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Integration of Newcomers

International Approaches


Intégration des nouveaux arrivants

Approches internationales

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- 3** INTRODUCTION
Immigrant Integration:
Simple Questions, Complex Answers
Usha George
- 7** Immigrant Integration: The Portuguese Way
*Rui Marques, High Commissioner for Immigration
and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME), Portugal*
- 10** Integration Concepts and Integration
Policy in Austria
Heinz Fassmann
- 14** International Approaches
to Integration: Australia
Christine Inglis
- 19** L'injonction paradoxale : le paradigme
de la politique d'intégration belge
Andrea Rea
- 23** Canada's Two-Way Street Integration Model: Not
Without Its Stains, Strains and Growing Pains
Lara Winnemore and John Biles
- 31** The European Union's Halting Approach
to Immigrant Integration
Patrick Ireland
- 35** Finland: Increased Immigration Puts
Added Pressure on Integration Policy
Arno Tanner
- 40** Le « modèle français d'intégration » :
politiques publiques et crise sociale
Patrick Simon
- 45** Immigration and Integration Policies
Since 1990 in Israel
Shmuel Adler
- 51** Out of Paradigms: The Italian
Reasonable Way to Integration
Giovanna Zincone and Irene Ponzio
- 57** The Vicissitudes of Dutch Immigration Policies
Rinus Penninx
- 64** *He Iwi Tahi Tatou?* Policy
in a Diverse New Zealand
Paul Spoonley
- 68** Norway's Approach to Integration
of Immigrants and Minorities
Eva Haagensen
- 72** The Polish Approach to Integration
Aleksandra Grzymala-Kazłowska and Agnieszka Weinar
- 76** Notes on the Portuguese
Experience of Integration
M. Margarida Marques
- 80** Foreign Immigrants' Integration in Spain
Ricard Moren-Alegret
- 86** The Integration Challenges of Sweden
Pieter Bevelander
- 92** International Approaches to Integration:
The Swiss Case
Gianni D'Amato
- 97** Canadian Integration: The Elusive Quest
for Models and Measures
Jack Jedwab
- 104** South Asian Muslim Youth in Britain:
Transnational Islam and Civic Discourse
Ifkhar H. Malik
- 110** Southern and Eastern Mediterranean
Governments and the Integration of
their Expatriates in Europe
Philippe Fargues
- 114** Unavoidably Side by Side: Citizenship as an
Integrated Policy Issue in Canada
Eva Lazar
- 120** Multiculturalism, Ethnicity and Integration:
Contemporary Challenges
Tariq Modood
- 123** A Second Look at Second Generation
Jean Lock Kunz and Stuart Sykes
- 127** The Danish Cartoon Controversy: A Defence
of Liberal Freedom
Randall Hansen (with correspondence by Joseph Carens)
- 134** Financial Institutions and
Immigrant Integration
Wei Li and Gary A. Dymski
- 140** Challenges to Diversity:
A Canadian Perspective
Sheila Van Wyck and Ian Donaldson
- 145** European Immigrant Integration in Change
Christian Joppke

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IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: SIMPLE QUESTIONS, COMPLEX ANSWERS

This era is marked by unprecedented human mobility across regions and continents. The sheer volume and diversity of migration is unparalleled in history; as a result, immigration has become an enduring feature in almost all Western countries. Not surprisingly, the adjustment of these newcomers to their new societies has become the focus of significant academic and policy concern, with an emphasis on finding effective interventions that will promote integration of immigrants.

Current interest in integration appears to be based on three major trends:

- Demographic transitions in most of the Western countries due to low birth rates have produced acute labour skill shortages at a time when post-industrial economies have significant demand for highly skilled immigrants. As a result, given the high levels of global mobility, the retention and integration of migrants is vital to the economic and social survival of these countries;
- Recent events in relation to threats to security and terrorism have heightened the need to foster social cohesion. Social isolation due to unemployment and poverty produces marginalization and disharmony, threatening the very fabric of societies. Providing opportunities for social, cultural, political and economic integration of immigrants has become an imperative for all host countries;
- Socio-economic and human rights implications of a large number of temporary and undocumented migrants in almost all countries require careful examination. In the interests of social justice, it is important to understand and implement policies and programs that guarantee fundamental rights to this category of vulnerable individuals.

Formal and operational definitions of integration

As the articles in this issue of *Canadian Diversity / Diversité canadienne* and a review of the broader literature indicate, definitions of the term “integration” vary considerably across jurisdictions. Based on this review, the following observations can be made:

- Terms such as integration, acculturation and adaptation are used interchangeably (Korac 2003, Remennick 2003);
- Integration is often treated as a process as well as an outcome (Breton 1992 as cited in Valtonen 1996, Berry 2001);
- Integration is conceptualized as an individual and a group phenomenon (Berry 2001), involving changes in attitudes as well as behaviours (Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind and Vedder 2001);
- Integration can be understood as holistic or differential where the latter refers to the selected adoption of host society characteristics (Henry 1994, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Portes, Fernández-Kelly and Haller 2005);
- In spite of statements to the contrary, integration is often treated as a one-way process, where the host society expects enduring changes on the part of the immigrants (Saygeh and Lasry 1993, CIC 2002, IMO 2006);
- Integration and other related processes are often conceptualized as dichotomous categories. As Gans (1997) points out, this polarization is not an empirical reality, and therefore, consideration is to be given to a “range of adaptations.” This calls for more sophisticated empirical categories of integration.

It is important to note that in the absence of a widely-accepted definition of what constitutes integration, it is impossible for newcomers to fully understand a host society’s expectations and this leaves them dangerously exposed to the vagaries of populous politics with ever shifting goal posts of what constitutes success. This danger is discussed in this issue, in several national case studies (e.g. Inglis, Penninx).

Dimensions and factors of integration

To further complicate matters, there is little agreement on which dimensions of integration ought to be considered. Much of the contemporary discourse revolves around labour market outcomes and adherence to an inchoate set of “values” that the host society is deemed to espouse (Simon).

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Yet, research suggests that social, cultural and political/civic integration may be equally important aspects of integration to consider (Jedwab). For example, a review of the literature reveals that the dimensions of integration are expressed in terms of the following factors:

- Feelings and patterns of social interaction of immigrants (Scott and Scott 1989, Henry 1994);
- Roles that immigrants occupy and spheres of immigrant activity (Guest and Stamm 1993, Kallen 1995);
- Characteristics of immigrant communities such as group size, social and cultural distances and the availability of social capital (Esser 2004);
- Professional skilled employment in the mainstream economy, diverse circle of socializing and social networks, and exogenous cultural media consumption (Delander, Hammarstedt, Månsson and Nyberg 2005);
- Opportunities for participation in the various societal spheres (Potoky 1996, Korac 2003, Valtonen 2004, Wilcox 2004).

In spite of these attempts to formulate models of integration, it has been argued that efforts to categorize variations in integration in terms of typologies are futile. Freeman, (2004) proposes a perspective that treats integration as a product of the interactions between migrant aspirations and strategies and regulatory frameworks in four domains – State, market, welfare and culture. These institutions are not created for immigrants *per se* and therefore, national incorporation frameworks or universally valid models of integration cannot be identified.

Nevertheless, both individual and structural factors have been considered in immigrant integration. The theoretical and empirical literature highlights the functional role of education, knowledge of the language of the receiving society as well as job experience in the host country as important factors in labour market integration of immigrants (Vegler 1988, Delander, Hammarstedt, Månsson and Nyberg 2005).

Structural factors such as opportunity structure and access have been considered important as well (Lerner and Menahem 2003). The following structural factors are thought to facilitate integration:

- Ethnocultural affinity; class differences (between country of origin and receiving nation), social capital; liberal immigration policy; welfare and service provisions; humanitarian features of the social services offered by voluntary and religious organizations; and qualities in the immigrant community that emphasize accommodation and adaptation as way of life (Valtonen 1996);
- Sources of immigration are a factor in integration; however, more important are the socio-economic conditions of the host society. The rate and direction of economic change, especially from a manufacturing to a service-based economy, has had a major impact on immigrants' ability to access labour markets (Dell'Olio 2004);
- Legal and institutional conditions play decisive roles in immigrant integration (Faist 1996, Dorr and Faist 1997, Reitz 2003a). As well, four interrelated institutional components affect newcomers' integration:

pre-existing ethnic or race relations within the host society; labour markets and related institutions; government policies and programs including immigration policy, policies for immigrant integration, and regulation of social institutions; and the changing nature of international boundaries in the process of globalization;

- Voluntary associations create social capital/social trust which transforms into political trust and higher political participation. The formation of an "ethnic civic community" formed and enhanced by the use of ethnic media (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001, Jacobs and Tillie 2004).

The articles in this volume explicitly focus on certain structural factors. In particular, authors were asked to focus on how governments conceptualize, frame and provide services to facilitate the integration of immigrants. In general, these articles address issues of integration in traditional countries of immigration (TCIs) as well as those which do not have active immigration programs. Most of the countries in the latter category are from Europe. A number of themes can be identified from the articles in this volume.

The first theme is the increasing demographic diversity in countries, most of which historically had "homogeneous" populations. The sheer volume of newcomers is simply unprecedented. Most of the countries in Europe have been transformed from sending to receiving countries, and a few recognize that they are now both sending and receiving countries. The increase in immigration, in the majority of cases, does not result from legal immigration and that impedes the efficacy of governments' efforts to address issues of integration.

The second theme is the consensus on the need for integration, although there is no clear articulation of the meaning of integration. Exceptions are Canada (Winnemore and Biles, Jedwab), which defines integration as a two-way process of change, and Switzerland (D'Amato), which describes integration as the participation of the foreign-born in the economic, social and cultural life of the country. Some of the countries have no stated integration paradigms; and there is considerable variation among the ones described in the articles: Austria's assimilationism (Fassman), Poland's "assimilation via abandonment" (Grymala-Kazłowska and Weinar); the Netherlands' "neo-assimilationism" (Pennix); Spain's interculturality (Moren-Alegret); Italy's reasonable integration (Zincone and Ponzo); Norway and Sweden's ethnic or cultural pluralism (Haagensen, Bevelander); New Zealand's bi-culturalism (Spoonley) and Australia (Inglis) and Canada's multiculturalism (Winnemore and Biles, Jedwab, Lazar, Van Wyck and Donaldson). Although not explicitly stated, Finland (Tanner), Portugal (Marques) and Israel (Adler) seem to most closely follow the assimilationist paradigm. The need for a common integration strategy for the European Union (EU) has also been articulated; however, collaboration on the implementation of a common EU approach to integration has been limited (Ireland, Joppke). In this context, the

questions for Europe, raised by Modood in this volume, will be of utmost interest to public philosophy and policy. Integration issues are considered important even in the sending countries, a trend reflecting the transnational nature of immigrant integration in modern times (Fargues).

The third theme is the structural and institutional responses to address immigrant integration. This is reviewed under two dimensions: legal and constitutional base and service delivery for immigrants. Australia, Canada and New Zealand, which are the traditional countries of immigration (TCIs) have immigration laws that are designed to admit foreign nationals as permanent residents. In addition, Canada has a broader legislative base such as the *Constitution*, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and the *Employment Equity Act*. Both Canada and Australia have multiculturalism policies. None of the European countries have such immigration policies; instead, most have integration policies or variants thereof to address and facilitate the integration of foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, who are within their national borders. Anti-discrimination and equity policies are in force in some of the countries (e.g. Belgium and France), with EU countries having two tracks of immigrant admission: free mobility for EU nationals, and restricted entry for third-country nationals (TCNs). In this context, border control is a major element in the policy mix.

Almost all of the countries represented in this volume have special provision of services to immigrants, France being an outlier in this regard (Simon). Some countries such as Canada, Finland and Switzerland have multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral arrangements for service delivery by non-governmental organizations, prominently as regards service provision. In almost all cases, language instruction tops the list of services and in some instances, it is mandatory. The range of service provision varies considerably; Israel has a very comprehensive system of services to its newcomers; whereas New Zealand offers very little by way of post-arrival services. It is also interesting to note that Australia and the Netherlands have adopted the fee-paying system in place of the “welfare model” of service delivery, effectively shifting the cost of integration onto the shoulders of newcomers, a move that is antithetical to the more reciprocal models of integration like Canada’s. Deviating from the theme of State provision of services, Li and Dymski examine a relatively unexplored – however, very relevant – question: the role of financial institutions in immigrant integration.

The fourth theme explored by all is naturalization. The period of residency for obtaining citizenship varies from country to country. In countries such as Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, dual or multiple citizenships are accepted, giving rise to the question of potentially competing loyalties. These concerns are exacerbated if naturalization is considered the final stage of integration. At a theoretical level, naturalization can be seen as the endpoint in the integration journey; however, in practice, citizenship should be viewed as one of the independent factors enhancing the process of integration. For this reason, for example, in Belgium, Norway and Sweden,

amongst others, foreign nationals who fulfill the required residency requirements have the right to vote in sub-national elections prior to naturalization.

A question that the articles in this volume have difficulty answering regards the success of the many initiatives undertaken by all the countries to foster and accelerate integration. While Australia (Inglis) and Canada (Jedwab) claim success in this realm, most countries are unable to provide definitive answers. In fact, there are intermittent periods of stress and strain in all countries. The Danish cartoon controversy highlighted in the debate between Hansen and Carens in this volume provides a sneak preview of the ideological chasm that exists between the diverse cultural and religious groups that co-habit the same geographical space. Arguably, the best means to ascertain the effectiveness of long-term integration is a study of second generations. The articles by Malik, and Kunz and Sykes provide interesting insights into this issue.

As indicated earlier, the articles in this volume focus primarily on the structural and institutional provisions made by host societies to enhance immigrant integration. Evidently, the “pathways to integration” are varied, judging from the diversity of approaches and initiatives undertaken by the countries discussed in this volume. There is, however, another important story on the other side of the equation, and that is the motivations, aspirations and activities of the immigrants themselves to realize the immigrant dream. Our understanding of this dimension is fragmented at best.

In conclusion, immigration is likely to be an ongoing process under the conditions of globalization and therefore, integration will continue to be a significant challenge for all host countries. This calls for a better understanding of the phenomena of immigrant integration and transnational citizenship. The intersections of immigrant strategies and aspirations as well as structural and institutional frameworks have to be explored in greater depth. The centrality of dialogue, debate and comparative research can hardly be overemphasized.

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IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: THE PORTUGUESE WAY

Portugal, after a long history of being a country of origin for emigrants – which is still the case – also became a host country at the end of the 20th century. Today, different communities, from which one can highlight Brazilian, Ukrainian and Cape-Verdean immigrants, now make up 5% of the population resident in Portugal (approximately 500,000 legal immigrants) and 8% of the active population. The growth of these communities has basically been seen from the 1990s onwards, when there were only approximately 100,000 immigrants, and this reflects a 400% increase in 15 years.

Portugal has benefited in recent decades from this presence of immigrants who have contributed greatly to the accelerated process of development that our country has been experiencing. Their contribution of 5% to the national Gross Value-Added (GVA), with particular emphasis on the Civil Construction (15%), Hotel and Catering (11%) and Services and Companies (10%) sectors (Sousa Ferreira et al. 2004), the positive balance of their contribution towards the State's finances – 243 million Euros, in 2002 – or the contribution made towards balancing the demographic pyramid, are some evident examples of the contribution which immigrants have brought us. But it is also important to highlight the rich cultural and religious diversity introduced by immigrant communities since “cultural diversity is one of the sources of development, understood not simply as economic growth, but also as a means of access to a satisfactory intellectual, affective, moral and spiritual existence.”²¹

This new context has meant that Portuguese society, since 1996, has been required to develop a more consistent and coordinated policy of welcoming and integrating immigrants, by the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME), a body reporting to the Prime Minister and the Minister to the Presidency. Its mission statement is “to promote the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities into Portuguese society, ensure the participation and cooperation of representative immigrant associations, social partners and welfare bodies in defining the policies of social insertion and the fight against exclusion, as well as following the application of legal instruments to prevent and outlaw discrimination while exercising one's rights on the basis of race, colour, nationality or ethnic origin.”²²

This option to take this institutional pattern, through placing responsibility for the integration policy at the centre of government, reflects the importance it has been given and the global and integrative vision of the various related areas that underlie it. Rather than allocating this role to internal Security or Labour and Social Affairs, it has been taken on board as a central theme throughout all areas of government.

Seven key principles

The policy of welcoming and integrating immigrants in Portugal is built upon seven key principles that directly influence the concrete programmes and actions that different public bodies have developed in the service of immigrants.

1. Equality

Equality of rights and responsibilities amongst national and foreign citizens who are present or who reside in Portugal, with the exception of some political rights, is seen as a determining and inspiring principle. In this way, the fight against all forms of discrimination and the effective carrying out of rights and responsibilities determines what we are arguing for in immigration policies – equal access to work, health, education, social security, justice and all the other sector areas. In the same manner, respect for the law, civic participation or the payment of taxes are obligations for immigrants, as well as nationals. Extensive national and community legislation support this principle, as well as the Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination (CICDR), the representative entity of various ministries, Parliament, immigrant and anti-racist associations, trade unions and companies.

2. Hospitality

But often equality is not enough. Immigrants, particularly recent arrivals, have competitive disadvantages or specific vulnerabilities, which demand positive actions to enable effective equality. To achieve such an objective, inspired by the principle of hospitality, Portugal has, similarly to other countries, developed Programmes and Actions that allow immigrants to be well received.

Specific expressions of this principle include, for example, the National Immigrant Support System, where initiatives such as the National Immigrant Support Centres (one-stop shops) have been developed. These support centres combine the presence of public bodies with which immigrants have to deal, with a diversified set of Support Offices (Family Reunion, Employment, Legal Support...) which speed up access to fundamental rights. as well, the National Network of Information for the Immigrant provides useful and practical information in a variety of languages and formats (paper, Web, media, telephone, information centres) in order to facilitate the integration of immigrants. It is also worth mentioning, in this regard the activities involving the teaching of Portuguese, initiated by the Programme Portugal Receives (Portugal Acolhe).

It is also important, in this field, to recognize cases and circumstances, should an immigrant be law-abiding and the law respected, and should networks involving the exploitation of irregular immigration should be fought against, one must also bear in mind that *the dignity of the human person remains untouchable and should be protected against the most extreme adversities*. This requires the extension of *essential rights due to any person, irrespective of their documental situation*. In our experience, the importance of consolidating access to essential health care, temporary shelter in an emergency situation or voluntary return to the country of origin are but a few of such cases. But it is also important to provide competent legal and solidarity support that specifies their situation with rigour and justice, since a lack of knowledge of the law and rights often leads to a situation of irregularity due to ignorance or a lack of means to mount a defence. And when there is no alternative to forced exclusion, this option may be carried out with humanity and respect.

3. Citizenship

The exercise of equality naturally leads to the principle of full citizenship. Whilst still non-nationals, we would argue that immigrants are citizens with full rights. They are active constructors of a destination community, even though they do not share a common origin. Even the restrictions still placed at the level of political participation

should gradually disappear, since political participation at the local authority level, in a regime of reciprocity, which the Portuguese Constitution foresees, is not sufficient in itself.

A form of access to citizenship *par excellence* is the acquisition of Portuguese nationality, and this has become easier with recent modifications to the *Nationality Law*. It is of particular importance to the descendants of immigrants who are now able to obtain Portuguese nationality more easily.

4 & 5. Co-responsibility and participation

This vision leads to another consequence of immigration policy: the affirmation of the principles of co-responsibility and of participation. An inclusive society can only be built through respect for the principle of full cultural and political participation of all citizens – national

and immigrant – who constitute a society within a specific time and space. Immigrants should seek this participation and, above all, the host society should be open to that participation within its *polis*.

In this way, it is hoped that immigrants, as citizens, will be participative and co-responsible for the Common Good and, particularly with respect to immigration policy, be part of the solution. The force of their associations, the presence of socio-cultural mediators from the immigrant communities in public services and the voice of their representatives in the Advisory Council for Immigration Affairs, the organ that advises the government on immigration policy issues, are examples of what has already been achieved.

6. Interculturality

In another area that is particularly sensitive in our days – the management of cultural diversity – the Portuguese option has been very clear and has involved the affirmation of the principle of interculturality. Within a framework of mutual respect and acting within the Law, it has promoted the affirmation of richness of diversity in dialogue. More than a peaceful co-existence of different communities, the intercultural model expresses itself at the crossroads of cultural miscegenation, with no one culture being annihilated, nor imposed. Much more than the simple acceptance of the “other,” the intercultural model proposes the welcoming of the “other” and the transformation of both within this meeting.

Opting to give priority to work within the field of education, the Entreculturas Office has, since 1991, been developing an important programme of intercultural education, using training activities and producing pedagogic materials.

The exercise of equality naturally leads us on to the principle of full citizenship. Whilst still non-nationals, we would argue that immigrants are citizens with full rights. They are active constructors of a destination community, even though they do not share a common origin.

7. Consensus

Finally, the construction of immigration policy in Portugal has been characterized by the principle of consensus. On questions of immigration, the permanent search for a widened political and social consensus through dialogue and negotiation is not a mere question of tactics. It is necessary to keep immigration policy away from fractious territory where populist anti-immigration arguments flourish, as has been verified in many European countries. For example, it has been possible to alter the *Nationality Law*, making it more open and humanistic, with an extremely wide parliamentary consensus, without a single vote cast against it.

However, in democratic societies, the construction of this consensus implies, among other things, raising public awareness regarding the welcoming of immigrants, by debunking stereotypes and preconceived false ideas. In this regard, much attention has been given to the treatment of immigration issues by the media, and the introduction of new perspectives. Initiatives such as the Journalism for Tolerance Prize or the production of the television programme *Nós* (We) are concrete expressions of this work.

These are seven mobilizing principles both for the State and for civil society. We would argue that the *State should become the main ally in the integration of immigrants*. This goal can only be achieved if the principle of ongoing cooperation between different State entities is respected, seeking coherent responses that cut across and into a variety of sectors. Particular attention should be given to the local aspect of reception, and to the promotion of proximity integration. At the same time, it is essential to reinforce the alliance with bodies from *civil society* by empowering their generous, flexible and, normally, more efficient intervention.

Portugal is still learning to be a country that receives immigrants. Its integration policy needs to be developed and consolidated. We have much to do and to improve. But this is a priority and we know what we want.

In the 21st century, immigration policy will be one of the factors that will define each society: “tell me which immigration policy you have and I will tell you who you are.” And each society needs to pay attention, so that one day it will not be ashamed of who it is.

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INTEGRATION CONCEPTS AND INTEGRATION POLICY IN AUSTRIA

ABSTRACT

According to the 2001 census, the Austrian population is about 8 million. This number includes more than 730,000 (or 9.1%) foreign residents who at the time did not hold Austrian citizenship. Two-thirds of them were citizens of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and of Turkey, the traditional countries of origin of the guest-worker migration. In addition, more than 300,000 Austrian citizens were born outside Austria. Altogether, Austria's proportion of foreign-born and foreign residents in 2001 was thus even higher than that of the United States, reaching a level of approximately 13%.

The discussion about migration policy, its implementation, and its execution are very relevant issues in the Austrian political debate. Elections can be won or lost on the answers to the challenge of the growing influx. All the parties in Austria present more or less substantial concepts of controlling migration in their respective programmes. Core elements of these concepts are the limitation of the migration flow and the distinction between desired and undesired migrants.

In the 1990s, a quota system was implemented linking the annual number of migrants to the need of the labour market and to the demographic development. In the following years, this system was improved and adapted mainly to decrease the overall amount of migration and to limit the number of low-skilled labour migrants. Special emphasis was put on family reunification and on the migration of skilled workers. However, due to other laws and regulations – the Geneva Convention, the legislation of the European Union concerning long-term third-country nationals and the family reunification of EU citizens – only a small proportion of the migration flow can be controlled exclusively by national regulation.

So, there is consensus concerning migration policy, but there is no concept of a consistent and comprehensive integration policy. Politicians at local and national levels and all party programmes emphasize the need for integration but avoid clear statements of what exactly they mean by this term. In fact, the term “integration” is used as a black-box which allows a consensus to be reached on a general level and defies political discussions in detail. Therefore it would be an oversimplification to talk of a consensual Austrian integration concept.

Nevertheless, we can identify a common denominator: the dominant integration paradigm is the idea of assimilation. The conservative parties as well as the social democratic party implicitly understand “integration” as a process of a one-sided adaptation to the Austrian way of life. Foreigners should learn to be Austrians – whatever that means –, they should learn the German language and adapt to the “Austrian” way of life. Cultural deviation is more or less regarded as a barrier on the necessary path of assimilation. Hence, most political parties and politicians unknowingly follow the ideas of the Chicago school formulated in the 1920s.

The only exceptions are the small Green Party and the city government in Vienna. The Greens represent approximately 10% of the voters and act as opposition in parliament. They oppose the idea of assimilation underlying the integration concepts of the other parties and instead promote cultural diversity and multiculturalism, which they regard as an added value in a modern society. However, the Greens avoid defining the limits of diversity and multiculturalism. Their programme does not address the daily and general conflicts between the values and norms of the host society, on the one hand, and of the society of origin, on the other. It is probably due to this vagueness that the multicultural concept of the Green Party is accepted only by a minority of the Austrian (and foreign) population.

The second exception to the rule of assimilation is the city government in Vienna. The city is governed by an absolute majority of the social democratic party that positioned the city government as a counter-model to the conservative federal government in several policy areas; integration policy is one of these. The cultural diversity of the Viennese population is increasingly seen as a

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strength of the city. “The diversity-oriented integration policy of the City of Vienna is committed to the principles of a pluralistic society and aims at equality and equality of opportunities of all residents irrespective of their gender, ethnic origin, religion, age, sexual orientation, disability or fundamental beliefs (*Weltanschauung*) (König and Perchinig 2005, 13). The explicit or implicit aim of the integration process is not assimilation, but the peaceful living apart of different cultures. However, again the concept of cultural diversity remains vague. Moreover, the political reality in Vienna does not seem to provide evidence that this concept engenders concrete policies. It might just be a slogan serving to counter the concept of assimilation.

Legislative base

Due to the lack of a consistent Austrian integration concept equipped with clear and explicit goals, there is not a single legislative or constitutional base. Several institutions deal with different aspects of migration and integration. “The integration debate is characterized by inconsistencies – there are inconsistencies between the positions of the federal and provincial governments, and inconsistencies within ministries. What is more, integration is only partly reflected in legislation, if at all, making this already complex topic even more complex in Austria.” (König and Perchinig 2005, 11)

In the context of integration at least six different acts have to be mentioned: the *Settlement and Residence Act* (*Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz*) regulates the legal residence of foreigners who intend to stay in Austria for more than six months; the *Aliens Police Act* defines the authority and the duties of a special police (*Fremdenpolizei*) and the legal titles of foreigners who intend to stay in Austria for a period of three to six months. The access to legal employment is governed by the *Aliens Employment Act* (*Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz*), the asylum procedure by the *Asylum Act* (*Asylgesetz* and *Grundversorgungsgesetz*) and naturalization by the *Citizenship Act* (*Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz*).

Without describing these different regulations in detail, we may identify one thread that all of them have in common. The idea of integration underlying them is an asymmetric and one-sided process of adaptation to the values and norms of the Austrian society. References to this idea can be found in the *Settlement and Residence Act*, which makes language training in German compulsory. All non-EU immigrants and those who have been residing in Austria since January 1, 1998 – except for “key personnel,” children, the elderly and any immigrant demonstrating suitable knowledge of German – will have

to attend such language courses. If the courses are not completed successfully within four years, the immigrant may lose his or her residence permit. Hence, good command of the German language is seen as a necessary prerequisite to be put on the integration track towards “austrianization.”

If foreigners residing in Austria follow this track successfully and are assimilated at the end of the process, they are eligible to receive Austrian citizenship. Again, this proves that Austrian legislation on integration relies on the idea of assimilation. The *Citizenship Act* describes naturalization as the completion of the integration process, formally inscribed into the law by examinations in German and in basic knowledge about Austria and the European Union as preconditions for the granting of Austrian citizenship. Moreover, the *Citizenship Act* aims to reduce the possibility of receiving Austrian nationality prior to the ten years of residence laid down in the law and to avoid dual nationality. Both options contradict the concept of assimilation as a long-lasting process of adaptation to one society.

Cultural deviation is more or less regarded as a barrier on the necessary path of assimilation. Hence, most political parties and politicians unknowingly follow the ideas of the Chicago school formulated in the 1920s.

Responsible institutions

Since Austrian ideas of integration are scattered in different acts, several institutions are responsible for delivering services promoting the integration process. To cite just some examples: the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the integration of refugees (a specialized “Integrationsfonds” was founded) but not for labour migrants or family members of labour migrants; labour migrants fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economics and Work, which executes the *Aliens Employment Act*; if the migrating family members are school-age children, the provincial boards of education are responsible for them; if they are older, they fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.

The situation becomes even more complicated when the different federal levels of competence are taken into account. In many policy areas the national level is responsible for setting the principal rules that have to be executed by the provinces. The *Citizenship Act* – for example – is adopted by the parliament at the national level and implemented at the provincial level. These split competencies further complicate the adoption of a comprehensive and consistent integration policy, especially when the ruling parties at the provincial and national levels have different ideas of what integration means and how it should be realized. The opposing interests between the Viennese and the State government mentioned earlier clearly illustrate this problem.

Finally, in order to understand the full complexity of the situation, we have to take into account another factor: the different organizational types of institutions acting in the area of integration. Apart from the ministries and public institutions (like school boards or housing agencies), the churches and many private institutions are active actors. The Catholic and the Protestant churches and their humanitarian associations such as Caritas and Diakonie act as advocates of immigrants' rights in public, and provide advice and language training courses for all migrants as well as shelter for asylum seekers and refugees. "Other important NGOs in the field include Helping Hands, a humanitarian organization associated with the Austrian Students' Union (the "chamber" of students with compulsory membership), which concentrates on giving free legal advice to immigrants and refugees; ZARA, an anti-discrimination watchdog, which gives legal advice, collects incidents of discrimination and publishes an annual "racism-report;" and the Austrian Asylum Coordination, an umbrella group of NGOs working in the field of asylum." (König and Perchinig 2005, 22). Most of these institutions rely on voluntary work, private donations and the enthusiasm of their collaborators. A lack of sustainability and professionalism are the consequence of these structures.

Major services

The list of public services that have long-term effects is rather short. They focus on the acquisition of the German language. Language training is mandatory for many migrants. Language capacity is seen as a first but central "gatekeeper" for societal inclusion. Proficiency in German is a precondition for higher achievements in education, which in turn equips immigrants to apply for more prestigious labour market positions offering higher incomes. These allow them to leave segregated living areas in the cities and to enter the middle class. Language training courses are provided by private or semi-private organizations and are certified and subsidized by public institutions.

Other services are rare or only rudimentarily developed. Migrants are expected to acquire the basic knowledge about Austria and the European Union, which is a precondition for receiving Austrian citizenship, independently. The relevant questions are listed in a booklet downloadable from the Internet. The recognition of foreign certificates is a difficult and long process without structured and institutional help. There are no mentoring programmes as a form of organized circulation of knowledge concerning the host society and ways of successful integration. Additional help for pupils in schools to compensate their language deficits

is scarce and linked to the school type and varies from one province to the other.

The churches and private institutions offer short-term help. They provide shelter and food for short periods. These measures are mainly targeted at refugees or migrants in need. Notwithstanding their importance for these people, they are of no significance for the integration process of the majority of the foreign residents.

The role of citizenship

From a normative point of view, acquiring Austrian citizenship marks the completion of a long process of assimilation. The new passport certifies that the foreigner has become a German-speaking Austrian. From an analytical perspective, however, citizenship is not a dependent variable linked to integration but rather an independent variable facilitating integration. Austrian citizenship not only implies privileged entry to the housing market, it also allows its holders to apply for subsidies to build houses, to open a bank account or buy real estate without further examinations, and to vote in national and provincial elections and thus to become relevant for politicians. Citizenship can therefore be regarded as an instrument for and not as a consequence of integration.

Outcomes

It is difficult to evaluate the current integration measures in Austria because they are not systematically monitored. Selected studies and a semi-official migration and integration report (Fassmann and Stacher 2003) offer overviews. These emphasize three main characteristics of the Austrian situation.

Integration (in terms of assimilation) happens, but it happens by accident. The newly arrived migrants are left to their own devices. Some migrants stick to their culture of origin, others assimilate very fast and others live in-between cultures. Many migrants do not know what the host society expects of them. They are kept in an ambivalent situation. Are they immigrants who can stay or guest-workers who will have to leave again at some stage? When you ask foreign residents whether they want to stay in Austria forever, their answers betray a high degree of uncertainty. Clearer signals from the political sphere are necessary.

Integration (once again in terms of assimilation) works differently in different groups. Indicators like interethnic marriage rates or labour market positions clearly show that migrants from Turkey marry within their own ethnic community and remain at the bottom of the employment system whereas migrants from Western and also from Eastern Europe are on the fast track to the middle class. These differences can be traced back to a

The majority of Austrian natives seem to believe that integration should be completed within a few months or a few years at the most. In reality, this process needs decades or even generations.... But politicians have to show "success" within a legislative period.

number of factors: a mixture of cultural behaviour and of structural deficits of the Turkish migrant population as well as prejudices of the majority population towards the Turkish migrants. Once again the differentiation between dependent and independent variables remains problematic.

Integration is a never-ending process. It means learning and adapting to new circumstances, not only for the migrant population. However, the majority of Austrian natives seem to believe that integration should be completed within a few months or a few years at the most. In reality, this process needs decades or even generations, especially in a society where ancestors, family names and titles are important to be accepted. But politicians have to show "success" within a legislative period. That is why they concentrate on migration flows, which seem to be easier to influence, rather than on developing a sustainable integration scheme – a trend observable not only in Austria!

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INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION: AUSTRALIA

ABSTRACT

This article briefly traces key features of the evolution of Australian multicultural policies over three decades. In evaluating the outcomes, it is noted that many of the gains for successful incorporation of immigrants are under pressure from other government policies, in particular those associated with the pursuit of the War on Terror, which are creating increasingly overt hostility towards Muslim groups in Australia.

From the commencement of European settlement in 1788, migration has played a critical role in Australian demographic, economic and social development and was featured extensively in political debates. Migrants currently constitute nearly one-quarter of the population of 20 million while over one-fifth of those born in Australia have at least one migrant parent. This figure of nearly half of the population with recent migrant background is similar to that in 1901 when the Commonwealth of Australia was constituted through the federation of the six former British colonies.

The multicultural paradigm

While multiculturalism has been the official policy guiding immigrant settlement and incorporation for three decades since the 1970s, for most of Australia's history the favoured policy was that of assimilation which assumed, and required, that immigrants would rapidly adopt Australian culture and practices and become "invisible." By the 1960s, after two decades of post-war mass migration intended to increase the population by 1% a year, the inevitability and speed of immigrant assimilation was being questioned as was its desirability amidst concerns about the negative social effects of migrant inequality for migrants as well as the wider Australian society. The first response in the late 1960s was a new policy (called Integration), which took a longer-term view of the settlement process and envisaged that, even if assimilation was the long-term objective, cultural diversity might continue in the privacy of the home. However, this did not address the concerns of diverse groups including migrant communities, teaching, health and other professionals for more pro-active policies which, following the Canadian example, were labelled as "multicultural."

Following the election of the socially reformist Australian Labor Party government in 1972, the then Minister for Immigration released a paper entitled *A Multi-cultural Society for the Future*. By the late 1970s national and State commitment to multicultural policies were flagged in the 1978 *Report on Participation* (Ethnic Affairs Commission of New South Wales 1978) prepared by the New South Wales State government and the 1978 *Galbally Report* (Galbally 1978) on the provision of migrant services prepared for the Australian federal government. Rather than relying on the universalistic delivery of services by mainstream agencies, the reports emphasized the importance of funding to address the specific needs of diverse ethnic and migrant groups and the role that these groups could play in the delivery of services. The initial focus was on migrants from countries where the majority of arrivals were not English speakers. Language differences became a shorthand to highlight other differences from the majority Anglo-Celtic population involving cultural practices and institutional experiences which affected access to welfare and settlement services.

In the three decades since then, there has been ongoing evolution in the multiculturalism policy paradigm.¹ One area of major change has included an extension of the policy from migrants to their children. This shift is indicated by the adoption of the term NESB (non-English speaking background) and indicates a realization of continuing diversity and potential disadvantage. By 1989 a further widening of the relevance of the policy was made clear in the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989), which stated that policies of multiculturalism were directly relevant to *all* Australians, including those of Anglo-Celtic and indigenous (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) backgrounds. This was a very specific effort to counter views that it was only the migrants who had anything to gain from policies of multiculturalism. The area which the *National Agenda* specifically emphasized in thus legitimating multiculturalism was the economic advantages provided by having people from diverse cultures and backgrounds whose knowledge and

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contacts could facilitate international opportunities for developing economic and trading links with their countries of origin. The strategic directions of the most recent statement *Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity* (2003) is due to be revised in 2006. The current statement of the policy emphasizes four principles as “a framework for maximizing the social, cultural and economic benefits that cultural diversity brings to all Australians.” But more than that, it actively promotes “good community relations and social harmony among us all.” The principles that refer to responsibilities and rights are:

- *Responsibilities for all.* All Australians have a civic duty to support those basic structures and principles of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality and enable diversity in our society to flourish;
- *Respect for each person.* Subject to the law, all Australians have the right to express their own culture and beliefs and have a reciprocal obligation to respect the rights of others to do the same;
- *Fairness for each person.* All Australians are entitled to equality of treatment and opportunity. Social equity allows us all to contribute to the social, political and economic life of Australia, free from discrimination, including on the grounds of race, culture, religion, language, location, gender or place of birth;
- *Benefits for all.* All Australians benefit from...the significant cultural, social and economic dividends arising from the diversity of our population (2003, 6).

This latest statement, developed in the wake of the overseas events of September 11, 2001 and the 2002 Bali bombings that killed nearly 100 Australians, emphasizes harmony, equity in access to government services and harnessing the benefits of diversity. In this it differs from earlier periods when the emphasis shifted between addressing issues of disadvantage and inequality and providing support for cultural maintenance.

Institutional bases for multiculturalism

The major bases for the policy of multiculturalism are contained in a range of administrative measures and government reports beginning from the 1978 *Gabally Report* (Galbally 1978) and summarized in the 1989 *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989). This reliance on administrative practice rather than extensive legislation reflects Australian political culture’s preferences in policy formulation. The Australian constitution lacks a *Bill of Rights* in its Constitution although at the national and State level there is a range of anti-discrimination legislation.

At the national level there have been a series of government agencies with major responsibility for the implementation of multiculturalism policies throughout the bureaucracy. The current responsibility lies with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. At the State level there are similar overview agencies although these, too, have changed their roles and often their names as in the case of the NSW Ethnic Affairs Commission which was reconstituted as the Community Relations Commission for a Multicultural NSW in 2001. Advisory councils and boards drawn from the community provide input to many of these agencies although since July 1, 2006 the national Council for a Multicultural Australia has lapsed.

The existence of these central agencies reflects the emphasis on monitoring change within the bureaucracy. At the State and national level the major government service delivery departments and agencies concerned with areas such as health, education and welfare all have

units responsible for developing and implementing policies for their ethnically diverse clientele and for training staff to provide appropriate services. However, service provision is often confused with the implementation of internal staffing policies to avoid discrimination in appointments and promotion. Also in the key policy-oriented departments, such as those concerned with economic policy, a major challenge has been to ensure the national Access and Equity strategy is considered when policies such as those concerning economic restructuring are being developed.

As a federation, Australian states retain constitutional responsibility for a range of areas directly affecting incorporation such as education, health and the legal system. However, through its substantial control of funding, the national government

has the ability to exercise considerable influence by setting preconditions for the use of the funding it gives the states. Another feature directly relevant to multiculturalism policy is a preference for reporting mechanisms which require government departments, agencies and businesses to report on the numbers of staff and students from targeted backgrounds rather than mandating the operation of ethnic quotas in the labour market and education.

Service delivery

In contrast to assimilation policy, where services did not target specific ethnic or cultural groups, in the early years of multiculturalism, government and community organizations, particularly those involving migrant and ethnic communities, were the major providers of services and support. A major source of funding for ethnic communities – often poor – to provide these ethnospecific services came from government funding. This also allowed

A significant complement to language-related services are a variety of educational and training programs that are designed for both migrants and the wider population to gain the knowledge and skills to operate in a diverse, multicultural society.

the government to control the type of services and activities provided. A tension exists between this type of service delivery and that referred to as “mainstreaming,” which involves all clients being catered for by the one organization or government agency regardless of whether it has staff with the linguistic or other culturally relevant knowledge. Given the diversity of Australian ethnic groups and, also, the ever-changing origins of immigrants, there are special challenges to providing services to new and smaller immigrant groups.

Over the last decade Australian governments have increasingly shifted their general welfare model to one based on “user pays” rather than on identified need while, at the same time, also outsourcing responsibility for these services to private, for-profit organizations and religious charities. The general shift to “user pays” and cutbacks in the provision of welfare services has had an inevitable impact on access to services, including among migrants. A particular issue is that it is not always self-evident that commercial providers are either aware of the needs of an ethnically diverse client base, or willing, to adapt their service delivery model to them.

Historically, Australia provided services to both citizens and those on permanent resident visas without differentiation. This reflected the expectation that permanent residents were “citizens in waiting” and should be accorded the same rights as citizens. Except for the right to vote and to hold permanent positions in the public service or the defence forces there is little to distinguish permanent residents from citizens. Despite this, high levels of naturalization are common in Australia which does not require those taking Australian citizenship to renounce their existing citizenship. From the 1970s, Australia also allowed all permanent residents to apply for naturalization after only two years residence and without extensive tests of English competency. Those in Australia on temporary residence visas, which now includes a number of asylum seekers on temporary protection visas, are not, however, entitled to apply for citizenship. Nor are they able to access services on the same basis as permanent residents. A recent revision to the Citizenship legislation, introduced in response to terrorism concerns and anticipated to come into operation in January 2007, will increase the period of residence to three years, a figure similar to other major immigrant receiving countries. This change coincides with increasing debate about the “loyalty” of various immigrant groups, not least those from Islamic backgrounds.

The range of services

Since the advent of mass air travel, settlement services for migrants and their families are normally provided

after their arrival in Australia. The major exception involves those migrating under the skilled migration program who are required, as part of their acceptance for permanent residence, to establish that their qualifications have been accepted for work in Australia. Upon arrival in Australia access to services specifically targeting migrants such as information and adult English language classes, as well as immediate access to more general welfare benefits, are available but under increasingly restrictive conditions.

As a predominantly English speaking country, one of the major areas of provision for migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds has involved extensive provision of translation and interpreting services throughout government agencies. These are complemented by the development of a Telephone Interpreter Service which provides immediate access to an interpreter in many languages. The Adult Migrant Education Service (AMES) was established to provide free language and orientation classes to all adult immigrants although it now is required to compete with a range of private providers to win contracts to offer classes. From the 1970s, English as a Second Language (ESL) teachers have been available to the majority of students from NESB backgrounds. Special Intensive Language Centres have also been established for secondary school arrivals to provide intensive English teaching alongside the normal curriculum and orientation to Australian school culture before these students move into ordinary secondary schools where ESL teachers are also available.

Other language related provisions have included the establishment of the government Special Broadcasting Service, which provides radio programs in all main immigrant languages. It also operates a television channel which, as well as offering a range of films and international news services in a variety of languages, has the mission of providing programming of particular interest and relevance to migrant and indigenous groups although they are also widely watched by the general population. Schools can now teach a very wide range of languages although the diverse language backgrounds in school populations and competition from other subjects mean that, in practice, few secondary schools teach more than two languages other than English. However, in states with large NESB populations, special Saturday Schools have been established by the government so that secondary students can attend them and study the languages for the end of secondary schools examinations. In NSW in 2005 over 6,000 students in these schools studied 24 languages ranging from Arabic and Armenian to Ukrainian and Vietnamese. Partly reflecting the very diverse language backgrounds in many

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schools, bilingual education is not common in Australia although specialist community language teachers in primary schools do sometimes offer transitional bilingual programs. Other government initiatives involve funding non-profit ethnic community groups to run out-of-hours language schools while offering curriculum and professional development support for their teachers.

A significant complement to language-related services are a variety of educational and training programs that are designed for both migrants *and* the wider population to gain the knowledge and skills to operate in a diverse, multicultural society. Labour market programs have been particularly important for skilled arrivals. Equally important, however, have been the range of formal and informal educational initiatives that target the whole population. These start at school level where curriculum content has been extensively widened to reflect the diversity of Australian cultures and experiences and progress through to tertiary and vocational courses where professionals are equipped with knowledge and skills to work with a diverse range of clients and patients.

Also important have been the many changes in institutions and organizational structures to take account of the population's diverse experiences and cultures. These involve areas of society as diverse as the legal system and the arts. Thus the Law Reform Commission has reported on issues affecting the operation of the legal system while the major arts funding organization, the Australia Council, has developed specific programs catering for multicultural and community arts initiatives. As this brief summary indicates, a distinctive feature of Australian multicultural policy is that programs target the whole population as well as migrants. They have also involved significant institutional reform.

After 30 years of program development and institutional change, the current key multicultural programs identified by the national government are:

- *Living in harmony*, which includes Harmony Day;
- *Fairer government services and programs*, which involves its Access and Equity strategy;
- *Diversity works!*, which is concerned with promoting the benefits for business and the economy of using the cultural and linguistic skills of the Australian workforce;
- *Muslim Community Reference Group*, which was set up following the July 2005 bombings in London;
- *National Action Plan*, which will formulate a government and community approach to address increased global, religious and political extremism threatening Australia's national security and social cohesion.

Evaluation

After three decades of increasingly diverse and substantial immigration coinciding with a policy of multiculturalism, Australia has become a far more cosmopolitan society with greater diversity in cultural practices, daily life and institutions than would have been envisaged at the end of the 1960s. There has been widespread public support for many of the changes in areas such as gastronomy, entertainment, the arts and sport. There have also been relatively high levels of inter-ethnic marriage. Accompanying this diversity there has not been the development of ethnic ghettos in the way commonly found in many other urbanized societies. There is also evidence of economic mobility for migrants and their descendants at a level which, with Canada, exceeds that in other Western industrial societies (Inglis and Model, in press). Underlying this economic mobility is a pattern of educational attainment which, again with Canada, exceeds that in other comparable countries with substantial migrant populations. This has been identified as linked to the substantial commitment to teaching English (OECD 2006) and, one might also add, other educational innovations to cater for diversity.

Despite these indications of success, the future is problematic. Until recently, in spite of ongoing debates about multicultural policy, there were few signs of the overt conflict and threats to social cohesion that many local and international critics predicted would accompany a policy not predicated on the basis of cultural homogeneity. One reason was that Australia's approach to multiculturalism had successfully managed the difficult task of supporting diversity while at the same time developing a unifying commitment to the wider Australian society, albeit a society which has undergone major changes in its institutions and structures over three decades.

Over the last decade many of the factors that were important in the successful implementation of the early changes have declined. These include the acceptance of government responsibility for social welfare; the existence of a system of labour market regulation supportive of workers rights; and commitment from political leaders not hankering for an unconsidered retention of the "old" Australian values and culture. Policies intended to restructure the Australian economy to meet the challenges of economic globalization and based on principles of economic rationalism have affected both immigrants and long-established Australians as have cutbacks in government spending on welfare and support services for the most disadvantaged in the community. One indication of the fault lines in social cohesion was the success of the

Many of the government's achievements in overcoming the disadvantage of immigrant groups and changing Australian attitudes to diversity are, paradoxically, being put at risk by other government policies which have increased popular fears of terrorism and of those, such as Muslims, linked with it.

populist Pauline Hanson One Nation Party in state and national elections in the mid-1990s. Its success has been linked to popular concerns sparked by the economic and social changes which found expression in anti-immigrant and anti-indigenous social policies and hostility towards many results of economic restructuring. It also was fuelled by claims that multiculturalism was a threat to “Australian values” and the “Australian way of life.” The reluctance of key political leaders to take a stance against the more outrageous and inaccurate claims of the One Nation Party further fanned the flames of prejudice. A consequence was that many people from Asian backgrounds, who were the major target of One Nation hostility, began to question their ability to become fully incorporated and accepted into Australian society. Another consequence was that political parties shifted their agendas to attract these populist causes.

Since 2001 and the Australian government’s active commitment to the War on Terror, Australia’s diverse Muslim population of nearly 300,000 people (1.5% of the population), one-third of whom are Australian-born, have increasingly felt themselves marginalized and depicted as being “un-Australian,” as stereotypical international images of Muslims are applied to those living in Australia. The rioting in December 2005 in Sydney when gangs of predominantly Anglo-Celtic youths attacked Muslim beachgoers in retaliation for the alleged attack by a group of “Middle-Eastern” youths on a lifeguard the previous weekend, highlighted the extent to which anti-Muslim sentiment built up in support of the War on Terror fuels hostility towards Australians perceived to be from that background. Despite national shock about the events and the role played in them by media identities calling for protection of the “Australian way of life,” represented in this case by enjoyment of the beaches, the subsequent responses by government, the legal system and the media led to increasing the alienation of many Muslims who felt that they, rather than the youths who began the rioting, were being cast as the real villains (Inglis 2006).

In earlier periods of Australian history, when assimilation was the dominant policy, immigrants also became the targets of hostility in times of economic recession and war. What is now evident after three decades of multiculturalism in Australia is that, despite educational efforts directed to understanding cultural diversity and the need for racial tolerance within the framework of a commitment to Australian values such as democracy and the rule of law, accusations that a particular group, such as Muslims, lack a range of often vague or unspecified “Australian” values, especially when expressed by prominent social figures, can still gain populist support. Indicative of worries about irresponsible statements are the threats of resignation by several members of the government’s hand-picked Muslim Community Reference Group concerned at remarks by the Prime Minister on the radio, and repeated in a popular newspaper, which singled out sections of the Muslim community as resisting integration by not embracing Australian values and culture, being unable to speak English and not understanding that men and women have equality (*Daily Telegraph*, 2 September 2006).

As the incident highlights, many of the government’s achievements in overcoming the disadvantage of immigrant

groups and changing Australian attitudes to diversity are, paradoxically, being put at risk by other government policies which have increased popular fears of terrorism and those, such as Muslims, linked with it. The unfortunate aspect of this outcome is that it has the potential to increase alienation among young Muslims, many of whom also have been less economically successful than their peers in other communities. If this happens and young Muslims do, indeed, become involved in terrorist activities, the blame should not be immediately placed on multiculturalism without examining other government policies and actions which are undermining integration and social cohesion.

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Note

- ¹ A brief summary of the official account of these changes and associated policy statements can be found on the Website of the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/06evolution.htm). The more detailed implications of these changes in relation to programme delivery up to the early 1990s are discussed in Lanphier, M. and O. Lukomsky (1994).

L'INJONCTION PARADOXALE : LE PARADIGME DE LA POLITIQUE D'INTÉGRATION BELGE

SOMMAIRE

La Belgique a connu plusieurs vagues migratoires. La construction de la politique d'intégration des immigrés de la Belgique peut être décomposée en deux périodes distinctes : la citoyennisation s'étend de 1947 à 1984, puis une deuxième période va de 1984 à nos jours. La politique publique d'intégration des immigrés est construite autour de trois axes. Le premier concerne les successives modifications de la loi sur la nationalité (1984, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2000); le deuxième est la lutte contre le racisme et les discriminations et le troisième est composé des politiques sociales qui dépendent des entités fédérées et de l'État fédéral. Par ailleurs, la divergence des paradigmes des politiques publiques en Flandre, en Wallonie et à Bruxelles cache une relative convergence : les minorités ethniques ne peuvent pas avoir d'existence dans l'espace public. La situation en Flandre pourrait être qualifiée de multiculturalisme inégalitaire et celle de la Communauté française de multiculturalisme méritocratique.

La Belgique a connu plusieurs vagues migratoires. Dans les années 1950, les immigrés proviennent essentiellement d'Italie, et ensuite d'Espagne et de Grèce. Ils s'installent majoritairement dans les zones industrielles de la Wallonie et du Limbourg. Après 1964, les immigrés viennent principalement du Maroc et de la Turquie. Ils s'installent davantage dans les grandes villes et, en particulier, à Bruxelles, Anvers et Gand. L'immigration est officiellement arrêtée en 1974. Toutefois, les flux migratoires n'ont jamais totalement cessé. Le regroupement familial, l'asile, les étudiants et les illégaux alimentent les nouvelles migrations. L'intégration des immigrés et de leurs descendants s'est posée tardivement. Deux raisons expliquent ce retard. D'une part, les autorités publiques ont pensé l'immigration comme un phénomène provisoire. Cette dernière était réduite à sa fonction d'adaptation conjoncturelle de la main-d'œuvre. La Belgique, comme l'Allemagne ou les Pays-Bas, ne s'est jamais considérée un État d'immigration. Dès lors, la Belgique n'a pas prévu de politiques d'intégration dans les domaines du logement, de l'enseignement, de la culture. L'absence de législation ouverte en matière d'acquisition de la nationalité constitue un autre indice de l'absence de perspective d'intégration. De leur côté, les immigrés ont envisagé leur immigration comme un événement temporaire, entretenant, dès lors, le mythe du retour au pays d'origine. Entre 1960 et 1970, les politiques publiques s'apparentent davantage à des expériences promues par des acteurs sociaux volontaristes qui trouvent parfois une attention auprès des pouvoirs publics. Jusqu'en 1974, les crédits alloués à l'accueil et l'insertion des immigrés sont principalement consacrés au regroupement familial et à l'indemnisation des prêtres catholiques qui sont arrivés pour encadrer les immigrés. Cette imprévoyance en matière de politique publique ne signifie pas qu'aucun processus d'inclusion n'ait eu lieu. Entre 1947 et 1974, l'intégration des travailleurs immigrés s'est réalisée principalement par les communautés locales et par leur inclusion dans la classe ouvrière. Les immigrés et leurs familles ont trouvé dans certains groupes intermédiaires des espaces d'intégration. Par le travail, les immigrés trouvent dans les organisations syndicales et dans des associations qui leur sont liées des espaces d'entraide et de solidarité. Leur intégration dans les syndicats, organisations sociales puissantes en Belgique, s'opère en même temps que celle au sein de divers groupes intermédiaires du pays d'origine.

L'extension des droits des étrangers

La construction de la politique d'intégration des immigrés de la Belgique peut être décomposée en deux périodes distinctes. La première, celle de la citoyennisation, s'étend de 1947 à 1984. Elle correspond au processus d'attribution collective de droits aux immigrés qui sont, par ailleurs, toujours juridiquement des étrangers. La deuxième période commence en 1984 et s'étend jusqu'à nos jours. La première phase se caractérise par l'attribution de nouveaux droits aux immigrés, levant ainsi certaines discriminations légales. Il en va ainsi du droit, acquis en 1971 par les étrangers, d'être éligible lors des élections sociales sous les mêmes conditions que les Belges. En 1970, un mouvement

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de défense des droits des immigrés naît et formule trois revendications principales : une loi sur le statut des étrangers, une loi réprimant le racisme et une loi octroyant le droit de vote aux élections communales. Au terme de dix ans de lutte, les deux premières revendications sont rencontrées : la loi sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers est adoptée en décembre 1980 et de même, en juillet 1981, celle réprimant le racisme. Avec la loi de 1980, les étrangers, objets du droit positif, commencent à bénéficier de droits subjectifs. Ils jouissent d'une sécurité de séjour et peuvent recourir aux tribunaux contre toute mesure discrétionnaire prise à leur rencontre. Avec la deuxième loi, l'État et les citoyens disposent d'une législation capable de réprimer le racisme et l'incitation à la haine raciale. Par contre, l'octroi du droit de vote n'est pas obtenu en 1981, faute de consensus. Vingt ans plus tard, le droit de vote et d'éligibilité est attribué aux ressortissants des États membres de l'Union européenne en 2000 et le seul droit de vote aux ressortissants des pays tiers en 2006. Un phénomène particulier change aussi les droits immigrés : la construction européenne. Sur la base du principe de non-discrimination, des immigrés perdent le statut d'étranger et deviennent des ressortissants d'un État membre de l'Union européenne (les Italiens, Grecs, Portugais et Espagnols, et maintenant les Polonais), assimilant leurs droits à ceux des nationaux sans changement de nationalité. Ces mesures initient la séparation juridique entre étrangers communautaires et étrangers extra-communautaires.

Le paradigme de la politique d'intégration et son contenu

La deuxième période débute en 1984. C'est le temps de la consécration du terme « intégration ». Une politique et un discours publics sur l'intégration s'affirment, bien qu'ils s'énoncent par une injonction paradoxale : « Vous pouvez rester, mais tout se passerait mieux si vous n'étiez pas là ». L'intégration se donne à voir comme une acceptation contrainte accompagnée d'un déni de reconnaissance. L'année 1984 consacre la première modification du code de la nationalité. Le second moment clé de la politique fédérale d'intégration naît avec la création, en 1989, du Commissariat royal à la politique des immigrés, remplacé en 1993 par le Centre pour l'égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme. Deux acteurs poussent, en 1991, à l'élaboration d'un consensus des élites politiques sur l'institutionnalisation de cette politique : les électeurs d'extrême droite en Flandre et les jeunes immigrés impliqués dans les émeutes urbaines à Bruxelles (Rea, 2001).

La politique publique d'intégration des immigrés est construite autour de trois axes. Le premier concerne les successives modifications de la loi sur la nationalité

(1984, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2000) qui, d'une part, instaurent définitivement le principe du *jus soli* pour les jeunes nés en Belgique et qui, d'autre part, assouplissent les conditions de naturalisation. La dernière réforme de mars 2000 instaure une des législations les plus libérales, en permettant à tout étranger ayant résidé légalement plus de sept ans en Belgique de bénéficier de la nationalité belge sur simple déclaration (procédure administrative). La disparition des statistiques de la population issue de l'immigration est à l'origine des débats sur les statistiques ethniques. La lutte contre le racisme et les discriminations est le deuxième axe. Durant les années 1990, le recours aux rhétoriques racistes par les partis démocratiques durant les campagnes électorales, relayées par les médias, tendent à disparaître, laissant le monopole de l'usage de l'idéologie et du discours racistes aux seuls partis d'extrême-droite. Des hommes politiques qui se sont montrés hostiles aux immigrés dans les années 1980 deviennent plus tolérants à l'égard

Au terme de dix ans de lutte, les deux premières revendications sont rencontrées : la loi sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers est adoptée en décembre 1980 et de même, en juillet 1981, celle réprimant le racisme.

d'administrés qui ne tardent pas à devenir de futurs électeurs en raison de l'assouplissement de la loi sur la nationalité. Si les discours racistes deviennent illégitimes dans l'espace public, le racisme quotidien et la discrimination raciale à l'embauche et dans la recherche d'un logement ne disparaissent pas. La lutte contre les discriminations ethniques et raciales s'accroît sous la pression exercée par les instances européennes. La faible utilisation de l'instrument juridique pour réprimer les discriminations raciales oblige à penser d'autres moyens encore en débat. Le troisième axe de la politique d'intégration est composé des politiques sociales qui dépendent des entités fédérées et de l'État fédéral. Elles ne concernent pas spécifiquement les immigrés et leurs descendants. Elles consistent essentiellement en politiques urbaines qui se structurent autour de deux pôles : la lutte contre l'insécurité et

la lutte contre les désavantages sociaux.

Derrière une unité de vue sur les principes généraux, des divergences opposent les Flamands et les francophones. Lors des débats parlementaires relatifs à l'assouplissement du Code de la nationalité, ces divergences apparaissent de manière saillante. La majorité des Flamands désire maintenir parmi les critères d'attribution de la nationalité des critères dits subjectifs (par exemple, un certain degré d'intégration culturelle) ou d'ordre linguistique (par exemple, la vérification de la connaissance d'une des langues nationales). La majorité des francophones ne souhaite garder que des critères dits objectifs (durée de séjour légal). Le registre argumentatif des Flamands se nourrit de références à l'*ethnos* alors que les francophones privilégient le *demos*. Cependant, cette opposition recouvre aussi un clivage politique, les partis de droite soutenant plus la première option et ceux de gauche, la seconde.

Dans une démocratie segmentée telle que la Belgique, l'intégration des immigrés relève de la gestion des territoires et des populations.

Un État et deux visions

La compétence institutionnelle de l'intégration des immigrés relève à la fois du niveau fédéral et de celui des entités fédérées. Des différences apparaissent là aussi entre les Flamands et les francophones. Une première distinction tient au mode de production de la politique publique. Les gouvernements flamands, contrairement aux gouvernements francophones, produisent des notes d'orientation générale définissant les priorités de la politique publique. Du côté francophone, c'est davantage la consultation de l'allocation des ressources budgétaires qui permet d'identifier les orientations de la politique publique. Dès lors, l'analyse des différences à partir des seuls discours politiques ne suffit pas à établir un véritable traitement différencié. Des ressemblances au niveau des pratiques sont peut-être plus grandes que ce qui est dit. Néanmoins, une différenciation dans le discours et dans les dispositifs apparaît au niveau des Communautés. En Communauté française domine un discours inspiré du « républicanisme français » de l'intégration qui tend à nier les spécificités culturelles et l'origine des immigrés et de leurs descendants alors qu'en Flandre, à l'instar des Pays-Bas, la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle est admise et l'existence de minorités ethniques affirmée.

Depuis 1990, la Flandre promeut une politique de reconnaissance et de soutien aux associations issues de l'immigration qui s'organisent autour d'une identité ethnique. Cette politique des immigrés (*Migrantenbeleid*) a pour groupe cible toute personne étant dans une position sociale défavorisée et/ou étant d'origine étrangère. En 1996, le gouvernement flamand adopte une nouvelle terminologie, et la politique des immigrés se transforme en politique des minorités (*Minderhedenbeleid*). Cette dernière reconnaît l'existence de groupes ethnoculturels et trois groupes cibles sont définis : les allochtones, les réfugiés et les gens du voyage. Cette nouvelle orientation politique est formalisée dans le décret relatif aux minorités ethniques de 1998, très largement inspiré du modèle néerlandais (Jacobs, 2001, 2004; Verlot, 2001). Le soutien apporté aux associations ethniques témoigne de la conviction flamande selon laquelle le maintien et le développement d'une identité propre chez les descendants des immigrés stimulent leur émancipation dans la société d'installation. La Communauté flamande a soutenu, jusqu'à présent, le développement d'organisations ethniques afin de stimuler la concertation, reste à savoir si cela va perdurer. En 2005, cette politique a fait l'objet d'après discussions au sein du gouvernement flamand. Depuis 2004, ce dernier a également repris des Pays-Bas la politique dite d'*inburgering*

(citoyennisation) qui impose aux nouveaux migrants non-européens de suivre des modules de formation comportant des cours de néerlandais, de connaissance de la société belge et des séances d'orientation sur le marché du travail.

Du côté francophone, le discours relatif aux immigrés est identique en Wallonie et à Bruxelles. Les minorités ethniques ne sont reconnues ni dans les faits ni dans les discours. La politique spécifique est relativement marginale. La politique d'intégration est davantage inscrite dans des politiques de ciblage territorial fondé sur des critères sociaux (pourcentage de chômeurs, de locataires, etc.) et démographiques (pourcentage d'étrangers). Bien qu'elle soit impropre, la dénomination dominante pour désigner ces « autres de l'intérieur » est celle « d'immigrés » ou « de personnes d'origine étrangère ». Pour des raisons institutionnelles, la Wallonie et Bruxelles adoptent des législations différentes. La représentation d'un multiculturalisme en Wallonie est généralement admise alors que toute approche en termes ethniques est rejetée.

Les anciens immigrés font partie de l'histoire wallonne parce qu'ils ont été des membres de la classe ouvrière qui constitue une composante essentielle de l'identité collective. En 1996, un décret relatif à « la population étrangère ou d'origine étrangère » organise la politique publique. Bien que ce décret établisse que la politique d'intégration soit fondée sur la discrimination positive pour promouvoir l'égalité des chances, ni les dispositions légales ni les projets financés ne donnent de contenu à cette notion. Des associations d'immigrés sont financées parce qu'elles proposent des activités d'insertion sociale (alphabétisation, formation professionnelle, etc.) et non parce qu'elles ont une identité ethnique. À Bruxelles, la politique publique francophone est organisée de 1993 à 2003 par une circulaire portant sur « l'intégration et la cohabitation des communautés

locales ». En 2004, un décret de portant sur la cohésion sociale les remplace. Les termes d'immigrés et personnes d'origine étrangère y sont absents. Le concept de cohésion sociale est supposé recouvrir les clivages socio-économiques et culturels de la ville. Ici aussi, les objectifs sont davantage sociaux que culturels. Les associations des minorités ethniques reçoivent des subsides pour leur action généraliste (amélioration du niveau scolaire, formation, animations culturelles et sportives, citoyenneté, etc.). Il existe un refus de soutenir des activités touchant au domaine de l'identité, du moins dans les discours. En effet, cette législation inaugure une pratique discursive de dénégation : « faire sans dire ». De fait, tant en Wallonie qu'à Bruxelles des animations ayant lieu pendant le Ramadan sont financées de même que des activités interculturelles. Toutefois, les discours politiques ne médiatisent pas ces pratiques.

La divergence des paradigmes des politiques publiques en Flandre, en Wallonie et à Bruxelles cache une relative

La majorité des Flamands désire maintenir parmi les critères d'attribution de la nationalité des critères dits subjectifs ou d'ordre linguistique. La majorité des francophones ne souhaite garder que des critères dits objectifs.

convergence. Les minorités ethniques ne peuvent pas avoir d'existence dans l'espace public. Leur spécificité peut être maintenue, voire soutenue comme en Flandre, dans l'espace de la société civile, mais elles ne peuvent se constituer en groupes autonomes revendiquant une légitimité à exister comme les autres piliers de la société belge. La situation en Flandre pourrait être qualifiée de multiculturalisme inégalitaire (Martiniello, 1997) et celle de la Communauté française de multiculturalisme méritocratique (Rea, 2001). Deux hypothèses peuvent être avancées pour comprendre cette différence. La première tient au rapport à l'héritage culturel. Dans l'histoire de la Belgique, les Flamands majoritaires en nombre ont subi une domination culturelle francophone de plus d'un siècle inscrite dans les pratiques sociales et incorporée dans les institutions. Ne pas renier l'héritage culturel et défendre son appartenance ont été des moteurs de la constitution de l'identité flamande. Les Flamands conçoivent difficilement d'imposer aux immigrés la négation de leur identité culturelle. La deuxième hypothèse relève de la stratégie politique. Dans un État où ils occupent une position minoritaire tout en défendant l'identité nationale, les francophones adoptent une stratégie visant à transformer les nouveaux Belges en francophones et non en minorités ethniques. Franciser et « belgiciser » ces nouveaux venus renforcent leur position face aux Flamands. La configuration des rapports de force des deux grands groupes nationaux expliquent, entre autres, les positions retenues par les entités fédérées en matière d'intégration des immigrés bien que cette différenciation soit également tempérée par l'appartenance politique (Martiniello et Rea, 2004).

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RELIGION
AND ETHNICITY
IN CANADA



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Religion and Ethnicity in Canada

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Religion and Ethnicity in Canada brosse le portrait des six principales religions du Canada : le judaïsme, l'hindouisme, le sikhisme, le bouddhisme, l'islam, et les religions chinoises. Ce livre aborde également la question de la place qu'occupe la religion dans la société canadienne eu égard à l'élaboration des politiques publiques, à l'immigration, à l'économie, et aux lois et normes régissant l'éducation.



CANADA'S TWO-WAY STREET INTEGRATION MODEL: NOT WITHOUT ITS STAINS, STRAINS AND GROWING PAINS

ABSTRACT

This article explores the Canadian “two-way street” model of integration. In addition to exploring the context within which it has been developed and implemented, the authors provide an overview of the specific programs the Government of Canada has developed to facilitate this reciprocal approach to integration. Importantly, they also address how the Canadian approach has tackled the stains, strains and growing pains with which any diversity policy must contend in the changing world in which we live.

Respect for diversity is now held as a cornerstone of the Canadian integration model, and is cited consistently in public policy discourse as central to the sense of a common or shared Canadian identity. It has not always been the case: Canadian history is littered with public policy that cannot be reflected upon with anything but shame, including the internment of Japanese Canadians that was redressed in 1988 and the explicitly racist nature of immigration head taxes imposed on immigrants from China (redressed in 2006). A significant body of literature chronicles these egregious moments in Canadian history (Adachi 1976, Ferguson 1975, Ward 1990). That said, Canadians and their governments have worked assiduously for generations to construct a more inclusive Canada. While the progress on this front has been uneven and much remains to be done, a remarkably inclusive and robust model has been developed. A model that has served Canada well as its population has diversified rapidly in the wake of immigration reforms in the 1960s and 1970s with the introduction of the famed “points system” that removed explicit racial and country-of-origin bias from the selection of immigrants to Canada.¹

The strength of this approach and its wide support can best be understood by looking at moments of “crises” and how Canadians and their institutions have reacted to such moments. For example, the arrival of three shiploads of Chinese refugee claimants off the west coast of Canada in 1999, the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the SARS outbreak in Toronto in 2003, and the arrest of 17 terrorist suspects in Toronto in the summer of 2006. In each case, public discourse was briefly tinged with intolerance and xenophobia, but in each instance the wider support for a multicultural and inclusive approach prevailed.² This clearly situates Canada in a different space than many of the countries covered in this issue of *Canadian Diversity / Diversité canadienne*, where a withdrawal from inclusive multicultural approaches can be seen.

Rather tellingly, in the Canadian context, political resolve remains strong. For example, in the wake of the arrests of 17 alleged terrorists in Toronto in summer 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper reinforced the Canadian public policy position on multiculturalism when he noted that the arrests had:

led to some commentary to the effect that Canada’s open and culturally diverse society makes us a more vulnerable target for terrorist activity...I believe that exactly the opposite is true. Canada’s diversity, properly nurtured, is our great strength. (Harper 2006)

This political support may simply be based on an understanding of Canadian demographics. The intersection of immigration and ethnoracial and religious diversity is a profound reality in Canada. At the time of the 2001 Census, 5.4 million or 18.4% of Canada’s population of 31 million were foreign-born. The visible minority³ population accounted for 13.4% of the Canadian population, or 4 million people, which is an increase of 25% from 1996 to 2001 as compared to an increase of

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The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Metropolis Project, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, or the Government of Canada.

4% for the overall Canadian population. Statistics Canada's demographic projections suggest that by 2017, the visible minority population will increase to 20% of Canada's total population.

Religious pluralism is also an increasingly important feature of the Canadian demographic landscape. For example, the Canadian Muslim population grew at a rate of 128.9% between 1991 and 2001. The 2017 demographic projections mentioned above estimate that adherents of religions other than Christianity will increase from 6.3% of the total population reported on the 2001 Census to between 9.2 and 11.2% of the total population in 2017 (GoC 2005b).

The rate of growth of diversity in Canada (Canadians listed more than 200 ethnic groups in their responses to the 2001 Census question on ethnic ancestry) is due in large part to Canada's relatively open immigration program and shifting immigrant source countries over the past 20 years – which has contributed to the vast majority of recent immigrants being visible minorities. While the majority of immigrants to Canada prior to the mid 20th century were European in origin, Canada has increasingly accepted immigrants from Asia, South and Central America, the Middle East and Africa. In 2005, the top five source countries for immigrants were the People's Republic of China (16.1%), India (12.6%), the Philippines (6.7%), Pakistan (5.2%) and the United States (3.5%).

Integration paradigm

The preferred model of immigrant integration in Canada is multiculturalism. Often described as what it is not – neither segregation nor assimilation – it is widely held that the Canadian integration process is a continuum that stretches from initial selection, settlement and adaptation through to and beyond formal acquisition of citizenship. From a public policy perspective, immigrant integration is described from a perspective of reciprocity. More than just helping a newcomer find a job and a place to live, integration in Canada is described as a “two-way street” requiring accommodation and adjustments, as well as rights and responsibilities, on the part of both the newcomers and the host society.⁴

Legislative/constitutional base

The multicultural model of immigrant integration in Canada is enshrined in a comprehensive legislative and constitutional framework that expresses support for linguistic, religious, ethnocultural and ethnoracial pluralism within the context of Canada's commitment to individual rights. It is this framework that provides the impetus for the “two-way street of integration” described above.

The key pieces of legislation that define the Canadian approach to integration include the *Canadian*

Multiculturalism Act of 1988 and the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA) of 2001. Section 3(1)c of the former notes that it is the policy of the Government of Canada to “promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation.” Thirteen years later this was echoed in Section 3 of IRPA's objectives: “(e) to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society.”

These two critical pieces of legislation are, of course, framed by the Constitution: Section 27 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) calls for the Charter to be interpreted “in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” Finally, other key pieces of legislation include the *Citizenship Act* (1947 and 1977), the *Canadian Human Rights Act* (1977), the *Employment Equity Act* (1985 and 1995) and the *Official Languages Act* (1969 and 1995), which all support multiculturalism. Naturally, the entire legislative framework is also structured within international human rights agreements.

Delivery of services

As a shared responsibility,⁵ integration programs and services follow as a logical consequence of the decision to admit someone to Canada. Newcomer settlement and adaptation takes place across various domains of integration, such as housing, health, education and the labour market.⁶ As such, prospective immigrants and newcomers are provided with a range of federally and provincially funded settlement and integration programs and services, both pre- and post-arrival in Canada.

While the federal government funds delivery of settlement services including orientation, mentoring and language training for adult immigrants, in Canada, the sectors of health, education and housing services fall under provincial jurisdiction. As well, immigrants live and work in cities and communities, thus municipalities often have a vested interest in planning for how to meet the needs of newcomers at the local level.

Given the multi-sectoral and multi-jurisdictional nature of integration in Canada, partnership with all levels of government, and with the private and NGO sectors, is essential to successful integration of newcomers. Community-based immigrant and refugee-serving organizations are especially instrumental in assisting newcomers with their immediate and ongoing settlement needs, since they are very sensitive to the needs of the local community as well as to the diverse cultural backgrounds and experiences that recent immigrants and refugees bring to Canada.

Canadians and their governments have worked assiduously for generations to construct a more inclusive Canada. While the progress on this front has been uneven and much remains to be done, a remarkably inclusive and robust model has been developed.

Major services

While the Government of Canada's immigration system seeks to select immigrants on the basis of human capital like education and language skills, and thus attempts to minimize the need for settlement and integration services, there is, of course, no such thing as what one of our colleagues has referred to as a "ready-to-wear immigrant." The migration process is disruptive and settlement and integration is challenging. It is in the best interests of both immigrants and Canadian society as a whole that the disruption be minimized and that the challenges be met as effectively and rapidly as possible. Importantly, the responsibility for meeting these challenges is shared by newcomers and other Canadians.

To respond to these challenges, the Government of Canada has developed a suite of core settlement programs consisting of the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP), the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC), and the Host Program. These services are delivered through formal contribution agreements with a range of partners including community-based and non-governmental organizations, businesses, educational institutions and other levels of government.

Settlement programming specific to refugees includes the Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP), an income support program that also provides reception, temporary accommodation and basic orientation services specific to government assisted refugees, and the Private Sponsorship Program where groups in Canada take on responsibility for resettling refugees from abroad by providing the necessary financial, orientation and emotional support.⁷

ISAP is targeted to meet the needs of the whole family, and funding allows for social and economic bridging services, such as translation, interpretation and job-search; orientation sessions in Canada and abroad; settlement support in schools for teachers, immigrant children and their parents; and funding for Enhanced Language Training, which provides higher levels of language training including job-specific language training in English or French, and bridge-to-work assistance, including mentoring, work placement and other assistance in accessing the labour market. ISAP also funds activities that support the delivery of settlement programming such as research, conferences, settlement worker training and delivery tools for service providers and community partners.

While some orientation services funded by ISAP are available to newcomers pre-arrival through Canadian Orientation Abroad, pre-arrival orientation services are

limited in their reach and substantive content. Critics have suggested that Canada needs to do more to inform prospective newcomers about life in Canada, even before they make the decision to migrate. Stakeholders have identified the lack of detailed and specific information available to prospective and new immigrants as one barrier to the successful integration of immigrants into the Canadian labour market and society. Through the 2005 Budget, funding was provided for the development of an integrated, comprehensive, national immigration portal. The Going to Canada Immigration Portal is being developed in collaboration with the provinces and territories through the enhancement of the existing Going to Canada Website.

The volunteer-based Host Program is designed to create connections among newcomers and established Canadians and permanent residents by matching newcomers with an in-Canada host (individual, youth, families) to support settlement and integration activities such as orientation, practice of new language skills, or enhancement of economic and social networks. While the Host Program is one of the most obvious settlement programs that articulates the "two-way street" of integration by creating connections between hosts and newcomers, thereby engaging Canadians and established residents in the integration process itself, it could be doing more.

As a volunteer-based program that has historically been funded at less than approximately 2% of the federal settlement budget, challenges exist for service providers with respect to promotion, volunteer recruitment and retention, and waiting lists with respect to matching challenges. Through additional funding announced in the 2005 Federal Budget for *Canada's Action Plan against Racism* (the Government of Canada's new horizontal approach to eliminate barriers to opportunities for Canadians of all ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic backgrounds), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) has committed to expand the Host Program to more children and youth, families and business.

LINC funds language instruction for adult newcomers in English or French, and includes delivery support and assessment services. It includes a child-minding component in order to encourage the participation of women, and flexible hours of instruction and a transportation allowance are also available. Unfortunately, the delivery of LINC is uneven across the country and even in the locations with the most advanced level of delivery, it only provides basic levels of language training.⁸ To further complicate the matter, education of children is under provincial jurisdiction so

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federal language training for newcomers to Canada is delivered solely to adult immigrants. English as a Second Language programs for newcomer children are offered by provincial governments through the education system.

According to the Parliamentary Main Estimates, in 2005 federal funding for immigrant integration programs outside of Quebec included \$44.7 million for ISAP programming, including Canadian Orientation Abroad, Settlement Workers in Schools activities, and Enhanced Language Training projects; \$2.8 million for the Host Program; \$100.5 million for LINC; and \$44.5 million for RAP. The Federal Government also provided \$227.5 million for provincial agreements with British Columbia, Manitoba and Quebec.⁹

While eligibility for federally-funded settlement programs and services generally spans the first three years in Canada¹⁰ or until an immigrant becomes a Canadian citizen, it is not expected that a newcomer is fully integrated and all settlement needs met after such a relatively short time in Canada. At the same time that public policy discourse describes citizenship as the “ultimate policy objective” of the integration program, it also recognizes that the integration process does not end at the official citizenship ceremony.

Role of naturalization and citizenship

Canadian citizenship means having legal status as a citizen of Canada as set out in the *Citizenship Act* (1977); sharing equally in the rights and responsibilities that belong to each Canadian; and taking an active part in Canadian society.¹¹

Unlike the law in effect in Canada up to 1977, the current *Citizenship Act* allows a Canadian citizen to voluntarily acquire foreign nationality without automatically losing Canadian citizenship. Since February 15, 1977, a Canadian citizen may retain Canadian citizenship, unless he or she voluntarily applies to renounce it and the application is approved by a citizenship judge. The current Act thus makes it possible to have several citizenships and allegiances at the same time for an indefinite period.¹²

In general, to become a Canadian citizen, applicants must be permanent residents who have lived in Canada for at least three of the four years prior to their application for citizenship. Applicants must be at least 18 years old and parents may apply on behalf of their minor children. People applying for a grant of citizenship must be able to speak English or French. They must also demonstrate knowledge of Canada, and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. This is evaluated with a written test or oral interview (hearing with a citizenship judge).

People may be prohibited from being granted citizenship if they were charged or convicted of certain crimes. As a policy, people over 55 years of age are exempt from the language and knowledge requirements. Minors

must be permanent residents and are not submitted to residence, language or knowledge requirements. The final step in becoming a Canadian citizen is to take the oath of citizenship. Applicants attend a citizenship ceremony where a citizenship judge administers the oath and presents each new Canadian with a Certificate of Canadian Citizenship.

As CIC has responsibility for the administration of the *Citizenship Act*, the Department also promotes the rights and responsibilities of citizenship to all Canadians. Established Canadians are also encouraged to reflect on these rights and responsibilities through citizenship reaffirmation ceremonies, special events and the production of teacher’s activity guides. In addition, the establishment of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship (ICC), an independent not-for-profit organization, was announced in September 2005 as a legacy project in honour of former Governor General Adrienne Clarkson. One of the objectives of the ICC is to explore ways to help new Canadians understand the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, as well as what it means to be an active and engaged citizen in one’s community.

One of the objectives of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship is to explore ways to help new Canadians understand the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, as well as what it means to be an active and engaged citizen in one’s community.

Federal public policy recognizes that the process of immigrant integration that facilitates attachment to the country and a sense of belonging can take many years. While CIC has the primary responsibility for settlement programs during the first three years of the integration process, the Department of Canadian Heritage also plays an important role in immigrant integration through responsibility for Canada’s multiculturalism policy and programs at the federal level. Canadian Heritage takes up where CIC’s responsibility leaves off, through programs that strengthen diversity, enhance capacity in ethnocultural communities, and aim to foster substantive equality for all Canadians. As Biles and

Mulholland (2006) have pointed out, “In some ways one could conceive of CIC’s role in the first three years to be working primarily with newcomers themselves to ensure successful integration, and Canadian Heritage works primarily on Canadian society to ensure that the two-way street model of integration is a success.”²¹³

This integration process is nested within a broader Government of Canada approach to shared citizenship that is described in articles by Van Wyck and Donaldson, as well as Lazar, included in this issue. In broad brush strokes, this approach creates a dynamic Canadian identity that evolves over time and that embraces diversity and accompanying change rather than clinging to an autochthonous and never changing approach.

Outcomes: Handling stains, strains and growing pains

When looking at immigrant outcomes, there are questions as to whether or not the two-way street of integration is working. As with any integration model there are the stains of injustice (real or perceived, past or

present); the strains of a system that is not delivering (or does not appear to be delivering) the desired outcomes; and the growing pains that accompany not only an immigration program that wishes to bring in more newcomers, but also one that wishes to encourage an ever increasing diversity of newcomers to settle in a wider range of locations than has typically been the case. It is our assertion that the Canadian model is working because of the commitment of Canadians and their governments to tackle all three in a spirit of reciprocity: newcomers must adapt, but so too must other Canadians.

An excellent example of this two-way approach is the willingness of the Government of Canada to reflect on past policy and to redress injustices. For example, the present government has worked to tackle one of the most prominently discussed historical biases in Canadian immigration history – the so called “head tax” charged to Chinese immigrants for the first half of the 20th century. On June 22, 2006 the Prime Minister described this as a “grave injustice, and one we are morally obligated to acknowledge.” The Government of Canada will make symbolic payments to those required to pay the tax, and the spouses of those who have passed way, and will create a fund for community projects designed to acknowledge the impact of past wartime measures and immigration restrictions targeting ethnocultural communities (GoC 2006).

Injustice can continue to stain present-day society. For example, racism remains a concern for many Canadians, especially Black Canadians who reported significantly higher levels of discrimination or unfair treatment than others: 32% of Black Canadians reported that they had been discriminated against or treated unfairly by others because of their ethnocultural characteristics, compared to 21% of South Asian Canadians, and 18% of Chinese Canadians (GoC 2003). As a result, the Government of Canada launched a three-year initiative called *A Canada for All: Canada’s Action Plan Against Racism* with six key components: 1). Assist victims and groups vulnerable to racism and related forms of discrimination; 2). Develop forward-looking approaches to promote diversity and combat racism; 3). Strengthen the role of civil society; 4). Strengthen regional and international cooperation; 5). Educate children and youth on diversity and anti-racism; 6). Counter hate and bias (GoC 2005).

A third stain that is presently frequently mooted in Canadian public discourse is the question of profiling used by police and security agencies. While it is officially denied, and the absence of widespread statistics collected

by these agencies makes it difficult to judge the extent of the practice, work by criminologist Scot Wortley and his colleagues do indicate that the Black community is both subject to greater police surveillance, and they are more likely to get caught when they do break the law (Wortley and Tanner 2004). Meanwhile, Muslim Canadians feel that they are often the subject of tighter than justified security surveillance (Khan and Saloojee 2003, Hamdani, Bhatti and Munawar 2005).

Several strains have also emerged in the integration of newcomers in Canada in the last decade. As we discussed earlier, with the move to a stronger focus on the “human capital” model under the present immigration act (*IRPA*) the assumption was that selection of higher education and

language skills would lead to more flexible labour market participation (Tolley 2003). It is premature to ascertain whether this will, indeed, be the case since a sizeable backlog of applications means that only five years after the introduction of the new Act are the first immigrants selected under its revised selection grid arriving in Canada. That said, we do know that poverty levels among immigrants have been rising with 47% of recent immigrants living below the low-income cut-off line (Picot and Hou 2003). In addition, a new range of strains to emerge includes complex issues like foreign credential recognition and how to effectively gauge facility in a language.

Facility in one of Canada’s official languages (French or English) is key to participation in all aspects of life in Canada and remains one of the principle integration challenges. Acknowledging the importance of language to successful integration, more points were linked to language in the revised selection criteria flowing from the 2001 *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’s* regulations. However, this only applies to principle applicants and, in a limited manner, their spouses. Despite this requirement, the reality is that many

newcomers, even with some fluency in English or French, lack the higher levels of language competence required to obtain employment in their chosen fields. The recently announced Enhanced Language Training may help with this process. Additionally, those newcomers who arrive as refugees or through family sponsorship are likely to require language training to facilitate integration into Canadian society. An interesting emerging measure of the efficacy and reach of language programs such as LINC is the assessment of language ability at time of citizenship acquisition. If LINC primarily funds basic language training, it could be expected that LINC participants would have achieved a competency level necessary to

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participate fully as citizens at the time of naturalization. Data from a study on this question will be available in the near future. This information should guide needed enhancements to settlement and integration programming funded at the federal level by the announcement of additional settlement funding for provinces and territories outside of Ontario and Quebec in the 2006 Federal Budget.

On the other side of the two-way integration street, questions of citizenship and who has a right to Canadian citizenship have become increasingly common. This erupted recently into Canadian public discourse surrounding the Khadr family, a family of Canadian Muslims who were implicated in Al-Qaeda activities (*Maclean's* 2006). More recently it has been making headlines because of the number of Canadian citizens in Lebanon when the most recent conflict began (Granatstein 2006, Savage 2006). Others have speculated on what would happen if China, Taiwan and Hong Kong were ever to become an international hot spot with 300,000 Canadians living overseas in these areas (Skelton 2006). This debate has gained little traction and falters on the same points as several recent attempts to revise the *Citizenship Act* – who should be empowered to revoke citizenship, on what basis, and within what parameters? (Garcea 2003)

Finally, a series of growing pains is increasingly apparent in Canada as the Government of Canada strives to both increase the number of immigrants to Canada and to encourage them to settle outside of major centres (especially Toronto, Vancouver and Montréal, but also increasingly Calgary). These changes raise questions of “absorptive capacity” and broaden the range of partners necessary to successfully integrate newcomers. For example, municipalities are becoming increasingly involved in the settlement and integration of newcomers. This runs the gamut from developing the expertise required to deliver municipal services to a more diverse population, to the formal agreement negotiated by the City of Winnipeg with the provincial government and the federal government on immigration topics.

As Van Wyck and Donaldson point out in their article in this magazine, there is a complex interplay between Canada’s two official language communities and immigration. This relationship has historically been quite antagonistic, but has more recently evolved in a collaborative fashion with the recognition that immigration is a key factor in the growth and vitality of Francophone communities outside Quebec.

In order to help maintain the Francophone minority communities and enhance linguistic duality in Canada, initiatives have been taken to increase the number of French-speaking immigrants who will settle in these communities across Canada. In March 2003, the

Government of Canada released its *Action Plan for Official Languages* (Action Plan), which revolved around three major areas: education, community development and an exemplary public service. There was \$751.3 million allocated to implement the Action Plan over five years. The Action Plan allocated \$9 million over five years, and \$2 million for subsequent years to CIC in order to initiate activities aimed at attracting, settling and integrating immigrants within Francophone communities outside Quebec. To date, under this initiative, CIC established the basic infrastructure to foster immigration to Francophone minority communities.

The Action Plan was updated in September 2006, when federal Minister of Immigration, the Honourable Monte Solberg, along with the Honourable Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation and Minister for La Francophonie and Official Languages, launched the new *Strategic Plan to Foster Immigration to Francophone Minority Communities* (Strategic Plan).¹⁴ The key objective of the plan is to increase the percentage of

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French-speaking immigrants by 2008: In 2001, approximately 3.1% of immigrants were French-speaking people who immigrated to Francophone communities outside Quebec. The Strategic Plan has a goal of raising this to a minimum of 4.4% of overall immigration by 2008. It proposes to increase, in particular, the number of French-speaking students and economic class immigrants in Francophone minority communities. The Strategic Plan also suggests these communities need to work in close partnership with federal, provincial and territorial governments to recruit people that meet their needs, and to help them succeed. It suggests strengthening a number of integration services, including language and skills training, community

awareness and local support networks.

Each expansion in the Canadian immigration programs, in the diversity within the newcomer population, or in the reception sites strains the integration model that has become used to newcomers clustering primarily in Canada’s largest cities. Alternative delivery models need to be developed, perfected and shared across jurisdictions. This shared expertise and knowledge across a wide range of players and jurisdictions strengthens the Canadian integration model and ensures that it will be robust enough to handle the inevitable crises of a globalized and unstable world.

Conclusion

As the experiences of many other immigrant receiving societies covered in this issue indicate, the success of any given integration approach will only last as long as the model’s ability to address the stains, strains and growing pains with which it is faced. The Canadian approach has

enjoyed success thus far as it has adapted to the challenges posed by mass migration without sacrificing the multicultural framework embedded in the Constitution and in a suite of legislation and policy at all levels of government. As long as Canadians and their governments continue to support an inclusive approach that encourages newcomers to become active and self-reflective or critical citizens, then this success is likely to continue.

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Notes

- Citizenship and immigration policies historically made an explicit link between national identity and racial identity at least until the 1960s with the introduction of the points system in the 1967 *Immigration Act* when race no longer was a condition of entry or exclusion. The 1976 *Immigration Act* is held to have continued in removing bias from selection system, and introduced the idea of cultural diversity as a positive benefit of immigration.
- Despite the claims of some critics like political pundit and pollster Allan Gregg who claims that 75% of Canadians believe too many immigrants come to Canada (Gregg 2005), other polls find that 49% believe the right number, and 18% believe too few immigrants come to Canada (Ipsos Reid 2005). The latter number is more in keeping with tracking polls as far back as 1988 (Biles 2006).
- "Visible minority" is a term used to refer to both immigrants and Canadian-born people of various non-European ethnoracial backgrounds. The term is defined in the *Employment Equity Act* as referring to "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour." This category includes the following groups: Blacks, South Asians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Southeast Asians, Filipinos, Arabs and West Asians, Latin Americans, and Pacific Islanders.
- For more on how federal settlement programs encourage the two-way street approach see Winnemore 2005.
- Section 95 of the 1867 *Constitution Act* defines immigration as a shared jurisdiction between the federal government and the provincial governments.
- For a comprehensive discussion of the multiple sites of integration, see Biles and Mulholland 2006.
- This includes Joint Assistance Sponsorship in which private sponsors and government share responsibilities.
- Originally launched in 2003, the ELT initiative (\$20M annually) addresses this issue to some regard, but it was designed more to help immigrants acquire the level of language proficiency necessary to find and retain work commensurate with their level of skills and experience, and does not address the issue of uneven delivery across the country for basic levels of language training.
- CIC has bilateral agreements for administration and delivery of settlement programs and services with provincial governments (British Columbia and Manitoba), and with Quebec via the Canada-Quebec Accord. In 2005, the Government of Canada also signed the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement. In the 2006 Budget, the Federal Government announced \$230 million in funding to support implementation of the agreement with the province of Ontario, and an additional \$77 million for provinces and territories outside of Ontario and Quebec to enhance settlement programming.


¹⁰ Three years is the length of time for the residency requirement for citizenship, and has little to do with the length of time it takes to integrate.

¹¹ The acquisition of Canadian citizenship by naturalization awards only a few rights that are not enjoyed by permanent residents. The right to vote and to run for political office in federal and provincial elections; the right to hold certain public offices; and the right to hold a Canadian passport are among those accorded by acquisition of citizenship. There are also some residency restrictions for permanent residents under IRPA that are removed once naturalized.

¹² While some have expressed concerns that multiple allegiances might imperil connections to Canada, there is no research to suggest that this is the case. Indeed, Jedwab finds that Canadian Muslims, often the group against whom the charge of mixed allegiances is presently most commonly leveled, reported higher levels of attachment to Canada than the general population: 83% of Muslims surveyed had a strong sense of belonging to Canada, while 79.4% of the general population reported a strong sense of an attachment (Jedwab 2006).

¹³ “Of course, CIC and other federal departments and agencies also work to ensure receptivity on the part of Canadians and their institutions, and Canadian Heritage does also work with newcomers and their communities to build capacity” (Biles and Mulholland 2006). See also Winnemore (2005) for a description of how CIC facilitates the two-way aspect of integration.

¹⁴ The Plan is available at www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/plan-minorities.html.



**Thinking About Immigration
Outside Canada's Metropolitan Centres**
**Penser l'immigration en dehors
des métropoles du Canada**

Special issue of Canadian Ethnic Studies

A recent special issue of *Canadian Ethnic Studies / Études ethniques au Canada* (Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, 2005) looks at the regionalization of immigration. It was guest edited by Michèle Vatz Laaroussi (Université de Sherbrooke), Margaret Walton-Roberts (Wilfrid Laurier University), John Biles (Metropolis Project) and Jean Viel (Social Development Canada). The issue includes articles on regional dispersal in British Columbia, immigrant settlement in local labour markets in Ontario, on the settlement of refugees in Québec City and in smaller cities in British Columbia, on francophone Acadians, interculturalism and regionalization, and on the services available to new immigrants in Halifax. There is also a conference report from “Immigration and Out-migration: Atlantic Canada at a Crossroads.”

Numéro spécial d'Études ethniques au Canada

Un numéro spécial d'Études ethniques au Canada / *Canadian Ethnic Studies* publié récemment (vol. XXXVII, n° 3, 2005) jette un regard sur la régionalisation de l'immigration. Michèle Vatz Laaroussi (Université de Sherbrooke), Margaret Walton-Roberts (Wilfrid Laurier University), John Biles (projet Metropolis) et Jean Viel (Développement social Canada), ont participé à sa publication, à titre de rédacteurs invités. La revue contient des articles portant sur la dispersion régionale en Colombie-Britannique, sur la participation d'immigrants dans les marchés du travail locaux en Ontario, sur l'établissement de réfugiés dans la Ville de Québec et dans des petites communautés de la Colombie-Britannique, sur les Acadiens, l'interculturalisme et la régionalisation, ainsi que sur les services offerts aux nouveaux immigrants à Halifax. La publication présente également un compte rendu de conférence d'« Immigration et émigration : le Canada atlantique à la croisée des chemins ».

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HALTING APPROACH TO IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

ABSTRACT

Despite pressures for a common strategy, collaboration on immigrant integration in the European Union (EU) has been limited, even though the estimated number of the Union's diverse non-European residents – comprising former colonial subjects, foreign workers, asylum seekers, refugees, and the undocumented – hover around 20 million out of a total population of 460 million. The project for a unified European market in the mid-1980s made common migration policies necessary: if third-country nationals did not face the same totally free labour market as European workers, job openings and job seekers would not match up as anticipated. This article traces the history of the Commission's initiatives over the last several years in building a common integration strategy, as proposes an overview of the search for common integration indicators that would enable member states to compare, benchmark, and evaluate their performance, hastening convergence toward common EU targets.

Despite pressures for a common strategy, collaboration on immigrant integration in the European Union (EU) has been limited. Citizens of EU member states have won nearly complete freedom of movement and extensive EU-wide social and political rights. Member-state governments have been less willing to relinquish control over the entry and settlement of third-country nationals (TCNs). After years of *ad hoc* intergovernmental cooperation, however, the past decade has seen a steady flow of EU instruments covering the admission, free movement, and even integration of resident TCNs. Many components of a common integration framework are now present, notwithstanding the absence of a legal basis in the founding Treaties of Rome. Basic principles along liberal multicultural lines have been agreed, and a new conception of “civic citizenship” has been mooted.

Unfortunately, the EU has focused on abstract rights and quantitative indicators, ignoring the importance of the integration process in generating or defusing conflict. That shortcoming, along with member-state governments' continued dominance over the policy area, has precluded a cohesive EU-level approach. It remains a work in progress, characterized by incoherence, contradiction, and wishful thinking.

The evolution of an EU integration policy

Estimates of the total number of the Union's diverse non-European residents – comprising former colonial subjects, foreign workers, asylum seekers, refugees, and the undocumented – hover around 20 million out of a total population of 460 million. Differing policies, laws, and historical ties have contributed to the creation of immigrant-origin populations that vary in size, regional concentration, and ethnic composition in and within EU member states (Ireland 1994).

In the EU “integration” usually refers to the evolution of the Union in general, yet the term has come to apply also to immigrants. Technically, integration policy is intended for legally resident non-nationals and not minority nationals. EU policy making in any field is incredibly complex and cumbersome. All major EU institutions have been implicated in developing responses to immigration. Regarding the integration of TCNs, however, member-state prerogatives have prevailed.

Before this policy area came into its own, TCNs had already won key protections. By means of a 1961 directive – which establishes an outcome that member states must achieve through their own means – the intergovernmental Council of Ministers recognized the right to family reunification and the equal access of foreign workers' family members to education and employment. A 1964 directive stipulated that non-nationals holding an unlimited residence permit could be expelled only on “serious” grounds relating to public policy, public security, or public health. Bilateral treaties between the Common Market and their homelands promised Turkish and North African workers the same treatment as nationals. With the blessings of the European Commission, responsible for upholding the interests of the Union as a whole, the European Court of Justice enforced and gradually broadened those treaties' application (Ireland 1997).

The project for a unified European market in the mid-1980s made common migration policies necessary: if TCNs did not face the same totally free labour market as European workers, job openings

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and job seekers would not match up as anticipated. The Treaty on European Union was drafted by the heads of State and government at their European Council summit in Maastricht in late 1991. Effective two years later, it committed the member states to harmonizing their answers to the challenges of immigration and asylum. The Treaty of Amsterdam, in force by 1999, shifted those issues from debates on the internal market to those on judicial cooperation and security. All migration-related matters became subject to actions adopted by the Council of Ministers based on proposals from the Commission and, provisionally, the member states.¹ At Tampere in 1999, the European Council set out specific objectives – “Milestones” – to be met on the path toward developing a common policy.

The Commission worked thereafter toward a collective legal structure by means of draft directives on undocumented migration, crime prevention, border controls, the reception of asylum seekers and refugees, and the admission of students and volunteers. These instruments stuck with vague, nonbinding references that granted member states considerable leeway. Final adoption had to await the opinion of the directly elected European Parliament, often frustrated with the Council of Ministers for refusing to accept its proposed amendments. Getting member states to transpose directives represented another struggle. Despite these teething pains, by 2004, a basic EU legislative framework was in place with respect to admissions.

Harmonization on immigrant integration was slower, although an agenda of inclusion did start to take shape. The Treaty of Amsterdam contained provisions for police and justice cooperation to deal with racism and xenophobia. Among the Tampere Milestones was a vow to ensure the fair treatment and integration of legally resident TCNs, granting them “rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens” (European Council 1999).

In 2000, the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament proclaimed jointly the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. It set out a number of principles whose universality rendered them applicable to TCNs. That same year, a package of antiracism measures was adopted by the Council of Ministers. It consisted of one directive to implement the principle of equal treatment in employment and another to combat discrimination more generally on the grounds of ethnicity, race, religion, belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation – though not on account of nationality.

Likewise in 2000, the Commission presented a communication to the Council of Ministers and Parliament that recommended a common approach to immigration management. This note introduced the concept of “civic

citizenship,” which provided for the gradual acquisition of core rights and obligations. Akin to the “denizenship” status championed in progressive European academic circles, it would guarantee equal treatment to TCNs after five years residence even in the absence of formal citizenship or naturalization.

Toward liberal multiculturalism?

The terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001, concentrated minds even more. The Seville European Council in 2002 argued for comprehensive policies on integration while leaving primary responsibility with the member states. Their governments were encouraged to develop informational programs and language training for newcomers and to set up a network of “national contact points” to facilitate cooperation between relevant authorities and help define common principles. This group of national administrators met for the first time in March 2003. The Thessaloniki European Council that June formalized their mandate. Concurrently, it asked the Commission to edit an annual report on immigration and integration, as well as a handbook of “best practices” in the field. Remarkably, almost a quarter of the conclusions in Greece related to the integration of TCNs.

The blueprint for an integration strategy announced there had been set out in a Commission communication on immigration, integration, and employment. It presented the EU’s definition of integration as “a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third-country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant.” Member states were “to ensure that the formal rights of immigrants are in place in such a way that the individual has the possibility of participating in economic, social, cultural, and civil life.” Immigrants had to “respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, without having to relinquish their own identity” (Commission 2003, 17-18).

After Thessaloniki, the Council of Ministers issued directives foreseeing long-term residency status for TCNs legally resident for five years in a member state and their conditional right to move from one member state to another to exercise an economic activity or to pursue training. The Commission oversaw local pilot projects to bolster networks and information exchange.

Amid the welter of EU policies and pronouncements, the outlines were visible of a budding liberal multicultural consensus: policy-makers ensured equality for minority ethnic cultures in the public realm, which systematically privileges the dominant culture, yet worked toward an even playing field and the phasing out of targeted

The project for a unified European market in the mid-1980s made common migration policies necessary: if third-country nationals did not face the same totally free labour market as European workers, job openings and job seekers would not match up as anticipated.

policies (Penninx and Slijper 1999). The EU maintained that ethnic identities and associations eased immigrants' social and cultural integration. Even so, they could only fill a temporary, instrumental function in ensuring the ultimate aim of equality of opportunity. They would eventually find their proper place in the purely private realm (Ireland 2004).

In November 2004, the European Council in The Hague implicitly endorsed that approach in a list of non-binding Common Basic Principles (CBPs) that were to constitute the EU's "integration framework." Integration was (1) a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation that nonetheless entailed (2) respect for the EU's "basic values." The areas requiring action were (3) employment; (4) knowledge of the host member state's language, history, and institutions; (5) education; (6) access to institutions and to public and private goods and services; (7) interaction between immigrants and native-stock residents; (8) the free practice of different cultures and religions; and (9) the participation of immigrants in the democratic process, especially at the local level. Integration was (10) to be "mainstreamed" into general policy formulation and implementation; and (11) clear goals, indicators, and evaluation mechanisms had to be developed (Gross 2005).

Member-state governments had assembled the Hague Program with little input from local policy-makers or immigrants. In the years since its unveiling, some CBPs have been more equal than others. Improving immigrants' familiarity with their host society's language and institutions (CBP 4) has become a priority. The interior ministers of six major member states agreed in March 2006 to consider an EU integration contract for newcomers. It would complement the citizenship tests and "introduction" programs that many member states have already introduced.

The search for indicators

Another focus has been the search for common integration indicators (CBP, 11). They would enable member states to compare, benchmark, and evaluate their performance, hastening convergence toward common EU targets (Entzinger and Beizeveld 2003). The job of finding those indicators has been contracted out to national "experts," think tanks, and academic research institutes. A torrent of commissioned studies, seminar proceedings, and workshop conclusions has poured forth.

Reports on the rights granted immigrants have been numerous. These analyses contain indices and scales derived from the coding of laws and policies. Such subjectively derived indicators lump many factors together and usually

pass over variations across time. Reality, moreover, can deviate greatly from formal rights. Authorities at all levels of governance have enjoyed room for maneuver, influencing how they are put into practice on the ground.

Another popular method has been to construct quantitative measures of integration in various domains. Establishing levels of *structural integration* has entailed assessments of employment, income, education/training, dependency on public assistance, language skills, housing conditions, residential concentration, crime, and so on. *Political and cultural integration* has been gauged according to inclusion within host-society institutions and organizations, patronage of recreational and cultural offerings, and levels of immigrant interest and involvement in political life.

There are problems attendant to such a tack.

Available data are insufficient and ill-suited to comparative analysis. There are differences in delineations of population categories and scales and levels of analysis. Statistics are collected on the basis of indicators that vary depending on the particular definition of "integration" that is used, overall and in particular sectors. Even studies in a single country of the sector that seems to be most amenable to straightforward measurement – labour market participation – have run into "insurmountable difficulties" (Gregori 2006).

The interpretation of measures presents traps as well. In figures relating to immigrant small businesses, should we see a strategy of self-isolation or a way of compensating for a lack of alternative employment opportunities? "Ethnic" neighbourhoods might lock immigrants within an encapsulated society, or they could represent a temporary but indispensable incubation stage in a process of integration over time. Similar ambiguity attends other indicators sometimes cited as evidence of integration, such as numbers of

mixed marriages, naturalization rates, personal contacts with non-immigrants, and the popularity of minority fashion and music.

In quantitative analyses a discrepancy between third-country and EU nationals, as revealed by an indicator, is perforce problematic. But what does a gap mean? How wide is too wide, and does any narrowing necessarily signify policy success? Officials have managed now and then to concoct effective strategies: from bilingual assistant teachers to accompany immigrant-origin cohorts through their classes, to apprenticeships in ethnic businesses, to teamwork with Muslim communities to devise sensitive solutions to issues like ritual slaughtering and distinctive burial practices. Some of these successful small-scale projects originated from collaborative EU programs with local

Sporadic outbursts of social unrest or violence and far-right electoral victories have stirred EU interest more consistently than has glaring evidence of immigrant marginalization. Worries over social cohesion and minority-majority relations have been a driving force behind integration policies.

authorities. Such micro-level developments have not been the subject of attention-grabbing headlines or significant, reliable funding from Brussels. The Commission's calls for a European Fund for the Integration of TCNs have fallen largely on deaf ears.

The EU's efforts have been motivated by fear of conflict at least as much as by its express, pie-in-the-sky objective of eliminating inequalities between TCNs and the majority population. Sporadic outbursts of social unrest or violence and far-right electoral victories have stirred EU interest more consistently than has glaring evidence of immigrant marginalization. Worries over social cohesion and minority-majority relations have been a driving force behind integration policies.

Unwisely, then, EU policy-makers and their immigration experts have neglected the integration process, which explains best when and why conflict erupts. When service delivery has been based on ethnicity, occasionally dramatic improvements have followed; but the result has also been the reification of culturally-based definitions of needs magnifying immigrants' separateness. When ethnicity has been discounted, the outcome has often been neglect of their special needs. Stressing structural integration first has done little in itself to bring forth political-cultural integration, yet it has reduced the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Starting with policies in the political and cultural realms that highlight ethno-religious boundaries, at least when structural integration has tarried, has brought more friction along those lines. Thus integration is a complicated, multi-dimensional balancing act. It is never "done" but requires constant steering and attention to local sensibilities and pressure points (Ireland 2004).

Besides neglecting process and sequence, European policy-makers have undercut their work to maintain social order. EU and member-state policies have split immigrants along the lines of nationality, ethnic origin, religion, legal status, and generation, preventing the emergence of much-needed representative interlocutors. Officials have embraced market-based solutions and social policy reform, ushering in wider socio-economic disparities and greater segregation and reducing the welfare state's powerful social control function (Ireland 2006).

Conclusions

The EU is unlikely to halt its drive for absolute quantitative indicators and decontextualized best practices or to confront its deeper concern over social order. It has built up a head of steam on integration (Urth 2005). The currently moribund Constitutional Treaty would facilitate European integration policy making and provide a legal basis for EU action to further member states' efforts. Yet it would not change the nature of those policies.

They suffer yet from the lack of a clear, coherent vision of overall ends and means. Speaking at a U.N. meeting on international migration in New York last March, Rita Süßmuth, former president of the German Bundestag, stated the obvious when she observed that "Europe's progress in forming coherent migration policies is based mainly on a dialectic made up of trial and error, one of weeding out contradiction." There is still a long row to hoe.

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Note

- ¹ The common EU immigration policy would not apply to Denmark, which opted out, and the UK and Ireland would determine their involvement on a case-by-case basis.

FINLAND: INCREASED IMMIGRATION PUTS ADDED PRESSURE ON INTEGRATION POLICY

ABSTRACT

Increasing immigration to Finland is putting pressure on the integration policies. This article examines the legislative basis for integration in Finland, the correlation between education and employment, the provision of services and its three-tiered system, the respective roles of the Ministry of Labour and NGOs. The author cautions that avoiding ethnic unrest and immigrant ghettos in the future depends on three factors: Can interministerial attitude divisions be settled? Will the individual integration plans become more than formalities? Will language education better consider immigrant needs?

Finland is increasingly becoming a country of immigration. Finland is the only EU country in which asylum seeking has increased in recent years. Moreover, there has been a considerable increase in all forms of immigration, as illustrated by three statistics. First, the number of foreigners legally living in Finland without citizenship increased four-fold between 1990 and 2003, from 26,300 to 107,100. Second, the number of foreign-born Finnish citizens and residents doubled between 1991 and 2003, from 77,000 to 159,000, which is 3% of the total Finnish population. Third, the number of residents whose first language is not Finnish has tripled between 1992 and 2004, from 43,000 to 128,000.¹

According to a survey by Finnish geographers Elli Heikkilä and Maria Pikkarainen, immigrants often come from neighbouring countries, typically settle in southern parts of Finland, have primary education, and those with a higher education tend to get permanent work less often than those with less education.²

For example, in 2002 a total of 12,487 persons of working age (ages 15-74) immigrated to Finland. The largest group by country of birth were native Finns returning to their homeland (39%), followed by immigrants born in the former USSR (15%), Estonia (6%), and Sweden (4%). Other large groups included Chinese-born, British, German, Iraqi, Turkish and Thai.

According to Heikkilä and Pikkarainen (2006) migrants born in the former USSR have settled in counties of the province of Uusimaa (in southern Finland), where the capital city of Helsinki is located, and Varsinais-Suomi (in southwestern Finland), as well as in the counties of southeastern Finland, where they may make up as much as half of all the migrants who have moved from abroad. Migrants born in Sweden have mainly moved to the Åland Islands, Uusimaa and to the coastal counties of southwestern Finland. The immigration target of Estonians was Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi, as well as Southern Ostrobothnia (in western Finland) and Pirkanmaa. In absolute terms, Uusimaa province received the largest number of immigrants from the border countries.³

Although all destinations seem concentrated in the southern part of the country, there are major variations between the immigrant groups – even among the immigrant groups from “the near abroad” – as concerns education and working prospects. Regarding the educational levels of immigrants from the major countries of origin (Sweden, Estonia and Russia), over 60% have only primary education, and about half of the immigrants from Estonia and Sweden have been employed in the preceding year, compared to only 20-30% employment of those from Russia.

Figure 1 indicates the correlation between education and employment of the immigrant groups and the diversity between them: the highest employment is among persons from Sweden with high education and among people from Estonia with low education, whereas for Russians, the least and most educated are well employed, whereas the ones with average education are worse off in terms of finding work.


The legislative basis for integration in Finland

Finland is thereby increasingly becoming a country of immigrants, where groups of diverse educational backgrounds have sharply contrasting chances of finding work. The increasing volume and complexity of the groups underline the importance for Finland of constantly developing its integration policies.

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Figure 1
Main activity of immigrants in Finland one year after immigration (2003), according to level of education and country of birth (Data: Statistics Finland)



The guiding principle of the Finnish legislation is to treat non-nationals and nationals equally, if exceptions concerning non-nationals have not been explicitly made. One of the foremost goals is efficient integration, or “learning the language and the rules of society quickly,” which is “a precondition of successful living in Finland.”⁴

Conversely, with any particular integration plan, immigrants are entitled to specific rights concerning health services, education, citizenship, voting rights, housing employment, etc.

To give legal basis for and to further advance these aims, there are provisions on integration in the *Integration Act*, the Constitution, the *Aliens Act* as well as the *Equality Act*. The *Integration Act*, which entered into force on January 1, 2006, was established to promote the integration, equality and freedom of choice of immigrants through measures that help them acquire the essential knowledge and skills they need to function in society, and to ensure the essential livelihood and welfare of asylum seekers by arranging for their reception.⁵

The *Integration Act* determines integration measures to persons who have moved to Finland and have a home municipality in Finland, as specified in the *Municipality of Residence Act*. The *Integration Act* applies to labour migrants as well as to asylum seekers (until such time as they have been granted a residence permit or until a legally valid decision on their deportation has been made and enforced), persons who have been granted a residence permit under the *Aliens’ Act* on the basis of need for protection or on strong humanitarian grounds, and persons who are family members of a refugee or are otherwise related to such a person, provided that they have been members of the family of the refugee or

person granted a residence permit before the said person entered Finland.

The most recent amendments to the law in 2006 endeavour to further facilitate integration. They clarify authority mandates (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of the Interior and other ministries) and uphold the existing rights of immigrants to individual integration plans. The respective mandates of the Ministry of Labour and the municipalities is clearer. The municipality has the final responsibility for coordinating individual integration.⁶

Regarding other relevant legislation, the Constitution includes such basic rights as: equality before the law; the right to life, personal liberty and integrity; privacy; freedom of religion and conscience; free basic education; and the right to one’s language and culture. These rights are guaranteed for all the people within the national borders, and not specifically reserved to the citizens of Finland. According to Section 19, “those who cannot obtain the means necessary for a life of dignity have the right to receive indispensable subsistence and care.”⁷

The core objective of the third law, the *Aliens’ Act*, is to implement and promote good governance and legal protection in matters concerning aliens. In addition, the purpose of the Act is to promote managed immigration and the provision of international protection with respect to human rights, basic rights, and the international agreements that are binding on Finland.⁸

Finally, the *Equality Act* came into force at the beginning of February 2004. The purpose of this Act is to foster equality and enhance the protection provided by law to those who have experienced discrimination. The *Equality Act* prohibits discrimination based on age, racial or ethnic origin, citizenship, language, religion or

belief, conviction, opinion, state of health, disability, sexual orientation or other personal characteristics (such as financial position, pregnancy, and family situation). The term “ethnic origin” refers both to immigrants and Finland’s “old” ethnic minorities, such as the Roma, Sami, Tatars, Jews and representatives of the old Russian community.⁹

A three-tiered provision of services

The services are divided into the national, the local (or municipal) and individual levels. At the national level, the Ministry of Labour is responsible for the overall drafting of integration policy and providing information and guidance to the local authorities on matters concerning the integration of immigrants.¹⁰

On the local level there is the so-called “integration program,” which is a document drawn up by the local authorities in collaboration with employment and other authorities and the Social Insurance Institution. The program contains a plan for objectives, measures, resources and collaboration in the municipal integration of immigrants. When programs are drawn up and implemented, immigrants, NGOs, employee and employer organizations and, when possible, other relevant local parties have a chance to provide feedback. Attributing the responsibility for drafting the integration programs to the local level has caused diversification both of the programs and of the way they are accomplished in the different municipalities. The actual realization of integration rests on the pro-activity of the municipal officials, due to a lack of clear-cut regulations concerning the responsibilities of officials.¹¹

Those immigrants who register as unemployed job seekers or apply for social assistance as referred to in the *Act on Social Assistance* are entitled to an “integration plan” drawn up in cooperation with the local authority and the Employment and Economic Development Center.¹² The duration of and amendment(s) to a plan as well as the extension of a suspended plan are subject to agreement between the local authority, the employment office and the immigrant. An integration plan must be drawn up before a five-month period of unemployment or receipt of social assistance by the immigrant have elapsed. Immigrants are entitled to an integration plan for a maximum period of three years after being first entered into the population data system of their home municipality. The employment office will decide whether a plan should be considered suspended. A plan may be considered suspended one month after the immigrant has become permanently employed in a full-time job or as an entrepreneur, or after the immigrant begins full-time studies leading to a vocational qualification or degree. The employment office must give a hearing to the immigrant before it makes the suspension decision.¹³

The integration plan may be an agreement on providing support for studies of Finnish or Swedish, labour market training, self-motivated education or training, vocational counselling and rehabilitation, practical training, preparatory education for the integration of children and young adults, and other reasonable measures to support integration. The immigrant entitled to an integration plan is required to participate in the compilation of the plan and in any services and measures agreed upon therein. If, without justified cause, the immigrant has refused to participate in the compilation of the integration plan, or has refused to participate in a reasonable measure without a valid reason, the basic amount of social assistance previously provided is lowered.¹⁴

On the individual level the immigrant is granted an integration allowance when an integration plan is agreed upon. The integration allowance can be granted for a maximum period of one year, and is renewable. The integration allowance is re-assessed if there are changes to the circumstances of the person receiving support, or of that person’s family, or if a change occurs in the need for support. In order to protect their right to integration allowance, immigrants must report on the progress of their integration plan and report if changes are required, otherwise the plan is suspended, as stipulated in the plan. When needed, immigrants must provide the local authority and the Social Insurance Institution office with information on any income affecting the amount of the allowance, and any other information needed to grant and pay for the allowance.¹⁵

The integration plan has faced some criticism. According to Peltosaari, integration plans are considered mere formalities by the immigrants, and the substance and potential of the plan do not quite open to the immigrant in the process. Peltosaari sees the main reasons for this to be language problems, the resources of the authority to concentrate on individual cases, and the perception of the authority that he or she is mainly assisting in the job search. Furthermore, cultural problems have not been tackled. Due to the traditional passive authority-client mentality of many immigrants stemming from the country of origin, a fertile dialogue has not emerged.¹⁶

The Ministry of Labour leads the public services

Public service providers have an organic or very close connection to the Ministry of Labour, which is primarily responsible for integration matters in cases where the immigrant is already residing in Finland. Service providers can be categorized as those who function at the national level, working closely with the Ministry of Labour, and those who work at the municipal level, either under the Ministry of Labour or the Ministry of the Interior.

Regarding the educational levels of immigrants from the major countries of origin (Sweden, Estonia and Russia), over 60% have only primary education, and about half of the immigrants from Estonia and Sweden have been employed in the preceding year, compared to only 20-30% employment of those from Russia.

At the national, Ministry of Labour level, the responsibilities of the Ombudsman for Minorities include promoting solid ethnic relations, monitoring and improving the status and rights of ethnic minorities, reporting, putting forth initiatives and providing information. In addition, the Ombudsman for Minorities, together with other officials, ensures that everyone is treated equally regardless of their ethnic background. The Ombudsman for Minorities mainly gives recommendations, instructions and advice. The Ombudsman may also launch initiatives concerning social inequities or the status of foreigners or different ethnic minority groups. In certain cases the Ombudsman or his or her office may help persons who have faced discrimination.¹⁷

Also on the national level, the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (ETNO) functions as a broad-based consultative expert organization releasing statements on matters relating to refugees and migration and on racism and ethnic relations. Several linguistic and cultural minorities are represented on the Advisory Board. Half of the Board's members represent traditional and new ethnic minorities, and the political division of the Ministry of Labour coordinates its activities.¹⁸

At the local level, Employment and Economic Development Centres – under the Ministry of Labour – plan, steer and follow up on the reception of asylum seekers and the integration of immigrants into society and working life. The Centres also perform other separately assigned functions.¹⁹ In cooperation with the local and municipal authorities led by the Ministry of the Interior, the Centres have a general responsibility concerning the integration of immigrants and a responsibility for related coordination measures.²⁰ Employment offices, in collaboration with employment and economic development centers, implement labour-market policy measures and provide employment services.²¹

NGOs typically specialize in assisting refugees

There is less non-governmental activity in support of immigrants in Finland than in North America, due to the traditionally larger role of government in the former. However, NGOs do play a large role, both in individual assistance and in participating in the public discussion about immigration policy and governmental activity. Most of the major NGOs particularly concentrate on assisting refugees and the asylum seekers.

The Refugee Advice Centre (RAC) provides legal aid and advice to asylum seekers, refugees and other foreigners in Finland. Both public and private funding has been given for this purpose, and the RAC has the main responsibility for organizing legal aid to asylum seekers in Finland. It also works to promote the legal rights of asylum seekers, refugees

and other foreigners. The organization is recognized as expert in refugee and alien affairs in Finland. It is therefore heard from by officials and Parliament when new laws concerning foreigners are drafted and passed. The RAC works in close co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as European refugee organizations. The RAC is a member of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), which represents 78 refugee organizations throughout Europe.²²

The Finnish Refugee Council (FRC) is a politically and religiously independent non-governmental organization founded in 1965. Its main tasks include information and education, fundraising as well as work with refugees in Finland and abroad. It works in co-operation with various international organizations, the most important ones being the UNHCR as well as refugee organizations in the Nordic countries.²³

In policy making, the constant, passively negative public opinion and the wrangling on immigration matters between the heads of two ministries – the Ministry of Interior (which generally handles permits) and the Ministry of Labour (integration) – have slowed the progress of immigration and integration legislation and policy.

The refugee activities of the Finnish Red Cross (SPR in Finnish) focus on supporting the integration of immigrants and promoting tolerance. The SPR maintains two reception centers and is also prepared to organize emergency reception of large groups of unexpectedly arriving asylum seekers. SPR's responsibilities also include making practical arrangements for family reunification, receiving quota refugees at the airport and monitoring employment histories.²⁴

Conclusion

Finnish immigration and integration matters are undergoing a major transition. Until the 1990s, Finland remained a "rich periphery," but EU membership in 1995 and a successful recovery from the depression of the early 1990s have made Finland into an attractive alternative for immigration. Although immigration to Finland has increased in recent years, the volume of immigration has been comparatively small so that Finland has avoided the problem of chaotic immigrant ghettos or systemic

ethnic conflict. This fortuitous outcome has therefore been partly independent of the development of Finland's integration policies.

In policy making, the constant, passively negative public opinion and the wrangling on immigration matters between the heads of two ministries – the Ministry of Interior (which generally handles permits) and the Ministry of Labour (integration) – have slowed the progress of immigration and integration legislation and policy. Many politicians have avoided speaking out for fear of losing support, hence improvements have been slow.

In general, immigrant's basic rights in Finland are, on a European scale, relatively well protected. In forthcoming years, however, the Ministry of Labour needs to better materialize the integration policy and keep up with the increase

in immigration in order to maintain stability and further develop the sustainably stable settlement of immigrants.

For this, treating immigrants as an active, individual party, better matching language training and the genuine desire of all parties to get immigrants proper work will advance the foremost goal of Finland's integration policy, i.e. "learning the language and the rules of society quickly," which is "a precondition of successful living in Finland." This activity needs to be based on a properly bilateral and earnest integration plan, where immigrants turn from passive subject of "another bureaucratic formality" to an active, eager counterpart in the integration process. Another essential precondition for transforming these policy goals into reality will be increasing the supply of new homes for immigrants.

Notes

- ¹ Tanner (2004).
- ² Heikkilä and Pikkarainen (2006).
- ³ Heikkilä and Pikkarainen (2006).
- ⁴ Haapalehto, Teemu, Valtioneuvosto 1997, Annex 1, Page 3.
- ⁵ Haapalehto, *Act on Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers*, section 6.
- ⁶ Ministry of Labour, www.mol.fi/mol/fi/04_maahanmuutto/index.jsp.
- ⁷ The Constitution of Finland.
- ⁸ *Aliens Act*.
- ⁹ *Equality Act*.
- ¹⁰ *Act on Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers*, sections 7-16.
- ¹¹ Söderling (2003, 915).
- ¹² According to Söderling, integration plans were written for 29, 912 immigrants between 1999 and 2001 (Söderling 2003, 914).
- ¹³ *Act on Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers*, sections 7-16.
- ¹⁴ *Act on Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers*, sections 7-16.
- ¹⁵ *Act on Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers*, sections 7-16.
- ¹⁶ Peltosaari (2004).
- ¹⁷ The Ombudsman for Minorities.
- ¹⁸ The Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations.
- ¹⁹ Employment and Economic Development Centres.
- ²⁰ Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities.
- ²¹ Employment Service.
- ²² The Refugee Advice Centre.
- ²³ The Finnish Refugee Council.
- ²⁴ The Finnish Red Cross.

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LE « MODÈLE FRANÇAIS D'INTÉGRATION » : POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES ET CRISE SOCIALE

SOMMAIRE

Les émeutes de l'automne 2005 en sol français ont montré avec force que le modèle d'intégration français est en crise, ne répondant pas adéquatement aux enjeux posés par la société globalisée et multiculturelle du 21^e siècle. Le modèle français d'intégration, vers lequel se tournent d'autres pays européens, est assimilationniste tout en tenant compte des apports des immigrés à la société. L'auteur explore dans cet article ce modèle à la définition récente, les contradictions inhérentes à ce modèle et la politique d'intégration. Il conclut en demandant s'il faudrait revoir le modèle : antidisiscrimination ou intégration ? L'accès à l'égalité ne repose pas nécessairement sur une indifférenciation des publics; il est probable que le modèle d'intégration français soit relativement efficace pour produire une identité commune et un sentiment d'appartenance. L'unité dans l'inégalité : il y a sans doute des paramètres qui peuvent être améliorés dans le modèle.

Le 27 octobre 2005, après la mort de deux adolescents d'origine immigrée poursuivis par la police, commençait en France une série d'émeutes urbaines dans des quartiers populaires de banlieue. S'étendant à de nombreux quartiers en région parisienne, puis dans l'ensemble de la France, ces émeutes ont duré jusqu'au 17 novembre 2005. Le bilan de ces nuits est assez impressionnant : près de 10 000 véhicules brûlés, 2 921 interpellations effectuées par la police et environ 600 personnes incarcérées, 56 policiers blessés, des dizaines d'écoles, gymnases, entrepôts, supermarchés et commerces, médiathèque incendiés. Bien que les émeutiers n'aient pas fourni d'explication à leur révolte, les diagnostics rendus par les responsables politiques ont été sans ambiguïté : le « modèle d'intégration français » est en crise. Le constat n'est pas nouveau, mais les événements lui ont conféré une acuité incontestable. Que révèle en définitive cette crise, sinon les limites de la conception française de l'intégration à répondre aux enjeux posés par la société globalisée et multiculturelle du 21^e siècle ?

La crise rencontrée par le modèle français d'intégration peut surprendre au moment où de nombreux pays européens commencent à s'en inspirer pour renforcer leur cohésion nationale. Sans avoir jamais été véritablement codifié avant la fin des années 1980, ce modèle est contemporain de l'avènement de l'État-nation lors de la fondation de la Troisième République (1871-1940) (Noiriel, 1988). Marqué par une conception très assimilationniste, le modèle a progressivement évolué vers une prise en compte des apports des immigrés à la société et la reconnaissance de spécificités culturelles. Ce mouvement n'a cependant pas remis en question la suprématie des « normes et valeurs » nationales que les immigrés doivent adopter pour pouvoir participer pleinement à la société française. C'est que les relations entre la France et « ses immigrés » ont souvent été conflictuelles et toujours contradictoires (Viet, 1998). Le rapport à l'histoire, tout d'abord : pendant longtemps, une étrange amnésie a été entretenue sur le rôle joué par l'immigration dans la formation de la société française. Cette situation a changé récemment avec la multiplication de travaux historiques consacrés à l'immigration et la création d'un musée de l'immigration appelé Cité Nationale de l'Histoire de l'Immigration, qui devrait ouvrir en 2007. Le modèle a pour objectif de faire des immigrés des « Français comme les autres », mais les discriminations fondées sur l'origine ethnique ou raciale qui ont longtemps été méconnues contredisent cet objectif d'égalité, non seulement devant la loi, mais également dans la vie sociale. Enfin, la révision de ce que j'appellerai le mythe national en fonction de la pluralité des pratiques et des héritages suscite un débat autour de deux enjeux stratégiques : 1) celui relatif à la prise en compte de la diversité ethnique de la population et de sa traduction non seulement dans l'aménagement des formes sociales, mais aussi dans l'imaginaire national; 2) la poursuite d'une égalité effective par des politiques publiques visant spécifiquement les groupes exposés aux discriminations, ce qui suppose de les identifier et de décrire les mécanismes des traitements défavorables insidieux.

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Un « modèle » à la définition récente

Bien qu'elle soit un pays d'immigration depuis le milieu du 19^e siècle et que la « question des étrangers » alimente les débats politiques tout au long du 20^e siècle, on ne trouvera pas de définition normative de l'intégration avant la fin des années 1980. La signification de l'intégration s'est déduite pendant longtemps des conditions énoncées dans le code de la nationalité, de leurs circulaires d'application et des débats qui ont entouré ses réformes successives (Weil, 2002). La définition institutionnelle des « règles » et des modalités par lesquelles se réalise, et s'est réalisé au cours du siècle et demi, le processus d'incorporation des étrangers au corps national a été proposée par le Haut Conseil de l'Intégration :

L'intégration consiste à susciter la participation active à la société tout entière de l'ensemble des femmes et des hommes appelés à vivre durablement sur notre sol en acceptant sans arrière-pensées que subsistent des spécificités notamment culturelles, mais en mettant l'accent sur les ressemblances et les convergences dans l'égalité des droits et des devoirs, afin d'assurer la cohésion de notre tissu social. [...] Elle postule la participation des différences à un projet commun et non, comme l'assimilation, leur suppression ou, à l'inverse, comme l'insertion, la garantie protectrice de leur pérennisation (HCI, 1993).

Réactualisant la tradition assimilationniste qui caractérise le modèle national français, le HCI établit un subtil dosage entre droits et devoirs des « femmes et hommes appelés à vivre durablement sur notre sol », adhésion aux valeurs fondamentales de la République et la nécessaire transformation de la société française pour « faire une place » aux nouveaux arrivants. Ce « modèle d'intégration » fait la synthèse de la longue histoire de l'immigration et condense les principes fondamentaux de ce qui va devenir la politique d'intégration :

- L'intégration est individuelle et ne tolère pas l'inscription des immigrés dans des communautés structurées qui, par leur institutionnalisation, mettraient en péril l'unité du corps national;
- L'entrée dans la citoyenneté, c'est-à-dire l'acquisition de la nationalité française, demeure le pivot du processus d'intégration. Le maintien d'un code de la nationalité relativement ouvert garantit la permanence des « brassages » et évite que la confusion entre citoyenneté et nationalité ne se traduise par la constitution et la reproduction de « minorités » distinguées par le statut juridique;

- L'intégration est liée au principe d'égalité dont elle vise à renforcer la traduction dans la réalité sociale.

Ainsi formulée, la doctrine de l'intégration entre souvent en contradiction avec des pratiques, y compris institutionnelles, qui s'écartent de ces principes généraux. L'opposition résolue à toute forme de reconnaissance de communautés constituées qui feraient écran entre les pouvoirs publics et les individus est ainsi souvent contredite par des compromis locaux et arrangements institutionnels. La volonté de ne pas cibler spécifiquement les immigrés dans les politiques publiques est depuis longtemps compensée par des applications pragmatiques qui prennent en compte l'origine, de façon positive ou négative d'ailleurs¹. En quelque sorte, la politique française d'intégration se caractérise par la recherche de cet équilibre miraculeux et, selon de nombreux commentateurs, inaccessible entre une tolérance active aux différences, comportant des concessions à l'égard de leur expression publique, et l'affirmation vigilante du « principe d'indifférenciation ».

Les contradictions du modèle d'intégration

Fondamentalement, le modèle français d'intégration a fonctionné sur un effet de croyance. Les réalités sociales étaient multiculturelles, mais la mémoire n'a gardé que des traces de l'homogénéisation forcée des populations dans un creuset commun. Les travaux historiques ont montré que les trajectoires suivies par les immigrés à la fin du 19^e siècle et dans l'entre-deux-guerres ont été marquées par de fortes concentrations résidentielles à proximité des bassins de production et des regroupements communautaires dans des réseaux associatifs couvrant un large spectre d'activités. Le panorama dressé sur l'intégration des Polonais, Italiens ou Arméniens dans les années 1930 avec la mémoire d'une intégration individuelle, rapide

et silencieuse. L'utilisation stratégique et déformée de l'histoire est révélatrice des difficultés à comprendre et analyser ce qui se joue aujourd'hui dans l'intégration des immigrés (Noiriel, 2002). Dépeindre en des termes idylliques les conditions sociales et politiques de l'incorporation des immigrés de l'entre-deux-guerres n'est pas seulement erroné, cela met en relief les problèmes rencontrés par les immigrés venus dans les années 1950 à 1970 et leurs descendants. Or rien n'autorise à rapporter la crise actuelle du modèle d'intégration à des particularités propres aux immigrés d'aujourd'hui. L'hypothèse d'un « refus de l'intégration » ou d'une « inassimilabilité » n'est ni nouvelle –

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elle a été largement évoquée à propos des Italiens ou des Juifs polonais dans les années 1930 par exemple (Schor, 1996) – ni fondée sur des caractéristiques, des revendications ou des projets radicalement différents pour les derniers arrivés.

On observe deux véritables nouveautés dans le paysage de « l’immigration » de ces trente dernières années. Le fait qu’une partie importante des migrants venus dans les années 1950 à 1980 soit originaire de l’ancien empire colonial français change considérablement les conditions même de l’intégration. L’expérience post-coloniale de la société française commence seulement à être reconnue et pourrait expliquer les divergences importantes entre la situation des originaires du Maghreb ou d’Afrique Sub-Saharienne et les migrants d’Europe du Sud. La seconde nouveauté, liée à la situation post-coloniale, tient à l’apparition d’une « question de la seconde génération ». En théorie, le modèle d’intégration a pour objectif de transformer les immigrés en citoyens français en une génération en agissant non seulement sur la nationalité, mais aussi sur la transmission des identités et des pratiques pour éviter que ne se reproduisent les spécificités héritées de l’immigration. En ce sens, l’idée même de « seconde génération » est contradictoire avec l’horizon de l’intégration. Pourtant, et bien que se considérant comme des Français à part entière, les descendants des immigrés continuent à subir des discriminations et sont perçus comme des *outsiders* devant encore trouver leur voie d’intégration. Leur citoyenneté ne les met pas à l’abri des préjugés et des stéréotypes dégradants. Face à cette expérience, le rappel insistant de leur « défaut d’intégration » pousse de nombreux descendants d’immigrés à refuser le terme lui-même. Mais sont-ils véritablement concernés par la politique d’intégration ?

Une politique d’intégration est-elle possible ?

Il est délicat de définir précisément ce que recouvrent les « politiques d’intégration » tant leurs domaines d’application débordent les territoires balisés de l’action publique et leurs frontières administratives. Transversale par définition, la politique d’intégration réunit des actions portant sur le logement, l’éducation, l’emploi, l’action sociale, l’organisation des services publics, etc. Le problème est que la plupart des actions concourant à l’intégration ne visent pas spécifiquement les « immigrés », et que celles qui leur sont directement adressées sont souvent relativement marginales (Joint-Lambert, 1997). La dispersion des actions se traduit en particulier par l’absence d’un ministère chargé de l’intégration. Depuis 2003, un comité

interministériel est chargé de l’intégration, mais ses prérogatives ne valent pas celles d’un ministère en exercice. Les moyens consacrés à la politique d’intégration sont également difficiles à identifier parmi les mesures d’ordre général.

Dans ses interventions concrètes, la politique d’intégration s’est surtout attachée à faciliter l’accueil et l’installation des immigrés tout en cherchant à les incorporer dans les actions de droit commun. Dernier dispositif en date, le Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration, initié en 2003 et confirmé par la *Loi de programmation sur la cohésion sociale* du 18 janvier 2005, s’inscrit dans cette oscillation entre ouverture de la société à l’expression des spécificités et imposition d’une norme collective par ailleurs disputée. Son inspiration est explicitement du registre de l’assimilation, en requérant des immigrés nouvellement arrivés un engagement à suivre une formation civique et éventuellement linguistique. Des plate-formes locales reçoivent les migrants étrangers et leur famille qui doivent signer un véritable contrat pour obtenir la délivrance de leur titre de séjour. En ce sens, l’intégration est devenue une prescription pour bénéficier des droits au séjour. Ce lien entre politique d’intégration et politique d’immigration tend à se durcir dans la nouvelle loi du 24 juillet 2006, dans une évolution comparable à celle enregistrée au niveau européen.

L’autre problème consiste à savoir qui est concerné par l’intégration et formerait le public ciblé par les interventions. Les « étrangers », les « exclus », les « femmes immigrées », les « jeunes issus de l’immigration », les « minorités visibles » forment des groupes interchangeables dont le repérage fait souvent appel à des critères inexistantes dans les classifications administratives (l’origine ou la « race »). Le succès remporté par les politiques territoriales, dont la « Politique de

la ville », s’explique en partie par la nécessité de ne pas définir un public par son origine et en particulier de ne pas développer de traitements préférentiels ciblés sur les populations immigrées ou d’origine immigrée. L’essentiel des moyens financiers de la politique d’intégration transite par ces dispositifs territoriaux qui sont fortement soutenus par le FASILD², seule agence spécifiquement dédiée aux populations immigrées. Le fait que les quartiers relevant de la politique de la ville se caractérisent par une forte concentration des populations immigrées permet d’afficher une politique préférentielle territoriale sans cibler des « minorités ». Une telle stratégie porte en elle ses limites : elle fait de la ségrégation urbaine la principale explication à la

En quelque sorte, la politique française d’intégration se caractérise par la recherche de cet équilibre miraculeux et, selon de nombreux commentateurs, inaccessible entre une tolérance active aux différences, comportant des concessions à l’égard de leur expression publique, et l’affirmation vigilante du « principe d’indifférenciation ».

persistance des inégalités qui frappent les immigrés et leurs descendants.

Enfin, on peut s'interroger sur le sens même d'une politique qui cherche à agir sur les représentations plus que sur les comportements. Qui veut-on changer à travers ces politiques : les immigrés qu'on veut adapter à la société française ou les structures et les institutions qu'il faut ouvrir aux *outsiders* pour accélérer l'émergence de la société multiculturelle ? L'interprétation actuellement défendue par la politique d'intégration française se situe plutôt du côté de la transformation des immigrés pour leur permettre de mobiliser les ressources sociales disponibles (augmenter leur capital humain), ce qui va de pair avec une entrée dans le *mainstream* de la population. Adoption de pratiques sociales et culturelles, mobilisation de références communes, manières de se conduire et répertoires de « présentation de soi » constituent un passage obligé pour accéder à l'égalité. En résumé : devenir semblables à la majorité pour devenir des égaux. Ce lien entre intégration et non-discrimination prend de l'importance alors que la France, comme de nombreux pays européens, s'engage dans un programme d'action contre les discriminations à la suite des directives européennes de 2000.

Changer de modèle : l'antidiscrimination contre l'intégration

Par leur ampleur et la diversité des domaines concernés, les discriminations « ethniques et raciales » contrarient l'intégration sur le long terme des populations immigrées et de leurs enfants. En favorisant l'exclusion de certains groupes liés à l'immigration du champ social et économique, l'extension des pratiques discriminatoires enferment ces populations dans leur singularité et contribuent à la formation de « minorités ethniques ». Cette dynamique constitue un véritable paradoxe pour le modèle d'intégration et signe sans doute son échec le plus spectaculaire. En voulant éviter une trop grande *visibilité* du fait multiculturel, le modèle aurait accéléré la formation d'identités segmentées.

Depuis 1998 et à la suite de nombreux rapports officiels et de résultats de recherches, une politique de lutte contre les discriminations est venue se superposer à la politique d'intégration. Deux directives européennes prises en juin et septembre 2000 ont engagé une vaste transformation du cadre juridique de traitement des discriminations. Transposées dans le droit français avec la *Loi relative à la lutte contre les discriminations* votée en novembre 2001 et la *Loi de modernisation sociale* de janvier 2002, ces directives européennes ont fortement contribué à mettre la thématique des discriminations sur

l'agenda politique. Une Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l'Égalité (HALDE) a été créée en 2004 et traite de tous les motifs de discrimination énoncés dans la directive européenne. Au-delà de la mise en place des outils d'intervention, le débat politique et médiatique s'est progressivement porté sur les discriminations qui sont devenues en moins de dix ans un problème public crucial.

Si les discriminations contredisent le projet porté par le modèle d'intégration, la stratégie d'action pour les combattre repose sur un paradigme radicalement différent. Il ne s'agit plus de surmonter des handicaps culturels et sociaux, ce qui est le propre d'une politique d'intégration, mais de rétablir l'égalité des droits entre individus disposant d'une légitimité équivalente quelles que soient leurs différences objectives. Le problème ne se situe donc plus

dans une défaillance des immigrés ou de leurs descendants (qui n'arrivent pas à s'intégrer et qu'il faut aider), mais dans l'incapacité de la société française à reconnaître et attribuer les mêmes droits, *au-delà* de la diversité des origines. Alors que l'intégration pose avant tout la question de la fusion pour constituer une unité plus ou moins formelle, l'antidiscrimination vise l'égalité dans la diversité. La conduite simultanée des deux politiques génère d'importantes contradictions dans les discours et les actions.

Or, la crise du modèle d'intégration invite à en réviser les fondements, les objectifs et les moyens. Du point de vue des objectifs, il ne s'agit plus seulement de réduire les écarts entre immigrés et Français afin de préserver le brassage séculaire dans une matrice commune, mais surtout de restaurer l'égalité de traitement afin d'égaliser les conditions. La lutte contre les discriminations offre un contenu à une politique qui comportait plus de déclarations d'intention que

d'instruments opérationnels pour peser sur les mécanismes sociaux. Cependant, le changement social nécessaire à la réalisation de ces objectifs commence par une prise de conscience du caractère multiculturel de la société française et de sa profonde diversité. La poursuite d'une égalité effective, dans une visée pragmatique, nécessiterait de réviser les logiques des politiques de redistribution. En particulier, l'accès à l'égalité ne repose pas nécessairement sur une indifférenciation des publics, contrairement à ce qu'a longtemps énoncé la doctrine du modèle républicain (identiques donc égaux). En revanche, il est probable que le modèle d'intégration français soit relativement efficace pour produire une identité commune et un sentiment d'appartenance. L'unité dans l'inégalité : il y a sans doute des paramètres qui peuvent être améliorés dans le modèle.

Adoption de
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En résumé : devenir
semblables à la
majorité pour devenir
des égaux.

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Notes

¹ Voir la position défendue par le HCI qui reconnaît la légitimité de liens et solidarités actives entre personnes de même origine, tout en soulignant le danger que représente la constitution de « regroupements communautaires durables » et, plus encore, leur reconnaissance institutionnelle.

² Fond d'Action Social pour l'Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations.



Canadian Diversity
Diversité canadienne

Following earlier international comparative editions of this publication, which focused on Multicultural Futures and National Identity and Diversity, Metropolis supported in 2005 a special issue of this magazine focused on "Negotiating Religious Pluralism: International Approaches." This special issue, guest edited by Matthias Köenig (University of Bamberg, Germany), includes over twenty articles on how Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway address issues arising from religious pluralism.

Ce numéro spécial de la *Revue de l'intégration et de la migration internationale* est axé sur un champ d'étude en grande partie oublié par les universitaires et peu traité par les décideurs et les intervenants, soit les liens entre la religion et la migration. Il comprend des articles du Canada, de l'Allemagne et du Royaume-Uni, ainsi qu'un article sur la laïcité au Québec. John Biles (Équipe du projet Metropolis) et Paul Bramadat (Université de Winnipeg) ont dirigé la préparation de ce numéro spécial, qui fait état des liens plus étroits établis entre la recherche et la politique dans le cadre du projet Metropolis.

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IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES SINCE 1990 IN ISRAEL

ABSTRACT

Existing limitations on immigration to Palestine enforced by the British Mandate Government during the 1930s and 1940s were abolished and the borders were opened. Mass immigration during 1948-1951, which doubled the existing Jewish population of some 600,000, was of utmost importance in the growth and development of the country. Israel's main focus is the ingathering of the Jewish people to their historical homeland. The size and structure of this immigration are due to many factors, which influence the volume of emigration from the Jewish diaspora communities throughout the world. During the mid-1980s a new concept of integration began to evolve meant to encourage and increase immigration from the Western countries. This article proposes a look at immigration in Israel, touching upon migrants' arrival, geographic distribution, employment, language acquisition, cultural integration, education, and identity. Immigrants have done, on the whole, extremely well.

With the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, existing limitations on immigration to Palestine enforced by the British Mandate Government during the 1930s and 1940s were abolished and the borders were opened on the basis of the opening statement of the Declaration of Independence: "The State of Israel will be open to the immigration of Jews and the ingathering of exiles." Israel's fundamental law, the *Law of Return*, passed in 1950, states: "Every Jew has the right to immigrate to the Land of Israel." A second law passed in 1952, the *Law of Citizenship*, guarantees Israeli citizenship to all who enter the country under the *Law of Return* along with all the obligations and rights of a citizen including the right to vote. The *Law of Return* was modified for humanistic reasons in 1970 to enable non-Jewish relatives of Jews to immigrate and obtain citizenship.

Mass immigration during 1948-1951, which doubled the existing Jewish population of some 600,000, was of utmost importance in the growth and development of the country. These immigrants were mainly refugees from the displaced person camps set up in Europe in the aftermath of World War II, and from Arab countries who declared war on Israel upon its establishment. The immigration of over 3 million immigrants to Israel since its inception has occurred in waves. Following the 1948-1951 peak, other peaks occurred in 1955-1957 (mainly from North Africa, Poland and Hungary), 1961-1964 (mainly from North Africa and Romania), 1971-1973 and 1978-1979 (both mainly from the Soviet Union) and 1989-2000 (mainly from the Soviet Union), which has been the longest period of sustained immigration. Since then immigration decreased by some 30% per annum levelling off at 23,000 since 2003.

The size and structure of this immigration are due to many factors, which influence the volume of emigration from the Jewish diaspora communities throughout the world. Such factors include:

- a) the size and structure of the population of these communities;
- b) the general political, economic and social conditions in the countries of origin and in particular the condition of the Jews and the attitudes and behaviours of the local population towards them;
- c) the degree of freedom to emigrate, with or without one's capital;
- d) the availability of alternative potential immigration destinations besides Israel;
- e) the influence of ideological factors (Zionist, religious and others) in channeling immigration towards Israel;
- f) economic and social conditions in Israel;
- g) Israeli policy in facilitating immigrants in their integration; and
- h) the warmth extended by the veteran population towards new immigrants.

Acceptance of refugees

Israel's main focus is the ingathering of the Jewish people to their historical homeland. Many of the Jewish immigrants arrived as refugees. Most notably were those from the displaced person camps

set up in Europe after World War II, from the Arab and Muslim countries after Israel's War of Independence, from the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and from Ethiopia.

Israel has also accepted non-Jewish refugees. In 1977 it accepted two groups of boat people from Vietnam, in 1995 a group of Bosnian-Muslims, and in 1998 two groups of Muslim refugees from Kosovo. These groups received almost all the benefits and aid that are provided to Jewish immigrants.

Immigration since 1989

The most recent wave of immigration of more than 1.2 million persons, has mainly come from the areas of the former Soviet Union (85%) and Ethiopia (5%). This wave began after a decade of low immigration during which only 154,000 immigrants entered Israel. By 1989, the Soviet system was breaking down and alternative destinations (mainly the USA) were problematic. Glasnost policy resulted in many Jews and Jewish-related persons immigrating to Israel. In 1990 alone, out of 200,000 immigrants, 185,000 arrived from the former Soviet Union (FSU). This was not only an unprecedented number from one country, but also, except for 1949, an unprecedented total immigration for one year.

During this same period, some 600,000 Jews and their relatives emigrated from the FSU to other countries, primarily to the U.S.A. and Germany.

The second significant component of recent immigration has been from Ethiopia (70,000), where some 15,000 persons were airlifted to Israel in the dramatic "Operation Solomon" which took place during a 36-hour weekend in May 1991. They joined their 17,000 brethren who had arrived in the 1980s. These immigrants were far younger (more than 50% were below the age of 18) and less educated (only a few had high school education or more) than the immigrants from the FSU and other countries. This group, which now numbers close to 100,000 taking into account the natural increase (the fertility rate of Ethiopian women is very high), lives in some 40 cities and towns with heavy concentrations in 15 of these.

On the other hand, 60% of immigrants from the FSU who are above the age of 18 possess postsecondary or university degrees. More than 90% were employed prior to their immigration. Some 38% were employed in scientific and academic professions and another 22% were employed in other professional and technical jobs. Although the benefits of this substantial "brain gain" have not been fully assessed or felt in the economy, many

economists have claimed that the very high increase in GDP (6 to 7% per annum) during 1992-1996 was a result of the integration of these highly educated and skilled immigrants into the economy and society.

The median age of FSU immigrants is 33 years. The largest age group (40%) is composed of people aged between 20 and 44. Children younger than 17 constitute over 23% of immigrants, while the proportion aged 65 and over is 12%. An excess of women (52.7% of all immigrants), characterized the FSU immigration. Approximately 63% of adults are married, while approximately 19% are single, 8% are divorced and 10% are widowed.

During the mid-1980s a new concept of integration began to evolve; it was meant, at its inception, to encourage and increase immigration from the Western countries...and was designed to increase the new immigrants' freedom of choice in deciding where to live in the country and in deciding how to spend funds granted to them during their initial period in the country.

Emigration

It is estimated that between 8 and 10% of all immigrants of the last decade re-emigrated, mostly to North America and Western Europe, with some returning to the former Soviet Union. Veteran Israelis also emigrate. It is estimated that some 25,000 to 30,000 do so each year, including immigrants that have chosen to re-immigrate to their original country or to another country, while 12,000 to 15,000 per year have returned during this same period.

Integration policy

During the mid-1980s a new concept of integration began to evolve (for lack of space I am unable to describe two different integration policies, the first from the 1950-1960s and the other from the 1970s); it was meant, at its inception, to encourage and increase immigration from Western countries. The term used to define it was an old one – "direct absorption" – but it now took on a completely different meaning. The concept was designed to increase new immigrants' freedom of choice in deciding where to live in the country and in deciding how to spend funds granted to them during

their initial period in the country.

At first, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption rented rooms in various hotels around the country. Upon arrival the immigrant was told that he might choose any hotel he wanted and could reside there for a period of up to two weeks, or stay with a relative or friend. He received a certain amount of money in cash to take care of his basic needs for that period. He was informed that within that initial period of time he must find an apartment. Once his apartment rented, he should bring the contract to the local office of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption and he would receive a cheque to cover the rent. A ceiling was set for the maximum amount that the immigrant would be reimbursed. Once the

immigrant was settled in his rented apartment, he was able to register for an *ulpan* (Hebrew acquisition class) and enrol his children in the local kindergarten or school. At the end of each month he would have to provide certification that he was attending *ulpan* classes and would then receive a monthly subsistence allowance. The bureaucracy involved in processing all these requests, as well as others, however, overwhelmed the system, especially as the numbers of new immigrants increased each month with the opening of the gates from the Soviet Union in late 1989.

In the mid-1990s, a new instrument was developed and introduced – the “absorption basket” – in order to increase efficiency and give more freedom to the immigrant in planning and executing his family budget, thus decreasing bureaucracy to a minimum. A computation was made of the average costs of all the financial supports given to each individual immigrant. These included: subsistence allowance for the first six months in the country; rent subsidy for a year; certain educational costs, depending on the age and number of children; transportation costs to and from *ulpan* classes; and a small sum for translating and printing professional resumes and other miscellaneous services.

Upon arrival at the port of entry and filling out registration forms, the immigrant would receive a small sum in cash and a larger sum in the form of a cheque. In order to receive the remainder of the absorption basket on a monthly basis, he had to open a bank account (in a bank of his choice), deposit the cheque he received at the port of arrival and bring a copy of certification of his bank account number to one of the local offices of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. The rest of the money was transferred automatically and directly into the immigrant’s bank account in differential amounts over the first year. The absorption basket is a grant and the money does not have to be returned. This method has recently been revised in order to eliminate the need to print cheques. The immigrant now receives a somewhat larger sum in cash and is instructed to open a bank account as soon as possible and report the account number to one of the local branch offices. The Ministry of Immigrant Absorption is developing a system of doing away with cash payments altogether and giving the immigrant an electronic money card which will enable him to withdraw money from a machine.

A family consisting of both parents and one child receives about \$11,000 for the year. This compares favourably to the annual minimal wage rate in the country, which is \$6,000. By law, the absorption basket is indexed to the Cost of Living. Besides the aid given through the absorption basket, immigrants with children under the

age of 18 receive the children allowance through National Insurance, which every other resident receives, as well as a “customs’ grant.” Until 1991 immigrants were allowed to bring into the country personal and durable goods free of customs. The shipping containers of possessions sent by Soviet Union immigrants glutted ports and storage facilities. Immigrants living in temporary rentals didn’t empty their shipping containers, preferring to wait until they were in permanent housing. The solution to this problem was a change in regulations that made goods imported by immigrants subject to customs and VAT. In lieu of the exemption, immigrants now receive approximately \$2,500 as a loan, which after five years becomes a grant, to cover the payment of customs and VAT. After the inauguration of this grant, immigrants stopped sending shipping containers.

Upon completing the first year in the country, immigrants face several options, including the following.

- 1) The immigrant can remain in his rented apartment or move to another one in the same or another area. For the following five years, the immigrant is eligible for a rental subsidy which begins with some \$200 per month (barely covering half of the going rental rates) and decreases by about 20% per year.
- 2) The immigrant can purchase an apartment using a heavily subsidized mortgage (which hardly covers 50% of the total cost). Some 200,000 family units used mortgages during the past 15 years. Some of the families purchased an apartment together with their elderly parents by using two mortgages, to which each family was entitled.
- 3) In the case of a single-parent family, an elderly couple, or a family in which someone is disabled or chronically ill, public rental housing is provided at a very highly subsidized rate (available mainly in the development areas in the North and South of the country).
- 4) During the first half of the decade, many immigrants rented mobile homes

that were set up in various parts of the country. All these sites have now been closed down. Ethiopian immigrants who in the 1990s lived in mobile home sites and since then in absorption centres were eligible for an affirmative action policy. They receive extremely subsidized mortgages, where the monthly repayment is limited to \$70 a month. In fact, over 90% of the mortgage is a grant.

- 5) Special hostels were built for the elderly and buildings rented by the government were turned into small studio apartments. Some 7,000 elderly couples and singles were able to rent such living units.

Geographical distribution

Immigrants who arrived in 1990-91 settled mainly in the central part of the country. The two major coastal cities, Haifa and Tel Aviv, and their surrounding areas

Immigrants’ successful integration in their new society is usually related not only to the absorption capacities of the host country and the new-comers’ demographic and socio-economic characteristics, but also to their ideological motivation and level of commitment to the new society as well.

had a large supply of empty apartments, and the owners were only too happy to rent them to the newcomers. The government also passed a regulation freeing the landlords of having to pay income tax on the rents received.

In the past Israel has had a policy of encouraging immigrants to settle in the peripheral areas in the North and the South of the country. This policy was implemented mainly by offering immigrants government-built housing with highly subsidized rents. This policy was partially successful.

As the present wave of immigrants began moving into permanent housing, they tended to settle in the more peripheral areas where housing was cheaper and in locations where the Government offered special grants to all its citizens for the purchase of an apartment, which further cheapened the price of the housing. Starting in 1995 a reverse trend emerged where immigrants began moving back to the central areas of the country, mainly because they found better employment opportunities. At the end of 1997, nevertheless, more than 25% of FSU immigrants were living in the Southern District while initially, 13% of the 1990-1991 FSU immigrants settled in that district (compared to 14% of the total population). In the Northern District migration was much less dramatic: 13% of the 1990-1991 FSU immigrants at first settled in that District, while at the end of 1997 some 14% of all FSU immigrants resided there (compared to 17% of the total population).

Employment

At the start of the latest wave of immigration, the economy was essentially stagnant. The unemployment rate in 1989 reached 10.3%. In the last quarter of 1991, after the arrival of 375,000 immigrants within two years, unemployment among new immigrants reached 38.5% and total unemployment increased to 11.7%. Gradually, as demand for commodities, services and housing by immigrants made an impact on the economy and as a result of the immigrants' flexibility in accepting any kind of employment, unemployment levels fell drastically, and by the end of 1997, they stood at 9%. This figure increased to 10.2% in 1998, as did total unemployment (8.2%), as a result of the financial crises in the Far East, Russia and countries of Latin America. In 1998, the unemployment rate of immigrants who had arrived in 1990-91 was lower than the average in the country. In 2004, the rate of workforce participation among immigrants who arrived since 1990 and aged at least 15 years was higher than among non-immigrants (58.1% compared to 54.9%). The unemployment rate however was the same (10.4%). The unemployment rate among 1990-91 immigrants was lower in 2004 than among non-immigrants (7.8% compared to 10.4%). Immigrants comprised 18.8% of the

employed in 2004, when they represented 17.8% of the population aged 15 and older. On the other hand they comprised 18.9% of the unemployed.

Quite remarkably, the initial challenge of finding employment for this massive immigration was met. A further challenge, which is to secure employment similar or related to the immigrant's original profession, has only partially been fulfilled. As stated earlier, some 65% of the immigrants who were employed in the FSU held higher education degrees. However, only 70% were employed in fields that demanded higher education. The government set up a wide variety of programs with the aim of enabling as many individuals as possible within macro-economic limits to obtain training and find suitable employment. One of the most successful was the program for immigrant scientists and R & D engineers. This program, originally created in the early 1970s to help the immigrant scientists who arrived at the time from the Soviet Union, serviced the 16,000 scientists and R & D engineers who

arrived since 1989. Some 80% were able to find initial employment in their fields of specialization. This program heavily subsidized the salaries of the scientist for 3 to 4 years and provided them with research funding.

Other programs included licensing, training, re-training and additional training courses of 500 to 1,000 hours in day programs and 200 to 300 hours in evening programs. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs runs many of these programs which are open to both veteran citizens and new immigrants, and almost all instruction is given in Hebrew. The Ministry of Immigrant Absorption runs other programs exclusively for newcomers where some of the material is transmitted in the native tongue of the immigrant. Almost 100,000 immigrants participated in these

courses during the last decade.

In the late 1990s, special *ulpan* classes have been set up for students from specific professions, teaching them professional terminology in Hebrew and English. In some of these classes the students also receive a basic course in the use of computers. Due to the drop in the number of immigrants during the past years to some 23,000, these special *ulpan*s were closed. Workshops are offered instructing how to prepare resumes, search for jobs and prepare for job interviews.

Another innovative program aims to encourage immigrants to be self-employed. Approximately 1,000 immigrants have used this option each year and opened businesses. They were aided by a certain number of agencies especially established for new immigrants, offering services for free or at nominal costs, and they are eligible for subsidized loans of up to \$15,000 to help them set up a business.

The median age of FSU immigrants is 33 years. The largest age group (40%) is composed of people aged between 20 and 44. Children younger than 17 constitute over 23% of immigrants, while the proportion aged 65 and over is 12%.

These efforts enabled some 40% of immigrants, after residing in the country for five years, to find work in their former profession or a similar one. Among engineers (the largest professional group), only one-third found jobs in the profession they held abroad, or similar jobs, within this period. But one must take into account the fact that more than 120,000 engineers arrived in the country, compared to the total 28,000 engineers employed in the Israeli workforce in 1989.

Israel could boast about having one of the highest ratios of physicians to population before this wave of immigration. Nevertheless, almost half of the physician immigrants who were able to qualify for their license found jobs as physicians.

For those Ethiopian immigrants who came from rural or non-developed economies and were often lacking even an elementary formal education, special courses were provided to train them in semi-skilled and skilled manufacturing and service jobs. Very few immigrants above the age of 45 were able to integrate the workforce.

Language acquisition

Each adult immigrant is eligible to attend Hebrew acquisition class, called *ulpan*, for 500 hours over a five-month period (day program) or over a ten-month period (evening program). Roughly 70% of the adults take advantage of this opportunity during their first six months in the country and about one-quarter of those enrolled drop out during the program. The main reason for dropping out is that the immigrant found employment. The second reason is personal or health problems.

In order to improve the language acquisition success rate and to decrease the dropout rate, specially designed classes were formed for specific professional groups.

The Planning and Research Division of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption carried out a follow-up survey among different cohorts of 1990-1991 FSU immigrants, which revealed that after five years in the country, approximately 55% of adults are able to converse more or less fluently in a simple conversation and 40% are more or less able to read a simple letter written in Hebrew. Also, various research projects have shown that the propensity of finding a job in one's original profession increases with a better knowledge of Hebrew.

In order to assist immigrants who were in the country for many years yet were not able to master the rudiments of the language, a new regulation was passed in 1999 to give immigrants a second opportunity to attend *ulpan*.

Cultural integration

In conjunction with the direct absorption policy, the absorption authorities encourage immigrants to retain their culture and language. From the above-mentioned follow-up survey, it was found that it is important for FSU

immigrants that their children continue to speak Russian and be well versed in Russian literature.

In fact, due to the wave of immigrants from the FSU, there are more Russian language daily newspapers than there are Hebrew dailies. All are privately owned and apparently profitable. From a survey on the consumption of the media by FSU immigrants in the beginning of 1999, we learn that 65% of all adult FSU immigrants who arrived in the 1990s had read a Russian language daily at least once during the week prior to the interview. Only 33% had read a Hebrew daily during the same period.

Israeli public radio also has a station that broadcasts in Russian 16 hours per day. A reported 60% listened to this station at least one hour a day. There are also radio programs in Amharic for the Ethiopian immigrants, as well as in other languages.

All these media provide jobs for the new immigrants. In this train of thought, artistic media were also given support. Thus, theatre groups were set up as well as orchestras, ensembles, and dance and folklore groups, all of which provide jobs on one hand, and offer familiar cultural activities that the new immigrants seem to appreciate very much.

Education

New immigrant children are integrated, in most cases, directly into the educational system. They are eligible to receive one to two hours of additional instruction per week either privately or in groups. They are also able to take some of the matriculation exams in their native tongue. If they choose to take the exam in Hebrew, they receive ten additional points towards their final grade.

A program exists to encourage immigrants to pursue higher education. The program includes the establishment of preparatory courses for those unable to enter schools of higher education directly and a full tuition scholarship for three years. Some of the courses are given in Russian for the FSU immigrants and they are able to take some of the exams in Russian.

For the Ethiopian immigrants additional help is provided, as part of an affirmative action project, including a program to encourage studying for a second degree.

Over 40,000 students went through this program during the last decade. Among these students, approximately 6,000 are from Ethiopia. In 2005 over 7,000 students were in the program, 1,500 of whom were from Ethiopia.

Jewish and Israeli identity of the immigrants

Immigrants' successful integration in their new society is usually related not only to the absorption capacities of the host country and the newcomers' demographic and socio-economic characteristics, but also to their ideological motivation and level of commitment to the new society as well. Though most studies on immigration patterns show

As many as 75% of FSU immigrants reported that they came to Israel out of choice, and 88% said that after being in the country for five years, they would decide again today to immigrate to Israel.

that the “push factors” in the home country are usually the compelling factors in making a decision to leave one’s home, the “pull factors” are determinant in choosing to which country one will immigrate. These findings have been proven valid for the Israeli case as well. However, the Ministry of Immigration’s follow-up survey has shown that Jewishness and solidarity with the State of Israel rank highest in the hierarchy of motives to immigrate to Israel among those individuals who in fact came to Israel; this sets Israel apart from other countries. As much as 75% of FSU immigrants reported that they came to Israel by choice, and 88% said that after being in the country for five years, they would choose again today to immigrate to Israel. The motivation behind this solidarity may be one of the major factors in the relative success of the integration of this wave as well as past waves of immigrants to Israel.

Conclusion

If one takes into account the various aspects of the absorption and integration process and the limited resources of the country, we may conclude that immigrants from the FSU have done, on the whole, extremely well. There are nevertheless some groups who are not doing so well, such as the elderly living on an old-age pension from the National Insurance (most still live in private rentals). The old age pension only allows for a minimum standard of living and these immigrants, for the most part, have no other source of income. Elderly immigrants receive a subsidy of approximately \$200 per month for renting an apartment but they frequently have to move. Also, those FSU immigrants who came from the Caucasian and Bukharian areas are having a harder time adapting than those from the European areas.

Immigrants from Ethiopia, a society and economy so different from those of Israel, are having much more difficulty; despite affirmative action programs and huge funds invested to support their integration (four times as much as for a family from the FSU). However, there are already many positive signs, such as an increase in the percentage of youth passing the matriculation exams, the number of students in schools of higher education and the number of soldiers who become officers.

OUT OF PARADIGMS: THE ITALIAN REASONABLE WAY TO INTEGRATION

ABSTRACT

Italy's policies on immigration and immigrants have been the product of a variable combination of functionalist, repressive, identitarian and solidarist oriented measures. The result has been a "reasonable integration model" – i.e. not too rigid, ideological or pretentious. However, this model is likely to survive in the future only in a revised version capable of taking into account fears and concerns of nationals about immigration. Otherwise it risks being undermined by a xenophobic backlash, as has already happened with other moderate integration models.

Italian immigration and immigrant policies¹ have never been inspired by a rigid paradigm; they have instead adopted a variable combination of functionalist (aiming at regulating immigration flows on the basis of the labour demand), repressive (aiming at preventing clandestine entries and illegal residence and at suppressing crime by immigrants), identitarian (aiming at preserving cultural and religious tradition and establishing preference for immigrants of national origin) and solidarist (aiming at widening immigrants rights) oriented measures (Di Gregorio and Zincone 2002, Zincone 2006a).

The first relevant Italian migration (*Law No. 943 of 1986*) treated immigrants mainly as workers (Colombo and Sciortino 2004); it granted them the same welfare rights as Italian workers, but did not deal with their cultural and social integration. Italian law-makers were forced to face that issue only a short time later. At the end of the 1980s the integration issue entered the political agenda abruptly, since social tension increased – as a consequence of uncontrolled squatting due to the lack of accommodation for migrants – and reached a peak when a Black labourer was murdered in a well-known tomato-farming area. These events led to the formulation of *Law No. 39* of February 28, 1990, which addressed the phenomenon in a new way: immigrants were no longer just considered as workers, but as individuals settled in the country, with the right to a decent life. However, central government did not provide concrete measures or public funds to implement their social integration, with the exception of financial resources allocated for temporary accommodation.

The negative feedback from the previous legislation, together with the need to comply with Schengen requirements for combating illegal immigration, were among the main reasons for the formulation of the new migration law passed in 1998, which is still the main piece of legislation regulating this area till the new centre-left reforms of 2006, despite the 2002 centre-right reform. *Law No. 40* of March 6, 1998, formerly *Consolidated Act No. 286/1998*, was the first act aimed at addressing a wide range of aspects of immigration and immigrants' integration. The model behind the Law was considered a "model of reasonable integration" (Zincone 2000a) – that is, not too rigid, ideological or pretentious. It considered integration as made up of two dimensions and political goals, namely integrity and interaction, which mean respectively: a) to preserve *personal integrity* and quality of life for immigrants as well as native citizens; b) to foster *positive interaction* between nationals and immigrant minorities, on the one hand, and between different foreign groups, on the other. The model could be broken down as follows (ibid).

Integrity as basic rights also for undocumented immigrants

The 1998 Law established the right/duty to education for minors regardless of their legal status and the access to "necessary, even if continuous" medical treatment for undocumented immigrants, guaranteeing anonymity by providing them with an identity card with a code number. Undocumented minors and pregnant women were entitled to complete health care and were exempt from expulsion. Furthermore, the Law allocated funds to the Public Health Units specifically meant for health care to illegal foreigners. These measures were strongly backed by the "powerful lobby of the weaker strata," an immigrants' advocacy coalition made up mainly of Catholic organizations, but also including unions, democratic lawyers and NGOs: they started out as an illegal practice at the local level under the pressure of members of the advocacy coalition and were gradually incorporated into increasingly formal acts until the inclusion in the 1998 Law (Zincone 1998).

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Integrity as equal rights for legal immigrants

The pre-requisite of this goal consisted in making the status of legal immigrant viable. Before 1998, the overly restricted annual planned inflows and the complexity of the procedures for obtaining a residence permit for working purposes² hindered legal entries, encouraging illegal ones. The 1998 Law introduced a job seeker's residence permit³ and centre-left governments (1996-2001) increased the quotas for planned annual inflows.⁴ A permanent residence permit, which could be obtained after five years' legal residence, was introduced. In the event of job loss, immigrants were given the opportunity to remain in Italy for one year to search for another job and to sign on for the dole.⁵ Furthermore, the children and spouses of immigrants holding at least a one-year residence permit were authorized to join them immediately, and the relatives of reunited families were allowed to work.⁶ The 1998 Law also confirmed equal treatment for regular immigrants and citizens, not only with regard to civil rights, but also social rights. In that way some elements of the republican assimilationist model, based on the universalistic recognition of individual rights, were also introduced (Zincone, Caponio and Carastro 2006). In order to ensure these rights were actually implemented, the Law set up the National Fund for Migratory Policies, 80% of which was given to the regions, which in turn transferred most of it to local public administrations and NGOs. This measure was needed. Before the 1998 Law, local administrations were not provided with enough funds. In spite of this, since the mid-1980s, integration policies had been implemented mainly on a local level by public and non-profit actors. The role of local actors, regions and municipal governments in this matter increased further as a consequence of the decentralization of the welfare system at the beginning of the 1990s. The initial lack of funds meant the burden of integration policies fell on local resources, giving rise to a high degree of territorial differentiation. The capacity to respond to the integration challenge depended on the degree of commitment and mutual understanding between public and non-profit local actors – which still influences the consistency of rights actually enjoyed by immigrants at the local level (Zincone 1994, Zucchini 1997, Zuchetti 1999, Cespi 2000, Campomori 2005, Caponio 2003, 2004, 2006, Ponzio 2004, 2006). Although the 1998 Act greatly improved “integrity for legal immigrants,” it strayed from this goal as far as the right to local vote was concerned. In fact, while the Bill allowed documented immigrants residing in Italy for at least five years to participate in local elections,

Before 1998, the overly restricted annual planned inflows and the complexity of the procedures for obtaining a residence permit for working purposes hindered legal entries, encouraging illegal ones. The 1998 Law introduced a job seeker's residence permit and centre-left governments (1996-2001) increased the quotas for planned annual inflows.

this measure was eventually expunged to avoid conflict with the centre-right opposition. The government, however, promised to approve it at a later date. The centre-left majority also promised to pass the reform of the *Nationality Law*,⁷ facilitating the naturalization of immigrants and their children (Zincone and Di Gregorio 2002).

Positive interaction based on legality and security

Law No. 40/1998 introduced measures to combat clandestine and illegal migration as well as smuggling and trafficking, and immigrant criminality in general. More precisely, it reinforced repressive measures against illegal entries, introduced various forms of forced expulsion, and included the possibility to hold undocumented immigrants in special detention centres for up to 30 days in order to be able to identify and repatriate them.⁸ However, centre-left policy-makers underestimated the impact on public opinion of immigrants' criminality and their high rate of presence in prisons.⁹

Positive interaction based on pluralism and communication

The 1998 Law, on the one hand, provided for some elements of multiculturalism by allocating funds to teach foreigners their language of origin and support multicultural activities¹⁰ – though these activities did not prove to be particularly adept at fostering better understanding and communication between native citizens and migrants. On the other hand, in order to avoid a “segregating” communitarian policy, *Law No. 40/1998* allocated financial resources to set up free courses in Italian as second language for adults¹¹ and provided for the use of support teachers for foreign pupils in schools.¹² In this way, the Law included a certain degree of “integrative identitarianism,” which calls for immigrants to learn the national language in order to avoid cultural and social segregation (Zincone 2006a), i.e. a sort of “societal oriented assimilationism” aimed at fostering equal opportunities in terms of access to jobs and education (Zincone, Caponio and Carastro 2006). Furthermore, the presence of “cultural mediators” was provided for in schools and public offices to adapt these services to the different needs of their new users. However, although cultural mediators have played a relevant role, their professional profile is not yet regulated by national legislation and they are thus at risk of being used as unqualified social workers or as mere interpreters. Despite all these improvements, a fundamental element to pursue the goal of “interaction based on pluralism” was left out: the approval of the *Bill on Religious Freedom*. Though some of the rights which should have been established by this

Act (such as the approval of reserved areas in cemeteries or the building and funding of religious buildings) have been granted by general laws, other measures (such as the respect of major festivities, the granting of space and time for prayer in the workplace, and the provision of food prepared in line with the different religious precepts in school and company canteens, etc.) have been left to the discretion of private firms and municipal governments (Ferrari 2000, Aluffi 2004). Furthermore, some issues end up by being ruled on by the courts – like the presence of the crucifix in public offices and schools which, according to court rulings, cannot be rejected since it is considered a symbol of civic values of tolerance and respect – or being disciplined by soft laws. For example, since the *Public Security Consolidated Act* forbids the use of hats in pictures for identity cards, in 1995 an internal instruction of the Ministry of Interior exempted hats or headcovers worn for religious reasons, like the *hijab*, if facial features are visible, in line with the rules applied to nuns (Zincone 2005, Aluffi 2004).

As far as the implementation of integration policies was concerned, *Law No. 40/1998* foresaw the involvement of civil society organizations both as providers of integration and social measures (together with public actors) and as intermediaries, following a sort of “indirect integration” model, i.e. a model in which the State devolves part of its competences to civil society organizations (Zincone 1992). As a consequence of the weakness of immigrant associations, the role of representing immigrant interests has been played by Italian associations, by what we have defined the immigrants advocacy coalition, the “powerful lobby of the weaker strata” (Zincone 1998). For a long time this benevolent lobby focused its efforts on protecting the most vulnerable, i.e. irregular migrants. The success of this strategy produced a series of amnesties – in 1986, 1990, 1995, in 1998 soon after the approval of the *Law No. 40* and in 2002 during the centre-right government – bearing the risk of rewarding illegal rather than legal behaviour and of feeding a vicious circle attracting undocumented migrants.¹³ This in turn has fostered negative attitudes in public opinion towards immigrants by highlighting emergency aspects instead of normal, positive processes of integration. However, more recently the “benevolent” lobby has also begun to press in favour of legal immigrants, since many former *sans papiers* are now settled and documented.

In any case, we can conclude that *Law No. 40/1998* fitted the “reasonable integration” model quite well, even if some relevant elements were subsequently toned down or left out. In order not to lose support in the run-up to the

2000 regional and 2001 general elections, the centre-left government smoothed the dimension of “integrity as an equal right for legal immigrants” and underlined the aspect of “interaction based on security.” It strayed from the first of these two dimensions by limiting some social rights to citizens and long-term residents,¹⁴ making the conditions for obtaining a permanent residence permit much more demanding,¹⁵ and breaking the promise to grant long-term residents easier access to citizenship and the right to vote in local elections. As a consequence of the latter – which was subject to much criticism by Italian scholars – until the centre-left returned to power in 2006, political participation of immigrants was mainly limited to the initiatives undertaken by some municipalities, which established consultative bodies or assistant councillors,¹⁶

while the number of naturalizations has remained very low.¹⁷ On the other hand, as far as “interaction based on security” was concerned, the fight against illegal traffic was improved by enabling the confiscation of means of transport used and making compulsory the arrest of those caught in the act.

While the “reasonable integration” model was not completely fulfilled by the centre-left government, it seemed destined to be deeply revised by the centre-right coalition (2001-2006). During the electoral campaign the coalition announced a reform of *Law No. 40/1998* inspired by functionalist, repressive and identitarian stances. In 2002 the foretold reform was eventually passed (*Law No. 189* of 2002), but it altered the 1998 centre-left Law less than might have been expected, especially as far as social and integration measures were concerned¹⁸ (Zincone 2000b, 2006b, Colombo and Sciortino 2003).

In fact, even if the 2002 reform was inspired by identitarian stances, the basic principles established by the 1998 Law concerning integration and social measures were not

changed, retaining the multicultural elements without introducing assimilationist ones and maintaining most of the welfare provisions already granted to regular and irregular migrants. The most relevant changes concerned pensions,¹⁹ council houses²⁰ and the National Fund for Migration Policies. In particular, this last provision consisted in incorporating the Fund into the National Fund for Social Policies, eliminating the mandate to use part of this to finance measures in favour of immigrants, and reducing its size considerably. This increases the power of regional and local authorities to decide which social and integration policies have to be financed, and to what extent, with the risk that these measures might not be implemented. Nevertheless, the decision to merge the

In the 2002 reform, more attention was given to repressive-legalist stances. The improvement of “positive interaction based on security” was pursued by increasing sanctions against clandestine and irregular migrants and by extending the possibility to hold undocumented migrants in the special detention centres up to 60 days.

two Funds could be seen as part of the general trend in progress since the 1990s, with immigration policies increasingly devolved to regional and local authorities, and the move to blur the distinction between social policies in favour of native citizens and those addressed to immigrants.

In the 2002 reform, more attention was given to repressive-legalist stances. The improvement of “positive interaction based on security” was pursued by increasing sanctions against clandestine and irregular migrants and by extending the possibility to hold undocumented migrants in the special detention centres up to 60 days. However, the vicious circle of illegal entries was boosted once again by another amnesty for undocumented foreigners (2002), passed under pressure from employers and the “powerful lobby of the weaker strata.”

At the same time, identitarian and functionalist stances were emphasized, making the “integrity for legal immigrants” goal more difficult to achieve. The 2002 Law fostered a sort of guest-worker and co-ethnic model, similar to the one adopted by Germany in the past and now enjoying a sort of revival at EU level, by tightening the link between residence permits and employment,²¹ abolishing the job seeker’s residence permit and reducing from one year to six months the period of unemployment tolerated. It also raised the years required to obtain a permanent residence permit from five to six, called for a more frequent renewal of residence permits and shortened their duration.²² Thus stability and security for legal immigrants decreased. Moreover, in order to avoid the arrival of foreigners who might put pressure on the welfare system, the 2002 Law forbade reunification with relatives up to the third degree of kinship and made reunification of parents dependent on a lack of other children who could take care of them in their country of origin. On the other hand, the centre-right government reserved larger quotas of annual inflows to seasonal workers and eased the procedures for obtaining this kind of residence permit.²³ Furthermore, in order to screen the inflows better and support the economic integration of new migrants, *Law No. 189/2002* stated that education and job training programs could be set up in the countries of origin by local and regional public authorities, employers’ associations, trade unions and NGOs, and foreigners who took part in these programs had a priority entitlement to receive a visa to work in the sectors concerned in the training.²⁴ Finally, reflecting a closed attitude to migration phenomena and a sort of “ethnocentric identitarianism,” the centre-right government introduced the co-ethnic principle in favour of immigrants of Italian origin in the annual inflows decrees and applied a two-plus-three-year moratorium for workers coming from new EU member states. Though in the end it was obliged to greatly increase

the annual planned entries under pressure from employers and the “benevolent” advocacy coalition, leading to the 2006 inflows decree that allowed 170,000 non-EU workers and another 170,000 workers from new EU member states to enter the country, in addition to arrivals due to family reunifications.

We will now try to conjecture some of the main future trends. The “reasonable integration” model, after the (soft) revision carried out by centre-right government, is likely to be restored and reinforced by the centre-left coalition which returned to power in April 2006. First of all, the new government is going to re-establish some of the elements that grant “integrity for regular immigrants” by making legal entries and residence more practicable. The link between residence permit and employment will be made more flexible.²⁵ Furthermore, the new centre-left government has already decided to abolish the two-plus-three-year moratorium on the free circulation of migrants from new EU member states, and to grant residence permits for working reasons to the 350,000 migrants who had applied

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for it on the occasion of the 2006 inflow decree but whose applications were not accepted because they exceeded the already very generous quotas established by the previous centre-right government (170,000 entries). Yet, this last provision appears to disguise some sort of amnesty, since almost all those applications were actually made by migrants already working in Italy without a residence permit.

With regards to “integrity for legal migrants,” the centre-left coalition is going to fulfil the promises concerning long-term residents, which were put aside after the 1998 Law was approved. It intends to grant non-EU migrants the right to vote in local elections, while the Ministry of Interior has already prepared a reform bill of the *Nationality Law* which foresees an easier naturalization of foreigners and their children by reinforcing the *jus soli* principle and reducing the length of residence required, but offsets this more favourable treatment by the introduction of both language and integration requirements and the restriction of the access to nationality through marriage. The government affirmed that it also intends to implement EU Council Directives concerning long-term residents (2003/109/EC) and family reunification (2003/86/EC) – in practice it will just restore the 1998 Law in these matters. At the same time, “integrity as basic rights also for undocumented immigrants” will also be improved thanks to the reform of the special detention centres introduced in the 1998 Law in order to guarantee more humane conditions. Finally, “positive interaction based on pluralism and communication” is likely to be reinforced by the eventual approval of the *Religious Freedom Act*. This is the case provided that the present government, which has a very narrow majority in the

Senate, gets enough parliamentary support to pass these measures.

Summing up, Italy seems to have embarked on the path of a “reasonable integration” model. However, the model is likely to survive in future only in a revised version, a version capable of taking into account fears and concerns of nationals. Otherwise it risks being undermined by a xenophobic backlash, as has already happened with other moderate integration models.

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Notes

- 1 Immigration policies establish the requirements to entry and residence in a country, while immigrants policies concern the endowment of rights enjoyed by immigrants living in a country (Hammar 1990).
- 2 The employers had to recruit foreign workers in the country of origin without knowing them.
- 3 These workers could enter the country sponsored by private individuals, regions, municipalities and associations listed in the relevant register. Sponsors had to deposit a financial guarantee, offer appropriate accommodation and pay the contributions for public health insurance. The permit lasted one year.
- 4 58,000 in 1998 and 1999; 83,000 in 2000; 89,400 in 2001.
- 5 We note that in Italy the unemployment rate of migrants is only a few percentage points higher than that of native citizens (11.5% compared to 7.8% in the last quarter of 2005, ISTAT), in spite of their higher labour turnover and weaker social integration. In a recent article a prominent economist, Tito Boeri, maintains that, always according to ISTAT data, 9 out of 10 immigrants between the ages of 15 and 64 are employed, while rates for nationals are of just 7 of 10 (T. Boeri, “Tre segnali sull’immigrazione.” *La voce*. www.lavoce.info/news, 24/07/2006).
- 6 Relatives allowed to come to Italy through family reunification were spouses, children if minors, parents if economically dependent on the person living in Italy, dependent relatives up to the third degree of kinship who are unemployable in accordance with Italian legislation.

- ⁷ The *Nationality Law* (Statute No. 91 of 1992), which is now under reform (see below), is inspired by the principle of preference for foreigners of national origin. In comparison with the previous, the 1912 Law reinforced the *jus sanguinis* principle by requiring three years of residence for aliens of Italian origin, four years for aliens from EU countries and ten years for aliens from non-EU countries in order to apply for Italian nationality. The *jus soli* on reaching the age of 18 was limited by the requirement of a legal residence entitlement at birth and a continuous presence in Italy. On the other hand, acquiring citizenship through marriage is much easier in Italy than in other EU countries, encouraging marriages of convenience.
- ⁸ This provision was also introduced to comply with Schengen requirements.
- ⁹ In 2002, 52.3% of Italians thought that an increase in the number of immigrants would lead to the spread of crime and terrorism (Bonifazi 2005).
- ¹⁰ Intercultural education has been especially fostered in schools, acknowledging students' language and culture of origin since the early 1990s by issuing leaflets (Dutto 2000). We note, however, that the Roman Catholic religion is on the curriculum of State schools, as provided by the 1984 Concordat between the Catholic Church and the Italian State. Nevertheless, attending religious education lessons is not compulsory. As a consequence of agreements with other religious denominations (as yet there is no agreement with the Islamic religion), a course on other religious traditions or lessons on religious issues and on religion as a phenomenon can be held on demand (Aluffi 2004).
- ¹¹ According to the latest data available, in 2001-2002 79,819 migrants attended Italian language courses in public adult education facilities (Centri territoriali permanenti), (about 6% of regular immigrants present in the country in that year). Data on the attendance of the courses set up by non-profit organizations is not available.
- ¹² In 2004-2005 4.2% of students in public schools were foreign. Their performance was lower than that of their Italian classmates: regarding the pass rate, in 2004-2005 the difference between foreign and Italian students was -3.36 percentage points in elementary schools, -7.06 in middle schools, and -12.56 in high schools (MIUR – Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research 2005). Nevertheless, Italian concern for the possible negative effects on children's education due to the presence of foreigners in classes seems to be limited since in 2001, 61% of native citizens thought that this factor represented an occasion for updating the education system and for improving education for all students (ISPO 2001). However, concern could increase as the number of foreign students in schools rises.
- ¹³ We have to remember that approximately two-thirds of migrants living in Italy are estimated to have spent a period of unauthorized stay (Blangiardo 2005).
- ¹⁴ The centre-left government disowned the INPS (National Institute of Social Security) circular which stated that immigrants were entitled to poverty benefits, while the law in favour of maternity (No. 53 of 8 March 2000), which granted benefits to single mothers and for the third child, restricted those rights to immigrants holding a permanent residence permit.
- ¹⁵ In addition to the five years' legal residence required by law, the immigrant had to have always held a residence permit for a permanent work contract. This requirement is hard to meet in an economy which expects the labour force, and especially immigrant workers, to be flexible.
- ¹⁶ They are elected representatives of immigrants who have the right to participate in sessions of municipal council, to intervene on any item on the agenda, to make proposals and interpellations, but do not have the right to vote. Thus their powers, like the ones of consultative bodies, are limited.
- ¹⁷ From 1991 to 2004 just 120,000 foreign citizens acquired Italian nationality, 13.4% by residence and 87.6% by marriage (ISTAT – Ministry of Interior)
- ¹⁸ A synoptic table of the two laws is available on the FIERI Website (www.fieri.it/khtml2/files/uploads/servizi/legislazione%20Italia%20ASGI/normativa_in_materia_di_immigrazione/quadro_sinottico_engl.pdf).
- ¹⁹ Foreigners who return to their own country without having reached the minimum necessary to receive benefits (20 years of contributions, and a minimum age of 65 years), lose all their contributions if they have been members of the retributive or mixed system; only if they have been members of the contributory system can they get back what they have paid in.
- ²⁰ In order to apply for them, the non-EU foreigner must hold at least a two-year residence permit, while before this condition was absent.
- ²¹ More precisely, the 2002 Law introduced the “unified contract of employment and residence,” which implies the obligation for the employer to guarantee accommodation and cover the cost of return to the worker's country of origin in the event of dismissal.
- ²² Residence permits became renewable only for the same period for which they were issued (previously they were renewed for twice that period), and in any case for not more than two years (more precisely, not more than nine months for seasonal workers, one year for temporary workers and two years for workers with permanent contracts and self-employment).
- ²³ Foreigners who can prove that they have come to Italy for at least two consecutive years to perform seasonal work can obtain a three-year residence permit for this purpose with the indication of the period of validity for each year.
- ²⁴ Until mid-2006 this provision was implemented by only three Italian regions in an experimental way and on a very small number of migrant workers in Sri Lanka, Moldavia and Tunisia. In July 2006 the government extended it to the whole national territory.
- ²⁵ Since the renewal of residence permit often takes months, the government has decided to extend the validity of the permit until the renewed one is delivered. Furthermore, it is going to reintroduce the job seeker's residence permit.

THE VICISSITUDES OF DUTCH INTEGRATION POLICIES

ABSTRACT

Dutch integration policies as well as the making of such policies have shown remarkable shifts and changes in the 25 years of their existence. The Dutch case has revealed a sequence of *ad hoc* policy responses in the 1970s, evolving towards a welfare state of EM policy in the 1980s, shifting to more Republicanist integration policies in the 1990s, and finally to more symbolic politics since 2002. This evolution is in line with a broader context of increased depoliticization and technocratic policy making and implementation in the early 1980s, followed by a strong politicization at the end of the 1990s. This article proposes an historical overview of the Dutch integration policies, starting with the pre-1970s era to the beginning of the 21st century.

Introduction¹

Dutch integration policies as well as the development of such policies have shifted remarkably since they were created 25 years ago. The Ethnic Minorities policy (EM policy) started – much like in Sweden – as a welfare state policy to stimulate equality and equity of vulnerable groups in society during the 1980s. It was developed in a relatively depoliticized political context and laid down in a number of governmental documents (Ministerie 1980, 1981, 1983). In its implementation phase, this policy led to significant policy activity in many domains during the 1980s.

Towards the end of the 1980s the public and political discourse started to look closely at the EM policy: it had “failed in important areas of labour and education,” and the collective character of the policy (target groups and their emancipation) and its “overemphasis on cultural aspects” was criticized. This led to the formulation of more Republican Integration Policies in the 1990s. The new policy document (Contourennota, Ministerie 1994) thus put the emphasis on the individual rather than on the group, focused on the socio-economic aspects of integration rather than on the cultural/religious ones, and put more emphasis than had previously been done on the citizenship responsibilities of individuals in integration processes. This led to new directions of policy implementation during the 1990s, among others to a national policy of introductory courses for newcomers in Dutch society on the one hand, and to area-based policies (urban policies), on the other.

The beginning of the new century prepared a new shift in policy orientation that was by now embedded in a full-fledged politicization of the topics of immigration and integration. The perception became dominant that integration processes and policies had fundamentally failed and that social cohesion of Dutch society had become endangered. Framing these topics in this way was successfully exploited in national election campaigns in 2002, thus reinforcing the politicization of the themes. A new policy called “Integration Policy New Style” was formulated in a letter of the Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration (TK 2003-2004, 29203, No. 1). The diagnosis of this policy document was that the integration policy of the 1990s was no longer in synch with the societal developments. It could no longer deal effectively with continuing immigration. Ethnic minorities are too far removed from Dutch society and there are insufficient incentives for participation in society (Ministerie 2004a, 6). A series of proposals and measures have therefore flowed from this bleak portrait, significantly reducing immigration (the Netherlands has had a negative net migration balance since 2003); with these changes, mandatory forms of integration for newcomers and oldcomers alike – called neo-assimilationist by observers – have been introduced.

How could such a remarkable development take place? In the following section I will analyze in more detail what the shifts and changes meant, why they took place, which actors have been involved. As indicated above, the basic policy documents that embody such changes follow somewhat later: 1983 for EM policy (Ministerie 1983), 1994 for Integration Policy (Ministerie 1994), and 2003 for Integration Policy New Style.

Policies of the 1970s and before

In the post-war period, the Netherlands did not consider itself an immigration country. Those who happened to be there, like the guest workers, were supposed to return to their home countries.

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Consequently, *ad hoc* measures for accommodation were the rule and reception facilities were short-term and scarce (Penninx 1996). (The only exception to this rule was the assimilation policy for the repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies). Accordingly, the two main policy goals were remigration and accommodation of the guest workers to the Dutch society – on the condition that they remain in the Netherlands. Maintaining migrants' own identity was thus considered important, but with the understanding that migrants would return to their countries of origin.

In the 1970s in order to respond to the needs of some vulnerable groups like guest workers, asylum seekers, migrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, Moluccans and “travellers” (*woonwagenbewoners*), a welfare policy was developed mainly within the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM). Many private institutions were thereby encouraged (and subsidized) to provide welfare services to each of these groups (Molleman 2004, Blok Commission 2004, Penninx 1979). As well, service delivery for guest workers, such as housing, were supposed to be ensured by the companies employing them. With increasing family reunification and the concentration of guest workers and their families in specific urban areas, local authorities were obliged to get involved. Often municipalities took initiatives in certain areas, such as housing, education, health care and welfare, and pressured the national authorities to recognize and finance these measures. However, the guest workers did not return to their sending countries after the halt in recruitment and the economic crisis that followed in the late 1970s. On the contrary, certain migrant communities grew significantly through family and asylum migration, in particular North African and Turkish migrants. Growing unemployment of migrant workers and the arrival of their families resulted in increased demands for specific measures.

The administrative layout of the policies described above was problematic. Different ministries were involved for different target groups and policy domains. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, responsible for the labour market and work permits, tended to continue its work based on the temporality of migration. The Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, responsible for general welfare, was directly confronted with the problems of reception and was therefore more aware of growing tensions; consequently, it pleaded for change. There were thus difficulties in coordinating the efforts between

ministries; indeed certain rivalry even existed (Hoppe 1987, Blok Commission 2004, Penninx 1979, Scholten and Timmermans 2004).

It was also during the 1970s that scientists started to get involved. Entzinger (1975) was one of the first to draw attention to the gap between the *de facto* permanent settlement of immigrants in the country and the policy-maker's view of temporary migration. He emphasized the risk of not acknowledging the problem. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work established the Advisory Committee on Research on Minorities (ACOM) that brought academics in this domain together within a common policy framework.

Media, the general public, local authorities, academics and civil servants all demanded policy changes (especially following the Moluccan terrorist attacks). The *Ethnic Minorities* report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1979) acted as a catalyst for change: it pleaded to fully recognize that a number of immigrant groups had settled permanently in the Netherlands and to create an active policy aimed at the integration of what it called “ethnic minorities” in society. In its preliminary reaction to the report (Ministerie 1980), the government accepted the advice, decided to develop an EM policy and to install a strong coordinating structure for such policy within the Ministry of Home Affairs. This new policy direction gained full parliamentary support, which was symbolized by the fact that the government coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals nominated an oppositional Labour Party politician (Henk Molleman) as Director of the Coordination Department within the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Ethnic minorities policy in the 1980s

The basic rationale of EM policy was that: specific groups in Dutch society that combined low socio-economic status with a perceived ethnic and/or cultural difference would run the risk of becoming permanently marginalized groups in society. It followed that low status immigrant groups would be specifically targeted by this policy (but not all immigrant groups), as would certain native groups such as “travellers” and long established gypsies. The main principles of the new EM policy were:

- 1) To achieve equality of ethnic minorities in the socio-economic domain, inclusion and participation in the political domain and equity in the domain of culture and religion within a constitutional framework;
- 2) It was targeted at specific groups that were regarded to be in danger of becoming distinct minorities by

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virtue of their low socio-economic situation combined with their being perceived as culturally different from mainstream society: guest-workers, Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and “travellers.” An important assumption was that development of (group) identity would stimulate the emancipation within the community of the group and would have a positive influence on the integration in the broader society as well;

- 3) The EM Policy should cover all relevant domains and ministries, and be strongly anchored in the governmental apparatus. As a result, a Department for the Coordination of Minorities Policy was created (DCIM) within the General Directorate of “Home Policies” and not within that of “Security and Order” (Molleman 2004). The idea behind placing the coordinating unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs was that it was a policy for new citizens, and therefore the ministry responsible for cities and provinces should be in charge.

The 1980s became the heyday of the EM policy. Irrespective of how one evaluates the outcomes, the range of policy initiatives is impressive when compared to other European countries in that same period. In the *legal-political domain*, for example, the full legislation of the Netherlands was scrutinized on discriminatory elements on the basis of nationality, race and religion (Beune and Hessels 1983) and many changes were made. Anti-discrimination legislation was reinforced and a structure for reporting and consulting was created. Furthermore, active and passive voting rights for alien residents were introduced in 1985. In 1986 the Dutch *Nationality Law* was changed to include more elements of *jus soli*, thus making it much easier for alien immigrants and their children to become Dutch citizens. Over the course of time a consultation structure for all target groups of EM policy was established that should give these groups a voice in matters relating to their position in society.² Subsidizing EM organizations both at the national and local levels, and trying to engage them in integration efforts became an important strategic aspect of policy implementation.

In the *socio-economic* domain three themes were key: the labour market/unemployment, education, and housing. In EM policy several initiatives have been taken to combat the high unemployment, including a law inspired by the Canadian *Employment Equity Act*, and

even affirmative action for national and local governmental employers in the period 1986-1993. The effect of these measures, however, has been weak.

Measures in the area of *education* have, from the outset, been an important part of EM policy. Currently, most of the EM policy’s specific financial resources have been allocated to this domain, and specifically support measures aiming to rectify immigrant children’s academic performance in the regular educational system. This was done by a points system in which schools received significantly more money for children of immigrant background than they did get for middle-class native-born pupils. Immigrant and minority children were rated at 1.9,

while native-born children of low socio-economic background were rated at 1.25 and the standard was 1. Apart from this general financial assistance to schools, a relatively small portion was allocated to specific measures like: education in the native language and culture of immigrants.

In the domain of *housing*, a fundamental change was introduced in 1981 that provided legally residing aliens with full access to social housing, which had been denied prior to this measure. Given the fact that social housing makes up the larger part of all housing in big cities in the Netherlands, this measure had a very positive impact on the position of alien immigrants.

In the domain of *culture, language and religion*, the EM policy may be called “multicultural” *avant la lettre*.³ Developing migrants’ culture was a key underpinning of the EM policy, and was, in principle, left to groups and organizations. The limits of its application is set by the acceptance of general Dutch laws. The role of government was defined as facilitating, i.e. creating opportunities for minorities, such as special programs in the media, in immigrant languages.

As for *religion*, “new religions” were able to legally claim facilities

such as denominational schools and broadcasting facilities on the same grounds as established religions. The outcome was a relatively quick institutionalization of Islam (Rath et al. 2001).

During the late 1980s, disappointment with EM policy grew, but it was only in the early 1990s that it became the topic of intense public debate and criticism. The first strong critique on the EM policy was formulated in 1989 in a new Report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1989). Briefly stated, the message was that there was too little progress in two crucial domains: labour market and education. An interpretation was added

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to this: too much attention was given to (multi)cultural aspects and subsidizing organizations, suggesting that that could hinder individual participation in education and labour market rather than enhance it. Consequently, the advice was that more effort should be made in the aforementioned key areas, and in a more compulsory way. "Obligations of migrants should be more balanced by extended rights," and policies should focus less on cultural rights and facilities.

Other topics were also publicly criticized. For example, Frits Bolkestein, leader of the Liberal Party and of the opposition in Dutch parliament at that time, suggested in a public speech in 1991 that Islam formed a threat to liberal democracy and a hindrance to integration of immigrants, and that immigrant integration should be handled with more courage.

Integration policy in the 1990s

Policy did not change immediately as a consequence of such critiques, but the seeds for a different conception were sown. A new policy document marked the first distinct shift in policy focus: it was titled the Contourennota of 1994 (Ministerie 1994). This document called for a renewed "Integration Policy" with a more "republicanist" character, and focusing on "good citizenship" and "self-responsibility" as guiding concepts. The argument was that citizenship entails not only rights but also duties, and that each citizen must be active and responsible for him/herself. Following the advice of the 1989 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, this new "integration policy" reflected three main changes in comparison with EM policy: 1) a shift away from target groups and towards disadvantaged individuals; 2) a strong focus on the socio-economic incorporation through labour market and education measures; 3) a shift away from (multi)cultural policies and strong reliance on immigrant organizations.

The social-democrat victory in the national elections of 1994 led to the so-called Purple Coalition, which included the Labour Party (PvdA) together with the Conservative Liberals (VVD) and left-wing Liberals (D66). The focus on economic integration of individual immigrants, as recommended by the Scientific Council report of 1989, fitted neatly with the general policy line of this government, whose motto was "work, work, and once again, work." As a consequence, measures specifically targeted at ethnic minorities were abandoned.

A new policy instrument that was better suited to this new philosophy were civic integration courses,⁴ aimed at facilitating the initial integration of newcomers. An integration tool has been developed at the local level in a number of cities in the Netherlands since the early 1990s: courses for newcomers who should be given a toolkit of Dutch language training and information on the functioning of important institutions in Dutch society. Local policy-makers had wanted to provide these tools to all newcomers who needed it, and developed it systematically in their cities. This instrument was later taken

over by the national government, and through the WIN-law of 1998, became the national reception policy.

Another way of transforming policies according to the new philosophy was to include many of the integration facilities in area-based policies (rather than group-based ones). In 1994 the Ministry of Home Affairs began establishing a policy dealing with deprived areas in major Dutch cities. This can be seen as a replacement of integration policies, as targeted areas are characterized by a majority of ethnic minority population. The "area" has been chosen as a primary policy category instead of groups in society. This was also institutionally reflected from 1998 onwards: a new Minister for Urban Policies and Integration was nominated within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Although such area-based policies have been a way of abandoning group-oriented policies, group-specific policies still exist at the local level.

A series of events at the turn of the millennium triggered a new shift in public and political discourse on immigration and integration issues that would later lead to a policy revision. It put the social and cultural dimension of integration back on the agenda, but in a different way. The search was no longer for "compatibilities," but rather for "commonalities" that would help preserve national norms and values and thereby restore and enhance

social cohesion of society (Entzinger 2003). The integration issue was also increasingly viewed as a perceived "clash of civilizations" (Snel 2003).

A new national debate followed the publication of a newspaper article by Scheffer (2000), in which the multicultural society in the Netherlands was dismissed as a "tragedy" and a "disaster."⁵ In this article, integration policy was declared a failure, followed by a call for a more assimilationist policy that would revive Dutch history, norms and values. As with the first national minorities

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debate in 1992, Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants were defined as particularly problematic. This was reinforced by international developments, such as the September 11 attacks in the United States that triggered fierce responses in the Dutch media, and led to several incidents of ethnic and religious violence.

In the meantime the Dutch political arena witnessed the rise of populist politician Pim Fortuyn. As a true populist, Fortuyn made harsh statements on criminality, direct democracy, and immigration and integration. He pleaded for “zero-migration,” argued that “the Netherlands was full,” and called for “a cold war against Islam.”⁶ To these arguments, that were not completely new, he added two elements: first, the accusation that the political elite had enhanced the failure of integration in the past by “hiding the real problems behind a curtain of political correctness,” and second, the contention that the real victim of all this was the common (native-born) Dutch voter.

His populist campaign exploited this discourse quite successfully. His party first won a landslide victory in the local elections of March 2002 in Rotterdam, the second largest Dutch city. A few weeks later Fortuyn was murdered, just before the national elections of May 2002. Notwithstanding (or thanks to) the murder, his newly established LPF party won a landslide victory, gaining 26 out of the 150 seats in parliament and thus entering parliament at once as the second largest party. This success changed the political discourse on immigration and integration radically. In fact, most parties changed their discourse on these issues in the aftermath of the victory of Fortuyn (Penninx 2006).

A new series of events followed, but after 2002 it became uncertain whether events truly trigger attention to the issues of migration and integration, or whether the high agenda status of these issues turn these events into trigger events (Snel and Scholten 2005). The climax was reached when Dutch filmmaker Van Gogh was murdered in 2004 by a Dutch-Moroccan youngster who was affiliated to a radical Islamist network in the Netherlands.

These events had two significant effects. First of all, they contributed to the image of policy failure. This led Parliament to establish a Parliamentary Research Committee on the Integration Policy that would examine “why policy had thus far known such limited success.” However, when this committee concluded that the integration had been relatively successful (Blok Commission 2004), this conclusion was widely dismissed as naïve. In fact, some observers complained that a new political correctness had now emerged that rendered positive statements on the integration policy and on multiculturalism⁷ taboo. Secondly, these events reinforced

a new mode of policy discourse, described by Prins as “hyperrealism” (Prins 2002). This represented a shift from the radical and “realist” type of discourse of the 1990s calling for a “tough” approach to integration, to a type of discourse in which “being tough” in itself became a goal.

Integration Policy New Style, since 2002

So from 2002 on, the policy took another turn, with a new political majority in power⁸ and a renewed institutional setting that foreshadowed changes: the coordination of integration policies was moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs (where it had been for 22 years) to the Ministry of Justice under a new Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration. The Integration Policy New Style, formulated in a letter by that new Minister (TK 2003-2004, 29203, No. 1) closely follows the paradigm of the 1990s, based on the leading concepts of “citizenship” and “self-responsibility,” but the emphasis is rather placed on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. The concept of integration policy is thus considerably narrowed. In addition, integration policy has clearly become tied to, and even instrumental to, immigration policy, facilitating the selection of migrants and restricting new flows, in particular those of asylum seekers, family reunion and marriage migration.

The premiere measure in the new policy was to be the reception of new migrants, which has been reformulated to serve the dual purposes of integration and migration control. Newcomers have an obligation of passing an exam, proving language skills and knowledge about Dutch culture and society before entering the Netherlands. After admission, they must attend civic integration courses. Renewal of temporary permits and of permanent permits are conditional on passing these courses.

The “new style” reception policy therefore includes significant modifications compared to the policy of the previous decade. On the one hand, it introduces a new distribution of responsibilities among the various partners involved, the migrants’ own responsibility being the most important starting point. Since 2007, newcomers must find their civic integration courses and pay for them themselves,⁹ and they are entitled to a refund of up to 70% of their training expenses, and this reimbursement is conditional on their succeeding the exam. Local authorities lose much of their responsibilities with this program.

The Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration, Rita Verdonk, aimed to expand the target population of the new reception policy. In her first proposal, all migrants between the ages of 16 and 65 were made to follow mandatory civic integration courses, regardless of the time they had spent in the country, and even when they are naturalized Dutch. When this turned out to be unacceptable,

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a revised proposal envisaged to extend the obligation to all individuals who had done less than eight years of obligatory schooling in the country. This would have included the so-called old-comers – people from migrant origin who already live in the country –, but also naturalized immigrants and native Dutch who had been abroad. She also specifically attempted to extend the obligation to immigrants from the Dutch Antilles, justifying this by the problematic character of this minority group. However, this proposal has been rejected by Parliament as unconstitutional and discriminatory, since Antilleans have Dutch nationality. Ultimately a final proposal has been passed at the very end of the Cabinet's legislative term (in July 2006), eliminating the obligation for (naturalized) Dutch citizens and postponing its actual implementation to the next legislature and therefore making it dependent on the next majority government in power.

Conclusion

The Dutch case has revealed a sequence from *ad hoc* policy responses in the 1970s to a welfare state of EM policy in the 1980s, turning to more Republicanist integration policies in 1990s, and finally to more symbolic politics since 2002. This development went hand in hand with the de-politicization and technocratic policy making and implementation of the early 1980s, followed by the strong politicization at the end of the 1990s. An unprecedented politicization took place in the years following the rise of Pim Fortuyn, leading to the articulation of popular ideas and sentiments concerning immigration and integration. As a consequence, the immigration and integration policy areas that used to be distinct have increasingly become integrated in a very specific way: restrictive immigration policies not only facilitate integration, but tough integration policies also discourage immigration. This new policy is top-down in its making and shows a strong tendency towards re-centralization in its implementation.

The gap between such symbolic politics at the national level and a more pragmatic “problem coping” approach at the local level leads to increasing tensions. A crucial question is how this tension will develop in the near future. Critique and resistance comes from different sides: civil society organizations, including churches, employers, trade unions and immigrant organizations, European and international institutions, but also particularly from local government that pressures less symbolic and more problem-oriented approaches to immigration and integration.

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Notes

- ¹ This article is based on a broader analysis of policy making in the field of immigration and integration in the Netherlands by Maria Bruquetas-Callejo, Blanca Garcés-Masareñas, Rinus Penninx and Peter Scholten. This analysis will be published as an IMISCOE Working Paper at www.imiscoe.org.
- ² In 1985, a National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) is established, in which the most important minority organizations are represented. The LAO was to advise government on issues of immigrant integration, and to be consulted in the context of administrative issues related to the integration policy. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the LOM, the National Consultation Body for Minorities, an institution with a weaker mandate.

³ In the policy documents of 1981 and 1983 the term multiculturalism was not used. The labeling of EM policies as multiculturalist policies has been introduced later, particularly by adversaries.

⁴ In Dutch these are called “*Inburgeringscursussen*.” The word “*inburgering*” has the word *burger* (citizen) in it, but it is different from naturalization (becoming a national citizen). To avoid such confusion we prefer the term “civic integration courses” rather than “citizenship programs.” The courses do not necessarily prepare for national citizenship.


⁵ Depending on the translation of the Dutch word “drama” in the title *Het multiculturele drama*.

⁶ Interview with *De Volkskrant*, November 2, 2001.

⁷ TK, 6 April 2004, 63-4112

⁸ The cabinet Balkenende I was a short-lived coalition of Christian-democrats, liberals and the extreme right party LPF; it was followed in 2003 by Balkenende II, a coalition in which the LPF was substituted by the progressive liberals (D’66).

⁹ Another element that has been introduced – without much debate – since the integration policy new style is financial: all costs of admission and immigration for the State should be born by the immigrants. This means that immigrants have to pay sums of money for visa and residence permits and their renewal that were unheard of before. An application for a temporary residence costs 430 euros, a renewal 285 euros per member of the family, a permanent residence permit costs 890 euros (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland 2004).



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HE IWĪ TAHI TATOŪ?*

POLICY IN A DIVERSE NEW ZEALAND

ABSTRACT

New Zealand is one of the classic immigrant receiving societies, but the immigrant flows until the mid-20th century have been very monocultural. Nation building was historically built around social and economic connections with Great Britain. Two different dynamics have disrupted this nation building project: the articulation of indigenous (Maori) interests and the cultural diversification of immigrant flows. Maori concerns have been reflected in policy shifts by the State, and the development of biculturalism. But a multiculturalism that recognizes the arrival of significant flows of Pacific and Asian immigrants is still underdeveloped.

New Zealand's path towards a policy framework that encompasses both biculturalism and multiculturalism has been different to those of the other classic immigrant receiving countries such as Canada, the USA and Australia. In recognition of a significant indigenous population – Maori –, policy since the 1970s has focused on integrating Maori into the State and national discourses. Only since the early 1990s has there been pressure (demographic and only more recently political) to develop an approach that more adequately recognizes the interests of those other than Maori or Pakeha.¹ The resulting policy mix has been to address questions of integration for Maori in a relatively comprehensive manner but to struggle with a form of multiculturalism that seeks to recognize and encompass ethnic communities other than the two main ones. The New Zealand approach to matters of integration and recognition has been dominated by a biculturalism which has evolved in the last 30 years and which concerns Maori.

Evolving policy frameworks

With the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, sovereignty was ceded to Britain by the indigenous Maori. The Treaty was signed by representatives of the British Crown and 500 Maori chiefs, and there were three provisions in the Treaty in two languages: acceptance of Crown sovereignty; recognition of Maori as a distinct collectivity with certain rights; and the conferral of citizenship on all Crown subjects (Fleras and Spoonley 1999, 10). But the reality of colonization was that the first provision held sway and by 1852, the Treaty was declared a nullity by the Chief Justice. The development of New Zealand included outright conflict as settlers sought to gain control of Maori-owned land along with policies that were built around separate and far from equal provisions for Maori: native schools, four Maori seats in Parliament, constrained political rights and separate provision for Maori in the justice system. The assumption was that the best approach was to encourage assimilation.

This mix of a peremptory takeover of Maori resources, a dismissal of Maori culture and language and the belief that Maori would die out in the face of a more “civilized” and “superior” cultural tradition lasted well into the 20th century (Walker 1990). Maori did resist, and in some cases, successfully, and Maori control of resources, and a language and cultural tradition, were preserved in certain parts of New Zealand. Major changes came with the migration of Maori from their traditional areas of settlement to the expanding urban economies from 1945. This was encouraged by government policies that sought assimilation by “modernization” away from tribal influences and rural locations. In the wake of relocation, it was increasingly recognized that Maori were not enjoying the same rights or standard of living as other New Zealanders, and so progressive governments (especially those of the Labour Party) sought to ensure that Maori were given the rights promised as part of the third provision of the Treaty of Waitangi, equal citizenship. But this was often interpreted as special provisions for Maori to encourage parity, with the result that the Department of Maori Affairs provided significant funding for Maori housing, economic development and education to ensure modernization. By the mid-20th century, the policy of assimilation had become one of integration, built around special recognition of Maori needs and interests. Under conservative governments in the 1970s and 1980s, this special provision was increasingly under attack as inappropriate in a modern nation-state, which should not treat anyone as ethnically separate. The Prime Minister at the time, Rob Muldoon, was

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fond of quoting the statement Governor Hobson made at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, “*He iwi tahi tatou*” (We are all one people). But that was not in accord with a now largely urbanized Maori.

Maori political groups began to protest that the second provision of the Treaty of Waitangi, the recognition of Maori as a distinct people with certain rights, had not been upheld by successive governments. A land march down the length of the North Island took place in 1975 and there was occupation of land in Auckland in 1977-1978 as well as other parts of the country to protest at land loss, along with a call for more formal recognition of the importance of Maori culture and language. The 1984-1989 Labour Government moved to rectify some of these grievances, and began a more extensive process of deciding reparations for the losses associated with colonialism, the incorporation of bicultural requirements into the delivery of government services (these agencies had to acknowledge the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi, develop Maori capability and ensure that they had adequately qualified people who could respond to Maori needs), and recognize Maori culture and language in New Zealand’s institutions. The effect was to significantly disrupt the nation building process which had been previously built around an assumption of British values and institutions and the assimilation/integration of Maori. Some Maori argued for *tino rangatiratanga* (Maori sovereignty) which directly challenged the notion that there was a single form of sovereignty held by the State on behalf of a unified New Zealand nation (Awatere 1984).

By the late 1980s, the assimilation/integration approach that had prevailed had given way to a policy framework which was bicultural (recognition of Maori as a people with distinct citizenship rights). Maori now comprised 15% of New Zealand’s population, were largely urban and made up an increasing proportion of younger age groups (as opposed to Pakeha who are an ageing population with low fertility). There was a constitutional recognition that Maori had group-specific rights by virtue of their status as the indigenous people, as having rights accorded to them as part of the Treaty of Waitangi and as having been unfairly treated (in a legal as well as a moral sense) by the processes of colonization. There is, once again, a separate Maori education system which provides for Maori language instruction and Maori knowledge, Maori is an official language along with English, there is a State-funded Maori television channel, social, educational and employment services for which Maori are provided either through various government agencies or as devolved schemes run by Maori organizations and Maori language and protocols are now widely used, at least in the public sector. The effect has been to marginalize policy that addresses the cultural diversity associated with immigration.

Cultural diversity in the 21st century

For much of New Zealand’s colonial history, immigration was almost exclusively British and Irish, and those non-European migrants who did make it to New Zealand, such as the Chinese, were racialized and discriminated against. In the 1960s, the census records nearly 99% of New Zealand’s population as either being European (both migrants and New Zealand-born) or Maori. But this situation rapidly began to change because of two non-European migration flows. The first was labour migration from the Pacific (Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Fiji) which was prompted by the need for semi and unskilled labour in the major cities. The arrival of Pacific migrants produced a major (negative) reaction during the 1970s, and there were campaigns to identify and deport “overstayers.” The second migration occurred as a result of the review of immigration policy in 1986 and a new act in 1987. This took away racial preferences in terms of the source country or culture of migrants and aligned New Zealand selection with the points system of Australia and Canada. The first period of major non-European migration involved Hong Kong Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans. The second, from 2000 onwards, has involved mainland Chinese and Indians (including from Fiji). The effect is that the diversity of New Zealand has changed dramatically, so that the country now has more overseas-born than Canada, and Auckland – as the gateway city – has more overseas-born than any other Australasian city. A bicultural approach is insufficient as the basis for integrating immigrants and their descendants.

The move to alter New Zealand’s immigration policy was in recognition that the country needed to re-align itself away from Europe and towards the Asia-Pacific region geo-politically. The emphasis since 1987 has been on immigrant selection, especially with the focus on economic immigrants (those who will contribute to New Zealand’s economic development and international competitiveness). The assumption is that immigrants who were carefully selected would then face few difficulties in settling in New Zealand. Unlike Canada or Australia, New Zealand has offered relatively few post-arrival services as part of the process of settlement. There was also little public discussion of the changes to immigration policy, and both Maori and Pakeha felt somewhat aggrieved at the sudden diversification of immigrant flows. From 1993 through to the 1996 General Election, there was another period of anti-immigrant politics with Asian immigrants now racialized and the subject of discrimination. An anti-immigrant political party, New Zealand First, gained significantly from these populist sentiments.

Research on the experiences of immigrants indicated that settlement was problematic, especially for non-English

This mix of a peremptory takeover of Maori resources, a dismissal of Maori culture and language and the belief that Maori would die out in the face of a more “civilized” and “superior” cultural tradition lasted well into the 20th century.

speaking background immigrants (see Boyd 2003). The irony was that the investment in selecting immigrants was not followed by positive settlement outcomes. The evidence led to a Cabinet paper in 2003 which marked an important acknowledgement that a different policy approach was called for. This paper, *The Immigration Settlement Strategy: A Programme of Action for the Settlement Outcomes That Promote Social Cohesion*, provided some of the elements for an evolving framework that addresses cultural diversity and immigrant integration. The target population, however, are permanent residents, not the very significant number of temporary workers or students, and the goal is social cohesion which is defined as a “climate of collaboration because all groups have a sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy.” Alongside this high level policy goal of social cohesion is an interest in strengthening national identity, maintaining trust in government and reducing inequality. The Cabinet statement recognizes that robust immigrant selection processes need to be accompanied by an investment in settlement. Early contributions to this policy debate have pointed out that immigrant settlement is important; so is the role and contribution of host communities. Various government departments and agencies are charged with developing and implementing this policy.

Immigrant selection and settlement

Immigrants are selected according to specified criteria. About 60% of the immigrants currently selected fall into the skilled and business investor categories, with points awarded for criteria such as qualifications, prior experience, a job offer and age. The points cut-off is adjusted according to the numbers applying and whether targets are being met, along with the demand for certain skills onshore. One of the more contentious elements since the early 1990s has been the English language requirements (at one point, a bond of NZ\$20,000 was required), especially given the research evidence that English language competency is the most significant factor in successful settlement outcomes. This is done by a single authority and according to a national qualifications framework. There is particular concern that certain professional bodies impose additional and unfair requirements before the immigrant is allowed to practice in New Zealand, the medical profession being the most obvious example. But the issues in this regard escalate quite significantly in terms of post-arrival experiences.

There is relatively little that an immigrant can expect by way of automatic post-arrival support (unless they fall

into a humanitarian category such as refugees). Access to benefits is subject to a period of residency, English language tuition is at the immigrant’s inclination and there are relatively few programs to help acclimatize to a New Zealand business environment. If difficulties are encountered, then some services are available. The Language Line (offered by the Office Ethnic Affairs) can be accessed in the case of medical situations or the courts system, for example. This low level of support compared to Canada or Australia is compounded by the attitudes of key gatekeepers. The research literature demonstrates that employers tend to see immigrants as a least preferred labour option, although there are some important exceptions (Trlin, Spoonley and Watts 2005). Surname or accent discrimination, an undervaluing of overseas qualifications and experience (despite a robust evaluation of credential qualifications prior to arrival) and stereotypes remain significant barriers in immigrants obtaining appropriate forms of employment.

In recent years, both private and public sectors agencies have sought to respond to these settlement issues and to contribute to the goal of social cohesion. The Office of Ethnic Affairs is charged with the promotion of diversity. The Human Rights Commission has both an educative and regulatory role, and seeks to reduce prejudice and discrimination and a complaints-based process. The Department of Labour and Ministry of Social Development provide advice and help in terms of employment and welfare benefits for immigrants. In the private sphere, some of the employer representative groups such as the Auckland Chamber of Commerce and Employers and Manufacturers Association have proactively sought to encourage employers to view immigrants in a more positive light. Politically, the government has emphasized the value of diversity and has offered apologies for past mistreatment to

the Chinese and Samoan communities, an act, which was emotionally accepted by leaders of the communities, concerned.

The successful settlement of immigrants has become an important policy consideration, although much of the investment remains in recruiting and selecting immigrants. The 2006 *Immigration Act Review* emphasizes border security, despite the Cabinet paper and its concern with social cohesion. This situation is compounded by the policy dominance of biculturalism and the lack of a systematic and publicly endorsed multicultural framework. The multiculturalism that does exist tends to operate in the public sector as a requirement to recognize cultural difference but there is minimal resourcing (with the

The 1984-1989 Labour Government moved to rectify some of these grievances, and began a more extensive process of deciding reparations for the losses associated with colonialism, the incorporation of bicultural requirements into the delivery of government services, and recognize Maori culture and language in New Zealand’s institutions.

possible exception of Pacific peoples) and it is secondary to biculturalism. Moreover, Maori and some others regard multiculturalism as a threat given that conservatives see it as a way of re-allocating resources away from Maori or regarding them as yet another ethnic minority. Elsewhere, multiculturalism is often reduced to festivals and food, and the degree of diversity in New Zealand and its political and economic significance is still widely underestimated. The immigrant communities themselves have proven to be the most adaptive and innovative, and have been active in setting up their own networks and ethnic sub-economies, and in promoting and resourcing those institutions and activities (such as language maintenance) that are important to them.

In all of this, one element has helped in an unanticipated way. When the New Zealand Government passed the 1977 *Citizenship Act*, along with the legislation and policy that followed, a soft form of citizenship was established. The awarding of Permanent Residence virtually grants all the same rights as full citizenship, New Zealand has a large number of visa waiver and dual citizenship arrangements with other countries, and the pressure to become a New Zealand citizen is low key. Recently, the difference between Australia and its hard line policies on refugees and immigrants and New Zealand's more relaxed approach has become more pronounced.

Integration and social cohesion

There is an unresolved tension between the major attempt to include the indigenous Maori in the modern New Zealand State and society – biculturalism – and the need to recognize the cultural diversity associated with immigration, via a locally relevant form of multiculturalism. The challenge in the next decade will be to construct a policy framework which makes it clear what immigrant and ethnic communities might expect by way of recognition and resourcing, as well as indicating those values and practices which mark a common and inclusive national identity. The present government is aware of these issues, hence the Cabinet statement on immigrant settlement and the various initiatives that have been taken by government departments. But there are also aspects of biculturalism which might help. A number of bicultural initiatives provide models for other communities and a rationale for government and public support. For example, the language nests (*kohanga reo* or pre-schools) for Maori and the bilingual units/schools in the State school system have been imitated by ethnic communities looking to maintain their own languages. Further, the reform of public institutions has provided an opportunity for ethnic and immigrant communities to become more involved in national institutions. The introduction of Mixed Member Proportional Representation in the New Zealand Parliament in the late 1990s has encouraged a wider range of ethnicities to be politically represented. But the challenge is to develop a more appropriate and extensive multicultural framework, which, as biculturalism has done, recognizes and resources minority and immigrant ethnic communities.

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Notes

- * "We are one people," Captain William Hobson, British Government representative at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840. The question mark is the author's.
- ¹ *Pakeha* refers to members of the majority group who are of European descent. This use of the term is contested by some (see Fleras and Spoonley 1999).

NORWAY'S APPROACH TO INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES

ABSTRACT

The universalistic welfare state and welfare concerns constitute core premises for Norway's integration policy towards immigrants, refugees and minorities. The principle rule is mainstreaming, which means that the needs of migrants' and minorities' are provided for within the general welfare policies, programs and services. General government policy is based on the principle that cultural plurality is positive, that discrimination, racism and intolerance are contrary to fundamental values and must be combatted actively. The design of welfare programs should recognize and respect diversity and different needs in the population. Some special measures are deemed necessary to ensure equal opportunities. Participation in the labour market is regarded the most important tool to fight poverty and exclusion. A coherent policy is sought by giving one ministry coordination responsibility for the integration and diversity policy as well as the coordination of the policy concerning the indigenous population and national minorities. Dialogue and contact with civil society are deemed important in developing policy. Mechanisms to follow up implementation of policies exist.

Norway experienced net immigration for the first time in 1970, which was relatively late compared to other European countries of immigration. In 1954, Norway became part of the open Nordic labour market. In the 1950s and 1960s, Norway had few immigrants and no official policy for incorporating migrants into mainstream society. From the end of the 1960s until 1975 – when Norway needed labour – few immigration restrictions were in place, and other European countries were banning low-skilled immigration, so labour migrants from non-European countries (especially Pakistan, Morocco, Turkey) immigrated to Norway. Since 1975, the year that Norway also restricted labour immigration of low-skilled immigrants from non-Nordic countries, immigrants to Norway have mainly been refugees, asylum seekers allowed to stay for humanitarian reasons, and family immigrants. Norway has seen a substantial increase in labour migration since 2004 – especially from Poland – within the framework of the Economic Area Agreement (EEA)¹ with the European Union, where free movement of persons applies on certain conditions.

Net immigration to Norway has been considerable in the last 35 years, in relation to Norway's total population. In the beginning of 2006 the immigrant population numbered 8.3% of the total population.² Norway is known for its State-run universalistic welfare policies, combined with a liberal market economy. Norway's immigration and integration policies are developed within the framework of the welfare state, and welfare concerns constitute some of the core premises for the development of immigration and integration policies. The welfare state affects many aspects of immigrants' lives, and immigration also affects the welfare state; immigrants become users and producers of welfare services. The presence of immigrants also confronts the welfare state with new challenges related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship and belonging. The generous welfare measures of the Nordic welfare states are based on high labour market participation of the population.

From 1975 onwards Norway's immigration policy has been restrictive and control mechanisms have been developed. Immigrants and refugees with a legal right to stay have been included in the general welfare policy and targeted by specific measures and, in principle, have been given the same social rights as Norwegian citizens. The aim is that everyone living in Norway, regardless of their background, shall have equal opportunities, equal rights and equal obligations to participate in society and make use of their resources.

General government policy is further based on the principle that cultural plurality is positive and that discrimination, racism, and intolerance are contrary to fundamental values and must be actively thwarted. A large step towards more comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation was taken when the *Anti-Discrimination Act* was implemented on January 1, 2006. The Act applies to all areas of society except family life and personal relationships, and prohibits discrimination based on

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ethnicity, national origin, descent, colour, language, religion or belief. The Act protects against both direct and indirect discrimination. At the same time the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud and the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Tribunal were established to enforce and monitor implementation of the law. The Ombud is mandated to deal with other anti-discrimination legislation such as the *Gender Equality Act*, as well as anti-discrimination provisions in the *Working Environment Act* and in housing legislation. The Ombud gives opinions on individual cases concerning discrimination, and citizens are given easy access to the complaints process. The Tribunal makes decisions on individual cases concerning discrimination and this service is free of charge.

The principle rule, however, is mainstreaming. The needs of immigrants and minorities are provided for within broad general programs or policies at the various levels (state, regional and local community). Public administration must recognize and respect diversity by ensuring that different needs in the population are reflected in the design of public services and general social systems. Offering equal services that take into account the fact that inhabitants may have new and different needs constitutes recognition, in practice, of the new diversity in Norwegian society.

Special measures for newly arrived immigrants are deemed necessary to ensure that immigrants have equal opportunities. The most important special measure, the *Introductory Act*, was introduced in 2004 and combines an introduction program with an economic benefit to which participants are eligible. The aim of the program is to provide basic Norwegian language skills, offer insight into Norwegian society, prepare for participation in working life and/or further education and to increase financial independence. Individual rights and obligations apply to individuals aged 18-55 who require basic qualifications and who, along with their families, have been granted residence as refugees on humanitarian grounds. The program, organized by the municipalities, normally last up to two years and are offered as soon as possible after placement in a municipality. Municipalities receive an integration grant from the central government authorities and have a duty to offer a program adapted to the needs and abilities of individuals; each participant must have his or her own personal liaison officer in the municipality. The program runs on a year-round, full-time basis. Full-time participation entitles the individual to an introductory grant and irregular absence results in deductions from the grant, as would be the case in a working context. The grant is the same for all participants, and they are required to pay taxes. Women participate on an equal footing with men. The participants each have their individual plan and may leave the program when they have reached their individual goals. An effective transition

to working life is dependent on close, binding cooperation between individual municipalities and the local government employment agency. A leaflet has been issued which describes the minimum elements that such cooperation must comprise. Effects of the Introduction Scheme will be monitored. So far there are indications of positive effects.

The *Introductory Act* also includes regulations regarding compulsory Norwegian language and social studies training. The target group is composed of immigrants aged between 18 and 55, who received a residence permit after September 2005, which constitutes grounds for a settlement permit. The training, offered free of charge, consists of 250 hours of language training and 50 hours of social studies in a language the immigrant understands. The completion of the 300 hours program is a condition for receiving either a settlement permit or Norwegian nationality. The training must be completed within the first three years in Norway. Immigrants aged between 55 and 67 have the right but no obligation to participate. Labour migrants are under the obligation to complete this program, but this is not an acquired right, which means that they have to pay for the course themselves. People holding an EEA permit are not required to take part in language training. Beyond the compulsory training, it is the municipalities' obligation to arrange for further language training for those who need it.

Norway has a long tradition of involving civil society in policy-making and implementation. The Contact Committee for the Immigrant population and the Authorities (KIM) is a government-appointed advisory body consisting of representatives from immigrant organizations, political parties, relevant governmental agencies and ministries. The Committee is a forum for contact and dialogue on a wide range of issues concerning immigrants, refugees and their families. The members from immigrant organizations represent different regions in Norway (www.kim.no). In order to facilitate their role as qualified partners, governmental grants are given to immigrant and minority organizations. There exists a multitude of voluntary immigrant organizations, which are mainly local.

The government wishes to promote dialogue and cooperation between religious and life stance communities both locally and nationally. In the wake of the controversy when a small newspaper printed caricature drawings of the prophet of Islam, there were fruitful dialogues between representatives of different religious communities as well as dialogues between the authorities and Muslim communities. The Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities is an important tool for inter-religious dialogue in Norway.

Since 1983, foreign nationals have the right to vote in municipal and county council elections, if they have resided in Norway for more than three years. In order to

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be eligible to vote in parliamentary elections at the national level, Norwegian nationality is a precondition.

Immigrants and their children are encouraged to naturalize. The new *Nationality Act*, in force since September 1, 2006, is based on the principle of a single nationality. A child automatically acquires the nationality of both parents by birth, irrespective of whether the child is born out of wedlock, or abroad. When the conditions of the Act are met, the applicant has a right to nationality, which means that there are few discretionary decisions to be made. A child can acquire nationality by application after the age of 12. Residence requirements are seven years of residence within the last ten years. A language requirement is introduced, i.e. applicants are required to have completed 300 hours of approved Norwegian language instruction. After having acquired Norwegian nationality, the applicants are welcomed to a voluntary ceremony where an oath must be taken.

The Sami are the indigenous people of Norway. The government's policies relative to the Sami people are based on the premise that the Norwegian State is established on the territories of two peoples, the Norwegians and the Sami, and that both peoples have the right to maintain and develop their language and their culture on those territories. The aim of the government's Sami policies is to enable the Sami people to preserve and develop their language, culture and way of life. In 1987 the Norwegian Constitution was amended, so that the State has a special obligation to establish the conditions necessary for the Sami to uphold and develop their culture, their language and their way of life. A Sami Parliament was established in 1989 and may on its own initiative raise an issue or voice an opinion with regard to any matter within the scope of its responsibilities. The Sami *Language Act* was established in the early 1990s giving the people in certain areas the right to communicate with the local authorities in Sami, in writing and orally, if necessary by means of an interpreter. The recent important national law is the Act concerning legal relations and management of land and natural resources in the county of Finnmark (the northernmost county of Norway), which came into effect on January 1, 2006. The purpose of the Act is to meet Sami demands for fairer legislation and reflect the Sami's historic and cultural affiliation with and their traditional rights to lands and waters. The Act constitutes a landmark decision concerning Sami rights in Norway. The Act establishes a body, the Finnmark Estate, to which ownership of approximately 96% of the land within the county's borders will be transferred by the State. The Finnmark Estate is an independent legal entity, which is governed by a board consisting of six persons. Finnmark

Municipalities receive an integration grant from the central government authorities and have a duty to offer a program adapted to the needs and abilities of individuals; each participant must have his or her own personal liaison officer in the municipality.

County Council and the Sami Parliament each elect three members to the board. To decide on the extent and the content of the rights acquired by the Sami or others based on prescription or traditional usage, the act provides for the establishment of a commission to investigate such claims. The purpose of the Commission is to obtain a more rapid and complete clarification of rights in Finnmark than could be achieved through ordinary courts.

The Jews, the Kvens (Finnoethnic minority population), the Roma/Gypsies, the Romani people/travellers and the Skogfinns (people of Finnish descent living in southern Norway) are recognized as national minorities. Common to the minority groups is a long-standing tie to Norway, yet a different language, culture or religion from that of the majority. As well, they have all suffered from an earlier policy of assimilation, resulting in a partial loss of their language and culture. A change came about in 1999 when Norway ratified two essential international instruments: the *European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities* and the *European Language Charter for Regional and Minority Languages*.

One important condition of these tools was that the authorities involve minority groups in the development and implementation of the policy. This started a process of dialogue between the various national minorities and the authorities and a contact forum has now been established. The priorities of the minorities have been the revival of language and culture, and compensation for previous suppression and discrimination during the assimilation process. Authorities have responded by presenting excuses for damages done and by setting up compensation packages.

Almost all of the 16 governmental ministries deal directly and indirectly with affairs relevant to immigrants and minorities. A coherent policy is sought by giving one ministry coordination responsibility. Since January 1, 2006, the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion has been given the responsibility of the integration and diversity policy as well as the coordination of the policy concerning the Sami people and national minorities, as well as migration and refugee issues. This reorganization emphasizes employment and social inclusion in a more comprehensive way than was done previously.

To follow up on the implementation of the Sami policy, an annual report from the Sami Parliament is submitted to the coordinating Ministry (the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion) and forwarded to the Parliament with remarks from the ministries involved.

To promote integration, concrete and measurable objectives on diversity and inclusion of immigrants and their descendants have been developed. The objectives

cover a broad range of issues such as labour, child care, education, foreign credentials, health, justice, housing, participation in elections and language skills. The annual fiscal budget includes concrete and measurable objectives that the different ministries should work towards within their own sectors of responsibility, in dealing with immigrants and their descendants. These objectives focus on outcome indicators, describing the situation of the immigrant population, usually compared to that of the population as a whole. The objectives are subject to regular reporting through indicators in the fiscal budgets for the coming years so that progress may be measured.

Government is concerned about unemployment levels among immigrants, higher levels of welfare dependency among people of migrant origin, dropping participation in local elections, and school dropout; it has therefore decided to prepare an Action Plan on the Integration and Inclusion of the Immigrant Population to be presented to Parliament in the autumn of 2006. The overall objectives are not only to ensure that as many people as possible participate in the work force, but to prevent development of a schism in living conditions along ethnic lines, to ensure equal opportunity for migrants and their descendants, to ensure that the labour market and society's institutions have room for all, regardless of background, and fight all forms of discrimination, intolerance and racism. The government will also launch an Action Plan to combat poverty and a White paper on Employment, Welfare and Social Inclusion which *inter alia* will contain improved and targeted measures to combat poverty and social exclusion in general.

An important tool to promote integration of immigrants and refugees was the establishment of the Directorate of Integration and Diversity, on January 1, 2006. The new directorate shall be a competence centre and a driving force for integration and diversity in Norway.

Notes

¹ The EEA includes the EU-25 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.

² The "immigrant population" consists of first generation immigrants (persons born abroad with two foreign-born parents) and persons born in Norway with two foreign-born parents (the descendants of the first generation immigrants). Norway does not register religion, ethnicity or race as categories in official statistics. See www.ssb.no/innvstat for statistics on migration flows, demographics and living conditions of the immigrant population.

THE POLISH APPROACH TO INTEGRATION

ABSTRACT

Polish immigration policy has been evolving in response to international events and agreements, and service provision to immigrants and refugees reflect the fact that Poland actively supports neither multiculturalism nor interculturalism. Polish policy towards immigrants can rather be described as “assimilation via abandonment.” This article briefly discusses the model of integration underlying immigration policy and its legislative/constitutional base, provides an overview of key immigrant services and their delivery, examines what role is played by naturalization/citizenship/denizenship policies, and concludes with an evaluation of the integration system as selective and small-scale.

Poland's approach to integration

Many researchers (Okolski 1998, Kepinska and Stola 2004, Grzymala-Kazłowska and Okolski 2006, Weiner 2006), have been pointing out, since 1989, that Poland lacks an official position on immigration policy. This can be explained by various factors: the relative novelty of immigration in Poland and the reduced scale of the phenomenon, problems resulting from the political, economic and social transition, as well as the EU conditionality. In general, Polish immigration policy has been evolving in response to international events and agreements. In particular, these policies are influenced within the EU by the Vienna and Schengen groups of nations. Thus Polish immigration policy is limited to border control, fighting criminality, regulations pertaining to foreigner admission and residence, as well as repatriation and basic asylum policy.

Polish immigration policy addresses the issues of immigrant integration only to a small extent, and the governmental activities related to socio-cultural integration of immigrants with the Polish society are poor. Despite the number of non-governmental organizations assisting immigrants, and civil initiatives promoting multiculturalism and tolerance in Poland, immigrants do not receive systematic, long-term and effective support. This lack is explained by the character of immigration to Poland (short-term, transitory, and to a certain degree undocumented and originating from neighbouring, culturally similar, countries) and the newness of the phenomenon. In the face of various social, economic and political problems, integration is not perceived as a priority issue, despite awareness of its necessity and in spite of EU recommendations.

Poland actively supports neither multiculturalism nor interculturalism. Its policy can be described as “assimilation via abandonment.” The limited institutional support from the public institutions and NGOs, the poorly-developed ethnic communities (with some exceptions), and a relatively low level of acceptance of ethnocultural diversity in the Polish society make adjustment of immigrants to life in Poland difficult, especially in the case of migrants of non-European origin.

With minimal institutional support and a low level of social acceptance of ethno-cultural pluralism, immigrants must often choose between assimilation or marginalization; the latter option will likely push them out of Poland. This lack of support is the reason that some immigrants treat Poland as a mere transit country; it has also brought about the de-facto assimilation of those who have decided to settle. Generally migrants of similar cultural backgrounds seem to be preferred in Poland, due to their integration abilities.

Legislative/constitutional base

At the beginning of the transformation period, Polish policy was characterized by fragmented and often provisory actions. In response to the changing reality, more or less *ad hoc* solutions were introduced to regulate the most critical matters pertaining to chosen aspects of immigration. In 1991, Poland signed the Geneva Convention and the New York Protocol. Some regulations related to refugees, while other categories of foreigners were included in the short Amendment to the *Alien Act* of 1963.

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Towards the end of the 1990s, activities in the field of migration policy intensified, as exemplified by the new *Alien Act* passed in September 1997 and the amendment to the *Alien Act* passed in 2001, with the appointment of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners, a central bureau of governmental administration dealing with immigration. The next development of immigration policy took place just before Polish accession to the EU in 2002-2003 when two separate acts on foreigners were adopted.

Among legislative acts introduced after 1989, of key importance were regulations included in the new Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997). The regulations concerning ethnic minorities included in the Constitution fundamentally pertain to “recognized” or “historical” minorities – i.e. Polish citizens of ethnic origin whose ethnic group has been settled in Poland for over a century. The State assumes the obligation to ensure minority members’ right to maintain and develop their own culture. It also acknowledges their right to develop education, cultural and religious organizations as well as to take part in decision making on issues associated with the protection of cultural and religious heritage. The Constitution also provides a number of anti-discrimination clauses in line with the Council of Europe’s recommendations.

The *Aliens Act* of 2003, amended in 2005, the *Act on Granting Protection to the Aliens on Polish Territory* of 2003, and specific Acts related to social services, promotion of employment and welfare benefits are the principal legislative tools regarding the integration of immigrants. In almost all cases, permanent residents, refugees, and people granted tolerated stay or temporary protection are granted the same social and economic rights as Polish citizens. Permanent residents enjoy many rights that are usually reserved for Polish citizens, such as free employment, access to free schooling and medical care. As a member state, Poland was required to introduce EU provisions, including the EU long-term residence permit¹ introduced in 2005, and provisions for EU nationals, enacted in separate Acts in 2002.²

All categories of people granted protection in Poland are entitled to employment (without permit), education, free health care, and social security benefits such as family allowances and social assistance; these, however, are limited.

A temporary residence permit, issued for a maximum of two years, is granted to all foreigners who legally work, are self-employed or study in Poland. The permit is also granted to foreign spouses of Polish citizens, regardless of their legal status. Although they do not need a work permit to enter the labour market, they are not automatically granted access to social benefits and medical care. This access only provides for a work permit; access to this permit is, however, a lengthy, costly, employer-driven

procedure. A foreigner may work for a Polish employer only when no Polish citizen can fill the job.

It is worth mentioning that in 2003, a regularization initiative was launched to facilitate the integration of undocumented migrants living in Poland since 1997.

In subsequent amendments of the *Act on Employment*, Poland has been regulating the access of foreigners to the labour market. It defines immigrant integration tools needed to enter the labour market, most notably the work permit. It also provides a catalogue of exemptions. However, Polish governments have been reluctant to open the path to legal economic migration. This has prevented them from ratifying several important international conventions on the topic, e.g. the key ILO Convention No. 97.

Delivery of services

There are only two special integration programs for immigrants designed for people granted refugee status and for repatriates.

After several attempts to introduce integration programs for refugees – that failed for lack of funds, detailed regulations and trained staff – a new integration program was launched in 2004. This Refugee Integration Program is spearheaded by the local authorities, and delivered by Local Family Assistance Centers (PCPS).

Services include: Polish language classes, social security, medical care and access to education. Refugees should also be provided with professional training, psychological, legal and practical support, accommodation and job-search assistance. The key issue is that refugees are entitled to a monthly net allowance between 285 euros and 130 euros per person in the family.³ According to the Ministry of Social Policy, over 800 people participated in the integration

programs in 2003 and 2004. In 2005, in the Warsaw area, the main destination for immigrants, 370 refugees entered the program, 175 of whom were children.

The program lasts only 12 months, refugees have to apply for it within 14 days after being granted refugee status and the program does not include people who are married to Polish citizens. Although the acknowledged refugees receive less support from the Polish government than asylum seekers who have the right to stay in special refugee centers where they are offered accommodation, full board, basic medical care, clothes, hygienic products and a small allowance, their situation is far better than that of numerous individuals granted tolerated status.

NGOs play an important role in delivering the following services to refugees: professional training; psychological, legal, practical and material support; accommodation and job-search assistance. This assistance to refugees is mainly financed by the

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European Refugee Fund (ERF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) with the EQUAL initiative. ERF funds are used for integration and repatriation of refugees, whereas ESF and EQUAL finance employment policy and social integration of refugees and foreigners with humanitarian status respectively.

Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) helps refugees with job searches and language acquisition. It also runs a refugee residential facility and public awareness programs. PAH also used to rent rotary flats to selected refugee families. In recent years, the Catholic organization Caritas-Poland has intensified its activities in this field. Caritas provides information and psychological counselling, as well as assistance, on a more limited scale, in finding jobs and providing accommodations, temporary financial support, free meals, medical services, integration benefits, language courses and aid in contacts with governmental intuitions.

The Polish Red Cross (PCK) played a most significant role at the onset of refugee inflows. Both PCK and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFPC) promoted Poland's ratification of the Geneva Convention. HFPC and Amnesty International specialize in human rights watch and legal advice for immigrants, as do recently established legal centers at Warsaw and Jagiellonian Universities. HFPC provides expertise in the field of immigration policy and monitors its compliance with international conventions and agreements. Non-governmental organizations such as the Polish Committee of Social Aid (PKPS) help refugees and other vulnerable social groups such as the homeless.

UNHCR monitors legislative activity and the implementation of law regarding refugees. It also provides both foreigners and government with expert guidance. The organization assists refugees with integration, financially supports special programs run by other NGO institutions, and organizes training, information and education campaigns about refugees.

Repatriates who receive Polish citizenship upon their arrival in Poland form another group that benefits from a special integration program. It is worthwhile mentioning that in addition to presenting proof of Polish origin, potential repatriates must prove that they possess adequate "settlement conditions," that is accommodation and livelihood in Poland assured by the commitment of local authorities or through an official invitation from a private corporation, association, or family. Polish government assumes the expenses of travel to Poland. The government provides repatriates with one-time financial assistance to resettle, including a start-up allowance and a

schooling allowance. Adaptation programs for repatriates include Polish language instruction, society and culture and vocational trainings. A repatriate can also enter a special professional activation program. The employer is subsidized to create a job for a repatriate; the position is subsidized for a certain period of time. In contrast to refugee programs funded by international NGOs and monitored by European Union institutions, repatriates are assisted by local NGOs and their support remains very limited.

In general, NGOs often expand the scope of their activities to include all foreigners, regardless of their status. Their programs focus on the assistance in Poland, but practically pay no attention to issues surrounding the country of origin. Their main activities focus on

humanitarian assistance, training and counselling. They sometimes offer financial help in crisis situations. There is also a possibility of psychological assistance to refugees and immigrants in the area of child development, crisis situations, and culture shock. The training includes Polish language instruction and career counselling. Also practical adaptation courses have been prepared by other NGOs. The Intercultural Center for Professional Adaptation offers free courses and training to refugees, immigrants and repatriates alike. These are mainly Polish culture and language classes for children, as well as training in Polish law and other aspects of setting up a business activity in Poland.

Acquisition of citizenship

Although in the preamble of the Constitution the idea of the nation becomes identified with the idea of citizens of the country, Polish citizenship is generally obtained by *jus sanguinis*.

Foreigners can acquire Polish citizenship through marriage with a Polish citizen or through the normal naturalization process. In the first case, a foreigner can apply for Polish citizenship after three years of marriage, provided that he or she has been granted a permanent residence permit. Normal naturalization (art. 8) can take place after five years of residence in Poland on the grounds of the permanent residence permit. It is a discretionary decision of the President of Poland. Citizenship can be granted to a person who does not meet the criteria, if there are other important circumstances.⁴

Repatriates form a special group of immigrants who come to Poland as Polish citizens. By entering the repatriation procedure in their home country, they begin the procedure of reacquiring Polish citizenship, on the basis of *jus sanguinis*. When they come to Poland they are automatically treated as Polish nationals. The foreigners

The Polish integration system is far from ideal. It overlooks a large part of the population of legal immigrants, not to mention illegal migrants. In Poland as in other central European countries, the approach to integration can be best described as selective...and small-scale..., as noted by Iglicka and Okolski.

who enter Poland as spouses of repatriates receive a permanent residence permit.

Evaluation

The Polish integration system proposed by Polish authorities is far from ideal. It overlooks a large part of the population of legal immigrants, not to mention illegal migrants. In Poland as in other central European countries, the approach to integration can be best described as selective (certain groups of immigrants and limited aspects of integration are being targeted) and small-scale (also low-cost), as noted by Iglicka and Okolski (2005).

Even the most established integration programs concerning repatriates and the acknowledged refugees encounter serious problems.

Repatriation has been problematic and is currently being reconsidered. There have not been many local communities ready to host a repatriate; furthermore, repatriates returning from urban areas of Kazakhstan do not want to stay in their selected communities, which are mostly in the countryside. Thus the number of arrivals has been dropping. Despite expected cultural advantages linked to Polish origin and cultural similarity, many repatriates face serious problems in adapting to Polish society, including inadequate language proficiency, legal and financial problems, and difficulty finding accommodation and employment. They also face prejudice and discrimination (Hut 2002, Weiner 2003).

As far as refugees are concerned, very few of them are granted refugee status and take part in the integration program. Even in the case of acknowledged refugees, there is a shortage of long-term, systematic, comprehensive integration support. First, the program is short and the level of funding programs is insufficient. For example, the allowances received by refugees are too small to live in the Warsaw metropolitan area.

Second, it is very difficult to find suitable housing for refugees. There is a low supply of council apartments, especially in the Warsaw metropolitan area. Moreover, refugees face discrimination in their housing search. There is still little done to change the attitudes of Polish society towards them.

Third, finding a job in Poland has been difficult even for Poles. Refugees, stigmatized as coming from another culture and with insufficient language skills, encounter even greater problems.

Fourth, the civil servants working with refugees are overworked and overloaded with administrative tasks and cannot fully and efficiently support their clients. However the new international program for refugees can be evaluated as a big step forward and an example of best practices.

Although in the ideological sphere Poland recognizes the need to support the integration of immigrants, and although the State tries to pursue a policy of integration based on European standards, the government dispenses minimal resources on it. So far immigrants who have managed to integrate owe this success to their own determination and the support of their family or friends. Thus far neither the State nor the non-governmental organizations have provided immigrants – including acknowledged refugees – with comprehensive, systematic, stable and effective long-term assistance. There are,

however, several promising new integration initiatives and discussions going on in this field.

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Notes

- ¹ 2003/109/EC, of 25 November 2003.
- ² Act of 27 July 2002 on the rules and conditions governing the entry and stay of EU citizens and their family members on the Polish territory (*Dziennik Ustaw* No.141, Item 1180, as amended in 2003, No. 128, Item 1175, as amended in 2004, Item 959, and No. 173, Item 1808).
- ³ The average gross monthly payment in the first quarter of 2006 was approximately 820 euros (in the public sector) and 525 euros (in the private sector) (www.stat.gov.pl). In 2006 the minimal monthly wage amounted to 233 Euros (*Dziennik Ustaw* no. 177, item 1469).
- ⁴ President Regulation of March 14, 2000 (*Dziennik Ustaw* No. 18, Item 231).

NOTES ON THE PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE OF INTEGRATION*

ABSTRACT

Maritime expansion and expatriation are key references of Portugal's history. Until recently, mass expatriation largely surpassed in-migration. This article summarizes the integration experiences in Portugal, providing an overview of the migratory movements in the last decades and the policies established since the mid-1990s, as well as the current situation of the second generation of immigrants. Integration policies adopted to date have assisted in structuring migrant groups into social collectives, fashioning them into social partners. But actual involvement of migrants in effective articulation processes aiming at a regular and full participation in the Portuguese society are still a long way from the State's goals.

Outward projection is a basic structuring vector of the way Portuguese conceive of nationhood. Maritime expansion and expatriation are key references of history. And one of the more persistent myths associated with these views is that the Portuguese are specially endowed to deal with the others and tolerate difference. This is often presented as an important asset to adapt to the new experience of mass immigration. This presentation of integration experiences in Portugal will start with a brief overview of migratory movements in the last decades, then carry on to present the basic structuring axes of policies since the mid 1990s to this day. A short excursus into the situation of the second generation will allow a discussion on the capacity built by the State for facing immigration issues is actually translated into results.

Migratory movements

A Portuguese scholar defined out-migration as a “structural” factor in Portuguese society. Until recently, in fact, mass expatriation largely surpassed in-migration. The turning point of this trend started with both the change in the regime in the 1970s and the return from the former African colonies, after decolonization, and from emigration destinations after the so-called first oil crises. Another scholar estimates that the magnitude of these returns reached approximately 10% of the total population, with important consequences, in the short term, for a rapidly ageing population.

Another significant consequence was the formation of a process of chain migration, notably from the former colonies. A process that started as a forced return, fleeing the political change and the social unrest in the new African countries, creaming off their elites, rapidly evolved into an economically-driven process, involving a majority of low-skilled labour and their families.

Meanwhile, Portuguese external policy targeted new partnerships, aiming at a rapid accession into the European Community. The distant attitude toward expatriate communities was abandoned in favour of a strengthening of the “natural” ties binding the communities in an archipelago-like nation. This was accompanied by a significant shift in ideological terms, with important consequences in the redefinition of the concept of nationality. From an inclusive, imperial understanding of the Portuguese including the “new worlds” built afar, a narrow, blood-premised understanding of the Portuguese as communities spread around the world.

With EU accession, and the Marshall-like programs associated with it, other migrants came, from elsewhere and with other characteristics. Contrary to the first period, the latter cohorts had no significant historical or cultural (real or imagined) ties with Portugal. The upsurge of Eastern Europeans in the 1990s is probably the best known. The large presence of women in the pioneer waves made it a most noticeable flow from the onset. Asians are less numerous, but no less conspicuous in the public opinion, because of the high numbers of small businesses they were rapidly able to establish, as well as the evidence of symbolic references different from the mainstream – notably religious.

Presently, Brazilians form the largest legally settled group of foreign citizens living in Portugal. The highly-skilled migrants from the first waves, fleeing social unrest, and often of Portuguese ancestry, were rapidly outnumbered by the later waves that keep coming to this day. In this case also, there are large numbers of women migrating alone.

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All in all, estimates of the foreigners living in Portugal point to a figure of about 5% of all inhabitants. This is a modest figure in comparison with the share of immigrants with Portuguese citizenship, and also involves native-born with non-Portuguese citizenship.

Policy instruments

Until the early 1990s, no specific policy instrument was drawn in order to face the rapidly growing number of arrivals from Africa, nor their immediate channelling into shantytowns and the informal economy spreading in the larger cities. A limited and tenuous expression of outrage began gaining more voice and reached the media, coming from leftist party members, as well as individuals and organizations of Christian churches.

Worries about border control were also voiced. The first significant policy measure, taken in the late 1980s, consisted of creating a specific control body to deal with the surveillance of borders and the admission of foreigners.

In 1992 and 1993, two decisions were taken, which had a major impact on alleviating the harsh conditions of thousands of settled migrants: to carry on an amnesty and to initiate a vast social housing program – not exclusively targeted at foreigners. Both met with some resistance – and harsh criticism. But the public resources involved were way behind those channelled to meet the needs of integration of the returnees arrived from Africa just two decades before.

It was not until 1996, when a High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (HCIEM) was appointed, that was forged a coherent policy towards migrant populations and other groups marginalized because of their ethnic background. From the onset, two vectors underpinning this policy were: 1) a redrawing of the norms regulating the access of migrants and their families to public life in general, systematically purging them from discriminatory dispositions (from the labour market to social security, from children's enrolment in school to access to public health services, etc.); and 2) creating the conditions for involving migrants in the decision process itself, when migration issues are at stake. In parallel, a device for monitoring and fighting against racism and discrimination was set up.

During the first in-migration period, stringent restrictions were applied to hiring foreign workers, which had the boomerang effect of making migrants massively enter through the back door in fast-growing sectors of the

economy. Purging the labour laws from the former restrictions to foreign labour was a major step, both in guaranteeing some dignity to the foreign labour force and in fighting against the rapid increase of the informal sector, plaguing entire sectors of the economy (from construction and public works, to domestic and personal services). But access to work in public administration is still restricted. Such measures went hand in hand with an active approach, arguably endowing public authorities with means of controlling the labour market. This capacity building of the State was not, however, immune to variations in other agendas, and actual control has met with some oscillation.

Access to social housing was also restricted to citizens. But as the large-scale re-housing process of the 1990s was set in motion, both local and central government authorities found ways of circumventing these restrictions. Other social rights were progressively recognized for foreign citizens, and the legal dispositions adapted accordingly. Such were the cases of the entitlement to social benefits, including training/schooling, public health care, unemployment dole, minimum subsistence subsidy, access to justice and the right to family reunification. Recognizing some of these entitlements was easier than acknowledging the right to others. All in all, however, one can say that, concerning social rights, legally settled foreigners today are not different from citizens, as stated in the Constitution (Article 15). As argued by some decision makers, rights to foreign citizens should be no less than rights required to citizens settled abroad.

The National System for the Support of Immigrants, a network set up by the HCIEM in 2004 in cooperation with some third-sector organizations (including a one-stop public administration service providers), testify to the will of facilitating migrants' access to public services. It also represents a way of

optimizing articulation with third-sector organizations, notably Catholic organizations, which often play the role of social support providers (language or ICT training, sports, adolescent single mothers support, etc.).

In the political realm, however, things evolved quite differently. From the onset, a consultation body was built in 1998, next to the HCIEM, but with an autonomous statute, termed the Consultative Council for Immigration Issues (CCII). This was meant to be an organization bringing together selected immigrant and civil society representatives (notably trade unions and employers) and have them cooperate with public authorities in all

Stringent restrictions were applied to hiring foreign workers, which had the boomerang effect of making migrants massively enter through the back door in fast-growing sectors of the economy. Purging the labour laws of these restrictions was a major step, both in guaranteeing some dignity to the foreign labour force and in fighting against the rapid increase of the informal sector.

decisions regarding immigration issues. Criticisms were voiced, concerning the ability of the chosen immigrant associations to truly represent migrants. The decision nevertheless had the effect of helping to shape migrants as constituencies, according to national affiliations. This body was recently redesigned to integrate, since 2002, the HCIEM, and to co-opt new members.

Migrants are entitled to freely form their associations. These can have very distinct outlooks. They can operate as just another local association, devoted to tackling situations arising at the local level. This was, in fact, the main goal of the bulk of local associations created during the first period of immigration. Many were called the “survival” associations, as their leaders had to deal with such basic issues as the power and water supply in the shanties they built, taking care of children when the parents were at work, etc. They had also played a major role in the 1996 and 2001 amnesties, operating as reliable mediators of the process. Other types of associations range from third-sector agents, providing social services in the context of partnerships built with public authorities (they are called Particular Institutions of Social Solidarity), to pressure groups, recognized as immigrant associations by the State, and who oftentimes liaise with central government on initiatives concerning immigration.

Since 1996, and as long as reciprocity has existed, migrants can vote in local elections. A slight privilege is accorded to citizens from Portuguese-speaking countries. Voting rights were in fact easier to recognize than some social benefits entitlements. But in fact, given the reciprocity clause, only citizens from two major national groups can participate: the Cape Verdean and Brazilians. Voting turnouts are modest, particularly in the case of the latter group. There are, however, strong defenders of the idea of reinforcing a “municipal citizenship,” notably through mobilizing migrants and their offspring to enrol and participate in local political structures.

The norms ruling acquisition of citizenship are presently being revised, after two decades of pressure to do so. With the change of the regime in the mid-1970s and decolonization, came a new concept of nationhood and change in the nationality law followed (in 1981). The shift away from an imperial *jus soli* rule, and the adoption of a reference premised on blood bonds was also meant to redress the wrongs of the former regime towards the expatriates. It was also counter-cyclical with the ongoing processes of chain migration and settlement of people coming from Africa. The new law is premised on a balance between blood and residence rights. It is meant both to facilitate the re-acquisition of citizenship to those foreigners having a Portuguese background, and to ease the acquisition of nationality to foreigners legally settled,

and notably to the children of immigrants. As for voting rights, again a bias in favour of Portuguese speaking people exists, and the idea of a “lusophone citizenship” has been suggested – which so far met with no effective success.

Except in the case of the consultative bodies, the very possibility of participation is strictly limited to individual citizens. Some exceptions exist, notably concerning cultural rights, and particularly religious minority rights. But, as a scholar showed, the only social problems arising with minority religions in Portugal occurred with Christian denominations involving a majority of Portuguese, not with those brought along by migrants (Muslims, Hindus...), which have a very modest expression. Most non-Christians come from sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The law on religious freedom was issued in 2001 not only to ensure that all denominations are equitably dealt with by the State, but also to ensure that they can express themselves in the public sphere. All denominations can apply to the use of free time in the media, and public schools can have religious education (if required by students’ families).

Finally, another important vector of integration policies concerns fighting against racism and discrimination. The Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination, created in 1999, shortly after the HCIEM and the CCII came into force, also includes migrants’ representatives. As the CCII, it was incorporated in 2002 into the HCIEM. The results obtained so far in the fight against racism and xenophobia are however quite meagre. As the public sanitary authorities ran a large scale inspection on Chinese restaurants early this year (2006), with wide and loud media coverage, this Commission issued a public protest against the way the inspection activities were being carried out, targeting specific nationalities’ businesses. This didn’t avoid a significant crash in the Chinese restaurants’ economic performance all over the country, also reported in the media.

In sum, integration policies adopted so far have helped to make migrants themselves into social collectives, with a national or ethnic connotation, fashioning them as social partners. But actual involvement of migrants in effective articulation processes aiming at regular and full participation in the Portuguese society is still very far away from the goals stated in some public discourse. Young people, socialized in the Portuguese society, are particularly active in giving voice to discontent. They do it in different ways, from expressive culture (notably music) to deviant behaviour – but only seldom using institutional forms of political voice.

As of 2002, a Monitoring Centre aiming at supporting research in the domains of migration and ethnic relations, created next to the HCIEM, was launched, and cooperation with scientific research institutes was further explored.

Young people, socialized in the Portuguese society, are particularly active in giving voice to discontent. They do it in different ways, from expressive culture (notably music) to deviant behaviour – but only seldom using institutional forms of political voice.

This initiative contributed to boosting research on the topic and the dissemination of results in a significant way. This was the case with the studies on children of immigrants.

The emerging second generations

As Alejandro Portes once said, it's the path the children of immigrants follow that will decide on what the outcomes of migration will be – not the adaptation of the first generations.

When one takes the aggregate statistical data on (pre-tertiary) school performances by foreign students, the prospects seem gloomy. Nearly one in every two students leaves school before concluding an upper secondary degree, according to European Commission data (EC 2006). But early school leavers in the EU25 at large are just below one-third among foreign students – thus suggesting differences in degree, not in the nature of the much heavier burden of disadvantages hampering children of migrants' school career all over the EU. However, as national students also have a high share of early school leavers in Portugal (more than twice the EU25 average), one might say that the problems that children of immigrants face in school are both of adaptation of the education structures to new publics, compounded with the fact that the State is having difficulties in building the necessary capacities to meet the propounded goals of achieving the knowledge-based society.

But studies now being made on the children of immigrants in Portugal convey a heterogeneous panorama. The lingering imbalance gives families and other informal networks of support the upper hand in determining school performances. Migrant families from the first waves of returnees are, in general, better equipped (in human and social capital) to face the knowledge-based society. They are also better off in socio-economic terms than the more recent flows, and children often have mixed parentage, with one parent being Portuguese. The students with this background are in fact doing better than the average students.

As for the first type of problems, a survey done by the Ministry of Education showed how the students who don't have Portuguese as their mother tongue were disadvantaged in schools. The so-called Groups of proficiency level were created in 2006, in order to provide language training in Portuguese and are now mandatory in schools with a large presence of foreign students. Schools are also being given a more autonomous role, as the students foreign credentials' recognition is committed, since 2005, to the schools where the students enrol. Sustained efforts are thus being made in order to match goals and achievements, thus building the necessary capacity to deal with these new publics in schools.

In sum, one might say that the first vector of integration, the recognition of social rights, was more fully achieved than the second one, the conditions for full participation in the public sphere. State capacity building is having a difficult time catching up with social needs, as evidenced by the problems faced by children of immigrants, most notably in the educational system.

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Note

- * A note of appreciation is owed to Maria Baganha who commented on the first version of the text.

FOREIGN IMMIGRANTS' INTEGRATION IN SPAIN

ABSTRACT

The rapid growth of Spain's foreign population is linked to a booming economy associated with the housing market expansion, to the consolidation of Spain as the second-most popular tourist destination in the world, and to the more tolerant governmental immigration policy aiming to provide flexible labour for the building industry, hotels, restaurants, domestic services. Yet it is difficult to evaluate immigrants' integration policies in Spain as a whole, given its diversity and dispersion. This article provides a description of immigrants' integration in Spain, through a brief literature review.

Foreign immigration from impoverished countries to Spain became a significant phenomenon in the mid-1980s (for several years, most foreign residents in Spain were Western European nationals). During that time the first *Foreigners Law*, (*LO 7/1985*), was passed (followed by a regularization process), just before Spain joined the European Community. However, during the last two decades, a notable evolution in migration flows has occurred, leading to a completely new situation. Today Spain hosts approximately 4 million foreign residents (with a total population of approximately 44 million residents). Among the European Union (EU), Spain is the country that attracts most foreign immigrants per year, and its percentage of foreign residents is similar to North Western European standards, especially in certain regions. This rapid growth of foreign population is linked, among other factors, to a booming economy associated to an expansion in the housing market, to the fact that Spain is the second-most popular tourist destination in the world, and to the tolerance of its governmental policy on immigration, which aims to provide flexible labour for the building industry, hotels, restaurants, domestic services. In this article, immigrant integration in Spain is approached through a brief literature review written as a summary of a longer report published in www.imiscoe.org/publications/workingpapers/index.html.

Immigrants' integration and immigration policy making in Spain as a whole

The first studies on international immigration in Spain were published in the mid-1980s and took stock of the general situation of this segment of population (Colectivo Ioé 1987). A few years later, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) published a document denouncing the situation of undocumented immigrants due to the stringency of Spain's *Foreigners Law* (Amnesty International et al. 1989). However, it is in the early 1990s that certain publications started to take the Spanish immigration policy into account. Raimundo Aragón Bombín (1991), who was then the head of Dirección General de Migraciones linked to the Labour Ministry of the central government, published an article outlining the need of an active immigration policy based on the control of migration flows and immigrant integration. That same year, a second extraordinary regularization process for undocumented immigrants took place in Spain.

In the mid 1990s, Alegría Borrás (1995) directed the publication of a book on the 10th anniversary of the first *Foreigners Law*, analyzing the influence of European integration on the Spanish legislation on immigration, the constitutional position of foreigners in Spain, the situation of foreigners before the penal process, the evolution of the administrative treatment, and foreigners' evolution in the social arena. Raimundo Aragón Bombín (1996), at the time no longer in power due to the Partido Popular's victory, also analyzed the first decade of foreigners' legislation in an article where he acknowledges the influence that some trade unions, NGOs and immigrants associations have on policy making. During that time, a number of studies on NGOs and immigrant associations at the Spanish level were published, which analyzed the institutional capacity of these types of organizations (Alonso and García 1995), reflected on their influence on social integration (Bel Adell 1994), and studied the associative performance of significant national groups like Moroccans (Del Olmo 1996). At that time, Javier De Lucas (1996), from Universitat de València, wrote about the role of Spain in the building process of a European fortress, while Carolina Mayeur (1997), a top civil servant in the previous Socialist government, explored the contradictions, hypocrisy and perverse effects of

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immigration policies, and Carlos N. Celaya (1997) studied the main political parties' response to immigration in Spain, taking the year 1996 as a reference. In his conclusion, Celaya noted that the so-called immigrants' pressure at the Southern border was influencing the treatment of the immigration question as a whole for both political parties.

In the second half of the 1990s, four doctoral theses dealing with immigration policies, immigrants' political participation and foreigners' legislation in Spain were submitted. Margarita Tarabini-Castellani (1997) presented a thesis on the rights of foreign workers, paying special attention to the situation of those undocumented and including a constitutional analysis of their juridical status (some pieces of her work were published in Tarabini-Castellani 1998). Liliana Suárez-Navaz's (1998a) thesis explored the rebordering of the Mediterranean; she also published an article on the impact of the foreigners' legislation on cohabitation of foreign workers and Spanish nationals (Suárez-Navaz 1998b). She found that the presence of foreign immigrants in the labour market enabled the State to achieve further modernization – at the economic level and, most fundamentally, at the political and cultural levels – in the process of constructing an ordered citizenship. Moreover, John Casey (1998a) presented a thesis exploring the role that NGOs play in the public policy process and evaluating the impact of such political participation. An analysis of the theoretical literature from diverse social science disciplines revealed that the participation of NGOs is likely to be conditioned by four factors: the political opportunities offered by the polity in which they operate; the nature of the policies they are addressing; the characteristics of the organizations seeking to participate and the resources they command; and the network of actors involved. These factors were used by Casey to construct a framework for evaluating the outcome of NGOs' participation in the development of public policies on immigration in Spain. As the main result of the documental analysis, he concluded that Spanish NGOs had not yet been able to establish themselves as strong independent actors in the immigration policy process. Finally, Ricard Morén-Alegret (1999) presented a thesis on the relation of governments, social organizations, global capital and foreign immigration in Spain and Portugal. This was an international comparative research addressing the complexities involved in integration processes, in socio-political participation and in policy making, mainly based on qualitative interviews held with 100 key informants and on the analysis of relevant documents. In closing, he noted that the increasing domination of capital logics over the population (i.e. systemic integration) was making socio-political

participation, social integration and socially-friendly public policies more difficult (most of the thesis was published as a book in Morén-Alegret 2002a).

The turn of the century saw the publication of some works dealing with more specific aspects of immigration policies; these include an approach to granting nationality as a path to foreign immigrants' integration (Rodríguez-Drincourt 1999), an article on the impact of the *Foreigners Law* on foreign women (Bedoya 2000), a study on the influence of the Census registration of foreign immigrants in obtaining social rights in Spain (Solanes 2000), a comparative research on the immigration national juridical models in Spain and France with references to the German and American cases (Marzal 2000), and a analysis of opinion surveys on immigration carried out in Spain in the 1990s (Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001). However, at that time Javier De Lucas (2000) asked

Today Spain hosts approximately 4 million foreign residents (with a total population of approximately 44 million residents). Among the EU, Spain is the country that attracts most foreign immigrants per year, and its percentage of foreign residents is similar to North Western European standards.

for a new immigration policy model, and other authors offered general approaches to 15 years of immigration policies in Spain, noting the need for more integration policies (Arango 2000, Blanco Fernández de Valderrama 2001, Ruiz López and Ruiz Vieytes 2001). In this sense, Cristina Blanco undertakes a critique of the *Plan Greco* (2000-2004) launched by the Spanish government because it is focused more on the idea of immigrant adaptation than on immigrant integration. A compilation of the Integration Plans in Spain can also be found as an appendix in a book edited by Gema Martín Muñoz (2003), including the ones launched from the central government, the Madrid regional government, the Andalusian government (*Junta*), and the Catalan government (*Generalitat*).

The *Foreigners Law* reform (*LO 4/2000*) and counter-reform (*LO 8/2000*) appeared in 2000, corresponding with the political shift that occurred following the legislative elections held in that same year (when the Partido Popular obtained absolute majority). The significant events and debates on immigration policies occurring in Spain in 2000 and 2001 (protests and riots) were studied by Víctor Pérez-Díaz, Berta Álvarez-Miranda and Carmen González-Enríquez (2001), who analyzed reports of the parliament, senate debates, internal political parties documents, media coverage, opinion surveys and focus groups. One of the main ideas outlined in their study is the preoccupation felt by significant portions of the population with regards to achieving an effective immigration policy in order to overcome a sensation of impotence.

On the other hand, the relation of the Spanish welfare state with immigrants is researched by Rosa Aparicio and Andrés Tormos (2002) using interviews with key informants and focus groups. In conclusion, these authors note that

the idea of taking advantage of a welfare state is not in the immigrants' minds before arriving to Spain although they are aware that once in Spain, they will have access to certain public services. Foreign immigrants have similar access to child education and health services than the Spanish population but the access to services linked to labour rights is not so common due to the difficulties in obtaining a proper work contract.

In 2002, Cristina Blanco (2002) and Miguel Pajares (2002) discussed immigrants' social integration policies in Spain. That same year, Michael Donaldson, Ares Montardit, Lluc Pelàez and María Jesús Montserín (2002) published a paper using the concept of governance to approach the history of the anti-racist movement in Spain in relation to the changing *Foreigners Law*. According to these authors, there has not been a clear influence (especially at the central government level) of the critical anti-racist network in public policy making (except a few cases at the local level) in favour of the movement. However, the network was able to introduce the immigrants' situation in the political agenda of some institutions and it built cognitive frameworks of reference for the movement itself, the public institutions and a significant part of public opinion that, even if supportive of dominant values, opened up positions towards discursive strategies closer to the network of critical collective action (for instance, today everybody uses the word "integration").

A complex theoretical and empirical approach to immigration policies in Spain is the one offered by Ricard Zapata-Barrero (2004, 2003). His premise is that there is in Spain a process of creating an accommodation culture for immigrants. Among his conclusions, the following can be underlined: there is a need for creating a framework of relations between the central government and regional governments; it is necessary to improve the perception that most people have regarding the involvement of employers' organizations, public institutions and political parties in the management of immigration policies; there is a consensus in fostering a combination of policies of equality and policies of difference to manage the process of creating an immigration society; there is a common perception that immigration policies have to avoid exclusion, assure cohabitation and defend solidarity; at the level of admission policies, it is more realistic to accept that borders should be partially open, and at the level of social policies, the priority should be integration policies; the receivers of immigration public policies should be both foreign immigrants and national citizens and the main goal should be to accommodate both groups in the current process of social change.

Finally, as contributors to the 4th Congress on Immigration in Spain, other authors can be mentioned

here. Thus Vicens Aguado Cudolà (2004) presents a paper on changes in the general administration of the State and on immigrant social integration policies, noting that the Partido Popular governments allocated immigration competencies in the Home Affairs Ministry, while the PSOE governments allocated immigration competencies in the Labour and Social Affairs ministries; Francisco Javier Durán Ruiz (2004) presents a paper comparing the European legislation on permanent permits for immigrants and the Spanish legislation, which concludes that there are too many limitations to move towards citizenship; and Ángeles Solanes Corella (2004) presents a paper on the lack of a multidimensional immigrants' integration policy in Spain, noting that immigrant integration in the labour market is precarious, access to social services being dependent on registration in the census (*empadronamiento*), which may be controlled by police, and a serious debate on voting rights for immigrants has still to be announced.

Two decades ago, a Foreigners Law was passed just prior to Spain's entry into the European Economic Community in 1986. Since then, several implementation laws have been passed and law reforms have occurred but *jus domicilis* is still relevant in Spain together with *jus sanguis*.

Diversity: Multicultural, intercultural and cultural identity – A variety of debates

In Spain, traditionally, debates on cultural diversity and identity have often been tied to regional and national differences (Basque, Catalan and Galician communities were the most relevant cultural identities asking to be included in the public arena). These debates were sometimes related to internal migration. Furthermore, in a more marginal situation and without specific territories, Roma people (gypsies) have also been included in discussions about identity in Spain.

Since the late 1990s, the arrival of an increasing number of foreign immigrants has changed the main focus of the debate (even if internal migration remains significant). As early as 1990, the first Summer School on Interculturality (Escola d'Estiu sobre Interculturalitat) was organized in Girona. It is an annual meeting of teachers, social workers, civil servants and academics and other professionals related to foreign immigration (e.g. Carbonell 1996). Since then, the concept of "interculturality" has been preferred by many scholars, activists and professionals as a goal (e.g. Aramburu and Zegrí 1994). As time went by, some local and regional governments (plus certain central government organisms) have included "intercultural mediators" in their policies (Navarro, Pascual and Rojas 2002). At the same time, multiculturalism became the target of a wide variety of criticisms (e.g. Delgado 1998).

Final considerations

A significant number of the studies compiled in this article are descriptive accounts of legislation and integration

policies based on documental and law analyses. Some authors have paid attention to governments' policy making on immigration, using both qualitative interviews with key informants, public opinion surveys and documental analyses. Political parties' discourses on immigration and their influence in public policies have also been studied via press and parliamentary debate analyses. There has been a growing interest in including NGOs in the studies on immigrants' integration and immigration policy making; however governance is a concept included in very few studies. In the conceptual arena, "integration" is the most often used term, although it is often understood as immigrants' adaptation or assimilation, while "accommodation culture" is suggested by some authors.

The integration paradigm in Spain is a mixture of assimilation, multiculturalism and interculturalism. Spain is a highly decentralized country and each region (*Comunidad Autónoma*) and municipality has a significant degree of autonomy in implementing immigrant integration policies. It means that the outcome of such mixture is geographically uneven. The central government is the only one that can implement immigration policies (i.e. border control and management of immigration inflows) but immigrants' integration policies are mainly a decentralized affair.

As previously mentioned, current legislation on immigration in Spain is relatively new. Two decades ago, a *Foreigners Law* was passed, just prior to Spain's entry into the European Economic Community in 1986. Since then, several implementation laws have been passed and law reforms have occurred but *jus domicilii* is still relevant in Spain together with *jus sanguinis*. Immigrant integration policies are more recent, most of them having been implemented in the mid-1990s: the first Immigrants' Social Integration Plan was passed in December 1994 by the Spanish Council of Ministers and it dealt mainly with immigrants who possessed labour and residence permits. During this period, some regional and local administrations began to elaborate and to execute more concrete social measures with respect to immigration. To this end, the Autonomous Community of Catalonia is particularly prominent, boasting the largest number of immigrants in Spain, and is the first one to coordinate measures for the social integration of immigrants into the Catalan society. Diverse autonomic governments also began to create specific political positions to take care of immigration issues in their respective communities. In 1995, the central government created the Interministerial Commission for Foreigners and in 1996, the General Office for Migrations Arrangement (*Dirección General de Ordenación de las Migraciones*) was created and restructured as the Institute for Migrations and Social Services

(*Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales*). Also, the Forum for the Immigrants' Social Integration (*Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*) was created in 1994, as the highest consultative entity of the government in this matter, in which are represented the generic associations of immigrants, associations supporting immigrants' rights and the main trade unions (in several regions similar advisory councils were set up during those years and afterwards with a diverse impact). In the same way, a Permanent Immigration Observatory (*Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración*) was established to analyze and support the government's policy in this matter.

Since the victory of the conservative party (PP) in 1996, foreign immigration policies have become a political battlefield. In 2000, the central government passed a new foreign immigrants' integration plan, called *Plan Greco*.¹ This Plan mainly considered immigration in problematic terms

and it was elaborated with very little dialogue with social agents or other political organisms. During most of this period, the basic consensus on immigration policy was broken among both majority parties (PP and PSOE), until the approval of a law reform in November 2003 (most minority parties were critical of such reform).

During this period, a number of Autonomous Communities pointed out major discrepancies with the restrictive policy carried out by the central government. Catalonia and other regions demanded that they share executive powers in immigration policy with the central State (not only integration policies). Many Autonomous Communities (Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, Madrid, Navarra, Basque Country...) passed regional plans on immigrant integration. Some of the guiding principles of these plans are similar, whereas others vary greatly. Contradiction between the Spanish and Basque

governments in this matter is testified by the mutual battle of regulations in the courts. Probably, both Catalonia and the Basque Country have developed the most progressive policies on immigrant integration thus far.

The current PSOE government, in power since March 2004, announced its intention of preparing a new immigrants' integration plan, but no specific results have been seen to date. As time has gone by, NGOs have increased the importance of their role with regard to the delivery of services to immigrants. However, their importance varies depending on the region or the municipality. The private sector still has a limited influence with respect to most services provision, although in some cases, such as driving licence training for immigrants, private companies remain the major providers.

Language training is a key service offered without charge to foreign immigrants by governmental bodies and

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NGOs alike. In regions with two official languages, training in both Spanish and the other official language (e.g. Catalan, Basque or Galician) is offered, and it is usually up to the immigrant to decide which language to study first (or to study both simultaneously).

Certain charities, trade unions and NGOs offer free legal information to foreigners in order to help them obtain or renew their work and residence permits. Labour training and orientation to find employment are also mainly carried out by these types of organizations. However, in the last few years, a growing number of private companies are offering legal services to foreign immigrants.

Finally, in relation to naturalization policies, foreign immigrants from former Spanish colonies (except Morocco) can apply for the Spanish nationality after two years of legal residence in Spain, while all other foreign immigrants must wait for a longer period (usually ten years). It is also possible to obtain Spanish citizenship by marrying a Spanish citizen.

It is very difficult to evaluate immigrants' integration policies in Spain as a whole, given the existing diversity and dispersion; in any case, there is not room enough in this article to ponder the question. However, it may be relevant to note that debates in North Western Europe concerning the necessity of a certain level of language proficiency and civic training for foreign immigrants are starting to make their way across the Pyrenees. One may wonder if such debates are here to stay or are just temporary Northern winds. In any case, again, internal diversity within Spain may be important in the debates, given that in certain communities like Catalonia, language proficiency might be required in two official languages, Spanish and Catalan.

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Note

- ¹ Global program of Regulation and Coordination of Foreigners in Spain, its application covers the 2000-2004 period.

THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGES OF SWEDEN

ABSTRACT

Over the last 40 years, Swedish legislation on acquiring citizenship has undergone various reforms. Since the mid-1970s, the integration policy of Sweden has been based on cultural pluralism and guidelines of equality, freedom of choice and partnership. This historical overview of immigration in Sweden is followed by a broader look at policy, modern migration, asylum and admission status, integration strategies, citizenship and economic integration.

Since the middle of the 1980s, increasing numbers of asylum seekers have been looking for protection in numerous European countries. Like many of its neighbouring states, Sweden has been affected by this dramatic increase in refugee movement worldwide. The large inflow of people seeking refuge during the 1980s and 1990s, together with a gradual lower employment integration of immigrants during these decades, has provoked a debate about immigration and integration policies in Sweden. The deep economic recession of the early 1990s obviously fuelled this attention and directed it particularly towards the economic adjustment of immigrants and refugees.

Modern migration

A simplified view of immigration to Sweden divides the post-war period into two distinct periods, the first primarily characterized by labour-force immigration, and the second by a shift towards refugee and “tied” immigration. The first period is usually said to have begun after World War II and ended in the first half of the 1970s. During this time, Sweden’s economy expanded rapidly, partly due to the reconstruction of her neighbouring countries after World War II. Accordingly, labour shortages were solved in the 1950s through the import of skilled labour, migrating from North-Western Europe, mainly Nordic countries, which served to complement the native labour force.

But the 1960s saw the beginnings of a rationalization phase in the Swedish economy, with the type of labour being sought shifting towards unskilled or low-skilled workers. Labour force immigrants during this decade came largely from Nordic countries but also from Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

By the end of the 1960s, however, the situation began to change for immigrants. The trade unions began to view immigration as producing a number of negative side effects. Delaying of industrial transformation through the steady supply of workers and depressing wages were the main arguments. The government responded to these criticisms and from 1968 future applicants for work and residence permits from non-Nordic countries had to apply before they entered the country, and at the same time arrange both for a job and a place to live. Over the next decades, this dramatically cut down on labour immigration originating from non-Nordic countries.

In the early 1970s, Swedish economic growth dropped to a lower level following the oil-crisis. Nordic labour migration – especially Finnish – gradually declined, mainly because of a diminishing gap in the standard of living between Sweden and Finland, and an increasing demand for labour in Finland. While labour migration dwindled during the 1970s, and more significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, other types of migration started to increase. These new groups were predominantly family reunion migrants and various categories of refugees, with a greater share of non-European immigrants. In the 1970s, the major contributors to the immigrant population in Sweden were primarily refugees from Chile, Poland and Turkey. In the 1980s, the lion’s share of this new immigration came from Chile, Ethiopia, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. Individuals from Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe countries dominated the 1990s. In 2005, Sweden’s foreign-born population numbered over 1.1 million and represented 12.3% of the total population.

Asylum and admission status

Like many other countries, the Swedish refugee policy is based on the UN Geneva Convention of 1951 which Sweden signed in 1954, and established in the *Swedish Alien Act* of 1989. Formally,

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Sweden gives asylum to one category of refugees only, the so-called “convention refugees.” Sweden cooperates with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and admits its share of “quota refugees,” who are asylum seekers who often arrive directly from a refugee camp and who have not individually entered the country. The size of the quota is decided upon yearly by the Swedish government and in agreement with the UNHCR.

However, since 1954 there has been a wider interpretation than the Geneva Convention, creating an established practice that has enabled a new group of refugees to obtain permanent residence in Sweden as “*de facto* refugees” or as “war-rejecters.” *De facto* refugees are individuals who can refer to political conditions or other circumstances in their country of origin that weigh heavily in support for claiming asylum. War-rejecters are individuals who have fled war or impending military service. Since 1997 a new category has been created, called “refugees in need of sanctuary,” including individuals with “refugee-like” reasons, such as mass flight situations due to environmental catastrophes or civil war, and individuals who fear risk of persecution due to their gender or sexuality, which mainly includes the earlier *de facto* refugees. Individuals can also obtain a permanent residence for humanitarian reasons, a state of war in their home country, for example. In addition, the Swedish government also has the possibility to grant temporary protection to individuals.

Like many other European countries, Sweden has seen an increase in the number of asylum seekers in the second half of the 1980s, peaking in 1993. Since then it dropped and increased again in the early new century. The general trend in this period was that over 50% of all asylum seekers are accepted for humanitarian reasons. The number of convention refugees as well as the number who have gained asylum as *de facto* refugees or in need of protection decreased in real numbers and in percentage in this same period. Among those who got asylum/residence permit, the humanitarians increased but other categories decreased. Over time, family reunification immigration increased. Almost 50% of all non-Nordic immigrants who gained a residence permit in Sweden between 1980 and 2001 were of this category. To some extent, this increase is due to the entrance of Sweden into the EES/EU in 1994-1995. Almost 25% of those who gained access to Sweden as family reunification migrants were connected to an individual who had a residence permit based on refugee status in some other European country.

Integration strategies

Earlier, it was claimed that immigrants were warmly welcomed until the mid-1960s, when Sweden still advocated a liberal migration policy due to its labour shortage. However, there was no clear political objective as

to how immigrants and refugees should be integrated until the mid-1970s. The main goal of the policy was to assimilate the immigrants as quickly as possible and to authorize residence permits, often permanent; these measures were heavily related to existing labour demands. A more distinct integration policy is discernible in the late 1960s, when a more restrictive immigration policy was implemented simultaneously. In 1965, the first steps were taken to facilitate the adaptation of immigrants to the Swedish society. These measures were taken through an initiative by LO (the Swedish Trade Union Confederation) and SAF (the Swedish Employers Confederation), and consisted mainly of education in the Swedish language, but also of general information about Sweden in several foreign languages, and the establishment of immigrant offices. In the early 1970s, further initiatives were taken to alleviate the increasing need Swedish language instruction for immigrants. This led to legislation in 1972, in which immigrants obtained the right to paid leave of absence by

the employer in order to study Swedish for a minimum of 240 hours.

Since the middle of the 1970s, a policy of ethnic or cultural pluralism was implemented based on three pillars: equality, freedom of choice and partnership. Equality reflects a fundamental principle of the Swedish welfare state, and in the context of immigration it rejected the guest worker system. Immigrants were to enjoy the same social and economic rights and standards as native Swedes. Freedom of choice reflects the idea that individuals determine their personal and cultural affiliations and identities to the Swedish society. Partnership can be seen as the need for mutual tolerance and solidarity between immigrants and native Swedes. In 1998, the immigration policy was replaced by an integration policy aimed at the whole population, and a new

central government agency, the Integration Board (*Integrationsverket*), was established with the special task of overseeing integration efforts throughout the Swedish society. The focus of this new organization is to monitor and evaluate trends in integration, promote equal rights and opportunities for everyone, and combat xenophobia, racism and discrimination.

Another watershed can be dated to the mid-1980s when Sweden reorganized its refugee reception program. Before this reform, a majority of refugees travelled directly to a municipality and applied for asylum there. A vast majority arrived in the regions of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. The National Immigration Board (*SIV-Statens Invandrarverk*) took over primary responsibility from the National Labour Market Board (*AMS-Arbeitsmarknadsstyrelsen*). The main principles of this new reorganization were that refugees should enjoy the benefits of Sweden’s integration policy in the same way as

While labour migration dwindled during the 1970s, and more significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, other types of migration started to increase. These new groups were predominantly family reunion migrants and various categories of refugees.

other immigrants. Asylum seekers and refugees should be placed in a municipality as soon as possible and obtain education in the Swedish language and society as well as housing and social benefits according to “general” Swedish standards. A selection of municipalities suitable for the integration of refugees should be made and the State should pay for the costs of the integration program as well as the fixed costs for the asylum seeker or refugee, including housing costs and social benefits during the first three years.

In practice, an individual could seek asylum directly at the border, or later at the local police station in the municipality where they chose to stay. The police, who forwarded the matter to the Swedish Immigration Board for further investigation, held the first hearing. The Board was further responsible for the reception of the asylum seeker, who at first was placed at one of the four clearance centres. Due to the waiting time for a residence permit, the asylum seeker could be placed in a more permanent refugee camp facility or stay with relatives while waiting for a residence permit. The latter had to be approved by the municipality and the Immigration Board. Non-approval by these authorities could lead to the loss of financial support for the asylum seeker. Until 1990, the only activities for refugees in the refugee camps were language instruction and courses on Swedish society. During 1991, more compulsory activities were allowed encompassing at least four hours a day. In 1992, it was decided to allow asylum seekers to work if the waiting time on a residence permit was estimated to take at least four months. The main idea behind these organized activities was to counteract passivity and to increase the possibilities of integration after a resident permit was obtained. In the end, the focus of the activities became more a sort of “contribute to your own support” than an actual effort towards integration into Swedish society. These activities could be anything from cleaning the camp, being an assistant in a day-care centre, holding information meetings for new asylum seekers, organizing theatre groups, producing newspapers, or taking different kinds of courses (language, computer knowledge, civics, etc.). Work outside the refugee camp has been less than 20% of the total supply of activities. The main activity here has been trainee places which are strongly influenced by the economic situation in the local labour market. Increasing competition for trainee places by the indigenous population during this period could explain this low percentage for asylum seekers.

Since the early 1970s, there has been an increasing negative gap in immigrant employment rates for both men and women compared to the native-born. The deep economic recession of the early 1990s further widened the gap between native- and foreign-born, whereas the economic recovery of the late 1990s and early new millennium seems to have reversed the negative development to some extent.

The Swedish Immigration Board was responsible for the transfer of the refugee to the municipalities once a residence permit was obtained. The board also had the responsibility of negotiating with municipalities for the settlement of refugees. The municipality involved could reapply for social grants from the State during the refugees’ first three years in the municipality and also receive a once-only compensation for each refugee received, aimed at covering extra costs. The integration responsibilities of the municipality include housing, language courses, and an introduction plan with the focus on how to reach self-sufficiency. During the 1985-1990 period, municipalities were reimbursed for their actual expenditures. Since 1991, however, municipalities are given a standard reimbursement per received refugee.

This reform never functioned in its original form and was not a success. This was mainly due to the sharp increase of refugees granted a residence permit in Sweden during this period which in turn increased the waiting time for a resident permit and the following settlement in the municipality. Also, during these years, the number of municipalities involved in settlement increased, even including those with less suitable labour market conditions. This policy is still in effect although refugees since the 1990s are allowed to move freely within the country and decide where they would like to live.

Citizenship

Citizenship in Sweden is based on the *jus sanguinis* principle. Children of non-Swedish citizens, although born in Sweden, are not automatically entitled to Swedish citizenship. Over the last 40 years, Swedish legislation on citizenship has undergone various reforms. The main reforms were that Nordic citizens obtained special conditions and that the years of uninterrupted residence changed substantially, from ten to five years for non-Nordic-born and only two years for Nordic-born, making Swedish legis-

lation on naturalization one of the most liberal in Europe.

Generally, since the mid-1970s, the official Swedish legislation on obtaining citizenship by naturalization is that foreign citizens can gain Swedish citizenship after five years of residence in Sweden, while refugees can do so after four years. Citizens from other Nordic countries are exceptions to this rule and can obtain citizenship after two years of residence in Sweden. Other preconditions for gaining Swedish citizenship include the “age condition,” which means that the applicant must be 18 years of age or

older, and the absence of a criminal record. Gaining citizenship by notification is also possible. This is basically a simplified juridical naturalization procedure and mainly used by Nordic citizens. Acquiring Swedish citizenship by notification is possible if the applicant meets the following requirements: he or she is 18 years of age or older, has lived in Sweden for five years and has not been sentenced to prison during this time. In Table 1, the most frequent citizenship changes by naturalization in the 2000-2004 period are shown.

While the acquisition of Swedish citizenship has become increasingly easier, there was one important formal deterrent. Dual citizenship was forbidden in Sweden until July 1, 2001. Many individuals may see uptake of a citizenship as a fairly casual act, but renunciation of a citizenship is much more serious. Prior to 2001, dual citizenship was only allowed in those cases where individuals were citizens of countries that did not allow renunciation of citizenship. After 2001, no such demands were placed on applicants. According to the latest official estimations by the Migration Board, 275,000 individuals have dual citizenship in Sweden.¹

Economic integration

Studies on the socio-economic integration of immigrants in Sweden show a very high labour market attachment during the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, incomes and employment rates were relatively high, with consequently low unemployment rates. Research on the employment situation of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, however, shows a different picture. During the 1970s and 1980s, the unemployment rate was quite low in Sweden compared to most other OECD countries. Gradually, since the early 1970s, there has been an increasing negative gap in immigrant employment rates for both men and women compared to the native-born. The deep economic recession of the early 1990s further widened the gap between native- and foreign-born, whereas the economic recovery of the late 1990s and early new millennium seems to have reversed the negative development to some extent.

In 2003, (see Table 2) the employment rate among foreign-born men from Finland, Germany, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania and Chile was close to 70%, while foreign-born men from Poland, former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Middle Eastern countries like Turkey, Iran and Iraq were below this level. The lower levels observed for Norway and Denmark can be attributed to immigrants who live in Sweden but commute to their country of origin, where they are employed (these persons were not accounted as employed in Sweden).

The employment rate for foreign-born women reach higher levels among Nordic-born and German women. Somewhat lower employment levels are found among women from East-European countries, Chile, Italy, but also Ethiopia. Women from Middle Eastern countries have the lowest levels.

Variations in employment adjustment have been partly explained by "time of residence" and partly by the motivation for migration. The change in country of origin mix, however, cannot by itself explain the lower employment adjustment for immigrants in general. Nor can it account

Table 1
Citizenship changes by naturalization (2000-2004)

Former citizenship country	Number naturalized 2000-2004
Bosnia-Herzegovina	24,428
Iraq	21,732
Serbia-Montenegro	14,395
Iran	8,817
Somalia	8,816
Turkey	8,228
Poland	6,337
Croatia	4,274
Syria	4,077
Lebanon	2,498

Source: SOU 2006: 2 (State Official Publications).

Table 2
Employment rate (%) among Swedish-born and selected groups of foreign-born men and women, aged between 25-60, 2003

Country of birth	Male	Female
Sweden	85	82
Denmark	60	67
Norway	62	69
Finland	71	74
Germany	70	68
Greece	54	41
Italy	61	61
Yugoslavia	62	52
Bosnia-Herzegovina	71	65
Poland	65	64
Romania	68	65
Hungary	64	64
Turkey	60	45
Lebanon	52	36
Syria	57	41
Chile	69	64
Iran	59	52
Iraq	39	29
Ethiopia	60	63

Source: Author's calculations based on register data collected by Statistics Sweden.

for the differences in employment integration between immigrant groups.

The differences in educational levels could be the main variable accounting for differences in the employment integration of immigrants groups in the Swedish labour market. Several studies based on individual data basically point to the same conclusion, namely that a higher educational level increases the probability of obtaining employment for both immigrants and natives between 1970 and 1990. A Swedish degree also better one's employment opportunities than does a foreign degree, but variations in educational levels do not fully explain the differences in the chances of obtaining employment, neither by itself nor together with other individual characteristics.

Other studies suggest that institutional and demand-side factors, not only supply-side factors, may help to explain the varying labour market attachment, which for some immigrant groups may be characterized as very weak. First, a lower level of economic growth was experienced during the last two decades compared to the earlier period, entailing a decreasing demand for “extra” labour. Second, on the aggregate level, there has been a structural change of the economy, where a declining industry sector has given way to an increasing service sector, which requires higher education and language proficiency. This means that the number of low-skilled industry jobs (traditionally filled by immigrants) has been decreasing steadily in recent years. Third, policies pertaining to immigration, integration and the labour market, as mentioned earlier, have influenced the labour market integration of immigrants on entry and long afterwards. Fourth, more information- and communication-intensive working processes were introduced in both the industrial and the service sectors of the economy. This development increased the demand for employees with higher levels of general competence, while unskilled labour was made redundant by efficiency improvements. One effect of this increased demand for general competence has been to increase the importance of informal skills without reducing the importance of formal education and skills. Such informal skills include country-specific skills, for instance language skills, and the understanding of different behaviour in teamwork and in relations with authorities and labour market organizations worldwide. This structural change made it more difficult for immigrants with the same general formal human capital stock than Swedes to obtain employment and earnings on the level as natives. Together with the shift in immigration towards what is perceived as culturally more distant from the Swedish society, this structural change may have resulted in more discrimination by authorities, employers and employees towards the new immigrants.

This lack of employment integration has in turn had negative effects on the relative income of the various immigrant groups. Due to the fact that unemployment benefits, parental leave and various pensions are based on earlier income, immigrants also have weaker welfare inclusion. Self-employment among some groups has partially counteracted the situation, but the social security payments directed towards certain immigrant groups show a harsh reality and a strong exclusion from the labour market.

The economic crisis of the early 1990s and the dramatic increase of asylum seekers during the same period paved the way for adjusting the refugee policy towards a more restrictive attitude, where temporary protection of asylum seekers replaced what formerly would have been the authorization of permanent residence permits.

Concluding remarks

Studying the immigration experience in Sweden diachronically shows that migration, as well as integration into the labour market, and the spatial patterns of settlement of the newly arrived immigrants have changed over time. A majority of the immigrants who came to Sweden in the first decades after the World War II were labour migrants mainly from Nordic and other European countries. For the most part, these migrants were driven by economic factors. On recommendation from the Labour Organization of Sweden, admission legislation was changed at the end of the 1960s, when a relatively liberal policy was replaced by a more restrictive policy, mainly towards non-Nordic labour migrants.

Unaffected by the change in admission policy, and based on a relatively greater willingness to grant asylum, together with a liberal family reunification policy, most immigrants who arrived during the 1970s, and especially the 1980s and 1990s, were refugees from East European and non-European countries and tied movers from both labour migrants and refugees. Statistics reveal that tied movers and refugees both make up for 50% of those granted a residence permit in the last decades. The economic crisis of the early 1990s and the dramatic increase of asylum seekers during the same period paved the way for adjusting the refugee policy towards a more restrictive attitude, where temporary protection of asylum seekers replaced what formerly would have been the authorization of permanent residence permits.

The assimilation policy towards immigrants also changed, and since the mid-1970s, the integration policy of Sweden is based on cultural pluralism and guidelines of equality, freedom of choice and partnership. Integration into the labour market has been an important goal of the policy. The settlement policy implemented in the mid-1980s, directing refugees who gained a residence permit to a number of municipalities, and especially those with a favourable local labour market, can be seen as a way of reaching both these goals.

Whereas the labour migrants adjusted relatively well into the labour market and the concentration in settlements of various immigrant groups were seen as a way of retaining certain cultural elements of these groups, the economic integration of immigrants in general declined gradually and for some groups deteriorated dramatically, resulting in an increase of spatial concentration for some immigrant groups.

In this sense, integration policies in Sweden have not been effective during the last decades. The “multicultural” society does exist in Sweden, but only when we look at

the number of foreign-born relative to native-born. Furthermore, when it comes to the most prominent measure of integration, employment integration, it becomes clear that large groups of immigrants are experiencing hard times in Sweden.

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Note

¹ No official statistics are available on dual citizenship.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION: THE SWISS CASE*

ABSTRACT

This article is an overview of immigration issues in Switzerland, and specifically of recent changes in admission policies, integration policies, and naturalization. It sheds light on the Bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the EU member states, on a more restrictive admission policy applicable to third-country nationals, as well as on differences in the implementation of Swiss immigration policies. It focuses on the discretionary power of the institutions, which appear to be a constitutive trait of Swiss federalism and its political culture, and on the challenges currently faced by Switzerland given national and international variables with regards to migration.

Throughout the 20th century, Switzerland has known one of the highest immigration rates on the continent, despite the often-remarked suspiciousness towards foreigners after World War I. According to the 2000 census, 22.4% of the total population of 7.4 million are foreign-born, and 20.5%, or nearly 1.5 million, are foreigners, defined as persons with a foreign nationality. This figure is twice as high as that of the US, and considerably higher than that of Canada, two classic countries of immigration. However, in opposition to its internal plural character, Switzerland does not consider itself a country of immigration and until the 1990s did not possess an immigrant policy at the federal level (Mahnig and Wimmer 2003). Since then, admission and integration policies have been developed and implemented.

Recent changes in admission policies

Regarding regular immigration, there have been two major changes in the last few years: firstly, the entry into force in June 2002 of the Bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the EU member states; secondly, the admission policy applicable to third-country nationals that will be more restrictive than the policy that Switzerland has pursued thus far. “Only urgently required qualified workers” will be admitted from outside the EU/EFTA area. Work permits are only issued to executives, specialists and other highly qualified workers from outside the EU/EFTA area, and only if no Swiss or EU nationals meet the requirements. When issuing residence permits, the authorities will further take into consideration the professional qualifications, the ability to adapt to professional requirements, the language skills and the age of the candidate. If a person meets the criteria established in these fields, she or he should be able to achieve sustainable integration into the Swiss labour market and the social environment (Efnayy-Mäder et al. 2003).

The draft for a new immigration law has been discussed in 2005 in both chambers of Parliament and will probably have to be submitted to a referendum in 2006. In quantitative terms, the new Bill, just as the old Law, lays the foundation for the authorities to pursue, if necessary, a more permissive or more restrictive admission policy. For the authorities, the decisive factors for determining the number of people to be admitted from outside the EU/EFTA are the economic situation in Switzerland and the need for labour in certain segments of the labour market. The authorities will continue to have the possibility to adopt a quota solution for third-country nationals (*Kontingentierung*).

The basic principle of the policy is that admission has to occur in the interest of the entire economy and not based on particular interests, whereas professional qualifications and the ability to integrate should play a decisive role. Additionally, admission has to take the social and demographic needs of Switzerland into consideration. In contrast to today’s regulation, a controlled opening of the market to self-employed people is foreseen in the Law if the activity is “desirable to stimulate competition.” Increased competition is intended to promote the efficiency of the economy, and in the long run, guarantee the international competitiveness of Swiss companies. Labour market assessment needs were revised in the 1990s, identifying the post-war migration policy as one of the main reasons for reduced investments and the decline of Swiss competitiveness in different new industrial branches (Blattner and Sheldon 1989, Sheldon 1998).

Altogether, on the one hand, the new immigration law constitutes a higher barrier for nationals of non EU/EFTA States to enter Switzerland. On the other, the situation for foreigners who lawfully and permanently reside in Switzerland will be improved through better opportunities to change occupations, jobs and cantons. The subsequent immigration of families of short-term residents and students is also to be permitted, provided that residential and financial requirements are met. These measures facilitate integration, simplify procedures for employers and for the authorities, and ensure a uniform application of the law. In the above-mentioned areas, the law aims at harmonizing the rules applicable to third-country nationals with those applicable to EU/EFTA nationals (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2003). The specific architecture of the future integration scheme is discussed in the following section.

Integration policies

When the Swiss government dropped its rotation policy in the early 1960s, it recognized that the alternative could only be a policy of integration. However, the belief was that integration takes place naturally in the labour market and in the schools, as well as in associations, labour unions, clubs, churches, neighbourhoods, and through other informal networks (Niederberger 2004). Since the 1970s, the Confederation's main integration policy has been trying to improve the legal status of immigrants, reunite families more quickly, and grant immigrants a more secure status. To facilitate foreigners' integration and to respond to the public's concerns about foreigners, the government established the Federal Commission for Foreigners (FCF) in 1970. The commission, which promotes the coexistence of the foreign and native populations, includes municipalities, communities, cantons, foreigners' organizations, employers and employees, and churches. The FCF cooperates with cantonal and communal authorities, immigrant services, and immigration actors, such as charities and economic associations. It also publishes opinions and recommendations regarding general issues of migration, and provides testimony when the legislature debates migration-related policy.

After the strong lobbying of the cities during the economic crisis of the 1990s, the Swiss alien policy adapted to the new realities, considering the integration of foreigners as a prerequisite for achieving a politically and socially sustainable immigration policy. At that time, the Federal Commission on Foreigners submitted a Federal Program on Integration (*Integrationsförderung*) to be funded by the Confederation that was thought to support

already existing efforts in order to enhance the integration of migrants in different social and cultural spheres. In particular, it was meant to promote all activities promoting the participation of former excluded migrants to public life, enforcing an orientation towards shared values and, above all, increasing the ability to interact and communicate to each other. Hence, "integration" was understood to be the participation of foreigners in economic, social and cultural life. Already, Integration Article 25a, found in the old *Aliens' Law* (ANAG), which was passed in 1999, paved the way for a more proactive federal integration policy; it also strengthened the FCF's position. Since 2001, the government has spent between 10 and 16 million Swiss francs (US\$8 million to US\$13 million) per year to support integration projects, including language and integration courses and training for integration leaders. Cantons and larger municipalities also have their own integration and intercultural cooperation committees and offices, which offer language and integration courses. In many communities, foreigners participate in school boards and, in some exceptional cases, the municipal government. Larger communities, with the support of consulates and the local education department, offer courses in immigrant children's native languages and cultures. Although churches proved to be among the first institutions to promote the coexistence of Swiss citizens and the foreign population, other organizations have been interested in the process, too.

The aforementioned new immigration law (AuG) foresees that immigration candidates have to fulfil certain integration criteria if they wish to be admitted as permanent residents. The goal of the new law no longer appears to be the prevention of foreign cultural hegemony (*Überfremdung*), but affirms the necessity of mutual respect and tolerance (Art. 4 AuG). However, it also requires that foreigners deal with Swiss customs and learn one of the official languages. A government integration decree issued in 1999 and reconfirmed at the beginning of 2006 is very specific in this regard: the government wants migrants to base their sojourn in Switzerland on common values, to adapt to the Swiss lifestyle, to respect all laws and democratic principles, and to express the will to participate economically and through education to their integration into Swiss society.

This demanding and restrictive component corresponds to the criterion of "qualitatively high standard immigration." The level of education and the professional qualifications should improve the integration of foreigners and guarantee their vocational reintegration in the case of unemployment. The restriction aims at avoiding the

According to the 2000 census, 22.4% of the total population of 7.4 million are foreign-born, and 20.5%, or nearly 1.5 million, are foreigners, defined as persons with a foreign nationality. This figure is twice as high as that of the US, and considerably higher than that of Canada, two classic countries of immigration.

errors that were committed in the past, i.e. granting seasonal work permits to low-qualified seasonal workers. The new immigration law abolishes the status of seasonal worker. Furthermore, it explicitly foresees that the immigrant has the duty to make every effort necessary to facilitate integration. Permanent residents and their families are required to integrate into the Swiss workplace as well as in Swiss society (Efonayi-Mäder et al. 2003).

Therefore, the degree of integration (or the assumed ability to integrate) will in the future be decisive for all non-EU immigrants who want to reside in Switzerland. And the interpretation of this capacity will foremost be delegated to local and cantonal officials of the foreigners' police, who will be empowered to measure the "degree of integration." The appreciation of officials, which may vary from one canton to the other, will be decisive in assessing the qualifications and language proficiency of future migrants, defining their right to enter the country and receive an immigration permit (Art. 23 AuG). Issuing a residence permit is also linked to the integration capability of migrants: if they possess excellent knowledge of the language, the migration office is enabled to issue such a permit after five years of legal residence, halving the legal duration of ten years. But the degree of integration always needs to be taken into account (Art. 34 AuG). A particular "integration agreement" (Art. 54 AuG) between the State and immigrants can make the issuance of immigration and residence permits conditional on the successful completion of a language and integration course.

In order to encourage and assist the integration of migrants, the government earmarked funds to support necessary measures. New instruments have been adapted to coordinate the schemes at the federal and cantonal levels. Cantons have had to establish integration offices and to launch projects that promote linguistic, professional and other forms of integration. A first round of projects to promote integration has already been implemented, aiming at giving support to already present State and private social commitments in this field. Consequently, the first program, established in 2001-2003, gave priority to six different focal points at the local and regional levels. The first was dedicated to the promotion of language and communication skills, the second to the education and training of key persons in the integration sphere. The third focus was laid on projects, which favoured migrants' participation within Swiss society, lending particular support to immigrant associations and encouraging their expertise to act in the public sphere. The other main points were covering national projects and strengthening already existing institutions.

At the end of the first program period, an evaluation was conducted in order to detect the

strengths and shortcomings of the promoted projects (see www.eka-cfe.ch/f/doku/eval_f.pdf). A preliminary assessment recorded the accomplishments of the first phase. Among other things, it stated that the network of organizations able to offer language, communication, and political skills at the regional level had visibly been strengthened. Of the 34 million spent in the first period, 22 million were dedicated to these three focal points. Half of all sponsored organizations included Swiss members only, one-third included migrants only, and the rest were mixed. The German part of the country received 79% of all resources; the French part 18%, and the Italian Ticino-speaking part 8%.

The assessment also made it clear that without the sponsorship of the Confederation, many of these projects would not have come to fruition. Further funding was contingent on the capacity of the projects to favour their own sustainability with regard to third-party funds, but also to prove that the newly created networks would continue to be stable.

The quality of the funded projects were deemed to be excellent, but an insufficient coordination of the different offers at the organizational level and with regard to their content was observed. Nevertheless, in a general assessment, the program was deemed to have succeeded in improving communication skills, in supporting key immigrant individuals, in creating better conditions for empowering migrants in Switzerland, and in building the foundation for an innovative integration approach.

The evaluation of the first program led to the following recommendations, further developing the integration policies at an inter-departmental level, strengthening quality controls in the program, and proposing more professional project management by introducing quality certifications. It was also estimated that in the future local leaders should be given a larger role

and that empowerment projects should be adapted to the requirements of the targeted groups.

Following the evaluation assessment, a new focus program has been developed for the years 2004-2007 (www.eka-cfe.ch/f/doku/IF/po_07_f_web.pdf). Continuity and further development of the former program has been emphasized. Moreover, the perception that processes of integration have to be assisted and encouraged, throughout the State, has gained general support. The new program reaffirmed the task of the Swiss authorities to create the general framework that gives one and all equal access to important social and economic resources. With this new perspective, integration crosses all levels of the State and should be enhanced at structural (education, job-market), political (citizenship) and cultural (communication) levels.

The government wants migrants to base their sojourn in Switzerland on common values, to adapt to the Swiss lifestyle, to respect all laws and democratic principles, and to express the will to participate economically and through education to their integration into Swiss society.

The efforts in promoting integration converged in an attempt to reconfigure the Swiss citizenship law in order to facilitate the access of migrants to citizenship. However, the effort was not successful, as the next section shows.

Naturalization

People who have resided in Switzerland for 12 years – the years spent between the completed 10th and 20th years are counted twice for this purpose – may apply for naturalization. The Federal Office for Migration examines whether applicants have successfully integrated into the Swiss way of life, are familiar with Swiss customs and traditions, comply with the Swiss rule of law, and do not endanger Switzerland’s internal or external security. In particular, this examination is based on cantonal and communal reports. If the requirements provided by federal law are satisfied, applicants are entitled to obtain a federal naturalization permit from the Federal Aliens Office (Wanner and D’Amato 2003).

Naturalization proceeds in three stages. Thus the federal naturalization permit only constitutes the Confederation’s “green light” for the acquisition of Swiss nationality. The cantons and communities have their own, additional residence requirements that applicants must satisfy. Those applicants who, after obtaining the federal naturalization permit, have also been naturalized by their communities and cantons, only acquire Swiss citizenship. As a rule, there is no legally protected right attached to being naturalized by a community and a canton. The cantons’ criteria, as well as the way in which cantons decide who gets citizenship, vary greatly. For example, in the canton of Nidwalden, applicants must have spent all the generally required 12 years in this canton. In Geneva, two years’ residence is sufficient. In addition, the requirements at the communal level can vary greatly within the limits of cantonal legislation.

In three referendums over the last 20 years (1983, 1994 and 2004), Swiss voters have rejected laws that would have made it easier for the children of immigrants to naturalize. The referendum in 2004 would have allowed the Swiss-born grandchild of a foreign resident to automatically gain Swiss citizenship at birth; 51.6% of the voters rejected this proposal. The main reason was that “automatic” naturalization would

have eliminated the community’s decision making role, which many Swiss consider to be an important political process. Over the last 40 to 50 years, naturalization rates have stayed below the level desired by the federal authorities because many immigrants probably thought they would return to their home countries after working in Switzerland. In 1992, Switzerland decided to permit dual citizenship. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of naturalizations increased from 8,757 to 37,070. Nationals from the former Yugoslavia, mostly from Kosovo and Bosnia, have been the quickest to naturalize. They have little interest in returning “home” because of the unstable political situation in their country of origin. Obtaining Swiss citizenship means they can never be forced to return. Yet citizenship is not always necessary for voting in local elections. In several cantons in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, foreigners who have lived in the area for many years have the right to vote on the community level and, in a few cantons, even on cantonal matters.

Conclusion

As some critics point out, the danger that Switzerland will continue with an assimilationist practice of their integration efforts even if the new *Aliens’ Law* has introduced to a certain extent a liberal terminology is a real one. Indeed, Swiss institutions at various levels have opened their structures to migrants, finally accepting the fate to be, as many other industrialized parts of the world, a country of immigration. With its integration programs, Switzerland undeniably offers opportunities to migrants, in particular to EU immigrants, and to a lesser degree to non-EU citizens. The implementation of these policies will obviously vary according to the political culture of the cantons and municipalities in which the migrants live. This discretionary power of the institutions can’t be changed in the near future and has to be accepted as a constitutive trait of Swiss federalism and its political culture. But one question remains: what happens in Switzerland, when in a near future a large part of the immigrants are structurally, socially and culturally integrated, but politically excluded? The quest for citizenship has still not been satisfied in one of the oldest democracies of the world and will remain until a response has been found.

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Note

- * This text is a shortened and adapted version of a talk given at the IMISCOE C9 (Network of Excellence) conference on the making of migratory policies in Europe, held March 19, 2006 in Turin (Italy).

Canadian Issues Thèmes canadiens

Metropolis, the Political Participation Research Network and the Integration Branch of Citizenship and Immigration Canada collaborated with the Association for Canadian Studies to produce a special issue of the ACS magazine, *Canadian Issues / Thèmes canadiens*, on the subject of "Newcomers, Minorities and Political Participation in Canada: Getting a Seat at the Table." Guest edited by John Biles and Erin Tolley (Metropolis Project Team), this issue includes interviews with the leaders of all major federal Canadian political parties (except the Bloc Québécois, which declined an interview), and twenty-two articles by researchers, policy-makers and practitioners from across the country.

Metropolis, le Réseau de recherche en participation politique et la Direction générale de l'intégration de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada (CIC) ont collaboré avec l'Association d'études canadiennes (AÉC) à la réalisation d'un numéro spécial de la revue *Thèmes canadiens / Canadian Issues* (« La participation civique des nouveaux arrivants et des minorités au Canada : Se tailler une place à la table »). John Biles et Erin Tolley (Équipe du projet Metropolis) ont dirigé la réalisation de ce numéro, qui comprend des entrevues avec les chefs de tous les principaux partis politiques fédéraux du Canada (à l'exception du chef du Bloc Québécois, qui a refusé une entrevue) et vingt-deux articles préparés par des chercheurs, des décideurs et des intervenants provenant de diverses régions du Canada.

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CANADIAN INTEGRATION: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR MODELS AND MEASURES

ABSTRACT

It is contended that integration is a concept around which there is little societal consensus. The author distinguishes between various aspects of integration and argues that it is possible to establish criteria so as to measure economic and linguistic integration. Indicators of cultural integration are highly problematic in the Canadian context and yet, several analysts continue to unsuccessfully measure this phenomenon.

In theory, any discussion on the topic of immigrant integration should begin with the definition of the term. In practice, however, such definition is frequently absent from much of the academic and policy discussions that address this vital societal issue. It is often presumed that what is meant when referring to “immigrant integration” is sufficiently self-evident as not to require further explanation. Paradoxically, a question frequently heard at academic and policy forums is the following: “What do you mean by integration?” Immigrant integration is associated with the notions of adjustment, adaptation, settlement and/or insertion. It is also multidimensional; hence, in academic and policy conversations, the term is often preceded by reference to economic, social, cultural and, to a lesser extent, political integration. These facets of integration are interdependent of a reality that is rarely reflected in efforts to measure the phenomenon. Criteria for integration are subject to change based on what “society” regards as dominant norms during a given period. Essentially then, integration means various things to various people in varying situations.

One thing upon which there appears to be at least some agreement in most immigrant receiving societies is that there is no single definition of integration. For example, the Commission of European Communities states, “no member state has a uniform definition of integration, however they do to a certain extent agree that integration is composed of different elements and that it must be a two-way process involving both immigrants and their local community.” Harris (2004) contends that “everyone in Europe concerned with migration seems to be talking about ‘integration’. It is the flavour of the month with most governments. Yet it is quite unclear into what immigrants are to be integrated, why they have to do it and whether they are to have any choices in the matter.” According to Penninx (2003), “the definition of integration is deliberately left open, because the particular requirements for acceptance by a receiving society vary greatly from country to country.” For their part, Weinfeld and Elazar (2000) describe the term “immigrant integration” as an oxymoron to the extent that it refers to a process in which an adult immigrant to a host society (e.g., Canada or the United States) actually achieves a high measure of “integration” into that host society. A situation that, according to them, “almost never occurs.” The authors maintain that “adult immigrants – especially if they arrived from a non-English or non-French speaking society – retain one foot firmly planted in the old country.” They conclude that this is often overlooked in the mounting concern, within many government circles, about the “failures” of immigrant integration. In effect, they contend that at best, immigrants go through adjustment, settlement or re-settlement. Of course this idea is strongly focused on the identity dimension of integration and on the idea that adopting the language of the receiving society, securing employment and obeying the laws of the land are insufficient in meeting integration criteria. In this respect, the tendency is to focus on the degree of immigrants’ attachment to Canada or to their adoption of Canadian values.

Integration policy

While some societies possess explicit immigrant integration policies, others possess implicit guidelines and programs. In European societies, it is more common for integration to be part of a legislative framework, with integration being understood as a process with certain core elements.

Within the context of the European Union, immigration policies of one country inevitably impact on other countries. In Canada, there is no explicit integration policy although an Integration Branch, led by a Director General, exists within Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and funds as programs aimed at integration. Immigrant integration involves coordination with a variety of branches and departments. The horizontal character of integration involves policies and programs in the domains, among others, of human resources, official languages, multiculturalism and justice. Some will recall that the Canadian government's immigration ministry (now CIC) was once "Immigration and Manpower" (reinforcing the link between immigration and employment) and in another period, "Citizenship and Multiculturalism" (linking immigration to cultural diversity).

It is acknowledged that immigration plays a special role in the majority Francophone province of Quebec, with regard to the reinforcement of its demographic character and, notably, to the protection of the French language. Such recognition was reflected in the ratification of a 1978 agreement (wherein Quebec was given a say in the selection of immigrants abroad and was allowed to define its own selection criteria), as well as in the transfer to the province, a dozen years later, of integration program funding (although Immigration et Communautés culturelles Québec uses only a small share of the allocated funds for that purpose). In 1990, Quebec issued its *Énoncé de politique en matière d'immigration et d'intégration* [Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration], titled *Au Québec, pour bâtir ensemble*. Finally, it is worth noting that in 2003, the Quebec government brought changes to its ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration [Ministry of Relations with citizens and Immigration], returning to its earlier incarnation as the ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration [Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration]. This presumably reflected the current provincial government's desire to offer greater recognition to the province's ethnocultural groups whereas in the previous administration, these groups were considered citizens like all other Quebecers. In policy terms however, the name change does not appear to have resulted in any meaningful difference in terms of recognition and/or integration.

While Canada does not possess an explicit integration policy, in terms of the degree to which the federal government becomes financially and programmatically involved in the integration process, the country resembles European countries more closely than it does the United States. The federal character of immigration policy is such that the accords with Quebec render the system asymmetrical,

noticeable among others in the variations in language integration requirements. Moreover, Quebec policy-makers describe their policy as "intercultural," as it fosters bilateral interaction between the majority Francophone population and minority ethnocultural groups, while multicultural influence on integration promotes a higher degree of cultural retention. In practice however, there is little difference in the degree of retention of cultural heritage – whether on the basis of non-official language retention or in terms of participation in ethnic associational life (as it reflects bonding social capital). In fact, on both indicators, ethnocultural groups in Montréal rank higher than their counterparts in Toronto and Vancouver.

Indicators of integration

Because of the fluid character of the notion of integration, it is difficult to measure its various dimensions with precision. Defining benchmarks to measure integration

It is often presumed that what is meant when referring to "immigrant integration" is sufficiently self-evident as not to require further explanation. Paradoxically, one of the questions frequently heard at academic and policy forums is: "What do you mean by integration?"


of immigrants is often connected to evolving expectations of non-immigrants and immigrants, and to the interaction between the two. Ray (2002) summarizes the factors usually employed in the measurement of integration.

- *Linguistic integration*: e.g., language used in public interactions, competency in a new language, language used in the home, language used in inter-generational communication.
- *Labour market integration*: e.g., education level, labour force participation of men and women, unemployment rate, labour market segmentation, socio-professional mobility, individual and/or household income.
- *Civic and political integration*: e.g., participation in political parties, unions, neighbourhood associations, religious institutions and/or community groups, registration to vote, voting behaviour.
- *Educational integration*: e.g., performance in school, drop-out rates, choice of school, post-secondary education attainment, interaction with students from receiving society, parent-teacher communication.
- *Residential integration*: e.g., degree of residential concentration/segregation, residential mobility, homeownership rates, dwelling size/crowding, discrimination in rental markets.

In Europe, housing issues and access to housing as well as health and social services are also considered part of the integration process. Because universal health care is guaranteed in Canada and in most European countries, access to health care is often considered an integral part of the integration process. However, this is not the case in the United States.

On the basis of the criteria applied to integration, many

Figure 1




Immigration Canada in March 2006 (Figure 1), some two-thirds of Canadians (65%) agree that “Canada does a good job of helping immigrants settle into their new communities.” This includes 24% who say they “strongly agree” and 42% who say they “somewhat agree.”

In comparison to residents of Toronto (18%) and Montréal (17%), Vancouver residents were most likely to “strongly agree” with this statement that “Canada does a good job” (41%). Paradoxically, it is those who feel that the effect of immigration on their communities is negative (35%), compared to those who say it is positive (20%), who “strongly agree.”

Regarding barriers faced by immigrants when establishing themselves in Canada (Figure 2), survey results reveal that according to Canadians, “language and cultural barriers” (53%) constitute the largest hurdle. Two out of ten respondents cite “employment” (21%) and “education/credentials” (21%) as key hurdles. In contrast to the October 2005 survey, the choice of “employment” as a key hurdle decreased by 11 percentage points, “language and cultural barriers” decreased 6 percentage points, while “education/credentials” increased by 7 percentage points.

Figure 2



Economic integration in Canada

According to Penninx, integration is strongly influenced by the interaction between newcomers and societal institutions. However, these two players are unequal partners with respect to the direction and the ultimate outcome of the integration process. In terms of its institutional structure and the way it reacts to newcomers, the receiving society has much more say in the outcome of the process.

Employment is a fundamental dimension of immigrant integration; however, this doesn’t necessarily imply that unemployment means failure of integration. To determine this, one must understand the underlying factors of the employment condition of the immigrant. The roles and responsibilities of the immigrant and the receiving society therefore need to be assessed. In the event that an immigrant does not have a job consistent with his or her skills and this situation is deemed a sign of non-integration, than the issue of responsibility comes into play. In the summer of 2004, Canada’s Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) was evaluated by the firm Goss Gilroy, Inc. In the final report (CIC 2005), it was observed that key informants, particularly focus group participants, strongly indicated that newcomers were unprepared for the settlement experience.

The report also notes that: “many newcomers expressed the view that they did not know where to locate in Canada, did not know how to find accommodation, and were unprepared for the difficulty of finding a job. Some of those entering in the professional, skilled worker class, who were unable to work in occupations related to their professions, feel misinformed and disillusioned.”

Still newcomers were generally satisfied with the services they received from providers. Their most consistent complaint however was the inability of the ISAP to help them find a suitable job. In the test of integration outcome, among the myriad of variables affecting newcomers (e.g., family and friends, knowledge prior to coming to

non-immigrants would not pass the test. At the group level and in many cases, the segment of the population composed of immigrants possesses lower rates of unemployment than the native-born segment. For instance, persons of African descent in Canada have higher rates of unemployment and lower average income than foreign-born persons of African descent. Underlying the process of integration are issues of inclusion and exclusion that, while difficult to measure, remain fundamental considerations.

There is a certain degree of intersectionality and interdependence between the dimensions of integration listed above. Economic integration is connected to linguistic adaptation, as is education, while civic participation may be connected to residential concentration.

Canadian opinion on immigrant integration

Is Canada doing a “good job” in integrating immigrants into Canadian society? The population seems to think so. According to a survey commissioned by Citizenship and

Table 1
Immigrant economic condition, according to date of arrival, Census of Canada, 2001

25-44 years Male	Immigrant population	1961-1970	1971-1980	1981-1990	1991-2001	1991-1995	1996-2001
Unemployment rate	6.9	4.2	4.8	5.6	9.2	6.9	11.3
Government transfer	3.7	2.1	2.5	3.6	5.0	4.2	5.9
Incidence of low income in 2000	19.9	6.6	9.0	15.4	29.8	20.1	38.6

Source: Statistics Canada, Custom Tabulations Census of Canada, 2001.

Table 2
Unemployment rates of immigrants according to date of arrival and place of origin, 2001

Place of origin	All groups	Before 1961	1961-1970	1971-1980	1981-1990	1991-2001	1991-1995	1996-2001
All groups	7.4	4.0	4.3	4.9	7.2	11.4	9.2	13.8
United States	5.6	4.6	4.7	4.9	7.1	7.2	6.6	7.7
Central and South America	8.3	4.5	4.3	5.2	8.4	11.2	9.4	14.0
Caribbean and Bermuda	8.7	2.7	5.3	6.7	10.3	11.7	11.2	12.7
Europe	5.2	4.0	4.2	4.1	5.4	9.2	6.9	11.7
United Kingdom	4.3	4.2	4.1	3.8	5.0	5.3	5.2	5.4
Other Northern and Western Europe	4.4	3.9	4.4	3.8	4.4	6.7	5.5	7.6
Eastern Europe	7.6	4.6	4.3	5.7	6.2	10.4	7.5	13.3
Southern Europe	5.2	3.7	4.3	4.2	5.1	10.6	7.5	14.1
Africa	11.4	4.6	4.1	5.1	9.2	17.5	13.9	20.7
Asia	8.8	4.2	4.3	5.1	7.4	11.7	9.4	14.0
West Central Asia and the Middle East	11.7	4.6	4.4	6.0	9.7	15.7	12.5	18.5
Eastern Asia	8.5	3.7	3.7	4.3	6.8	11.4	8.9	13.9
South East Asia	6.8	3.3	3.8	5.6	7.0	7.7	7.1	8.6
Southern Asia	9.8	6.0	5.3	5.1	7.1	12.9	10.6	14.8
Oceania and other	5.3	2.1	3.6	5.4	5.8	6.3	5.9	7.1

Source: Statistics Canada, Custom Tabulations Census of Canada, 2001

Canada, etc.), it is difficult to directly attribute outcomes to ISAP services.

While there is an understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of Citizenship and Immigration Canada and other immigrant service provider organizations (SPO) the report points out that there still exists some disagreement. From the government's viewpoint, a certain number of SPOs are undertaking activities outside the scope of ISAP, including advocacy and taking clients to appointments. SPO respondents claim that it is their duty to help their clients, regardless of what is funded by government. Their perspective is that newcomers have needs that exceed the services offered and programs should be expanded to meet these needs.

Table 1 reveals that over time immigrants' economic conditions improve steadily. There is growing evidence that the latest cohorts of immigrants are suffering from greater economic challenges than previous waves of immigration. This raises the issue of how to define the period of years that corresponds to the process of economic integration.

As observed in Table 2, unemployment rates based

on time of arrival vary considerably according to the place of birth of the immigrant. However, across all groups, there is obvious progress in terms of unemployment rates from one decade to the next.


Difficulties in finding employment

Canadians continue to feel that immigrants are at a disadvantage compared to other Canadians with respect to finding employment in their field of expertise. Indeed, according to the survey, three-quarters (75%) of Canadians agree that immigrants have more difficulty in this regard; furthermore, a high proportion of Canadians (46%) "strongly agree" (see Figure 3).

The proportion of Canadians who agree immigrants have more difficulty finding employment in their area of expertise increased by a significant six percentage points since the last survey on this issue (October 2005).

An analysis across socio-demographic factors reveals that those most likely to "strongly agree" that immigrants have greater difficulty than Canadians in finding employment in their field of expertise are residents of Toronto (64%) (compared to Montréal residents (43%)), foreign-

Figure 3



born Canadians (61%) and first-generation Canadians (55%) (compared to immigrants of third-generation or more (41%)), and those with higher levels of educational attainment (peaking at 59% among those with a university education).

Linguistic integration

Research has shown that language proficiency is a determining factor in how quickly immigrants integrate into the labour market. Current training programs, largely funded through federal programs, provide immigrants with the language skills required for social interaction and employment in service and industrial contexts, where advanced language skills may not be required. An Enhanced Language Training (ELT) initiative allows immigrants to attain higher levels of language skills in order to assist them in entering and remaining in the labour market, particularly in information intensive domains, in which many skilled immigrants possess training and experience.

Cultural Integration

Table 3
Language knowledge and immigrant status for Canada, 2001

Total	English population	French only	English only	Neither and French	English nor French
Total population	29,639,035	20,014,645	3,946,525	5,231,575	446,290
Non-immigrants	23,991,905	15,615,445	3,745,700	4,552,220	78,540 (0.3)
Immigrants	5,448,485	4,256,235	190,345	653,625	348,280 (6.4)
Before 1961	894,465	760,440	16,965	94,325	22,740 (2.5)
1961-1970	745,565	588,040	21,760	103,035	32,725 (4.4)
1971-1980	936,275	735,040	30,815	123,445	46,980 (5.0)
1981-1990	1,041,500	788,185	39,995	139,140	74,180 (7.4)
1991-2001	1,830,680	1,384,535	80,815	193,680	171,650 (9.4)
1991-1995	867,355	656,835	34,680	98,950	76,895 (8.8)
1996-2001	963,325	727,700	46,135	94,730	94,760 (9.8)

Source: Statistics Canada, Custom Tabulations Census of Canada, 2001.

The cultural dimension of integration generates much debate because it is so closely related to the issues of identity, with which societies constantly grapple. This dimension also involves defining relationships between majority and minority, as well as non-immigrant and immigrant – relationships that don't necessarily reflect national or regional demographic circumstances. Penninx notes that cultural integration processes, for both individuals and groups, are of a long-term nature and their success or failure is best evaluated by examining the second generation. According to Weinfeld and Elazar, full integration is a multi-generational process of adjustment. Government may call for integration to take place within a shorter term, but this often leads to erroneous presumptions of policy failure on matters of integration. While the amount time required to find employment can be easily determined, the process of cultural integration, however defined, involves generational change.

Ray (2002) points out that integration discourse often seems wedded to a normative vision of societies as culturally homogeneous, where residents born in other countries are exceptional rather than customary participants in economic, social and cultural life. These views reflect a sort of dialectic between what immigrants adopt from the host culture and what they retain from their ancestral culture. Weinfeld and Elazar remark that what generally takes place in the case of Jewish immigrants is a three-fold, nested process of integration into the sub-community, community, and host society. Alternatively, it might be stated that multiple hosts are involved in the receiving process. Indeed, there is a much-needed debate about who or what constitutes the "host society."

Underlying the notion of cultural integration is the idea that we have competing forms of identity wherein the expression of ethnicity and religion conflict with a sense of belonging to the nation. A 2005 survey conducted by the firm Decima Research reveals that 58% of Canadians believe that strong attachment to country of origin "hurts" loyalty to Canada. However, as we shall observe, little causal evidence exists suggesting that immigrants who feel a strong attachment to their country of

origin are less loyal to their receiving country. In the absence of empirical tests demonstrating this limited loyalty, we are often asked to accept this hypothesis on the basis of anecdotal evidence. Polling has revealed however that immigrants, on average, identify more strongly with Canada than do multigenerational Francophones and Aboriginals. Paradoxically, the sense of detachment felt by these two latter groups has resulted from perceived attempts to force their integration into the English majority.

Although multiple identities are an increasingly common characteristic of pluralist democracies, some cultural integration theorists insist that Canadian identification is insufficient among immigrants, very often adding that this is also true for their children. In the aftermath of the debate over ethnic categorization in the 2001 Census, some felt that the percentage of respondents defining themselves as “Canadian only” was a test of the strength of attachment to Canada. It is worth noting that a large number of those who defined themselves as “Canadian only” were from the province of Quebec, where many support the country’s breakup. Moreover, the insistence that duality, hyphenation and multiple attachments are obstacles to integration runs counter to the notion that ethnic mixing through exogamy is an important indicator of integration. When it comes to

integration, the way in which the matter is presented to the population will often influence the understanding of how the process is understood. When surveyed, some two-thirds of Canadians disagree that it would be better for Canada if almost everyone shared the same customs and traditions. Does this imply that they are against integration? Or perhaps the question below, around which Canadians are divided, provides a better test of integration. Again, it is worth noting that the more ethnically-mixed segment of the Canadian population (the 18-29 group) is more inclined to encourage Canadians to try to accept minority groups, as well as their customs and language, than the less mixed segment (45 and over), for whom it is more important to encourage minority groups to become more like most Canadians. Of course, there is a need to define what is meant, for most Canadians, by such questions.

Recently, increased attention has been directed to the Muslim population, to its degree of integration and to the broader question of religious identity and societal integration. A recent survey showed that approximately 60% of Quebecers feel positively about the successful integration of Muslims. The more negative sentiment hails from persons over the age of 55 and from those who are less educated.

Quebecers and other Canadians may express concerns

Table 4
Overall what do you think should be a higher priority for Canada? To encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their customs and language or to encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians?

	Age group of respondents				
	All ages	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+
To encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their customs and language	43	59	45	37	30
To encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians	45	34	43	49	54
Neither	7	6	7	8	8
DK/NA	5	1	4	6	8

Source: Focus Canada survey, Environics, March 29-April 18, 2004 for the Department of Canadian Heritage.

Table 5
Would you say that you have a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative opinion about the successful integration of Muslims in Quebec (n=1003)?

	Very Positive Opinion	Somewhat Positive	Somewhat Negative	Very Negative	Refuse to Respond
18-24	14	71	9	5	1
25-34	11	59	22	5	3
35-44	8	53	29	3	7
45-54	8	52	22	11	7
55-64	5	40	29	15	11
65+	2	45	22	12	19
Elementary	17	25	27	9	22
Secondary	7	52	21	9	11
College	6	57	23	7	7
University	9	55	23	8	5
Total	8	53	23	8	8

Source: Association for Canadian Studies and Leger Marketing, August 2006.

about the degree of integration of Muslims in this society, but survey evidence provides no support for the idea that they feel any less a sense of belonging to Canada than others. This does not mean that some individuals within this group or other groups hold values that are not democratic; it rather suggests that the collective problem is not related to their sense of belonging to Canada. Special cross-tabulation of results from Statistics Canada's 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey reveals that approximately 83% of persons identifying as Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Canada compared with 79.4% of the overall population. Regarding the sense of belonging to Canada versus the sense of belonging to an ethnic group, a survey of religious groups shows that in the case of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents, there is a tendency for the immigrant segment to report a higher sense of belonging to Canada than second-generation respondents.

Table 6
Religious groups: Strong sense of belonging to Canada vs. Strong sense of belonging to ethnic group, 2002

	% strong sense of belonging to Canada	% strong sense of belonging to ethnic group
No religious affiliation	76.5	32.7
Catholic	77.3	51.2
Protestant	86.8	43.1
Muslim	83.2	62.2
Jewish	82.0	61.8
Buddhist	67.5	51.8
Hindu	80.1	73.6
Sikh	80.0	73.6
Total	79.4	46.1

Source: Statistics Canada and Canadian Heritage, Ethnic Diversity Survey, 2002.

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SOUTH ASIAN MUSLIM YOUTH IN BRITAIN: TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM AND CIVIC DISCOURSE

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, the Muslim experience in Great Britain has undergone three distinct phases, revealing a strong element of progression from inception to consolidation within an increasingly multicultural Britain. While there are numerous ethnoregional groups among Britain's Muslims, the South Asian component has been the largest and most visible of all. The author argues that a cultural identity within an overarching British milieu, joined by a greater camaraderie with Muslims elsewhere, could allow women and youth groups a dual sharing with their fellow Britons as well as with people of their own faith.

The attention currently being devoted to predominantly younger and highly politicized Muslim groups within the United Kingdom by academics, journalists and policy-makers is a nascent development, touching upon interlinked sociological, ideological and geopolitical domains. In addition to some of its alarmist and even exceptionalist undertones, this multidisciplinary discourse features an engaging debate on vital themes such as multiculturalism, integration, intragenerational relationship, political Islam and contestations over British foreign policies in West Asia. While most British sociologists may continue to debate over the respective role of two major variables – class and colour –, several of their colleagues, especially from amongst Muslims, have begun to focus on culture as another significant variable and are urging the British State to take it aboard as a major identity marker while reformulating policies on racism and discrimination. Until more recent times, sociological studies of the Muslim diaspora not only remained sparse, they didn't cover the ideological orientations and intra-Muslim positions on identity politics. In the process, predictable and often repetitive statistical tables mainly concentrated on areas like housing, jobs and education in reference to performance graphs of achievers/underachievers. And, here again, Muslims' were reduced to mute figures since they remained absent from the debate as active participants, nor was sufficient attention devoted to the ideological and demographic transformation happening within these communities.

The Salman Rushdie affair, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and, most of all, the terrorist events of 9/11, the Madrid bombings, and 7/7 have not only exposed these serious academic gaps, they have led to a call for the total redirection of academic research. Another important contemporary development corresponding with these crucial landmarks was the emergence of a significant number of Muslim sociologists, writers, journalists and activists who refused to be objectified within the *given* paradigms. Interestingly, a large proportion of this new generation is composed of young, articulate and self-confident women, whose own professional and ideological orientations began to challenge/refashion the entire debate on identity politics. Instead of the stereotyped victims of Islamist chauvinism, they, along with male graduates and professionals, took upon themselves the initiatives of institution building. Such a crucial trajectory has been mostly absent from the debate about Muslims, and accordingly clichéd views such as reluctance to integrate, acute gender imbalances and a presumed widespread propensity to a fundamentalist transregional Islam remain quite prevalent. Consequently, politicization and assertive articulation through an efficient use of IT have taken everybody by surprise and the challenge now is how to assess these newer societal configurations. The erstwhile patronizing analyses are as deficient as are the dictums of an “evil ideology,” “home-grown terrorism” and “socio-economic marginalization.” Whereas earlier, Muslims were being accused of not being political enough, their heightened political discourse is now making analysts nostalgically yearn for apolitical decades and docile groups. Many policy-makers, scholars, media specialists and even first-generation Muslim immigrants are faced with a complex and often dissatisfied generation of “home-grown” Muslims who, despite varying views on Islamic ethos, are immensely politicized, occasionally restive but mostly adoptive and deserving of

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dispassionate comparative analyses. Whereas Muslims may be predominantly agitated over the British/EU foreign policies vis-à-vis the Muslim regions, it is the civil society and the democratic nomenclature within a middle-class milieu that are seen by the former as a creative arena to further their own communitarian and cultural ethos.

As shown in Table 1, Muslims in Britain make up 2.7% of the nation's population and account for 1.7 million in the aggregate total of about 59 million. It is important to note that in 2001 census respondents were asked for the first time to identify themselves in reference to their creed. In London's population of 7.6 million, Muslims account for 1 million, while there are 150,000 Muslims in Birmingham. Wales and Northern Ireland account for 50,000 and 4,000 Muslims, respectively, while there are 60,000 Muslims in Scotland, 33,000 of them living in Glasgow. Thus, compared to the estimates of Muslims totalling 21,000 in 1951, there are now many more, of whom one-third are under 15 years of age, and 18% fall within the 16-24 age group. In other words, 51% of these 1.7 million Muslims are local-born and, interestingly, their third generation is slowly making its presence felt. Most of these Muslims are of South Asian origin with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis making the majority, followed by Indians, Arabs, Turks, Africans and other Eurasian groups. Interestingly, 77% of Pakistanis are, in fact, of Azad Kashmiri origin rendering the proportion of Pakistanis within the Muslim community comparatively smaller. However, Kashmiris and even post-1979 Afghan immigrants and refugees are all collectively identified as Pakistanis. Among the younger generation, one notices the emphasis on cultural (Muslim) identity though the issues of region, class, colour, politics and foreign policy also remain crucial. The younger groups, until recently, felt a greater sense of ease and mobility. However, 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and now Lebanon have rekindled the debate on Muslimness and its interface with the US-UK foreign policies. In the entire EU, the Punjabi Muslims outnumber all other South Asian groups whereas the Afghan diaspora all across Western Europe is identified as South Asian.

The UK-Muslim interface has a long history that is still largely unknown, as the focus remains on more recent and current phases. Other than their Near Eastern roots, both Christianity and Islam (and Judaism as well) have interacted in several ways within the United Kingdom and elsewhere long before South Asia became the hub of the British empire. The inscription of Quranic verse on King Offa's gold coins, commercial and intellectual relations with Muslim Spain and Sicily, the Crusades, links with the Ottomans and North Africans, import of Turkish coffee, and literary and clerical interest in Islam and Muslims surely predated the Raj and the subsequent arrival of Muslim students, *lascars*, *ayas* and visitors to the United Kingdom. The pre-War relationship certainly was uneven within the context of imperial hegemony, yet it provided the context for migrations from the former colonies soon after the hostilities came to an end. Over the last five decades, the Muslim experience has undergone three distinct phases that reveal a strong element of progression from inception to consolidation within an increasingly

Table 1
Who and how many?

Britain: Population by religion in 2001.		
Creed/Community	Thousands	%
Christians	42,079	71.6
Muslims	1,591	2.7
Hindus	559	1.0
Sikhs	336	0.6
Jews	267	0.5
Buddhists	152	0.3
Others	179	0.3
No religion	9,104	15.5
Not stated	4,289	7.3
Total	58,789	100

Source: Census 2001, London: Office of National Statistics, 2004.

multicultural Britain. While there are numerous diverse ethnoregional groups among Britain's Muslims, the South Asian component has been the largest and most visible of all. Even among groups such as atheists, agnostics, political exiles, litterateurs, Ismailis and Ahmadis, there is a large South Asian presence. During the 1960s and 1970s, Muslims in Britain undertook steps to establish mosques, Sufi centres and *ibaadat khanas* as single immigrants were joined by their families and the community expanded horizontally. The early mosques had been smaller, isolated rooms whereas new mosques were purpose-built buildings, which during the second phase in the 1980s and early 1990s gradually began to assume the role of community centres. This phase was quite crucial as in the post-Cold War era, islamophobia was on the increase along with ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and mayhems in Chechnya and Kashmir. In post-Rushdie years, the younger Muslim Britons were witnessing these traumatic developments fully cognizant of the IT revolution in the form of Internet, mobile phones and rolling news channels.

During the current and third phase, several of those hundreds of centres and mosques have begun to adopt IT resources along with providing advice on health and education, whereas the Muslim graduates began joining professions. A sizeable proportion of them are women who, in several cases, began to make independent decisions on their Muslimness, *hijab* and linkages with other like-minded university graduates. These British Muslims, after leaving colleges and universities, started to form study circles and think tanks expanding the remit of hitherto *biradari*- (clan) and mosque-based circles where mostly influential men used to make all the decisions. Instead of Urdu, Bengali, Gujarati and Punjabi, now English with some sprinkling of Arabic/Quranic terms emerged as the lingua franca. The discourse was in English and a flurry of emails, letters and petitions began to reach the offices of the BBC, Sky and various tabloids and broadsheets. The emergence of inclusive and confident bodies such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPACUK), the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the Al-Khoei Foundation, the Islamic Human Rights Commission, the Association of Muslim

Social Scientists, the Khayyal Theatre, the City Circle and magazines such as *Emel* joined the existing local and regional bodies. Even erstwhile bodies such as the Muslim Parliament, the Islamic Foundation in Leicester and the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies – previously more concerned with the cooption of like-minded individuals – had to open up to some younger elements. The issues of the Muslim world and the rising tide of islamophobia politicized these youth in Britain who felt uneasy with the official policies and the abrasive media campaign on political Islam. The Runnemedede Trust's report, *islamophobia*, had certainly substantiated many of the Muslim grievances, redirecting academic and policy research towards the issues of culture and politics. Other than this ongoing and expansive institutionalization which has been crucially affected by 9/11, 7/7 and the subsequent legislation on terror, one notices the evolution of various socio-psychological phases in the career of British Muslims over the past several decades. The initial phase was characterized by the round-the-clock work ethics pursued by mostly single men who viewed themselves as visitors, reflecting a "myth of return." This was replaced by a second phase of settlement during the 1970s and 1980s. It was in the 1990s that Muslims began to challenge the existing models of identification, which was solely based on ethnicity, and started to flag their cultural identification as Muslims. This demand eventually led to the inclusion of religious identity in the census of 2001, which was certainly a major development of far-reaching consequences. The fourth phase, again led by younger Muslims, is less inward-looking and refuses to accept media denigration and partisan objectification and here, one notices a number of stratagems at work.

As is clear from the following opinion charts – further augmented by participant observation – the younger Muslims in Britain are predominantly against violence though they are deeply concerned with foreign policy issues. In Britain they see a home and have no grudge against the society at large, yet remain weary of objectification and exceptionalization. For instance, a major survey conducted a few weeks after 7/7 and reproduced here reveals a broad and often positive consensus on several areas dealing with the British society. The Federation of Societies of Islamic Students (FOSIS-UK) conducted a survey among dozens of British academic institutions; 49% of respondents were female students, and 43% were male students. Concurrently, the findings of the ICM opinion poll conducted in early 2006 and published in *The Sunday Telegraph* were not that different from the other polls in the same league. These surveys challenge several prevalent views about Muslim youth being extremist and irrational clusters who are using campuses, sport arenas and IT channels to organize themselves into potential terrorist groups. These surveys reveal a strong critique of the official policies in West Asia yet are not celebratory of groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Muhajroon and Hizb-ul-Tehreer. They also offer a strong negation of a report by professor Anthony Glees of Brunel University, which is a largely media-based dissertation by one of his students which somehow identifies almost 30 universities as being hotbeds of potential terrorists. Tables 2 to 5, from the

forementioned FOSIS survey, reveal very interesting Muslim positions on several crucial issues.

Unlike the common misperceptions about *Londonistan* or *British Jihadism*, the situation is rather complex and different throughout the different political scenarios, such as more bloodshed in West Asia or invasion of Iran, and may only add to a pervasive dismay among all, agitating some more than others. Intra-Muslim pluralism is a reality that is often overlooked when positing Muslims as a monolithic community. It is true that there is a greater pull towards Muslimness, and an unease with divisions, yet national and sectarian diversity may eventually give way to a greater professional and ideological pluralism among the new generation British Muslims. A high rate of literacy, a higher level of middle class professionalism, and greater socio-economic mobility may usher role models as well as fresher perspectives on Islam, which may positively lead to a British Islam with its own distinct personality. It is not to suggest that radical sections will totally disappear nor will the transnational sentiments wither away; instead they would keep on intensifying the nature of debate on Muslimness, British foreign policies and the role of media. More and more Muslims will undertake lobbying to bring about change from within, though such an optimistic scenario may require concerted efforts over a sustained period of time. Like the anti-war rainbow alliance, Muslims, owing to their youthfulness and politicization, will remain proactive – often more than other similar communities. Such a democratic and civic activism within the strict domain of British citizenship may have its own dividends and costs but is not impossible. If these polls are the indications of the trends to come,

Table 2
Students on terror


Attitudes toward extremism

Do you condemn the London attacks?

Yes	85%
No	4%
No response	11%


Would you tell the police if you found that a fellow Muslim was planning an attack?

Informing the police that a fellow student is planning an attack.



- Inform police straight away (72%)
- Try to talk them out of it and then inform the police (8%)
- No, would never grass on a Muslim (2%)
- No, am mistrustful/scared of the police (2%)
- No, did not specify why (6%)
- No response (10%)

Table 3
On foreign policy




then there is a reason to be hopeful. As shown in the above polls, respondents are overwhelmingly against violence – both at the State and societal levels and decry events such as the London bombings. A vast majority of them are willing to inform the authorities of any potential militants within the community, yet midnight raids and arrests of hundreds of younger people all across the North Atlantic regions only exacerbate their disenchantment with the politicians and police. In the same vein, they are critical of British foreign policy in Muslim regions and share wider grievances on the invasion of Iraq and bloodshed in Afghanistan, Palestine and elsewhere. Two-thirds of these respondents are happy with the British academic institutions for being sensitive to their communal needs.

Only 2% have been influenced by imams, while a vast majority have learned about Islam on their own or through friends, and 20% of them have been taught about their religious and cultural heritage by their parents. In other words, the exaggerated views about the role of religious seminaries and travels to West Asian countries underwriting political activism among some of these Muslim youth do not hold water.

It is believed that British policies towards Muslim regions along with a continued media-led distrust of the Muslims may keep most of the younger groups, including women, agitated. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Muslims have no problem defining themselves as British citizens of the Muslim faith. Their citizenship remains non-


Table 4
Sources of instruction and influence



controversial and their Islamicity does not push them to trivialize this civic identity. Many of them are eager to benefit from the British academic, professional and democratic institutions. As seen during the Danish cartoons controversy, they are uneasy with a few firebrands from within trying to speak for the entire community, in the same way that they are wary of several establishments intent upon denigrating and agitating Muslims in the West.

This is a situation where authorities can help by adopting more even-handed policies, distancing themselves from the ongoing legacy of discretionary adventurism and midnight raids whisking away European Muslims to interrogation centres while exposing them to a grave level of social and psychological humiliation. It is safe to suggest that a higher rate of mobility, adequate grooming within the British education system, exposure to media and study groups, and developments in Muslim regions will holistically continue to fashion the attitudes of British Muslims. Some might even surrender their Muslimness while a few may continue to opt for more extreme views by seeking likeminded colleagues across the United Kingdom. The vast majority of them, however, will likely

Table 5
On women and youth




enter professions and, conscious of their own identification as British citizens of Muslim background, continue debating and agitating over the issues of foreign policy.

Certainly, the Israeli invasion of Gaza and the debilitation of Lebanon has, once again, exacerbated anger among younger Muslims who feel that Britain has been abetting Israeli policies by stalling a ceasefire without any regard to human rights or Muslim public opinion. It is feared that a bottled-up anger over such issues may radicalize some younger British Muslims, whose daredevil acts could once again set back inter-community relationships by decades. Concurrently, a cultural identity within an overarching British milieu joined by a greater camaraderie with Muslims elsewhere could allow women and youth groups a dual sharing with fellow Britons as well as with people of their own faith. Such a role may have its own dividends on all sides, just as it could engender suspicions in some quarters, but this is where greater debate and dialogue will be needed to allay reservations, or even inclination towards extremism. A greater sense of acceptance and mutual tolerance within a multicultural and democratic environment, and proactive official efforts geared towards a just global order can certainly augur a new phase in the career of Muslims, where European Islam could evolve as a positive reality.

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RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN CANADA

Religion and Ethnicity in Canada

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Religion and Ethnicity in Canada explores six major religions in Canada: Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Islam, and Chinese religions. The book also discusses the place of religion in Canadian society as it pertains to the formation of government policies, the ebb and flow of immigration and the economy, and the laws and standards of education.

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SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTEGRATION OF THEIR EXPATRIATES IN EUROPE*

ABSTRACT

In December 2005, the Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE) and the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) jointly organized a seminar titled *Integration Policies: The View from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries*, held in Tunis. This seminar addressed the need for policy-makers from both sending and receiving countries to evaluate the impact of their policies on the actual integration of migrant integration in the receiving society. In this article, the author provides an overview of the current situation regarding Middle East and North Africa immigration to European countries, and presents the major conclusions reached at the Tunis seminar, notably in the following areas: the role played by the countries of origin in the integration of their expatriates; family reunification, education and religious practice; access to work, income, health, and housing; naturalization and political participation; and discrimination and protection of rights.

Mediterranean countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)¹ form a major region of emigration, with approximately 12 to 13 million first-generation emigrants, representing some 4.8% of their aggregated population, which amounted to 260 million in 2005. Emigration has gained momentum in most of the region in recent years. At the same time the region receives significant flows of immigration, whether destined for the region as such or in transit to Europe and stuck at the gate of their intended destination.

Europe is the single largest destination of first-generation emigrants from Mediterranean countries of the MENA, and hosts almost half of all such emigrants worldwide. The Arab oil countries, i.e. the Gulf States and Libya, constitute the second largest destination, with the rest of the world, mainly North America, ranking far behind.

At a time when economic immigration into Europe could resume in relation with demographic developments in the EU and deficits in the labour supply, integrating immigrants appears to be a condition for their full participation in the economic, social and human development of both destination and origin countries. Integration of migrant populations in destination societies can be broadly defined as the process through which migrants are able to participate in helping to build a cohesive society respectful of comparable rights and obligations.

The European Commission has recommended that immigrants gradually acquire core rights and assume obligations, so that they are treated in the same way as nationals of their host state, even if they are not naturalized. EU member states have established specific tools, which vary from one country to another, in order to facilitate the integration of migrant populations and to progressively eliminate all forms of segregation to which these populations may be subject. These tools include urban, housing, education, linguistic, health and cultural policies, among others.

On the other side, governments of migrants' countries of origin have established institutions – either full ministries or specialized ministerial sections, as well as specialized agencies – in order to develop links between MENA expatriates, wherever they reside, and their country of origin. These institutions have developed tools which operate mainly in two domains: economic and cultural. Their action is defined along the two following lines:

- *Economic line*: facilitating financial transfers and investments made by MENA expatriates in their country of origin, allowing them to contribute to its economic, social and human development;
- *Religious and linguistic line*: offering migrant populations, and particularly second-generation migrants, the means to maintain their cultural and religious identity.

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Origin countries' institutions may also intervene in other domains, for example:

- *Legal*: with a view to protecting migrants' rights in their country of residence;
- *Political*: with a view to managing political participation of migrants in their country of origin.

To what extent do policies to integrate immigrant populations pursued by European countries, on the one hand, and policies regarding expatriates pursued by MENA governments, on the other, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants?

The seminar "Integration policies: The view from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries," jointly organized in Tunis in December 2005 by the Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE) and the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM), addressed the need for policy-makers from both sending and receiving countries to evaluate the impact of their policies on the actual integration of migrants in the receiving society.² The seminar, which was attended by high-level representatives of MENA countries, reached the following conclusions.

States of origin and the integration of their expatriates

Integration policies designed to help immigrant populations should be defined in a dialogue between the host countries and countries of origin.

The integration of new immigrants by host countries should be accompanied by concrete policies to promote their reception with a view to successful integration, and should not be treated merely as a set of conditions to limit and control immigration.

Countries of origin should not view expatriate communities solely as a source of external financing. Institutions set up to manage relations between expatriates and their country of origin should take into account the range of assets that these communities represent, not only financially, but also in terms of human, cultural and social resources. The management of emigrants' remittances and their impact on the development of the country of origin are important, but not the sole aspects of the work of these institutions.

The policies of countries of origin vis-à-vis their expatriate communities have evolved with, and in response to, the immigration and integration policies of host countries, and to the calls of immigrant groups in response to changes occurring within these groups.

The need to maintain links with their expatriate communities is recognized by all country of origin governments, particularly regarding language, religion and the role of their professional elites. However, the tools to manage this link differ depending on the country in question.

Institutions set up in some countries of origin to protect and promote immigrant populations in host countries should be used as a model for those countries that concentrate exclusively on the financial aspects of relations with their expatriate communities.

Best practices occur when three actors are willing to cooperate: the institutions of the host countries, institutions in the countries of origin, and the organizations and associations that operate within the immigrant communities.

Dialogue and coordination among the countries of origin should encourage the formulation of policies to promote the integration of expatriates, given that the latter may share similar experiences and request similar rights. The formation by immigrant groups originating from Maghreb countries of a genuine Maghrebine community in Europe suggests the need for a South-South cooperation in managing relations with the expatriate communities.

An effective instrument would be decentralized cooperation between the institutions in the countries of origin responsible for managing relations with their expatriate communities, local administrations in host countries and the associations active within the immigrant communities themselves.

The ratification by the host countries of the 1990 *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Family* would create a situation conducive to a more successful integration of immigrant groups.

The particular situation of Palestinian refugees in Europe, who cannot invoke the protection of a country of origin, calls for the definition of the status of "stateless person." Such persons would be entitled to international protection provided as refugees as per the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

Best practices occur when three actors are willing to cooperate: the institutions of the host countries, institutions in the countries of origin, and the organizations and associations that operate within the immigrant communities.

Integration in private life: Family reunification, education and religious practice

Host countries must respect the freedom of immigrants to choose a husband or wife, including from country of origin with which they maintain affective links, although the right to family reunification via marriage should not be used as a way to skirt immigration regulations.

The definition of the beneficiaries of family reunification must take into account the specific cultural nature of family composition in the country of origin.

The basic right to migrate on the grounds of family reunification should play a pro-integration role in the host society, and shouldn't generate exclusion by creating ethnic enclaves. Urban social planning policy must take this concern into account and promote ethnic mix in urban neighbourhoods.

Bilingualism and biculturalism are positive practices for integration. Promoting the creation of mixed

neighbourhoods, and introducing the teaching of Arabic and Turkish in schools for migrants and non-migrants alike, are ways to avoid the creation of ethnic enclaves in urban agglomerations.

The school must recuperate its role as an instrument of integration and social mobility. It should thus eliminate inequality of access to academic tracks within the school, just as inequality of access to the labour market should be eliminated upon completion of schooling.

The transition from first- to second-generation immigrants is accompanied by a cultural transition within the family, as the first generation is educated in its country of origin and the second in the host country. The school must take this fact into account using systems of support and specifically adapted programs.

Countries of origin play a role in the moral and religious education and also of restraint of immigrant groups and in encouraging their integration. This helps them understand the authentic values of their culture of origin and to avoid their falling prey to extremist movements in the host country.

The role of the imams in the transmission of moral values conducive to integration must be promoted. The shortage of sufficient numbers of religious teachers to instil and to restrain identification with religious values leaves room for the appearance of leaders who are beyond the control of the authorities, and cut off from the true values of Islam.

The training of imams in State-controlled institutions in their countries of origin is a guarantee against the self-appointment, within the immigrant populations, of elements that could undermine the maintenance of civic order.

Integration and socio-economic conditions: Access to work, income, health, and housing

The prevalence of unemployment among immigrant populations and the fact that a considerable proportion of the people in these groups remain outside the labour market are matters of serious concern.

In the near future the demographic situation in Europe will require the resumption of economic immigration, and this may function as an instrument of integration for the older immigrant populations, which, thanks to the arrival of new immigrants possessing different educational and professional profiles from those of their predecessors, will tend to raise the overall educational and professional profile of immigrant groups.

Migratory flows are regulated exclusively by the host countries. The formulation by the countries of origin of educational and employment policies that treat emigration as an option could promote the integration of their émigré workers in the host countries.

Integration and civic life:

Naturalization and political participation

With the exception of local elections, nationality, either acquired or by birth, remains a precondition of political participation for immigrant groups in host countries.

The integration of these groups will be facilitated by their participation in the management of local affairs, particularly in neighbourhoods where they represent a significant proportion of the population.

Countries of origin should be active in raising the awareness of immigrants to the importance of integration in their host country, particularly through their involvement in associational activity.

The responsibility of immigrant populations themselves in their own integration should be stressed.

Countries of origin should also emphasize the need for their dual nationals to take part in the political life of their host country *and* their country of origin (i.e. elections), which will help achieve equality of opportunity.

Countries of origin must assign some form of political participation for their expatriates, possibly in cooperation with the host countries in the practical organization of elections.

Combatting discrimination and protecting rights

Combatting discrimination, direct or indirect, in order to achieve equality of opportunity, not only formally, but also in fact, means carrying out educational work with the indigenous population of host countries. This involves a long-term program of awareness building, particularly cultural awareness building, which should be carried out in cooperation with the countries of origin.

During a period of transition, affirmative action, or positive discrimination, should help overcome prejudices and frustrations, provided

that this is not done to the detriment of merit, that it does not stigmatize the beneficiaries, and that it is understood and accepted by the autochthonous population.

There is a risk that anti-discrimination legislation will not achieve its goals if they are not accompanied by measures of affirmative action. In particular, the presence of immigrant groups in the media as an instrument of positive identification with the host society is still very weak.

The representation of migrant groups in democratic institutions and in the mass media better proportioned to their presence in society, is a pressing goal and one which affirmative action can help achieve.

Immigrant populations are not *between* two cultures, but *of* two cultures, and the media have a role to play in the diffusion of a common culture.

The popularity of Arab and Turkish television media among the immigrant groups helps maintain links with


The school must recuperate its role as an instrument of integration and social mobility. It should thus eliminate inequality of access to academic tracks within the school, just as inequality of access to the labour market should be eliminated upon completion of schooling.

the countries of origin, as does the popularity of European media in the countries of origin. Using the media to promote an understanding of the culture of origin in the host country will certainly facilitate integration.

Countries of origin must work with their nationals to instil respect for the rules and values of host countries in order to improve their chances of successful integration.

Notes

- * Conclusions of a seminar presented by Philippe Fargues.
- ¹ Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.
- ² www.carim.org/index.php?areaid=15&contentid=23.



Immigration and Families L'immigration et les familles

Special Issue of / Édition spéciale de *Canadian Issues / Thèmes canadiens*

Metropolis has continued its successful partnership with the Association for Canadian Studies to produce special issues of the magazine *Canadian Issues / Thèmes canadiens* on immigration and diversity topics. This issue (Spring 2006) focuses on immigration and the family. It features an introduction by Madine VanderPlaat of Saint Mary's University, an interview with Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Monte Solberg, and twenty articles by knowledgeable policy-makers, researchers and non-governmental organizations. Like earlier issues, it has been assigned as course readings in many disciplines at several universities.

Le partenariat entre Metropolis et l'Association des études canadiennes continue de porter fruit, avec la production de numéros spéciaux de la revue *Thèmes canadiens / Canadian Issues*, portant sur l'immigration et divers thèmes connexes. Ce numéro (printemps 2006) met l'accent sur l'immigration et la famille. Il comporte une introduction signée Madine VanderPlaat (Saint Mary's University), une entrevue avec le ministre de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, Monte Solberg, ainsi qu'une vingtaine d'articles rédigés par des responsables des politiques publiques, des chercheurs et des organisations non gouvernementales spécialisés dans le domaine en question. Ce numéro de la revue, comme les numéros précédents, compte parmi les lectures obligatoires de nombreux cours universitaires de disciplines variées.

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UNAVOIDABLY SIDE BY SIDE: CITIZENSHIP AS AN INTEGRATED POLICY ISSUE IN CANADA

ABSTRACT

In the current era of globalization, mass migration and heightened security, and Canadian public policy discourses appear beleaguered by competing notions of citizenship and immigration. What is the best citizenship route to successful immigrant integration and nation building? How can policy-makers balance legal and civic concepts of citizenship, while simultaneously ensuring that Canada is prepared for the 21st century's demographic challenges and labour market pressures? Eva Lazar proposes a new and integrated approach to citizenship as a policy issue – one that may provide Canadian policy-makers with an essential lens for assessing and pursuing contemporary immigrant integration and nation building goals.

EVA LAZAR

Eva Lazar, Ph.D., is a Senior Policy Analyst at Citizenship and Immigration Canada. She has worked extensively in the areas of international development, social policy, human rights, and gender relations within governmental, academic and non-governmental sectors in Canada, the United States, South Africa, and the Philippines.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, or the Government of Canada.

Over 200 years ago, philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote that human beings live “unavoidably side by side,” but to do so in a state of peace required concerted human effort. Today in Canada it is generally expected that as birth rates decline and the population ages, this country will become increasingly dependent upon high levels of immigration to deal with long-term labour market demands created by a combination of demographics and global economic pressures. At the same time, the expansion of immigrant source countries¹ and deepening cultural diversity has been accompanied by new integration challenges² for new immigrants as well as established citizens, fuelling public debates over the meanings of citizenship and immigration in the 21st century. On the one hand, growing disagreement over existing and imagined citizenship ideals may be a healthy sign of a deepening multicultural democracy; it may even begin to correct the widely bemoaned contemporary disengagement of citizens from public life. On the other hand, as post-9/11 terrorism continues to stoke public anxieties and strain public policy discourses, the call for social solidarity based on shared values appears unremitting.³ In this context, Canadian policy-makers in the areas of citizenship and immigration find themselves walking a nation building tightrope: balancing numerous internal and external pressures related to foreign policy interests, domestic security concerns, human rights commitments and social inclusion goals.

Occasionally informing public debate, Canadian research and theorizing on the broad and interrelated areas of citizenship and immigration are extensive and growing; however, elaborated consideration of this work is a subject for a separate paper. Instead, and respecting these contributions, this article offers policy-makers a particular conceptual route to navigating citizenship and contemporary immigration pressures through three broad, interrelated and dynamic liberal democratic citizenship concepts – specifically, *juridical status*, *civic identity* and *civic practice*. While these three citizenship concepts often arise within citizenship and immigration policy discourses, they have yet to be treated together within an integrated framework recognized across a wide range of governmental departments. The framework offered here is not intended as prescriptive or leading to fixed solutions; rather, it is meant to offer a new perspective on citizenship and immigration policy issues in Canada.

Three concepts of citizenship

Juridical status

Historically, citizenship as *juridical status* has related to the core legal responsibilities of a liberal democratic state: to warrant national state certification (in the case of immigrants through

naturalization), accompanied by the granting of rights and security for its citizens. Citizenship from this perspective has been the mark of formal legal inclusion within the nation-state – a specific and internationally recognized geopolitical entity. Hence, legal citizenship traditionally defined the population that could legitimately make claims on the State for protection as opposed to those – both inside and outside of a national territory – who could not.

As a result of intensified international migration and enhanced communications over the past several decades (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2000), the juridical basis of citizenship in contemporary nation-states is being increasingly contested. Organizing and legitimating principles of citizenship are based progressively on universal personhood rather than national belonging. This shift is demonstrated by the incorporation of guestworkers in Europe without legal citizenship status into various aspects of the social and institutional order of their host countries, often enjoying as non-citizens a range of rights and protections.⁴ By contrast, in the United States undocumented workers have settled into permanent and large communities, intensifying American debates on the legitimacy of various routes to legal citizenship.⁵

Clearly, while citizenship as juridical status continues to be associated with a number of important policy issues – namely citizenship qualifications, statutory bars to citizenship, revocation, and deportation – citizenship cannot be reduced to legality alone. In fact, as the following section will demonstrate, the declining benefits of naturalization may be contributing to making legal citizenship largely unnecessary to the pursuit of other civil, political and social rights, as well as responsibilities, for a great number of new immigrants.

Civic identity

Civic identity refers to the character of membership within a civic community, which in turn shapes the processes of social cohesion and trust. As discussed above, many non-citizens living in host countries in the current period develop their civic identity long before, or even without, naturalization. By extension, the civic identity of non-citizens may also contribute to the shaping of a number of social and political phenomena associated with social cohesion in their host societies: community values, the limits of governmental decision making in relation to individuals, the rights of private interest groups and associations, and the balance between individual and group concerns. The opportunities and risks associated with this particular trend depend on the compatibility of non-citizens' values and behaviours with those of the host

society; the effectiveness of integration policies and programs; and a host society's receptivity to deepening pluralism and diversity. This article takes a decidedly optimistic view of the possibility that all people living in Canada can potentially contribute to Canadian nation building in a positive manner, regardless of the juridical status of individuals.

Over the past six decades Canada has developed a unique constitutional and statutory framework to support a civic identity that accommodates diversity and advances equality. The suite of legal tools affecting both citizens and non-citizens to varying degrees includes the *Canadian Citizenship Act* (1947 and 1977), the *Canadian Bill of Rights* (1960), the *Official Language Act* (1969), the *Multiculturalism Act* (1978), the *Human Rights Act* (1977), the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), the *Employment Equity Act* (1985 and 1995), the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2002), the *Canada Health Act* (1985), the *Canada Labour Code* (1985), and the *Official Languages Act* (1988). Within this federal legislative framework, rights and entitlements have been extended increasingly to individuals, including non-citizens. This means that non-citizens may move freely within Canada, obtain education and employment, and qualify for a range of government services, including health care.

In support of this approach to nation building, Canadian scholars Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting recently pointed out that “[m]any rights are indeed owed to people simply on the basis of their personhood, regardless of their legal nationality; for instance, respect of basic civil liberties, and provision of health care and education.”⁶ At the same time, Kymlicka and Banting suggest that in the interests of national solidarity, “the State has a legitimate interest in preserving the category of national citizenship as

the locus of certain tangible rights, such as voting rights, and responsibilities such as jury duty and military service.”⁷ In addition to those restrictions identified by Kymlicka and Banting, non-citizens are restricted from employment in the public service, from holding a passport, and also do not enjoy a number of Charter rights and protections, perhaps mostly significantly the right to enter and remain in Canada.⁸

Notwithstanding the legitimate (and intuitively sensible) concern that maintaining some distinctions between citizens and non-citizens is important for national solidarity, it is important to note here that only approximately 65% of Canadians chose to vote in the last national election, and that Canada does not have mandatory military conscription. Moreover, there are

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some circumstances under which the Canadian Armed Forces will in fact accept the enlistment of non-citizens.⁹ Hence, while the symbolism of legal citizenship remains important, it is becoming increasingly difficult to demonstrate convincingly that the few remaining rights and obligations associated with juridical status are relatively more significant than those accorded to non-citizens for successful nation building. Expressed differently, Canadian civic identity amongst all those living in Canada may be more significant to immigrant integration and to Canadian nation building than the putative benefits of juridical status.

Undeniably, the privileges bestowed upon non-citizens, in addition to the increase in dual citizenship,¹⁰ foster important public policy questions about the allegiance of new immigrants to Canada, or the incentives for positive civic identity. On the one hand, it is well known that 85% of immigrants to Canada become legal citizens following the required residency period of three years (Statistics Canada 2005) – a phenomenon often viewed as an expression of allegiance and commitment to Canada. This naturalization rate is in stark contrast to that of Australia, where 75% of individuals who complete the two year residency requirement are naturalized. Moreover, according to the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), more than 92% of immigrants who arrived in Canada between October 2000 and September 2001 intended to become citizens.¹¹

Nevertheless, a high rate of naturalization does not necessarily correlate with sustained allegiance to Canada, a cohesive citizenry, or ultimately, nation building. In fact, there is very little empirical research demonstrating immigrants' individual motivations for applying for legal citizenship.¹² Provocatively, author Neil Bissoondath has suggested that the motivations for acquiring Canadian citizenship appear to be wide-ranging. For example, motivations for naturalization may “emerge from the realization that all of one's intellectual and emotional loyalties have come, through the years, to commit themselves to Canada.” Alternatively, the desire for legal citizenship may be “merely access to a passport that allows return to the comforts of the former homeland with the assurance of safe haven should the plan go awry, or should political instability necessitate flight.”¹³

The point here is not to cast judgement upon immigrants' varied motivations for becoming Canadian citizens. Rather, it is to emphasize that what remains most important to immigrant integration and nation building is the civic identity of all those who live in Canada, regardless of citizenship status.

Civic practice

The notion of partnership often conjures up the idea that citizens are entitled to equal benefits and entitlements; however, partnership is also closely linked to ideas of citizen participation and responsibility, or citizenship as *civic practice*. The notion of civic practice places the active and responsible citizen in the foreground. Specifically, civic practice captures the Aristotelian, or republican, notion of citizenship, which defines the citizen as one who can participate “in giving judgement and holding office”¹⁴ and who shares in the administration of justice. Civic practice is often characterized as the participation of private actors in the public sphere, whether through voting, involvement in political parties and electoral processes, or engagement in a wide range of community activities.¹⁵ The focus of this concept of citizenship is on the responsibilities that shape and build a diverse and multi-ethnic society, and on ensuring basic civility in its functioning.

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The quality of civic practice is dependent upon citizens possessing the sufficient civic knowledge required to understand and effectively engage in the country's public life.¹⁶ Moreover, as economist Amartya Sen (1999) reminds us, it is the capacity and freedom of individuals to participate in civic life that bridges the rights and entitlements of citizenship to the responsibilities of citizenship. In this view, legal, regulatory and policy frameworks combine with political, socio-cultural and economic conditions to determine the capacity of citizens to engage in civic practice. Concomitantly, the proper role for public institutions is to help form a sense of civic responsibility and to support enabling conditions which allow citizens to fulfil their obligations.¹⁷

As noted above, the civic practice of voting and participating in electoral politics in Canada is limited to citizens. Nevertheless, there is evidence to demonstrate that official multiculturalism in Canada, with its commitment to promoting and assisting understanding between individuals, organizations, institutions and communities of different origins through a wide range of policies and programs, plays a strong role in supporting civic participation and facilitating immigrant integration before legal status is obtained.¹⁸ Moreover, there has been a growing policy discussion in Canada on the use of immigrant integration as a two-way street in order to emphasize rights and responsibilities, while encouraging newcomers to become active and engaged citizens. Indeed, Citizenship and Immigration Canada suggests directly to the new immigrant: “ask yourself which *responsibilities* you will take on when you become a Canadian citizen.”¹⁹ Although this approach to immigrant integration and civic development is laudable, it is important to note that

official multiculturalism was also envisioned as a reciprocal approach requiring high levels of responsibility and civic practice amongst *all* Canadian citizens.

Despite naysayers, Canadians have demonstrated consistently high levels of support for multiculturalism and immigration policies.²⁰ Moreover, recent studies on measures of social capital – an indicator of the willingness of individuals to work together and to engage in cooperative civic endeavours collectively – suggest that diversity *per se* in Canada does not exert a negative influence on civic attitudes and behaviours.

Nevertheless, recent studies indicate declining civic practice and eroding trust in public institutions over the past decade amongst Canadian citizens – epithetically known as the “democratic deficit” (Stasiulis 1997, Gidengil et al. 2004, EKOS 2005, Pammet 2003). Predictably, a number of surveys indicate that a large segment of Canadian society lacks the basic civic knowledge needed to meaningfully participate in civic life.²¹ However, recent findings suggest that declining civic participation is not a phenomenon specific to new immigrants, second generation immigrants or visible minorities generally in Canada, but to all Canadian citizens.²² Hence, given that rates of civic practice appear similar amongst new immigrants and established Canadian citizens in many respects, policy-makers should exercise caution to ensure that civic practice is not problematized as a policy issue exclusive to immigrants.

Conclusion

The challenge of citizenship and the diminishing significance of juridical status in Canada have evoked a number of political and policy responses over the past several years. The most significant amongst these have included a number of failed attempts to modernize the *Citizenship Act* itself in order to align it with the provisions and principles of the Charter and other legislation, while accounting for public opinion and evolving civil society discourses on citizenship.²³

In the 21st century, strengthening and modernizing the tools related to legal citizenship may offer only a partial solution to the question of how people in Canada live and work side by side. However, an integrated policy approach – one that considers seriously juridical status alongside civic identity and civic practice – may offer policy-makers a new lens for approaching the challenges of immigrant integration while simultaneously addressing goal of nation building for all. However, continued analysis of citizenship as an integrated policy issue will require serious commitment by policy-makers to re-examining the repertoire of citizenship and immigration policy tools available, while imagining new tools and solutions through a horizontal process that includes public consultation. Finally, policy-makers must be committed to making these tools work together to respond effectively and holistically to external pressures in developing a truly integrated and inclusive approach to Canadian citizenship.

Most Canadians would agree that citizenship should ideally be based on a willingness, not a resignation, to live side by side.

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Notes

- Immigration in recent decades has shaped Canadian diversity. Whereas in 1980 one in three immigrants came from the US or Europe, today that proportion is filled by immigrants from countries in the Middle East and Africa. Countries in Asia and the Pacific now account for about half of all immigrants to Canada. As a result, today few immigrants speak English as their mother tongue, while the percentage of those who have French as their mother tongue has remained unchanged in the last 25 years. Some languages, such as Mandarin and Arabic, have replaced European languages as those most commonly spoken in Canada. This diversity for the most part characterizes large urban centres, particularly Montréal, Toronto and Vancouver, where over half of newcomers to Canada choose to settle.
- According to census data, while immigrants and the Canadian-born both had poverty rates of 17% in 1980, the rate of poverty among new immigrants has steadily increased to 20% while the Canadian-born rate had declined to 14%. In 1980, one year after arrival in Canada, a skilled worker principal applicant could expect to earn almost 25% more than the Canadian-born; by 2003, the average was 32% less than the Canadian-born. Several factors contribute to the poorer economic performance of some recent immigrants, including language problems as the greatest barrier, followed by a lack of Canadian job experience. The latter is often accompanied by a lack of recognition of foreign credentials and work experience. Other research points to the role played by unfavourable local labour market conditions, the demand for specific skills and occupations, racial discrimination and low literacy skills. Additional challenges may lie with problems related to integration policy and programs themselves, which do not always effectively address the contemporary complexities of integration and newcomers needs.
- There is a long-standing and wide-ranging debate in Canada as to whether this country has a system of shared values, what these values might be, and whether shared values are even necessary for social cohesion and nation building. On the one hand, many Canadian social historians argue that a central expression of the Canadian notion of citizenship has been our long history of social programs, demonstrating commitment to the common good. Social programs, such as employment insurance, pensions, family allowances, and universal health care, operate as a safety net, by helping to spread the costs, or share the risks, of living in society. As well, equalization payments to certain provinces provide another way of smoothing out the inequities of geographic resources.
- The British council in Brussels is currently addressing the phenomenon of 13 million EU residents in the EU-15 member states as non-naturalized immigrants through the development of stronger policies governing inclusion and civic citizenship. The project notes: "If Europe is to meet its Lisbon targets on employment and jobs; maintain cohesive, healthy societies; and live up to its founding values of equality and openness, then it must take a close look at its policies governing inclusion and civic citizenship." See www.britishcouncil.org/brussels-europe-inclusion-index-in-detail.htm.
- In May 2005, United States Senators John McCain and Edward M. Kennedy introduced legislation to reform this country's immigration system. The *Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act* (s. 1033) suggested allowing millions of undocumented migrants in the United States the opportunity to obtain legal status as temporary guest workers, thereby creating the possibility of eventual citizenship for this population. The provisions on undocumented workers were incorporated into Arlen Specter's *Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act* of 2006, which was voted out of the Judiciary Committee. In the spring of 2006, millions of people in over 100 US cities demonstrated against the current immigration system and in favour of the legalization of undocumented migrants.
- Kymlicka and Banting (forthcoming, 303). Note that the *Canada Health Act* states that "the primary objective of Canadian health care policy is to protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other barriers" (1984, c. 6, s. 3).

- ⁷ Op cit.
- ⁸ Thorough review of all legislation for impacts on non-citizens is the subject of another paper. Briefly, as a result of the guarantee of equality in section 15 and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Andrews vs. Law Society of British Columbia* (1989), the Charter constrains the governments' capacity to confer benefits or impose restrictions on the basis of citizenship. However, some examples of restrictions on non-citizens are outlined here. The *Canada Elections Act* specifies that voting is limited to every person who is a Canadian citizen and is 18 years of age or older on polling day (although the Chief Electoral Officer, the Assistant Chief Electoral Officer; and citizens imprisoned in a correctional institution serving a sentence of two years or more are disqualified from voting). (2000, c. 9, s. 11; 2003, c. 22, s. 100) Moreover, under the Act, electoral candidates themselves must fulfil the qualifications for voting. (2000, c. 9, s. 65; 2002, c. 7, s. 92) Only three Charter rights are specifically intended for legal citizens. These are the right to vote and be qualified for membership in the House of Commons or a provincial legislature (s. 23), to enter and remain (s. 6(1)), and minority-language education rights (s. 23). Other rights are conferred variously on "everyone," "any person," "every individual," or "any member of the public in Canada. For further analysis of the implication of the Charter for distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens see Sharpe (1993, 234).
- ⁹ For example, in cases where the Canadian Forces have need of and cannot fill a position with a Canadian citizen, but have permanent resident status and possess specialized skills/qualifications, and do not pose a risk to any national interest, may be enrolled into the Canadian Forces if permission is granted by the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG). See www.recruiting.forces.gc.ca/engraph/howtojoin/non_canadians_e.aspx.
- ¹⁰ The 1977 *Citizenship Act* allowed for dual citizenship. According to 2001 Census data, 2.5% of the Canadian population identifies themselves as being a citizen of at least one other country. Amongst recent Canadian citizens, approximately, 13.5% also identify themselves as citizens of another country.
- ¹¹ 95% of people living in Canada are Canadian citizens – 81% by birth and 14% by naturalization. The remaining 5% of people living in Canada may be non-permanent residents, disinterested in naturalization, or provisionally or permanently ineligible for citizenship. See Tran, Kustec and Chui 2005, p. 9-10.
- ¹² Nevertheless, some studies suggest that naturalized citizens are slightly more successfully economically integrated than non-citizens. According to the 2001 Census, the employment rate for naturalized citizens aged 25-54 was 84% (similar to the general population), while the rate for those who were eligible but did not have citizenship was 80%. Further, 20% of naturalized citizens had personal incomes under \$10,000 in 2000, compared to 26% of those who were eligible but did not have citizenship.
- ¹³ Bissoondath, Neil, "A Question of Belonging: Multiculturalism and Citizenship," in Kaplan (1992, 384).
- ¹⁴ Aristotle. (1981, 169). Obviously Aristotle's omission of women and slaves from the notion of citizenship severely devalues its appeal in both historical and contemporary contexts.
- ¹⁵ Civic practice is directly linked to the quality of its democratic system. One popular – though limited – way to measure changing levels of civic engagement has been through comparisons of voter turnout over time. Voter turnout in federal elections in Canada has been decreasing steadily since the late 1980s, though it increased slightly in the last election. In 2004, only 61% of eligible voters cast a ballot, the lowest level of voter participation recorded in Canadian history for a federal election. As noted earlier in this paper, in 2005 only 65% of eligible voters cast a ballot. On the other hand, according to the national survey of giving, volunteering and participating, participation in social and community organizations has been rising, particularly amongst youth. See www.givingandvolunteering.ca/.
- ¹⁶ For more information on the levels of civic knowledge amongst Canadian citizens, see <http://dominion.ca/>.
- ¹⁷ From a policy perspective, this requires providing the space and opportunity for citizenship, as well as the provision of support and institutional mechanisms. As well, the public role may be found within a broader governance structure based on partnership in program delivery between a mix of governments, markets, and non-profit organizations.
- ¹⁸ See Kymlicka (1998). For dissenting views, see Gwyn (1995) and Granatstein (1998).
- ¹⁹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "A Look At Canada." Available at www.cic.gc.ca/English/citizen/look/look-02e.html. Emphasis in original.
- ²⁰ In 2003, a survey published by the Centre for Research and Information on Canada (CRIC) in 2003 found that 54% of Canadians cited multiculturalism as a source of pride. This figure rose to 66% among those between the ages of 18 and 30.
- ²¹ According to the Dominion Institute/Angus Reid Group Poll Citizenship Exam Survey of 1997, 45% of Canadians would not be granted citizenship on the basis of having failed the Citizenship Exam. See www.angusreid.com/old/pressrel/citizenexam-Nov97.html. Based on these results, the Dominion Institute recommended that the Council of Ministers of Education develop and implement a National Civics Framework.
- ²² See Pendakur and Aizelwood (2005). Pendakur's and Aizelwood's findings demonstrate that in Canada, the hypothesis that diversity does not exert a negative influence on civic attitudes and behaviours: "We find that in Canada, where differences based on ethnocultural identifiers do exist, they are the exception rather than the rule....Rather, in Canada, where community size, diversity, wealth, and education so closely and positively correlate, an urban lifestyle may be a more useful explanation for variance in civic attitudes and behaviours....Perhaps the dominant finding is the effect of community size on measures of social capital." (p. 14) Further, "[m]itigating the effect of city size are the individual characteristics of education and income." As Pendakur and Aizelwood conclude, "[b]ased on our research, controlling diversity is neither justifiable nor realistic, but more importantly, does not appear to be the answer. Education and income appear to be far more effective levers for affecting social capital" (p. 15).
- ²³ Between 1998 and 2003, all three bills introduced to reform the *Citizenship Act* failed.xxiv Before the last federal election, the Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration released a number of reports recommending the updating of Canada's citizenship laws. See the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration reports, *Citizenship Revocation: A Question of Due Process and Respecting Charter Rights*, June 2005, and *Updating Canada's Citizenship Laws: It's Time*, October 2005. More recently, reacting to the crisis in Lebanon and the evacuation of over 10,000 Canadian-Lebanese citizens, Canadian historian Jack Granatstein suggested that "[i]t is long past time for a new Citizenship Act to replace the legislation that came into effect in 1977. And it may be that the government should establish a Royal Commission on the Rights and Obligations of Canadian Citizenship." See J. L. Granatstein's (2006).

MULTICULTURALISM, ETHNICITY AND INTEGRATION: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

ABSTRACT

In most of the largest European cities, the proportion of non-White citizens currently reaches 15 to 30%. A high degree of racial/ethnic/religious mix in its principal cities will be the norm in 21st century Europe, and will shape its national economic, cultural and political life. The author explores similarities and differences between Western Europe and the American non-White immigration experience in order to shed light on future trends in this field, in Western Europe. At least three trends are currently visible: accommodation or novel compromises; renewal of Christianity as a cultural marker; and radical secularism. The author concludes that while the Christian Right could be a domestic obstacle to the civic integration of Muslims and Islam in the US, radical secularism risks playing the same role in Europe.

Currently most of the largest cities, especially the capital cities of North-Western Europe, are composed of approximately 15% to 30% non-White persons (i.e., of non-European descent). Even without further large-scale immigration, being a young, fertile population, these proportions will grow for at least one generation more before they stabilize, reaching or exceeding 50% of some cities in the next decade onwards, with Malmö, Birmingham, Leicester and Marseille leading the way. The trend will include some of the larger urban centres of Southern Europe. A high degree of racial/ethnic/religious mix in its principal cities will be the norm in 21st century Europe, and will characterize its national economic, cultural and political life, as it has done in the 20th (and will do so in the 21st) century USA. Of course there will also be important differences between Western Europe and the USA. Amongst these is that the majority of non-Whites in European countries are Muslims; the UK, where Muslims form about one-third of non-Whites or ethnic minorities, is the exception. With over 15 million Muslims in Western Europe today, this group is larger than the combined populations of Finland, Denmark and Ireland. In this context, with the “Cartoon Affair” and the riots in the suburbs of Paris and elsewhere being the latest in a series of conflicts focussed on minority-majority relations, questions about integration, equality, racism and Islam have become central to European politics. We need, however, some clarity about what the important questions are; we can also usefully learn – positively and negatively – from the American experience.

Assimilation, integration and multiculturalism

A good place to start is to clarify the key terms of assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. I propose the following. *Assimilation* is where the processes affecting the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way, and where the desired outcome for society as a whole is seen as involving least change in the ways of doing things of the majority of the country and its institutional policies. This may not necessarily be a *laissez-faire* approach – for the State can play an active role in bringing about the desired outcome, as with early 20th century “Americanization” policies towards European migrants in the United States – but the preferred result is one where the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new compatriots as possible. *Integration* is where processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, and where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for “failing to or not trying to integrate.” The established society is the site of institutions – including employers, civil society and the government – in which integration has to take place, and they accordingly must take the lead. *Multiculturalism* is where processes of integration are seen both as two-way and as working differently for different groups. In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and thus integration cannot consist of a single template (hence the “multi”). The “culturalism” – by no means a happy term either in relation to “culture” or “ism” – refers to the understanding that the groups in question are likely to not just be marked by newness, or phenotype,

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or socio-economic location but by certain forms of group identities. The latter point indeed suggests that a better, though longer, term might be “pluralistic integration.”

The American experience

While the 19th and first half of the 20th century Europe has been a continent of emigration and nation-states, 19th and 20th century America has been a continent of immigration and continental federation, the creation of a super-state. From the middle of the 20th century new processes were initiated in Europe both in relation to emigration/immigration and to national/supra-national formations. Europe began to move in the direction of American processes; though it was still somewhat short of the US by the end of the 20th century, this was moreso in relation to continental federation than to levels of immigration and of immigration as a source, not just of labour but of citizens.

Key features of the American experience:

- Constitutional patriotism/nationalism, the American dream and economic expansion, early 20th century policies of assimilation giving way to hyphenation (Irish-Americans, African-Americans etc.), but integration perhaps being facilitated by the desire to be part of a successful nation, a superpower;
- No governmental or legal “recognition” of ethnic diversity in a major way but a *laissez-faire* attitude to the formation of residential concentrations, to ethnic community-based churches as a major basis for integrating new populations into an existing social landscape, to ethnic blocs in politics, and to various minorities actively campaigning in “homeland” politics and exercising influence on US foreign policy (e.g. Jews in relation to Israel, Cubans in relation to Cuba).

This has been labelled “the Ethnicity Paradox”: allowing, even encouraging, ethnic identity maintenance in the form of community organizations and cultural pride displays as a way of not damaging the self-esteem of migrants and non-coercively achieving civic integration and national loyalty. This patriotic integration in a context of *laissez-faire* ethnic diversity was primarily the experience of “White ethnics,” of European migrants and their progeny. For native Blacks, the primary experience has been that of “the colour line.” Hence the US has had not one, but two dominant ways of dealing with “difference”: expanding the nation to integrate Whites without top-down

assimilation, and the perpetuation of racial segregation and inequality in relation to native-born Blacks. Both ways, however, allow for a degree of ethnic/racial explicitness within the socio-political system that is greater than is the norm or regarded as acceptable in contemporary Europe. Different again from the (later) experiences of White ethnics and Blacks is that of post-1965 migrant groups, which mainly consist of Hispanics and Asians. Their experience is somewhere between the other two, though with perhaps different groups exhibiting divergent trajectories. East and South Asians have been developing an entrepreneurial/professional profile and Mexicans a disadvantaged profile. While it is probably the case that no non-Black group is likely to end up having the socio-economically disadvantaged profile of Blacks, some Americans nevertheless fear the threat of linguistic division and for many the greatest contemporary multicultural challenge is seen to do with Hispanics.

Patriotic integration in a context of *laissez-faire* ethnic diversity was primarily the experience of “White ethnics,” of European migrants and their progeny. For native Blacks, the primary experience has been that of “the colour line.” Hence the US has had not one, but two dominant ways of dealing with “difference.”

Some questions for Europe

Following this brief discussion I would raise four important issues. They are profound questions of public philosophy and policy but also require social science inquiry in relation to trends, possibilities and feasibilities, and are ranked from least to most challenging:

Will the dividing line in Europe be:

- A colour-line (stronger in the UK than continental Europe, where often the primary meaning of “racism” is “anti-semitism”)?
- Or one of xenophobia (including white victims)?
- Or will the dividing line be one of Muslims (including some of European phenotype) and non-Muslims (including Jews, Blacks, Hindus etc)?

Perhaps, as in the US, it does not just have to be one division, but it is likely that one of these three divisions will be more salient and more intractable than the others.

Will Europe insist on assimilation, the dominant historical pattern, or allow some space for private cultural difference within a model of civic integration (the current French ideology but not comprehensive practice) or some degree of multicultural integration (found to some degree in the Netherlands, Britain and Sweden)? The latter was becoming influential in the English-speaking world until 9/11; since then the perception has grown that unassimilated migrants are a potential security threat, a fifth column. Nevertheless, there is a strong ideology of diversity in the air, for instance in relation to sexuality and to squashed nationalisms (such as the Catalanian, Scottish, Walloon, etc.).

It is unlikely to fade in the current context of globalization, and so second and third generations who breathe this atmosphere may continue to mobilize around identities of cultural difference and demand equality of respect, especially when those identities are the basis of discrimination and structural inequalities – as was so evident in the suburbs of France in December 2005.

At what level does integration take place (especially in relation to identity building): city/region versus national versus European? Another way of formulating the question is, what is the hyphenation on offer? What will work? In the US, the hyphenation always refers to America (not Texas, California, etc.) but in contemporary Europe, integration policies are directed to developing a sufficiently strong sense of national citizenship. Indeed, in countries like France and Britain a (hyphenated) national identification is quite strong amongst the “second generation” (and often a basis for complaints of unequal treatment), but identification with Europe is much weaker than amongst White/indigenous peers. While European identity as a platform for equality/belonging and lever for equality/belonging at the national level may or may not be helpful (in some countries), it is probably the case that ethnic minority identification with the city one lives in (e.g., Liverpool or Rotterdam) may be easier than to identify with “British” or “Dutch” because of all the national, cultural, historical and political (including foreign policy adventures like Iraq) baggage that go with the latter. For example, one can express pride in being a Liverpuddlian without feeling that this implicates him or her in the US/UK occupation of Iraq. Moreover, co-citizens may say of you “You are not really Dutch” but are less likely to say “You are not a Rotterdammer.”

Religion and secularism (political and legal norms)

The sociological fact of “secularization,” the decline of religious authority in the public sphere and decline of participation in religious activity in the private sphere is strong in Europe (much less so in the US) but religious observance continues to be high everywhere else in the world, and in many places religion’s public significance is on the rise.

In most if not all European countries, “secularism” – if not in theory, certainly in practice – allows some space for one or more churches in the public/national space, whether symbolic, institutional and in terms of resources/subsidies. Yet the historical and geographical trend has been for this space to have been decreasing for some

centuries. Yet, in the very recent decades the presence of Muslims and Islamic “claims making” upon European societies and states has resulted in a (temporary?) reversal of aspects of secularization and the decline of collective religion. While there are also increased assertions of Enlightenment secularism, there are also increased assertions of cultural Christianity. Each of these is a domestic version of a “clash of civilizations” thesis that under some circumstances is, and could be, projected more internationally, even globally.

At least three trends are currently visible:

- Accommodation into existing or novel compromises: e.g., Islam as part of Council of Religions in Belgium and France, as a mini-pillar in the Netherlands or as recognized national or public religion in Austria and Spain. Each of these approaches is characterized as Europeans are willing to share public resources and symbols with Muslim identities (sometimes only by paying lip-service);
 - Renewal of Christianity as a cultural marker: e.g., in Denmark, in the UK 2001 census and perhaps also in Germany, and in the EU Constitution debate and debate about Turkey as a future EU member. Note that these assertions of Christianity are not usually accompanied by any increase in expressions of faith or church attendance, which continue to decline across Europe.
 - Radical secularism, evocations of the Enlightenment and the need to (re)defend it; this is now emerging as the dominant response amongst centre-left intellectuals but not necessarily amongst policy-makers. Which of these will become dominant, or how these trends may develop, interact and synthesize is not clear but (i) would probably be more conducive to better relations with Asia and the Muslim world, while (ii) would highlight differences with those areas (and partly its growth may be stimulated by that sense of difference).

Will Europe insist on assimilation, the dominant historical pattern, or allow some space for private cultural difference within a model of civic integration (the current French ideology but not comprehensive practice) or some degree of multicultural integration (found to some degree in the Netherlands, Britain and Sweden)?

The third trend is also likely to cause identity friction with Asia and the Muslim world, and while it is a more “universal” ideology, thus capable of having followers in all parts of the world, it currently stands in a more antagonistic relationship to non-European religions, especially Islam, than the second trend. Indeed, I will go as far as to say that while the Christian Right could be a domestic obstacle to the civic integration of Muslims and Islam in the US, radical secularism risks playing the same role in Europe.

A SECOND LOOK AT SECOND GENERATION

ABSTRACT

This article profiles the “new second generation Canadians,” in a country experiencing change in its immigrant source countries, and therefore in the composition of its second generation. The author looks at the types of changes in the second generation, explores questions of upward economic mobility and “segmented” social integration, and identifies key issues and knowledge gaps. While economically still outperforming their immigrant parents, the social integration of the second generation appears to be “segmented” along the lines of race and ethnicity.

The immigrant story contains two broad narratives, the experience of adult immigrants and that of their offspring. Much has been written about the barriers that newcomers experience in adapting to their country of settlement, especially in regards to a lack of proficiency in the official language(s) of the host country, cultural differences, devaluation of credentials and experience acquired in their home country, and a lack of social networks. By comparison, the narratives of second generation (i.e., those born to immigrant parents) and the 1.5 generation (i.e., those who immigrated at a very young age) are often described as positive with several common threads. Having spent their formative years in their adopted country, these individuals are believed to be spared from the hardships that their immigrant parents endured. Granted, they would still need to reconcile the values of their country of ancestry held by their parents with those of the country in which they live. Nevertheless, these individuals are expected to achieve a higher level of success than their parents and fully integrate into society, due in part to their parents’ insistence on them excelling in the mainstream society as well as to their own perseverance.

Recent research findings in Canada and other immigrant receiving countries have revealed variants to this narrative, prompting the need to take a second look at second generation.¹ The reason is that, with a shift in immigrant source countries, the racial and ethnic composition of the second generation has become more diverse than before. Subsequently, the pathways of integration appear to diverge across ethnicity, culture, and social economic status. Moreover, as the world becomes more connected, international events often have domestic impacts that must also be considered within the integration narrative. In this paper, we review what is known about second generation Canadians within this emerging global context before proposing areas for research and policy.

Second generation in transition

In 2002, among non-Aboriginal Canadians aged 15+, 17% (3.9 million people) were second generation. The largest group (36%) consisted of those with only European origins especially German, Italian, Dutch, Ukrainian and Polish, followed by those of British, French, and/or Canadian ancestry (32%). One in ten second generation Canadians had only non-European origins, the most frequent of which were Chinese or East-Indian. This is largely a reflection of Canada’s immigration trends up to the 1970s, which was predominantly Eurocentric (Statistics Canada 2003).

The distribution of second generation Canadians varies across regions. One in four British Columbians aged 15+ are second generation. The proportion of second generation among those aged 15+ was 24% in the Prairies provinces and 21% in Ontario. In comparison, 80% of the population aged 15+ in Quebec had been in Canada for three or more generations (Statistics Canada 2003).

While this is the situation, a number of profound shifts are currently underway that will transform the racial and ethnic composition of the second generation. In large part this is driven by an ongoing shift away from Europe as the primary source of immigrants. In 2002, almost one in two (46%) first generation Canadians aged 15+ reported non-European origins. Chinese, East Indian, Filipino and Vietnamese are the most common ancestral groups reported. By comparison, 31% of first generation Canadians were of European origins, mostly Italian, German, Portuguese and Polish (Statistics Canada 2003). This shifting composition within the first generation will naturally change the composition of the second generation that follows.

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Like composition, distribution patterns also appear to be shifting. Second and 1.5 generations are more urban than those of third generation or more, but this is especially true among the visible minorities dominating current immigration cohorts; almost all of them (96%) reside in the census metropolitan areas (Boyd 2006). Further, with the concentration of immigrants in large urban centres and the increase of single ethnic neighbourhoods in these cities (Statistics Canada 2005), the current second generation is more likely to grow up in neighbourhoods with their co-ethnics. Hence, the new second generation may have different experiences in integrating into the Canadian society than previous cohorts.

Upward economic mobility and “segmented” social integration

It has been argued in the United States that patterns of adaptation may differ between descendants of immigrants of non-European origin and those of European origin for three reasons. First, compared to their European counterparts, non-Europeans could have more difficulty blending into mainstream society due to their skin tone. Second, immigrants tend to concentrate in neighbourhoods of native-born minorities who may be at the margins of the society, which could hamper or distort the integration of recent arrivals into the mainstream society. Third, labour market polarization could make it harder for the second generation to move out of the low-pay menial occupations held by their parents. Consequently, the integration of the new, mostly non-White second generation could be “segmented” depending on the adaptation strategies of different ethnic groups and the social milieu in which they circulate (Portes and Zhou 1993).

Given increasing race and ethnic diversity in Canada, will the new second generation encounter similar experiences as their counterparts in the United States? Preliminary evidence indicates that the answer may be yes. Regarding education, immigrant and second generation youth aged 15+ have higher educational aspirations than other Canadians in part due to the expectations of their parents. In particular, visible minority youth – immigrant or second generation – are twice as likely to aspire to university as other youth of the same age (Krahn and Taylor 2005). In terms of actual educational attainment, some inter-ethnic differences exist. Among second generation Canadians aged 25-39, Asians are more likely to have a university degree than other groups and Blacks appear marginally less likely to complete university (Reitz and Zhang 2006, Reitz and Banjee 2005). In spite of these differences though, second generation Canadians generally exceed their immigrant parents in education (Reitz and Zhang 2006). This could

change in the future as education level at landing is higher among recent immigrants to Canada than earlier cohorts. That being said, having obtained their formal education in Canada, second generation would not experience difficulties in recognition of their credentials.

Educational success often translates into upward income mobility between generations, provided that all have equal opportunity to advance in a society. In this regard, the experiences of second generation Canadians are very similar to those of other Canadians and compare favourably with other countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Children of immigrants of Caribbean, Oceania and Central and South American origins make less earnings progress relative to the Canadian average than those from other source regions, but they still do better than their parents. It has been speculated that lower general education levels and different norms, expectations and resources within the communities

One in four British Columbians aged 15+ are second generation. The proportion of second generation among those aged 15+ was 24% in the Prairies provinces and 21% in Ontario. In comparison, 80% of the population aged 15+ in Quebec had been in Canada for three or more generations.

where these second generation Canadians were raised may be a disincentive (Aydemir, Chen and Corak 2005). Research on visible minorities also indicates that there may be issues and challenges that may affect visible minority second generation Canadians; in particular, consistent findings that Blacks earn less than mainstream society at all education levels are cause for concern (Milan and Tran 2004, Flegal 2002). Overall, however, it appears that second generation Canadians enjoy a level of educational opportunity and labour market mobility similar to that of the general Canadian population.

Nevertheless, other research suggests that social integration appears to be segmented across ethnic groups and more importantly, between visible minorities and Whites. While similar in regards to rates of voluntarism, second generation Whites and visible minorities differ in terms of life satisfaction, sense of belonging, and voting. Compared to Whites, visible minority second generation, Blacks in particular, are more likely to report lower levels of life satisfaction and sense of belonging. Visible minority second generation Canadians are also less likely to identify themselves as Canadian and are less likely to vote. In fact, visible minority recent immigrants seem to have a stronger sense of belonging than the visible minority second generation that was born here (Reitz and Banjee 2005).

Visible minorities are more likely to report being treated unfairly at work and in other settings than those who are not visible minorities (Derouin 2003). According to the Ethnic Diversity Survey, among second or more generations, 18% of visible minorities reported being treated unfairly sometimes or often, compared to 5% among those who are not visible minority. The most common reason for perceived discrimination is race or colour for

visible minorities, and language or accent for those who are not visible minority (Statistics Canada 2003). Compared to lower household income and education, perceived discrimination has been found to play a much bigger role in social integration, negatively affecting one's sense of belonging and life satisfaction (Reitz and Banerjee 2005). These findings suggest that visible minority second generation Canadians may feel like outsiders and self-exclude.

Understanding the new second generation: Issues and knowledge gaps

It has been argued that how well the second generation integrates into mainstream society depends on three interrelated factors: government policies, the level of receptiveness of the society at large, and resources in ethnic communities (Portes and Zhou 1993). The changing ethnocultural composition of second generation Canadians could be attributed to Canada's colour blind immigration policy. As well, geopolitical trends must also be considered; more individuals from developing countries are seeking better economic opportunities in the developed world. Further, the country's approach to ethnocultural diversity could impact on the acculturation process of immigrants and their descendants (Phinney et al. 2006). Canada's multiculturalism policies encourage ethnic groups to integrate into the mainstream society without foregoing their cultural identities. Such an approach could alleviate the pressures of having to choose between the norms of one's country of ancestry and that of their country of birth or settlement.

In this sense, it can be argued that second generation Canadians are doubly blessed. Growing up in immigrant families, second generation are likely exposed to their cultural heritage through their parents and relatives at the same time as being acculturated to their country of settlement. Such claims have yet to be tested empirically. Other than attitudinal measures, there is little research on the extent to which these individuals maintain links with their country of ancestry and their heritage, as it relates to the social and economic outcomes for these individuals (Patel 2002). More research on this topic is required.

Until now, there is scant information on the well-being of the second generation in Canada. The 2001 Census marks the first time that respondents were asked to identify the place of birth of their parents. The post-censal Ethnic Diversity Survey also allows for the distinction between first and second generation and more on a set of social and economic indicators. Comprehensive surveys, such as

the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) in the US, could be useful in this regard.

Generally, Canadians appear to be receptive of immigration and multiculturalism. That said, this level of receptiveness appears somewhat subject to events at home and abroad, as well as how these events are played out in the media. On the one hand, Canada abounds with success stories of second generation Canadians in all walks of life including governor generals, entertainers, and other professionals. On the other hand, the June 2006 arrests of 17 terror suspects in the Greater Toronto Area, and similar arrests in the UK and the US, gave prominence to the issue of "home-grown terror," because many of those implicated were second generation nationals who were Muslims. At issue is why these young men would turn their back on the democratic society that welcomed their immigrant parents

and offered them opportunities to succeed (Sibley 2006). Some have attributed multiculturalism with isolating Muslim and Canadian ethnic groups in general from the mainstream society (Zolf 2006). Others have argued otherwise, asserting that geopolitical realities, rather than multiculturalism, are the contributing factors of "home-grown terror" (Beyer 2006). The fact that violent radicalization appears isolated to only a very few would appear to support this latter position. Nonetheless, there is no sign that this debate is drawing to a close, highlighting the need for research in this area that would separate facts from headlines.

Such research will have to move beyond what is currently available. Most often, education and earnings/income remain the sole indicators for the integration of immigrants and their descendants. Such an approach overlooks the non-economic factors contributing to the integration of ethnic groups. The size and quality of social network is a key factor. Often, to move ahead in society depends not

only on what you know, but whom you know and, more importantly, who knows you. As shown previously, social integration of second generation varies between whites and visible minorities as well as across ethnic groups. Further, studies on second generation in the United States illustrate that strategies of incorporation vary across groups, resulting in different social and economic outcomes (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Given the diversity of Canada's second generation, how would pathways into mainstream society differ across and within various ethnic groups?

In conclusion, as immigrant source countries change, so too is the composition of the second generation. This article profiles the new second generation Canadians. With increases in the percentages of skilled worker migrants, one could expect that second generation

Canada's multiculturalism policies encourage ethnic groups to integrate into the mainstream society without foregoing their cultural identities. Such an approach could alleviate the pressures of having to choose between the norms of one's country of ancestry and that of their country of birth or settlement.

Canadians would likely continue to have high education aspirations, and, consequently, may continue to be well placed to economically outperform their parents. Yet, given the possible or perceived presence of covert and overt discrimination, economic success may not readily follow and upward social mobility for visible minorities may be stifled. Reasons why a very few become violently radicalized also need to be more fully explored. Hence, the conventional narrative on second generation may not apply uniformly to the realities of the current and future second generation. New data should be able to shed light on the social and economic well-being of this population.

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Notes

- ¹ Second generation hitherto refers to both individuals born to immigrant parent(s) and those who immigrated at a young age, i.e., the 1.5 generation.

THE DANISH CARTOON CONTROVERSY: A DEFENCE OF LIBERAL FREEDOM*

ABSTRACT

In October 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in response to several European incidents of self-censorship out of fear and intimidation in dealing with Islam. The author, in this abridged version of the article, recalls the facts surrounding this international controversy, specifies that they were motivated not by racism but by hatred for a religion. He concludes that the same liberal democratic values that protect a right to practice one's religion and to maintain one's distinctive cultural practices, also protect the right to free speech. These questions are further debated in the correspondence which follows the article, between the author and a colleague from the University of Toronto, Professor Joseph Carens.

In October 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in response to several European incidents of self-censorship out of fear and intimidation in dealing with Islam.² The cartoons varied from the anodyne to the offensive. The publication of the cartoons first caused Muslim groups in Denmark to launch protests, then slowly escalated into an international crisis. Islamic countries asked the Danish government for an apology, which was declined, citing principles of free speech and independent press. *Jyllands-Posten* issued apologies for hurting Muslim feelings, though not for publishing the cartoons. Without effect. As protests became ever more violent and spread internationally, papers around the world decided to re-publish the cartoon as demonstration of the right to free speech. Meanwhile, Scandinavian embassies were set on fire, Lebanon closed its embassy in Denmark, the Danish flag was burned, and protestors outside the Danish representation in London held placards stating "Europe will pay, your 9/11 is on its way." Some 139 people were killed during demonstrations in Somalia, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As the accusations of Western hypocrisy and Islamophobia became ever louder, reactions in the West became ever more accommodating. The European Union protested the burning of the embassies, but balked at the prospect of collectively withdrawing its ambassadors. The United Nations (UN) launched an investigation into the cartoons' "racism" and the Council of Europe attacked the Danish government's invocation of free speech as a defense of the cartoons. Politicians condemned Europe's islamophobia. Those who defended the cartoons in the name of free speech found themselves isolated and their motivations impugned. They were at best hypocritical, at worst racist. The majority of liberal newspaper commentators and scholars judged the motives of the cartoon's publishers and relativized that of the violent protestors.

The cartoons seem to equate Islam with terrorism, to argue that Islam is an essentially violent and deadly religion. This is, of course, nonsense, but is it racism? It is not. It is hatred of a religion. And in a liberal society, there is and must be a distinction between racism and religious hatred for the simple reason that while there can be no acceptable reason to object to "Blackness" there are many good reasons to object to religion, whether Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. Many people believe, not without historical evidence, that religion encourages intolerance and violence (how many throats have been slashed in religion's name?) and oppresses women and minorities (think of all three religions' attitudes toward gays). In a liberal democratic society, religion is, like it or not, a fair target for criticism, satire, mockery and ridicule.

Some might reject the distinction between hatred of religion and hatred of race as untenable on the grounds that putative hostility to religion masks a deep-suited hostility to Muslim people. After all, as Tariq Modood points out, the "victimization of another religious group, the Jews, is paradigmatic of many people's understanding of racism" (Modood 2006). This argument, however, oversimplifies the matter. A religious group may be transformed by racists into an ethn racial

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group, which is exactly what happened to the Jews. There are, of course, clear-cut instances when Muslims are attacked because they are Muslim: women wearing the *hijab* are spat on, men who appear Muslim are denied jobs. This does not mean, however, that every injustice suffered by Muslims can be tied to a hatred of religion. In many if not most cases, those committing the injustice could not distinguish a Muslim from a Hindu and are motivated by nothing other than base racism. Such actions can and should be criminalized on the basis of racism, but such protection cannot be extended to the mockery of religion.

It would be hypocritical if Western countries protected some religions but failed to protect others. They do not. When Christian fundamentalists burn abortion clinics, they are told that their religious beliefs are inconsistent with liberal constitutional values. If any religion has been treated with leniency and indulgence, it is Islam. The real hypocrites in the debate were liberal intellectuals, too many to name, who spent years denouncing Christian fundamentalist demands for prayer and the teaching of evolution in schools, the censorship of books and films, and limits on abortion, only to cave to fundamentalist Muslim demands: for the introduction of Sharia law, for separate swimming classes for boys and girls, and – in the Danish case – for the respect for religious rules not only by members of the religious group but by the society at large. Portraying the prophet may be prohibited for Muslims, but it is not and cannot be for anyone else.

I sympathize with the many Muslims who are deeply and genuinely offended by the Danish cartoons. But this offence is the price of living in a liberal society, one that has been paid by many groups before. Soldiers in Canada or Britain who were disgusted by the thought of serving in the army with homosexuals have been told they must; Jews, including holocaust survivors, have been told that they could not stop neo-Nazis from marching past their front windows. In these as in many other cases, people have been told that their beliefs were inconsistent with liberal democracy and that, however offensive a failure to respect them was, they simply had to accept it. Those Muslims who think that their religion is above satire and mockery have to accept that it is not; no religion is.

Those who wish to restrict free speech, whether they be Muslim or non-Muslim, citizens or non-citizens, recent immigrants or longstanding permanent residents, have to decide whether they wish to live in a liberal democratic society. If they do, they have to accept that they will hear and see things that offend them, sometimes deeply. They are free to protest them peacefully, but not to

demand their criminal sanction. In the end, the same liberal democratic values that protect a right to practice one's religion, to maintain one's distinctive cultural practices, to be reunited with one's family through family reunification, protect the right to free speech. It is part of the liberal democratic framework, not a negotiable addition to it.

* * *

Reply by Joseph Carens

Dear Randall,

I feel compelled to write in response to your article's accusation of hypocrisy against "liberal intellectuals" who criticized the publication of the cartoons by *Jyllands-Posten*, since I am myself one of those liberal intellectuals. Your article derives much of its rhetorical force from the

The cartoons seem to equate Islam with terrorism, to argue that Islam is an essentially violent and deadly religion. This is, of course, nonsense, but is it racism? It is not. It is hatred of a religion.... In a liberal democratic society, religion is, like it or not, a fair target for criticism, satire, mockery and ridicule.
– Richard Hansen

implied claim that one cannot be a principled liberal committed to free speech and critical of the publication of the Danish cartoons. I think this is plainly wrong, and I paste below a few pages from a recent paper in which I defend this view. (Although excerpted from a larger piece, I think they can be understood on their own.) If you think my position is intellectually respectable (even if you do not agree with it), then your article loses a lot of its steam since the position I am defending is one that is common to many liberals and your accusations have a much more limited target than first appears, if indeed they apply to anyone. If you think the position is indefensible, you have to confront the arguments more directly than you have in your own piece.

Excerpts from "Fear vs. Fairness: Migration, Citizenship, and the Transformation of Political Community," by Joseph Carens (forthcoming in the 2006 Yearbook of the Philosophers of Education Society)

Consider these general comments about normative expectations and democratic values in relation to a recent controversy: the Danish cartoons case. For the purposes of my paper what is most important about this incident is what it can tell us about legitimate normative expectations that immigrants and the receiving society can have of each other. Who violated those legitimate expectations (if anyone) and in what way? I will simply assume here (though I would be prepared to defend it) that the newspaper had a right to publish the cartoons in the sense that no liberal democratic State could prohibit their publication without violating fundamental norms about free speech, (even if one does not accept the strong American version of this liberty). The cartoons were offensive to most Muslims but they cannot reasonably be characterized as the sort of hate speech that is restricted

by law in some liberal democratic States. Relatedly, but importantly, I will assume that everyone accepts the principle that the cartoonists and the publishers should not have been subjected to death threats. No one should be subject to death threats for what they write or publish, no matter how offensive. No one should feel unable to express views out of fear of violent retribution. I take these claims to be uncontroversial...By the same token, those who engaged in non-violent protests against the publication of the cartoons were exercising their rights of free speech as permitted by liberal democratic laws.

But what about liberal democratic norms? Did the protestors – or the publishers – violate those? Some people have argued that even protesting against the publication of the cartoons reveals a lack of commitment to democratic norms of free speech. I think that is just wrong. To say that the cartoons were offensive and that the newspaper should not have published them is not, in itself, a violation of democratic norms. Freedom of speech does not entail immunity from criticism, including criticism of the decision to say what one said. On the other hand, one can reasonably say that placards advocating “death to the cartoonists” would be a violation of democratic norms, (even if they were legally permissible because they did not in themselves constitute the sort of threat that could be punished by law). In my view, the people who advocated or endorsed violence against the cartoonists deserve criticism, regardless of where they live or whether they accept democratic principles, but, in addition, any resident or citizen of a democratic State expressing such a view can be criticized for violating legitimate normative expectations that members of a democratic community should be able to have

of one another, and, in our context, that the receiving community is entitled to have of immigrants. I have heard different reports about what the placards in the actual demonstrations said, so I do not know to what extent this sort of advocacy of violence actually occurred in Europe or North America. It seems clear, however, that it was generally not the typical public reaction of Muslims in Western States.

What about those who published the cartoons? Do they deserve any criticism? Some would argue that they do not, on the grounds that, in a democratic society, no subject is taboo and one must be able to criticize, even mock all sacred cows (including, as the phrase “sacred cows” suggests, religion). Even if one accepts this general principle, however, it does not follow that anyone may publish anything in any context without violating democratic norms.

Step back for a moment and consider the origins of the controversy. An author was writing a children’s book about the life of Mohammed. That sounds admirable. It evokes an image of some multiculturally oriented Danish author who wants to provide Danish children from the

non-Muslim majority with some information about the leading historical figure in the religion practised by some of their fellow Danes. Rhetorically this reference to the origins of the conflict has made it appear as though an innocent exercise in intercultural communication was suddenly disrupted by the irrational reactions of an illiberal minority. But wait a minute. If the author knew anything about Islam, he must have known that many Muslims do not think that anyone should draw pictures of Mohammed. And if he did not know this at the outset, he ought to have figured it out when the illustrators kept turning him down. So, why would someone deliberately present information to children about another religion in a way that the author knows will be offensive to many followers of the religion? Suddenly the author’s agenda does not appear so benign, and the refusal of the illustrators (if they acted out of principle and not fear) an admirable exercise of multicultural respect rather than a suppression of free expression.

What about *Jyllands-Posten*, the Danish newspaper, that solicited and published the cartoons of Mohammed, ostensibly because it was outraged about the restrictions on free speech revealed by the inability of the children’s book author to find an illustrator? Here again, context matters in interpreting what is at stake and evaluating actions. On the one hand, it is crucial that there be few legal restrictions on expression, and, on the other hand, every major newspaper has to make choices about what to publish. And *Jyllands-Posten* is a major newspaper in Denmark. The mere fact that it is legally permissible to publish something does not mean that it should be published, and especially, that a given newspaper is obliged to publish it. As many commentators have noted, *Jyllands-*

Posten chose not to publish some anti-Christian cartoons a few years previously, and at least partly justified its reactions on the grounds that it did not want to offend its readers. It is legally permissible to publish racist and anti-semitic cartoons but no major newspaper – or perhaps I should say no reputable newspaper – in Europe or North America would do so, even though such cartoons are available on the web and appear in print in small circulation journals. (Furthermore, I suspect that if we looked at the archives of major newspapers from the first half of the 20th century, we would have no difficulty in discovering such cartoons in them.) Why won’t newspapers publish such things? One of the reasons, I assume, is that they think such cartoons do not treat Jews and racial minorities with the respect that is due them as members of a democratic society.

Are the Danish cartoons comparably objectionable? Some are, some aren’t. But even the ones that only depict Mohammed and don’t portray him as a terrorist are intended to offend Muslim sensibilities, and not just the sensibilities of Muslims who do not accept democratic norms of free speech. There are many, many Muslims

“...treating people with respect, when it does not cost you anything to do so, is not the same as internalising their religious norms.”
– Joseph Carens

who live in Western democratic States and accept familiar democratic constraints upon politics (e.g., rule of law, freedom of speech and religion, no use of threats of violence against those with whom one disagrees, etc.) who were deeply offended by the cartoons. And, it seems to me, giving offence in that way, requires justification. It violates a norm of civility and respect in engaging with other members of society. Sometimes there may be good reasons to be uncivil and disrespectful, but I do not think this case is one of them. In Denmark, the Muslim minority has been marginalized socially, economically, and politically and has been portrayed as a threat to the Danish nation. So, one can reasonably say that Denmark has not met the morally legitimate expectations of Danish Muslims about how they should be treated in a democratic society, and the publication of the cartoons by *Jyllands-Posten* is part of this failure.

There is a wider context as well. I think there is a deep and unjustified hostility to Islam within Western States – not just to Islamists and their actions and versions of Islam – and that this is manifested in a wide variety of attitudes, dispositions, and actions, as reflected in part by the reactions to the Danish cartoons controversy. It seems to me that one’s views on what policies and practices are appropriate in Western States and what must be done to meet the morally legitimate expectations of immigrants will depend, at least in part, on whether one thinks that islamophobia is a serious problem in these States or not.

* * *

Reply by Randall Hansen

Dear Joe,

Thank you for your comments. On the minor issue of hypocrisy, I did not mean that there was anything inherently hypocritical about liberals opposing the publishing of the cartoons. My point was this: the same liberals who are indulgent towards Muslim fundamentalist (and some moderate Muslim) demands have been uniformly hostile in response to Christian fundamentalist (and some moderate Christian) demands: Sharia law yes, Christian prayer in school no. The hypocrisy lies in treating one religious group’s demands differently from another; on this charge, I think many of us would have to plead guilty.

My first reaction is that your qualifiers have narrowed the ground considerably. Of course we all agree that the death threats were wholly unacceptable. You also say, though, that there was no question that the newspaper had a right to publish the cartoons. Where does this leave us then? It seems that the publication of the cartoons was fully legitimate, but not nice. I suppose it wasn’t, but this line of argument begs the question of how we judge the

niceness of proposed material when deciding whether or not it is to be published. It also seems to me to be an intellectually unstable position: conceding that they had a right to do it, but then condemning them for doing it. To get back to the question of standards, at one point, your text suggests that newspapers should not exercise their right to publish material when that material is racist. I made clear in the article why I don’t accept that the cartoons were racist: they attack a religion, not a race. “Muslim” is not a race anymore than “Christian” is (“Jewish” is a unique hybrid category because of unique historical experiences that do not obtain in the case of Muslims), so this prohibition would neither prevent nor condemn the publication of the cartoons.

The other possibility – and I think this is what most people have in mind when they object to the cartoons – is offence. Is offence a legitimate ground for limiting free speech? Legally, it isn’t at all, as you have noted. You seem to suggest that intentionality is relevant here: if the actors intend to offend, then they can be justly criticized. This can’t be sustainable. Intending to offend or knowing that one will offend cannot themselves be grounds for limiting or condemning the exercise of free speech. Whether the newspaper wanted to offend Muslims or show that Muslims do not share the same values as others in liberal democracy (and, frankly, there is more evidence for those who wish to believe this assertion following the publication of the cartoons than there was before they it) seems to me to be irrelevant.

This takes me to your point about context. Since many Muslims suffer disadvantage in Europe, there was a particular, Muslim-relevant reason for not publishing the cartoons:

In Denmark the Muslim minority has been marginalised socially, economically, and politically and has been portrayed as a threat to

the Danish nation. So, one can reasonably say that Denmark has not met the morally legitimate expectations of Danish Muslims about how they should be treated in a democratic society, and the publication of the cartoons by *Jyllands-Posten* is part of this failure.

The logical corollary of this is that if Muslims were socially integrated, politically influential and affluent, it would have been acceptable to publish the cartoons, and Muslims would have been happier with them. It also means that it is acceptable to offend Jews and Hindus (who are more affluent and politically integrated), but not Muslims. Would we really want to support this? If context is determinative, we would have to. What if we disaggregate the category of Muslim into individuals? Is it acceptable to offend rich Saudis living in South Kensington but not poor Bangladeshis living in Mile End (London’s East End)?

My view is that as a society becomes more diverse and pluralistic, liberal secularism and the common framework of liberal democratic rights becomes more, not less, important. Many things can be transformed through dialogue, but this framework isn’t one of them.

– Richard Hansen

We end up with these uncomfortable questions because liberals have not, I would venture, been entirely honest with themselves about why they oppose the publication of the cartoons. I submit that they have internalized Muslim norms: they think the cartoons should not have been published because it is prohibited by Islam. This becomes doubly clear if we accept – as I think we must – that most Muslims were offended because Islam prohibits portrayals of Muhammad. This position is, as I argue, wholly unsustainable: in a liberal society religious dictates apply only to members of the religion and to one else. So I conclude both that the publication of the cartoons was legal, and that the only tenable liberal position is that it was acceptable.

My last point on your comments refers to the argument that: “There is a wider context as well. I think there is a deep and unjustified hostility to Islam within Western States – not just to Islamists and their actions and versions of Islam – and that this is manifested in a wide variety of attitudes, dispositions, and actions, as reflected in part by the reactions to the Danish cartoons controversy. It seems to me that one’s views on what policies and practices are appropriate in Western States and what must be done to meet the morally legitimate expectations of immigrants will depend, at least in part, on whether one thinks that islamophobia is a serious problem in these States or not.” I have expressed my views of where your context-based arguments take us, but I have to say that this strikes me as an intellectual cheap shot. It’s saying that you have to deny islamophobia to defend the publication of the cartoons. I don’t agree at all, and view this is the equivalent of the argument that you have to deny the existence of anti-semitism to criticize Israel. Many of those who are most concerned to emphasize islamaphobia would be the first to reject this argument.

To conclude, I think my argument stands in the face of the arguments presented in your text. My view is that as a society becomes more diverse and pluralistic, liberal secularism and the common framework of liberal democratic rights becomes more, not less, important. Many things can be transformed through dialogue, but this framework isn’t one of them. You can’t have a dialogue about it anymore than you could have one about ending free elections.

* * *

Reply by Joseph Carens

Dear Randall,

I want to make 4 brief points in response. First, on

hypocrisy. I don’t think a charge of hypocrisy is a minor issue. It is quite a different claim from inconsistency, for example, because of what hypocrisy implies about the intentions of the actor. It is like the difference between “making a mistake” and “cheating.” You say, the same liberals who are indulgent towards Muslim fundamentalist (and some moderate Muslim) demands have been uniformly hostile in response to Christian fundamentalist (and some moderate Christian) demands: Sharia law yes, Christian prayer in school no. The hypocrisy lies in treating one religious group’s demands differently from another.

Do you mean to include in this charge scholars such as Jeff Spinner-Halev, Melissa Williams, Will Kymlicka, and Ayelet Shachar, to name just a few of those who have written from a liberal perspective about religion and multiculturalism? These are scholars who are neither “indulgent” toward Muslims nor “uniformly hostile” towards Christians. They adopt nuanced, careful and principled positions that sometimes advocate accommodation of the demands of religious groups (Muslim or Christian) and sometimes oppose such accommodation. You may disagree with any of them (as they often do with one another) and you may argue that they are occasionally inconsistent (which is a perfectly fair critique) but to accuse them of hypocrisy seems to me unwarranted, to put it very mildly. And I could say something similar about other scholars like Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood who do not identify themselves as liberals but also adopt carefully reasoned and principled positions. Indeed, I would hope to include myself in this general company. If you do not intend to direct your animadversions at these sorts of scholars, you ought to say so (since the context does not make clear why they should be exempt). If you do intend to include them, I think you are wrong to do so.

Second, my fundamental argument was that there are there is a distinction to be drawn between what is legally permissible and what it is morally right to do. Some things, including expressions of opinion, may be legally permissible but may still deserve moral criticism. You seem to recognize the distinction but you want to reject any position that builds upon the distinction: “It also seems to me to be an intellectually unstable position: conceding that they had a right to do it, but then condemning them for doing it.”

There is in fact nothing “intellectually unstable” about the view that something is legally permissible but morally wrong. I used the example of racist cartoons to illustrate the point. It is legally permissible to publish

My main point is that this alternative account, downplaying the significance of islamophobia, illustrates how context matters morally and politically...The only reason to publish pictures of Mohammed was because Muslims do not like pictures of Mohammed to be published. That is not a good enough reason. In fact, it is not a good reason at all.
– Joseph Carens

them, in many States at least, but I think that it would be morally wrong to do so (as is now widely accepted). Your insistence that the Danish cartoons were not racist (which I never claimed) misses the point of this example. If you really think that it is wrong to object to the publication of anything that is legally permissible, you would have no grounds to say that racist cartoons ought not to be published, when there are no legal obstacles. Is that really your view? If so, you should acknowledge it explicitly, rather than ducking behind the distinction between racism and hostility to Islam. (And you should acknowledge that your position is an extreme one, not shared by most liberals or by most liberal newspapers which generally acknowledge some responsibility to exercise discretion – in various forms – in what they publish. Even those newspapers that published the Danish cartoons did not take this extreme position.) If this extreme position is not your view, i.e., if you think that newspapers in a democratic State should not publish racist cartoons even when they are legally free to do so, then you, too, are adopting a sort of position that you characterize as “intellectually unstable,” even if the sorts of things you would object to being published are more limited than the ones I would object to. Then we are back to the substantive argument about whether these cartoons were so objectionable that they should not have been published or whether they were not so objectionable or perhaps not objectionable at all but just fair comment.

Third, in addressing that substantive issue, your radical rejection of context is deeply misguided. Again, take an extreme case. Do you really think that Germans had no more reason than others in the second half of the 20th century to worry about the expression of Nazi or anti-semitic views? Leave aside the question of what was legally permitted. If a major German newspaper had published an anti-semitic cartoon in the 1950s, would this have warranted (or received) only the same level of public criticism that it would have received anywhere else in Europe or North America at the time (or none at all, if we adopt your extreme standard)? Of course context matters, both morally and politically, because it inevitably affects the nature of the problem in various ways. If context did not matter, why did you spend so much time supplying it in your original article? In this case, it matters greatly whether one sees the publication of the cartoons as an isolated event or as part of an overall pattern of negative and hostile public communications about Islam by major players in civil society and in the State within Denmark. In the former case, ignoring it may well be an appropriate strategy. In the latter case, ignoring it entails sticking one’s head in the sand.

Your appeal to individual variations among Muslims in Europe strikes me as a strange move for a social scientist. It is as if you thought it were impossible to make any generalizations about social groups or social trends. If you think that islamophobia is a serious problem in Europe today and that many Muslims are disadvantaged in part because they are Muslims – your text is somewhat ambiguous about your own views on these issues – then how could you ignore the ways in which civil society contributes to this problem, including by means of the

legitimation of anti-Muslim views in major newspapers? Is the formation of public opinion somehow beyond critical scrutiny? You might still think for some reason that it was appropriate for *Jyllands-Posten* to have published the cartoons or that the cartoons themselves did not contribute to or reflect this islamophobic pattern or perhaps that it would be inappropriate for you to pass judgment on *Jyllands-Posten*, but surely this account of the context would create moral and political concerns that would be quite different from the ones that would emerge if you think, say, that the basic social problems in Europe today arise from class divisions and immigration generally or from the dynamics of the global economy and have little to do with Muslims as a social category or with Islam as a marker of social identity. I’m not saying that such an analysis is an indefensible position. (On the contrary, I think it contains elements of the truth, though I think it is wrong about the irrelevance of Islamic identity.) My main point is that this alternative account, downplaying the significance of islamophobia, illustrates how context matters morally and politically (which was the point of my original comments which I think you have misunderstood).

Fourth, on the point about religious dictates applying only to believers, I think that you miss the point that treating people with respect, when it does not cost you anything to do so, is not the same as internalising their religious norms. If Muslims had a norm against publishing pictures of any contemporary Muslim figure, the conflict with the obligations of newspapers to report the news would be clear and direct. But Mohammed is not news. The only reason to publish pictures of Mohammed was because Muslims do not like pictures of Mohammed to be published. That is not a good enough reason. In fact, it is not a good reason at all.

* * *

Reply by Randall Hansen

Dear Joe,

I would like to thank you for this response. It is very energizing to engage in intellectual debate (something we talk about doing more than we do) and I appreciate your taking the time to comment on my work.

I’ll leave most of my comments for a larger debate we’re having in *International Migration* (forthcoming in volume 44, issue 5, 2006) but I’ll just respond to your comments on the hypocrisy issue. First, I apologize if I cause anyone offense. Second, I want to nuance but not retract my comments.

For those who supported the adoption of Sharia law in Ontario, I naturally don’t think this is an inherently hypocritical position. Wrong, but not hypocritical. And I certainly didn’t intend to single any of these individuals out; I have a high regard for the work they have produced. There are naturally disagreements between me and some of them, as there are disagreements among them, but it would be odd and boring if it were otherwise. There is a Canadian craving for consensus, but I don’t share it.

My point on hypocrisy is this: if one accepts the argument that Muslims’ religious attachments are so profoundly important to their identity, sense of self-


worth, integration and so on that we need to make an exception to the application for liberal democratic laws for them, but reject the same argument when it is made by Christians, then that is an inconsistent and hypocritical position. I know that you were reacting to the provocative word “hypocrisy.” I chose it deliberately because some (Muslim and non-Muslim) activists, intellectuals and members of the anti-racist lobby frequently accuse “the West,” “Europe,” the US, or democrats of flagrant hypocrisy in its approach to Islam. They introduced the term hypocrisy; I didn’t. What the Sharia law made clear is that if there is hypocrisy Muslims and Islam are not those that primarily suffer from it; Christian fundamentalists are.

Notes

* The full version of this article first appeared in *EUSA Review* 19, 2 (Spring 2006), I am grateful to the publishers for granting permission to reproduce it.

¹ Professor Hansen’s Website is www.randallhansen.ca.

² I have discussed the issues raised in this essay with many people, and I am grateful for their comments: Emmanuel Adler, Fiona Adamson, Erik Bleich, Joseph Carens, Matthew Gibney, Todd Lawson, Rahsaan Maxwell, Shourideh Molaei, Shahreen Reza, Phil Triadafilopolous, Gokce Yurdakul, and Melissa Williams.



Our Diverse Cities World Urban Forum

In 2006, Metropolis partnered with the Housing and Homelessness Branch of Human Resources and Social Development Canada, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, the Multiculturalism Program of Canadian Heritage, and the Association for Canadian Studies to produce a new edition of *Our Diverse Cities*. This publication examines immigration and diversity in Canada’s second- and third-tier cities. Guest edited by James Frideres of the University of Calgary and featuring articles from researchers, policy-makers and non-governmental organizations and contributions from across Canada, *Our Diverse Cities* helps build awareness and understanding about the different ways diversity is manifesting itself in cities outside of the large urban centres. Metropolis released this publication at The World Urban Forum

(WUF3), which was hosted by the Government of Canada and UN-HABITAT from June 19 to 23, 2006, in Vancouver, Canada. The theme of the conference was “Our Future: Sustainable Cities – Turning Ideas into Action,” and more than 10,000 participants from over 150 nations met to discuss how to make our cities better places to live.

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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION*

ABSTRACT

We are living in an age of international migration and financial globalization, in terms of the unprecedented scope and complexity of these people/money flows. Population and money may flow together, in opposite directions, or in the same direction. However, regarding the latter, the result of both wealth generation in source countries and recruitment by destination countries in the past few decades has not yet been fully recognized or studied. Likewise, public policies on immigrant integration often lag behind in accommodating increasingly diverse populations and money flows. Therefore, we call for a more systematic examination of the roles of financial institutions in immigrant financial integration and of these institutions' transnational connections. More comparative studies of cross-border flows will help in the future design of appropriate policies pertaining to international migration, capital flows and immigrant integration.

Given the increasing scope and pace of contemporary cross-national movements of population, goods, information, and financial resources – that is, given the trend of accelerated globalization – communities and nation-states around the world have been facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges regarding population movements. While traditional “immigrant countries” such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand continue to receive large influxes of immigrants, some countries traditionally sending large emigrant waves have now become in-migrant receiving countries, with human flows in both directions. These include many South European and Asian countries, such as Italy, Spain, China, Korea, and India. Further, some traditionally non-immigrant receiving developed countries, such as Japan and numerous EU nations, are currently experiencing rising international migrant inflows. In fact, these countries now sometimes rely on immigrants to sustain and replenish their labour forces, if not their overall populations. Many countries have remade their laws for regulating international migration flows, so as to lure “desirables,” however defined, while keeping unwanted people away. A variety of integration policies have been implemented to handle arriving migrants, based on principles of either assimilation or multiculturalism.

The traditional notion that international migration can be attributed to “pull and push” factors retains some validity: differences still prevail in wage levels, in the degree of economic development, in political structures, and in the threat posed by continuing war and famine in various parts of the world. Migrants still gravitate toward high-wage economies so as to make a living for themselves and to support their extended families at home; they still join their families or seek political refuge in host countries; and they are still displaced by home-country war and chaos. But international human flows have been different in recent decades, for several reasons. For one thing, the sheer number of migrants seeking to generate earnings supporting families in home countries with unstable or stagnant economies has grown precipitously. For another, there are increasing numbers of economic migrants who invest in their host countries, as well as student migrants who sometimes become permanent residents in host countries at the end of their courses of study. So at least for some portions of the world, “brain drain” has become “brain circulation,” giving new meaning to the notion of “diaspora.” In short, international migrants have become increasingly heterogeneous regarding their source and destination countries, as well as their own socio-economic and demographic profiles.

Taking account of these shifting trends, immigration study paradigms have shifted from an emphasis on one-way, straight-line immigrant assimilation into host societies, toward a “two-way street approach” emphasizing “negotiated integration” (Biles, Tolley and Ibrahim 2005) in the context of a “transnational paradigm” (Dunn 2005) that goes beyond simple host country/home country flows. A large body of theoretical and empirical research has addressed the issues of immigrant integrations from spatial, socio-economic, demographic, or political perspectives. Even with the renaissance in studies of immigrants and transnationalism, little attention has been paid to the notion of transnational capital flow as a part of global migration; and there is virtually no work

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on immigrants' financial integration. Despite the extensive research on financial globalization and on financial capital within the geography of money and finance, few works have related financial flows either to population flows or to the strategic behavior of financial firms.

Social scientists typically study global migrant flows, not the money flows that accompany them, with some exceptions (e.g., APF and CCPIT 2005, DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005, Dymski and Li 2004, Fong 1994, Hiebert and Ley 2006, Ley 2003 and 2005, Li, P. 1993, 1997 and 1998, Li, W. et al. 2001 and 2002, Mitchell 2004, Pollard 2003, Sassen 1990, Wong and Ho 2006, Zhou and Tseng 2001). Nonetheless, one important contemporary phenomenon is the growth of bi-directional cross-border flows of money and people. Studies of global flows of capital and international migration have overwhelmingly focused on migrant remittance sent to home countries (e.g., Adams 2004, Aescobar 2004, Dymski 2005, Glytsos 2005, Hiebert and Ley 2006, Orozco 2004, Preston, Kobayashi and Siemiatycki 2006, Rapoport and Docquie 2005, Straubhaar and Vadean 2005). Another type of co-movement, overlooked until recently, occurs when money and migrants flow in the same direction – from origin to destination countries, with money being brought either by immigrants themselves or as overseas investment.

Focusing on immigrants' integration makes this inattention to money as well as people flows a more serious lacuna. This integration involves changing local landscapes and communities. In recent years, this has especially impacted the suburbs in some receiving countries. In spite of the increasing recognition of and studies about this aspect of contemporary immigration (e.g., Burnley and Hiebert 2001, Hiebert et al. 2003, Ley and Murphy 2001, Li, W. 2006, Poulsen et al. 2002; in the US, Allen and Turner 2002, Clark 2003, Fan 2003, Logan 2001, Logan, Alba and Zhang 2002, Ma 2003, Tolbert 2002; in Canada, Hiebert 1998, Li, P. 1992, 1994, 1998, 2003 and 2005, Lo 2006, Preston, Kobayashi and Siemiatycki 2006), rarely do such studies examine the roles of financial institutions in suburban transformation as a result of globalization and immigration (among the exceptions are Dymski and Li 2004, Edgington 2006, Li and Dymski forthcoming, Li, W. et al. 2002). Additionally, even while economic transnationalism has been widely studied as a key component of transnationalism (Dunn 2005, Satzewich and Wong 2006), most of this literature concentrates on remittance, or on cross-national economic transactions by ethnic businesses (e.g., Portes et al. 1999).

This paucity of studies regarding the financial integration of immigrants and the roles of financial institutions is explained largely by the increasingly diverse and rapidly changing character of immigrant populations. The older immigrant population relied heavily on informal financial arrangements, eventually graduating to more typical financial arrangements, such as bank saving and checking accounts, and home and business loans. Today, many lower-income migrants focus more on wiring remittances to home countries than on graduating to mainstream financial products. At the other extreme, many new immigrants possess more substantial existing wealth, and/or greater wealth generating capacities, than the older immigrant population. This is the result of

globalization together with shifting global economic and geopolitical dynamics. Countries whose economic infrastructures have been ruined by political or economic crisis are generating ever more migrant workers, seeking work of any description (usually low-wage work) in host countries as a means of supporting their households in home countries. At the same time, some societies' sustained economic development is producing increasing numbers of middle or upper-middle class emigrants, who often have both means and motivations for migrating. In response to this latter trend, host societies are changing their immigration policies so as to recruit capitalists and highly-skilled immigrants. The portable assets brought in by immigrants of the second type are channeled into host societies' financial structures, leading in due course to asset acquisition and further wealth generation. Money invested as overseas investments must be managed.

These new dynamics raise some new questions. First, do different types of financial institutions play different roles vis-à-vis immigrant integration processes; and if so, why?

Second, how do different types of financial institutions tap into immigrants' financial resources and needs? Third, in what ways do banks and other financial intermediaries facilitate or hinder the immigrant integration process? Finally, are public policy interventions called for?

Financial institutions world-wide have been caught in a whirlwind of structural change. In the past quarter century, previously strict national rules protecting and shaping domestic banking systems have broken down. Large "mainstream" banks have expanded their market areas through acquisitions (Dymski 1999), and have expanded the range of financial services they offer. This dual expansion of geographic and product markets has been fed by an ongoing process of bank mergers and

In countries characterized by diverse racial and ethnic populations, mainstream banks have left ethnic-minority customers and areas underserved. In some cases, these practices... have led to the creation of ethnic banks focused on meeting the banking needs of underserved populations.

Table 1
Ethnic and global connections and structures of financial institutions

Where does this institution have access to capital, customer base, & branch network?	Possession and usage of ethnic capital	
	Yes	No
Global banks – global equity market and customer base; worldwide branches	HSBC (in countries receiving Asian immigrants)	Citibank / Bank One
Regional/transnational banks – regional/national equity market and customer base; regional or cross-national branch network	East Asian banks and other foreign bank subsidiaries; Immigrant owned banks	Other “mainstream” banks
Local banks – local equity market; customer base and limited branch network	“Indigenous” minority banks (e.g. Native American-owned banks)	Small “mainstream” community banks

Source: Dymksi and Li 2004, Table 1.

consolidation. These processes have become globalized: so mergers and battles for market share occur in many financial markets across national borders (Dymksi 2002). One fierce area of competition involves the struggle for the remittance market. Banks have attempted to take market share from the money-order companies that have traditionally dominated this market. Increasing the strength of this competition is the fact that technical and product innovation has created a range of financial services – paycards, debt cards, payday loans, and so on – that can be marketed to lower-income individuals, a disproportionate number of whom are immigrants or migrant workers (Dymksi 2006).

Traditionally, in countries characterized by diverse racial and ethnic populations, mainstream banks have left ethnic-minority customers and areas underserved. In some cases, these practices of discrimination and redlining have led to the creation of ethnic banks focused on meeting the banking needs of underserved populations. Until recently, these ethnic banks have primarily served localized ethnic communities in the context of racial/ethnic exclusion (Dymksi and Weems 2004). More recently, ethnic banks have been created in response to a new set of global economic pressures.

Elsewhere (Dymksi and Li 2004), we have attempted to account for the expanded role of the ethnic dimension of banking in the context of a world with increasing cross-border human and financial flows. We suggest the idea of “ethnic capital,” that is, ethnically-specific private information, network connections, or cultural knowledge – the latter including but not limited to familiarity with immigrants’ native language(s) and dialects, cultural affinities, and home-country business practices. We argue that ethnic capital is a key to the role of financial institutions in immigrants’ financial integration into host countries. Table 1 depicts the types of financial institutions and their differential access to capital and to customer bases in immigrant receiving countries (expanded on Dymksi and Li, 2004, Table 1). Note that not every immigrant receiving country possesses banks in all cells. Further, the division between these types of banks can be blurry, since many mainstream banks in immigrant receiving countries have increasingly acquired ethnic capital by hiring employees and/or promoting managers who have similar backgrounds as, or speak the same languages as, their immigrant customers

(or both). That said, this categorization emphasizes the relationship between how banks are funded (the horizontal dimension) and how they seek and serve customers (the vertical dimension).¹

Banks’ differential abilities to rely on ethnic capital, together with their differential scales of operation, determine their roles in immigrants’ financial integration. Here we provide a few vignettes of the financial-integration roles played by banking institutions in several countries.

The offices of global and other foreign banks in immigrant-destination countries can serve dual roles in immigrant-host countries: functioning as outposts managing their headquarters’ cross-border financial flows, and also as localized institutions that are gradually incorporated into internal banking and financial markets, wherein they serve both immigrant and native-born customers (Dymksi and Li 2004). Although the globalization process has undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state, its importance has not diminished (Coleman and Porter 2003, Mosley 2005, Panitch 1997, Weiss 2005). Instead, national financial regulatory stipulations continue to regulate the numbers and transactions of both domestic and foreign banking institutions. With differential national financial regulatory regimes, it is anticipated that domestic and foreign financial institutions play different roles in different countries. For instance, the two neighboring countries in North America, the US and Canada have very different financial structures. The US has over 8,800 banks (as of 2005) whereas Canada has 14 (as of 2002). While the largest five banks in the US account for 34% of all American bank assets, the “big five” banks’ share in Canada is 93%.

One likely unanticipated outcome for Canada’s centralized banking system may be the void left for foreign banks – including globally prominent banks and diasporic Asian banks – to fill by actively tapping into the social and financial capital of immigrants, especially in those immigrant-concentrated metropolitan areas. HSBC (Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation) is a good example. Originating in Hong Kong and Shanghai, as its name suggests, HSBC has had a history in some Asian countries for 140 years. It has since evolved into a London-based global bank, and has recently surpassed Citibank and become the largest bank in the world. It adopts an aggressive strategy in worldwide acquisitions

and operations. As such, it is far more active in Canadian immigrant gateway cities, especially in those with large numbers of Hong Kong immigrants, than in similar gateway cities in the US. For instance, HSBC has 40 and 25 branches in the Vancouver and Toronto metropolitan areas, respectively, but a mere six and three branches each in the Los Angeles and San Francisco metro areas. Capitalizing on its access to global financial markets, name recognition and worldwide branch network, it stands out in its capability of serving the needs of those individual and institutional customers who have transnational connections and business activities between and beyond immigrant “home” and “host” countries.

Smaller transnational banks such as those from Taiwan have also served a special niche market of Taiwanese/Chinese migrants and businesses in various countries after Taiwan’s financial liberalization in 1987. In 2002 the same 12 Taiwanese banks that had local branch offices in Los Angeles possessed a total of 101 branches outside Taiwan. However, given their limited asset size, host countries’ financial regulations, and the fact that they are often focused on serving primarily as global outposts, their impacts on immigrant financial integrations is limited (Dymski and Li 2004).

Another component of the matrix of ethnic-capital possibility involves immigrant-owned banks serving localized banking markets. This is a relatively recent phenomenon that represents an important departure from informal ethnic financial institutions such as rotating credit associations; it is the one component in immigrant financial integration that is least studied in the contemporary immigrant-study literature. When national regulatory regimes permit, immigrants gain advantages from creating formal financial institutions that can capture and recirculate their funds, as is the case in the ethnic banking sector in the US (Ahn and Hong 1999; Li, W. et al. 2001 and 2002; Lin 1998; Pucell and Warf 2006; Smith 1995). Since the American financial structure is more of a multi-tiered complex with both federal- and State-chartered and regulated banking institutions (compared with Canada, for example), the situation in each State varies a great deal. Pollard (1995, 1996 and 1999), for instance, analyzes banking fluctuations and argues that a relatively permissive regulatory regime has led to a booming retail banking sector in California. This also partially explains why California has a proliferation of Chinese- and Korean-owned and US-chartered banks, and an emerging sector of Vietnamese-American owned banks (Ahn and Hong 1999; Flanigan 2006; Li, W. et al. 2001 and 2002), compared with the less-developed ethnic banking sector in New York and in other major immigrant gateway metropolitan areas (Li and Dymski forthcoming).

Interestingly, this trend is emerging in other areas with even limited numbers of immigrant groups. For instance, an “Asian Bank of Arizona” was launched in metropolitan Phoenix, when the Asian population in that metro area totaled only 98,100 in July 2005.² The first Islamic subsidiary of an American bank in the US, University Islamic Financial Corporation (UIFC), opened its doors in December 2005, largely driven by the large

Muslim population in the greater Detroit area (Chiu and Newberger 2006, Pollard and Samers 2006).

We are living in an age of international migration and financial globalization: not in terms of people and money crossing national borders *per se* – they have been doing that many centuries – but in the unprecedented scope and complexity of these people/money flows. Population and money may flow together in opposite directions or in the same direction. However, only the former (in the form of remittances) has drawn much attention from the media, academics and policy-makers. The latter, the result of both wealth generating in source countries and recruitment by destination countries in the past few decades, has not yet been fully recognized or studied. Likewise, public policies on immigrant integration often lag behind in accommodating increasingly diverse population and money flows. Therefore, we call for a more systematic examination of the roles of financial institutions in immigrant financial integration and of these institutions’ transnational connections. More comparative studies of cross-border flows will help in the future design of appropriate policies pertaining to international migration, capital flows and immigrant integration (Abu-Laban and Garber 2005).

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Notes

- * This article is drawn upon, in part, Dymski and Li 2004; Li and Dymski, forthcoming, and Li, W. et al. 2001 and 2002.
- ¹ Note that this figure and the remaining discussion focuses on traditional banking practices, not on the exploitative financial practices often aimed at lower-income households.
- ² This figure represents one race data. See http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&nd-context=dtandds_name=ACS_2005_EST_G00_and-mt_name=ACS_2005_EST_G2000_B01001D.



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CHALLENGES TO DIVERSITY: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE*

ABSTRACT

In response to terrorist attacks and related incidents of global violence, multiculturalism – variously defined – is being questioned internationally. Although Canada is often held up as a model of multicultural integration both domestically and abroad, such world events, whether in Britain, France, the Netherlands, or Australia, ought to remind us that Canada has its own legacy of less publicized “flashpoints” which point to the serious political, cultural and economic concerns of groups such as Aboriginal people, official language minorities, and visible minorities. This article suggests that what may be required in Canada is more comparative analysis to determine which socio-economic, religious, cultural, and politico-legal factors need to be addressed to ensure that the country is able to engage all citizens in finding common ground, and extending a collective sense of belonging.

In the wake of a series of terrorist attacks worldwide (e.g. New York, Madrid, Bali, London), rioting in “immigrant” suburbs of Paris, Birmingham and Sydney, political shifts and reactions surrounding the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, and violent incidents occurring in the aftermath of the controversial *Jyllands-Posten* cartoon depictions of the prophet Mohammed (the so-called “Danish cartoons”), multiculturalism – variously defined – is being questioned internationally. Canada’s approach is often profiled as one that has been more successful than other liberal democracies in accommodating diversity. The Canadian approach to diversity, therefore, draws considerable international attention as a model that may be uniquely suited to meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

Given recent international events, or “flashpoints,” it is important to explore the degree to which Canada shares with these other countries what has been characterized as the multicultural challenge to social cohesion. The meaning of multiculturalism, for instance, is highly contested even within a given national context. Multiculturalism is a social construct; it can mean significantly different things to different people – and to different nations. Canada is often held up as a model of multicultural integration both domestically and abroad. While this country may not have experienced the kinds of high profile flashpoints that have characterized other countries, Canada has its own continuing legacy of less publicized flashpoints which point to serious, political, cultural and economic concerns of groups such as Aboriginal peoples, official language minorities, and visible minorities which too often remain ignored.¹ This article suggests that what may be required in Canada is more comparative analysis to determine which socio-economic, religious, cultural, and politico-legal factors need to be addressed, with particular emphasis on identity and belonging.

The Canadian experience

While it is well known that Canada is a country built on immigration, it is important to understand the country’s diversity in terms of a specific set of historical forces. The first is the past and present role of Aboriginal peoples (including First Nations, Métis, and Inuit). This role and the attendant rights that have evolved as a result of it are explicitly recognized in the *Constitution Act* of 1982 (s. 35). The second force consists of the two colonizing groups who eventually defined themselves as the two founding peoples of Canada, namely, the French- and English-speaking communities. The third force comprises those racial and ethnic minorities who fall outside these first two categories, that is, native and foreign-born Canadians with non-Aboriginal, non-French and non-British ancestry. Based on this kind of history and sociology, Canada has been described as a multinational and poly-ethnic society.

Although immigrants to Canada during the early and mid-20th century were overwhelmingly European in origin,² shifting patterns of world migration and changing immigration policies have meant that Canada now increasingly accepts immigrants from source countries such as Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central America. What this means, in turn, is that approximately 13% of the population, or 4 million people, are visible minorities. The number of visible minority

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Canadians is projected to grow as high as 20% of the population by 2017. In view of declining fertility rates in Canada and an ageing population (with the exception of the Aboriginal population), immigration increasingly provides Canada with its most reliable source of population growth.

Before the adoption of multiculturalism as a policy in 1971, nation building, in the symbolic and cultural sense, was oriented toward a British type of society in Canada. In fact, Canadians were defined as British subjects until the passage of the *Canadian Citizenship Act* in 1946. Events during the 1960s paved the way for the eventual demise of assimilation as government policy and the subsequent appearance of multiculturalism. The pressures for change at this time stemmed from the mounting assertiveness of Aboriginal peoples, the growing wave of Québécois nationalism, and the increased resentment by ethnic minorities about their place in society. Thus, with the adoption of official policies of bilingualism in 1969 and multiculturalism in 1971, Canada's major forces of diversity were given institutional expression for the first time. Bringing these forces into the mainstream of government and society has undoubtedly helped to ensure greater stability for Canada with respect to its diversity challenges.

Despite Canada's international reputation and self-image as the world's most peaceable multicultural liberal democracy – a national myth that arguably began to take root in the public imagination after the 1969 official languages policy and the 1971 multiculturalism policy – history tells a more complex and often painful story.³ Interestingly, Canadians tend to suffer from a kind of collective amnesia with respect to such history. Since the 1967 Centennial, for instance, there have been some significant incidents of violence, discrimination, and social upheaval in Canada, emerging from contending diversities and national visions.⁴

Such events do not easily square with the Canadian collective myth. However abhorrent, these and other incidents like them have remained *potential* flashpoints; they have not yet led to an erosion in international opinions, nor in Canadians' idea of themselves, as citizens of a peaceable, multicultural society nor their support for multicultural diversity – either from the point of view of public opinion or government policy. This stands out most clearly in international comparisons.

What is the source of Canada's optimism? Is it the very specificity of Canada's flashpoints – and the fact that few of the threats to social cohesion have been directly associated with immigration?

Is Canada fundamentally different, or merely 20 years behind Europe in terms of the challenges of

diversity? What do past potential flashpoints, and the widespread “amnesia” about them, mean for Canada's future? How – and how well – will Canada accommodate the increasing diversity of the future?

The near future: Canada 2017

Canada's prosperity, security, unity, and social cohesion in 2017 will depend, at least in part, on revitalizing the concept of Canadian citizenship for the 21st century. Two major challenges to such an accomplishment are: integrating unprecedented numbers of new immigrants of non-European background and Canada's Aboriginal people into an already diverse social fabric, such that no one is left behind; and, responding to profound alterations in the traditional relationships and cultural connections between Canadians being brought about by globalization, urbanization, and proliferating information and communications technologies. This implies a level of public education and dialogue which has not yet occurred, and for which the policy development has barely begun.

In respect to revitalizing Canadian citizenship, there are intersecting challenges that have only begun to be understood in their complexity and are in need of further research: these include the meaning of Aboriginal citizenship in Canada, the meaning of religious pluralism in the Canadian context of secular liberalism, the future of official language minority communities, Canadian youth and their more open definitions of diversity that are not confined to ethnic difference.

Exploring dimensions of diversity

In a recent article, Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka questions his own “triumphalism regarding liberal multiculturalism” (Kymlicka 2005, 82). International events have led governments to reconsider their approaches to multiculturalism and this, in turn, leads

Kymlicka to acknowledge that liberal democracies are not necessarily on the same progressive continuum with respect to diversity and integration. Having reached this important conclusion, Kymlicka offers the following set of four indicators comparing international contexts of, and responses to, diversity:

Migration status (legal vs. illegal)

Large numbers of illegal entrants generate fears of being swamped and may cause the general population to believe that multicultural policies encourage illegal immigrants to enter the country. Significantly, Canada probably has the lowest level of illegal immigration among the Western democracies and the highest level of public support for multiculturalism.

The number of visible minority Canadians is projected to grow as high as 20% of the population by 2017. In view of declining fertility rates in Canada and an ageing population (with the exception of the Aboriginal population), immigration increasingly provides Canada with its most reliable source of population growth.

Cultural practices (liberal vs. illiberal)

It is difficult to gain public support for multiculturalism if those who are perceived as its beneficiaries are also thought to exemplify “illiberal” cultural practices that violate widely accepted Western norms of human rights – especially if multiculturalism is invoked to maintain such practices. In the West, cultures that are not perceived as sharing Judeo-Christian values are viewed as having the most religious or cultural commitment to “offensive” practices. For example, Muslims have been portrayed in the West, especially since 9/11, as the classic “other.”

Economic impact (contributors vs. burden)

It is difficult to sustain public support for multiculturalism where immigrants who would benefit from multicultural policies are seen as a burden on the welfare state. In Canada, immigrants have generally been perceived as net contributors to the welfare state. Historically this has been the case, this is strengthened today by the perception that immigrants are needed to offset the ageing population structure.

In accordance with Canada’s well-known points system, immigrants are recruited for employability, and tend to have *relatively* high rates of employment. In Europe, this is not usually the case and post-colonial populations with the right to enter, plus refugees, and especially illegal entrants, are viewed as an unsustainable burden.

Security risk (low vs. high)

Fears about security and border control can be viewed as attempts to rationalize the dislike of diversity. Even in Canada, where multiculturalism can be viewed in relatively positive terms by the public, concerns are regularly expressed in political and media discourse that the institutional recognition of ethnic identities erodes Canadian national solidarity.

Kymlicka’s four dimensions focus primarily on the dominant society’s *perceptions* about newcomers, based on a mixture of empirical “facts” about the immigration system and judgements about them. It should be noted that there is also a complex intersection of dynamics *between* these dimensions that may come into play. Other factors include religious diversity, citizenship access and uptake, diversity of diversities, and socio-economic outcomes.

Religious diversity

As we have seen in the dimensions listed, Kymlicka identifies the allegation of “illiberal” cultural practices as a predictor of public opposition to diversity. In recent times, in Canada and elsewhere, this has largely been a question of minority religious beliefs and the practices attributed by the wider society to those holding those beliefs. At times,

illiberal cultural practices “stand for” a whole religion, which is then set against the whole of Western “civilization.” Once accomplished, this kind of sleight of hand can result in the kind of “clash of civilization” rhetoric that has appeared in Europe, the United States and Australia in the context of the war in Iraq, and that has occurred most recently in the “Cartoon Crisis” in Denmark (2006), although in a somewhat different form.

Citizenship access and uptake

In approaches to immigration and integration, there are important differences between liberal democracies of the “Old world” (Europe) and the “New World” (North America and Australasia). In “New World” settler societies like Canada, national myths about origins and development revolve primarily around immigration. Access is comparatively open: newcomers are eligible to obtain citizenship within a relatively short period (2 to 5 years), and citizenship acquisition is celebrated and mythologized (Tran et al. 2005, Wills 2005). Many continental European nations only reluctantly grant access to citizenship for immigrants and their descendants and require residency ranging from five to twelve years.

Diversity of diversities

Low population densities, wealth of resources, and economic opportunities have allowed the classical immigration countries to absorb larger numbers of newcomers than the countries of Western Europe, who have sometimes reacted strongly against *any* further immigration at all.⁶ Unlike Europe, Canada has maintained comparatively high levels of immigration, while selecting migrants considered to be “desirable” – in recent years, economic migrants. These levels and selection processes, combined with the comparative geographic isolation of Canada, ensured that the source countries

were more diverse, preventing the development of dominant immigrant groups and helping to create the “diversity of diversities” that characterizes Canada today.

Socio-economic outcomes

In Canada and abroad, one of the main contributors to social conflict is the socio-economic exclusion of immigrants and minority group members. Recently, a number of fault lines have begun to develop in Canada, related to increasing socio-economic exclusion: Jeffrey Reitz’s recent work, for instance, suggests that immigrant outcomes in Canada are in decline, that recent immigrants are not doing as well as their predecessors, in spite of better education, and that durable concentrations of ethnic groups are occurring at a much higher rate than in the past.

While most new immigrants to Canada settle in Toronto, Vancouver or Montréal,⁶ not all immigrant

Since the 1967 Centennial, for instance, there have been some significant incidents in Canada of violence, discrimination, and social upheaval, emerging from contending diversities and national visions. Such events do not easily square with the Canadian collective myth.

communities are poor. However, if poor socio-economic outcomes do become associated with particular ethno-cultural groups that are concentrated in particular neighbourhoods, there is a danger of the wider public forming an association between those groups, marginalization, and poverty. Once such an association is formed – as has occurred widely in Europe – it may lead to the perception that immigrants put extra strain on social programs, resulting in anti-immigrant backlash (Reitz 2005, Wills 2005).

In spite of higher levels of education, economic outcomes for immigrants to Canada are worsening. Denise Helly recalls that in 2001 “immigrant men earned 63.1 cents for every dollar a native-born Canadian with the same education earned” whereas 20 years earlier the ratio was equal, namely \$1 for everyone in 1980 (Helly 2004, 6).

This discrepancy will increase the number of immigrants who live in poverty, make residential concentrations of poverty more likely and heighten the dependence of immigrants on the close social bonds of their own community. At the same time opportunities decrease for developing the bridging and linking social capital that is so crucial to integrating into the wider society, as well as creating a wider public perception that immigrants are not contributing their share to the economy and society.

Citizenship for the 21st century

In an international context where social order based upon diversity is showing signs of strain – or threatening to break down completely – it is critical to find the balance between smug romanticism and hand wringing fatalism about the Canadian multicultural model of citizenship (i.e. “It could never happen here; we’ve got it right in Canada” vs. “It is only a matter of time; the centre cannot hold”). While there is a kernel of truth in each response, both misrepresent the complexity of the challenge in open societies committed to both diversity and shared core values – and neither is constructive in itself. All such societies are vulnerable (including Canada) and all have much to lose if socio-political commitments to diversity falter.

Although, in comparison to other liberal democracies, Canada’s national identity has evolved through a process which has arguably left more “space” for the negotiation of difference, the pace of demographic change in the coming years is expected to weigh most heavily where the model may be most fragile, i.e. mutual respect, shared values and common understanding between citizens (new immigrants and visible minority Canadians, people of different – or no – religious faiths, Aboriginal Canadians, official language minority Canadians, etc.)

In this environment, re-imagining and revitalizing the concept of Canadian citizenship looms as one of the country’s greatest challenges. The process will require putting an essentially political frame around the human task of welcoming newcomers, finding a way to continue the historical conversation between English and French-speaking Canadians including Quebec’s role in the federation, and in achieving reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples. Such a process could be definitively Canadian if it manages to engage all Canadians in finding common ground and extending a collective sense of belonging.

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Notes

- * We would like to thank Basilia Zagrobelny for her help in editing this version of the article.
- ¹ The arrests of terrorist suspects in Toronto in June 2006 caused a minor media storm but nothing comparable to the European contexts referred to above as “flashpoints.”
- ² This is not to say that there were not already significant Black and Asian communities, for example, in parts of Canada but rather that immigration patterns or waves during this period flowed predominantly from Europe.
- ³ See *Official Languages Act* 1988; *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* 1988.
- ⁴ Some of the better known examples that have occurred since 1967 include: the forced removal of the historic Afro-Canadian community of Africville, by the City of Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1967; FLQ terrorist incidents in Montréal, Québec (the “October Crisis”) in 1970; the Air India Flight 182 Bombing in 1985, a flight which originated in Vancouver, BC; the Concordia University protest and cancellation of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech in 2002 (Québec); the fire bombing of Montréal’s Jewish United Talmud Torah school library (2005); and, a lengthy series of Aboriginal blockades, protests, occupations and crises across the country; such as the Oka Crisis, 1990 in Kanasetake First Nation (Québec); the Ipperwash Crisis, 1995 in Kettle & Stony Point First Nation (Ontario); and the recent Six Nations occupation of Caledonia, Ontario in 2006.
- ⁵ See Van Selm 2005.
- ⁶ According to the 2001 Census, 43% of immigrants during the 1990s settled in Toronto, 18% in Vancouver, and 12% in Montréal.

Attachment

	Canada	Australia	United Kingdom	Netherlands	France
Population July 2005, estimate ^a	32.8 million	20.9 million	60.4 million	16.4 million	60.7 million
Net migration 2005, estimate ^b	+5.9 migrants /000	+3.91 migrants / 000	+2.18 migrants / 000	+2.3 migrants / 000	+0.66 migrants / 000
Top 5 source countries of immigrants in 2002 (thousands) ^c Percentages ^d	33.2 China 14.5% 28.8 India 12.6% 14.2 Pakistan 6.2% 11.0 Philippines 4.8% 7.0 Iran 3.1%	12.5 U.K. 13.4% 12.4 New Zealand 13.3% 6.7 China 7.2% 5.8 India 6.2% 4.6 South Africa 4.9%	34 Australia 12.8% 18 China 6.8% 16 France 6.0% 16 Germany 6.0% 16 India 6.0% (2001 data)	5.4 Turkey 6.2% 5.1 Germany 5.9% 4.9 Morocco 5.7% 4.8 U.K. 5.5% 3.4 China 3.9%	23.3 Algeria 16.1% 21.4 Morocco 14.8% 8.5 Turkey 5.9% 7.6 Tunisia 5.3% 3.4 USA 2.4%
Visible minority population ^e	13.4% visible minority (2001) but projections for 2017 are 19-23%	N/A	7.9% non-White (2001)	6% (estimated)	8% (estimated) Mostly North African
Foreign-born - % of total population in 2002 ^f	18.2% (2001)	23.2%	N/A	10.6%	10% (1999)
Foreign population - % of total population in 2002 ^g	N/A	N/A	4.5%	4.3%	5.6% (1999)

^a World Fact Book, 2005 estimate, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos.

^b World Fact Book, 2005 estimate, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos.

^c Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI 2004 Edition. OECD 2005.

^d Calculated from data in Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI 2004 Edition. OECD 2005.

^e Information available on the Government of Canada and the United Kingdom's Government Websites.

^f Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI 2004 Edition. OECD 2005. Foreign Born defined as first-generation migrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens.

^g Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI 2004 Edition. OECD 2005. Foreign Population includes immigrants having retained the nationality of their country of origin as of the second or third generations born in the host country.

EUROPEAN IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN CHANGE

ABSTRACT

This article charts the changing direction of European states' immigrant integration policies. Based on a close reading of a key European Union document in this area, the author discusses the questions of consensus on an inclusive understanding of integration as a "two-way" process; of lowered emphasis on cultural recognition and expected respect on the part of migrants for the principles of liberal democracy; puts strong focus on getting migrants into work; and explores the rise of compensatory anti-discrimination policies. Particular emphasis is given to the strange coexistence of obligatory "civic integration" and remedial "antidiscrimination" policies, which very much constitute the *Gestalt* of the contemporary integration scene.

Half a century after the onset of the great post-World War II migrations, there is a widespread sense across Europe that the State policies that were established to accommodate these migrations were insufficient or even harmful. Even in states that were long believed to adhere to articulate and coherent "national models" of immigrant integration, such as "multicultural" Netherlands or "assimilationist" France, this sense of failure is strong. In the Netherlands, a parliamentary inquiry of government policy towards ethnic minorities between 1970 and 2000 came to the devastating conclusion that, if some migrants in the Netherlands succeeded, then it was "in spite of" rather than "thanks to" government policy.¹ In France, a similar review of the French postwar immigration experience by the Cour des Comptes noted that State attention had always been fixated on refining instruments of immigration control, while integration policies remained "badly defined in their objectives and principles," "incoherent," "contradictory," and "insufficient" (Cour des Comptes 2004, 9f).

A key feature of the policy solutions that have been offered in response to the integration crisis is the weakening of national distinctiveness and a convergence with respect to the forms and contents of integration policy. The notion of "national models" no longer makes sense, if it ever did. Gary Freeman rightly noted in this respect that the notion of "national models of incorporation...lend(s) too much dignity to the patchwork of institutions, laws, and practices that constitute incorporation frameworks in the West" (Freeman 2003, 3). The French auto-critique by the Cour des Comptes powerfully confirms this view. Even in the more chaotic and less philosophical ways that national distinctiveness existed in the past, it is now counteracted by the trend toward convergence across Europe, on which I shall expand in the following.

Policy convergence in the European Union

Unique windows into the changing direction of integration policies in Europe are the November 2004 European Council conclusions on "immigrant integration policy" (Council of the European Union 2004). Because they were agreed upon by the Justice and Home Ministers of the EU member states, these conclusions reflect national policy preferences in Europe; they show these preferences under the sway of convergence. A general feature of these policies, which is in fact no novelty, is to be "broadly if imperfectly inclusive" (Freeman 2003, 3). As Freeman points out, this is "counter-intuitive," if one considers that many of Europe's migrants arrived and continue to arrive uninvited, and that national electorates are generally hostile to large-scale immigration, especially of non-European provenience. This inclusiveness is due to the post-war rise of a human rights discourse and accompanying international and national legal regimes, which have extended rights from national citizens to all "persons," irrespective of citizenship (Soysal 1994). It is thus not a European specificity but is rather germane to all Western liberal democracies.

Inclusiveness is usually formulated in the metaphor of "two-way" integration. Accordingly, the *first* of the EU's "common basic principles" of immigrant integration policy reads: "Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member States" (Council of the European Union 2004, 19). This means that not only migrants must change, but that receiving societies must evolve as well, as they are mandated to create "the opportunities for the immigrants' full economic, social, cultural, and political participation" (*ibid.*).

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This stance has become a platitude, but one should not forget its extreme improbability. Ever since the transition from nomadic to sedentary life in the Neolithic Revolution, the maxim that settled populations have repeated to newcomers was to adapt to their ways – “when in Rome do as the Romans do.” The idea that something as complex and massive as the receiving society – a “society” after all and not just “people” – should change in response to the arrival of numerically inferior “migrants” is unheard of. That a settled society *would* change as a result of migration is of course inevitable, but elevating this into an ethical maxim, a *should*, is an unprecedented stance.

The *second* of the EU’s “common basic principles” offers insight into what is expected on the part of migrants: “Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.” What are these values? The answer is: the joint stock of all liberal democracies, “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (p. 19). All these are political values, not substantive ethical values. Europe is becoming like America, in the sense that, much as Rawls’ “political liberalism” has formulated it, the integration of society can only occur in terms of a procedural consensus on what is “right,” not in terms of a substantive consensus on what is “good.” Political liberalism’s application in the migration domain is a common preference for “integration” over “assimilation” – assimilation had meant imposing the substantive culture of the majority society (“comprehensive doctrine,” in Rawls’ terms) on newcomers, while the precise meaning of integration is to abstain from this. Accordingly, the EU’s “common basic principles” include “(f)ull respect for the immigrants’ and their descendants’ own language and culture” (p. 20).

With respect to migrants’ “own language and culture,” the crucial question is whether their expression is left to the free play of society, or whether the State becomes involved in their protection and maintenance. Interestingly, only Spain, under a socialist government bent on setting a progressive counterpoint to its conservative predecessor, wanted to commit the EU states to a “multicultural” stance on this question, obliging them to proactively further and protect migrant languages and cultures.² This quest was rebutted. The compromise formula, “full respect,” does not go beyond the classic liberal stance on matters of culture and way of life, leaving them to the discretion of individuals, and not considering them the business of the State. Moreover, when the Council document reiterated that “the freedom to practice one’s religion and culture” was guaranteed by constitutional law, emphasis was put on the strings attached to it – respect for the “equality of women,” the “rights and interests of children,” and the “freedom to

practice or not to practice a particular religion” (p. 23). This reservation reflects the most recent difficulties with Muslim integration in Europe. As a result, the pendulum has swung from cultural maintenance to enforcement of liberal core values.

The lowered emphasis on cultural recognition in the EU document, while at one level consistent with the precepts of liberalism, points to an important reorientation of European states’ immigrant integration policies. Previous programmatic statements by European states were much louder in affirming the integrity of migrant cultures and ways of life, and some states – most notably Sweden and the Netherlands – went even further in protecting and supporting them. Instead, the *third* of the EU’s “common basic principles” reads: “Employment is a key part of the integration process” (p. 20). Responding to an alarming degree of unemployment and welfare dependency among immigrants and their offspring in Europe, socio-economic integration has become the key focus of European states’

immigrant integration policies. This is in sharp contrast to the United States or Canada, where migrant ethnics are generally in work. This reorientation is framed by a new, post-national-model philosophy of migrants’ “self-sufficiency” and “autonomy,” to be found in the Netherlands and France alike, according to which – paradoxically – the primary task of the State is to make migrants independent of the State.

The inevitable result of the new focus on socio-economic integration is to heavily shift the burden of adjustment toward the individual migrant, particularly in the first phases of entering the new society. Accordingly, the *fourth* principle in the EU statement on integration policy says: “Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration.” This refers to the new policy of civic

integration, which the Netherlands pioneered in the late 1990s, and which has since been adopted, among other European states, by Finland, Denmark, Austria, Germany, and France. This policy obliges newcomers to enrol in civics and language courses immediately after entry (and in the Netherlands lately, even before entry), and non-compliance tends to be sanctioned through financial penalties or denial of permanent residence permits. The novelty of civic integration policy is its obligatory character, which has notably increased over time. This notional “integration” policy has even transmuted into a tool of migration control, helping states to especially restrict the entry of unskilled and unadapted family migrants. The obligatory, repressive character of civic integration policy makes it a prime instance of an illiberal policy “in the name of liberalism” (King 1999), which sets it apart from similar – yet voluntary and humanitarian – civic integration policies in Canada.

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However, a gentle counterpoint to increasingly harsh civic integration policies is the parallel emphasis on anti-discrimination laws and policies, which – forced by the EU Race Directive of June 2000 – are now taking hold across Europe. Accordingly, the *last* of the EU's integration principles that shall be mentioned here is: "Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration" (Council of the European Union 2004, 21).³ Equality of treatment, irrespective of one's ethnic origin or any other ascriptive marker, is certainly the stock-in-trade of all liberal societies and guaranteed by their constitutions. Yet to enforce this by explicit anti-discrimination laws, which lowers the hurdle of claims making for the victims of discrimination and – above all – expands the reach of the nondiscrimination principle from the public to the private sector, is a novelty in Europe. Though enabled by a unique window of opportunity at EU level (see Guiraudon 2004), the proliferation of anti-discrimination laws and policies reflects Europe's structural transformation into a multiethnic society, as well as a general willingness to tackle the specific inequalities that go along with it.

Repressive liberalism

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the contemporary European immigrant integration scene is the joint rise of civic integration and anti-discrimination policies. While they are at one level complementary in focusing on different phases of the integration process, both policies follow opposite logics. The logic of civic integration is to treat migrants as individuals, who are responsible for their own integration; civic integration is application to the migration domain of the austere neo-liberalism that frames economic globalization. The opposite logic of anti-discrimination is to depict migrants and their offspring as members of groups who are victimized by the majority society, thus reintroducing at the tail end of integration the ameliorative group logic that had been thrown out at its beginning by the harsh individualism of civic integration. The strange coexistence of civic integration and anti-discrimination reveals that the liberal mantra of "two-way" integration consists of two separate one-way processes: at first, the burden of change rests solely on the migrant; later, it rests exclusively on society.

The coexistence of civic integration and anti-discrimination in contemporary European immigrant integration policies reveals the workings of two opposite types of liberalism: an "old" liberalism of equality and individual rights, which has moved states from "assimilation" to "integration" and is now feeding

the trend toward anti-discrimination policies; and a "new" liberalism of disciplinary individualism, which, as one can see in obligatory civic integration, is coercing individuals to release their self-producing and self-regulating capacities as alternative to redistribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no longer deliver.

To further flesh out the contours of the "new" liberalism, consider the centrality of employment in Europe's current immigrant integration policies. As the European Commission observed in its first Annual Report on Migration and Integration, "access to employment" has become "the most important political priority within national integration policies" (European Commission 2004, 5). This priority is as old as the hills, consonant with Brecht's belly-centered ethic of *Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral*. However, on a more subtle level this also displays a novel sense of "integration" in the post-

national state, as "social inclusion," which is in itself subordinate to the exigencies of globalization. In the European Union, for instance, the "combat" against "social exclusion" is not free-standing but tied to the global competition goal, formulated within the so-called "Lisbon strategy" that seeks to make the Union "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" by 2010. From this optic, even anti-discrimination laws and policies, as envisioned by the EU Race Directive, do not so much aim at equality as allow a full utilization of society's resources in the global contest. As Eichenhofer (2005, 2) put it, "these people (women, handicapped, aged, and ethnic minorities) are to be fully included in society and labour market of the member states, not least in order to reduce the costs for social protection or welfare." Overall, social inclusion becomes narrowly tied to the labour market rather than the nation-state at large, motivated by the image of society

"as a machinery of performance" (Haahr 2004, 225).

In its economic instrumentalism, integration as "social inclusion" is a world apart from old notions of cultural assimilation and nation building. However, there is still a "perfectionist" dimension to it, and one with paternalist, obligation imposing possibilities, in the sense that being at "work" is not just a means to obtain income, but is seen as of intrinsic importance to an individual's well-being. It must therefore be pursued, or imposed, for its own sake. The main purpose of social inclusion is social cohesion: that is, order, not justice. This distinguishes social inclusion, as a new form of repressive liberalism that frames contemporary globalization processes, from the old liberalism of equal opportunities, which had been the lode of the classic welfare state: "Whereas the aim of equality of opportunity seeks to put people in a position in

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which they are able to participate in the economy and other aspects of social life, the aim of social inclusion also seems to include an element that sometimes requires people to become included. There are no rights without responsibilities” (Collins 2003, 24f). Social inclusion is *not* about equality: “Social inclusion does not seek the same...outcomes for citizens. It concentrates its attention...on the absolute disadvantage of particular groups in society” (*ibid*, 22). Social inclusion thus justifies group-specific policies of the State; it is indeed the prime justification of antidiscrimination policies that violate the equal treatment principle, such as positive action (or so is the interesting argument by Collins 2003). If, for instance, France is moving today toward Anglo-style, colour-conscious antidiscrimination policies, and thus to mellowing its traditional rejection of *communautarisme*, the reason is that, like all states in the European Union today, it is feeling the sway of the social inclusion and cohesion objectives.

However, one should not push the perspective of repressive liberalism too far, even where it seems to fit, the new policies of obligatory civic integration. There are also other, less discursive and more material-sociological factors driving these policies. For example, if one asks why civic integration in Canada, which has been practiced here under the blander name of settlement programs for more than half a century (Bloemraad 2006, ch. 3), has retained its entirely optional and voluntaristic face, while in Europe this policy is marked by a repressive tone, a plausible answer must also consider the vastly different demographic and sociological profiles of migrants to Canada and to Europe. Canada selects predominantly highly skilled and resourceful immigrants, which naturally helps in their adjustment. The majority of migrants to Europe, by contrast, are not “selected” at all, but enter on the basis of “rights” through the family reunification and asylum angles. Because the majority of these migrants is unskilled, non-proficient in the language of the receiving societies, and often directly dependent on welfare, they pose serious adjustment problems. The obligatory and repressive dimension of civic integration in Europe cannot be decoupled from the non-selected and essentially unwanted quality of most of her migrants.

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Notes

- ¹ See *Migration News Sheet*, February 2004, p. 25.
- ² *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 November 2004.
- ³ Other “common basic principles” of integration policy not further discussed here are: education, “inter-cultural dialogue,” political participation (especially at the local level), the “mainstreaming” of integration policies in other policy portfolios, and the development of better “indicators and evaluation mechanisms.”

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