uneven. On the rights dimension there is some progress, e.g. the recent expansion of anti-discrimination legislation in Europe that was brought about from above through EU directives, but a stalemate in other areas, e.g. in addressing the claims of Roma minorities in Eastern Europe or of Australian Aborigines. But I think it is fair to say that we have not yet witnessed a significant rollback.

Multicultural arrangements and public policies that have not been constitutionally entrenched have suffered a more severe setback in some countries. For example, several European governments are now accusing whole immigrant communities of being unwilling to integrate into mainstream society. Two policy instruments that have been adopted in order to break up what in Germany is now called “parallel societies” are age thresholds of 21 and higher for spouses brought in from abroad and mandatory language courses backed up by sanctions ranging from fines to a withdrawal of welfare benefits and a loss of residence permits.

Still, what has happened so far is more often the adoption of new policies that send a signal to majority voters than an actual scrapping of established multicultural accommodation. The reason for this is easy to understand. Public administrations, especially at the local level, are often reluctant to execute policies adopted by legislators that cater to majority prejudices. The task of municipal civil servants, police officers, public health workers and teachers is to provide public services to culturally diverse populations. They would fail to meet their own professional goals if they did not do this in culturally sensitive ways. This is why we find a lot of multicultural accommodation at the local level even in a country like France where the official

On the other hand, national identities are too thick and exclusive to accommodate deep diversity. A shared political identity should instead emphasize the composite nature of the polity and highlight diversity as a basic feature of its history and as an asset for its future.

republican discourse denies the existence of cultural minorities.

The most significant backlash against multiculturalism occurs at the level of political rhetoric. It is here that we witness a full swing of the pendulum in some European countries, including the Netherlands, which in the 1990s were admired as the continent's multicultural showcase. Changing the political rhetoric is much easier than dismantling entrenched rights and overturning accommodationist policies. Yet this diagnosis is cold comfort. Downplaying the impact of the current crisis of European multiculturalism would be rather short-sighted. If the rhetoric falls on fertile ground it will eventually generate a popular mandate for policy-makers to take more radical steps.

This fertile ground on which the seeds of diversophobia can grow has been mostly left uncultivated by multicultural policies. The problem is a serious deficiency of European multiculturalism on the public identity dimension. "Old stock" Dutch, Swedish and English populations have learned to think that multiculturalism is about the others and their rights rather than about their own history and identity. This helps to explain a sense of loss and deep grudge among sections of native majorities who had not been offered an alternative identity they could feel to share with minorities.

In this respect, Europe is still quite different from North America where the imagined community of nationhood had always included at least a sense of diversity of origin, albeit not always the recognition of cultural difference. Western European governments have only reluctantly admitted that they, too, have become countries of immigration. But they have failed to construct new multicultural identities for their countries. No other western country has gone as far as Canada in adopting multiculturalism not only as a policy towards minorities but also as a basic feature of a shared identity. This does not prevent incidents such as honour killings, ethnic riots or murders motivated by religious fanaticism. But it may prevent them from triggering a wholesale reversal of public commitments towards pluralism and respect for diversity.

So is there a better response than multiculturalism? Conservative critics have always argued that the promotion of minority rights and identities results in "disuniting the nation." They fail to understand that under conditions of liberal democracy and cultural diversity there is nothing more divisive than projects of forging national unity. Multiculturalism has emerged as a reaction and a response to these divisions. It has balanced the scales that had been heavily tipped against cultural minorities and has created new opportunities for self-determined communal identities. Yet if it is to succeed, it must also try to bridge the cleavages by transforming public identities of both minorities and majorities in such a way that they support a shared citizenship.

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Neither Finding nor Losing Our Way: The Debate over Canadian Multiculturalism

Jack Jedwab

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ABSTRACT

The debate over multicultural policy is typically Canadian. Based on a presentation given at the Multicultural Futures conference in Prato, Italy, this article explores the many complex dimensions of integration, accommodation, interculturalism and multiculturalism. Citing a variety of recent studies, the author presents the attitudes and opinions of Canadians – young and old – on this topic.

Over the last decade opinion surveys on multiculturalism amongst Canadians point to a bright future for diversity. Indeed, as demographic reality, ideology and discourse multiculturalism has rarely enjoyed so much public support. If, however, the term resonates positively with the Canadian population, there remains an important debate about what it entails as public policy – a matter around which there appears to be less unanimity. Debates over multiculturalism have therefore been more pervasive in Canadian policy circles with some arguing that too much emphasis is being put on the things that make us different and not enough on the things that the population shares.

Through the 1990s and into the 21st century, both detractors and supporters of multiculturalism were less outspoken in articulating their respective sentiments and more nuance seemed to characterize the positions taken on either side of the debate with an apparent softening on the part of the more ardent supporters, and conversely some relaxation in the stand taken by many of the policy's detractors. Thus it was not so much multiculturalism per se that bothered its detractors but instead what was viewed as its potentially illiberal manifestations. In effect, concerns about multiculturalism were depicted as a defense of liberalism, a philosophy that its supporters traditionally claimed to be central in their support of the policy. Debate further centered around multiculturalism's soft or extreme expression, its compatibility or incompatibility with the vague concept of social cohesion and its fostering ethnic community bonding or cross-cultural bridging.

The once popular idea that Canadian multiculturalism weakened national identity no longer represents a strong argument in the arsenal of the policy's detractors faced with abundant empirical evidence that did not support such a linkage. As to whether multiculturalism threatened integration, while this remains a sticking point for many, there is a growing emphasis amongst policy-makers on the need for a better definition of what integration involves. Others have countered that what needs better defining is multiculturalism itself. The latter's supporters nonetheless insist that there is no contradiction between discussing the things we share while maintaining our differences and hence bridging and bonding forms of social capital need not be contradictory.

Both critics and supporters of multiculturalism agree upon a need to focus on shared citizenship (something most presumably do by definition) or perhaps more specifically define shared values or common civic norms. However, differences persist over the idea that limits to diversity need to be enumerated and some identification of that which is out of bounds (even some soft supporters of multiculturalism have warmed up to this idea). Others have argued for using the term interculturalism as frequently, if not more often, than multiculturalism or discuss the need to ensure social cohesion in conjunction with discussion of multiculturalism.

Both of these ideas have attracted some of multiculturalism's softer supporters. But its most devoted advocates tend to ignore such suggestions and have benefited from the fact that politically, neither interculturalism nor social cohesion are concepts that are well understood by the population. Indeed such terminology has failed to connect with the broader public, even in Quebec, where there tends to be a somewhat greater number of opponents of multiculturalism. Elected officials are aware that multiculturalism resonates with the Canadian public and by consequence some academics and policy-makers have been frustrated in their efforts to shift policy and public discourse towards interculturalist or cohesionist approaches.

Critics of multiculturalism have more recently directed their concerns at possible infringements of human rights, and notably, where women's rights are concerned – for example when it comes to purportedly obliging women to wear

religious headgear. Paradoxically, such critics tend to target multiculturalism rather than guarantees of religious freedoms as prescribed in the Charter, which clearly carries more weight than its section dealing with multiculturalism.

Integration: Canada's Discursive Consensus

The absence of a shared understanding of what multiculturalism envisions as policy gives rise to divergence in debates around its real and perceived repercussions. In many nations the debates over multiculturalism often pit those advocating integration against those urging assimilation of immigrants. For historic reasons, the idea of assimilation is unpopular in Canada and hence discussion around the ramifications of multiculturalism for new Canadians tends to centre around whether it facilitates integration or creates an obstacle in its path. As such, supporters and detractors of multiculturalism tend not so much to differ over the shared objective of integration but rather over what and how much needs to be given up by those being integrated and those doing the integration. Presumably, ardent supporters of multiculturalism policy opt for a softer form of integration while its detractors want greater adaptation to Canadian norms – however defined. It is here where the ‘cracks’ in the debate over the Canadian mosaic have become most apparent.

A survey conducted in 2002 by the firm Environics entitled the Social Cohesion Survey reveals that a near equal share of Canadians feel that minority groups should adapt to Canada rather than Canadians adjust to growing diversity. Some 43% felt that it was a higher priority to encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their customs and languages versus 45% that felt that minority groups should be encouraged to try to change to be more like most Canadians.

Canada’s multicultural defenders, including this author, insist that the two objectives are not incompatible. Still, when asked in 2004 about the impact of multicultural policy, more Canadians agreed that it helped rather than hindered integration. In another Environics survey, some 50% said that multicultural policy helps people with various backgrounds and religions to fully integrate into Canadian

society whereas 40% that believe that it some groups to never fully integrate into Canadian society. Such ambiguity over the intent of multicultural policy has become a catalyst for various types of criticisms that tax multiculturalism by encouraging behaviour which contradicts human rights.

Multiculturalism's Multiple Meanings

Whatever one’s stand on the issue of cultural integration there is a widely held view that multiculturalism is a fundamental element of Canadian identity and something within which the country can take much pride. In fact, many of the same individuals calling for greater degrees of integration may simultaneously support the ideology of multiculturalism. Nonetheless, such support is likely softer amongst those insisting on greater degrees of adaptation. As observed below, 77% of Canadians surveyed in 2002 that support encouraging minority groups to change to become more like most Canadians similarly agree that our multicultural society is a source of pride, and three-quarters believe that schools with multiethnic and multiracial compositions enrich one’s educational experience. Finally, two-thirds agree that multiculturalism is a cornerstone of Canadian culture.

But perhaps the more tangible point of departure between those favoring greater integration of minorities relates to concerns over the perceived rate of change to institutions caused by minorities. In the table below these distinctions are somewhat more apparent when cross-referencing responses on the Social Cohesion Survey’s adaptation question with those relating to Canadian institutions and values.

When asked in 2002, some 83% of Canadians agreed that ‘people from different racial and cultural groups are enriching the cultural life of Canada’. Yet in the same survey some 47% stated that the fact of accepting immigrants from different cultures makes ‘our culture’ stronger (10% much stronger and 37% stronger), 23% said that it weakened our culture and 28% believed that it neither weakened nor strengthened it. In light of these results it is worth considering the following: If we generally regard the presence of people from various cultures as a source of strength why is it that many simultaneously agree that they

Table 1		
Agree (Both Strongly and Moderately combined)	To encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their customs and languages	To encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians
People from different (1) racial and cultural groups are enriching the cultural life of Canada	91	76
Our Multi-Cultural Society is a Source of Pride for Canadians	90	77
Schools With Students From a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds provide a more rich educational experience	87	75
Our Multi-Cultural Society is a Cornerstone of Canadian Culture	81	67

Social Cohesion in Canada survey, Environics, November 28 – December 9, 2001 for the Department of Canadian Heritage
 (1) It is worth noting that 51% of those encouraging greater acceptance of difference strongly agreed with this proposition versus 26% of those encouraging greater adaptation

Agree (Both Strongly and Moderately combined)	To encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their customs and languages	To encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians
Discrimination Against Non-Whites is a problem in Canada	61	49
Canada is Changing Too Quickly Because of all the minorities we have here now	30	53
In Order to be accepted as members of Canadian Society, People Belonging to Minority groups must give up such parts of their religion and culture that may be in conflict with Canadian norms	28	54
People From Different Ethnicities and Backgrounds are more Difficult to Accommodate in our schools	34	47

Social Cohesion in Canada survey, Environics, November 28 – December 9, 2001 for the Department of Canadian Heritage

must give up their cultures to become more like ‘us’? It is worth noting that when Environics asked the same question in 2004 some 55% of Canadians (28% much stronger and 27% somewhat stronger), believed that immigrants from many countries strengthens our culture.

Limiting Diversity or Limiting Rights: Universal and Canadian Multiculturalism

Detractors of multicultural policy have insisted that limits need to be set on certain expressions of diversity. As previously noted, those advocating have been accused of supporting behavior that would contradict human rights. Paradoxically, surveys conducted by the Centre for Research and Information on Canada reveal that advocates of multiculturalism are also the staunchest supporters of fundamental human rights. Moreover a survey conducted

in the year 2002 by Environics for the Association for Canadian Studies found a significant convergence between those supporting various rights (i.e. in the case of official language minorities) and the preservation and enhancement of Canada’s multicultural heritage as defined in the Canadian Charter of Rights. When asked about the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians (the words used in Section 27 of the Charter) some 82% of respondents agreed that the government should support this objective.

Through much of its existence, one of the principal arguments against Canadian multiculturalism has been that it constitutes a threat to the future of the French language. However a majority of Quebecers (58%) disagree with this view. Does this mean that francophones do not believe that there is an ongoing threat to the French

Agree	Canada	Quebec	Canada Outside Quebec
Objective that the government should support	82	86	80
Threat to the future of the French language	25	39	22
Promotes the sharing of common values	77	76	77
A threat to social unity and solidarity	32	31	32
Enhances the value of Canadian Citizenship	80	78	81
Ensuring institutions respect cultural and racial diversity	80	78	81
Removes barriers to full and equal participation	71	67	72
Helps solve problems of racism and prejudice	73	74	73

Social Cohesion in Canada survey, Environics, November 28 – December 9, 2001 for the Department of Canadian Heritage

	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+
It helps people with various backgrounds and religions to fully integrate into Canadian society	56	53	48	46
It causes some groups to never fully integrate into Canadian society	36	37	44	41
Both/Depends	3	3	1	4
Other	–	–	1	–
Neither	1	2	2	2
DK/NA	4	5	4	7

Focus Canada survey, Environics, March 29 – April 18, 2004 for the Department of Canadian Heritage

language? When asked whether the future of the French language and culture are secure, a Focus-Environics survey (2000) found that just over 50% of Canada’s francophone population did not feel that it was secure. The likely conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that francophones do not attribute the threat to the French language to multiculturalism.

Accommodating Multiculturalism

When inquiring into some of the issues that are often associated with that which defines a multicultural society, interesting paradoxes emerge. One of the most apparent is on the matter of religious accommodation. When asked whether the population supports women wearing the Islamic headscarf in public schools and public service employment, a majority of the population agrees that it should be permitted. Some 57% disagree with the policy adopted recently by the government of France in this regard (38% agree). However, despite the fact that most Quebecers do not believe that multicultural policy blocks integration, some 52% of respondents in that province agree with the approach adopted by France prohibiting the Islamic headscarf in public schools and government bodies. In addition to the regional differences there is also an important generational gap on this question. Some 70% of respondents between the

ages of 18 and 29 agree with the wearing of the Islamic headscarf, a sentiment shared by 46% of respondents over the age of 60 with 47% in agreement with the approach adopted by the government of France.

Detractors of multiculturalism have argued that it is the policy that gives rise to individual and community actions that may put the rights of others at risk. Recent controversies over allowing the use of Islamic courts (Sharia) to rule on the situation of couples has resulted in criticism of multiculturalism as providing justification for what might result in the violation of the rights of women. Both such criticism and that which takes aim at the wearing of the Islamic headscarf are misdirected in their attacks on multicultural policy. Indeed, it is paradoxical that such detractors pay scant attention to the much stronger provisions of the Canadian Charter which deal with freedom of religion. Very often attacks on multiculturalism seem to be veiled criticisms at the Charter of Rights and the interpretation that arises from decisions taken on this and other matters associated with what societal norms and legislation may choose to reasonably accommodate.

Multiculturalism and Interculturalism

Multiculturalism incorporates the fundamental element of interculturalism, which is the emphasis on interaction

	Total	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+
To encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their customs and language	43	59	45	37	30
To encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians	45	34	43	49	54
Neither	7	6	7	8	8
DK/NA	5	1	4	10	8

Focus Canada survey, Environics, March 29 – April 18, 2004 for the Department of Canadian Heritage

Agree	Total	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+
Our Multicultural Society is a Source of Pride for Canadians Strongly	82	88	86	79	78
Our Multicultural Is a Cornerstone of Canadian Culture	74	75	79	75	68
People from Different Racial and Cultural Groups are Enriching the Cultural Life of Canada	83	90	84	84	75
Canada is Changing too Quickly Because of all the minorities we have now	40	36	36	40	48
People From Different Ethnicities and cultures are difficult to accommodate on our schools	40	30	38	42	49
In Order to be accepted as members of Canadian Society, People Belonging to Minority groups must give up such parts of their religion and culture that may be in conflict with Canadian norms	40	31	41	42	46

Refer to Jack Jedwab article in Canadian Issues magazine, February 2002

between cultures or cross-cultural understanding that have been described elsewhere as the distinction between community bridging and bonding. Some advocates of interculturalism tend to reject multiculturalism as a policy that undermines interaction between cultures in favour of support for community insularity that they insist is the result of strong ethnocultural attachments. While neither multiculturalism advocates nor multiculturalism as policy rejects bridging between cultural groups, the proponents of interculturalism insist otherwise. They do so despite considerable empirical evidence that suggests that multicultural advocates value cultural mixing.

It is paradoxical that it is in Quebec where officials describe policies addressing diversity as intercultural, that the province's ethno-cultural minorities have the highest rates in Canada of rates of retention of identity. For example, the retention of ethnic or non-official languages is highest amongst most Quebec groups (something that is paradoxically boasted about by government representatives responsible for intercultural policies). If interculturalism stresses cultural mixing, then it follows that advocates of multiculturalism who purportedly foster preservation of ethnic cultures will reject too much of such interaction. Yet survey data does not support such causality. Instead, those calling less so for adaptation of minorities

tend to be more inclined to agree that schools with students from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds provide a more rich educational experience; they also tend to be more open to marriage across ethnic and racial groups.

Critics of multiculturalism generally contend that members of ethnocultural groups stick together and use the term ghettoization to describe the behaviour of some groups as a factor. Yet residential concentration of ethnic and racial groups is higher in Montreal than it is in other major Canadian cities. While this is more likely attributable to factors other than policies on cultural diversity it nonetheless remains relevant to note the gap between the intercultural reality as articulated by its proponents and the socio-cultural conditions of the society. Not surprisingly, a study conducted by McAndrew demonstrates that while there may be theoretical differences between multicultural and intercultural approaches to diversity in policy terms there is much similarity and convergence between federal and Quebec government programming in this area.

Canada's Multicultural Futures Generation

If the future of multiculturalism is to be measured by how the younger generation of Canadians perceive the policy's impact, then its prospects may indeed be bright. Age is perhaps the key variable when exploring differences in

Table 7 – Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians?

Strongly or Somewhat Agree	18-29	60+
Objective that the government should support	90	73
Threat to the future of the French language	30	26
Promotes the sharing of common values	82	71
A threat to social unity and solidarity	28	36
Enhances the value of Canadian Citizenship	85	74
Ensuring institutions respect cultural and racial diversity	87	72
Removes barriers to full and equal participation	75	62
Helps solve problems of racism and prejudice	77	67

Refer to Jack Jedwab article in Canadian Issues magazine, February 2002

opinion with respect to issues of multiculturalism and diversity. The surveys discussed earlier reveal that the younger members of society are much less concerned about the presumed threat posed by the presence of diverse cultures. As to the impact of multicultural policy as seen below, the 2004 Environics survey suggests a significant divide between baby boomers and those in generation X.

Other surveys confirm a similar generational divide. When broken down on the basis of age cohort, the 2002 Social Cohesion Survey demonstrates that the 18-29 group is less inclined to favor an 'adaptationist' emphasis towards minority groups than are persons above the age of 30 and this view is in even starker contrast to those over 45 who are far more favourably disposed to the 'adaptationist' approach.

As observed in Table 6 several other indicators point to less discomfort with diversity amongst the younger generation of Canadians than for baby boomers and beyond.

And the 2002 ACS-Environics survey on multiculturalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reveals strong support for the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians amongst the 18-29 segment of the country.

A survey conducted in the fall of 2003 on the historic memory of Canadians points further to generational differences in what best describes the story of Canada with the 18-29 group by far citing increasing multiculturalism, while those over 45 regard the establishment of the country's safety net and the challenges of linguistic and cultural duality as equally if not more important.

Multiculturalism and Integration: International Comparisons

It has often been observed that Canada is a society that combines both American and European traditions. When it comes to issues of cultural diversity, clearly the views of Canadians are more similar to those of their American neighbours than they are to most Europeans. Moreover, the demographic patterns and immigration history are more similar in Canada and the United States than they are with European countries, something that is not always easily acknowledged by Canadians. As seen below, the 2002 Global Attitudes Survey conducted by Pew Research illustrates the differences between North America and Europe with regard to the influence of immigrants on the country. Canada tends to describe itself as a nation of minorities or nations of immigrants that lacks an identifiable ethno-national majority (with the possible exception

Table 8 – All in all, which one of the following best describes the story of Canada?

	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+
Increasing multiculturalism	39	28	25	17
Establishment of a social safety net (welfare, medicare)	14	24	25	25
Coming to terms with two languages and two cultures	15	18	22	27
Increasing political sovereignty or independence	12	13	13	14
Conquest of Aboriginal people	7	5	4	5
Other	-	3	2	1
DK/NA	1	2	3	5

Environics for ACS-AEC, October 2003

of Quebec's French-Canadians). That distinguishes it from most European countries and may in part explain the differences in attitudes displayed in the tables below. In Canada when inquiring into or talking about 'others' becoming more like 'us' increasingly we find that the so-called others are rapidly becoming us – or we them – if they are not already in many parts of the country and notably in its major cities.

The same poll found that North Americans were more likely to reject the view that it is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and values.

Surveys conducted by Eurobarometer (with similar questions asked by Environics for Canada) further illus-

trate the differences between Canada and many European countries when it comes to how much we think that minorities need to give up to adapt to national norms. In this regard Canadian attitudes more closely resemble those expressed in Ireland, Spain and Italy, though in each of these instances the proportion of immigration within the general population is higher in Canada.

When it comes to valuing the immigrant contribution, Canadians tend to be well ahead of other European countries in agreeing that minority groups enrich cultural life. Only in Sweden and Finland were there relatively comparable rates expressed on this question.

Table 9 – Overall would you say immigrants are having a good or bad influence on the way things are going in your country?					
	Canada	United States	United Kingdom	France	Europe
Very Good	18	14	6	3	5
Somewhat Good	55	28	26	36	32
Very Bad	15	31	31	39	37
Somewhat Bad	5	16	29	14	17
Not Sure	7	11	8	8	9

Sources Globus International Affairs Poll, Ipsos-Reid, May 7-11, 2004

Table 10 – It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions?					
	Canada	United States	United Kingdom	France	Europe
Strongly Agree	21	12	24	21	20
Somewhat Agree	19	15	22	31	28
Somewhat Disagree	26	25	22	27	27
Strongly Disagree	33	46	28	19	21
Not sure	1	2	4	2	4

Sources Globus International Affairs Poll, Ipsos-Reid, May 7-11, 2004

Table 11 – People belonging to minority groups must give up parts of their religion and culture which may be in conflict with (COUNTRY)			
	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Don't know
Canada (1)	45	55	5
Belgium	73	21	7
Greece	61	30	9
Netherlands	75	18	7
France	69	24	7
Denmark	85	12	3
Portugal	53	28	19
Austria	50	31	19
Germany	61	30	9
United Kingdom	61	22	17
Luxembourg	56	36	8
Sweden	79	17	4
Finland	73	20	7
Spain	33	55	12
Ireland	42	37	22
Italy	34	56	10
EU	56	32	12

Eurobarometer on Racial Discrimination, 2000

(1) Please note that the same questions were asked in Canada in the Social Cohesion survey cited earlier

Table 12 – People from minority groups are enriching the cultural life of (COUNTRY)			
	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Don't know
Canada	83	15	2
Belgium	45	44	11
Greece	26	11	63
Netherlands	62	29	9
France	52	38	10
Denmark	54	34	12
Portugal	50	30	20
Austria	43	36	21
Germany	51	33	17
United Kingdom	43	39	19
Luxembourg	56	33	11
Sweden	75	18	8
Finland	70	23	7
Spain	53	30	17
Ireland	32	42	27
Italy	52	33	15
EU	50	35	15

Eurobarometer on Racial Discrimination, 2000

Multiculturalism and the Welfare State:

An Emerging Debate

Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka

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ABSTRACT

The authors present the beginnings of a new research project, undertaken to assess the relationship between multiculturalism policies and the welfare state. First they explain why some people now believe that MCPs may be eroding welfare systems, and then go on to examine preliminary findings from their project. They conclude that there is no evidence of a systematic tendency for MCPs to weaken a country's welfare state. A number of individual case studies are forthcoming.

The past 30 years have witnessed a dramatic change in the way many Western democracies deal with issues of ethnocultural diversity. In the past, ethnocultural diversity was often seen as a threat to political stability, and hence as something to be discouraged by public policies. Immigrants, national minorities and indigenous peoples were all subject to a range of policies intended to either assimilate or marginalize them. Today, however, many Western democracies have abandoned these earlier policies, and shifted towards a more accommodating approach to diversity. This is reflected, for example, in the widespread adoption of multiculturalism policies for immigrant groups, the acceptance of territorial autonomy and language rights for national minorities, and the recognition of land claims and self-government rights for indigenous peoples.

The adoption of these policies of cultural recognition and accommodation – which we will call “multiculturalism policies” or MCPs – has been (and remains) controversial. One line of critique is philosophical, arguing that MCPs are inherently inconsistent with basic liberal-democratic principles, since they involve treating people differently on the basis of their ethnicity (which contradicts liberal norms of non-discrimination), or because they involve recognizing “group rights” (which conflict with liberal commitments to individual rights). This philosophical debate dominated the literature on multiculturalism for many years, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s.¹ The debate is not over, but since the mid-90s it has been supplemented, and to some extent supplanted, by a new more empirical argument against MCPs: namely, that they make it more difficult to sustain a robust welfare state. On this view, there is a trade-off in practice between a commitment to MCPs and a commitment to the welfare state. Critics generally acknowledge that defenders of MCPs do not *intend* to weaken the welfare state. On the contrary, most defenders of MCPs are also strong defenders of the welfare state, and view both as flowing from the same underlying principle of justice. The conflict between MCPs and the welfare state, therefore, is not so much a matter of competing ideals or principles, but of unintended sociological dynamics. MCPs, critics worry, erode the interpersonal trust, social solidarity and political coalitions that sustain the welfare state.

This newer, empirical complaint has been advanced by influential writers in both the United States and Britain (eg., Richard Rorty, Todd Gitlin, Brian Barry, David Goodhart), and has become a major cause of controversy within the social-democratic left throughout Europe. This conflict is often labelled as a conflict or trade-off between a “politics of recognition” and a “politics of redistribution.” The belief that such a conflict exists is causing progressive intellectuals throughout the West, who might in the past have been favourable to MCPs, to rethink their support, since it is now seen as potentially threatening to distributive justice.

The empirical complaint has some intuitive plausibility. After all, the same 30-year period that has witnessed the widespread adoption of MCPs has also witnessed a widespread backlash against, and retrenchment of, some important welfare state programs. It is natural to wonder whether the former trend has somehow facilitated the latter trend. On the other hand, the same retrenchment of the welfare state has occurred in countries (like France) that have strenuously avoided MCPs. Moreover, defenders of MCPs argue that these policies are intended to increase feelings of solidarity and trust, and hence can actually strengthen rather than weaken the welfare state.

There has been much armchair speculation about these possible effects, both by defenders and critics of MCPs, but there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the topic. While the empirical complaint is now well-known, it has never

been systematically tested. In order to fill this gap, we have embarked on a new research project to try to assess the relationship between MCPs and the welfare state. In this short article, we first explore why some people think that MCPs might erode the welfare state, and then examine some preliminary evidence from our research project.

Explaining the Complaint

Critics offer a variety of reasons why the adoption of MCPs could inadvertently erode the welfare state. We can summarize these reasons under three headings:

The crowding out effect: According to one line of argument, MCPs weaken pro-redistribution coalitions by diverting time, energy and money from redistribution to recognition.

People who would otherwise be actively involved in fighting to enhance economic redistribution, or at least to protect the welfare state from right-wing retrenchment, are instead spending their time on issues of multiculturalism.

The corroding effect: Another line of argument suggests that MCPs weaken redistribution by eroding trust and solidarity amongst citizens, and hence eroding popular support for redistribution. MCPs are said to erode solidarity because they emphasize differences between citizens, rather than commonalities. Citizens have historically supported the welfare state, and been willing to make sacrifices to support their disadvantaged co-citizens, because they viewed these co-citizens as “one of us,” bound together by a common identity and common sense of belonging. However, MCPs are said to corrode this overarching common identity. MCPs tell citizens that what divides them into separate ethnocultural groups is more important than what they have in common, and that co-citizens from other groups are therefore not really “one of us.”

The misdiagnosis effect: A third line of argument suggests that MCPs lead people to misdiagnose the problems that minorities face. It encourages people to think that the problems facing minority groups are rooted primarily in cultural “misrecognition,” and hence to think that the solution lies in greater state recognition of ethnic identities and cultural practices. In reality, however, these “culturalist” solutions will be of little or no benefit, since the real problems lie elsewhere – such as racist prejudice or economic deprivation. (A Machiavellian version of this argument suggests that right-wing political and economic elites have in fact promoted MCPs precisely in order to obscure the reality of racism and economic marginalization).

These are not entirely implausible suggestions. On the other hand, one can imagine equally plausible arguments in

the other direction. In response to the crowding out argument, for example, defenders of MCPs have argued that the struggle for MCPs may actually have helped to reinvigorate the left, which had been progressively losing ground to the right well before the rise of multicultural politics.

In response to the corroding argument, one could argue that low levels of inter-ethnic trust and solidarity predated the adoption of MCPs, which are intended precisely to combat this pre-existing problem. And finally, in response to the misdiagnosis argument, defenders of MCPs argue that any adequate diagnosis of the disadvantages facing minorities requires attending to a range of different dimensions – including race, class and culture – and that it is a mistake to ignore any of them. The theory and practice

of multiculturalism is intended precisely to supplement and enrich our conceptual tools and political spaces for arriving at a more adequate diagnosis of the full range of injustices faced by different groups in our society.

It should be clear that this debate cannot be resolved by more armchair theorizing, or by simply trading anecdotes. We need to look more closely at the evidence.

Testing the Complaint

In our study, we asked whether countries that have adopted strong MCPs over the last two decades have, in fact, experienced a weakening or even just slower growth in their welfare states, compared to countries that have resisted such policies. Answering these questions required several steps. First, we classified OECD countries in terms of the relative strength of their MCPs, based on the presence or absence of a series of specific policies.

In the case of *immigrant groups*, the list of MCPs included:

- (1) constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism;
- (2) the explanation/celebration of multiculturalism in school curriculum;
- (3) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing;
- (4) exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation, etc.;
- (5) allowing dual citizenship;
- (6) the funding of cultural activities by ethnic group organizations;
- (7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction;
- (8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

The first three policies celebrate multiculturalism; the middle two reduce legal constraints on diversity; and the final three represent forms of active support for minority communities and individuals. One could obviously think of additional policies to add to the list, but we

The theory and practice of multiculturalism is intended precisely to supplement and enrich our conceptual tools and political spaces for arriving at a more adequate diagnosis of the full range of injustices faced by different groups in our society. It should be clear that this debate cannot be resolved by more armchair theorizing, or by simply trading anecdotes. We need to look more closely at the evidence.

believe that these eight policies provide a good measure of a country's commitment to immigrant MCPs. A country that had adopted six or more of these policies was classified as "strong"; a country that had adopted two or less of these policies was classified as "weak." Countries falling in-between were categorized as "modest." The resulting classification was:

STRONG: Australia, Canada
 MODEST: Belgium, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK, US
 WEAK: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland.

In the case of *national minorities*, we adopted the following list of six MCPs that are designed to recognize and support distinctive national groups:²

- (1) federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy
- (2) official language status, either in the region or nationally
- (3) guarantees of representation in the central government or on Constitutional Courts
- (4) public funding of minority language universities/schools/media
- (5) constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of 'multi-nationalism'
- (6) according international personality (eg., allowing the substate region to sit on international bodies, or sign treaties, or have their own Olympic team)

A similar approach to grouping countries as strong, medium and weak produced the following classification:

STRONG: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Spain, Switzerland
 MODEST: Italy, UK, US (with respect to Puerto Rico)
 WEAK: France, Greece, Japan

Finally, in the case of *indigenous peoples*, we developed the following list of nine MCPs designed to recognize their distinctive claims:

- (1) recognition of land rights/title
- (2) recognition of self-government rights
- (3) upholding historic treaties and/or signing new treaties
- (4) recognition of cultural rights (language; sacred sites; hunting/fishing)
- (5) recognition of customary law
- (6) guarantees of representation/consultation in the central government
- (7) constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct status of indigenous peoples
- (8) support/ratification for international instruments on indigenous rights
- (9) affirmative action

The resulting groupings are:

STRONG: Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, US
 MODEST: Australia, Finland, Norway
 WEAK: Japan, Sweden

Having categorized countries as "strong," "modest" or "weak" in their level of MCPs, the next step was to examine how the three categories of countries fared in terms of change in the strength of their welfare state between 1980 and the end of the 1990s. Is it true that countries that adopted strong MCPs had more difficulty than countries that resisted such approaches in maintaining and enhancing their welfare states over the last two decades of the 20th century? To answer this question, we relied primarily on two indicators: change in social spending as a proportion of GDP; and change in the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers. Table 1 provides a first cut at the answers.³

Clearly, there is no evidence here of a systematic tendency for MCPs to weaken the welfare state. Countries that adopted such programs did not experience an erosion of their welfare states, or even slower growth in social spending, compared to countries that resisted such programs. Indeed, in the case of immigrant groups and national minorities, the countries with the strongest MCPs fared best in terms of growth in social spending and greater redistribution, providing a hint that perhaps MCPs may actually ease any tension between diversity and redistribution. In the case of indigenous peoples, it was the countries in the middle group that fared best. On no indicator did countries that resisted MCPs – the "weak" group – fare best.

This study represents the starting point in a continuing research agenda about the relationship between the politics of recognition and redistribution. Together with several colleagues, we are pushing the analysis forward in two ways. First, we are conducting more complete statistical analyses, which incorporate MCPs into leading models of the determinants of social spending, in order to hold constant other factors known to influence social spending. Second, we are conducting a number of case studies of the experience of particular countries. Aggregate cross-national statistics say little about the complex experiences of specific countries, and more in-depth explorations can help illuminate how MCPs and social policy are linked in particular places or contexts. Our case studies include Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Britain, and the United States, and will examine the linkages between multiculturalism and the welfare state at the level of public attitudes and political coalitions, as well as policy choices and social outcomes. The results of our ongoing research will be published in a forthcoming volume.⁴

In the interim, however, we believe that the evidence presented so far casts serious doubt on assertions about

Strength of MCPs	Immigrant Groups		National Minorities		Indigenous Peoples	
	Social Spending %	Redistribution %	Social Spending %	Redistribution %	Social Spending %	Redistribution %
Strong	46.4	15.3	38.1	12.2	16.4	10.0
Modest	8.6	-2.1	27.9	-5.4	48.6	12.7
Weak	31.8	10.1	36.5	11.4	6.9	1.0

the inevitably corrosive effects of MCPs on the welfare state. Our research to date suggests that the ideal of a “multicultural welfare state” that combines multicultural recognition and economic redistribution remains a viable goal.

Notes

¹ For an overview of the philosophical debate, see Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford University Press, 1995).

² By “national minorities”, we mean sizeable groups (at least 100,000 people) that are regionally-concentrated in what they view as their historic homeland, that conceive of themselves as a nation within a larger state, and that mobilize behind nationalist political parties to achieve recognition of their nationhood, either in the form of an independent state or through territorial autonomy within the larger state. Examples of such substate nationalisms include the Québécois in Canada, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium, the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol in Italy, the people of Puerto Rico under US rule, and the Corsicans in France.

³ Change in social spending represents change in public social expenditure between 1980 and 1998. Based on data in OECD SocX. Change in redistribution represents change in redistributive impact of taxes and transfers between the early 1980s and the late 1990s or near years. Based on data provided by the Luxembourg Income Study. For details of the calculations, see the appendices in our “Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?”, Working Paper No. 33, posted on the web at: www.queensu.ca/sps/WorkingPapers/

⁴ Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (eds) *Is Multiculturalism Bad for the Welfare State?* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Contributors include Stuart Soroka, Richard Johnston, Geoffrey Evans, Nicola McEwen, Han Entzinger, Peter Kraus and Karen Schoenwaelder, Rodney Hero and Rob Preuhs, Donna Van Cott, Willem Assies, Matt James, David Miller, Anne Phillips and John Myles.

Of 'Middle Eastern Appearance':

Police and Muslim Communities in Australia

B. Hass Dellal

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ABSTRACT

Since the War on Terror was declared, old stereotypes and attitudes have returned to haunt the Arab and Muslim communities in Australia. The rate of racially motivated attacks is on the rise. How have the police responded? Mr. Dellal describes the efforts of police services to develop better communication and more satisfactory outcomes with regards to reported incidents of discrimination.

Following both the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Bali bombings, and with the introduction of new federal counter-terrorism laws, Australian Arab and Muslim citizens have encountered increased hostility and suspicion. Many have felt unfairly targeted in the war against terrorism and that their communities as a whole were being discriminated against. Arab and Muslim communities have experienced the inequity of being unjustly suspected of aiding terrorists and of being anti-Australian, which resulted in the Australian Muslim community having to continually re-pledge and recommit their loyalty to Australia.

There have been some well-publicized arrests of suspected terrorists which have led to the old stereotypes of the 'Arab villain' re-emerging with full force. Racial profiling by the media using the phrase 'Middle Eastern appearance' created the usual negative stereotype and aroused undue suspicion and fear in the general population. While maintaining vigilance is of paramount importance, some of the official messages regarding security and being alert to terror were mixed and misleading. This can easily be construed as 'us versus them,' meaning anyone who may physically resemble a person of 'Middle Eastern appearance' was a potential suspect. Not only can such descriptions be misleading and inaccurate, but often inadvertently lead to the victimization of individuals and, in some cases, entire communities.

To demonstrate this, take for example an account by Dr. Joseph Pugliese who wrote an essay titled "I am of Middle Eastern Appearance and I am not Middle Eastern". He was born in a Calabrian village and grew up in Australia, and here he describes his experiences while travelling throughout Western countries:

At a cake shop, I am identified as a swarthy Turk. My ethnic identity assigned, I consequently become invisible and repeatedly fail to get served. A bank teller in San Francisco interrogates me as to whether I am a Palestinian before she deigns to proceed with my transaction. Visiting a friend in hospital I am identified as his Jewish rabbi. At a dinner party I morph into a Pakistani.

At the barber's, as my hair is cut, my exotic ethnicity is questioned and, before I can reply, my Syrian status is confirmed. In the electronics store, the sales assistant asks me a question that is really a self-confirming knowing statement: "You're Lebanese, aren't you?" On a train from Seattle to Vancouver, the ticket inspector inspects both my tickets and my ethnic identity: "Are you Iranian, and why are you travelling to Vancouver?"

Dr. Pugliese adds that the figure of Middle Eastern appearance throws people into a state of fear, suspicion and anxiety. This geographically loose term has implicated entire communities rather than the few individuals who actually commit crimes. The term 'Middle Eastern appearance' has become synonymous with criminality and, particularly post 9/11, has provided a simplistic profiling tool for the global search for terrorists.

The solution

In Australia, community groups and the police have been very conscious of the need to connect to overcome the isolation and divisiveness created by recent events. Certainly, Australian Muslims believe that maintaining a positive relationship and cooperating with police and law enforcement agencies has been essential in overcoming negative elements surfacing through fear, ignorance and uncertainty. From both a police and community perspective, recruitment, information and education have been identified as key areas for further development to generate this 'connectedness' as well as increase police competencies in managing cultural and religious diversity.

It is fair to say that the recognition and respect for cultural and linguistic diversity has been the key element of Australian multiculturalism. But not since September 11 has religious diversity featured so prominently in Australia's Multicultural Agenda. With over eighty faiths, religious diversity in Australia has become a very important component of Australian multiculturalism because of its prominence in the lives of so many people. The recognition of religious diversity has required police to reframe concepts and to develop strategies in order to effectively deal with multi-faith elements and customs of the Australian community.

Part of this challenge for police officers is the increased need to ensure appropriate equity and diversity training. The value of comprehensive and on-going training in this area cannot be underestimated. It is also important to ensure continued modification and updating of relevant curricula in this area to ensure that the training context remains relevant and takes into account emerging trends and issues. Other initiatives include:

- Further introduction and expansion of the role of multicultural liaison officer, not only to link with communities but also act as an educator/resource for other operational police working in the same communities or districts;
- Introducing program funding that encourages projects to be developed between community and police;
- Development of community help lines to monitor hate crimes and complaints;
- Jurisdictions setting up training programs for police to develop skills and recognize how to deal with racially motivated crime; and
- Communities providing lectures, forums and open-day events for police members and the general community to help with a better understanding of the community.

Dealing with diversity is probably one of the most sensitive areas for police. It has therefore been important for Australian police to incorporate into their repertoire greater levels of understanding, knowledge base, attitudes, perceptions and experiences of the community, particularly more recently arrived groups and refugees from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa. Police need to be aware of how communities view and understand Australian law and the role of police. Information booklets such as "A Guide to the Role of Police in Australia" are very useful resources for communities.

Reporting of Incidents post-September 11

It was also considered important by police services to gain the confidence of those communities that were being

vilified and discriminated against. However, this proved quite difficult. A recent community consultation conducted by the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission found that some community members were reluctant to report incidents because of the difficulty of identifying the perpetrator, fear of retribution, a mistrust of government authorities and scepticism about obtaining a useful outcome. Some experienced a lack of interest from local police and a general approach of not taking hate offences seriously. Although most states in Australia have criminal sanctions against racial vilification and some against religious vilification, the statistical data on race hate crimes or of incidents is limited and varies from state to state. There is currently a recommendation from the Human

Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission study "that State and Territory police consider reviewing current systems for recording incidents motivated by racial or religious prejudice with a view to ensuring greater consistency in the collection of data across Australia."

Ms. Joumanah El Matrah, from the Islamic Women's Welfare Council in Australia also pointed out that: "Although organisations have attempted to gather information about the nature and extent of attacks against Arabic and Muslim communities, there are no definitive reports or registering of attacks to date. Police reports and complaints made to the Equal Opportunity Commission do not reflect the level of attacks experienced by the affected communities. Even though a range of strategies have been implemented by community groups and police, it is difficult to gauge the impact of these strategies. Many forms of vilification and racist attacks do not easily sit under the powers of police and other statutory bodies. It is very difficult to prosecute crimes such as spitting or pulling off the hijab, because perpetrators do not generally remain to give their contact details. Accordingly to the report, one of the most disturbing factors of the last two years has been the gendered nature of the attacks against the community. Women have been overwhelmingly targeted in the violence."

We are hopeful future efforts to develop better communication between police and community and anti-discrimination agencies will help support Australian Muslims and others who have experi-

enced discrimination or vilification and increase the chances that a satisfactory outcome will result from reporting an incident.

Dealing with diversity is probably one of the most sensitive areas for police. It has therefore been important for Australian police to incorporate into their repertoire greater levels of understanding, knowledge base, attitudes, perceptions and experiences of the community, particularly more recently arrived groups and refugees from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa.

Multiculturalism in Australia:

Finding or Losing Our Way?

Stepan Kerkyasharian

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ABSTRACT

This article is adapted from a lecture given at the Multicultural Futures conference in Prato, Italy, September 2004. The author examines in a very positive light the development of multiculturalism in Australia, and particularly in New South Wales, the country's most populous state. He affirms that governments must be leaders in the quest for acceptance of diversity and equality of opportunity for all.

Multiculturalism has never been easy for Australia, yet it can be seen as one of the country's greatest successes. Emerging from a history of highly exclusionary immigration policies and a strong commitment to assimilation, Australia's adoption of the policy of multiculturalism since the 1970s has guided the successful political, social and economic integration of peoples from many different cultural backgrounds into a relatively conflict-free society. The leadership on this matter came from the federal and state governments; without their legislation outlining community and individual rights and government obligations to multiculturalism, Australia's recent social and political history might have been very different.

Through multicultural policy Australia took a bold new path and approach in creating and defining its society. Defined in the 1970s, multiculturalism was perceived in the Australian context "not as a oneness, but a unity, not a similarity, but a composite, not a melting pot but a voluntary bond of dissimilar people sharing a common political and institutional structure." (AEAC 1977:18) Today the policy continues to recognize and celebrate Australia's cultural diversity. "It accepts and respects the right of all Australians to express and share individual and cultural heritage with an overriding commitment to Australia and the basic structures and values of Australian democracy." (NMAC p. 36)

Multiculturalism has not been a static policy for Australia, but one that over decades has been built and redefined. Recognition of the linguistic, religious, racial and ethnic backgrounds of all citizens and promotion of equal rights and responsibilities forms the backbone of Australia's brand of multiculturalism. It also differentiates the Australian experience from that of many other parts of the world. Social scientist Stephen Castles (2002:140) has highlighted how much the Australian multicultural experience has differed from both a European definition that sees it based on separation of identity leading ultimately to exclusion, and a U.S. model that focuses on recognizing the contribution of groups traditionally excluded from the "dominant canon." Australia has focused on ensuring the full social, economic and political participation of all members of its increasingly diverse population. This approach may be the secret of Australia's success.

At the pinnacle of this commitment is legislation enacted by New South Wales in 2000, the Community Relations Commission and the Principles of Multiculturalism Act. This legislation saw it become the first state in Australia to express in law the relationship between the notion of citizenship and the issues of social justice, community harmony and cultural and economic opportunities in a multiethnic, multi-religious, multilingual and multiracial society. It instilled a respect of difference within the confines of a commitment to Australia and its future. The path to reaching this goal has not always been smooth, but it provides an interesting study into how a whole-of-government commitment to a multicultural society has proven successful for the state of New South Wales. At a time when the concept of multiculturalism is being questioned and challenged, this model could indeed form the basis for a new interpretation internationally.

As was the case in many other parts of the world, multiculturalism emerged in Australia in the context of various international as well as domestic trends and forces, such as decolonisation, shifts in trade links and alliances, and changes in international migration patterns (Lopez 2000:37). However, while multicultural policies in many countries have been concerned with immediate issues of national unity as a means of ensuring national security and border integrity, a relatively isolated geographical position afforded Australians the possibility of debate and policy implementation on a pluralist society.

That is not to say that Australia "got it right." The near destruction of Australia's indigenous culture and communities and their forced assimilation into European-Australian society through removal of Aboriginal children from their families paints a bleak beginning to multi-racial relations in Australia. Australian governments are still attempting to tackle

issues of reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous populations, including symbolic gestures of apology for past injustices. In fact, it may be surmised that the cruel lessons of assimilation learnt through these experiences have greatly influenced Australia's embracement of multiculturalism.

Ironically, while Australia is an immigrant nation, much of its history has been absorbed in controlling its borders to prevent the entry of others. With the assistance of government policies and control, Australian society essentially remained through the first part of the 20th century a cultural derivative of Britain. After Federation of the British Colonies in Australia in 1901, the new nation continued to shape the local culture to be white and of British origin. Australia's notorious "white Australia policy" came into force.

Successive British and then Australian governments up until the Second World War dealt with ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities primarily by enforcing gate-keeping mechanisms for outsiders while attempting to assimilate minorities such as the indigenous population through strict control of their democratic and civil rights. In fact, indigenous populations were deliberately excluded from the 1901 Constitution at the Federation of the British Colonies as Australia. Aborigines were not afforded citizenship rights in their own country until a 1967 referendum changed the legislation.

After the Second World War, concerns about population size and the ability of the country to defend itself in the event of an invasion led to a loosening of Australia's tight immigration laws, allowing significant numbers of European migrants to enter the country. Assimilation and monoculturalism were seen as the way to meet Australia's population needs and ensure that non-British immigration did not undermine the Australian way of life. This emphasis on maintaining Australian tradition forced new Australians to "break with [the] 'old country', its language, traditions of dress, dance, cultural ceremonies and social relationships" (Collins 1991:228).

Providing special services to "new Australians" went against the assimilation ideology. "Migrants were trapped in a Catch-22," writes Collins. "They had to learn English to successfully assimilate, yet they were not given any special support in this process." However, by the mid-1960s, the growing non-English speaking background population was demanding suitable welfare and education services. By the mid-1970s a shift to multicultural policy was supported on all sides of politics.

In the 1970s multiculturalism was very much about protecting minority rights. Now it encompasses various forms of government and individual responsibilities as well. In his submission to the Inquiry into Multiculturalism in

1999, New South Wales Premier, the Hon. Bob Carr MP outlined a new government vision for cultural diversity: "Multiculturalism cannot be constructed as a policy which affects only certain groups in our society, the 'ethnics'. Multiculturalism can only succeed if it engages everyone in its most powerful expression as a policy recognising individual identity and participation on an equal basis for all."

New South Wales' ground-breaking 2000 legislation, the Community Relations Commission and the Principles of Multiculturalism Act, was driven by an effort to reduce the marginalisation of its citizens by enhancing their level of participation in all aspects of the life of the state. Under this framework, ethnicity, race, language and religion should not play any part in determining or defining the status of

a citizen. So too the loyalty and commitment of a citizen to a state should not relate to the individual's race, religion, language and ethnicity. They should have the right of self-identification by way of any of those identifiers.

Australia is moving beyond legislative assurances of equality for minorities. There is also an increasing realisation that the recognition of absolute specific rights for specifically identified and separate ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic minorities can lead to social and political fragmentation. Despite good intentions based on identifiable needs, Australia has learned that public policies that seek to meet the needs of specific communities because of their minority status may not be beneficial in the long term. Instead of creating opportunities, such policies run the risk of marginalising groups by limiting their participation and reducing opportunities to assume leadership positions within the greater community. In these instances, well-meaning policies might end up destroying the very rights they intend to establish and maintain.

Hence the needs for a multicultural state to assume a stronger focus on citizenship and inclusion in its public policies.

The relationships between governments and the people of their states, including newcomers, are ultimately determined by the notion of citizenship. It is citizenship that establishes the rights of an individual and the reciprocal obligations of a state. Citizens should also have the right to form communities based on any or all of the "identifiers" of race, religion, language or ethnicity. The notion of a community of communities should form part of the accepted foundation of a nation or a state. This notion should hold true for any state, regardless of the size or the diversity of the minorities who reside within it.

Australia has one of the most open citizenship models of any country in the world and there is no formal requirement for cultural adaptation. In contrast to the European experience, Australia did not go down the path of the "guest

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worker” model. Migration to Australia was a commitment for life and for successive generations.

In fact, Australia’s history of not legislating the rights and obligations of citizenship has allowed the policies of multiculturalism to fill the void. This means that contemporary Australian society may have some interesting and important lessons for other nations that have multiple ethnic groups or cultures.

The New South Wales 2000 Community Relations Commission and the Principles of Multiculturalism Act provides an opportunity for various communities, including indigenous people, to relate to citizenship in a new way. Allowing all peoples the right to self-identification as citizens will give them freedom of choice and the right to form communities, instead of community groupings being mandated by governments. This means the concept of a community of communities and a culture of cultures will become the building blocks for Australian society. The role of government in this area is still evolving. However, policies and guidelines of multiculturalism remain the critical framework for such developments.

In New South Wales, Australia’s most populous state, almost one quarter of its residents were born overseas, and 41% have one or both parents born in a country other than Australia. By enshrining the principles of multiculturalism in law, the New South Wales government has strengthened the obligations on public authorities to ensure that the principles are woven into the fabric of government business and service delivery. Under the Act, the Community Relations Commission’s charter is the “promotion of a cohesive and harmonious multicultural society with mutual respect for an understanding of cultural diversity”. The Commission approaches this mandate systematically and responsively by (amongst other things):

- assisting and assessing the effectiveness of public authorities in observing the Principles of Multiculturalism (as outlined in the Act), particularly in connection with the delivery of government services;
- ensuring that communities have input into community relations in New South Wales;
- assisting in resolving issues associated with cultural diversity.

The legislation concedes that, ultimately, to deal with cultural diversity laws should not convey specific rights upon identified minorities – such actions would sow the seeds of alienation, separation and division. Instead, the legislation is a model of inclusiveness and equality. This is a double-sided equation that needs to be balanced with

clearly defined laws that assert equality between identified minorities. The legislation also works to instil a sense of security in all citizens. It does so by allowing them to give their best to the state without being distracted by self-consciousness about their difference from dominant mainstream culture. And this increased security is complemented by extending a sense of confidence that all citizens will have equal access not only to services but to the decision-making tiers of society, government and business.

The legislation addresses this particular element through the four principles of cultural diversity outlined in the Act and, more importantly, through the administration of Ethnic Affairs Priority Statements (EAPS), which ensure equity, access and social justice in the provision of government services to people from culturally diverse backgrounds.

EAPS are managed through the Commission as part of its commitment to assist and assess the effectiveness of public authorities in observing the principles outlined in the Act in the conduct of their affairs and delivery of services. EAPS put into practice the legislative commitment that each public authority holds to observe the principles of multiculturalism in the conduct of its affairs. EAPS hold government agencies accountable in planning and developing programs and services for the state’s culturally diverse society. The legislation also ensures that the chief executive officer of every public authority meets their obligations in implementing the provisions of the Act.

Each of the approximately 200 government agencies in New South Wales is obliged to develop EAPS and to report on their implementation, progress and plans for future strategies in the agency’s annual report. Each agency is guided by a standard framework that provides guidelines and sets benchmarks in the areas of planning and evaluation, program and service delivery, staffing, communication and the provision of services by funded organizations.

In addition to the EAPS, the Commission has initiated through the wider community a number of other successful programs that work to address the needs and opportunities of all members of society:

- Community Harmony Initiatives have taken a central place in New South Wales following September 11, the 2002 terrorist attacks in Bali and, most recently, Australia’s involvement in the military activities in Iraq. The Community Harmony Reference Group was one initiative that was directed by the New South Wales Premier and chaired by the Commission to ensure a rapid response to any local community relations issues arising in the wake of international events. It brought together more than 40 leaders from

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Islamic, Jewish, Arab, Indonesian and Sikh communities and representatives from government agencies to create a whole-of-community response. A community relations crisis management plan has been developed to manage community harmony within New South Wales in response to local or international events that impact on relationships within the community and between people.

- Community and Youth Initiatives provide an opportunity for the Commission to work with specific groups to ensure representation and participation in all levels of the community. The twice yearly Community Relations Symposium provides one such vehicle for community leaders and representatives to share knowledge and experiences with government agencies and with each other. The Commission has also been a strong advocate of increasing youth representation in ethnic community organizations, particularly leadership positions. Successful Youth Partnerships have been initiated with Arabic-speaking and Pacific Islander communities. In 2003 the Commission appointed two young people as Community Relations Commissioners.

These are just some of the initiatives that are proving successful in New South Wales. There have also been failures, but between the challenges there is much to be hopeful about.

Much has been said recently by various opinion leaders, high profile newspaper columnists and others that multiculturalism has lost its way in meeting the needs of minority populations both in Australia and overseas. This may be true using past definitions, but history shows that multiculturalism has not and never will be a static term. As societies' and citizens' needs change and develop, so too must the policies that governments develop to meet these needs. It is through strong legislation that a deep and lasting commitment to a harmonious multicultural society can be forged.

Emerging from highly exclusionary and assimilationist immigration policies, the Australian, and in particular the New South Wales, example is testament to the need for not only nimble government policy in working with cultural diversity but a commitment to go beyond "lip service". New South Wales has ensured that all government services commit to meet the needs of all members of society.



Multiculturalism in Australia has found its way because of government policies that use citizenship as a unifying force and ensure the equal participation of all citizens. Laws and public policies that enforce equality and guarantee the right to self-identification rather than those that bestow privileges on specifically identified minorities are the pathway to a more harmonious society.

If governments genuinely strive to achieve equality of opportunity for all groups within their state – and more importantly, if they openly demonstrate their respect for and acceptance of diversity of language, race, religion and ethnicity amongst their citizens as an inseparable fabric of their society and state – then internal division will be lessened.

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