



Univers Canadian n Universe

Jack Jedwab & Karin Amit, Eds.

ג'ק ג'דווב וקארין אמית



PROMISED LANDS OF SETTLEMENT?

MIGRANTS, INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY IN CANADA AND ISRAEL

TERRES PROMISES D'ÉTABLISSEMENT?

MIGRANTES, INTÉGRATION ET IDENTITÉS AU CANADA ET EN ISRAËL

ארץ מובטחת למתיישביה?

מהגרים, השתלבות וזהות בקנדה ובישראל



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INTRODUCTION

Jack Jedwab & Karin Amit

Many Canadians and Israelis describe their countries as nations of immigrants who are demographically multicultural. Although to varying degrees both countries possess historic narratives that focus on founding peoples and first settlers, it would be impossible to discuss their historic evolution without considering the contribution of migrants to their respective national identities. Nonetheless, the characterization of the relationship between migration and nation building differs in the two countries. In theory, the migrants settling in Israel are returning to their homeland rather than settling in a new one. In practice, however, they are doing both (much like in Canada), so migrants to Israel are more often adjusting to a new environment and building a new life. Another divergence is that the selection of migrants in Canada is driven primarily by economic considerations while in Israel it is driven by what might be described as identity demographics—the desire to strengthen the state’s national identity—its “raison d’être”. This publication reveals Israel’s identity-based migrant selection process does not necessarily produce more social harmony than Canada’s economically driven model of selection and hence both countries are engaged in ongoing discussions about multiculturalism and national identity.

With that being said, Israel and Canada are amongst the three leading countries in the world (Australia is the other) whose populations are foreign-born. Over the past few decades both Canada and Israel have undergone profound demographic transformations with changing source countries of newcomers and this is reflected in the increasingly multiethnic composition of their respective populations. People in both countries are favorable to sustaining current levels of immigration. Moreover, majorities in both countries tend to agree that newcomers stimulate the economy and that migrants improve society by bringing in new ideas. The majority of Canadians and Israelis also agree that it is important for newcomers to speak the dominant national language(s).

Yet in both countries it is widely acknowledged that there are important challenges to be confronted when it comes to migrant absorption. Both countries are dealing with such common concerns as language training, employment and income gaps, the recognition of foreign training, and citizenship acquisition. Both countries are perceived as being strongly interventionist when it comes to government involvement in the process of immigrant absorption. The respective governments actively follow the process of the migrant’s adjustment to their new home.

Hence the message each country sends to newcomers has been modified over time with successive waves of migrants. Israel's message to newcomers has also evolved away from the idea of a melting pot towards the multicultural framework which remains the object of continued debate. In 1971 Canada introduced a policy of multiculturalism whereby it deemed that preserving one's ethnic origin did not conflict with identification with Canada. But that model has been the object of ongoing debate and as it will be observed some contend that the recognition of diversity undercuts identification with the French language and culture mainly centered in Quebec. And paradoxically while some Quebecers have contended that multicultural policy reinforces immigrant identification with Canada, outside of Quebec some opinion leaders insist that it has diminished national identification. In the 1990's, the government of Quebec successfully negotiated an agreement with the government of Canada to assume responsibility for the integration of newcomers following an arrangement that gave it increased authority over important aspects of immigrant selection. This publication could not do justice to its theme without devoting attention to discourse and policy in Quebec around migration, integration and identity. This also explains the presence of English, Hebrew and French in the publication.

Many migrants regard Canada and Israel as lands of promise. The collection of essays that follows offers significant analysis of the migration experience in the two countries from the perspective of the migrant and the host society. Several leading Canadian and Israeli scholars and community leaders examine the challenges faced by migrants in both societies. Particular attention is directed at the concept of social integration thus providing valuable insights into ongoing debate around national identities and how the presence of newcomers influences such discussion. Canadian contributors to the publication pay somewhat more attention to the policy discourse around migration and diversity while the Israeli contributors focus more on the socio-economic gaps between various segments of that society. It makes for a thought-provoking mix of perspectives and enriches opportunity for bi-national dialogue. Taken together, the texts raise some important questions about the very notion of integration and the challenges of constructing national identities in pluralist democracies. We hope that this publication offers the promise of further collaboration between researchers and policy-makers in lands of promise.

From a demographic standpoint both Israel and Canada are home to a highly diverse population from many different ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic backgrounds.

Of its seven million citizens, less than 1,4 million, under 20 percent of Israel's population, are not Jewish. Almost all are Arab Israelis, mainly residents from before the establishment of the State of Israel or their descendants. The Israeli Bureau of Statistics reports that in 2007 some 5.4 million Israelis were Jewish, nearly 1.2 million were Muslim, approximately 150 000 were Christian and just under 120 000 were Druze. For comparative purposes, in ten years (1996-2006) the Jewish population grew by 15%, the Muslim population by 40%, the Christian population by 20% and the Druze population by 25%. Israel is not a melting pot society, but rather more of a mosaic made up of different population groups co-existing in the framework of a single democratic state. Of the country's Jewish and non-Arab population, 70 percent were born in Israel. In 1948, only 35 percent of Jews were born in the country. Among Jews, the largest group is those who originate from a European-American extraction – 2.2 million, which represents 38.5 percent of the total Jewish population in the country as of the end of 2007. Fifteen percent of Jews numbering some 870,000 are of African origins while about 12.0 percent are from Asian countries. A total of 34.6 percent of Jews are native born Israelis whose parents were also born in the country.

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/arabs2.html

English and French are Canada's two official languages. Some 80% of the population report English and French as their mother tongue (58% and 22% respectively). The remaining 20% have a mother tongue other than English or French (these include Aboriginal languages). According to the 2006 Census, 98% of the population can speak one or both official languages.

In 2006, Canada counted more than 200 different ethnic origins, with eleven surpassing the one million mark. The largest group enumerated by the census consisted of just over 10 million people who reported Canadian as their ethnic ancestry, either alone (5.7 million) or with other origins (4.3 million). Other frequently cited origins were English (6.6 million), French (4.9 million), Scottish (4.7 million), Irish (4.4 million), German (3.2 million), Italian (1.4 million), Chinese (1.3 million), North American Indian (1.3 million), Ukrainian (1.2 million) and Dutch (1.0 million). In 1981 some 1.1 million persons identified as members of a visible minority and in 2006, their numbers surpassed five million as they made 16.2% of the total population in Canada.

In 2001, seven out of ten Canadians identified themselves as either Roman Catholic or Protestant. Far more Canadians reported in the 2001 Census that they had no religion. This group accounted for 16% of the population in 2001,

compared with 12% a decade earlier. On the basis of religion, in 2001, the estimated number of Jews was 330 000 an increase of nearly 4% from the previous decade. Some 580 000 Canadians in 2001 reported that they were Muslims an increase of 128% over the previous ten years. The numbers of Canadians who reported religions such as Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism also increased substantially with each group numbering between 275 000 and 300 000 almost double their number in 1991.

INTRODUCTION

Jack Jedwab & Karin Amit

Nombre de Canadiens et d'Israélien définissent leurs pays comme des nations d'immigrants aux démographies multiculturelles. Quoiqu'à des degrés divers, le récit historique de ces deux pays repose sur celui des peuples fondateurs et des premiers arrivants. Cependant, on ne saurait étudier leur évolution historique sans tenir compte du fait migratoire et l'apport considérable des vagues de l'immigration sur la formation des identités nationales canadienne et israélienne. Les caractéristiques du lien qui existe entre immigration et construction nationale (fait national) diffèrent selon les pays. En Israël, théoriquement, l'arrivée des « immigrants » est comprise comme un retour à la patrie plutôt qu'une immigration. En pratique, les immigrants sont comme ceux du Canada : ils doivent s'adapter à un nouvel environnement (social, culturel, économique) pour se construire une nouvelle vie. Par ailleurs, si la politique d'immigration canadienne est fondée sur des considérations économiques, la politique israélienne mélange démographie et promotion de l'État-Nation comme moyen de renforcer le sentiment d'appartenance nationale, comme ses raisons d'être. Au cours de cette étude nous tâcherons de montrer que le processus israélien de sélection des immigrants, fondé sur l'identité nationale ne conduit pas forcément à une plus grande harmonie politique et sociale que celui du Canada qui est, lui, fondé sur des considérations économiques. Par conséquent, les deux pays sont engagés dans un débat fondamental sur le multiculturalisme et l'identité nationale.

Israël et le Canada font partie des trois pays (l'Australie étant le troisième) dont la population est majoritairement d'origine étrangère au territoire national. Au cours des dernières décennies, le Canada et Israël ont connu une profonde

transformation démographique car la provenance géographique des nouveaux arrivants s'est profondément renouvelée. La première conséquence de cette évolution est le caractère éminemment multiethnique de ces pays. Et ce n'est pas un hasard si Canadiens et Israéliens sont généralement favorables à un flux migratoire soutenu. En outre, la majorité des Canadiens et des Israéliens sont d'accords pour dire que les nouveaux arrivants stimulent l'économie et qu'ils contribuent à améliorer la société d'accueil en apportant dans leur bagage identitaire de nouvelles idées. La majorité des Canadiens et des Israéliens s'accordent aussi pour dire qu'il est important que les nouveaux arrivants parlent la ou les principales langues nationales.

Cependant, les deux pays doivent relever des nombreux et importants défis quant à l'intégration des nouveaux arrivants. À cet égard, ils font face à certaines problématiques identiques : apprentissage de la langue, emploi et écart entre les revenus, reconnaissance des diplômes étrangers, acquisition de la citoyenneté. Il n'empêche : les deux pays sont considérés comme interventionnistes en matière d'intégration des immigrants, puisque les gouvernements suivent avec attention le processus d'adaptation des nouveaux arrivants.

Ainsi, le message envoyé par chacun de ces pays aux nouveaux arrivants s'adapte selon la nature des vagues migratoires. Le message israélien est passé d'une vision de melting-pot à une vision multiculturelle, ce qui est source d'un débat constante. En 1971, le Canada met en place une politique fondée sur la reconnaissance du fait multiculturel considérant que la préservation de l'origine ethnique ne s'oppose nullement à l'identité nationale canadienne. Cependant, ce modèle reste l'objet d'un débat dans lequel certains soutiennent (notamment au Québec) que la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle amoindrie la langue et la culture françaises au Québec. Paradoxalement, pendant que certains Québécois affirment que la politique multiculturelle renforce l'attachement au Canada des nouveaux arrivants, de nombreux leaders d'opinion du reste du Canada insistent sur le fait que cette politique anémie le sentiment national canadien. Dans les années 1990, le gouvernement du Québec a négocié une entente avec le gouvernement du Canada afin de prendre en charge la politique d'intégration des nouveaux arrivants. Ainsi, le gouvernement québécois a accru ses compétences en la matière, ou il détenait déjà le pouvoir de sélectionner la plupart de ses immigrants. À cet égard, cet ouvrage ne répondrait pas à son ambition s'il n'étudiait pas le discours identitaire et la politique d'immigration et d'intégration du Québec. Ces trois axes pourquoi cette publication est trilingue : anglais, hébreu et français.

Beaucoup d'immigrés perçoivent le Canada et Israël comme des terres promises. Les études que nous présentons dans cet ouvrage offrent des analyses importantes sur les expériences d'immigration dans ces deux pays, tant du point de vue des immigrés que des sociétés d'accueilles. Plusieurs universitaires canadiens et israéliens ainsi que des leaders communautaires examinent les défis auxquels les immigrés sont confrontés au Canada et en Israël. Une attention particulière est portée sur le concept d'intégration sociale, car il permet de mieux comprendre les enjeux du débat sur la question des identités nationales, et montre comment le fait migratoire alimente ce débat. Les auteurs canadiens portent leur regard et leurs réflexions sur le discours politique de l'immigration et de la diversité alors que les auteurs israéliens se concentrent davantage sur le fossé socio-économique qui existe entre les différents segments de leur société. Cette double perspective est riche d'enseignement et ouvre la voie à un dialogue binational. Pris dans un ensemble cohérent, ces textes soulèvent des questions majeures sur les notions d'intégration et les défis que les démocraties libérales et plurielles doivent relever pour construire des identités nationales. Nous espérons que ce travail collectif offre la promesse d'une collaboration future entre les chercheurs et les décideurs politiques de ces deux terres promises.

D'un point de vue démographique, Israël et le Canada abritent une population très diverse aux origines ethniques, religieuses culturelles et linguistiques multiples.

Sur les 7 millions d'Israéliens, moins d'1,4 millions, soit moins de 20%, ne sont pas juifs. Presque tous sont des Arabes Israéliens installés avant la naissance de l'État d'Israël. En 2007, le Bureau israélien des statistiques a rapporté que 5,4 millions des Israéliens étaient juifs, que près de 1,2 millions étaient musulmans, qu'environ 150 000 étaient chrétiens et qu'un peu moins de 120 000 étaient druzes. À titre de comparaison, la population juive a augmenté de 15% de 1996 à 2006, la population musulmane a cru de 40% durant la même période, de 20% pour les chrétiens et de 25% pour les druzes. Israël n'est pas une société melting-pot mais plutôt une mosaïque de différents groupes qui coexistent dans une structure étatique démocratique. De la population juive et non-arabe, 70% sont nés en Israël. En 1948, seulement 35% des juifs étaient nés au pays. Parmi les juifs, le groupe le plus important est d'origine européen-américaine. Avec 2,2 millions d'individus ce groupe représente 38,5% de l'ensemble de la population juive en 2007. 15% des juifs, c'est-à-dire 870 000, sont d'origine africaine alors que 12% viennent des pays asiatiques. 34,6% des juifs sont des Israéliens en Israël de parents nés également au pays.

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L'anglais et le français sont les deux langues officielles du Canada. Environ 80% de la population considère que l'anglais et le français comme langue maternelle (respectivement 58 % et 22 %). Les 20 % restants sont de langues maternelles autres que l'anglais ou le français (langues autochtones incluses). Selon le recensement de 2006, 98 % de la population parle une ou les deux langues officielles.

En 2006, le Canada comptait plus de 200 ethnies différentes, dont 11 dépassaient le million d'individus. Le groupe le plus important recensé comptait 10 millions de personnes qui se déclaraient d'origine canadienne seulement (5,7 millions) ou avec d'autres origines (4,3 millions). Par ailleurs 6,6 millions des répondants affirmaient être d'origine anglaise, 4,9 millions d'origine française, 4,7 millions d'origine écossaise, 4,4 millions d'origine irlandaise, 3,2 millions d'origine allemande, 1,4 millions d'origine italienne, 1,3 million d'origine chinoise, 1,3 d'origine indienne d'Amérique du Nord, 1,2 millions d'origine ukrainienne, et 1 millions d'origine hollandaise. En 1981, 1,1 millions de personnes étaient identifiées comme membres d'une minorité visible, alors qu'ils étaient plus de 5 millions en 2006, soit 16,2% de la population canadienne.

En 2001, sept Canadiens sur 10 se considéraient comme catholiques ou protestants. Dans le recensement de 2001, 16 % des Canadiens se déclaraient sans religions, alors qu'ils étaient 12 % dix ans auparavant. Selon le critère religieux, le recensement de 2001 estimait à 330 000 le nombre de juif canadiens, ce qui représentait une augmentation de 4% en dix ans. Toujours en 2001, quelques 580 000 Canadiens se déclaraient musulmans, soit une augmentation de 128% en dix ans. Le nombre de Canadiens qui se déclarent hindouiste, sikh, et bouddhiste a également cru de manière significative. Avec une population évaluée à 275 000 à 300 000 personnes pour chacun de ces groupes, leur nombre a pratiquement doublé depuis 1991.

הארץ המובטחת? מהגרים, אינטגרציה וזהויות בקנדה וישראל

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קנדים וישראלים רבים מתארים את ארצם כארצות הגירה רב-תרבותיות מהמבחינה הדמוגרפית. למרות שבשתי הארצות קיימים נרטיבים היסטוריים המתמקדים במייסדים ובמתיישבים הראשונים, יהיה זה בלתי אפשרי לדון בסוגיות אלו ללא התייחסות לתרומה של המהגרים השונים לזהות הלאומית של כל מדינה. ובכל זאת, יחסי הגומלין בין הגירה ובניית אומה שונים בקנדה ובישראל. באופן חלקי, מהבחינה התיאורטית, ההבדלים נשענים על היותה של ישראל מולדת שהמהגרים ("עולים") חוזרים אליה מהפזרות השונות ולכן אינה ארץ חדשה. אך מהבחינה המעשית, מהגרים בישראל, כמו בקנדה, נדרשים להשתלב בסביבה חדשה ולבנות לעצמם חיים חדשים. הבדל נוסף בין המדינות נעוץ בשיטת הסלקציה של מהגרים הנהוגה בקנדה והמבוססת בעיקר על שיקולים כלכליים, בעוד בישראל ההגירה היא חלק משמעותי מזהות המדינה ומזכות קיומה. כפי שיוצג בפרסום זה, הבדל בסיסי זה לא בהכרח מייצר יותר הרמוניה חברתית בישראל לעומת קנדה, ושתי המדינות עסוקות בשאלות הנוגעות בזהות לאומית וברב תרבותיות. לאחר הבהרה זו, יש לציין כי ישראל וקנדה נצבות בין שלוש מדינות ההגירה המובילות בעולם (השלישית היא אוסטרליה), אשר ילידי חו"ל מהווים שיעור משמעותי מאוכלוסייתן. במהלך העשורים האחרונים, קנדה וישראל עברו שינוי דמוגרפי משמעותי, כתוצאה מהגעה של מהגרים ממגוון רחב של ארצות מוצא, שינוי המשתקף בהרכב התרבותי של האוכלוסייה. מרבית האוכלוסייה בקנדה ובישראל מצדדת בהגירה ומבינה כי המהגרים מהווים תמריץ לכלכלת המדינה ולשיפור הרכבה. כמו כן, מרבית הקנדים והישראלים מסכימים כי חשוב שהמהגרים ידברו בשפת הארץ החדשה. לצד הסכמות אלו, בשתי הארצות מבינים כי ההגירה מציבה אתגרים בכל הקשור לקליטתם ושילובם של המהגרים. האתגרים עמם מתמודדים בשתי הארצות דומים: הקניית השפה המקומית, פערי תעסוקה ושכר, הכרה בהון האנושי שנרכש בארץ המוצא ושאלות הנוגעות לאזרחות.

קנדה וישראל נתפסות כארצות בהן יש מעורבות ממשלתית בתהליך הקליטה

והשילוב של המהגרים. המסר שכל ארץ משדרת למהגרים החדשים עבר שינויים במהלך השנים. ישראל התפכחה מרעיון "כור ההיתוך" ועברה למחשבה רחבה יותר על רב-תרבותיות, אך הדיון בסוגיה זו לא תם ומלווה בויכוחים ופרשנויות. בקנדה הוצגה בשנת 1971 מדיניות הרב-תרבותיות הקובעת כי השמירה על המוצא האתני אינה מתנגשת עם ההזדהות עם קנדה. אולם, מודל זה נתון מאז לויכוחים ודיונים מתמשכים, כפי שניתן יהיה לראות במאמרים העוסקים בהזדהות עם השפה והתרבות הצרפתית

בעיקר בקוויבק. באופן פרדוקסאלי, בעוד חלק מהקוויבקים מסכימים כי מדיניות הרב-תרבותיות מחזקת את ההזדהות עם קנדה, מחוץ לקוויבק דמויות מובילות בקנדה טוענות כי מדיניות זו דווקא החלישה את ההזדהות עם קנדה. בשנות ה-90, ממשלת קוויבק וממשלת קנדה הגיעו להסכמות בנוגע לאחריות בתהליך הסלקציה של המהגרים. בפרסום זה יש ביטוי לדיון סביב סוגיות מדיניות בהקשר להגירה, השתלבות וזהות

בקוויבק. ולאור חשיבות הנושא, בחרנו גם לתת מקום בפרסום לשפה האנגלית, הצרפתית והעברית.

מהגרים רבים מתייחסים לקנדה ולישראל כארצות המובטחות. אסופת המאמרים בפרסום זה מציעה ניתוח משמעותי של ניסיון ההגירה בשתי הארצות, מנקודת המבט של המהגר ושל הארץ הקולטת. חוקרים וקובעי מדיניות בולטים מקנדה ומישראל בוחנים בפרסום זה את האתגרים העומדים בפני המהגר בקנדה ובישראל. תשומת לב מיוחדת ניתנת למושג השתלבות חברתית אשר תורם לדיון אודות זהויות מהגרים. הכותבים הקנדים בפרסום זה מקדישים מעט יותר מקום במאמריהם לדיון סביב מדיניות ההגירה, בעוד הכותבים הישראליים מתמקדים יותר בהבדלים הסוציו-אקונומיים בין קבוצות אתניות שונות בחברה הישראלית. שילוב זה של דעות ותפיסות מהווה הזדמנות מעשירה לדיאלוג דו-לאומי קנדי ישראלי. בהסתכלות כללית על הפרסום, הוא מעלה שאלות בנוגע למושג ההשתלבות (אינטגרציה) והאתגרים בבניית זהות לאומית בדמוקרטיה פלורליסטית. אנו מקווים כי פרסום זה מהווה נדבך ראשון בשיתוף פעולה עתידי בין חוקרים וקובעי מדיניות בארצות המובטחות.

ההבחנה הדמוגרפית האוכלוסייה, בישראל ובקנדה, מגוונת ומורכבת מקבוצות שונות בעלי רקע אתני, דתי, תרבותי ושפתי שונה.

מתוך כ-7 מיליון האזרחים בישראל, פחות מ-1.4 מיליון (כ-20% מהאוכלוסייה) אינם יהודים. מרביתם ערבים בעלי אזרחות ישראלית, שהתגוררו באזור עוד לפני הקמתה של מדינת ישראל ב-1948. הלשכה המרכזית לסטטיסטיקה מדווחת כי ב-2007 כ-5.4 מיליון ישראלים היו יהודים כמעט 1.2 מיליון מוסלמים, כ-150,000 נוצרים ופחות מ-120,000 דרוזים. לצורך השוואה, בין השנים 1996-2006 האוכלוסייה היהודית גדלה ב-15%, האוכלוסייה המוסלמית גדלה ב-40%, האוכלוסייה הנוצרית גדלה ב-20% והדרוזית ב-25%. לא ניתן להגדיר את ישראל כחברת כור-היתוך אלא כחברה המורכבת מקבוצות אוכלוסייה שונות המתקיימות זו לצד זו במדינה דמוקרטית אחת. מקרב האוכלוסייה הלא ערבית (יהודים ושאנים ערבים), כ-70% נולדו בישראל. בשנת 1948 רק 35% מהיהודים נולדו בישראל. בקרב היהודים, הקבוצה הגדולה ביותר היא של יוצאי אירופה-אמריקה, כ-2.2 מיליון איש המהווים 38.5% מכלל האוכלוסייה היהודית בסוף 2007. חמישה עשר אחוז מהיהודים, כ-870,000 יוצאי אפריקה וכ-12% יוצאי אסיה. בהסתכלות כוללת, כ-34.6% מהיהודים בישראל הם ילידי ישראל שהוריהם ילידי חו"ל.

אנגלית וצרפתית הן שתי השפות הרשמיות בקנדה. כשמונים אחוז מהאוכלוסייה בקנדה מדווחים כי אנגלית או צרפתית היא שפת אמם (58% ו-22% בהתאמה). לעשרים האחוז הנותרים שפת אם שאינה אנגלית או צרפתית (קבוצה זו כוללת את הילידים המקומיים-האבוריג'ינים). על פי נתוני המפקד הקנדי בשנת 2006, 98% מהאוכלוסייה דוברת אנגלית או צרפתית (או שתיהן).

בשנת 2006, בקנדה התקיימו יותר מ-200 קבוצות אתניות שונות, כאשר 11 קבוצות מתוכן בגודל העולה ממיליון איש. הקבוצה הגדולה ביותר על פי המפקד כוללת כ-10 מיליון איש שדווחו שמוצאם הוא קנדי בלבד (5.7 מיליון) או קנדי בצירוף מוצא אתני נוסף

(4.3 מיליון). מוצא בולט נוסף הוא אנגלי (6.6 מיליון), צרפתי (4.9 מיליון), סקוטי (4.7 מיליון), אירי (4.4 מיליון), גרמני (3.2 מיליון), איטלקי (1.4 מיליון), סיני (1.3 מיליון), אינדיאני צפון אמריקאי (1.3 מיליון), אוקראיני (1.2 מיליון) והולנדי (1 מיליון). בשנת 1981 1.1 מיליון איש הזדהו בקנדה כמשתייכים לקבוצת מיעוט שיש לה ניראות (visible minority), בשנת 2006 מספרם חצה את ה-5 מיליון והם היוו 16.2% מאוכלוסיית קנדה. בשנת 2001, 7 מתוך 10 קנדים הגדירו עצמם כקתולים או פרוטסטנטיים. בשנה זו כ-16% מהקנדים דווחו שאין להם דת, אחוז הגבוה מהמדווח בעשור הקודם (12%). האחוז המשוער של יהודים בקנדה בשנת 2001 הוא 330,000, גידול של כמעט 4% מהעשור הקודם. כ-580,000 קנדים דווחו בשנה זו כי הם מוסלמים, גידול של 128% מהעשור הקודם. מספר הקנדים המגדירים עצמם כמשתייכים לדתות אחרות (הינדים, סיקים, בודהיסטים) עלה אף הוא וגודלן של הקבוצות נע בין 270,000 ל-300,000 (כל אחת), מספר כמעט כפול ממספרם ב-1991.

ABSTRACTS

CHALLENGES AND CONFRONTATIONS: IMMIGRATION AND ABSORPTION POLICY IN ISRAEL

DVORA HCOHEN

Between 1948 and 1951, nearly 700,000 Jews from disparate nations across the world converged upon Israel, doubling its population. The demographic profile of these immigrants affected the absorption process. The great majority of immigrants who arrived after the founding of the state, both from Europe and from Arab countries, were destitute and lacking in skills which would enable their employment in Israel. Their dependence on the government was to determine the manner of absorption and the relationship between newcomers and veterans, which was clearly patronizing. The new immigrants were granted citizenship upon their arrival in Israel, where a component of citizenship was the right to vote, thereby granting considerable political clout to a public that was wholly uninitiated in the intricacies of Israeli politics. This had an immense influence on Israeli politics. As a society of immigrants, Israel has been afflicted with many problems and difficulties, with conflicting lines of policy, with rifts between the expectations of immigrants and veterans, and with the development of significant cultural and socio-economic gaps. The interaction developed between the veterans and immigrants was to have long-term implications, leaving an indelible mark on the new state's social and cultural makeup, as well as on its political system. Waves of immigrants who continued to arrive over the years helped to turn Israel to a pluralistic society. This development was also influenced by the goals of modern Western societies that encourage pluralism and support individualism, a fact that has played an important role in loosening societal consolidation, in increased cultural disintegration, and in the blur of the boundaries of collective identity in Israel.

Entre 1948 et 1951, près de 700 000 Juifs provenant de divers pays à travers le monde convergèrent vers Israël, doublant sa population.

Le profil démographique de ces immigrants eu un effet sur le processus d'intégration. La grande majorité des immigrants qui arrivèrent à la suite de la fondation de l'État provenaient d'Europe et de pays arabes, ils étaient démunis et dépourvus de compétences qui auraient facilité leur embauche en Israël. Leur dépendance envers le gouvernement allait déterminer le déroulement de leur intégration et de la relation entre les nouveaux arrivants et les plus anciens, qui était clairement de nature condescendante.

Les nouveaux immigrants acquièrent la citoyenneté israélienne dès leur arrivée. Une composante de cette citoyenneté était le droit de vote, ce qui eu pour effet d'accorder une influence politique considérable à un électorat qui n'était pas initié aux complexités de la politique israélienne. Cela eu un effet immense sur la politique israélienne.

Une société d'immigrants, Israël a été affligé de plusieurs problèmes et difficultés, entre autres, par des lignes politiques parfois contradictoires, des déchirements entre les attentes des immigrants et des plus anciens, sans compter le développement d'écarts socioculturel et socioéconomique importants.

L'interaction qui se développa entre les plus anciens arrivants et les immigrants allait avoir des implications à long terme, laissant une marque indélébile sur la composition sociale, culturelle et sur le système politique du nouvel état.

Les vagues d'immigrants qui continuèrent à arriver au long des années aidèrent à faire d'Israël une société pluraliste. Ce développement fut aussi influencé par les objectifs des sociétés occidentales modernes qui encouragent le pluralisme et supporte l'individualisme, un fait qui a joué un rôle important dans le desserrement la consolidation sociétale, dans l'augmentation de la désintégration culturelle et dans le brouillement des frontières de l'identité collective en Israël.

בין השנים 1948-1951 התקבצו בישראל קרוב ל-700,000 יהודים מן התפוצות והכפילו את אוכלוסייתה.

הפרופיל הדמוגרפי של עולים אלה השפיע על תהליך הקליטה. רובם הגדול של העולים שהגיעו לאחר קום המדינה, הן מאירופה והן ממדינות ערב, היו חסרי כל וללא מיומנויות שאפשרו את העסקתם בישראל. התלות של העולים בממשל קבעה את אופן הקליטה ואת אופי היחסים בין עולים חדשים לוותיקים, שהיה בו מידה ניכרת של התנשאות.

לעולים החדשים הוענקה אזרחות עם הגיעם לישראל, כאשר אחד המרכיבים של אזרחות זו הייתה הזכות להצביע. כך ניתן כוח פוליטי לא מבוטל לציבור שברובו לא הכיר את הפוליטיקה הישראלית על כל מורכבותה. הייתה לכך השפעה עצומה על הפוליטיקה הישראלית.

חברה של מהגרים, ישראל סבלה מבעיות וקשיים רבים, כולל קווי מדיניות מתנגשים, פערים בין ציפיותיהם של עולים ושל וותיקים וכן התפתחותם של פערים תרבותיים וסוציו-אקונומיים משמעותיים. האינטראקציה שהתפתחה בין הוותיקים לעולים השפיעה לטווח הארוך והשאירה חותם בלתי מחיק על האופי החברתי והתרבותי של המדינה החדשה וכן על המערכת הפוליטית שלה.

גלים של עולים שהמשיכו להגיע במרוצת השנים סייעו בהפיכתה של ישראל לחברה פלורליסטית. התפתחות זו הושפעה גם מיעדיהן של חברות מערביות מודרניות המעודדות פלורליזם ותומכות באינדיבידואלים, עובדה ששיחקה תפקיד חשוב בהתרת הגיבוש החברתי, בהגברת ההתפוררות החברתית ובטשטוש הגבולות של הזהות הקולקטיבית בישראל.

“ONE LAW” FROM EXODUS HAS NO PLACE IN CANADA’S PLURAL LEGAL SYSTEM

JEAN TEILLET

Exodus (12:49) states that “One law shall be for the native-born and for the stranger who dwells among you.” This article argues that Canada’s legal system has never ascribed to the “one law” theory and has always been pluralistic and reflects the English, French and aboriginal laws of its founding peoples. The fundamental principles of the Two Row Wampum Belt, an agreement of mutual respect, non-interference and peace between aboriginal peoples and European newcomers to Canada, can better be used to describe the history of Canada’s legal plurality. The legal history of Canada can be divided into three eras. The first era was one of contact and recognition of all three legal systems. The second era is characterized by the attempt to assimilate the laws, customs and traditions of the aboriginal peoples. In 1982, with the patriation of the new Canadian constitution, a third era began – reconciliation. This new era is re-invigorating aboriginal laws, customs and traditions and re-asserting their place within Canada’s pluralistic law, and fully rejecting any “one law” theory.

Le livre de l’Exode (12:49) déclare que « La même loi existera pour l’indigène comme pour l’étranger en séjour au milieu de vous ». Ce texte argumente que le droit canadien n’a jamais souscrit à la théorie de la « loi unique ». Au contraire, le système de droit canadien a toujours été de nature pluraliste, reflétant les lois d’origines anglaises, françaises et amérindiennes issues de ses peuples fondateurs. Les principes à la base du « Two-Row Wampum Belt », un accord conclu entre les peuples autochtones et les colons européens au Canada et fondé sur le respect mutuel, la non-ingérence et la paix, illustrent mieux l’histoire du droit pluraliste canadien. Cette histoire peut d’ailleurs être divisée en trois périodes. La première a été celle des contacts et de la reconnaissance de chacun des trois systèmes de droit. La période suivante est définie par un effort d’assimiler les lois, les coutumes et les traditions des peuples autochtones. La troisième période, celle de la réconciliation, a débuté en 1982 avec le rapatriement de la Constitution canadienne. Depuis 1982, les lois, les coutumes et les traditions autochtones se sont vues revigorées; de même, la place de ces dernières au sein du système de droit pluraliste canadien s’est vue réaffirmée, rejetant entièrement la théorie de la « loi unique ».

על פי ספר שמות "תורה אחת יהיה לאזרח ולגר הגר בתוכם" (יב', מט'), מאמר זה טוען כי מערכת המשפט הקנדית לעולם לא צידדה בתיאוריית ה"תורה האחת" ותמיד הייתה פלורליסטית. היא משקפת את החוק האנגלי והצרפתי וכן חוקיהם של עמי הילידים. העקרונות הבסיסיים של הסכם Meech Lake, הסכם של כבוד הדדי, חוסר התערבות ושלוש בין הילידים לבין התושבים האירופאים החדשים בקנדה, מתאימים יותר כדי לתאר את ההיסטוריה של המשפט הקנדי הרב-גוני. ניתן לחלק את ההיסטוריה המשפטית של קנדה לשלוש תקופות. התקופה הראשונה התאפיינה במגע והכרה בשלוש המערכות המשפטיות. בתקופה השנייה ניסו להטמיע את חוקיהם, מנהגיהם ומסורותיהם של העמים הילידים. ובשנת 1982 החלה התקופה השלישית, תקופה של פיוס, עם קבלת החוקה החדשה של קנדה. בתקופה חדשה זו מרעננים מחדש את החוקים, המנהגים והמסורות של העמים הילידים ומציבים את מקומם מחדש בתוך החוק הקנדי הפלורליסטי, תוך דחייה מוחלטת של כל תיאוריה הדולגת ב"תורה אחת".

A FOUNDING NATION OF CANADA: THE ACADIANS

MAURICE BASQUE

In November 2006, the Canadian House of Commons adopted a motion that recognized the Québécois people as a nation within the Canadian federation. This was yet another milestone in a debate that has been going on since the creation of Canada in 1867, namely the definition of the Canadian national identity or identities. This article briefly explores the evolution of one of Canada's oldest nations, the Acadians, whose origins date back to the 17th century. Without official recognition from the Canadian federal government, the Acadians, especially the Acadian community of New Brunswick, have been nonetheless able to promote themselves as a nation by emphasizing their cultural distinctiveness.

En novembre 2006, la Chambre des communes du Canada avait adopté une motion accordant au peuple québécois le statut de nation au sein de la fédération canadienne. Cette motion constituait un parmi de nombreux événements ayant marqué le débat portant sur la définition de l'identité canadienne (ou des identités canadiennes), débat qui a lieu depuis la fondation du Canada en 1867. Cet article examine brièvement l'évolution de l'une des plus anciennes nations du Canada, les Acadiens, dont les origines remontent au 17^e siècle. N'ayant jamais bénéficié d'une reconnaissance officielle de la part du gouvernement fédéral canadien, les Acadiens, notamment la communauté acadienne du Nouveau-Brunswick, ont promu l'idée qu'ils constituaient une nation en misant sur leurs particularités culturelles.

בנובמבר 2006, אומצה החלטה על ידי בית הנבחרים הקנדי להכיר באנשי קוויבק כאומה בתוך הפדרציה הקנדית. זה היה ציון דרך נוסף בדיון מתמשך מאז הקמתה של קנדה ב 1867 בדבר הגדרת הזהות או הזהויות בקנדה. מאמר זה סוקר בקצרה את יצירתה של האומה הותיקה ביותר בקנדה, האקדית, אשר מוצאה מגיע עד למאה ה 17. ללא הכרה רשמית של הממשל הפדראלי בקנדה, האקדים, ובמיוחד הקהילה האקדית בניו ברסוויק, הצליחו בכל זאת לקדם עצמם כאומה תוך הדגשת הייחודיות התרבותית שלהם.

THE LAW OF RETURN AND (LACK OF) ISRAELI IMMIGRATION POLICY

NA'AMA CARMİ

Given that The Law of Return grants every Jew and the family member of every Jew the right to immigrate and settle in Israel, and that Israel views itself in many respects as a “country of immigration” – it may seem strange to state that Israel does not really have an immigration policy. But in certain respects it does not. Israel is an “aliyah country” rather than an immigration country. It does not view Jews as immigrants but as “olim”, returning to their homeland. I will argue that the Law of Return, both in its symbolic and practical meaning, is responsible for the lack of a comprehensive immigration policy. Apart of the Law of Return, no such policy was ever considered or planned, either because the Law of Return was regarded as an adequate immigration law, or because the need for a comprehensive policy was simply overlooked or ignored.

Considérant le fait que la Loi du retour permet a tous les juifs et aux membres de leur famille le droit d'immigrer et de rester en Israël, et que ce pays se considère en plusieurs façons comme un « pays d'immigration », il peut sembler bizarre que l'État d'Israël ne possède pas vraiment de politique d'immigration. Pourtant, de plusieurs façons, il ne l'est pas. L'Israël est un « pays d'aliyah » plutôt qu'un pays d'immigration. Il ne considère pas les juifs comme étant des immigrés, mais plutôt en tant qu'« olim » retournant à leur patrie. Je vais argumenter que La loi du retour, dans sa signification symbolique et pratique, est responsable du manque d'une politique d'immigration claire. À part la Loi du retour, aucune telle politique n'a été considérée ou prévue, soit parce que la Loi du retour a été considérée comme une loi d'immigration adéquate ou parce que le besoin de politique claire a simplement été négligé ou ignoré.

הואיל וחוק השבות מקנה לכל יהודי ולכל בן משפחה של יהודי את הזכות לעלות ולהתיישב בישראל, ושישראל רואה עצמה במובנים רבים כ"מדינת הגירה" – נראה מוזר שלמעשה אין למדינת ישראל מדיניות הגירה של ממש. אבל במובנים מסוימים אכן אין לה. ישראל הינה "מדינת עלייה" ולא מדינת הגירה. אין היא רואה יהודים כמהגרים, אלא כ"עולים" החוזרים למולדתם. אני אטען כי חוק השבות, הן במובנו הסמלי והן במובנו המעשי, אחראי להעדר מדיניות הגירה מקיפה. מלבד חוק השבות, מדיניות כזאת לעולם לא נשקלה או תוכננה, או משום שחוק השבות נחשב למדיניות הגירה מספקת או משום שפשוט התעלמו מן הצורך במדיניות מקיפה.

IMMIGRATION TO CANADA AND CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP: CONTEMPORARY ASPECTS OF LAW AND POLICY

GERALD GALL

This paper examines some contemporary aspects of Canadian law and policy as they relate to immigration to Canada and Canadian citizenship.

With respect to immigration, this paper looks at the traditional allowable categories or classes of prospective immigrants to Canada and ongoing changes to these categories including skilled workers and the creation of a new category designated the Canadian Experience Class. It examines the current backlog in immigration processing and projected target figures for particular categories of immigrants. The paper briefly examines the special case of immigration into the province of Quebec. It also touches upon current issues that have attracted widespread publicity including security certificates and credentials recognition.

With respect to Canadian citizenship, this paper examines some recent changes including adoption policies and the issue of Canadians born abroad.

Ce texte examine, dans une perspective contemporaine, certains aspects du droit canadien et de la politique canadienne dans leur rapport à l'immigration au Canada et à la citoyenneté canadienne.

En ce qui a trait à l'immigration, ce texte examine les catégories ou les types d'immigrants traditionnellement admissibles, ainsi que les changements qui sont en train d'être apportés à ces catégories, tels que les travailleurs qualifiés et la création d'une nouvelle catégorie d'immigrants, soit celle de la « catégorie de l'expérience canadienne ». L'actuel arriéré de traitement des demandes d'immigration et les cibles projetés quant au nombre d'immigrants voulus dans certaines catégories sont d'autres sujets abordés dans ce texte. Le cas de l'immigration au Québec y est aussi abordé, de même que des sujets d'actualité qui ont attiré l'attention des médias, tels que les certificats de sécurité et la reconnaissance des titres de compétences étrangers.

Quant à la citoyenneté canadienne, cet article analyse quelques réformes récentes, dont les politiques relatives à l'adoption, ainsi que la question des Canadiens nés à l'étranger.

מאמר זה בוחן היבטים עכשוויים של החוק הקנדי ומדיניות קנדה ביחס להגירה ולאזרחות קנדית. בעניין ההגירה, המאמר בוחן את הקטגוריות או הסיוגים הרשמיים המסורתיים של מהגרים לקנדה ואת השינויים המתמשכים בקטגוריות אלה, כולל עובדים מיומנים ויצירת קטגוריה חדשה המכונה "מעמד ההתנסות הקנדית" "ssalC ecneirepxE naidanaC". נבחנת ההצטרפות הקיימת בעיבוד ההגירה וכן מספרי יעד חזויים עבור קטגוריות מסוימות של מהגרים. המאמר דן בקצרה במקרה המיוחד של הגירה לתוך מחוז קוויבק. כמו כן, הוא נוגע בנושאים שזכו לפרסום נרחב, כגון אישורי ביטחון והכרה ברישיונות והמלצות. לגבי אזרחות קנדית, המאמר בוחן שינויים שחלו לאחרונה, כולל מדיניות אימוץ והנושא של קנדים שנולדו בחו"ל.

NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN CANADA AND ISRAEL

JACK JEDWAB

Efforts to provide some empirical basis for community and national belonging have become increasingly popular in plural democracies preoccupied by cohesion. Canada and Israel are no exception as reflected in studies that purport to measure social integration. The author contends that diverging methods characterize social integration research with some analysts submitting tests that force people to make choices between various identities and others calling upon respondents to weigh the importance of such identities. Underlying these approaches are differences over whether identity is inherently in conflict and notably the ethnic and/or religious versus its national expression. Analyzing research from Canada and Israel, the author suggests that those insisting identities are in conflict need to answer the question of "who we are" in terms of national identity in order to establish the conditions of social integration.

Dans les démocraties pluralistes, pour lesquelles la cohésion sociale constitue une question de grande importance, de plus en plus d'efforts sont entrepris pour attribuer un fondement empirique à l'appartenance communautaire et nationale. À ce titre, le Canada et l'Israël ne font pas exception, comme en témoignent d'ailleurs les études qui prétendent mesurer l'intégration sociale. Comme l'argumente l'auteur, la recherche qui s'effectue sur cette question se caractérise par l'utilisation de méthodes divergentes. Certains chercheurs conçoivent des tests qui obligent les répondants à faire des choix entre plusieurs référents identitaires, alors

que d'autres chercheurs préfèrent plutôt demander aux répondants d'évaluer l'importance qu'ils accordent à de telles identités. Essentiellement, ces différentes approches reflètent les divergences d'opinions qui existent autour d'une question, à savoir si oui ou non le conflit est inhérent à la notion d'identité, comme, par exemple, l'identité religieuse et/ou ethnique par opposition à l'identité nationale. Analysant la recherche qui se fait au Canada et en Israël, l'auteur argumente que, pour établir les conditions de l'intégration sociale, ceux qui soutiennent que les identités sont en conflit l'une contre l'autre doivent répondre à la question « qui sommes-nous? » en privilégiant la dimension de l'identité nationale.

הולכים וגוברים המאמצים לבנות בסיס אמפירי בנושא השייכות הקהילתית והלאומית בדמוקרטיה העוסקות בלכידות. קנדה וישראל אינן חריגות מבחינה זו, כפי שמשתקף במחקרים שמתיימרים למדוד שילוב חברתי. המחבר טוען כי חקר השילוב החברתי מאופיין במתודות חלוקות כאשר חלק מן החוקרים עורכים מבחנים שמחייבים אנשים לבחור בין זהויות שונות ואילו אחרים מבקשים מן הנבדקים לשקול את חשיבותן היחסי של זהויות אלה. ביסודן של גישות אלה קיימים הבדלים לגבי השאלה: האם הזהות מצויה בקונפליקט באופן אינהרנטי ובמיוחד כאשר מדובר בפר האתני ו/או הדתי מול ביטוייה הלאומי. המחבר מנתח מחקרים מקנדה ומישראל וטוען כי אלה המתעקשים על כך שזהויות מצויות בקונפליקט חייבים לענות על השאלה של "מי אנחנו" מבחינת הזהות הלאומית על מנת לבסס את התנאים לשילוב חברתי.

THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF WESTERN IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL

KARIN AMIT

This study examines the social integration of immigrants via their satisfaction their lives upon arrival in their new country. The study focuses on Jewish immigrants arriving from Western countries to Israel over the last decade; specifically from North America, Argentina and France. These immigrants are generally highly educated and skilled, and come to Israel out of choice. The objective of this study is to learn about the integration of Western immigrants via their satisfaction with life in Israel and understand the factors explaining it, while taking into account the different countries of origin of these immigrants.

The findings, based on 2007 Ruppin representative survey data, point to great similarities in demographic characteristics and immigration motives among North American and French immigrants. The Argentinean immigrants are less educated, less religious, have a lower standard of living and feel less Israeli than their French or North American counterparts. Yet French and North American immigrants

tend to live in closed ethnic communities. This knowledge may serve Israeli policy makers dealing with the immigration and integration of Western immigrants in the Israeli society.

Cette étude porte sur l'intégration sociale des immigrants en mesurant leur taux de satisfaction avec la vie qu'ils mènent dans leur pays d'accueil. L'étude en question porte sur les immigrants d'origine juive qui, au cours de la dernière décennie, sont arrivés en Israël depuis les pays de l'Occident, en particulier de l'Amérique du Nord, de l'Argentine et de la France. Dans l'ensemble, ces immigrants sont très éduqués et hautement qualifiés et ils sont venus en Israël en raison d'un choix personnel. Le but de cette étude est d'apprendre davantage sur l'intégration des immigrants occidentaux en mesurant leur taux de satisfaction avec leur nouvelle vie et de comprendre les facteurs sur lesquels repose cette satisfaction, tout en tenant compte des différents pays d'origine de ces immigrants.

Basés sur les données de 2007 issues du sondage représentatif «Ruppin», les résultats de nos recherches démontrent qu'il existe d'importantes similitudes au niveau des caractéristiques démographiques et des motifs d'immigration chez les immigrants nord-américains et français. Les immigrants argentins sont moins éduqués et moins religieux; de plus, ils ont un niveau de vie moins élevé et s'identifient moins en tant qu'Israéliens que leurs confrères français et nord-américains. Par contre, les immigrants français et nord-américains ont tendance à se regrouper dans des communautés ethniques fermées. Ce genre de renseignements pourrait être utile aux décideurs israéliens responsables de l'immigration et de l'intégration des immigrants occidentaux au sein de la société israélienne.

מחקר זה בוחן את השילוב החברתי של עולים על סמך שביעות רצונם מחייהם במדינתם החדשה. המחקר מתמקד בעולים יהודים שהגיעו לישראל ממדינות מערביות במהלך העשור האחרון, מצפון אמריקה, ארגנטינה וצרפת. עולים אלה נוטים להיות משכילים ומיומנים והם הגיעו לישראל מתוך בחירה. מטרת המחקר היא ללמוד על שילובם של עולים מערביים על סמך שביעות רצונם מחייהם בישראל ולהבין את הגורמים המסבירים זאת, תוך התייחסות למדינות המוצא השונות של העולים. הממצאים, המבוססים על נתוני סקר ייצוגי של רופין משנת 2007, מצביעים על דמיון רב בין המאפיינים הדמוגרפיים ומניעי העלייה בקרב עולים מצפון אמריקה ומצרפת. העולים הארגנטיניים הם פחות משכילים, פחות דתיים, בעלי רמת חיים נמוכה יותר ומרגישים פחות ישראליים מאשר עמיתיהם הצרפתים או הצפון אמריקנים. אולם עולים צרפתים וצפון אמריקנים נוטים לחיות בתוך קהילות אתניות סגורות. מידע זה עשוי לשמש את קובעי המדיניות הישראליים העוסקים בעלייה ובשילוב של עולים מערביים בתוך החברה הישראלית.

QUEBEC'S QUANDARIES WITH IDENTITY

VICTOR ARMONY

Quebec is the only province in Canada and one of very few sub-national jurisdictions in the Western world that chooses the immigrants that are deemed to better fit its distinct societal goals. Quebec's unique status in the Canadian federation puts immigrants before a particularly bewildering dilemma: Which is the point of destination in this particular migration process? Is it Quebec or Canada? The easy and agreeable answer would be "both," but loyalty, identity, and the sense of belonging are difficult to split, subjectively and materially, between two competing and, in some ways, mutually excluding, host societies. Thus, most immigrants to Quebec, even when they are reluctant to "take sides" in the English-French divide, are forced to navigate and decode this intricate reality and to make specific, sometimes life-altering choices. Ethnic identity of young non-Jewish immigrants from former Soviet Union in Israel

Le Québec est la seule province du Canada et l'un des seuls états non-souverains de l'Occident qui sélectionne lui-même les immigrants jugés les mieux aptes à répondre aux projets de société qui lui sont propres. La position unique que détient le Québec au sein de la fédération canadienne crée chez les immigrants un important dilemme : Quelle est la destination finale de leur processus d'immigration ? Est-ce le Québec ou le Canada ? La réponse la plus facile et la moins litigieuse serait « les deux ». Par contre, la loyauté, l'identité et le sentiment d'appartenance sont des notions qui ne se partagent pas facilement, que ce soit subjectivement ou matériellement, entre deux sociétés d'accueil qui sont en concurrence et qui, à bien des égards, s'excluent l'une l'autre. Ainsi, la plupart des immigrants au Québec, même lorsqu'ils se tiennent à l'écart du débat « Anglais/Français », sont néanmoins obligés de naviguer et de déchiffrer cette réalité complexe et de prendre des décisions qui, parfois, ont un grand impact sur leur vie.

קוויבק הינו המחוז היחיד בקנדה, ואחד מאזורי השיפוט התת-לאומיים הבודדים בעולם המערבי, אשר בוחר מהגרים על פי התאמתם ליעדיו החברתיים הייחודיים. מעמדו הייחודי של חבל קוויבק בתוך הפדרציה הקנדית מעמיד את המהגרים בפני דילמה מבלבלת: מהו היעד הספציפי של מסע ההגירה שלהם, קוויבק או קנדה? התשובה הקלה והמזומנה היא "גם וגם", אך קשה לחלק את הנאמנות, הזהות ותחושת השייכות בין שתי חברות מארחות מתחרות, שאף במובנים מסוימים נוגדות זו את זו, הן מבחינה סובייקטיבי והן מבחינה ממשית. לכן, מהגרים המגיעים לקוויבק, אף אם הם נרתעים מ"לבחור צד" בפילוג האנגלי-צרפתי, נאלצים לנווט בתוך מציאות מורכבת זו ולפענח אותה על מנת לקבל החלטות ספציפיות ואף לעתים הרות גורל.

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF YOUNG NON-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN ISRAEL

TATYANA ZASLAVSKY & TAMAR HOROWITZ

Since 1990 about a million immigrants have come to Israel from the former Soviet Union (FSU). More than a quarter of these immigrants were not registered as Jews (NRAJ)¹. The present study focuses on the acculturation and ethnic identity of NRAJ young immigrants and assesses the influence of formal nationality registration on ethnic identity formation.

The results of the study are based on the in-depth interviews with 21 young NRAJ immigrants and on the structured survey conducted among immigrants aged 16-22, NRAJ as well RAJ (registered as Jews).

Most NRAJ participants reported that immigration and the encounter with the Jewish Israeli society raised the question of ethnic identity and prompted their need to explore their connection with the Jewish people. Three patterns of dealing with the ethnic identity crisis were found: 1) participants who felt and defined themselves as Jewish regardless of their religious and legal status; 2) participants who didn't define themselves as Jews but did perceive Israel as their home and considered themselves an integral part of Israeli society; 3) participants who neither identified themselves as Jews or Israelis.

Most participants, both NRAJ and RAJ, tend to perceive the Israeli society as ethno-centric and non-tolerant toward non-Jews immigration. Nevertheless the religious definition and the formal nationality registration did not have significant influence on the immigrants' integration into the Israeli society and their ethnic self-identification. Jewish mother and non-Jewish father (RAJ) and children of non-Jewish mother and Jewish father (NRAJ). In other words, the extent of Jewish affiliation influences more the immigrants' Jewish identity formation than their national status in Israel.

Depuis 1990, environ un million d'immigrants sont venus en Israël de l'ancienne Union Soviétique. Plus d'un quart d'entre eux n'étaient pas enregistrés comme Juifs (PECJ)¹. La présente étude met l'accent sur l'acculturation et l'identité ethnique de jeunes immigrants PECJ et évalue l'influence de l'enregistrement formel de la nationalité sur la formation de l'identité ethnique.

Les résultats de l'étude sont fondés sur les entrevues détaillées de 21 jeunes immigrants PECJ et sur le sondage structuré conduit auprès d'immigrants âgés entre 16-22 ans, parmi des PECJ ainsi que des ECJ (enregistrés comme Juifs).

La plupart des participants PECJ rapportèrent que l'immigration et la rencontre avec la société israélienne juive souleva la question de l'identité ethnique et provoqua chez eux un besoin d'explorer leur lien avec le peuple juif. Trois mécanismes d'adaptation à cette crise d'identité ethnique ressortirent : 1) les participants qui se sentaient et se définissaient comme Juifs sans tenir compte de leurs statuts religieux ou légal; 2) les participants qui ne se définissaient pas comme Juifs, mais qui percevaient Israël comme leur pays et qui se considéraient comme une partie intégrante de la société israélienne; 3) les participants qui ne s'identifiaient ni comme Juifs, ni comme Israéliens.

La majorité des participants, PECJ et ECJ, tendent percevoir la société israélienne comme ethnocentrique et non tolérante à l'égard de l'immigration non juive. Néanmoins, la définition religieuse, ainsi que l'enregistrement formel de la nationalité n'avaient pas d'influence significative sur l'intégration des immigrants dans la société israélienne et sur leur auto-identification ethnique. Les ECJ ayant une mère juive et un père non-juif, ainsi que les PECJ ayant une mère non-juive et un père juif. En d'autres mots, l'étendue des affiliations juives influence plus la formation de l'identité juive des immigrants que leur statut national en Israël.

מאז שנת 1990 כמיליון עולים הגיעו לישראל ממדינות חבר העמים. למעלה מרבע מן העולים הללו לא נרשמו כיהודים (לרכ"י). המחקר הנוכחי מתמקד בהטמעה התרבותית-חברתית ובזהות האתנית של עולים צעירים שאינם רשומים כיהודים ומעריכה את השפעתו של רישום הלאום הפורמאלי על עיצוב הזהות האתנית. תוצאות המחקר מבוססות על ראיונות עומק שנערכו עם 21 עולים צעירים לרכ"י ועל הסקר המובנה שנערך בין עולים בגילאי 16-22, רשומים ולא רשומים כיהודים. רוב המשתתפים שאינם רשומים כיהודים דיווחו כי העלייה והמפגש עם החברה הישראלית היהודית העלו עבורם את שאלת הזהות האתנית ועוררו בהם צורך לחקור את הקשר שלהם לעם היהודי. נמצאו שלושה דפוסי התמודדות בעניין משבר הזהות האתנית: 1) משתתפים שהרגישו והגדירו עצמם כיהודים על אף הסטאטוס הדתי והמשפטי שלהם; 2) משתתפים אשר לא הגדירו עצמם כיהודים אך כן ראו את ישראל כביתם והחשיבו עצמם כחלק אינטגרלי מהחברה הישראלית; 3) משתתפים שלא זיהו עצמם כיהודים או כישראלים. רוב המשתתפים, הן הרשומים כיהודים והן שאינם רשומים כיהודים, נוטים לתפוס את החברה הישראלית כאתנו-צנטרית וכבלתי סובלנית כלפי עולים שאינם יהודים. למרות זאת, ההגדרה הדתית ורישום הלאום הרשמי לא השפיעו באופן משמעותי על שילובם של העולים בחברה הישראלית ועל הזהות העצמית האתנית שלהם. כלומר, מידת השיוך היהודי משפיעה על זהותם היהודית של העולים יותר מאשר הסטאטוס הלאומי שלהם בישראל.

BONJOUR! SHALOM! – INTEGRATION INTO THE MONTREAL JEWISH COMMUNITY **HOWARD BERGER, MONIQUE LAPOINTE AND RUTH NAJMAN**

This paper will discuss the multiple challenges Agence Ometz faces when trying to assist Jewish immigrants with their integration into Quebec/Montreal while simultaneously trying to secure their future participation in the life of the Montreal Jewish Community. It will also discuss the criteria upon which its successes should be measured.

Ce texte constitue une réflexion sur les nombreux défis auxquels fait face l'Agence Ometz en essayant de faciliter l'intégration des immigrants d'origine juive au Québec et à Montréal, tout en cherchant à assurer leur éventuelle participation à la vie de la communauté juive de Montréal. Il y sera aussi question des critères qui devraient être utilisés pour évaluer le travail accompli par cette agence.

מאמר זה דן באתגרים המרובים העומדים בפני סוכנות ztemO בבואה לעזור למהגרים יהודיים בשילובם לתוך קוויבק/מונטריאול תוך ביסוס השתתפותם העתידית בחיי הקהילה היהודית של מונטריאול. כמו כן, המאמר דן בקריטריונים על פיהם יש למדוד את הצלחות הארגון.

ETHNICITY AND CULTURE AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN THE ISRAELI PERIPHERY **MOSHE SHOKEID**

The relationships between center and periphery have been a continuing subject of research among economists, sociologists and geographers. In nation states the centers take a growing role in the world global economy leaving behind the periphery in a state of dependence on government policies designed to keep them from further decline. Inevitably, that situation seems designed to increase poverty and cultural deprivation in peripheral zones and cause the gradual departure of the stronger elements among the local population. The equation of center versus periphery introduces a severe subtext of social problems when it implicates weaker social minorities such as indigenous traditional populations or groups of Third World immigrants. Our presentation will introduce the Israeli case, concentrating on some facts and myths related to the social, ethnic and cultural circumstances of the Negev (southern region) periphery.

Les relations entre le centre et les périphéries continuent d'être un sujet de recherche parmi les économistes, sociologues et géographes. Dans les états-nations, les centres occupent un rôle croissant dans l'économie mondiale globale,

laissant les périphéries dans un état de dépendance envers les politiques gouvernementales conçus pour prévenir l'accentuation de leur déclin. Inévitablement, cette situation semble être conçue pour augmenter la pauvreté et la privation culturelle dans les zones périphériques, et semble aussi causer le départ graduel des meilleurs éléments parmi la population local. L'équation du centre versus la périphérie laisse sévèrement sous-entendre l'existence de problèmes sociaux lorsqu'elle implique des minorités sociales plus faibles, tel que les populations ou groupes indigènes traditionnelles des immigrants du tiers monde. Notre présentation introduira le cas israélien en se concentrant sur certains faits et mythes reliés aux circonstances sociales, ethniques et culturelles de la périphérie de Negev (région du sud).

יחסי הגומלין בין מרכז לפריפריה מהווים נושא קבוע למחקר בקרב כלכלנים, סוציולוגים וגיאוגרפים. במדינות לאום המרכזים ממלאים תפקיד הולך וגדל בכלכלה העולמית הגלובלית ומשאירים את הפריפריה מאחור, כאשר היא תלויה במדיניות ממשלתית שנועדה למנוע את המשך התדרדרותה. באופן בלתי נמנע, נראה כי מצב זה מגדיל את העוני והמחסור התרבותי באזורים פריפריאליים וגורם ליציאה הדרגתית של האלמנטים החזקים בתוך האוכלוסייה המקומית. המשוואה של מרכז לעומת פריפריה מציגה סאבטקסט חמור של בעיות חברתיות כאשר היא מערבת מיעוטים חברתיים חלשים יותר כגון אוכלוסיות ילידים מסורתיות או קבוצות של מהגרי עולם שלישי. מחקרנו יציג את המקרה הישראלי ויתמקד בעובדות ובמיתוסים שונים הקשורים בניסיונות החברתיים, האתניות והתרבותיות של פריפריית הנגב בדרום.

CHRISTIAN IMMIGRANTS IN A JEWISH STATE: ETHNIC IDENTITY OF NON-JEWISH MIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

REBECA RAIJMAN AND YANA HASIN

This paper focuses on patterns of ethnic identity amongst a specific group of non-Jewish, Former Soviet Union (FSU) migrants arriving in Israel after 1989 under its Law of Return: those who defined themselves as Christians and attend church services in Israel.

Ce texte porte sur les caractéristiques de l'identité ethnique qui existent au sein d'un groupe particulier d'immigrants non-juifs provenant de l'ancienne Union soviétique et arrivant en Israël après 1989 sous la loi du Retour de ce pays. Il s'agit de ceux qui se sont définis comme chrétiens et qui vont à la messe en Israël.

מאז שנות ה-90 מספר הולך וגובר של מהגרים שאינם יהודים מבחינת ההלכה היהודית מגיעים לישראל על סמך חוק השבות. לכן, בפעם הראשונה ישראל נעשתה בפועל לחברת מהגרים, למרות הגדרתה העצמית כמדינת עלייה. במחקר זה אנו מתמקדים בקבוצה ספציפית של מהגרים לא יהודים, אלה המעדיפים לשמר את דתם הנוצרית במדינה בעלת אופי יהודי ברור. אנו מתמקדים באופן ספציפי בסיבות להגירה, בדרכים לנצרות ובתפקידן של כניסיות ושל ארגונים דתיים בלתי רשמיים בתהליך השילוב של המהגרים, דפוסים של זהות אתנית ועמדות כלפי עמדת ההכללה של המדינה וקבוצות אתניות אחרות בחברה הישראלית. בפרק המסקנות אנו דנים בהשפעה הריבודית המשמעותית שעשויה להיות למעמד החדש הזה של עולה לא יהודי מבחינת גישה לשוק העבודה ובהתהוותן של זכויות חברתיות ואזרחיות אלו ואחרות במדינה אתנו-לאומית כישראל.

LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AS THE MAIN VEHICLE OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION: RUSSIAN IMMIGRANTS FROM THE 1990S IN ISRAEL

LARISSA REMENNICK

Drawing on the survey from a representative national sample of 804 post-1989 Russian-speaking immigrants in Israel, this article highlights the key role of host language acquisition as a pathway to economic success and social integration. Russian immigrants are known for their tendency for cultural and linguistic retention, which in the Israeli case was augmented by problems of occupational integration. The formation during the 1990s of a strong Russian community in Israel – with its own labor market, consumer services, media and social networks – was for many immigrants a further disincentive to improving their Hebrew. Although they are able to meet most of their basic needs within the so-called “Russian street”, immigrants with poor Hebrew skills remain socially disengaged from the host society. The improvement of Hebrew skills with increasing tenure in Israel was mainly found among young and middle-aged respondents. Younger and upwardly mobile immigrants show the tendency to additive bilingualism, including the elements of Hebrew into everyday communications and cultural/media consumption, while retaining Russian as their core language. Mastering and using Hebrew serves as the key trigger for the reshaping of immigrants’ identity to include new Israeli elements.

Ce texte est basé sur les résultats d'un sondage effectué auprès d'un échantillon national et représentatif de 804 immigrants russophones qui sont arrivés en Israël après 1989. L'étude démontre que l'apprentissage de la langue parlée par la société d'accueil constitue un facteur clé de la réussite économique et de l'intégration sociale. La rétention culturelle et linguistique est une tendance souvent remarquée

chez les immigrants russes. Cette tendance s'est accrue dans le cas israélien en raison de problèmes d'intégration professionnelle. Avec la mise en place, durant les années 1990, d'une forte communauté russe en Israël – bénéficiant de son propre marché du travail, ses propres services aux consommateurs, ses propres médias et réseaux sociaux – plusieurs immigrants ne voyaient pas la pertinence d'améliorer ou d'approfondir leur connaissance de l'hébreu. Bien qu'ils soient capables de subvenir à la plupart de leurs besoins élémentaires au sein de la soi-dite «Russian Street», les immigrants ayant une faible connaissance de l'hébreu demeurent socialement à l'écart de la société d'accueil. C'est surtout chez les jeunes répondants et les répondants d'un certain d'âge que l'on peut décerner une amélioration des connaissances de l'hébreu qui est concomitante à la durée du séjour en Israël. Tout en conservant le russe comme langue principale, les jeunes immigrants et les immigrants à mobilité sociale ascendante démontrent une tendance vers le bilinguisme additif, puisqu'ils incorporent des éléments de la langue hébraïque dans leurs communications quotidiennes, ainsi que dans leur consommation médiatique et culturelle de tous les jours. La maîtrise et l'utilisation de l'hébreu constituent les outils principaux permettant de refaçonner l'identité des immigrants afin de pouvoir y incorporer de nouveaux éléments israéliens.

מיומנות בשפת המדינה המארכת מוכרת כאחד הגורמים המרכזיים בשילובו המקצועי והחברתי המוצלח של המהגר. עולים ממדינות חבר העמים הגיעו לישראל בשנות ה-90 לאחר שחיו בבידוד מן המערב מאחורי מסך הברזל ולא קיבלו כל חינוך יהודי ולמעשה לא דיברו אנגלית או עברית כלל. בהתבסס על הניתוח המשולב של מחקר איכותי ומובנה שערכתי במהלך העשור האחרון, אני בוחנת את תפקידן המכריע של שפות (בעיקר עברית, אבל גם אנגלית עבור בעלי מקצועות חופשיים) בהמשכות המקצועית ובחדירה החברתית של דוברי רוסית בישראל. אני מתמקדת במחסומים הניצבים בפני רוב העולים מבחינת התקדמות העברית, תפקידה של העברית באישור הזהות הישראלית, הבדלים בין-דוריים ותפקידם של מקום העבודה ושל רשתות חברתיות בשילוב שפתי וחברתי.

MISCONCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

MORTON WEINFELD

Immigrants to Canada, whether economic migrants, refugees, or family class, may be unable or unwilling to act to maximize economic and social integration. Focusing on these outcomes in assessing the impact of immigration on Canadian society may therefore be somewhat misplaced.

Qu'ils soient des immigrants économiques, des réfugiés, ou encore des immigrants de la classe familiale, il est possible que les immigrants arrivant au Canada soient incapables, ou encore soient peu disposés d'agir afin de maximiser leur intégration économique et sociale. Par conséquent, la maximisation de l'intégration économique et sociale ne constitue peut-être pas le meilleur variable à privilégier afin d'évaluer l'impact de l'immigration sur la société canadienne.

מהגרים לקנדה, בין אם הם מהגרים כלכליים, פליטים או מהגרים בעקבות איחוד משפחות, עשויים לא להשתדל או לא לרצות למקסם את השתלבותם הכלכלית והחברתית. לכן, יתכן ומוטעה במידה מסוימת להתמקד בתוצאות אלה כאשר מעריכים את השפעת ההגירה על החברה הקנדית.

DE QUELQUES DÉBATS SUR L'INTÉGRATION DES IMMIGRANTS AU QUÉBEC ET SUR LA DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE À LA LUMIÈRE D'UN RETOUR CRITIQUE SUR LA NOTION DE CAPITAL SOCIAL

ANNICK GERMAIN

This paper explores the thesis of Robert Putman on social capital and his contention that immigrants diminish social capital as they fail to engage sufficiently contribute to what Putman describes as bridging social capital. This presumably has an important bearing on immigrant integration and social cohesion. Yet in applying Putnam's hypothesis to immigrants in Montreal by looking at their community engagement there appears little basis to support the concerns raised by Putnam.

Ce texte examine la thèse du capital social énoncée par Robert Putman. Il est possible donc de présumer que cet état de chose pourrait grandement influencer l'intégration des immigrants ainsi que la cohésion sociale. Par contre, le cas des immigrants à Montréal ne semble pas confirmer l'hypothèse de Putman. En effet, une analyse de la participation communautaire des immigrants montréalais suggère que les inquiétudes suscitées par Putman n'ont que très peu de fondements.

מאמר זה בוחן את תיאורית ההון החברתי של רוברט פוטנמן ותפיסתו כי מהגרים מצמצמים את ההון החברתי משום שאינם מעורבים מספיק בתרומה ל"הונם החברתי המגשר" במונחיו של פוטנמן. ההנחה היא שיש לכך השפעה חשובה על שילובם של המהגרים ועל הלכידות החברתית. אך כאשר מחילים את השערתו של פוטנמן על מהגרים במונטריאול דרך בחינת מחויבותם הקהילתית נראה כי אין בסיס של ממש לחששות שהוא מעלה.

BÂTIR UNE COMMUNAUTÉ ACCUEILLANTE : LE CAS DES COMMUNAUTÉS FRANCOPHONES EN SITUATION MINORITAIRE AU CANADA

CHEDLY BELKHODJA

What is meant by a “welcoming” or “host community” when referring to the group that presumably assumes responsibility for addressing the needs of new immigrants? The increasing use of this term raises a number of issues about immigrant integration. Some thoughts will be offered about the use of the term “welcoming community”. Focusing on smaller urban centres in Canada, an analysis will be offered of the institutional capacity of the welcoming communities and their specific needs. It is noted that the enhancement of institutional capacity can be an important precondition in providing a proper welcome to newcomers.

Qu'entend-on par l'expression « société d'accueil » lorsqu'elle sert à désigner le groupe qui vraisemblablement prend la responsabilité de répondre aux besoins des immigrants? L'utilisation de plus en plus fréquente de cette expression soulève plusieurs questions au sujet de l'intégration des immigrants. Ce texte portera une réflexion sur l'utilisation de l'expression « société d'accueil ». Se penchant sur le cas des petits centres urbains au Canada, ce texte présentera une analyse des sociétés d'accueil en termes de leur capacité institutionnelle et de leurs besoins particuliers. L'amélioration de cette capacité institutionnelle peut-être un important facteur pouvant permettre d'offrir un accueil convenable aux nouveaux venus.

מהי הכוונה במונח קהילה “מקבלת” או “מארחת” כאשר מדובר בקבוצה שאמורה לקבל על עצמה את האחריות לטפל בצרכיהם של מהגרים. השימוש הגובר במונח זה מעלה מספר נושאים לגבי שילוב מהגרים. אנו נציע רעיונות לגבי השימוש במונח “קהילה מקבלת”. מוצע ניתוח של היכולת המוסדית של קהילות מקבלות וצרכיהן הספציפיים, בהתבסס על מרכזים עירוניים קטנים בקנדה. אנו נציין כי הגברת היכולת המוסדית עשויה להוות תנאי מוקדם חשוב לקבלה נכונה של תושבים חדשים.

ESTIMATING SELF-SELECTION OF IMMIGRANTS: DECOMPOSING THE DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN NATIVES AND IMMIGRANTS IN THE US AND ISRAEL

YITCHAK HABERFELD

Conventionally, differences in the self-selection of immigrant groups on unobserved earnings determinants are estimated by comparing the groups' earnings assimilation rates at destination. However, such estimates may be contaminated by differences in the destinations' market structures. This paper offers a better

strategy for estimating immigrants' self-selection patterns on unmeasured attributes by applying the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) method for decomposing difference in differentials. This method enables us to decompose the difference in earnings gaps between native-born workers and immigrants in two countries (or in two time periods) into (a) a portion due to inter-country (or between-period) differences in returns to observed and unobserved characteristics; and (b) a portion due to differences in the mean observed and unobserved attributes of immigrant groups. The focal component is the relative difference in the mean unmeasured characteristics of the two immigrant groups.

This method has three major advantages over the conventional approach of estimating assimilation rates. First, it controls for differences in the structure of immigrants' respective destination markets. Consequently, it also allows us to relax the assumptions involved in the standard method of using assimilation rates as proxies of immigrants' unmeasured attributes. Finally, this method provides us with a quantified and testable effect of immigrants' unmeasured characteristics on their economic success.

This strategy is demonstrated by re-analyzing the data used by Cohen and Haberfeld (2007), who presented assimilation rates as evidence for immigrants' self selection. Drawing on US and Israeli decennial census data and comparing the self-selection patterns of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) who arrived in the US and Israel during the 1970s, the results support the previous findings that used indirect evidence. FSU immigrants who chose the US have significantly higher levels of unobserved earnings determinants than those who chose Israel.

Normalement, les différences dans l'auto-sélection de groupes immigrants sur les facteurs de revenus inobservés sont estimées en comparant les taux d'assimilation de revenus du groupe à destination. Cependant, ce genre d'estimé peut être contaminé par des différences dans les structures commerciales des destinations. Cet article offre une meilleure stratégie pour évaluer les modèles d'auto-sélection des immigrants sur des caractéristiques non mesurés par l'application la méthode *Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce* (1991) pour l'analyse de différences de différentiels. Cette méthode nous permet de décomposer les différences dans les écarts de revenus entre les travailleurs citoyens de naissance et les immigrants dans deux pays (ou dans deux périodes de temps) dans (a) une partie causée des différences entre pays (ou entre périodes de temps) de revenus vers des caractéristiques observés et inobservés; et (b) une partie causée par des différences dans la moyenne des attributs observés et inobservés de groupes immigrants. Le point central est la différence relative dans la moyenne des caractéristiques non mesurés des deux groupes immigrants.

Cette méthode a trois avantages importants sur l'approche conventionnelle utilisée pour évaluer les taux d'assimilation. Premièrement, elle contrôle les différences dans la structure des destinations commerciales respectives des immigrants. Par conséquent, cela nous permet d'assouplir les hypothèses impliquées dans la méthode standard d'utiliser les taux d'assimilation comme indicateurs des attributs non mesurés des immigrants. Finalement, cette méthode nous fournit un effet quantifiable et analysable des caractéristiques non mesurés des immigrants sur leur succès économique.

Cette stratégie est démontrée en ré-analysant les données utilisées par *Cohen and Haberfeld* (2007), qui présentaient les taux d'assimilation comme une preuve de l'auto-sélection des immigrants. En se fondant sur des données de recensement décennal des États-Unis et d'Israël, et en comparant les modèles d'auto-sélection d'immigrants Juifs arrivant de l'ancienne Union Soviétique qui arrivèrent aux États-Unis et en Israël pendant les années 1970, les résultats supportent les conclusions précédentes fondées sur des preuves indirectes. Les immigrants de l'ancienne Union Soviétique qui ont choisi les États-Unis ont des niveaux bien supérieurs de facteurs de revenus inobservés que ceux qui ont choisi Israël.

באופן קונבנציונלי, הבדלים בסלקציה העצמית של קבוצות מהגרים המבוססים על קובעי הכנסה משמעותיים נאמדים באמצעות השוואת שיעורי האסימילציה של הקבוצות במדינת היעד. אך אומדנים אלה עלולים להיות מזהמים על ידי הבדלים במבני השוק של אותן מדינות יעד. מחקר זה מציע אסטרטגיה טובה יותר לאומדן הסלקציה העצמית של מהגרים באמצעות בחינת תכונות לא מדידות תוך שימוש בשיטתם של *John H. Murnighan and David A. Colander* (1991) (לפירוק הבדלים) דה-קומפוזיציה. שיטה זו מאפשרת לנו לפרק את ההבדל בפערי ההכנסה בין עובדים ילידים ומהגרים בשתי מדינות (או בשתי תקופות זמן) (ל: א) (חלק הנובע מהבדלים בין-מדינותיים) או בין פרקי זמן (בהחזרים עבור תכונות מדידות ובלתי מדידות; ו-ב) (חלק הנובע מהבדלים בתכונות המדידות והלא מדידות הממוצעות של קבוצות מהגרים. המרכיב המרכזי הינו ההבדל היחסי בתכונות הבלתי מדידות הממוצעות של שתי קבוצות המהגרים.

לשיטה זו שלושה יתרונות עיקריים לעומת הגישה הקונבנציונלית של אומדן שיעורי האסימילציה. ראשית, היא שולטת על ההבדלים במבנה השוק בכל ארץ יעד. בפועל יוצא מכך, היא מאפשרת לנו להגמיש את ההשערות הכרוכות בשיטה הסטנדרטית של שימוש בשיעורי אסימילציה כמייצגים את התכונות הלא מדידות של המהגרים. לבסוף, שיטה זו מספקת אפקט כמותי ובדוק של התכונות הלא מדידות של מהגרים על הצלחתם הכלכלית. אסטרטגיה זו מוצגת באמצעות ניתוח חוזר של הנתונים ששימשו את *John H. Murnighan and David A. Colander* (2007) אשר הציגו שיעורי אסימילציה כעדות לסלקציה עצמית של מהגרים. בהתבסס על נתוני מפקד האוכלוסין האמריקני והישראלי ועל השוואת דפוסי סלקציה עצמית של מהגרים יהודים מברית המועצות לשעבר אשר הגיעו לארה"ב ולישראל במהלך שנות ה-70, הממצאים תומכים בממצאים הקודמים שהשתמשו בשיטות אומדן עקיפות. למהגרים מברית המועצות לשעבר אשר בחרו להגיע לארה"ב יש רמה גבוהה יותר באופן מובהק של קובעי הכנסה לא מדידים מאשר אלה שבחרו להגיע לישראל

IMPACT OF ETHNICITY ON FINANCING OF IMMIGRANT BUSINESSES

NONNA KUSHNIROVICH & SIBYLLE HEILBRUNN

The purpose of this study is to investigate how ethnicity and co-ethnic business deals affect financing patterns of immigrant entrepreneurs. The purpose of this study is to investigate how ethnicity and co-ethnic business dealing affect financing patterns of immigrant entrepreneurs. The study examines differences in financing between immigrant and non-immigrant businesses, investigating whether these differences are caused by co-ethnic business deals of immigrant entrepreneurs.

The target research population consisted of Israeli born and FSU immigrant entrepreneurs who came to Israel between 1989 and 2006 and were operating businesses at the time of survey. Based on a combination of convenient and snowball samples, 183 FSU immigrant and 244 Israel-born business owners were surveyed. In our study we compared three groups of entrepreneurs: immigrant co-ethnic entrepreneurs, immigrant non-ethnic entrepreneurs and Israeli born entrepreneurs.

Our study revealed that co-ethnic business deals do not does not influence start-up funds of immigrant business but does effect the problems encountered when recruiting ongoing funds and accessing trade credit. In other words, it is not a critical factor in the stage of setting up a business but is a salient factor influencing business survival. Co-ethnic business deals also significantly affect business viability in terms of growth. The financial viability of co-ethnic immigrant businesses is lower than that of their counterparts. Co-ethnic business deals fills in for the average immigrant fills in immigrant entrepreneurs lack of social capital, but does not constitute a competitive advantage for them.

Sujet de recherche ou problème: l'objectif de cette recherche est d'étudier comment l'ethnicité et la co-ethnicité en affaires affectent le financement des entrepreneurs d'immigrés. L'étude examine les différences dans le financement d'entreprises d'immigrés et de non-immigrés, essayant de comprendre si ces différences sont provoquées par la co-ethnicité en affaires des entrepreneurs d'immigrés.

Méthodologie de recherche. La population cible fut composée d'israéliens d'origine et d'immigrant post-FSU étant venus en Israël entre 1989 et 2006 et opérant des entreprises durant la période de distribution des questionnaires. Basé sur une combinaison d'échantillons, 183 immigrés de FSU et 244 Israël-nés, tous entrepreneurs, ont été examinés. Dans notre étude, nous avons comparé trois groupes d'entrepreneurs : entrepreneurs co-ethniques immigrés, entrepreneurs non-ethniques immigrés et entrepreneurs nés en Israël.

Conclusions. Notre étude a révélé que les relations d'affaires co-ethnique n'a pas d'impact sur l'accès à un fond de démarrage pour les entreprises d'immigrés, mais affecte les problèmes rencontrés en ce qui concerne la recherche de fonds de continuité et l'accès au crédit commercial. En d'autres termes, ce n'est pas un facteur critique dans l'étape de démarrage en affaire, mais est un facteur saillant influençant la survie en affaire. Les relations d'affaires co-ethniques affectent de manière significative la viabilité d'affaires en termes de croissance. La viabilité financière des entreprises d'immigrés co-ethniques est inférieure à celle de leurs contreparties. Les relations d'affaires co-ethnique encombrant les entrepreneurs immigrés d'un manque de capital social, mais ne constitue pas un avantage compétitif pour elles.

מטרתו של מחקר זה היא לחקור איך האתניות וניהול עסקים דו-אתניים משפיעים על דפוסי מימון של יזמים עולים. המחקר בוחן את ההבדלים בין עסקים של עולים לעומת עסקים שאינם של עולים ובודק האם ההבדלים הללו נובעים מניהול עסקים דו-אתניים של יזמים עולים.

אוכלוסיית היעד של המחקר כללה יזמים ילידי ישראל ויוצאי מדינות חבר העמים שעלו לישראל בין השנים 1989-2006 שהפעילו עסקים בעת ביצוע הסקר. בהתבסס על שילוב של מדגמי נוחות ומדגמי כדור שלג, נסקרו 183 בעלי עסקים עולים ממדינות חבר העמים ו-244 ילידי ישראל. במחקר שלנו השוונו בין שלוש קבוצות של יזמים: יזמים עולים דו-אתניים, יזמים עולים בלתי-אתניים ויזמים ילידי ישראל.

מחקרנו גילה שניהול עסקים דו-אתניים אינו משפיע על מימון התחלתי של עסקים עולים אך אכן משפיע על הבעיות הכרוכות בגיוס מימון שוטף וגישה לאשראי עסקי. כלומר, אין זה גורם קריטי בשלב הקמת העסק אך זהו גורם חשוב מבחינת הישרדות העסק. ניהול עסקים דו-אתניים גם משפיע באופן משמעותי על יכולת הקיום של העסק מבחינת צמיחה. יכולת הקיום הכלכלית של עסקים דו-אתניים נמוכה מזו של עמיתיהם. ניהול עסקים דו-אתניים מגשר על חוסר ההון של יזמים עולים, אך אין הוא מהווה יתרון תחרותי עבורם.

THE CURRENT WAVE OF FORMER SOVIET UNION IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR ABSORPTION PROCESS IN ISRAEL: A LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH (1989-2006)

YEHUDIT ROSENBAUM-TAMARI

My paper presents a unique study carried out by the Ministry of Absorption on the Former Soviet Union (FSU) immigrants, who came to Israel during the period from 1989 to 2006.

Ce texte présente une étude unique effectuée par le Ministère de l'immigration et de l'intégration et portant sur les immigrants originaires de l'ancienne Union soviétique qui sont arrivés en Israël durant la période s'échelonnant de 1989 à 2006.

מאז שנת 1989 הגיעו לישראל כמעט מיליון עולים ממדינות חבר העמים, ובכך הגדילו את האוכלוסייה הכללית בכ-16%. בתחילת גל עליה זה המשרד לקליטת עלייה יזם סקר לגבי כל היבטי קליטתם בישראל. סקר זה נמשך והוא מהווה אחד הכלים המרכזיים להספקת מידע בסיסי של מדיניות ועובדי שטח לגבי תהליך זה תוך כדי התרחשותו.

אוכלוסיית היעד כללה יחידות משפחתיות של עולים שהגיעו לישראל ממדינות חבר העמים במהלך תקופה נתונה. מדגמי שכבות של אוכלוסיות אלה, שכללו כ-1100 ראשי משפחה כל אחד, נלקחו מתוך תיקי המידע של משרד הקליטה. כל אדם במדגם רואיין פנים מול פנים בשפה הרוסית בנקודות זמן שונות של שהותו בישראל: במהלך השנה הראשונה לאחר העלייה, במהלך השנה השנייה, הרביעית ולבסוף, לאחר חמש שנים בארץ.

המחקר מספק אמצעי קליטה בתחומי עניין שונים, ביניהם: דיור ומגורים, קליטה כלכלית ורמת חיים, תעסוקה, רכישת שפה והשימוש בה, קליטה חברתית ותרבותית, זהות ישראלית ויהודית ורמת מחויבות לישראל. שישה מדגמים נכללו במחקר זה במהלך 17 שנות עלייה. הם מייצגים את כל היחידות המשפחתיות של עולים שהגיעו לארץ בחודשים מסוימים בשנים: 1989, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2001 ו-2005 עד 2006.

המאמר מתמקד בשני מקטעים שנלקחו מתוך שלל הממצאים של המחקר: האחד, ניתוח השוואתי של אמצעי קליטה סובייקטיביים בקרב עולים שהגיעו לארץ בשנים 1990-2001, כפי שנמדדו בשנה הרביעית לאחר הגעתם. השני, ניתוח המניעים לעלייה שאפיינו עולים אלה כפי שדווחו בראיון הראשון, האופן בו השתנו מניעים אלה במהלך השנים מאז תחילת הגל ועד היום והקשר שלהם לרמות שונות של מחויבות לישראל, כפי שהובעו על ידי העולים בשנתם הרביעית בארץ. מניעים אלה ינותחו מבחינת ההיבט האוניברסאלי והיחידני שבהם וכן כיצד הם השתנו במרוצת הזמן.

TEQUELQUES REPÈRES ENTOURANT LA NOTION D'INTÉGRATION : LE CAS DU QUÉBEC

RALPH ROUZIER ET PATRICIA RIMOK

The growing diversity in the composition of Quebec's population has made immigrant socio-economic integration a larger challenge. Recently the children of immigrants have also become the object of attention when it comes to integration. There is a need to identify the best practices to address the varying circumstances that face first and second generation Quebecers as their integration is essential to the effective management of diversity.

By focusing on actions supporting the integration of immigration identifying with ethnocultural minorities there is a risk that the problems encountered by the second generation will be neglected. Our focus will be upon the respective condition of the two generations.

La population du Québec devient de plus en plus diversifiée ; il en résulte que l'intégration sociale et économique des immigrants pose un défi de plus en plus grand.

Un développement récent dans le domaine de l'intégration consiste en l'attention qui est de plus en plus portée sur les enfants d'immigrants. Une gestion efficace de la diversité ne peut se faire sans l'intégration des Québécois de la première et de la deuxième génération. Ainsi, il faut identifier les meilleurs moyens permettant d'aborder les différentes circonstances auxquelles ils font face. En privilégiant des mesures qui appuient l'intégration des immigrants s'identifiant à des minorités ethnoculturelles, les problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les membres de la deuxième génération courent le risque de passer inaperçus. Ce texte argumente en faveur d'une approche qui tient compte des circonstances respectives de chacune des deux générations.

הגיוון ההולך וגדל בהרכב אוכלוסייתה של קוויבק מגביר את האתגר הטמון בשילוב הסוציו-אקונומי של מהגרים. לאחרונה, מופנית תשומת הלב גם לילדי המהגרים בכל הנוגע לנושא השילוב. קיים צורך בזיהוי הדרך הטובה ביותר לטפל בנסיבות השונות העומדות בפני הדור הראשון והדור השני של מהגרים לקוויבק, כאשר שילובם הוא חיוני לניהול אפקטיבי של האוכלוסייה המגוונת. כאשר מתמקדים בפעולות התומכות בשילובם של מהגרים תוך הזדהות עם התרבות האתנית של מיעוטים, קיים סיכון של הזנחת בעיותיהם של בני הדור השני. אנו מתמקדים בתנאים של שני דורות המהגרים.

DILEMMAS IN THE FORMULATION OF ABSORPTION POLICY

YAIR TSABAN

Crucial decisions and significant dilemmas are involved in the decision making processes immigration policy makers, and especially the immigration Minister, undergo. The major difficulty is to choose between two significant values or two justified interests that contradict. Important questions and dilemmas in this respect are: How can a low budget Ministry influence the immigration policy? To what extent the government must support the new-comers and enlarge the gap between new-comers and veteran Israelis who also need support? Do Ethiopian and FSU immigrants deserve the same support and aid from the government? Is it justified to direct Ethiopian new-comers, as well as other weak social groups, to developmental towns in the Israeli periphery?

Avec la plus grande diversité que connaît le Québec, les questions entourant l'intégration socioéconomique des immigrants semblent se complexifier. Plus récemment, cette question concerne aussi les individus de 2^e génération, soit des personnes nées au Canada d'un ou deux parents immigrants. Pour des raisons différentes des immigrants, certaines d'entre elles ont parfois des difficultés d'intégra-

tion, notamment, au plan socioéconomique². Cette diversité croissante et certaines difficultés vécues par certains groupes demandent des outils afin que tous puissent s'intégrer le mieux possible à la société québécoise. À cet égard, ces outils s'inscrivent dans la gestion de la diversité ethnoculturelle.

Favoriser l'intégration des minorités ethnoculturelles à la vie collective – notamment en participant et en bénéficiant de la création de la richesse matérielle (p. ex., l'économie) et immatérielle (p. ex., la culture) –, n'est pas sans poser des problèmes importants. Cette combinaison vise généralement les immigrants, mais pas nécessairement leurs descendants. À partir de cette perspective, il est considéré que les problèmes soulevés en matière d'intégration sont généralement plus importants dans le cas des nouveaux arrivants que dans le cas de la deuxième génération.

תהליכי קבלת ההחלטות של קובעי מדיניות העלייה, ובייחוד שר הקליטה, כרוכים בהחלטות גורליות ובדילמות משמעותיות. הקושי העיקרי טמון בבחירה בין שני עקרונות משמעותיים או שני אינטרסים מוצדקים שמתנגשים. שאלות ודילמות חשובות מבחינה זו הן: איך משרד ממשלתי דל תקציב יכול להשפיע על מדיניות העלייה? עד כמה צריך הממשל לתמוך בעולים החדשים ולהרחיב את הפער בין עולים חדשים לבין ישראלים ותיקים הזקוקים אף הם לתמיכה? האם מגיעה לעולים מאתיופיה וממדינות חבר העמים אותה תמיכה ועזרה מידי הממשל? האם מוצדק להפנות עולים חדשים מאתיופיה, כמו גם קבוצות חברתיות חלשות אחרות, לערי פיתוח בפרפריה הישראלית?

NOTE

¹ Under the "Law of Return", anyone with a Jewish grandfather or grandmother can immigrate to Israel with his/her spouse and offspring. Nevertheless, only someone whose mother is Jewish is defined as Jewish according to Jewish law ("Halacha") and registered as a Jew by the Israeli authorities.

Sous la « Loi du retour », quiconque a un grand-père ou grand-mère d'origine juive peut immigrer à Israël avec son époux et ses enfants. Néanmoins, seul une personne dont la mère est juive est définie comme juive accordément à la loi juive (« Halacha ») et enregistré comme tel par les autorités Israéliennes.

² Voir, notamment : Maryse Potvin, Paul Eid et Nancy Venel (sous la dir.), *La 2^e génération issue de l'immigration. Une comparaison France-Québec*, Montréal : Athéna Éditions, 2007, 270 p.

CHALLENGES AND CONFRONTATIONS: IMMIGRATION AND ABSORPTION POLICY IN ISRAEL

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DVORA HACHOEN a obtenu une maîtrise *summa cum laude* de l'Université de Tel Aviv en histoire juive moderne et un doctorat en sociologie et anthropologie de l'Université Bar Ilan. Elle est spécialiste de l'histoire du sionisme, du Yishuv (la communauté juive en Palestine préalable à la fondation de l'état juif moderne), l'immigration juive et son intégration, et le développement politique et social en Israël. Elle fut professeur invité à l'Université Rutgers, ainsi que chercheur invité aux Universités d'Oxford et d'Harvard.

דבורה הכהן מוסמכת ב AM בהיסטוריה יהודית מודרנית ואת עבודת הדוקטורט שלה קבלה בסוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה באוניברסיטת בר-אילן. מתמחה בהיסטוריה של הציונות, תקופת הישוב, העלייה והקליטה של היהודים בישראל, וההתפתחויות הפוליטיות בתקופת הקמתה של מדינת ישראל. שמשה כפרופסור אורח באוניברסיטת רוטג'רס בארה"ב, באוניברסיטת אוקספורד בבריטניה ואוניברסיטת הרווארד בארה"ב.

Since its establishment sixty years ago, Israel has been a nation of immigrants. In fact, it has been absorbing migrants at a rate that has led to population growth by a factor of about ten times, yet paradoxically, it has no defined immigration policy similar to other countries. Israel was established four years after the horrible atrocities of the holocaust were revealed, when millions of Jews lost their lives because they had no safe refuge. The newly born state saw its mission and target to provide refuge to all Jews who suffered from persecution and discrimination in Europe, Arab countries and other places.

Immigration to Israel started right after the establishment of the state, even though it was involved in a bitter war at the time. During the early years of statehood, nearly 700,000 Jews from disparate nations across the world converged upon Israel, doubling its population within a three year span. This wave of mass migration caused a demographic revolution in Israel. This was an era that saw not only the creation of a new state, but the birth of a new society.¹

IDEOLOGICAL ASPECT

Mass Immigration to Israel was unique not only in its numerical dimension; but also in the ideology which sparked and stimulated it. The State of Israel, which arose by virtue of the Zionist movement, expressed its deep commitment to immigration from its very inception. Israel's Declaration of Independence states that "The State of Israel shall be open to Jewish immigration and to the ingathering of the exiles."² This approach guided the state's immigration policy, as was reflected in the Law of Return, which categorically declares that "every Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel." Thus, the Law of Return firmly established the legal right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel.³

Mass immigration to Israel had the potential to cause a revolution in all sectors of national operations: in its economy, society, culture and politics. Thus, the question of absorption became a central issue in Israel's social and cultural design. The ideological aspect also affected the absorption policy of Israel.

THE ABSORPTION POLICY

The principle of the 'ingathering of the exiles' was not just an empty slogan. There was a genuine conviction that Israel was the home of the Jewish people and that any Jew who chose to settle in the country had the historical right to do so.

In contrast to other countries' immigration policies, those at Israel's helm felt it was their duty to ensure that the newcomers were provided with a roof over their heads, with food and vital services. The national institutions thus took responsibility for absorption, and assumed it was their job to decide where and how the immi-

grants would be integrated into their new home. It was this notion of duty that seemed to legitimize a paternalistic attitude.

“The State of Israel shall be open to Jewish immigration and to the ingathering of the exiles.”

Apart from the composition of immigrant groups, the size of these groups as well as the timing of their immigration also influenced their absorption. The large streams of immigrants that arrived in Israel during the first years of statehood, when Israel was suffering from an economic crisis, faced a significant delay between their and subsequent absorption into employment streams, housing and in the provision of other services. The fact that during the first few years following their immigration, most immigrants were housed in transit camps, separated them into a kind of ecological, socio-cultural isolation. This limited their contact with the veteran population, which was already involved in the absorption process.

The problems relating to absorption were so numerous that the Jewish Agency and the government were constantly improvising and seeking temporary solutions. Among those which left a lasting mark was the Ma'abarah- the transitional camp or quarter that was designed as a social bridge between the newcomers and residents of the towns. Envisaged as a breakthrough in the realm of absorption, the Ma'abarah program went awry from the beginning and became a serious impediment. The dramatic confrontation between the established Jewish community and the Ma'abarah immigrants affected the fragile and emerging relationship between them and had profound implications for years to come.

The demographic profile of immigrants also affected the absorption process. The great majority of immigrants who arrived after the founding of the state, both from Europe and from Arab countries, were destitute and lacking in skills which would enable their employment in Israel. Their dependence on the government was to determine the manner of absorption and the relationship between newcomers and veterans.

The population dispersal policy was based on land-planning and security considerations. This was another factor that affected the immigrants who were dependant on the government in getting housing and employment. They were transferred to areas far from the center. Thus, the policy of population dispersal in Israel became a policy of immigrants' dispersal.

Before the establishment of the State of Israel and in the first year of statehood, dozens of settlements had been established along its borders by veterans who volunteered to establish Kibbutzim and Moshavim. And even though the dispersal

policy of the government was also applied to all Israeli citizens, the veterans were given free choice, whereas the immigrants did as they were told. The socio-spatial plan devised by the government of Israel was also meant to prevent the clustering of immigrants in urban centers near Israel's ports of entry, since, it was felt, that it was common for such concentrations to turn into slums.

There was nothing new in setting up stipulations with regard to immigrant employment and areas of residence. Many countries open to immigration made such demands and no one complained. Yet in Israel, this approach was at odds with the right of every Jew to settle in the country as provided by the Law of Return.

Scanning the map, one can see that Israel was highly successful in the area of population dispersal during the great wave of immigration following the establishment of the state. The Negev and the Galilee, in particular, registered an impressive growth spurt. Nevertheless, the policy of sending immigrants to far-flung locations conflicted with the declared aim of encouraging them to integrate socially and culturally. The outcome was the emergence of the 'other' Israel, which lagged behind the veterans in social and economic advancement, and perpetuated a sense of isolation.

THE MELTING POT

The State's responsibility for absorbing immigrants went above and beyond the physical plane, Israel also aimed to centrally design its developing society and culture. The wide variety amongst immigrant groups, the differences in social and cultural backgrounds and in expectations, exacerbated the gap between the Yishuv⁴ and the new immigrants, especially those who came from a different social and economic background than the European immigrants.

The newcomers hailed from dozens of countries and hundreds of towns and villages, from many different cultures, bringing with them a broad array of languages, customs and beliefs. Also the Jews of Arab countries were not a homogeneous group. They did not constitute a unified segment within the Arab world, but were made up of dozens of communities scattered throughout the region, each with its own social and cultural features, its own class structure and its own ideology.

The image of all of these immigrants was low. Negative stereotypes of immigrants who were Holocaust refugees and those who had come from Islamic lands were widespread amongst veterans. Their lifestyles, traditions and traits were criticized. These negative images caused suspicions among the veterans that the socio-cultural legacy that had been forged during the Yishuv period would be damaged.

The dominant elite that sought to prevent the subversion of cultural and political stability and maintain the continuity that they had forged, thus adopted a

strategy of patronage. In view of its dimensions and demographic composition, the wave of newcomers was expected to introduce immediate and far-reaching changes in the socio-cultural landscape. For this reason, special attention was paid to drawing up and implementing programs that would serve as blueprints for the inauguration of a new society.

Heading these efforts was David Ben-Gurion, who was both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and a driving force in the emergence of the state of Israel. Ben-Gurion's dream was to spark a triple revolution: to change the demographic profile of the Jewish people, to turn Israel into a modern state, and to instill a major spiritual and cultural center that would affect the lives of Jews all over the world. Hence the crucial importance he attached not only to the 'ingathering of the exiles' but also to the melting pot, or in his words- the 'fusion of the exiles'. What this meant in real terms, was the molding of the socio-cultural character of the new entity evolving in Israel.

Nothing was left to chance. Ben-Gurion worked tirelessly to steer social and cultural development in the desired direction, enlisting government and public bodies to help him. He perceived the immigrants as an object that required shaping, and he was not alone in such thinking. In many circles, even among intellectuals and academics, ethnic diversity was regarded as a historical fluke that would soon disappear if Israel adopted the appropriate cultural and educational policies. With the need for social reform acknowledged by a broad sector of the population, the patronizing attitude became even more entrenched.

This patronizing attitude proved to be a major source of tension that accompanied the absorption process, causing conflicts between the veterans' desire to continue developing the social structures as had been done prior to the establishment of the state, and the immigrant population, which brought with it diverse social and cultural traditions that they wished to retain.

The policies established at that early period, had far-reaching repercussions on the formation of social realities in the State over the following years. The unamiable relationship that developed between the immigrants and the veteran population was to have long-range implications, leaving an indelible mark on the new State's social and cultural makeup, as well as on its political system.

Some sociologists have criticized these policies, claiming that the development of rifts in Israeli society was due to such discriminatory policies. In their opinion, economic and social gaps were not only resultant from the immigrants' own constraints.⁵ Rather, they argue, the moving of immigrants to development areas remote from the country's center was the result of conscious ethnic discrimination

by veterans, who wished to prevent the immigrants from entering the employment market, thereby reducing their potential competition and demand for services. Critical sociologists further claim that the veterans did not provide the immigrants with equal opportunities and prevented them from accessing social and political power centres, thereby sealing their fate economically as well. They blamed the elite that had arisen in Palestine during the period of the Yishuv, most of whom were former Europeans, with intentionally preventing Oriental Jews from joining their institutions and leaving them on the social and political periphery.

However, this situation changed over the course of time, and the influence of particularistic traditions on the nature of public life in Israel began to increase with the growing sense of self-assurance amongst traditionalist groups in Israeli society. They slowly began to free themselves from their marginal position in society, opting for a more central stance.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT

Pursuant to the Citizenship Law and the Residents Register Ordinance, which are connected to the Law of Return, automatic citizenship is granted to every immigrant immediately upon his or her arrival in Israel. This right includes the right to vote for municipal and central government without any limitation whatsoever, (such as knowledge of the Hebrew language or length of period of residence in Israel) thereby granting considerable political clout to a public that was wholly uninitiated in the intricacies of Israeli politics.

As a result, every large wave of immigrants has a very strong electoral potential to change the power relations between parties and overhaul the political system. Consequently, the mass immigration wave set off a wild political scramble with an endless round of confrontations and crises. The parties competed viciously amongst themselves to win the support of the newcomers, while seriously questioning the wisdom of conferring citizenship on these people as soon as they disembarked.

Before they knew what was happening, the immigrants found themselves enmeshed in power struggles and the target of manipulation from all sides. On the other hand, withholding citizenship was unthinkable; this was an inalienable right embedded in Israel's constitution. This situation had an enormous influence on Israeli politics.

The paradox is that the battle for the immigrants' political support from the moment they set foot in the country actually accelerated their integration into the Israeli political scene. It was in the dramatic confrontation between the Yishuv and

the immigrants in the early years of statehood that the character of the veteran community began to lose its hard edges and the newcomers were able to leave their mark.

When immigrants began to be absorbed into the economy and their dependence on the bureaucracy lessened, the public atmosphere changed. As a result, the parties that had been dominant in the first decades of the state became weaker. In 1977, a political turnabout took place, in which the Labor party, which had been in power for the first three decades, lost the elections. This change in the political map strengthened the influence of religious and ultra-religious parties. Waves of immigrants who continued to arrive over the years helped to turn Israel into a pluralistic society. The waves of immigrants had a great impact on Israeli society, no aspect of the state was left untouched, and a unique social-cultural mosaic came into being.

During the first decade of Israel's existence, over a million immigrants arrived on its shores. Most were refugees from displaced persons' camps in Europe, others were holocaust survivors from countries in Eastern Europe and a few were refugees from Muslim countries. As the flow of immigration continued, thousands of immigrants came from North Africa, South America and other far flung countries.

Just in the last two decades, over a million or more immigrants have arrived in Israel, the great majority of them from the former Soviet Union and others from Ethiopia. For all these years, Israel had to bear the enormous economic burden involved in absorbing these immigrants. Because of this unique situation, conventional immigration laws were never fully legislated.

"The Right of Return" was not intended to be a standard immigration law, as in other countries. Rather, as previously mentioned, this law recognized the right of every Jew to return to the land of his forefathers.

Over the past few decades, with the arrival of economic migrants searching for work, regulations regarding their stay in Israel were set in place. There has been no legislation passed regarding this issue, but lately there is an increasing demand that these migrants receive a civilian status, subject to the same demands and conditions as are found in other countries that attract economic migrants. Future policies of immigration will have to take into account the changes in Israeli society and in its ethos.

NOTES

- ¹ Dvora Hacoen, 2003, *Immigrants in Turmoil: Mass Immigration to Israel and its Repercussions in the 1950s and After*. Syracuse University Press. Horowitz, d. and Lissak, M. (1990). *Troubles in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel*. Am Oved.
- ² The Declaration of Independence, May 14 1948.
- ³ Law of Return, July 15 1950. Dvora Hacoen, 1999 "The 'Law of Return' as an Embodiment of the Link between Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora," *The Journal of Israeli History*. Vol.19 no. 1. Frank Cass , London (pp. 61-89).
- ⁴ The Jewish community in Palestine prior to the state, about 90% of them came from European countries.
- ⁵ Smoooha, S, (1978) *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*. Routhledge and Kegan Paul. Kimmerling B. (1999) "Between Hegemony and Dormant Kulturkampf in Israel". *Israel Affairs* 4, 3-4: 49-72.

“ONE LAW” FROM EXODUS HAS NO PLACE IN CANADA’S PLURAL LEGAL SYSTEM

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ג'ין טיילט היא עורכת דין המתמחה במשא ומתן והתדיינות בנושא זכויות ילידים. היא שותפה במשרד עורכי הדין "פייפ, סלטר, טיילט" ומרשית להופיע בבית המשפט במחוזות אונטריו, הטריטוריות הצפון מערביות, קולומביה הבריטית ומניטובה. היא שימשה כעורכת דין הראשית במשפט הראשון בנושא זכויות ילידים (קנדיים) עם ה"מטיס" שנידון בפני בית המשפט העליון של קנדה. הגב' טיילט פרסמה עבודות רבות, וביניהן המהדורה השנייה של הספר "השאלות הגדולות של קנדה". בשנת 2002 הוענק לה פרס לינקולן אלכסנדר מיד' האגודה המשפטית של קנדה הצפונית לאות שירותה לציבור. במרץ 2005 היא קיבלה את פרס הצדק הילידי של אגודת הסטודנטים הילידיים למשפטים באוניברסיטת אלברטה ובשנת 2008 ייסדה את פרס ג'ין טיילט לגישה לצדק בפקולטה למשפטים של אוניברסיטת וינדסור. ג'ין טיילט הינה נצר ללואיס רייל, מייסד מחוז מניטובה ומנהיג עם המטיס.

The law school at the University of Toronto has a large brass plaque hanging in Flavelle House. One of its many lines is a quote from Exodus (12:49) “One law shall be for the native-born and for the stranger who dwells among you.” Its placement in a Canadian law school is curious because the “one law” concept has never been part of Canada’s history or traditions. Canadians have always existed with a plural legal system that reflects the origins of the settlement of Canada. This plural legal system is made up of three distinct legal traditions – the English common law, the French civil code and the customs, laws and traditions of the aboriginal peoples.

Even if the quote from Exodus did reflect Canadian law, then the logical conclusion is that the “one law” would be the law that was developed by the “native-born” and applied to the strangers dwelling among them. In other words, the laws of the aboriginal peoples would be applied to the European immigrants. The laws of the forty-seven (47) distinct aboriginal peoples in Canada never applied to the incoming strangers. But then again, in some parts of Canada it is not until the late 19th century or early 20th century that the laws of Euro-Canadians effectively applied to aboriginal peoples. In a recent court decision, the judge held that,

It is clear that although the Europeans had control over their European settlers, their control over the Metis was entirely subject to their [Métis] acquiescence. In other words, they [the Europeans] had no effective control ... although attempts were made to control the customs, practices, and economic life of the Metis prior to 1870, these attempts were largely ineffective.¹

In fact, Canadian law has always functioned more in line with the principles set out in the Two Row Wampum Belt or *Kahswenhtha* of the Iroquois. The Two Row Wampum Belt was an agreement of mutual respect, non-interference and peace between aboriginal peoples and European newcomers to North America. The belt has two parallel rows of purple wampum on a bed of white beads. Each purple row symbolizes one of the peoples making the agreement. The aboriginal people are symbolized in their canoe with their culture, laws, traditions and customs. The Euro-Canadians are symbolized in their ship with their culture, laws, traditions and customs. Each people stays in its own vessel. Neither people will try to steer the other’s vessel, or interfere or impede the travel of the other. The white beads symbolize the purity of the agreement and friendship, peace and respect between the two peoples.

The Two Row Wampum Belt is a treaty of respect for the dignity and integrity of the other culture and stresses the importance of non-interference of one nation in the business of the other, unless invited. The belt embodied the

principle that neither group would force its laws, traditions, customs or language on the other and that both groups would peacefully coexist.²


Such was the custom of plural law in Canada from contact until the middle of the 19th century. It was a period of mutual respect and agreement between the “strangers” or incoming Europeans and the “native-born” – the aboriginal peoples of Canada. However, by the mid-1860s the situation began to change. The incoming European settlers grew into the majority and Canada began to forget its previous acknowledgment, non-interference and respect for the laws of the aboriginal peoples.

Canada then entered into a century-long period whereby it attempted to assimilate aboriginal peoples and denied their laws, customs and traditions in favor of the other two recognized legal regimes – the French civil code and the English common law. Following on the lead of the Americans, Canadians began to assert that the land was empty at the time of discovery – *terra nullius*. That, they argued, gave them the right to assert sovereignty over aboriginal peoples throughout the country.

“no government or individual will again be able to put aside or disregard the rights of Canada’s original peoples.”

This period, best characterized as one of assimilation, lasted until the 1970s when Canada began to discuss patriating its Constitution. At that time several influential groups including, the Canadian Bar Association, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity, a Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee on the Constitution, and church groups all called for a constitutional provision that would provide protection for Aboriginal rights. When finally enacted, the new Canadian *Constitution Act*, 1982 included section 35, which recognized and affirmed the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples

REPLICA OF TWO ROW WAMPUM BELT



of Canada and identified the "Indians, Inuit and Métis peoples" as the "aboriginal peoples of Canada." Thus began a new era in Canada – reconciliation.

In 1982, there was a consensus that the aboriginal peoples of Canada had "old and difficult grievances" that required reconciliation.³ Section 35 was to be a guarantee that, "no government or individual will again be able to put aside or disregard the rights of Canada's original peoples" because Parliament has taken the "opportunity of redressing their claims in the Constitution and to provide a legal basis for it."⁴ In this way, Canadians wrote a remedial and equitable statement of purpose about aboriginal peoples and their rights and laws into its Constitution.

As a result of this constitutional recognition and affirmation, aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada, previously subject without restriction to federal and provincial legislation, now have constitutional protection. Although this constitutional recognition was unique at the time, several other states have now amended their constitutions to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples.⁵ Indeed, such constitutional recognition appears to be an emerging customary international law norm.⁶ While the general constitutional recognition of aboriginal and treaty rights is no longer unique to Canada, at least one aspect of it is: the constitutional recognition of the Métis.

The Supreme Court of Canada, since 1982, has articulated the basic purposes of s. 35 – protection and reconciliation.⁷ Section 35 recognizes the prior use and occupation of the land by Aboriginal people and the fact that they had pre-existing legal systems. This constitutional protection, the court has said, is also the means by which the aboriginal peoples of Canada are to be reconciled with the assertion of Crown sovereignty. In doing so, the Supreme Court of Canada has become the champion of aboriginal peoples in Canada. Over 40 aboriginal rights cases since 1982 have recognized and declared aboriginal rights including harvesting rights, trading rights, aboriginal title, customary laws, law making authority and the aboriginal right to self-government.

The effect of constitutional recognition has re-invigorated the place of the laws, customs and traditions of the aboriginal peoples of Canada into the legal system. It has restored the fundamental principles of the Two Row Wampum Belt – respect for the dignity and integrity of the culture and laws of aboriginal peoples and the importance of non-interference. Governments in Canada must now recognize, respect and accommodate aboriginal rights including their self-government. Thus, one effect of patriating the Constitution in 1982 was to re-enforce the plurality of the Canadian legal system and affirm its previous rejection of the "one law" concept from Exodus.

NOTES

- ¹ *R. v. Goodon*, [2009] M.J. No. 3 at par. 69(f) and (i)
- ² Wampum belts were used as mnemonic devices indicating consent to treaty promises. A mnemonic device is created to assist memory. "Such visual graphic systems served as mnemonics by means of which a suitably trained expert could recover important cultural information." David R. Olson, *The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1996) p. 70.
- ³ Hansard of the House of Commons and Senate of Canada 1980-1982 re inclusion of s. 35, Statement by Senator Austin in Senate Debates at 3317.
- ⁴ Hansard, *supra* note 4 Senate Debates at 1921-1922 and 3318; And see H.C. Debates at 3889, 4044-4045, 7448, 7519-7521, 9403, 13276 and 13280.
- ⁵ For example see the Bolivian Constitution, amended in 1994; the Brazilian Constitution, amended in 1988; the Columbian Constitution, amended in 1991; the Ecuadorian Constitution, amended in 1998; and the Political Constitution of Nicaragua, amended in 1995.
- ⁶ S. James Anaya and Robert A. Williams, Jr. *The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System* 2001, Vol. 14, Harvard Human Rights Journal.
- ⁷ *R. v. Sparrow*, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; *R. v. Van der Peet* [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507

A FOUNDING NATION OF CANADA: THE ACADIANS

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מוריס באסק הינו היסטוריון ומשמש כמנהל המכון ללימודים אקדמיים באוניברסיטת מונטון בניו ברנסוויק, קנדה. הוא מומחה להיסטוריה של חבל ארץ אקדיה הקולוניאלית ולתרבות הפוליטית האקדית. הוא פרסם מאמרים וספרים רבים, כאשר האחרון ביניהם דן באקדים של ניו ברנסוויק. בשנת 1995 קיבל את פרס צרפת-אקדי עבור ספרו הן בהיסטוריה של המורים האקדיים בניו ברנסוויק. באסק משרת כחבר במספר ועדות מדעיות לאומיות והשתתף בתריסר סרטים דוקומנטאריים וביניהם "מסעה של אוונג'לין" (הועד הקולנועי הלאומי הקנדי, 1994) (בימויו של ג'ינט פלרין ו"שיר אפי") (הועד הקולנועי הלאומי הקנדי, 1995), (בימויו של הרמנגילד שיאסון. סרט דוקומנטארי זה זכה בפרס "SVT" לסרט הדוקומנטארי הטוב ביותר במסגרת הפסטיבל הבינלאומי ה-11 לסרטים דוברי צרפתית שהתקיים בנאמור, בלגיה בשנת 1996. הוא משמש גם כמנחה בחברת הרדיו הקנדית. בשנת 2002 העניק לו הממשל הקנדי אות כבוד אקדמי ובשנת 2003, הוענק לו אות כבוד בתחום האמנות והספרות. מוריס באסק משמש כיו"ר הועד המייעץ של מסדר ניו ברנסוויק, ובשנים 2005-2007 כיהן כנשיא האגודה ללימודים קנדיים.

In November 2006, the Canadian House of Commons overwhelmingly voted a motion that recognized the Québécois people as a nation within the Canadian federation. This motion was adopted after much debate among the different political parties in Canada and in the media. The real political impact of this motion has yet to be determined but the questions that arose from the debate reminded Canadians once again that Canada had no well defined national identity. Since the creation of the Canadian federation in 1867, the dominant intellectual and political discourse upheld the idea that Canada had two founding nations, the English Canadians and the French Canadians. This conception of a dual national identity left no place for the First Nations of Canada who, despite being the country's original occupants, were not officially recognized as such and did not have a say in the discussions that led to the creation of the Canadian federation. It also assumed that French speaking Canada was limited to the province of Québec, although there were important francophone communities in the Maritimes, Ontario and in the West. The adoption of a multicultural policy by the federal government in the 1970's was at the origin of a paradigm shift regarding the national identity question. Essentially it meant that being a Canadian was no longer limited to the concepts of English Canadian and French Canadian. This new environment permitted different cultural groups to join in the public debate and to make their grievances and their demands known. One of these groups was the Acadians of the Atlantic provinces of Canada.

The Acadians are an important part of the Canadian francophone communities that exist outside of Québec and that have a population of more than a million. In the 2006 federal census, the Acadian population of the four Atlantic provinces of Canada numbered more than 300 000. This francophone population has a distinct history that differs from its Québécois neighbour. Most Acadians are descendent from French pioneer families that crossed the Atlantic Ocean in the 17th century to settle in a small French colony of the New World, Acadie, which corresponded at the time to today's province of Nova Scotia. Caught between the numerous conflicts that pitted New England against New France, the Acadians became British subjects following the treaty of Utrecht of 1713¹. The British administrators of Nova Scotia did not believe the Acadians to be loyal subjects of the British Crown. In 1755, they ordered the Acadian population to be expelled from their lands and scattered amongst the Thirteen Colonies of British North America. Known as the *Grand Dérangement*, this historical event became the key element in the construction of the Acadian identity.²

The Acadian expulsion lasted from 1755 to 1764. In that year, the British authorities allowed the Acadians to resettle in the Atlantic colonies of Canada. By the start of the early 19th century, a few thousand Acadians were settled in small villages in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, a few in Newfoundland, but mostly in New Brunswick where they became the largest Acadian community of the region by the mid 19th century.³ Originally prosperous farmers in pre-expulsion Acadie, the Acadians had become a society of fishermen, lumberjacks and owners of small farms, perceived by their Anglo-protestant neighbors as a quaint but backward people. But more importantly, from a society who was the majority group before 1755 in Acadie, the Acadians were now the minority group in the Maritime provinces of Canada. Many of them became assimilated to the language and culture of the omnipresent Anglophone world but still the majority of Acadians stuck to their French language and Roman Catholic faith. By the 1850's, their leaders headed a movement to create a small network of Catholic convents and colleges that would educate in French and in English a new generation of Acadians who could take their rightful place in society alongside their Anglophone neighbors in the complex universe that was the British Empire at the time.

Acadian historians called this movement the Acadian Renaissance. By the second half of the 19th century, a new generation of Acadian leaders was creating a new infrastructure of Acadian-controlled cultural and social institutions. In this they were helped by newcomers that came from Québec and France, priests, nuns, politicians, businessmen that embraced the Acadian cause as their own. The great American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow greatly contributed to this dynamism with his poem *Evangeline, A Tale of Acadie*, published in Boston in 1847. French intellectual François Edme Rameau de Saint-Père also gave this emerging Acadian nationalism quite a boost when he stated in a book in 1859 that Acadians constituted an original people, distinct from their French Canadian neighbors.⁴

In 1867, the year of the creation of the first Acadian newspaper, the *Moniteur Acadien*, Canada was created as a dominion of the British Empire. It is interesting to note that the majority of Acadians voted against the idea of joining the new Canadian federation at the time. But the Acadian elites at the time rapidly understood that the new federal government meant new possibilities for them, not only regarding social mobility, but also in terms of protection of their French language.

Strongly influenced by the ideas of 19th century nationalism, the Acadian leaders organized great gatherings starting in the early 1880's where they displayed themselves as the standard-bearers of the Acadian nation. They often

compared themselves to a new Moses who had brought the Acadians out of an age of darkness and into the modern world while, at the same time, keeping their French language, Roman Catholic faith and cultural identity. To their Anglophone and French Canadian neighbors, they sent a strong identity message: in 1881, they chose a distinct national holiday (the 15th of August, the feast of Our Lady of Assumption), and, in 1884, a national anthem (*Ave Maris Stella*, a Latin Catholic hymn) and a national flag, the French *tricolore*, to which they added a yellow star in the upper blue corner symbolizing their attachment to the Catholic faith. They also became more involved in provincial and national politics. In Canada, where senators are not elected but appointed by the Prime Minister, Acadian elites succeeded in having a first Acadian senator in 1885, Pascal Poirier, an Acadian intellectual, linguist, playwright and historian.⁵ One could argue that, by this nomination, the Canadian federal government recognized for the first time the distinctiveness of the Acadian people. This would be the first of many gestures by Ottawa that would give credence and legitimacy to the Acadians' belief that they constituted a distinct nation within Canada. For instance, in 1995, Roméo LeBlanc, an Acadian politician, was named Governor General of Canada, becoming the country's official head of state.⁶

By the 20th century, Acadian leaders considered their society to be a nation within Canada albeit much smaller than the French Canadian nation, but a nation nonetheless. They had created their own lobby group known as the *Société Nationale L'Assomption* (currently the *Société Nationale de l'Acadie*) who boasted that it was the official spokesperson for the Acadian people. Even if this lobby group saw itself as a shadow government of the Acadian nation⁷, the Acadians themselves never saw an opposition between being an Acadian and being a Canadian and continued to be active in all aspects of Canadian life.

In the 1960's, Québec nationalists put forward a modern Québécois identity and abandoned the notion of a French Canadian nation. Francophones in Ontario and Western Canada deeply felt abandoned by this new Québécois identity, but the reaction in the Acadian community was not that negative since they already perceived themselves as a distinct nation from the French Canadian. In 1960, Louis-J. Robichaud became the first Acadian elected as Premier of New Brunswick. His administration modernized the province and, in 1969, it became the first officially bilingual province in Canada. A few months later, Canada also became an officially bilingual country.⁸

“Generally speaking, Acadians have mostly concentrated their efforts in the cultural realm more than in the political one”

With the creation of the Université de Moncton in 1963, Acadians in New Brunswick became more visible and began to request more official recognition from the different levels of government. When, in 1979, Acadian author Antonine Maillet won the Goncourt prize, the most important French literary award, Acadians also became visible on the international stage. Acadian leaders in New Brunswick lobbied the provincial government for a law that would fully recognize the equality of the province’s two official linguistic communities. Adopted in 1981, this law was entrenched in the Canadian constitution in 1993.

While Acadians and other francophones living in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador also lobbied their respective provincial governments for specific cultural and linguistic rights, Acadians in New Brunswick fared much better. Today, they represent a third of New Brunswick’s 730 000 inhabitants. Moncton, one of the province’s largest cities, became Canada’s first official bilingual city in 2002, once again as a result of an important lobbying campaign carried out by Acadian leaders. In 1999, it had hosted the 8th international francophone summit where heads of state from around the world paid homage to the resiliency of the Acadians. United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, reiterated this view, saying that the Acadians were an example for the world. Such praises led to a certain triumphalism among certain Acadian leaders who emphasized the different gains of the Acadian people much more than their challenges.

During the 2006 debate surrounding Ottawa’s recognition of the Québec people as a nation, a few Acadian leaders tried to ignite a similar debate at home, asking why Ottawa was not doing the same for the Acadian nation. The debate never materialized, signaling that the vast majority of Acadians appeared to be content with the status quo. It is as if today’s Acadians consider their national status to be *de facto* recognized since they have a national holiday which provincial and federal politicians, including the Prime Minister of Canada, now attend on a yearly basis. Their national flag, the *tricolore étoilé*, is present almost everywhere in the Acadian regions of the Maritime provinces and, in 2005, the Canadian Parliament, by way of a royal proclamation, officially recognized the trials and suffering experienced by the Acadians during the *Grand Dérangement*.

Acadians trace their history back to 1604 when French entrepreneurs established a trading post on the minuscule Ste Croix Island located between New Brunswick and Maine. Because Québec City was founded 4 years later in 1608, Acadians consider their community to be the dean of francophone societies in North America. While this claim is not always well received by Québec nationalists⁹, and often overlooked by federal civil servants and politicians, Acadians, like other minorities, are proud of their history and culture and want to celebrate them and share them with other Canadians.¹⁰ Generally speaking, Acadians have mostly concentrated their efforts in the cultural realm more than in the political one.¹¹ By doing this, they never considered the Canadian national identity as being a contradiction. Indeed, like a Matryoshka doll, the Acadians are a good example of multilayered identities. They are proud to be Acadian; they are proud to be Canadian; some of them will be proud to be francophones while others will be proud to be bilingual.¹² While this pluralistic notion of identity has its challenges, it has given most Acadians the means to adapt themselves to the ever-changing Canadian multicultural landscape. It also has permitted immigrants, as it still does today, to become full-fledged members of Acadian society. As a result, functioning as a cultural nation, the Acadian Matryoshka doll offers more than the eye can see.

NOTES

- ¹ John G. Reid and al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial and Aboriginal Constructions*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004.
- ² John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland*, New York, Norton, 2005. See also: N.E.S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People 1604-1755*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's/Canadian Institute for Research on Public Policy and Public Administration, Université de Moncton, 2005.
- ³ Some Acadians eventually settled in Louisiana where they created a new society, the Cajuns. Shane K. Bernard, *The Cajuns: Americanization of a People*, Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, 2003; Carl A. Brasseaux, *Acadian to Cajun: Transformation of a People, 1803-1877*, Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, 1992.
- ⁴ Edme Rameau de Saint-Père, *la France aux colonies: Acadiens et Canadiens*, Paris, A. Jouby, 1859.
- ⁵ James Laxer, *The Acadians: In Search of a Homeland*, Toronto, Doubleday, 2006, p. 125-126. See also Sheila M. Andrew, *The Development of Elites in Acadian New Brunswick, 1861-1881*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.
- ⁶ Maurice Basque, Nicole Barribeau and Stéphanie Côté, *L'Acadie de l'Atlantique*, Moncton, Société Nationale de l'Acadie/Centre d'études acadiennes/Centre international de recherche et de documentation de la francophonie/Année Francophone internationale, 1999, p. 73.
- ⁷ Maurice Basque, in collaboration with Eric Snow, *La Société Nationale de l'Acadie: Au cœur de la réussite d'un peuple*, Moncton, Les Éditions de la Francophonie, 2006, p. 85.
- ⁸ *The Robichaud Era, 1960-70*, Moncton, Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, 2001.
- ⁹ Allan Greer, "1608 As Foundation," *Canadian Issues/Thèmes canadiens*, Fall 2008, p. 20-23.
- ¹⁰ Jacques Paul Couturier, "L'Acadie, c'est un détail: Les représentations de l'Acadie dans le récit national canadien," in *L'Acadie plurielle: Dynamiques identitaires collectives et développement au sein des réalités acadiennes*, edited by André Magord with the collaboration of Maurice Basque and Amélie Giroux, Moncton, Centre d'études acadiennes/Poitiers, Institut d'Études Acadiennes et Québécoises, 2003, p. 43-44.
- ¹¹ André Magord, *The Quest for Autonomy in Acadia*, Bruxelles, P.I.E. Lang, Canadian Studies no. 18, 2008.
- ¹² Marc Robichaud and Amélie Giroux, "Les perceptions des jeunes Acadiennes et Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick à l'endroit de l'histoire de l'Acadie," *Les Canadiens et leurs passés – Bulletin/Canadians and Their Past – Newsletter*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 3-4.

THE LAW OF RETURN AND (LACK OF) ISRAELI IMMIGRATION POLICY

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לריסה רמניק היא פרופסור לסוציולוגיה וראש החוג לסוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה באוניברסיטת בר-אילן. נולדה וחונכה במוסקווה ועלתה לישראל בשנת 1991. תחומי המחקר שלה הם הגירה, השתלבות, זהויות אתניות, הגירה ומגדר והגירה ובריאות. הייתה עמית מחקר וחוקרת אורחת באוניברסיטת טורונטו. ספרה האחרון העוסק ביוצאי בריה"מ לשעבר בשלוש יבשות, מספק מידע על סוגיות של זהות והשתלבות בגרמניה, קנדה, ארה"ב וישראל.

Does Israel have an immigration policy? First we have to ask how such policy is decided upon. Is it by an explicit decision or by practice? There are countries that have a public and explicit immigration policy. But even if such explicit policy does not exist, if one can show regular patterns, that may be generalized, then the practice reflects policy. When we approach the question whether Israel has an immigration policy, the legal-formal answer is positive. The Israeli immigration policy is reflected in three major statutes: The Law of Return (1950), The Nationality Law (1952) and the Entry to Israel Law (1952). And yet, when the government decided, on June 2005, to devise an immigration policy, and the Minister of Interior established a committee to consider such policy and advise the government on the subject, the response of many was that it is high time, since Israel actually does not have an immigration policy. The government decision asked “to devise an immigration policy that will be based not only on security arguments, but will secure the existence of Israel as a democratic and Jewish state.”¹ Actually, this was the first time that the Israeli government decided to consider immigration policy vis-a-vis non-Jews. The state has always had an immigration policy vis-à-vis Jews, the essence of which was “everyone who comes – is welcome”.

It is hard to argue that a country that has a law such as the Law of Return – that grants every Jew and his or her family members (even if they are not Jewish) a right to immigrate to Israel – does not have an immigration policy. As a matter of fact, Israel is an example in the literature of a country that employs a policy based not on economic parameters.² It is also considered in many respects as an “immigration country”, as in the years since its establishment, it absorbed large flows of immigrants from all over the world. However, in a major respect it does not view itself as an immigration country but as a “country of *aliyah*”. The Law of Return does not see Jews as immigrants but as *Olim* who return to their homeland. And the difference is not solely terminological. As I will try to show, the Law of Return is indirectly responsible for the fact that the Israeli immigration policy was created negatively, by way of omission.

Israel has a clear immigration policy towards Jews. Towards all the others there is no clear policy but practice of to make their lives a misery. This is derived from the basic approach towards Jews’ immigration, which makes all others unwanted. As MK Yossi Beilin once said, “Every Jew who will want to make Aliyah may do so, and every non-Jew will go through hell”³ The first part of this proposition has a legal basis: The Law of Return grants every Jew (and his or her family members) a right to immigrate and settle in Israel. This is an

individual right and universal in its application among the Jewish group. The second part, on the other hand, is not based on a statute but on de facto policy of the Ministry of Interior. Until the establishment of the above committee, no public discussion was held in Israel regarding a *general* immigration policy. Does Israel want *only* the Law of Return's immigrants? Does a "Jewish state" mean there is no room in it for non-Jews? Does it enable immigration of non-Jews and if it does, under what terms? Are there certain aliens to whom it wants to give precedence in immigration? What are the criteria? Questions such as these are ones that every state deals with. Each state may decide upon different models of immigration policy. Principally speaking, its immigration policy will be derived from the way the state regards itself and what it means to be a citizen of that state.

In Israel, the questions began being asked sporadically, as a response to the political and social reality: Globalization, migrant workers and asylum seekers, as well as the discussion on the Nationality and Entry to Israel (Temporary Provision) (2003) that prohibited Palestinians from the Territories to acquire any status in Israel, even if they marry Israeli citizens. Nevertheless, we can speak of a policy that was created negatively, without discussion and ordered conclusions.

A few words about the legal situation. The Law of Return does not grant citizenship. This is the task of the Nationality Law, in which the first route to acquire citizenship is by return. Israeli law does make provision for entry and naturalization of non-Jews in the Entry to Israel Law and the Nationality Law, respectively. The latter enables also acquisition of citizenship, as distinguished from naturalization, not only by return but also, inter alia, by birth (to parents one of whom is a citizen) and residence (a provision that is in fact confined to Arab residents who were born in Israel before the establishment of the state). Naturalization, as in every country, is not a right but a privilege, which depends on the authorities' discretion. So as we can see, immigration laws in Israel are not pure *ius sanguinis* but mixed, although *ius sanguini* play a major role.

Going into the criticism of the Law of Return will be out of the scope of this note. So I will mention it very briefly. One criticism is based on the distinction it makes on the basis of origin, a mixture of religion and national origin, and the question whether this amounts to a prohibited discrimination under international law. Another criticism is directed to the distinction the law implies between *citizens*, Jews and non-Jews (mainly Arabs), involving questions of cultural and national rights of the majority and minority groups. A third criticism aims to restrict the application of the Law of Return only to Jews and not to their non Jewish family members, especially to grandchildren of Jews.

Here, however, I would like to view the Law of Return from a different angle, and to tie it to the way in which an immigration policy towards non-Jews came into being, without being adopted explicitly and with no proper public discussion. A policy made by omission.

“The Law of Return, then, is not only a symbol, but also responsible for the present immigration policy”

Historically, the Law of Return was preceded by 17 drafts of the Nationality Law, that generally maintained equality between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. Distinction among them was made only in order to facilitate Jewish *aliyah*. In the explanation to the 17th draft it was said that “Israeli citizenship is not dependant on belonging to the Jewish people or to the Jewish religion or to the national Jewish movement. And on the other hand, such belonging is not sufficient in order to grant the status of Israeli citizenship”⁴ Eventually, the Law of Return was adopted separately from the Nationality law, in order to give legal substance to the significance of the ingathering of the exiles, which is in the basis of the Jewish state. This way a distinction was made between an *oleh* who returns to his or her homeland, to whom the Nationality law grants citizenship as if he or she were born in the country, and an immigrant who goes through naturalization. In the historical circumstances of the end of the 40s of the 20th century, most of the Jewish people were dispersed in the Diaspora. After the Holocaust, many of them were stateless. The national home that was established for the Jewish people in Israel, with the agreement of the family of nations, enabled the Jewish people to realize their right of self-determination, thereby justifying Jewish immigration into it. When Ben-Gurion presented the bill to the Knesset, he declared that “The Law of Return has nothing to do with immigration laws. This is the persistent law of the Israeli history. It determines the national principle according to which the state of Israel was established. The historical right of every Jew to resettle in Israel”⁵ According to this view, the Law of Return forms part of the constituent power of the state of Israel. This is why Ben Gurion says that “this law determines that not the state grants the Jews abroad the right to settle in the country, but this right is inherent in him as a Jew, if only he wishes to join the settlement of the country”⁶ Thus, some view the Law of Return as a law that should be given constitutional status that will reflect its status in practice.⁷ When he declared that the Law of Return is not an

immigration law, Ben Gurion meant to emphasize its status as an *aliyah* law, law of repatriation, not a law that guides the immigration of aliens into a state that is not theirs. But in an historical and somewhat ironical view, it seems that his declaration was taken literally. Israel did not regulate the immigration of non-Jews (who are not family members of Jews). The Entry to Israel law places entry into the state of persons not covered by the Law of Return entirely in the discretion of the Minister of Interior. But discretion is not a criterion. The practice of the Ministry of Interior during the years shows a quite consistent pattern, under which non-Jews are generally not granted immigrant status in Israel.

The Law of Return, then, is not only a symbol, but also responsible for the present immigration policy. One can look at it in two possible ways; Either the Law of Return is the sole immigration policy, as only Jews and their family members are *entitled* to enter the gates of Israel, or through the Law of Return Israel has allowed immigration of Jews, while simply neglecting to formulate any immigration policy vis-à-vis persons not covered by this Law.

60 years after the establishment of the State of Israel, the time has come to consider seriously the criteria for immigration of persons not covered by the Law of Return. Discussion of these criteria is beyond the scope of the present lecture. I will only note that part of the criteria might be connected to the Jewish character of the state. For example, admitting refugees, a situation with which the Jewish people has had a tragic experience.

The advisory committee on immigration policy published an interim report in February 2006. It presented several assumptions for immigration policy, in which the Law of Return will continue to be the moral and normative foundation of the Israeli immigration policy. In addition, this policy will consider “the accepted norms and principles of international law of human rights and in the rights of political asylum (...) as well as the interests of its non-Jewish citizens”⁸ The committee dealt more concretely with several aspects of immigration policy: marriage immigration, family reunification, migrant workers and refugees. There has been no response to the report. It gathers dust on the shelves of the government offices.

NOTES

- ¹ Government decision no. 3805.
- ² Ann Dummeett, *A New Immigration Policy* (1978): 8-9.
- ³ Quoted in Adriana Kemp & Rebeca Raijman, *Migrants and Workers: The Political Economy of Labor Migration in Israel* (2008): 189-190
- ⁴ 17th draft to the Nationality Law of December 5, 1949, explanation to the 17th draft. Quoted in Zerach Verhafeig, *Constitution to Israel Religion and State* (1988): 136.
- ⁵ Divrei HaKneset 6 (1950): 2036-3027
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ Dalia Schori, "Justice Barak: To make the Law of Return into a Basic Law". *Ha'aretz* 14 April 2004.
- ⁸ Advisory committee on immigration policy, interim report, February 2006. Copy with author.

IMMIGRATION TO CANADA AND CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP: CONTEMPORARY ASPECTS OF LAW AND POLICY

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ג'רלד גאל הינו פרופסור למשפטים באוניברסיטת אלברטה. הוא כתב את הספר "מערכת המשפט הקנדית", במהדורתו החמישית ומכהן כעת כנשיא ויו"ר הדירקטוריון של מרכז ג'ון האמפרי לשלום ולזכויות האדם. פרופ' גל הנו חבר בדירקטוריון האגודה ללימודים קנדיים ובדירקטוריון הקרן הקנדית לחינוך רב-תרבותי וכן חבר כבוד בוועד המנהל של המרכז ללימודים חוקתיים. פרופסור גאל שימש בעבר כחבר בדירקטוריון האגודה לחינוך משפטי של מחוז אלברטה, בוועד הבינלאומי ללימודים קנדיים, בקרן הקנדית לזכויות האדם וכן שירת כמנהל בפועל של המכון הקנדי למתן צדק. לפרופסור גאל הוענקו מספר פרסים, ביניהם פרס זכויות האדם של מחוז אלברטה, אות יובל הזהב של המלכה אליזבת השנייה ואת יובל המאה של מחוז אלברטה. כמו כן, הוא מונה בשנת 2001 כחבר המסדר הקנדי. בין תחומי העיסוק של פרופסור גאל נכללים הדיון החוקתי, זכויות האדם ומתן צדק בקנדה.

A. IMMIGRATION

The relevant piece of federal legislation is the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* and the regulations contained there under. In addition, various issues have been subject to litigation in the Federal Court of Canada, resulting in a refinement and elucidation of the law through a now comprehensive and emerging jurisprudence.

One area of immigration law that has attracted attention, relates to the various categories under which prospective immigrants must fall in order to be considered eligible for entry into Canada as new permanent residents. Traditionally, Canada has encouraged immigration under its family class category whereby Canadian citizens can sponsor designated family members, essentially reuniting their families in Canada.

The so-called economic class of immigrants has undergone some major developments over the years. Canadian policy makers have always been cognizant of the need for immigration to a country that is geographically broad and economically diverse, and often in need of persons with certain skills to contribute to the economic growth and well-being of the nation. Recently, Canada has enhanced this economic category by encouraging the admission of entrepreneurs and investors. Overall, there has been a significant growth recently in the economic class.

With respect to skilled and professional workers, changes in the law have resulted in a prerequisite that skilled applicants must fall into one or another of three sub-categories. A skilled applicant must have had at least one year of work experience in one of about forty occupations designated by the minister responsible for immigration; or must have been engaged as a temporary foreign worker or an international student in Canada for at least one year prior to admission; or must have a guarantee of approved pre-arranged employment upon immigration to Canada. Unless an individual applying as a skilled worker falls into one of these sub-categories, an application will not even be accepted for processing.

These changes augment the pre-existing point system under which applicants are considered for immigration if they achieve a minimum score based on various factors such as, age, language or languages spoken, work experience, education, arranged employment and adaptability. Under the point system, the applicants must also demonstrate that they have sufficient funds to support themselves and their dependants upon their arrival in Canada. However, in addition to those factors, prospective immigrants must have had at least one year of experience over the past ten years in one of three designated national occupational categories.

As of September 2008, a new economic sub-category was instituted; namely,

the Canadian Experience Class. Prospective immigrants in this class may be admitted into Canada separate and apart from the traditional point system. To be eligible, a prospective immigrant must have engaged in at least two years of skilled work experience in Canada in a designated field falling under the National Occupational Qualification (NOC) or must have graduated from a Canadian post-secondary institution with similar skilled work experience for at least one year. Although not subject to the point system, these prospective immigrants must demonstrate ability in one of Canada's two official languages.

Essentially, the underlying object in the existing, and now expanded, economic class is to ensure that Canada is able to remedy any specific labour shortages. At the same time, it serves to encourage qualified prospective immigrants the likelihood of greater chances of success in the Canadian labour market with the provision of reasonable expectations and connections with established labour networks. The economic class requirements serve to prevent persons coming to Canada who are not required in terms of Canada's economic needs, given existing oversupply of personnel and undersupply of jobs in particular areas of employment. The new policy also attempts to attract and retain foreign students to study in Canada's post-secondary institutions.

The Government of Canada has also instituted measures to assist in the economic integration of new immigrants. For example, it has increased funding in support of settlement programs and services. Moreover, it has attempted to deal with one of the more controversial and troublesome issues facing foreign trained immigrants – that of recognition of foreign credentials. Professional accreditation is largely a matter of provincial jurisdiction with federal funding assistance. In May of 2007, the federal government created a Foreign Credentials Office in order to address this somewhat pressing concern. Some employers are encouraging the integration of internationally trained immigrants through greater recognition of foreign credentials (see *The Edmonton Journal*, April 18, 2009).

Another category of immigration that has attracted considerable attention recently is Canada's program to assist refugees and other persecuted people. This program essentially consists of two sub-categories. One relates to convention refugees, that is, those falling under Canada's obligations pursuant to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In a somewhat unique action, in 2002, Canada expanded its definition of refugee protection to include additional criteria with respect to persons in need of protection in order to fulfill its obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It also added further criteria of risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The other sub-category to assist persecuted people relates to humanitarian-protected persons.

In addition to the foregoing, there is a reserve of discretion in the responsible Minister, to grant permanent residence in Canada on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate grounds, with respect to those persons in Canada who would suffer excessive hardship if they had to return to their home country. For a discussion of humanitarian and compassionate grounds, see *Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)*, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.

The Constitution of Canada provides for joint jurisdiction over immigration. Under section 95 of the *Constitution Act of 1867*, both the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures have authority to enact laws relating to immigration; however, in the event of an inconsistency between the federal and provincial laws, the federal law will be paramount and operate to the extent of any such inconsistency. As a matter of practice, this provision has led to the institution of immigration agreements with the provinces, allowing provinces to have a role in the implementation of immigration decisions. This is achieved under the provincial nominee program. Provincial participation is most pronounced with respect to the province of Quebec which, under the immigration agreement and the resulting provincial nominee program, has essentially established its own immigration system. Under this arrangement, Quebec, in effect, chooses its own immigrants in a parallel system.

In general, the provincial programs have the advantages of quicker processing than that occurring under the federal application program and presently do not have a limit on the numbers of immigrants admitted to each participating province. The provincial programs are designed to permit the provinces to admit a sufficient number of immigrants to satisfy local or regional needs for particular skills required. They also serve to attract immigrants to smaller communities. It was recently reported in a study conducted by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities that many new Canadians are bypassing the “population magnets” of the larger cities, such as Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal, and settling in smaller communities (see *The National Post*, March 20, 2009). Ironically, despite these programs, under section 6(2) of *The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, all citizens of Canada and all permanent residents are entitled to move and take up residence and gain employment in any province of Canada. That is, under the Canadian constitution, no province can impose a barrier to movement upon any permanent resident once admitted to Canada.

One somewhat current issue relates to the backlog of immigration processing. For example, in March of 2008, there existed a backlog of some 900,000 applications. This led to the fast-tracking of existing applications. Citizenship and Immigration Canada annually publishes figures showing the projected number of immigrants expected to be admitted in each of the major classes and sub-classes.

When the backlog was announced, it was thought by some that it might lead to a reduction in the number of immigrants in some of the designated classes, despite the published projections at the time. This did not materialize. What, in fact, did occur was a new policy under which applications in the skilled workers class were not to be accepted for processing unless it was first determined that they met the eligibility requirements. Moreover, it was estimated that the wait time for those applicants who were part of the backlog could be up to six years for processing. With respect to applications submitted after February of 2008, the wait time would be reduced to about six to twelve months.

It is useful to briefly review some recent immigration statistics. In 2008, over 247,000 persons were admitted as permanent residents. The breakdown, in terms of the various immigration categories, was as follows. Approximately 65,500 persons were admitted under the family class designation, about 149,000 were admitted as part of the economic class, roughly 21,800 were admitted in the refugee category and about 10,700 persons were admitted in a group of miscellaneous categories. The projected plan for 2009 anticipates that approximately the same total number of immigrants is expected to be admitted overall this year as compared to last, including similar projections in each of the various categories. There may be some slight increases in the family and protected persons (refugees and other persons in need) categories. However, the figures for each year's plan are actually set out in terms of anticipated ranges of immigrants in each category. The upper range for the economic class in 2009 is higher than 2008. The number of provincial nominees is expected to constitute a record high in the current year. However, ultimately, the overall number of immigrants is roughly the same from year to year. At the same time, it was recently reported that, as a result of a "souring economy", the government may be considering a cutback in the number of newcomers allowed into Canada (see *The Edmonton Journal*, February 11, 2009). It was also reported that, according to United Nations figures, there is a 30% increase in the number of people seeking refugee status in Canada. The minister responsible for immigration attributes this increase to "wide-scale and almost systematic abuse" of Canada's refugee system (see *The National Post*, March 25, 2009).

“They also serve to attract immigrants to
smaller communities”

There are also some other issues that have captured public interest. One relates to security certificates. Security certificates are legal instruments under which non-citizens living in Canada may be detained and/or deported on grounds of security,

violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality. They are authorized under major changes to the law in 2002. The *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, replacing the older *Immigration Act*, provides that when a security certificate is issued, this bypasses the usual admissibility hearing and appeal processes. These cases can facilitate the immediate detention of persons concerned and involve the maintenance of confidentiality of intelligence information. As a result, they have led to constitutional challenges under section 7 of *The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (that is, the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice). See, for example, *Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)*, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1; *Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli*, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711; and *Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9. The latter case attracted considerable attention in respect of the inability of lawyers to challenge the evidence under which a security certificate is issued. The Supreme Court of Canada struck down certain sections of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* but suspended the judgment allowing the federal government time to deal with the impugned provisions. This has led to the appointment of special advocates to represent these individuals, with these advocates having access to the evidence upon which these security certificates are based.

Another important issue relates to the role of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) and the Federal Court of Canada in immigration cases. The IRB conducts hearings for people in custody and inadmissibility hearings where there is a family sponsorship refusal and a removal order. The IRB has three divisions including a refugee protection division. With respect to this division, it determines whether a person qualifies as a convention refugee or as a person in need of protection under the Act. At present, there is no refugee appeal division although there has been some discussion of establishing one. The IRB decisions can be reviewed with leave by the Federal Court of Canada. As it turns out, only about 10% of cases receive leave to have their cases reviewed by the Federal Court. There is a further appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal only in respect of “serious questions of general importance”.

Another contemporary issue facing policy-makers relates to the so-called safe third country policy. This policy arises as a result of refugee applicants applying to Canada from outside their country of origin and is directed at avoiding “country shopping” by refugee applicants. This is a matter that was recently litigated in the Federal Court of Canada. As a result of a decision rendered, the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States remains in effect. Under this

agreement, people making refugee claims are required to seek protection in whichever of the two countries (Canada or the United States) they enter first.

An issue that surfaces from time to time relates to the role of immigration consultants, persons engaged in the business of advising prospective immigrants and their families. Indeed, some consultants perform a useful and valuable service while others are opportunistic and disreputable. As a result, the Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants was established to set standards and provide for the certification of recognized immigration consultants. Subsequently, the “Government of Canada amended the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations as of April 13, 2004 so that all practicing immigration consultants in Canada need to be members in good standing with either the Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants, a Canadian law society or the *Chambre des notaires du Québec*” (see, <http://www.csic-scci.ca/content/history>). Interestingly, in *Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat*, 2001 SCC 67, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with constitutional issues in relation to a conflict between the provisions of the Immigration Act and the Legal Profession Act (of British Columbia) and the underlying issue of whether immigration consultants were engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.

B. CITIZENSHIP

Professor Ronald Cheffins of the University of Victoria, author of the *Constitutional Process in Canada*, wrote that a constitution mirrors the soul of a nation. It, in fact, reflects the values that define a nation. In Canada, these values may be identified by examining the provisions of *The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and include freedom of religion, freedom of expression (including freedom of the press) and freedom of association and assembly. The Canadian constitution exclusively gives Canadian citizens the right to vote, the right to run in an election and the right to serve if elected. It also gives every citizen the right to remain, enter and leave Canada and the right to move and take up residence in any province and to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province. It also provides Canadian citizens with the right to a minority language education.

Section 91(25) of the *Constitution Act of 1867* gives the Parliament of Canada exclusive legislative authority over matters of naturalization and aliens. This provision grants federal authority to legislate matters in relation to citizenship, how it is acquired and how it can be lost.

Apart from our First Nations peoples, Canada is, essentially, a nation of immigrants. There have been some six million new citizens since the enactment of the

first *Citizenship Act* in 1947. Prior to that date, Canadians were considered British subjects. But, to quote Gabe de Roche of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship, this “did not reflect the character of our nation” (see <http://www.icc-icc.ca/en/citizenship/history.php>).

Recently, the Institute for Canadian Citizenship was established to promote, through a program of research and events “the idea that citizenship is one of the most important bonds we share”. The Institute is co-chaired by Canada’s former Governor General, the Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, P.C., C.C. and John Ralston Saul, C.C. The Institute has established its six pillars of Canadian Citizenship. They are: economic security, social networks, legal status, political participation, cultural identity and public discourse. In a speech delivered at the Hague on December 4, 2007, the Honourable Adrienne Clarkson titled her address and expressed the view that “Citizenship is the Way a Country Believes in Itself” (see <http://www.icc-icc.ca/en/publications/documents/CitizenshipSpeechDecember42007condensed.pdf>).

There are, however, some current issues of considerable controversy surrounding the notion of Canadian citizenship. First, in recent years, Canada has had to deal with the question of the revocation of citizenship with respect to persons designated as ‘war criminals’. The leading case involves Helmut Oberlander and his activities during the Second World War. Pursuant to subsection 18(1)(b) of the *Citizenship Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, the minister responsible referred Mr. Oberlander’s case to the Federal Court to determine whether he had obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances (see *Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2004 FCA 213 (2004)). Following this decision and subsequent judicial hearings, Mr. Oberlander was stripped of his Canadian citizenship in October of 2008.

Most recently, *Bill C-37* amended the *Citizenship Act*. The new provisions came into effect on April 17, 2009. One provision relates to the issue of so-called ‘lost Canadians’. The new Act deals with four distinct legal scenarios under which persons lost Canadian citizenship and provides for the acquisition and/or restoration of their citizenship. Among those affected are so-called ‘war brides’. Some have criticized the legislation alleging it contains certain omissions (see *The Edmonton Journal*, March 11, 2009).

Another issue which has attracted considerable attention relates to children born abroad to Canadian parents born abroad. Under the new law, a child born outside Canada to a Canadian citizen will only be a Canadian at birth if the child’s parent was born in Canada or became a Canadian citizen by immigrating to

Canada and acquiring Canadian citizenship. In other words, children born in another country after the new law comes into effect will not be Canadian citizens by birth if they were born outside Canada to a Canadian parent who was also born outside Canada to a Canadian parent. In effect, the new law limits Canadian citizenship to the first generation born to Canadian parents outside of Canada. In some circumstances, this limitation applies to foreign born children adopted overseas by Canadian parents. Some have alleged that this creates 'two-tier Canadians'. Notwithstanding extensive criticism, the government decided to proceed with the amended legislation (see *The Globe and Mail*, April 17, 2009).

The Minister responsible for immigration and citizenship, the Honourable Jason Kenney, recently made some comments that have ignited much public discussion. For example, the Minister stated that immigrants to Canada should be competent in either of Canada's official languages before becoming Canadian citizens (see, for example, *The National Post*, March 24, 2009). The Minister also remarked that "[i]ntegration does not mean assimilation. It is not about forcing people to cut themselves off from their religion, their faith, their customs. It means keeping those things, celebrating them, but not staying locked in a mini-version of one's country of origin" (see *The Edmonton Journal*, April 26, 2009). According to one commentator, the Minister is "selling a new vision for immigration and it's all about Canadian identity" (see *The Edmonton Journal*, April 26, 2009). The Minister is also seeking to address some of the more detailed, problematic issues such as the recognition of foreign credentials. For additional analyses, see the commentaries by Rudyard Griffiths, "The Meaning of Canadian Citizenship" and Arsun Smith, "Taking Citizenship Seriously" (both articles appearing in *The National Post*, April 16, 2009).

Immigration and citizenship are important matters in Canada deserving of public attention and discussion. As mentioned earlier, Canada is historically a nation of immigrants and, given the demographic reality of modern Canada, it will continue to be a nation where immigration will exert a major influence on the country's economic, social, cultural and political fabric. Immigration and citizenship are also areas experiencing considerable ongoing scrutiny, review and change. This paper has focused on some contemporary aspects of immigration and citizenship law and policy, and has sought to capture the dynamism which they play in defining Canada, Canadian life and the Canadian experience.

NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN CANADA AND ISRAEL

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JACK JEDWAB occupe actuellement le poste de directeur exécutif de l'association d'études canadiennes (l'AEC). De 1994 à 1998, il a été directeur exécutif du chapitre québécois du congrès juif canadien.

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ג'אק ג'דוואב מכהן כעת כמנהל בפועל של האגודה ללימודים קנדיים (SCA) (ובין השנים 1994-1998, כיהן כמנהל בפועל של הקונגרס היהודי הקנדי במחוז קוובק. דר' ג'דוואב מחזיק בתואר שלישי בתחום ההיסטוריה של קוובק מאוניברסיטת קונקורדיה ופרסם מאמרים בספרים, ירחונים משכילים ובעיתונים ברחבי קנדה, ובמיוחד ה-MaertnoG, ettezaG aL, esserP, ו-rioveD. בין תחומי העיסוק שלו נכללים נושאים דמוגרפיים ובלשניים, זהות לאומית ורב-תרבותיות וגיוון.

In pluralistic democracies, there is rarely consensus over how to define the national identity, or what might be described as the nation's self-definition. This makes answering the question, "who are we" an object of ongoing debate across much of the globe. The popularity of such recent publications as "Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity" by the late Samuel P. Huntington (2006) and "The Unfinished Canadian: The People We Are" by Andrew Cohen are prime examples of the continued importance directed at such debates.

John Wrench (2008) contends that:

"...there are important differences in "national myths" which have implications for the acceptability of policies relating to immigrant and ethnic minorities. In countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia, which have been built on immigrants, the idea of immigration has been a relatively positive theme in national development. European countries, on the other hand, see their cohesion as coming from nationality or ethnicity rather than the 'strength through diversity' which is associated with traditional immigration countries."

Favell (2003) notes that

"...in Europe we are talking about tightly bounded and culturally specific nation-states dealing in the post-war period with an unexpected-but still not very large-influx of highly diverse immigrant settlers, at a time when for other international reasons, their sense of nationhood is insecure or in decline. It is a problematic very different to those faced by the USA or Australia, whose histories and sense of nationhood have always been built on immigration. Europe, rather, faces a problematic, where the continuity of nation-building is perhaps a much more significant fact than the multicultural hybridity that is sometimes sought for in these other, newer 'model' nations (Favell 2003, 30)

According to Soroka et al. (2007) "...growing ethnic diversity has generated two intersecting policy agendas in Western democracies." The first celebrates diversity and challenges government to respect cultural difference and construct inclusive forms of citizenship. The other emphasizes social cohesion or social integration where the objective facing diverse societies is to strengthen a shared sense of community and construct a common national identity. As Soroka et al. rightly

observe, there is no logical reason why both these agendas cannot be pursued simultaneously. They note that in general, policy orientation has shifted back and forth between these agendas

Still, some idea around the parameters of national identity guides thinking when it comes to public discourse, policy formulation and program development in regard to multiculturalism. Defining the contours of national identity helps answer questions over immigrant integration. By answering the question “who are we” one is presumably establishing some basis for the related question “into what do migrants integrate?”

Ambiguity in public discourse and policy is not uncommon when it comes to defining the complex relationships between national identity and internal diversity. In Canada’s case, there are historical commitments to support the vitality of the country’s official language minorities (the francophones outside of Quebec and the anglophones within the majority French province), along with obligations towards the country’s First Nations or aboriginal peoples, notably in regard to territorial rights and ongoing efforts to recognize the province of Quebec’s specificity within Canada as the only part of North America with a French language majority. In the 1970’s, Canada described its model of diversity as “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.” To be more precise, it endorsed the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural character of the country within the context of English and French being the two official languages. In the words of then Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Canada could have official languages but not official cultures. Although the term multiculturalism has remained broadly popular, it has never been unanimously endorsed and to this day is the object of criticism.

Amongst others, several Quebec opinion leaders feel that Canada’s multicultural paradigm undercuts the country’s self-description as originating with two founding peoples, the English (previously British) and French. By promoting identification with Canada it diminishes from attachment to Quebec. Hence Quebec policymakers employ the term interculturalism to describe their approach to diversity even though the Quebec program differs little from that implemented by the government of Canada. Indeed Quebec’s approach might be described as intercultural within a unilingual French framework. Yet, paradoxically, Quebecers are the country’s most bilingual population. When it comes to the presence of diversity, *there can be* gaps or inconsistencies between discourse, law and practice. In effect, policy-makers can publicly praise diversity and describe it as a source of enrichment, while offering limited public support for preserving community identities, and others may offer such support, while publicly discouraging the preservation of minority cultures.

Sociologist Chaim Waxman (2007) declares “the age of the melting pot is long gone in Israel” and he adds that the country has become a very diverse, multicultural society with ideology-charged differences across groups. Israel’s model of diversity might be described as “multiculturalism within a religiously Jewish framework”. In their book, rhetorically entitled, “Is Israel One: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Religion Confounded”, Ben-Rafael and Peres (2005) points out that identity debates in Israel are currently characterized by such questions as “In what sense is Israeli society Jewish?”, “How Jewish is it?” and “How Jewish should it be?” Ben-Rafael and Peres suggest that it is appropriate to speak of several Jewish Israeli identities and not just one. They refer to the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between religion and people in the context of a Jewish state and of the role of religion in the formation of Jewish nationalism as the principal reason that a clear formula has yet to be fully endorsed. Indeed, they add that the effort to identify such a formula inevitably triggers confrontation.

Debates over national identities and cultural diversity are certain to remain with us in the foreseeable future. An increasing feature of such debates is the effort to provide some empirical basis for measuring the importance of identity and the sense of belonging to its various and varying expressions. As it applies to migrants, such empirical research is associated with the notion of “social integration”. That which follows will be divided into two parts. First we’ll look at the concept of social integration and its application in Canada and Israel. To this end, we will examine efforts at measuring social integration in Canada by Soroka and al. (2007) and Reitz and Banerjee (2007) on the one hand and on the other, work done by Ben-Rafael and Peres (2005) on social integration in Israel. It is contended that social integration theorists tend to be divided into two groups – one that assumes identities are in ongoing competition and choices are required, while the other, assumes that in plural democracies, identities needn’t be viewed as competitive and choices are not required.

1. DEFINING SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD, 1994) has suggested that there are several ways of understanding the concept of social integration. It can be equated with the goal of inclusion thus implying equal opportunities and rights for all human beings. As such, greater social integration results in improved life chances. Some hold that the opposite of social integration is disintegration or exclusion. Others, however, attribute a negative connotation to social integration, conjuring up the image of an unwanted imposition of uniformity. And, yet others, feel the notion is neither positive nor

negative, rather it simply describes the established patterns of human relations in any given society.

The UNRISD report points out that the meaning of social integration is frequently broad and ambiguous. It generally targets the objective of heightened solidarity and common identity to deal with sharpening ethnic strife that persists globally. Although it is difficult to dismiss the importance of remedying intergroup tension and making an appeal for greater solidarity, the UNRISD report raises concern over “hidden assumptions” that may underlie an exclusive emphasis on social integration

As mentioned, the promotion of social integration, invites questions around what such integration entails? To the extent that social integration theorists believe that ethnic strife is a source of disintegration, does the pursuit of social integration thus undercut cultural diversity? The authors of the UNRISD report wonder whether: “The excluded can be included in ways which attempt to promote an unacceptable degree of homogeneity; and, when this occurs, the search for social integration becomes synonymous with the imposition of uniformity.”

Soroka et al. (2007) point out that several analysts believe that a common sense of identity is critical to the capacity of a society to undertake collective action and prevent fragmentation by attaining social cohesion. Others place less emphasis on shared values and identities and argue that widespread engagement and participation are the keys to social integration. Soroka et al. note that contemporary societies are characterized by multiple identities and diverse values, and it may be illusory to find the wellspring of cohesion in common attitudes. Referring to Berger (1998), it is contended that society can function perfectly adequately as long as there is a general consensus on the institutions and procedures through which tensions can be mediated and conflicts adjudicated.

For their part, Reitz and Banerjee (2007) define “social integration” as the extent to which individual members of a group form relationships with people outside the group — relationships that help them to achieve individual economic, social or cultural goals. Social integration, in this sense, is relevant to the broader question of social cohesion which they define as the capacity of society to set and implement collective goals. They consider in particular the impact of inequality and discrimination on minority social integration.

2. SOCIAL INTEGRATION TESTS

As multiple identification is increasingly acknowledged in pluralistic societies, social integration theorists attempt to get at which expressions or markers of identity are deemed most important by citizens. Analysts often differ in their methods

for collecting information relevant to their hypothesis. Researchers examining social integration employ qualitative or quantitative tests to understand the importance of national identities by looking specifically at attachment, belonging and/or pride in nation and/or community. The types of “identity tests” employed often depend on a particular concept of national identity. Therefore, social integration analyses are often based on whether ethnicity, religion and language background are believed to conflict with national identity or to present no obstacle to it. Indeed, in the latter case, strong attachment or belonging to various markers of identity may be seen as reinforcing the national expression of identity.

The notion that identities, particularly ethnic and national, are inevitably in competition or conflict has been at the very centre of debates between supporters and opponents of multiculturalism in Canada and elsewhere. In fact, such debates pre-date the introduction of the multicultural discourse and policy in Canada. To position such identities as competitive requires that the history, geo-politics and demographic circumstances be explained. Social integration tests attempt to offer some empirical foundation for helping us understand group identification at a given point in time.

The extent to which the analyst feels that identities are in competition often influences the manner in which an identity test is constructed and how the questions are formulated. When it comes to the measurement of social integration, the most common types of “identity tests” either require respondents to rank in order of their importance various expressions of identity (i.e. which of the following is most important: your nation, province, ethnic and/or religious group). What might be labeled the “required response” may also oblige an interviewee to pick amongst pre-selected options (i.e. Canadian versus specific ethnic and/or religious group). Another approach to the identity test that does not frame the options as competitive, employs a scale measurement (call it the “relative response”) to determine the degree of attachment, belonging or pride in a particular expression of identity (i.e. rate on a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 implying the strongest attachment how attached are you to Canada, province, ethnic group, etc. or are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not attached at all to the following, Canada, province, your ethnic group, etc.). In the latter approach one needn’t make choices between options and it thus allows for identities to be seen as complimentary. It is by correlating responses that one can determine the degree of intersection or conflict between identities. Finally, the interpretation of results arising from these distinct identity tests can be crucial.

In a 2007 poll of some 500 Canadians of Muslim faith conducted by the firm Environics, respondents were asked whether they thought of themselves first as Canadians or Muslims to which 56% responded Muslims, 23% Canadians and 16% both equally. While the forced choice may support the view of those who believe identities are in competition another survey question asked how proud Muslims were to be Canadian? To this question, some 73% said they were very proud and another 21% said they were somewhat proud. This presumably would satisfy those for whom such identities are not deemed to be in competition. Correlating the responses reveals that of those who said “Canadian first” some 86% said they were “very proud” and the rest “somewhat proud”, while amongst those saying they were “Muslim first”, some 67% said they were “proud” and 23% were “somewhat proud”.

There are variations on “required response” and “relative response” identity tests. For example, surveys may also invite respondents to self-define by providing an open question on such things as ethnic origin or ancestry and ideally such an approach would be accompanied by a definition of these concepts. Reitz and Banerjee use the 2002 Statistics Canada Ethnic Diversity Survey which was in large part aimed at unraveling the meaning of ethnic identity and its relationship to national identity. The survey of some 41 000 respondents included an open questions on self-identification of one’s ethnic or cultural identity (permitting up to six choices) and one’s ancestry. Specifically the EDS question is formulated as follows:

“I would now like you to think about *your own* identity, in ethnic or cultural terms. This identity may be the same as that of your parents, grandparents or ancestors or it may be different.”

What is your ethnic or cultural identity?

No examples are provided.

Your ethnic or cultural identity is the ethnic or cultural group or groups to which you feel you belong.

Prior to that question being asked, the EDS asked the following:

“I would now like to ask you about your ethnic ancestry, heritage or background. What were the ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors?”

Another set of identity questions asked about one’s sense of belonging to Canada where respondents were asked on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 meaning very strong. This followed a section in which respondents were asked to rate their sense of

belonging to family, ethnic or cultural group, municipality and province on a five-point scale, from not strong at all to very strong.

Reitz and Banerjee (2007) contend that the measure of sense of belonging to Canada is a broad indicator of the strength of interpersonal relations, whereas self-identification as Canadian is a more specific indication of belonging in the national society. As the White respondents to the survey were more inclined to self-identify as Canadian than were the visible minority respondents, Reitz and Banerjee conclude that there is an important “racial” gap in social integration.

As observed in the table below, for recently arrived immigrants, there is no such racial gap. Indeed the Chinese group is more likely to identify as Canadian than are groups of European origin. For earlier immigrants however, the extent of Canadian identification is higher for both Whites and racial minorities, presumably reflecting their higher sense of commitment to Canada, but the difference is greater for Whites than for racial minorities.

Overall, racial minorities are slower to acquire a sense of identification as Canadian than are immigrants of European origin; this difference can be observed for all racial minority groups, including Chinese. Perhaps equally significantly, among the second generation, for Whites, the rate of Canadian identification is quite high — 78.2 percent — while for racial minorities, it lags by over 20 percentage points. On the basis of the analysis, Reitz and Banerjee contended that Canada was experiencing a serious problem in social integration arising from a purported “racial” gap in the strength of Canadian identity amongst second generation visible minorities.

TABLE 1: DO YOU IDENTIFY AS CANADIAN?

IMMIGRANT	IMMIGRANTS	IMMIGRANTS	SECOND GENERATION	THIRD GENERATION AND HIGHER
	RECENT*	EARLIER**		
Whites	21.9%	53.8%	78.2%	63.4%
Total visible minorities	21.4%	34.4%	56.6%	—
Chinese	30.6%	42.0%	59.5%	—
South Asian	19.1%	32.7%	53.6%	—
Black	13.9%	27.2%	49.6%	—
Other visible minorities	17.4%	32.8%	60.6%	—

* Arrived in Canada between 1991 and 2001 ** Arrived in Canada before 1991.

Source: Jeffrey G. Reitz and Rupa Banerjee and based on data compiled from the Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage, 2002-03.

It is essential to keep in mind that the EDS self-identification question did not directly ask respondents about Canadian identity. The results are based on the number of “Canadian” responses to an open question on one’s ethnic or cultural identity and the results depended in part on the way ethnicity is understood by the respondent.

Reitz and Banerjee note that: “regarding the sense of belonging to Canada which overall is higher for visible minority groups than for Whites, generational analysis shows that this higher rate is most pronounced for immigrants, particularly recent immigrants.” Paradoxically on the issue of belonging, the empirical evidence presented by the Reitz and Banerjee as regards “social integration” suggests that Canadian immigrants may be better “socially integrated” than non-immigrants! Among the second generation, all visible minorities have less of a sense of belonging to Canada than Whites. This is most striking in the case of Blacks, but is quite pronounced for Chinese and other visible minorities, and it is significant even for South Asians.

Reitz and Banerjee’s interpretation of EDS results to make observation about social integration differs sharply from the findings of Soroka et al. (2007). Relying primarily on the *Equality, Security and Community Survey*-second wave (ESCS) conducted in Canada in 2002-03, Soroka et al. provide insights through the measures on pride and belonging to Canada. Comparisons are made across various ethnic groups and between non-immigrant and immigrant with the reference group being the British/Northern European origin respondents. The ESCS questions on pride and belonging are framed as follows: “How proud are you to be Canadian: very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud?” and do you feel that you belong completely in Canada (by scoring themselves 10 on a scale of 1 to 10). The authors point out that the question on “sense of belonging” is a more complicated matter than pride, as it depends not just on how much the person wants to be part of the place, but also on how well accepted that person is by others in that place.

Soroka et al. (2007) contend that the principal challenge to social cohesion in Canada remains connected not in the attitudes, beliefs and attachments of relative newcomers but in the historic fault lines between the oldest nations (French and Aboriginal) that make up this country. When it comes to pride, most of the differences between immigrant and Canadian-born populations narrow considerably, the longer newcomers are in Canada. Differences associated with groups of relatively recent arrival are a product of the time they have been in Canada. In effect, for immigrants, it is the length of time in Canada that

drives what at first glance appear to be strong ethnic differences. The longer they are in Canada, the more their sense of pride. Furthermore, immigrants' sense of belonging equals or exceeds that of the country's largest ethnic group. Soroka et al. (2007) point to some limits in the integrative power of Canadian life for newcomers as Southern and Eastern Europe eventually come to feel they belong almost as much as those with ancestry in the United Kingdom and Northern Europe. But the visible minorities, and notably the East Asian, Caribbean and African origin immigrants, remain less confident that they fully belong. Still, the question does not directly address their sense of belonging but instead probes whether they feel they are accepted.

Ben-Rafael and Peres (2005) note that rapid social changes require societies accept and recognize cultural heterogeneity as a basic aspect of the social order. Israel is no exception, as it must also cope with internal discord and the conflicting values and interests that accompany this. In their research on multiculturalism in Israel, they set out to examine respondents' identification with, and allegiance to, their groups as opposed to the national collectivity. Ben-Rafael and Peres (2005) mostly employ the required response method in formulating questions. They do, however, include questions about the salience of identity.

Summarizing their approach, the authors note that respondents were first asked to assert their identification with both their ethnic identity (Ashkenazi and Mizrahi) and national identity (Jewish or Israeli). They were asked to limit themselves to first and second choices in order to yield a sharper portrait than a wider range of choices. The authors observe that a large majority in all groups define themselves primarily in terms of broader-than-ethnic identities (Israeli or Jewish). In the case of first generation Mizrahim, they appear to divide equally between those who define their first allegiance as Jewishness or as Israeliness; their offspring tend more clearly to rank Israeliness in first place. Among Ashkenazim, both generations prefer Israeliness, but the first generation is more prone to emphasize Jewishness. The authors point out that the difference between the two categories is more pronounced in the second generation. The authors observe that "Ashkenazim are more ethnic than Mizrahim-and the difference in this respect tended to be sustained in the second generation". We are told that this contradicts previous findings that compared Ashkenazim and Mizrahim (Ben-Rafael and Sharot. 1991) and found that Mizrahim of both generations are more ethnic than Ashkenzim. It is noted however, than in the earlier study, respondents were asked to state the degree of their identification with

four relevant identities-Jewish, Israeli, broad-ethnic (Mizrahi versus Ashkazi) and narrow-ethnic (country of origin). Hence the authors underscore the importance of question formulation which is at the heart of the changed outcome and indeed, has a profound bearing on the measurement of social integration.

Looking specifically at some of the tables presented by Ben-Rafael and Peres (2005), one observes that amongst the identity choices that are offered to the respondent, they can select two of them. That said, the categories still remain open to some interpretation on the part of the respondent and it is uncertain whether they can legitimately be represented as competing identities.

TABLE 2

FIRST AND SECOND IDENTITIES	First Choice (percent)			Second Choice (percent)		
	MIZ	ASHK	ISRAELI	MIZ	ASHK	ISRAELI
Ashkenazi	0.4	18.0	19.8	0.8	31.0	1.2
Mizrahi	11.1	2.3	3.7	26.5	3.2	11.1
Israeli	54.0	54.8	39.0	26.5	24.9	36.4
Jewish	33.3	23.6	37.4	44.1	37.7	51.2
Other	1.1	1.8	–	2.1	3.2	–

Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yochanan Peres. *Is Israel One? Religion, Nationalism and Multiculturalism Confounded*, Brill NV, Leiden and Boston, 2005

In the table below, the focus is on whether Russians adopted Israeliness as an identity and how they related it to Jewishness and to Russianness. FSU immigrants still seem to emphasize with their Russian and Jewish identities (more or less equally) than they do their Israeli identity. Ben-Rafael and Peres also provide a comparison with non-immigrants divided according to broad ethno-cultural divisions and as observed for whom “Israeliness” is much more important.

TABLE 3

PREFERRED FIRST CHOICE OF IDENTITY	ASHKENAZIM	MIZRAHIM	RUSSIANS	TOTAL
Whites	21.9%	53.8%	78.2%	63.4%
Total visible minorities	21.4%	34.4%	56.6%	–
Chinese	30.6%	42.0%	59.5%	–
South Asian	19.1%	32.7%	53.6%	–
Black	13.9%	27.2%	49.6%	–
Other visible minorities	17.4%	32.8%	60.6%	–

Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yochanan Peres. *Is Israel One? Religion, Nationalism and Multiculturalism Confounded*, Brill NV, Leiden and Boston, 2005

The authors are not surprised that immigrants stress ethnicity more than do the Mizrahim and Ashkenzim, though they have similar rates of selecting Jewishness. The authors suggest that the groups have different notions of Jewishness, with Russians equating it with belonging to a “historic-cultural collective” which differs from the “legacy-allegiance” and the Jewish-nationalism brands of characterizing the perspective of Mizrahim and Ashkenazim respectively.

They further note that identity preferences are affected by length of time in Israel. Russian Jews in Israel, they point out, are definitely undergoing “ethnicization” but their “Israelization” is undeniably progressing—especially where the younger generation is concerned. Where as well the older generation insists more on Jewish Russianness, the younger generation is more likely to speak of Russianness and Israeliness.

As to the salience of ethnicity, Ben-Rafael and Peres observe that: “ostensibly stronger ethnic allegiances should not be taken at face value” and further add that: “people may understand ethnic allegiances as classificatory concepts within a broader collective without attaching great importance to them.” This is illustrated in the table below. These results suggest however that the framing of questions where ethnic and national identities are set up as competitive, may require greater conceptual clarification.

**TABLE 4: DOES YOUR ETHNIC ALLEGIANCE PLAY A ROLE IN YOUR LIFE?
(AMONGST THOSE WHO DEFINED ETHNIC ALLEGIANCE AS THEIR FIRST ALLEGIANCE)**

Ashkenazim	69.9	5.4	16.1	8.6	93
Mizrahim	22.0	12.2	43.9	22.0	41
Israeli	66.0	20.3	8.7	5.0	379
Jewish	42.5	19.7	25.4	12.3	228
Total	56.7	17.7	16.8	8.8	741

Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yochanan Peres. *Is Israel One? Religion, Nationalism and Multiculturalism Confounded*, Brill NV, Leiden and Boston, 2005

Religious identification is a far more important marker of identity amongst Israelis than it is for Canadians. The authors conclude that Jewishness and not necessarily Jewish religiosity is an important constituent of the identity of Israeli Jews in all categories of religiosity. But there is considerable variation across the spectrum of religious identifiers in the importance attributed to ethnic and national identity. Each group has its own perspective on how and where religion might fit into national identity. For the ultraorthodox, Israel should be a Jewish state first and a democracy second. For the non-religious the priorities are reversed. But the table below reinforces the potential for confounding religion, ethnicity and national identities in the predominantly Jewish state. And while the authors acknowledge its confounding effect, they may inadvertently be contributing to it. Both in Israel and Canada, work on social integration needs to further clarify how ethnicity is understood by the population.

TABLE 5

TO WHICH GROUP DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU BELONG FIRST	ASHKENAZI	MIZRAHI	TOTAL ETHNIC	ISRAELI	JEWISH	TOTAL NATIONAL
Ultraorthodox	21	8	29	6	65	71
Religious	5	5	10	17	73	90
Tradition	6	9	15	40	45	85
Non-Religious	18	4	22	65	12	77

Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yochanan Peres. *Is Israel One? Religion, Nationalism and Multiculturalism Confounded*, Brill NV, Leiden and Boston, 2005

3. CONFOUNDING ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CANADA AND ISRAEL

One of the principal lessons of the Canadian and Israeli comparative experience is the potentially different understanding of the definition of ethnic and national identities on the one hand, and the relationship between them on the other. For many Europeans the idea of ethnicity is closely associated with nationality which is not the case in many other parts of the world. This should come as no surprise in a country where the meaning of nation is being debated. For in 2007, the Canadian Parliament adopted a resolution recognizing the Quebecois as a nation although they wisely did not define Quebecois. This prompted debate over whether Quebec was a sociological or political nation.

In the focus on Canadian or Israeli identification, those not identifying as such, possess stronger minority ethnic attachment, which in turn, is seen as an obstacle to social integration. Two things need to be considered in any analysis of the relationship between ethnic and national identification. Reitz and Banerjee (2007) assume that the failure to self-identify as “Canadian” was a sign of poor social integration. They note that the EDS question on belonging to Canada reveals gaps on the basis of second generation visible minority and non-visible minority. However they choose not to look at EDS results on the strength of belonging to one’s ethnic group which can in turn be correlated with the strength of belonging to Canada and thus providing valuable insights into the relationship between ethnic and Canadian identities. Although it may prove counterintuitive to some observers, the EDS reveals that strong ethnic belonging reinforced the sense of belonging to Canada. Hence those with a very strong sense of belonging to their ethnic group (78.9%) have the highest sense of belonging to Canada.

TABLE 6: PERCENTAGE THAT BELONG TO ETHNIC OR CULTURAL GROUP AND PERCENTAGE THAT BELONG TO CANADA, 2002-03

BELONG TO ETHNIC OR CULTURAL GROUP	BELONG TO CANADA					
	1 – NOT STRONG AT ALL	2	3	4	5 – VERY STRONG	4 AND 5 COMBINED
1 – not strong at all	8.3%	3.9%	10.9%	16.5%	60.0%	76.5%
2	2.9%	5.8%	12.7%	25.5%	52.9%	77.9%
3	2.4%	4.2%	16.2%	24.0%	53.1%	77.1%
4	1.9%	3.2%	12.4%	31.5%	50.6%	82.1%
5 – very strong	1.9%	1.6%	6.2%	10.9%	78.9%	89.5%
Total	3.0%	3.3%	10.9%	19.9%	59.4%	79.3%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage, 2002-03

The same correlation of survey results in Israel yields a very similar conclusion. The 2003 results of the International Social Survey programme (ISSP) for Israel demonstrates a similar pattern. Amongst those saying they were very proud of Israel, some 88% said they were very close to their ethnic group, as compared to 68% saying they were not close at all. Some 67% of those saying they were very close to their ethnic group said they were very proud of being a national of that country, compared to 43% of Israelis reporting that they were not close to their ethnic group. Based on these figures, it is difficult to assert that there is an inherent conflict between strong ethnic ties and national identity.

Yet another issue needs to be taken into consideration which involves the relationship between age and national identification. Much of the so-called racial gap described by Reitz and Banerjee is connected to the issue of the age of the respondent and not the generation. In other words, the EDS data reveals that the generational effects of belonging to Canada diminish considerably when age is taken into consideration. Age must be examined in conjunction with generation when examining gaps in identity and belonging to Canada. Indeed the average age of second generation visible minority respondents in the EDS is 25, compared to the average age of second generation Whites, which is 45 years of age. The importance of age in understanding how the sense of belonging to Canada relates to generational effects and visible minority status is illustrated in the tables below.

TABLE 7: RATED SENSE OF BELONGING TO CANADA BY AGE COHORT, 2002-03

BELONG TO CANADA	1 – NOT STRONG AT ALL	2	3	4	5 – VERY STRONG
15-17	4.7%	7.1%	17.0%	27.8%	40.6%
18-24	4.6%	5.1%	16.6%	27.2%	43.9%
25-29	3.5%	4.4%	13.1%	24.7%	51.6%
30-34	3.1%	3.7%	12.8%	23.5%	54.2%
35-44	2.7%	2.7%	11.2%	20.5%	59.9%
45-54	2.7%	2.6%	9.2%	18.2%	64.8%
55-64	2.2%	2.3%	7.0%	14.2%	70.5%
65+	1.9%	1.3%	4.8%	9.8%	74.5%
Total	3.0%	3.3%	10.9%	19.9%	59.4%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage, 2002-03

The much lower average age of second generation White Canadians needs to be factored in to any conclusion about the generational effects of belonging to Canada. By consequence, when considering the sense of belonging to Canada for visible minority groups in similar age cohorts, the variations do not appear significant in the 25-29 and 30-34 cohorts.

TABLE 8: TABLE 8: RATED SENSE OF BELONGING TO CANADA FOR SELECTED VISIBLE MINORITIES AGES 25-29 AND 30-34, 2002-03

SENSE OF BELONGING TO CANADA	RATED 4 AND 5 ON A 5 POINT SCALE WHERE 5 MEANS VERY STRONG	
	25-29	30-34
Not in a visible minority	77.6%	78.3%
Chinese	71.6%	73.8%
South Asian	82.9%	78.6%
Black	70.8%	79.2%
Filipino	86.0%	94.9%
Latin American	70.5%	82.5%
Southeast Asian	65.4%	61.6%
Arab	80.0%	87.1%
Japanese	77.0%	77.4%
Total	76.3%	77.7%

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage, 2002-03

On the basis of second generation visible minority identification, amongst respondents age 25 to 29, some 80% of white respondents reported a strong sense of belonging to Canada (54% rank as 5 on 1-5 scale) and 76% for the Chinese population and 86% of South Asian origin respondents. Respondents identifying as visible minority Black ranked lowest on 25-29 category at 68%. But in the next cohort, persons between the ages of 30 and 34, the gap between the groups disappears almost altogether.

TABLE 9: RATED SENSE OF BELONGING TO CANADA FOR SECOND GENERATION CANADIANS NOT IDENTIFYING AS A VISIBLE MINORITY, IDENTIFYING AS EITHER CHINESE SOUTH ASIAN OR BLACK, AGES 18-24, 25-29 AND 30-34, 2002-03

2 ND GENERATION-BELONGING TO CANADA	RATED 4 AND 5 ON A 5 POINT SCALE WHERE 5 MEANS VERY STRONG		
	18-24	25-29	30-34
Not in a visible minority	73.4	80.3	83.4
Chinese	69.1	76.1	78.1
South Asian	77.6	86.3	85.6
Black	60.6	66.7	77.1

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage, 2002-03

When correlating visible minority identification in the first generation, it is observed that across each group surveyed, those with the strongest sense of belonging to Canada also possess the strongest sense of belonging to their ethnic group. In the second generation, those identifying as a visible minority with the strongest sense of belonging to Canada, were persons with the very highest sense of ethnic belonging (ranking 5 on the 5 point scale) and the lowest (1 on the 5 point scale). In other words, those either completely belonging or not belonging at all ethnically, were most likely to express the strongest belonging to Canada.

4. TAKING ACCOUNT OF MULTIPLE IDENTITIES IN CANADA AND ISRAEL

In the “identity tests” that are often employed in research on “social integration”, the menu or list of choices can be crucial. In the 2003 edition of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted in over thirty countries, the respondents are asked to rank the group that is most important amongst a pre-selected set of choices. But the menu of choices is relatively extensive moving beyond ethnic, religious and national identities. As such, the ranking does not permit a strong interpretation on the basis of competing identities but instead permits observations about how much certain expressions of identity may matter thus putting the elements of social integration into context.

As mentioned, when it comes to markers of identity, the survey reveals a sharp difference between Israelis and Canadians in those things which they regard as most important to their identity. Some one in four Israelis ranks religion as either the first or second most important marker of their identity and some 35% rank their nationality as either first or second in importance. This contrasts with the response given

by Canadians where 14% rank religion as either first or second and 24% ranks nationality as either first or second. Some 66% of Israelis surveyed believe it is very important to share the religion of the majority compared to less than one in three Canadians.

TABLE 10: MOST IMPORTANT GROUPS WITH WHICH RESPONDENT IDENTIFIES IN CANADA, ISRAEL AND ROLL UP OF 32 OTHER COUNTRIES SURVEYED (FIRST AND SECOND CHOICES COMBINED), 2003-04

	CANADA	ISRAEL	OTHER COUNTRIES SURVEYED (32)
Your family or marital status	66.7%	40.6%	49.1%
Your occupation	30.1%	32.1%	36.8%
Your nationality	24.7%	34.8%	19.8%
Your gender	16.3%	16.4%	21.5%
Your religion	14.6%	25.8%	12.6%
Your age group	11.9%	14.8%	18.4%
Your social class	8.7%	15.4%	19.6%
Your ethnic background	6.9%	6.7%	12.7%
The part of country you live in	5.6%	3.1%	5.2%
Pref political party	1.4%	4.9%	3.5%

Source: International Social Survey Programme, 2003-04

As observed below, in Canada, relative responses to identity tests offer different insights than do forced choices. Based on a survey of 1600 Canadians in January 2009, there is a gap in overall attachment on one end of the spectrum between family, language, Canada and province and on the other, city and ethnic group with religion well behind. When it comes to “very attached” responses, the family leads, with language and Canada with similar scores, followed by province, town, ethnic group and religion. While those reporting that they were very attached to Canada were much stronger than similar attachment to province, attachment to family and language was stronger than attachment to Canada.

TABLE 11: PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU FEEL VERY ATTACHED, SOMEWHAT ATTACHED, NOT VERY ATTACHED OR NOT AT ALL ATTACHED TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:

	TOTAL ATTACHMENT	VERY ATTACHED	SOMEWHAT ATTACHED
Family	94	80	14
Your language	92	63	29
Canada	87	62	25
Province	84	44	40
Your City or Town	78	34	45
Your Ethnic Group	66	28	38
Your religion	45	24	20

Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, January, 2009

On the basis of language used in the home, francophones reported weaker attachment to Canada than non-francophones, and rate of attachment to one's ethnic group was nearly as high for francophones as it was than for allophones. Attachment to religion was weakest amongst francophones and strongest amongst allophones.

TABLE 12: PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU FEEL VERY ATTACHED, SOMEWHAT ATTACHED, NOT VERY ATTACHED OR NOT AT ALL ATTACHED TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:

TOTAL ATTACHED (VERY AND SOMEWHAT) %	FRENCH	ENGLISH	OTHER
Family	94	95	94
Your language	92	93	92
Canada	59	95	95
Province	86	85	81
Your City or Town	73	79	84
Your Ethnic Group	75	59	79
Your religion	34	43	62

Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, January, 2009

Correlations from the survey reveal that those anglophones and allophones with strong ethnic attachments tend to have stronger attachments to Canada. Amongst those Canadians whose principal language is English, some 84% reporting that they are very attached to their ethnic group, say they are very attached to Canada, while amongst those reporting that they are not attached to their ethnic group, some 66% say they are very attached to Canada. The gap in attachment to Canada and to one's

ethnic group amongst those whose principal language is neither English nor French is even wider. Within this group, some 76% of those reporting that they are very attached to their ethnic group say they are very attached to Canada, while some 45% of those reporting weak attachment to their ethnic group say they are very attached to Canada. In the case of Canada’s francophones, there emerged no difference in attachment to Canada based on attachment to one’s ethnic group. In other words, stronger attachment to one’s ethnic group did not result in stronger attachment to Canada nor however, did weaker attachment to Canada imply greater attachment to one’s ethnic group.

The difference between the ranked response and the relative response to identity questions is illustrated in a survey conducted by the firm Leger Marketing in January 2009 for the Association for Canadian Studies.

When asked how Canadians define themselves on the basis of attachment to Canada, province and combinations of them, one observes that just over one in four Canadians describe themselves as Canadian only, another 30 percent as Canadian first, but also from province. Hence the majority describe themselves as either only Canadian or first Canadian and then province. Ontarians are most likely to define themselves as “Canadian only” followed by Albertans. Quebecers are by far the least likely to define themselves as Canadian only and indeed Quebec is the only part of the country where the majority are more inclined to put their provincial identification before the Canadian.

TABLE 13

PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT WAYS OF DEFINING	TOTAL	FRENCH	ENGLISH	OTHER
Canadian only	27%	5%	35%	26%
Canadian first but also from <PROV>	31%	18%	36%	33%
Equally Canadian and from <PROV>	18%	18%	17%	21%
From <PROV> first but also Canadian	12%	38%	7%	0%
From <PROV> only	5%	19%	0%	2%
No, none of the above	6%	2%	4%	17%
I don't know/I prefer not answering	1%	0%	0%	1%

Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, January, 2009

In effect, it is one of Canada's more rooted population, Quebec francophones, that are more likely to view Quebec and Canadian national identities in conflict and for many of them, ethnic and national identities are intertwined. In this regard, it is interesting to note that current leader of the Opposition in the Canadian Parliament, an international authority on nationalist movements, recently declared that the people of Quebec could be Canadian and/or Quebecers in the order they preferred.

5. CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES ON IDENTITY AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN CANADA AND ISRAEL

As observed below, despite the variations in their narratives and in their respective process of recruitment and selection of immigrants, there a number of similarities in public opinion in Canada and Israel around issues of integration and belonging. The one exception is the greater importance Canadians attribute to possessing country citizenship.

TABLE 14: RESPONSES TO SELECTED QUESTIONS ON INTEGRATION AND BELONGING IN CANADA, ISRAEL AND ROLL-UP OF 32 OTHER COUNTRIES SURVEYED, 2003-2004

VERY IMPORTANT %	CANADA	ISRAEL	OTHER COUNTRIES SURVEYED (32 OTHER COUNTRIES)
To Have Citizenship	76.8%	59.5%	53.4%
Your To be able to speak country language	69.4%	71.3%	58.0%
Feel country nationality	63.9%	66.4%	57.2%
To have country ancestry	26.1%	28.7%	34.9%

Source: International Social Survey Programme, 2003-04

Canadians and Israelis alike regard the ability to speak the dominant national language as important, with some 70% declaring that it is very important (another 20% say it is fairly important). Overall, some nine in ten Canadians report feeling very close to their county. The ISSP reveals that some nine in ten Israelis (73.1% very close plus 18.3% somewhat close) compared with 87.1% of Canadians (47.6% very close plus 39.5% close). Apart from the gap in the degree to which residents of the two countries describe themselves as very close to their respective countries, there are important internal ethnic and/or regional differences in responses to the question. In effect, some 26% in the "Arab sector" of Israel and the same percentage in the province of Quebec, report feeling very close with

some 43% of each group reporting that they feel somewhat close to the country.

On the issue of whether citizens should support their country even if it is in the wrong, some 3.7% of Canadians strongly agree and another 15.4% agree. This is in stark contrast with the view of Israelis where 27% strongly agree and some 33% agree. As to whether they would prefer to be a citizen of their country rather than any other country in the world, some 59% of Canadians strongly agree and 27% agree while 56% of Israelis strongly agree and 24% agree.

Minorities in Israel (45.7%) and in Canada (41.5%) agree that it is impossible for people who do not share customs and traditions to become fully part of the country. As to pride in their country's history, some 56.3% of Israelis say they are very proud and another 28.6% say they are somewhat proud compared with 43% of Canadians saying they are very proud and another 48.4% who state that they are somewhat proud. Again, the Arab sector of Israel has a considerably lower degree of reported pride with 11.3% saying they are very proud and 32% somewhat proud. For their part, some 28% of respondents in the province of Quebec said they are very proud of the country's history and another 56% said they were somewhat proud.

Arab Israelis and Quebecers differ sharply over preferred levels of immigration with 17% of the former that advocated an increase (3%) or the numbers remaining the same (15%) whereas in the case of Quebecers some 38% favored increases in the numbers of immigrants and 35% maintaining the same number. Overall 27% of Israelis favored an increase in the number of immigrants while 28% preferred the status quo compared with 29% of Canadians supporting increases and 33% in favor of sustaining the same number.

6. CONCLUSION

Critics of multiculturalism often base their concerns over integration on how people define themselves. They therefore oblige respondents to choose between various expressions or markers of identity. They hold the view that identities are frequently in competition and this is especially the case for national identities which are presumably undercut by a strong sense of belonging to ethnic, religious and language communities. In this view, dual and multiple attachments represent an important threat to cohesion and an obstacle to social integration. Those studying national identity frequently confuse rootedness or the sense of attachment to place with the degree of pride in it. Canada's most rooted groups, francophone Quebecers and Aboriginals, possess a weaker sense of national identity when asked about Canada. In effect however, they channel their national identities respectively to either a Quebec-based national identity or to the multitude of aboriginal

national identities. Thus analysts need to be cautious in assuming that rootedness in place is the principal causal factor in national belonging and pride. This is true in Israel where many potential migrants (especially Jews in North America and Western Europe) are pre-disposed to a strong sense of belonging and pride in Israel in some instances without ever having set foot in the country! Hence assuming rootedness is the key to social integration may give rise to misleading observations about social integration that inadequately define the ethnic group and nation.

Around measures of social integration, it is difficult to describe identity tests as neutral. In effect, as we observed in the question formulation, is very often dependent on some vision of national identity and the perceived relationship between ethnic and religious identities with national identities. Is there such a thing as a 'neutral' question in a survey when we examine opinion around identity? Rarely do identity tests account for the evolving salience of people's identities under changing contexts or circumstances. Undoubtedly ethnic and national identities can and do collide, but such conflict is neither inevitable nor inherent.

Some justification by way of historic and geo-political background is needed when putting identity tests to the population forcing them to make choices that may imagine or telegraph contradiction where it doesn't meaningfully exist. Persons of the Jewish faith in Canada may feel obliged to answer a question on whether they are more Jewish or Canadian but the real question is why set up the choice in the first place. Clearly in Quebec, some may characterize the conflict as pitting ethnic and national attachment between the populations of French descent in its identification with Canada. However, some will insist that the divergence pits two conflicting expressions of national identity. Whether in Canada or Israel, the underlying issue may therefore be the definition of the nation and the need to offer historic and geo-political justification to support social integrationist methodology.

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THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF WESTERN IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL

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רבקה רייכמן היא פרופסור בחוג לסוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה באוניברסיטת חיפה. קבלה את תואר הדוקטור בסוציולוגיה באוניברסיטת שיקגו. תחומי המחקר שלה הם הגירה בינלאומית (בישראל, אירופה וארה"ב) עם התמחות בהשתלבות של מהגרים בארץ החדשה. פרסמה מאמרים בנושא יזמות מהגרים בקרב מהגרים מקסיקנים בארה"ב, השלכות של הגירת יהודים בשוק העבודה הישראלי, הגירתם של לא יהודים לישראל וכן העמדות כלפי מהגרים בישראל ובאירופה. בשנת 2008 פרסמה עם אדריאנה קמפ ספר "עובדים זרים" העוסק בכלכלה הפוליטית בהקשר להגירת עבודה בישראל. משמשת כעורכת בכתב העת לענייני הגירה ופוליטיים.

INTRODUCTION

The process of immigrant integration into a host society has been studied for many years, from many perspectives and with relation to a multiplicity of factors and characteristics that influence the process. In addition to immigration characteristics (such as number of years since migration) and demographic characteristics of the immigrant (such as gender and age) – economic, social and psychological characteristics were also found to be linked to the process. The current study examines these characteristics as predictors for subjective social integration, as expressed by the immigrant's satisfaction with life in the new country.

Life satisfaction is defined as an overall assessment of an individual's quality of life according to his/her personal judgment and criteria (Diener, 1984). Life satisfaction was found to be associated with a range of background individual characteristics. Studies show that increases in income are associated with increases in life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1993). In another recent study testing life satisfaction across countries in Europe, standard of living was found to have a significant positive effect on life satisfaction in most countries (Bohnke, 2008). Other studies indicate that education often results in improved social relationship and higher earnings which in turn enhance satisfaction (Helliwell, 2003). The results are not clear for gender and age, but for elderly people it was found that marital status, health conditions and social capital (contacts and social activities) are significant predictors of life satisfaction (Litwin, 2005). It was recently found, in a cross-national study, that 81 percent of the variation in mean life satisfaction is due to individual attributes, whereas 19 percent is due to country characteristics (Bonini, 2008). This finding may hint that predictors of life satisfaction may be different among people coming from various origin countries, in other words, among immigrants.

“Studies show that increases in income are associated with increases in life satisfaction”

What can we learn from the literature about the life satisfaction of immigrants? In recent years, the subjective dimensions of immigrant's integration process have received more research attention (g.g: Anson et al, 1996; McMichael & Manderson, 2004; Neto, 1995; Massey & Redstone, 2006; Vohra & Adir, 2000). Massey & Redstone (2006) examined the integration of immigrants in the United States via a series of socio-economic variables together with their satisfaction with life in the United States. Their research shows that immigrants who express higher levels of

satisfaction are significantly more likely to intend to naturalize and are more likely to want to stay in the United States. This study and others show that it is not enough to evaluate the integration of immigrants in a host society by objective parameters (such as level of income), but it is also necessary to examine the immigrants' own perception of their integration and satisfaction (Lester, 2005).

THE ISRAELI CASE

While there are many Israeli studies about immigrants coming from countries in distress, less effort has been devoted to investigating immigrants coming from first world Western countries. The present study focuses on Jewish immigrants who arrived in Israel in the last decade from Western countries. From 1990, about 85,000 immigrants arrived from Western countries: North America (United States 26,500 and Canada 3,000); Latin America (mainly Argentina 20,000); Western Europe (mainly France 22,000 and England 7,500) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007).

The research about immigrants to Israel from Western countries is sparse and not up-to-date (Waxman, 1989; Bensimon & Della Pergulla, 1986). A study commissioned by the Jewish Agency among Jews from North America and France investigates their motives for coming to Israel (Jewish Agency, 2005) and sheds light on the religious motives of these communities but does not deal with the integration process in Israel. In this respect it is important to note that, whereas the immigration motives of North Americans are mainly religious (Amit & Riss, 2006), Publications of the Israeli Ministry of Absorption indicate that the contemporary French immigration is driven partially by religious and Zionist motives but also by anti-Semitic concerns. Most recent Argentinean immigrants came as a result of the political and economic crisis that shook Argentina in the years 1999-2002 and dealt a heavy blow to the country's middle class, but these immigrants were also motivated by religious and Zionist considerations (Dgani & Dgani, 2004).

The presents study examines the integration of Western immigrants via their satisfaction with life in Israel and the factors explaining it, while taking into account the different countries of origin of these immigrants.

METHOD

SAMPLE

This study is based on a representative sample of Western immigrants aged 20 years and older, who immigrated to Israel after 1996. The sample was taken from 2007 Ruppin Survey data, carried out by the Dachaf Institute using stratified sampling method. In the final research sample there are 242 immigrants from North America, 63 from Argentina and 50 from France (total=335).

VARIABLES

The 2007 Ruppin Survey was a telephone survey of 62 closed questions which were translated into English, French and Spanish. The dependent variable in this study is general satisfaction with life in Israel, rated on a scale of 1-6. A series of independent variables were tested: Country of origin, Number of years in Israel, Religiosity level(1-4), Academic education, standard of living index (calculated from five standardized variables compared to the mean of the sample, reliability =.783), Perception of Israeli identity (1-5), Perceived identity (by others) (1-5), Social networks (most of the participant's friends are immigrants; ethnic neighborhood), Hebrew language Proficiency – Index calculated from 4 questions (reliability =.815), and Push/pull immigration motives.

FINDINGS

I examined a series of demographic characteristics while comparing the three major Western immigrant groups: immigrants from North America, France and Argentina. The findings are summarized in Table 1. The table shows us that the groups do not differ significantly in their average number of years in Israel, which hovers around 6 years. There is also no significant difference in the percentage of married couples in the different groups. However, the groups differ regarding the rest of the demographic variables. Immigrants from Argentina are older than those from France and North America; they have a lower percentage of men and lower level of religiosity than their North American and French counterparts. We can clearly see greater demographic similarities between French and American immigrants in comparison to Argentinean immigrants.


TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF WESTERN IMMIGRANTS

VARIABLES	IMMIGRANTS FROM NORTH AMERICA	IMMIGRANTS FROM FRANCE	IMMIGRANTS FROM ARGENTINA
Average age (STD)	38.53 (10.72)	39.29 (10.62)	44.13 (14.10)
% men	60%	64.1%	41.1%
% married	77.3%	81.5%	67.7%
Average no. of years in Israel (STD)	6.16 (3.52)	6.28 (3.48)	5.99 (2.92)
Average level of religiosity (1-4)	3.30 (0.84)	3.06 (0.78)	2.13 (0.59)
No. of N cases	242	50	63

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

A central variable in the immigration process of each of the groups is the major impetus for their immigration. The immigrants in the survey were asked to choose the major reason for their immigration out of a broad variety of reasons. These reasons were grouped into major categories. Below is a graph showing the distribution of the variable for each of the groups.

FIGURE 1: MAIN MOTIVE FOR IMMIGRATION FOR THE THREE GROUPS OF WESTERN



IMMIGRANTS.

We see from the figure that while the main immigration motive of the French

and North American immigrants was religious (the desire to live and raise one's children in the Jewish state), the major impetus among Argentinean immigrants was the lack of personal security in the country of origin. The latter motive is not apparent among North American immigrants but 6.9 percent of French immigrants report coming due to lack of personal security in France. North American and French immigrants also report that they were influenced by the encouragement or decision of relatives, at higher percentages than their Argentinean counterparts. The economic motivation is the least important motive. For the purpose of the study (and based on the relevant professional literature), the reasons were grouped into pull (attraction to Israel) or push (rejection from the country of origin) motives. This comparison shows that more than 99% of North American immigrants and 93% of French immigrants came to Israel because of "pull" (attraction) factors, while only 41% of Argentinean immigrants were driven by the same motive and a full 59% came because of the rejection scenario in their country of origin.

Another requested analysis is the differences between the groups regarding socio-economic independent variables as well as the dependent variable. Table 2 below demonstrates the differences in these variables.

VARIABLES	IMMIGRANTS FROM NORTH AMERICA	IMMIGRANTS FROM FRANCE	IMMIGRANTS FROM ARGENTINA
% holders of academic degrees	75.4%	44.7%	15.8%
Standard of living index (standardized in comparison to the total Western immigrant population)	63. (2.94)	38.- (3.07)	1.97- (1.48)
Perception of Israeli identity (1-4)	3.24 (1.17)	3.51 (.94.)	2.91 (.58.)
Israeli identity as perceived by natives	3.02 (1.04)	3.04 (1.01)	3.17 (.64.)
% most friends are from country of origin	34%	48%	19%
% living in a neighborhood in which more than half are from their country of origin	23%	32%	19%
Level of Hebrew proficiency (1-4)	3.22 (85.)	3.22 (67.)	3.67 (87.)
Level of satisfaction with life in Israel (1-6)	5.33 (83.)	5.34 (86.)	4.87 (92.)

TABLE 2: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF WESTERN IMMIGRANTS* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

We see from Table 2 that North American immigrants are the most highly educated of the Western immigrants. However, the Argentinean immigrants have a slight but significant edge on the North American and French counterparts regarding Hebrew language proficiency.

As far as standard of living: the North American immigrants have the highest standard of living, which is higher than the average of the Western immigrants group. Argentinean immigrants have a significantly lower standard of living, both in comparison to the two groups as well as in comparison to the total Western immigration group.

An examination of identity variables reveals that immigrants from North America and France report a much stronger sense of Israeli identity in comparison with Argentinean immigrants. However, there is no significant difference among the groups in their assessment of how native Israelis perceive them. Both of the social capital variables point to an interesting picture. Immigrants from France and North America testify that most of their close friends are from their country of origin, in significantly higher percentages than immigrants from Argentina. Also, immigrants from France and North America report that they live in neighborhoods of which more than half are from their country of origin, in higher percentages than Argentinean immigrants. This last finding is not statistically significant. The two human capital variables emphasize mainly the ethnic closure of the French immigrants, whose social capital is more bonding than bridging.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings point to the importance of examining the integration process for each immigrants group, in accordance with the group's unique characteristics and circumstances of immigration. Although the immigrants all came to Israel around the same time, and all came from Western countries, there are still prominent differences in their characteristics but also with regards to factors related to their satisfaction with life in Israel. Most of the immigrants from Argentina came on the heels of an economic-political crisis in Argentina, thus they can be categorized as economic immigrants. In contrast, immigrants from France and North America did not make the move from these kinds of consideration but mainly out of religious-Zionistic considerations.

Western immigrants at the focus of this study are immigrants with high socio-economic profiles in terms of education and profession. In the current era of glob-

alization, these immigrants, classified as highly skilled, are 'courted' by various countries interested in receiving them. These countries even make adaptations in their immigration policies in order to attract highly skilled immigrants, thereby increasing their "brain-gain" and their economic development (Iredale, 1999; Mahroum, 2001; Quaked, 2002). This issue is also relevant to the Israeli context. Although Jewish candidates for immigration to Israel do not undergo any kind of screening on the basis of socio-economic considerations, the immigration Israeli authorities understand the potential of Western immigration and its ability to enrich the human capital of Israeli society. Hopefully, the results of this study will shed light on the integration processes of these immigrants reflected by their satisfaction in Israel.

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QUÉBEC'S QUANDARIES WITH IDENTITY

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ויקטור ארמוני משמש כעורך הירחון הקנדי ללימודי אמריקה הלטינית והקריביים (SCALJC), מנהל המחקר בקתדרת המחקר הקנדית לגלובליזציה, אזרחות ודמוקרטיה, פרופסור ומנהל תכניות הלימוד לתואר ראשון במחלקה לסוציולוגיה של אוניברסיטת קוויבק במונטריאול, וכן כפרופסור מן החוץ במחלקה לסוציולוגיה של אוניברסיטת אוטווה.

Immigrants from so-called Third World countries are often perceived by non-immigrants as the subjects – if not then powerless victims – of circumstances beyond their individual control (war, oppression, poverty, etc.), rather than agents acting on their own free will. While political and economic factors certainly play an important role in shaping migration trends, it is sociologically inaccurate to understand immigration from such an overly deterministic perspective. Most candidates who apply for Canadian residency as independent workers, hoping to be selected at the end of a lengthy and costly process, are without doubt more than pawns of historic necessity. Furthermore, this kind of deterministic perspective is loaded with moral implications: if immigrants had “no choice” – or, more precisely, if they were placed in front of two absolute options: either “stay in country A and suffer” or “come to country B to avoid suffering” – then the simple fact of being allowed to abandon country B and join country A would represent an almost infinite reward in itself. It then follows that any demand put forward by immigrants may well appear as inherently excessive (“Isn’t it enough that we took them in and thus save them from war/oppression/poverty?”), and many will assess such claims as

irrecoverably tainted by arrogance, ingratitude, or egoism (as shown in the overwhelmingly negative reaction to demands for accommodation made by religious minorities in Québec in recent years). Of course, the immigrants' attitudes and behaviour should instead be gauged as those of any rational actor: most newcomers legitimately seek a favourable trade-off between the immediate and future gains to be achieved in their new country and the losses incurred by leaving their homeland (social status and networks in their country of origin, language proficiency, professional credentials, emotional attachment, cultural enjoyment, etc.)

1. Immigrants that settle in Québec are no different in this respect. However, the individual choices they must make in order to maximize this trade-off involve a higher degree of complexity and place them in a substantially more challenging situation. Reasonably enough, most immigrants try to attain upward mobility. This goal not only implies ensuring some degree of material progress (primarily through income) but also obtaining cultural capital (ranging from speaking the language "correctly" to adopting "middle-class values" to acquiring "good taste" as established by dominant cultural patterns). However, an already difficult learning and decision-making process in any society becomes exceedingly problematic in Québec. For an immigrant to decide to prioritize English rather than French in his or her children's education, to define himself or herself as Canadian rather than Québécois, or to stick to an "international" accent rather than acquiring Québec's accent when speaking French (or vice-versa), to mention but a few typical predicaments, express preferences that, even in the course of the same day, may prove advantageous in certain settings (for example, at the workplace) and detrimental in others (for example, when interacting with neighbours). This reality begs the question: What does it mean to choose Québec?

CHOOSING QUÉBEC

Both in policy parlance and in scholarly discourse, even when other variables are factored in, migration is usually assumed to be a rather straightforward transition from a point of origin to a point of destination: according to the usual terminology, individuals leave their "source country" and enter a "host country". Although the immigrants' actual experience has always been more complex than what this relatively crude view suggests², it can nevertheless be argued that, at its fundamental level, the idea of a host country that incorporates newcomers into a unified national community is a key aspect of how people – including migrants themselves – understand migration. This is, of course, consistent with the principle of mutually exclusive territorial sovereignties by which every individual is normally expected to be primarily bound to a single nation-state, and it goes without saying that most

rights and duties are ascribed on the basis of legal membership to a specific polity. In this regard, the opposition between convenience and loyalty is sometimes raised when referring to the immigrants' level of commitment to their new homeland, but the idea that citizenship should involve some sense of belonging and obligation to one's country is generally prevalent in contemporary societies. While it is obvious that many facets of globalization – e.g. transnational diasporas, supranational communities, passports of convenience, cross-border commuting, etc. – seem to undermine such a one-dimensional view of nationality, the fact remains that both native-born and newcomers tend to share the notion that the integration process in liberal democratic countries is based on a linear path leading to the end result of immigrants – or their offspring – eventually switching identities and becoming “one of us”. In brief, common sense dictates that immigrants who settle in France will tend to speak like the French people, self-consciously try to “blend in” in public settings (e.g. while riding a bus), and even subconsciously develop personal and political preferences that follow those that are dominant in mainstream French culture. But, once again, things are more complicated than they look, as we need to take into account that the very principle of a common national culture is also sometimes challenged from within: the strengthening of regional and minority self-government in some countries during the last two or three decades has, without a doubt, created a new and challenging reality for many immigrants. Unlike foreigners in France (and in most unitary states), those who settle today in, let's say, Spain's autonomous community of Catalonia face a thorny predicament that entails political, emotional, and also very practical considerations: which “host society” should come first in terms of loyalty and sense of belonging, the country as a whole (and the majority's national culture and language) or the distinct region (within which the minority's culture and language is the dominant one)? This is indeed the same question that most Québec's immigrants must confront. But unlike Catalonia and other similar cases, Québec's unique status in the Canadian federation puts immigrants before a particularly bewildering dilemma.

“Which is the point of destination in this particular migration process? Is it Québec or Canada?”

Regardless of the degree and nature of the autonomy that Spain's regions have acquired in recent years, immigration remains a paramount national matter. Catalonia's government has asked Madrid to regionalize the selection of immi-

grants but, as most observers agree, that is unlikely to happen in any foreseeable future. Québec, on the other hand, signed with Ottawa the Cullen-Couture Agreement on immigration in 1978, granting the province full selection powers for independent applicants. Québec has since utilized a “point system” similar to the federal one in order to select skilled workers (55% of immigrants who settle in Québec). Thus, even if the Canadian government holds the right to ultimately refuse permanent residency to a particular individual on the basis of security or public health concerns (and deals directly with asylum seekers and family reunification applicants), Québec is the only province in Canada – and one of very few sub-national jurisdictions in the Western world – that chooses the immigrants that are deemed to better fit its distinct societal goals and, according to the official wording, “who will adapt well to living in Quebec”³. That is why the ability to speak French is considered a crucial asset, but also the “adaptability factor”, for which a substantial number of points is given (8 out of 60 required to be accepted), which furthers the provincial authorities’ ability to fine-tune the targeting of desirable traits in immigrants. A lot has been said and written about the overlapping and confusion that this federal-provincial mechanism generates. Potential immigrants to Canada need only to apply to the federal government, unless they wish to settle in Québec: for them, the process is twofold, as they have first to apply to the provincial government and, once selected, they need to start a second process at the federal level in order to obtain the permanent resident status. Many applicants are puzzled by this two-step system: “What if I’m admitted to Québec and then I settle in a different province?” Or, conversely, “What if I’m admitted to Canada and then I settle in Québec?” These questions are simply answered (no problem, once you have your residency papers you can settle in any province), but they reveal the profound ambiguity underlying the Québec situation within the Canadian federation and, more specifically, in its dealings with immigrants. Given the fact that Québec selects its own immigrants, it logically – if not legally – follows that the newcomer is, to a certain extent, morally beholden to Québec as well as to Canada as a whole. Going back to our initial discussion, we have to ask: Which is the point of destination in this particular migration process? Is it Québec or Canada? The easy and agreeable answer would be “both”, but loyalty, identity, and the sense of belonging are difficult to split, subjectively and materially, between two competing and, in some ways, mutually excluding, host societies. For example, bilingualism – which might look as an ideal compromise in terms of language – is generally seen by Québec’s Francophones as a choice for English at the expense of French: because the overwhelming attraction force of the English language makes the slightest over-

ture to bilingualism the equivalent of that proverbial tiny hole in the dam that eventually explodes into a waterfall and, pushing this metaphor further, rapidly drowns out the French fact in North America. Hence, the obligation of immigrants to send their children to French schools, most of which – and particularly the public ones – are known for their exceedingly, almost calculatedly meagre teaching of English as a second language. While this is often seen as unacceptable imposition and considered by some as an infringement on people’s individual rights, many others argue that this is a reasonable limitation of personal freedoms in the pursuit of a higher common good (i.e. the preservation of Québec’s French character). But regardless of the inherent validity of the opposing arguments in this debate, a core disagreement lays on the answer given to the question “Which is the point of destination in this particular migration process?” Immigrants to Germany or to Italy don’t expect to be given the right to educate their children (fully or primarily) in English in state-subsidized schools, so why immigrants to Québec – remember that they were selected by Québec, not Canada – should expect otherwise? There is no clear and definite way of settling this debate, because the duality and the entailing paradox are built into the institutional and administrative system itself. Most immigrants to Québec, even when they are reluctant to “take sides” in the English-French divide, are forced to navigate and decode this intricate reality and to make specific, sometimes life-altering choices (for example, in which city or neighbourhood to live in order to optimize the exposure to one or the other – or both – competing cultural frameworks that coexist in the province, the “French Québec” majority and the “English Canada” minority). Newcomers to Québec also discover that many utterly trivial actions that would entail no need for a decision in other societies – e.g. in which languages should one answer the phone or greet a customer – may be rightly or wrongly interpreted by others as a fundamental choice for one or the other “host societies” and consequently elicit positive or negative reactions toward them.

QUÉBEC VERSUS CANADA

Apart from the obvious language rift and the cultural aspects that this reality involves, what does embracing Québec as their host society mean to immigrants? Does it entail a choice for sovereignty, the preferred political option held by the majority of Québec Francophones, or at least a degree of sympathy for the nationalists’ movement? If we agree that a particular political project, even if over-reaching in its scope, is not the litmus test of belonging to Québec, we will need to turn our attention to a fundamental – and quite tricky – question: What makes

immigrating/belonging to Québec different from immigrating/belonging to (the rest of) Canada? One answer that has been proposed in the wake of the referendum on sovereignty in 1995 suggests that Canada and Québec differ fundamentally on the basis of their respective understanding of nationality: the former would propose a “civic” and “multicultural” nationalism and the latter an “ethnic” or “assimilationist” one. Obviously, a moral evaluation is implied: while Canada promotes and thrives in diversity, Québec builds up a tension between “Us” and “Them” rooted in blood and tradition. In its harsher version, ethnicity bars foreigners (and Anglophones) from joining the Québécois family; in its milder version, the “Other” can become Québécois by assimilating entirely into the Francophone majority. The main point is to oppose Canada’s “openness” and Québec’s intrinsic unease toward diversity. Although this caricature is hardly fair or useful, it points – if detached from normative judgements and placed in the context of Québec’s history as a threatened minority in English-speaking North America – to an actual difference in the way in which citizenship is conceived. Simply put, Quebecers adhere to the Continental European model of integration, a much more state-centered and communitarian comprehension of how society works. Thus, by giving relative precedence – or at least more emphasis – to collective equality and solidarity over individual liberty, the “social contract” that mutually engages the government and the citizens includes more positive (distributive) rights, by means of social policy and state interventionism (typical of Social Democracy as opposed to Liberal Democracy), but also more citizenship duties than in the Anglo-American context⁴. In other words, citizens are linked by denser networks of mutual obligation. There is no doubt that some ethnocentric reflexes can be observed in contemporary Québec, remnants from a not very distant past in which many a generation had to rely on closed-knitted community ties in order to survive in a menacing environment. It cannot be denied either that the ongoing political polarization over the Québec sovereignty project strains the relationship between Francophones and others. However, many instances of apparent intolerance toward cultural diversity and openly expressed irritation toward those who do not assimilate to the French-speaking majority need to be grasped under this larger framework. It is then not surprising that Quebecers hold immigrants to a higher level of commitment to integration than Canadians do elsewhere, not only because of the nationalist ideal and the need for French speakers to maintain the linguistic balance in the province, but also and maybe chiefly because of the very way in which citizenship is conceived. Much has been written about the process of integration through which immigrants eventually become – or fail to become –

members of the host society. However, there is significantly less research done on how different and usually tacit conceptions of integration, regardless of official rhetoric and stated rules, make immigrants face varying patterns and degrees of informal pressure to enter a given “social contract” involving more or less moral duties to the host society. The new “declaration” that the Québec’s government will now require all immigrants to sign, although centered on a few generalities about “values” and purely ceremonial, clearly reflects Quebecers’ idea of citizenship as a pledge to pursue a shared identity and a common good. For better or for worse, depending on each immigrant’s views, this is a considerably different deal from the one offered by multiculturalist Canada.

NOTES

- ¹ Those who indeed faced persecution or whose personal security was threatened will assign an increased value to “just being allowed to stay”.
- ² For example, the category “Polish immigrants to Québec in the 1930s”, which seem quite clear (Point A: Poland and point B: Québec) includes both Russian-speaking Jewish families from small villages in rural areas settling in Montreal and ethnically Polish and Christian families from Warsaw settling in the Abitibi mining region. Even if formally the same category applies to both groups, it can hardly be said that they share a common national origin or that they integrated to the same social environment.
- ³ Quoted from Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s webpage on “Quebec-selected skilled workers” (<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/quebec/index.asp>).
- ⁴ Actually, the relative precedence of collective rights over individual rights is a complex matter. In some respects, Continental Europe’s and Québec’s approach to civil liberties is less restrictive than in the Anglo-Saxon world: for example, there is more public support for wider decriminalization, deregulation or less punitive control of what social conservatives would call “morally deviant behaviour” such as prostitution, pornography, homosexuality, abortion, unconventional lifestyles, juvenile delinquency, drug use, alcohol consumption, etc.

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF YOUNG NON-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN ISRAEL

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טטיאנה זסלבסקי בעלת תואר דוקטור מהטכניון. בין השנים 2005-2000 שמשה כחוקרת בכירה במרכז הבינתחומי לחקר מדיניות וטיפול בילדים ונוער באוניברסיטת תל אביב. מרצה כיום במחלקה לחינוך בטכניון ובמכללת אורנים. תחומי המחקר שלה הם: הגירה וזהות.

Since 1990, about a million immigrants have come to Israel from the former Soviet Union (FSU). More than a quarter of these immigrants were not registered in Israel as Jews. Under the “Law of Return”, anyone with a Jewish grandparent has the right to immigrate to Israel with his/her spouse and offspring. Nevertheless, *only* someone whose mother is Jewish is defined as Jewish according to Jewish law (“Halacha”) and registered as a Jew by the Israeli authorities.

The non-Jewish status of new immigrants involves a number of restrictions and consequences on the legal, social and psychological level. On the one hand, non-Jews are expected to join the Israeli-Jewish collective, like any other new immigrants, on the other hand, the authorities doubt their Jewishness and erect barriers before their complete integration into Israeli society. Among the most disturbing problems encountered by the non-Jewish immigrants in Israel is the absence of the institution of civil marriage and separate burial areas for Jews and non-Jews. Israeli society today, more than in the past, shows an understanding and tolerance toward immigrants’ desire to preserve their language and cultural uniqueness. Yet, at the same time, a readiness to accept national and religious diversity is rather limited.

This reluctance is mainly because some Israelis perceives non-Jewish immigration as a threat to the cohesion and Jewish character of Israeli society. These opinions, as well as demands to reconsider the Law of Return and restrict non-Jewish immigration, are recurring themes in Hebrew as well as in the Russian press in Israel. In addition to the problems common to most immigrants, such as culture shock, disconnection of social ties and decline of social and professional status, non-Jewish immigrants have to also deal with confusion about their ethnic identity and also with the feeling of discrimination and rejection by parts of Israeli society.

“The present paper focuses on the young non-Jewish immigrants’ ethnic identity.”

METHODOLOGY

The present paper focuses on the young non-Jewish immigrants’ ethnic identity. The data reported on here were collected in a series of 21 semi-structured interviews with young non-Jewish immigrants and a survey conducted among 233 young immigrants, both Jewish and non-Jewish. Out of 21 participants interviewed at the quality stage of the study, there were 10 males and 11 females, all aged 18-23. The sample was heterogeneous in terms of age on reaching Israel (9-17), time spent in Israel (2.5-12 years), and extent of Jewish affiliation: nine participants had Jewish father and non-Jewish mother, ten had one Jewish grandparent, and two boys had no Jewish ancestry at all.

PATTERNS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY DEVELOPED BY NON-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL

Most participants reported that prior to arriving in Israel, they had none or hardly any connection with Jews or with Judaism. Some participants said that before immigration they had defined themselves as Russian or Ukrainian. However, most prefer to use expressions like 'In Russia I was like everyone else' or 'I did not feel different' and stressed that they had not confronted the issue of their national identity in their home country. The majority of participants reported that the immigration process and encounters with Jewish society raised the question of ethnic identity and prompted the need to explore their connection with the Jewish people. In spite of a broad diversity of ways of dealing with an ethnic-identity crisis among the participants, we could divide them into three major groups in terms of ethnic self-identification and degree of integration in the Israeli society: Aliens, Non-Jewish Jews and Russian Israelis.

"ALIENS"

The first group included participants who did not identify themselves with the Jewish-Israeli society and did not feel that they belonged to their original culture either – a strategy defined in the research literature as marginality (Berry, 1997). The feelings of alienation and confusion are reflected by the following interview snippet:

Interviewee: I don't feel at home in Israel. Not at all.

Interviewer: Where is your home?

Interviewee: Where is my home? It's gone.

The participants supplied different reasons trying to explain their alienation from Israeli society. Kostia felt that the veteran Israelis rejected him. During the interview he kept recalling the insults and humiliations that he experienced in his first years in Israel. Unlike Kostia, Lena didn't suffer from rejection. Isolation and avoidance of veteran Israelis was the adjustment strategy she chose deliberately: "They didn't reject me, because I never tried to fit in. I feel much more comfortable with Russians. It's much easier. Maybe it's wrong, but I usually choose the easier way."

Sergey's anger was directed at the Israeli establishment, which failed to support him and his family: "My parents are university graduates, but they had to do unskilled work, so that my sister and I could go to university. This country didn't do anything for me. Why should I love it?"

While the extent of participants' affiliation to the Jewry varied – Kostia and Lena were half-Jewish, Sergey only had a Jewish grandfather, Sasha did not have any Jewish ancestors and none of them identified themselves as Jewish and had no interest in Jewish culture and tradition. Sasha: "Tradition is something you get from your

parents or from your grandparents. I don't know anything about their holidays. Even if I wanted to celebrate them, I wouldn't know how or why. But frankly, I don't care. I get a day off and that's OK with me." Lena demonstratively separated herself from Jews. For example, while speaking about anti-Semitism she remarked: "The fact that they don't like us... not us, the Jews, it doesn't bother me, because I don't feel like a Jew. Religious Jews disgust me too." Kostia did not deny his Jewishness, but in his opinion, rejection and hostility of veteran Israelis which caused his alienation from Israel, prevented him from developing a Jewish identity: "It was difficult to feel Jewish in Israel. They always made me feel Russian; I had no chance of starting to feel Jewish."

Despite not feeling at home in Israel, the participants did not express nostalgia or identification with their country of origin or its culture. "Russia doesn't interest me and I don't want to go back, that's for sure. Even Israel is better than Russia," claimed Lena. Sasha felt that he was too young when he left Russia, and could not absorb Russian culture and form a Russian identity: I was cut off from Russia when I was thirteen. If only I had lived there until I was 20, at least. But no, I only began to grow up when I was tossed into another country, a different world with a different culture, different people, different everything. It's not healthy. I can't say I am Israeli but I am not Russian either." Sergey gave up trying to belong to any country or any group. He defines himself as a cosmopolitan and explains:

It means I have no homeland; I don't feel a part of any society. When Israel rejected me and I rejected Israel, I understood that you don't have to be a part of a group. I can't tell whether it is better to have a homeland or not, because I only can imagine what people who love their country feel. I suppose their life is more complete. Holidays, Independence Day... They feel united, belonging to something big and significant. I believe it increases their confidence.

"NON-JEWISH JEWS"

Participants from the second group developed a Jewish identity and sense of belonging to the Jewish people regardless their formal status. This has been categorized as a process named sociological converting by Cohen (2006), which is in contrast to the religious process of converting to Judaism. These participants frequently used expressions such as "Jewish blood" and "Jewish genes" in order to justify their belonging to the Jewish people. But mainly, they tend to relate their affinity to Judaism to exposure to Jewish culture and history.

Natasha: When I lived in Russia, I did not feel Jewish so I could not be proud of it. Now I do feel Jewish, especially when I visit Russia, I feel proud of being Israeli and Jewish. You see, I am not so good at history and humanities in general, but here at school I started to learn the Jewish history and it captivated me. It's a terrific country with terrific history. I chose Kabala and history of Hasidism as my elective courses and I want to know more. I even consider converting to Judaism. I have no time for that now, but maybe after graduation.

The participants reacted in different ways to the dissonance between their self-perception and their formal status. Grisha was one of the few participants who identified themselves as Jewish before immigration. In some way, Grisha's Jewishness was forced on him. Although his parents divorced before he was born and his relations with the Jewish side of his family (father and grandparents) were rather limited, Grisha was perceived as a Jew by others and suffered considerably from anti-Semitism: "I look Jewish, my brothers were luckier, they didn't inherit a Jewish appearance, so they could chose whether to be a Jew or not. I did not have the privilege". Grisha was particularly frustrated by the fact that under Israeli law he is not considered Jewish. "I felt insulted when I finally understood the rules. I can't get married, like everyone else; I even can't be appropriately buried. It hurt because inside myself, I knew that I was a Jew."

Pavel tried to diminish the significance of authorities' refusal to accept him as Jew: "I don't see it as Israel doesn't accept me as a Jew. OK, I am not a Jew according to the orthodox authorities, but they are just one of the different conceptions in Judaism. For example, Reform Judaism does accept me as a Jew. I had a bar-mitzvah in a reform synagogue. Sonia did not think that the formal nationality registration influenced her self-identification or the others' attitude towards her: "It's a pity that the state doesn't perceive me this way, but I am not going to prove anything to anybody. It's my country and I feel complete belonging here."

"RUSSIAN ISRAELIS"

The third group included the participants who did not identify themselves with the Jewish people or Jewish culture, but expressed strong identification with Israel. These participants tried to redefine the meaning of "being an Israeli" by devaluing the national-religious facet of the Israeli identity, and emphasizing the qualities of commitment and contribution to the Israeli society, especially army service, sense of common destiny and involvement in Israeli life.

Dima: I was reared in Russia as a Russian. Here in Israel I still feel Russian. I think to become a Jew because you came to Israel is a betrayal... I am not a Jew, but nobody can say I am not an Israeli, because it's my country and I feel Israeli one hundred percent. I was in the Army, so I think I have every right to feel Israeli. Besides, I love this country. Of course, there are thieves, liars, corrupt politicians just like everywhere, but here people have faith, they have a purpose...

This pattern of acculturation is rather unusual in Israel. According to Zionist ideology, the justification of Aliya (immigration to Israel) is returning the Jews to their national home. In spite of great cultural diversity of the Israeli society and complicated relations between different ethnic groups, like Ashkenazim and Mizrahim (western and eastern Jews), or between the new immigrants and the veteran Israelis, Jewishness was always considered as a major unifying factor. It is hard to anticipate how this new group identity is going to change over time and what possible influence it may have on the collective Israeli identity. Thus, these issues deserve further observation and exploration.

CONNECTION BETWEEN FORMAL NATIONALITY STATUS AND ETHNIC SELF-IDENTIFICATION

One of the purposes of the quantitative stage of the study was to compare the ethnic identity of registered as Jews (RAJ) and not registered as Jews (NRAJ) immigrants and to assess the influence of formal nationality registration (as Jews or as non-Jews) on the formation of ethnic identity among FSU immigrants. Out of 233 immigrants who took part in the survey, there were 42% males and 58% females, aged 16-22 with a mean age of 18.2. Their average residence in Israel was 4.2 years, ranging between 2 and 9 years. About 40% of the respondents were registered as Jews and 60% were not.

No significant difference were found between RAJ and NRAJ immigrants either in measures of Israeli identity or in sense of belonging to Israeli society (Table 1).

As to Jewish identity, there was a significant difference between the immigrants who are recognized as Jews and those who are not.

TABLE 1: JEWISH AND ISRAELI IDENTITY AMONG RAJ AND NRAJ IMMIGRANTS

	RAJ (N=93)	NRAJ N=(140)
Potency of Israeli identity (1-7)	4.1 (1.65)	4.0 (1.72)
Attractiveness of Israeli identity (1-4)	2.5 (0.57)	2.5 (0.64)
Sense of belonging to Israeli society (1-4)	2.8 (0.59)	2.8 (0.56)
*Potency of Jewish identity (1-7)	4.1 (2.19)	3.1 (1.79)
*Attractiveness of Jewish identity (1-4)	2.7 (1.02)	2.0 (1.92)

* $p < 0.001$

The stronger Jewish feelings expressed by the RAJ immigrants may be explained by family influence and also by the experience accumulated in their home country. Another possible explanation is that after coming to Israel, the NRAJ immigrants internalized the outsider point of view on them (as non-Jews) and rejected their Jewishness, as a reaction to discrimination. In order to examine the later hypothesis, we compared the following four groups: 1) respondents who had two Jewish parents; 2) respondents who had a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father; 3) respondents who had a non-Jewish mother and a Jewish father; 4) respondents who had parents of partially Jewish descent (both parents were not registered as Jews in Israel). Our interest was especially focused on the groups 2 and 3. These groups are similar in the extent of Jewish affiliation and in the pre-immigration experience (the FSU children from mixed families could choose nationality of any of the parents).

Most of the youth (96%, according to Toltz, 2003) did not choose to be registered as Jews. So in both of these groups, the individual's pre-immigration experience and, in particular, the need to deal with anti-Semitism, was mainly affected by such factors as Jewish appearance or surrounding and relations to Jews, which vary widely among regions of the FSU. On the other hand, in Israel, the children of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father were defined and registered as Jews, whereas the children of a non-Jewish mother and a Jewish father were not.

Our main conclusions were:

- 1) There was no significant difference between the two half-Jewish groups: Jewish mother non-Jewish father (RAJ), and Jewish father non-Jewish mother (NRAJ).
- 2) Offspring of two Jewish parents had a significantly stronger sense of Jewish identity than the immigrants from the three other groups. They were also the only group that perceived their Jewish identity as more potent and more attractive than the Israeli or Russian ones.

- 3) Difference between the two RAJ groups: two Jewish parents and Jewish mother non-Jewish father was bigger than difference between the two half-Jewish groups: Jewish mother non-Jewish father (RAJ), and Jewish father non-Jewish mother (NRAJ).

TABLE 2: IMMIGRANTS' JEWISH IDENTITY, RELATIVE TO THEIR JEWISH AFFILIATION

	RAJ		NRAJ	
	TWO J. PARENTS (N=30)	J. MOTHER & NON-J. FATHER (N=55)	Non-J. mother & J. father (N=70)	Two non-J. parents (N=59)
*Potency of Jewish identity (1-7)	5.6 (1.70)	3.4 (1.98)	3.3 (1.67)	2.5 (1.65)
*Attractiveness of Jewish identity (1-4)	3.4 (0.71)	2.5 (0.94)	2.2 (0.93)	1.8 (0.85)

* $p < 0.001$

CONCLUSIONS

No significant difference was found between RAJ and NRAJ immigrants in the measures of Israeli identity and sense of belonging to the Israeli society. These findings contradict the widespread opinion that higher rates of criminal activity, violence, drug, and alcohol abuse shown by non-Jewish immigrants compared to Jewish ones (Shemesh, 1999; Mash, 2003), stems from their alienation towards Israeli society. The cause posited was the restrictions imposed on them by state and religious authorities and by the rejection they suffered. But we suggest that the difference in the level of anti-social and risky behavior between Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants does not necessarily result from different immigration experiences, but could rather be attributed to the higher educational and socio-economic status of Jewish families, and also to social-psychological features which labeled Jews as “others” in the country of origin (distinguishing them from the Russian majority). Other factors put forward by scholars include attitudes toward education, strength of family ties and so on (Furman, 1995; Goltsman and Zelnick, 1996, Remennick, 2006).

The conjecture that registered nationality influences Jewish identity formation, and that immigrants labeled as non-Jews might internalize this external definition, was not confirmed either. In addition, no significant difference was found in the potency of Jewish identity between the two groups of half-Jews: children of Jewish mother and non-Jewish father (RAJ) and children of non-Jewish mother and Jewish father (NRAJ). On the other hand, children having two Jewish parents reported

stronger Jewish feelings than participants from mixed-nationality families. These findings suggest that immigrants' Jewish identity was influenced more by the extent of their Jewish affiliation than by their national status in Israel.

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BONJOUR! SHALOM! – INTEGRATION INTO THE MONTREAL JEWISH COMMUNITY

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Agence Ometz was formed in April 2008 and results from the merger of 3 service agencies of the Montreal Jewish Community – Jewish Family Services established in 1853, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services established in 1918, and Jewish Employment Services established in 1940. Thus Agence Ometz is the successor of a long and rich tradition of service to the Montreal Jewish Community and has been seen by many, as a positive example of the potential of what a cultural community service agency can achieve.

The purpose of the merger was to provide an integrated continuum of service delivery, based upon a centralized intake and a case management approach to each dossier, thus coordinating the many services the community offers. In the past, it was primarily the new immigrants who availed themselves simultaneously of the services of all three agencies, another reason that supported the merger process.

From the point of view of the agency the challenge of integration is twofold. As an external partner of the government there is the commitment and the obliga-

tion to help immigrants adjust to the lifestyle and rhythm of the larger Quebec/Montreal host society. On another level, there is the additional objective of integrating the immigrants into the Montreal Jewish community (currently numbering about 85,000 people) and making them feel welcome.

The role of the agency as an external partner of the government is a ‘win-win’ for all players. The government by its very nature is bureaucratic, farther removed and somewhat at a disadvantage to understand the cultural barriers that hamper successful integration of new immigrants. An agency responding from the perspective of a specific cultural community has a major pre-occupation to secure early success as it wishes to grow its community numbers by ensuring that the newcomers are properly integrated and thus remain in Montreal.

Additionally, the external agency is smaller, more flexible, and closer to the client and better placed to respond to the immigrants’ needs more quickly, and in a more culturally sensitive manner. Finally, the external agency can act as an effective and trusted conduit for feedback to the government of the problems arising from its own systems and protocols, and yet be independent enough to engage in advocacy activities to promote and protect the rights and needs of immigrants and particularly those seeking refugee status or permission to remain on humanitarian grounds.

Clearly there is a double challenge for the agency – to support the successful integration into the wider host community even as it seeks to assure identification within the specific cultural community. This burden is compounded by the difficulty in measuring the success of these efforts as sometimes the elements of integration coincide between these goals and sometimes they diverge.

It is important to understand this dilemma as different criteria may be needed to assess the success of the agency’s efforts at each level of integration.

MEASURING THE SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION INTO THE GENERAL HOST COMMUNITY OF MONTREAL

In the general community, integration is usually measured by success achieved in the following areas:

- 1) Linguistically – mastering the host community’s language(s);
- 2) Economically – achieving some semblance of financial independence by securing employment, and hopefully a job that uses the skills and expertise acquired before immigrating;
- 3) Socially – participating in civic, communal and social activities that widen the immigrants network of acquaintances, and developing friendships and social networks that solidify the desire to become part of the host community;

- 4) Educationally – the attendance at and completion of a publicly recognized course of study leading to objective certification or recognition of the skills/learning of the immigrant that secures employment or leads to a further course of study; school-age children’s attendance in school and where appropriate, day cares.

For the general community, measuring the success in attaining these 4 benchmarks may be evaluated by asking the following questions:

- 1) Linguistically – Can you speak French and/or English? At what level?
- 2) Economically – Do you have a job? Is your job related to what you have been trained to do? To what extent are you self supporting?
- 3) Socially- Do you belong to any groups, clubs or do you participate in any groups – social, recreational, civic, sport?
- 4) Educationally – Are you attending a school, a vocational or training program, a course of accreditation? Do you children attend school or a daycare?

MEASURING THE SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION INTO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF MONTREAL

For thousands of years Jews have been dispersed throughout the world, assimilating their host community’s cultures and languages, and living in wide-ranging political and economical climates; hence they are a heterogeneous and diverse population. They are not a people with one unique language, one set of traditions, one culture and a common history. For immigrants arriving in Montreal from more than 20 countries these factors complicate and challenge successful integration into the general community and more so into the Jewish community.

If we use the 4 criteria of assessment above developed for the general community, the following is a brief description of what we witness at Ometz.

LINGUISTICALLY

Newcomers arriving from French-speaking countries or who have mastered the French language, certainly have an easier time to integrate into the general community, whether from the perspective of finding employment, navigating government bureaucracies or establishing social networks. However, French is not enough to advance their employment opportunities and many unilingual French speakers devote their energies to acquire English language skills. In recent years, more young French immigrants are arriving with both languages and are experiencing less difficulty to enter the Quebec labour market.

The mother tongues of a significant number of Jewish new arrivals are not of Latin origin. They encounter more linguistic challenges but have the determination to focus first and foremost on French language acquisition and attend courses offered by the government. Once the entire program has been completed, the mastery of the French language is quite impressive. Aware that French is not enough, some continue to learn English.

Spanish-speaking newcomers usually arrive with a sound knowledge of English. Speaking a romance language facilitates their acquisition of French. In a short time, they become fluently trilingual.

School age children are required to attend French language schools. The ministry of education has established concentrated French programs during their first year in the school system, usually enough for them to subsequently continue in the regular school programs. Families with infants and toddlers are not as fortunate. As spaces in affordable French and/or English speaking day cares are limited, many parents tend to send their youngsters to day cares of their mother tongues which subsequently delay their children's readiness for the French system.

ECONOMICALLY

In large part, the immigrants are highly educated and/or have skills in specific trades. In certain areas, they can be gainfully employed almost immediately, particularly in the fields of IT and high-tech. In many professions, and even trades, they have to undergo an evaluation and accreditation process. Often the newcomer does not have the time and/or financial resources to undertake this process. Some clients opt to retrain and change their careers.

“Many students repeat the grades and will be much older than their peers, which impacts on their social lives?”

The prerequisite for this is that the newcomer has a strong command of English and/or French. In many instances, their experiences from their country of emigration are not helpful. In a family unit, a compromise is often reached whereby one spouse focuses on language acquisition and career opportunities, while the other partner supports the family with ‘survival jobs’. These situations can negatively impact the dynamics of the family vis-à-vis self esteem, role reversals, and family insecurity.

The situation differs with young adults who are better equipped with languages, have no familial responsibilities and are therefore more flexible.

Regardless of family situation, or country of emigration, all newcomers need to be sensitized to the cultural business values which differ from their emigration countries. Their individual expectations and motivation are major factors that also impact on their success to enter the work force.

SOCIALLY

A common language is the basic pre-requisite to interact with members of the host community. People new to the community and equipped with either English or French, have an easier time to socialize although it is a challenge to penetrate established social circles. Some immigrants expect to form friendships with their work cohorts but learn quickly that there are often boundaries between professional and personal relationships. Young adults integrate more easily due to their flexibility, more open attitudes and the transcendent impact of the Internet. In today's society, Face book is an important social utility tool that the young capitalize on instinctively.

Parents with school-age children have the advantage of being brought together with parents of the host community through the activities of their children at school and through playgroups that develop. At first, those of similar backgrounds tend to congregate together but with time, they begin to interact with host parents. If language is a barrier, then these opportunities are limited; language and cultural sub-groups naturally form. The children, however, make new friends easily.

At the secondary level, there are fewer occasions for newcomers to meet with local parents as children are more independent and parents, in general, are less involved.

EDUCATIONALLY

For primary and secondary schooling:

Depending on religious and cultural backgrounds, educational philosophies, and financial means, families opt to register their children either in the public school system, which is free, or in the more expensive Jewish day school system which does provide financial assistance, or the private French system which is at a significantly lower cost than Jewish schools. In either case, children must attend the French system.

Elementary school age children do fairly well in the French system, regardless of pedagogy, whether in an integrated approach which may offer a pull-out program or the classe d'accueil program where a child is immersed for a year with other immigrants, to strictly acquire French language skills. Upon graduation from primary school, parents are often concerned for their children's academic achieve-

ments and social development, and will most likely set private education as a priority, be it in a Jewish Day School or in a private French school. In most cases, they are satisfied with either one.

The same does not hold true for high-school age children new to the country, particularly those who are approaching the high school matriculation examinations. The older the child, the more difficult it is for them to acquire the new language(s). One year in a classe d'accueil is usually not sufficient and school principals will refer them to a class poste-accueil in their second year. This being the case, students fall back in other subject matters. Most frustrating are the lower levels of math that the children are subjected to in comparison to their former schools. Of course, one must take into consideration that they must acquire French terminology in order to advance. Many students repeat the grades and will be much older than their peers, which impacts on their social lives. Government regulations also dictate that adolescents cannot remain in a regular high school beyond 18 years of age and then must complete their high school leaving certificate in an adult education centre which is not an ideal environment.

The Russian community has established various supplementary school systems to promote Russian culture, language and literature, as well as tutorials in other school subjects, particularly the sciences, offered in their mother tongue.

SO HOW ARE WE DOING? – THE CHALLENGE TO THE MONTREAL JEWISH COMMUNITY

While the four (4) broad criteria cited above may answer the objective needs for government reporting purposes, the Jewish community must consider other factors to understand what, if any success is being achieved in attracting, integrating and retaining new immigrants as participating members of its community.

Logically, the community may ask the following very different questions in addition to the foregoing:

- Where has the immigrant chosen to live – is it in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood, or at least accessible to one?
- What Jewish institutions/synagogues has the immigrant become affiliated with?
- What constitutes Jewish affiliation? Is it a synagogue membership, a child attending a Jewish day school, receiving financial assistance or employment advice from a community agency?
- Is it attending social outings/Jewish holiday celebrations organized by a communal agency?

- Has the immigrant made a contribution to a Jewish charity or offered to volunteer time at a communal agency?

The list could be very long in this same vein. Indeed it may be any one of the foregoing, or a combination of any of the above.

And how exactly does a community accurately measure a sense of affiliation or belonging?

It defies a simple answer but is partly embedded in the third broad criteria noted above for social integration – *‘...participating in civic, communal and social activities that widen the immigrants network of acquaintances, and develops friendships and social networks that solidify the desire to become part of the host community...’*

All this but with a Jewish twist!

Jewish immigrants of varying backgrounds and countries develop their own methods of integration. In addition the Montreal Jewish community offers certain programs to encourage the participation.

In Montreal, we offer ‘matching programs’ between host members and newcomers. These are most successful for newcomers who have a command of English or French and are receptive to these overtures. Newcomers from certain countries are less willing to accept these invitations as they are foreign to their cultural norms. Local community members certainly find this experience most rewarding. A good match can form an enriching and lasting friendship.

In North America the synagogue is more than a place of prayer, it is a community centre where newcomers can network with host members at many synagogue functions. Montreal offers a wide range of synagogues for those who feel comfortable to approach them. Yet many immigrants come from backgrounds where synagogue attendance, or communal participation, as we define it in Montreal, was different or non-existent in their countries of origin.

Jews emigrating from countries with a deep-rooted communist or socialist system have different Jewish experiences, if any. Their perspective of Jewish integration is often non-existent.

Thus we have to ask ourselves whether the questions of affiliation are sufficient given the divergent backgrounds and the unlikely prospect that immigrants will integrate according to standards/activities that the community has developed through the 150+ years of living in Montreal.

We know that we would not apply many of these same criteria to measure the sense of affiliation/belonging of many community members who were born here. This is probably based on the assumption that by simply being born/present in the community for some time, its resources, its workings, its networks and its possibilities are well enough known to these individuals who can opt in and avail themselves of whatever they feel they need, whenever they feel so inclined. We would not consider that these people are not well integrated and we would consider them participating members of the community.

The newcomer lacks this nuanced and intimate knowledge which natives have been exposed to via family/friend/social networks, or have gleaned through the trial and error of living in the same place for an extended period of time.

If community based knowledge is sufficient to consider unaffiliated and inactive Jews, who were born here, as members of the community, is it legitimate/fair/acceptable to expect more from new immigrants?

Thus it has been suggested that knowledge of the Jewish community and its resources might be another very significant factor that best indicates how well we have integrated these newcomers into our community. It may in fact be less about their integration and more about the sincerity of our openness, outreach and willingness to embrace these newcomers, i.e. what information do we impart and do we do it in a way that encourages participation by the immigrants?

Introducing this criterion will shift the focus from solely assessing how many ritual, social, communal activities a newcomer attends/supports/engages in and explore the extent to which he/she has become aware of the services/programs that are available from the Montreal Jewish community. It will force our service agencies to assess how well they articulate their message, how responsive and accessible they are to the newcomers i.e. how well they adopt a flexible attitude which is sensitive to the temporarily vulnerable state of the newcomer.

Inevitably we will have to develop a questionnaire that will assess initial knowledge acquisition of the Jewish community and its resources; decide upon the frequency and the time delays at which to follow up on this assessment and to record attitudinal changes towards affiliation/belonging over time as a result of this acquisition of knowledge of community resources and services.

It will not be a simple assessment tool but ultimately it may be a better reflection of what lies at the root of helping newcomers adapt to the Montreal Jewish community.

ETHNICITY AND CULTURE AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN THE ISRAELI PERIPHERY

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MOSHE SHOKEID (Doctorat de l'Université de Manchester, Royaume Uni) est Professeur d'Anthropologie. Il enseigna pendant plusieurs années à l'Université de Tel Aviv et servit à titre de président du programme de maîtrise en études d'immigration et d'intégration au Centre académique Ruppin. Il débuta sa carrière professionnelle en tant que sociologue rural à l'Agence juive, au Département de l'établissement du territoire. Il participa aussi à des projets de développement en Iran, au Nicaragua et au Pérou. Ses livres et articles présentent des études sur le terrain qu'il a conduit parmi des immigrants nord-africains dans des communautés fermières israéliennes, des Arabes au Jafa, des immigrants israéliens aux États-Unis, et d'autres groupes minoritaires à New York.

משה שוקד (דוקטורט מאוניברסיטת מנצ'סטר, בריטניה) הוא פרופסור באנתרופולוגיה שלימד במשך שנים באוניברסיטת תל אביב. שימש כראש תוכנית ה-AM בהגירה ושילוב חברתי במרכז האקדמי רופין. החל את הקריירה המקצועית שלו כסוציולוג יישובי מטעם הסוכנות היהודית אגף ההתיישבות והשתתף בפרויקטים באירן, ניקרגואה ופרו. ספריו ומאמריו מתבססים על עבודת שדה בקרב עולים מצפון אפריקה מישובים בדרום, ערביי יפו וישראלים מהגרים בארה"ב.

The relationship between center and periphery, has been a continuing topic for research among economists, sociologists and geographers (e.g. Shils' seminal work, 1975)*. The ongoing process of globalization seems to have intensified the inequality inherent in this relationship. In nation states, the center is taking a growing role in the global economy, leaving the periphery in a state of dependence on government policies whose aim is to keep it from further decline. Inevitably, this situation leads to increased poverty in peripheral zones and causes the stronger elements among the local population to leave in search of greener pastures. The relationship of center and periphery introduces another critical subtext of social and cultural problems when it involves weaker social minorities such as indigenous disadvantaged populations or groups of Third World immigrants. The purpose of my presentation is to introduce the Israeli case by illustrating some facts and myths related to the ethnic, social and cultural circumstances in the Negev, Israel's southern region (e.g. Yiftachel and Tzfadia, 1999, Gradus, 2006). However, my arguments should be considered somewhat exploratory, suggesting further investigation that would employ both quantitative and qualitative research methods.

The recognition of the State of Israel by the UN in 1948 was followed by two major dramatic developments: a war that resulted in the expansion of the territory that had been designated by the UN as Israel's national borders and the beginning of mass Jewish immigration from the Diaspora. In the first decade after 1948, more than 600.000 immigrants arrived in the newly created state. These may be divided into two major groups: a group primarily made up of Holocaust survivors from Rumania, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria, and a similar number of newcomers, from Moslem countries, including Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria, Iraq and Yemen.

Many thousands of these newcomers settled in Palestinian towns and villages that had been evacuated during the war (Jaffa, Ramle, Lod, Acre, suburbs of Haifa and Jerusalem, among others) or were settled in hastily constructed neighborhoods on the outskirts of Israeli towns (including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem). However, the majority of the new arrivals were settled in the territories acquired in the war, some of which were remote from the previously concentrated areas of Jewish settlements. The Israeli government's policy of geographically dispersing incoming populations led to the founding of more than two hundred small-holders' farming communities and about thirty new urban settlements designated as "development towns."

As a result, eleven towns were established in the southern part of Israel (the Negev). Some of these towns have developed successfully according to the planners' expectations, (for example, Beer Sheba and Kiryat Gat). But most

of the others have remained underdeveloped, particularly due to the decline of primary sources of employment generated for their inhabitants (such as the closing down of labor-intensive and low capital investment textile industry). An interesting example of a periphery town is Netivot, originally a neglected outpost in the Northern Negev close to the Gaza Strip, which became a center of religious activity after the death of its venerated rabbi, Baba Sali, in 1984. The tomb of Baba Sali became a popular national pilgrimage site, particularly attracting many thousands of worshippers of North African extraction. Yeshiva schools for religious instruction have also been founded in Netivot under the leadership of other charismatic religious figures who have settled there.

The issue of the underdeveloped “development towns” in most peripheral regions in northern and southern Israel has been a continuing subject of public concern. Most researchers have usually agreed regarding the adverse socio-economic effects of these locations on the lives of their residents (e.g. Spilerman and Habib, 1976, Tzfadia and Yiftachel, 2001, Gradus 2006,). Undoubtedly, the distance from urban centers and the lack of varied commercial and industrial resources as well as other opportunities for gainful employment, have placed a majority of the inhabitants of these towns at an economic, social and cultural disadvantage. Most studies have also indicated that these towns seem to be predominantly populated by immigrants from Moslem countries, especially North Africa, nicknamed the Mizrahim (“Orientals”).

Although some critics have accused the authorities of originally planning to settle most of the Mizrahi immigration in these peripheral areas, many immigrants from Europe were also settled in development towns in the early years. However, due to their better education and higher technical skills, in addition to their affinity with the dominant Israeli culture and stronger ties with the veteran Ashkenazi (European) population, they soon managed to move to more central locations. Moreover, they were more mobile due to having smaller families to support. Middle Eastern families were much larger on the average than European families, which averaged no more than 1-3 children per family. As a result of this process, many development towns, and the smaller ones in particular, eventually became ethnically homogeneous (e.g. Spilerman and Habib, 1976). In the Negev, for example, the towns of Netivot, Ofakim and Sderot, have, for many years, acquired a public image of “North African towns.” But even in larger towns, such as Beer Sheba, Kiryat Gat, and Dimona, the majority of the residents are also Middle Eastern in origin.

Paradoxically, a contradiction emerges between two major national goals: on the one hand, population dispersal that facilitated the securing of new territories, and

on the other, the efforts to implement a “melting pot” ideology (e.g. Cohen, 1969). Recent forces put in motion by globalization have even further exacerbated the gaps between the rapid economic development of the center and the continuing decline of the periphery, and this holds true of the Negev in particular (Gradus, 1996).

“I also question the current stereotypical evaluation of the cultural scene that developed in that peripheral region that included both urban and rural sites.”

A case in point is Daniel Ben Simon’s (2002) semi-documentary text, *Dirty Business in the South*. A journalist and popular commentator on Israeli life, his literary portrayal of life in the urban settlements of the Negev is based on direct observation and interviews with local residents and municipal leaders, as well as a review of the academic literature. It offers a most depressing picture of the present situation and future prospects of these sites, and the destiny of the southern part of Israel in general. He blames everybody for this situation: town planners, the government’s continuing failed policies and inadequate investments in public projects and education, the poor leadership of local leaders, and finally, the residents themselves for lacking the initiative to change their situation.

Apart from the development towns, thirty-three farming villages (Moshavim, small-holders cooperatives) were founded in the Northern Negev region during the first decade of statehood. Of these, nearly thirty are inhabited by settlers of Middle Eastern extraction: from Yemen, Kurdistan, Morocco, Tunisia and Tripoli. Many of these settlements are composed of closely-knit communities of immigrants who arrived together in Israel from the same villages and towns in their countries of origin. The policy of founding ethnically homogeneous communities was adopted by the settlement authorities after a period during which they had tried to implement the melting pot ideology and settle populations of various ethnic origins in the same communities. The new strategy was apparently recommended by sociologists working at the Hebrew University as a means of facilitating social life and avoiding conflict in the new communities.

My own involvement with social realities in the Negev region is the outcome of my engagement during the 1960s as a rural sociologist with the Jewish Agency Land Settlement Department, as well as a long-term participant in an anthropological observation study in a village of immigrants from the Atlas Mountains in Morocco. For the last four decades, I have followed the changes that have taken place in

various spheres of private and public life in the community to which I gave the name “Romema,” whose residents had previously lived for many generations in the same Moroccan village, serving their Berber neighbors as craftsmen and peddlers. They arrived in Israel in 1956 and soon found themselves fated to become farmers in the semi-arid Negev region. My ethnographic study reported on the settlers’ adjustment to farming, the effect of their new economic activities on conjugal relationships, the changing circumstances of kinship obligations, the changing position of their traditional religious leaders, their adjustment to the cooperative management of the local economic and municipal organization, and finally, the relationships between the immigrant parents and their children (e.g. Shokeid, 1971).

In their new Negev environment they were located a few kilometers away from two other villages composed of settlers who had arrived from North Africa and another village of settlers from Europe. Netivot, the nearest town (about ten kilometers away and populated mostly by North African immigrants) offered most of their household needs for groceries and other merchandise as well as a seasonal farming workforce (before the 1967 war opened the border with nearby Gaza markets that also provided them with cheap farm labor). Netivot was also the residence of one of their most venerated religious leaders. Beer Sheba, the largest urban center in the vicinity (about forty kilometers away and the regional administrative center) offered a better choice of home products as well as a market where settlers could sell their surplus farming products.

My observations afford quite a different viewpoint regarding the disastrous consequences of the planning strategies that propelled groups of Middle Eastern immigrants into the apparently “dark hole” of the Israeli periphery. The economic and social circumstances of those who by chance and pure luck were settled in the new farming villages, has been far superior compared with those of other immigrants coming at the same time and from the same country who were settled in the new towns only a few kilometers away. I also question the current stereotypical evaluation of the cultural scene that developed in that peripheral region that included both urban and rural sites. The story of the south of Israel and possibly of other peripheral zones is not only one of deprivation and neglect, as interpreted by critics of the “development towns” project.

The major conclusions in my 1971 ethnographic study presented a viable and prosperous community. Except for a few settlers who were unable to take on full-scale farming, most others, both younger and older, have made a successful adjustment to farming. That success was evident in the remarkable improvement of the farmers’ standard of living and the acquisition of expensive home appliances,

as well as their generous donations to religious foundations. A few years later, during the mid 1970s, most farmers had already acquired tractors and cars and expanded their business activities (for example, they had bought shops in the markets of Beer Sheba). Their children, boys and girls, attended better schools that were supported by the Moshav settlements' regional institutions. The younger generation served in the army and gained a technical, professional or academic education. In addition, some of them were elected to leading positions in regional (municipal) and national (political) organizations.

My data suggest that the circumstances of life in the Negev, remote from the center and defined as a depressed periphery, do not necessarily imply a disadvantaged future of failure for all residents. As in the case of "Romema," the farmers in most villages have done well economically. They became experts in the cultivation of a large variety of vegetables that grow at all seasons of the year in the semi-arid Negev climate and at a later stage also constructed hothouses for growing flowers and other profitable export plants. They could afford a comfortable life style. They encouraged their children to acquire an education and helped them financially, a luxury that was not within the grasp of their compatriots in the nearby development towns. The list of those enjoying a comfortable existence should also include the settlers in the kibbutzim of the Negev, who have never been considered a part of the disadvantaged peripheral population.

A survey I conducted in the late 1980s revealed that the majority of the younger generation, married men and women, had left the village and settled elsewhere. To my surprise, however, only about 20% of the men and about 30% of the women had taken up residence in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area or in other remote regions. Instead, about 50% of both men and women had settled in the Negev towns, in Netivot and Beer Sheba in particular. The rest had moved to other new Negev settlements that had been founded in the Gaza Strip (Gush Katif) after the 1967 war, or had taken residence in rural municipal service centers (such as regional school compounds). This trend, that was also observed in later years, seemed to contradict the common assumption that younger mobile people would tend to leave the periphery and look for a new life in a central urban area that might offer better opportunities than had been available back home (Shokeid, 1990).

In actual fact, the children of Romema found that the opportunities available to them close to home allowed them to utilize their skills and realize their ambitions. They chose to join the more prosperous ranks in these semi-urban or rural locations and make their homes in affluent neighborhoods. They had become economically well off and were engaged in business, technical professions or various military

ranks or involved in education as teachers or school principals. In sum, instead of competing for skilled positions in the center of the country, where there was a larger pool of equally competent candidates to compete with, they took advantage of the opportunities open to more highly qualified candidates in their own Negev region.

I did not conduct a survey in other villages, but my local informants have confirmed my observation that a major sector of the younger generation in other villages have also tended to settle down in the Negev region. I found evidence of this in Semyonov's conclusions (1981) regarding the Israeli government's policies that were aimed at compensating, either directly or indirectly, residents in remote localities. These advantages, however, were not equally exploited by all potential local clients.

But my observations also uncovered another sensitive issue that has been examined for the past two decades by "critical sociologists" (e.g. Ram, 1993). I relate in particular to the ongoing debate regarding the cultural hegemony of the veteran establishment and its negative effects on the Middle Eastern immigrant community. Israeli mainstream culture is generally considered secular and Western and may be traced back to the founding fathers, who were mostly of European extraction. It is a major axiom in Israeli sociological discourse that the melting pot ideology and the policies adopted by various powerful agencies responsible for the absorption of immigrants have directly or indirectly resulted in the elimination of "Mizrahi" culture in its various forms (e.g. Shenhav 2006). These ethnic traditions were considered inferior to Israeli mainstream culture as promoted by the veterans and identified in the public consciousness as "Ashkenazi." It has been claimed that the Ashkenazi social and cultural hegemony has led to discrimination against the Mizrahim, and has driven them to Israel's economical and social periphery, in addition to depriving them of their authentic Arab-Jewish culture.

But against that unmitigated verdict, there is substantial evidence that the Negev region has been the scene of the revival of some important elements of Mizrahi Jews' ethnic culture. One striking example is the cult of saints, a North African tradition that has been intensively studied by anthropologists (Ben-Ari and Bilu, 1987, Weingrod, 1990, Shokeid, 1998). Saints' tombs and Moroccan rabbinical courts in the southern towns of Netivot and Beer Sheba have gained a wide national reputation. Such developments have been particularly noted by Prof. Pedaiah (2007), a literary and Kabbalistic scholar (of Iraqi extraction) at Ben-Gurion University in Beer Sheba, who has postulated that the territorial concentration of immigrants from Moslem countries in the periphery has actually encouraged the preservation of their communal-ethnic memory, including language, folklore, food and music. However, she argues that the periphery has also had its

impact on the center. An example of this is the emergence of successful rock bands from the Negev towns (e.g. Tippex – “Tea Packs” and Knesyiat Hasechel – “The Church of Wisdom,”) that originated in Sderot and are reminiscent of the Beatles’ emergence from the provincial city of Liverpool.

Other researchers who have, on the one hand, emphasized socio-economic deprivation in towns in the Negev region have, on the other hand, pointed out the efforts made by residents to preserve their cultural identity. For example, Tzfidia and Yiftachel (2001), geographers at Ben-Gurion University, have described the emergence of local political factions and the battles waged by the Mizrahim to secure control of the municipalities in their Negev towns (in face of the later arrival of immigrants from the former Soviet Union). Moreover, as indicated by Ben Simon (2002:85), the SHAS party, which is the largest Orthodox party represented in the Knesset and is led by Mizrahi leaders, whose agenda is a “return to (our) roots,” recruits about a third of the votes in the Negev towns.

This can provide yet another explanation for the tendency of the younger generation to stay on in the Negev. Choosing their residence in settlements close to their families and a wider network of local connections must have facilitated the survival of traditional Moroccan cultural elements typical of the Negev social milieu. In a survey conducted by Yiftachel and Tzfidia (1999) in a sample of Northern and Southern development towns regarding attitudes of life expectations for personal development and satisfaction with local services, a majority of the residents interviewed expressed positive feelings about their life in these localities. For example, 60% of the participants agreed that “in spite of the difficulties they had experienced during the early days of their construction, the Development towns offer an excellent residential site.” (*Lamrot hakshayim bhathala, ayarat hapituach hen makom metzuyan lagur bo*, pp. 40-41). Moreover, the younger generation manifested even a higher degree of loyalty to their home towns (p. 66-67). The Negev towns in the survey included Ofakim, Kiryat Gat and Dimona. The authors seemed surprised, if not disappointed, by these widespread attitudes, which contradicted the apparently objective measures of socio-economic deficiency in the Negev periphery, as well as the authors’ theoretical premises and underlying ideological agenda.

Another surprising finding of the same survey was the younger generation’s identification with Israeli mainstream cultural icons: novelists, musicians, entertainers, etc. In conclusion, the authors of the survey critically commented that the younger generation exhibited a dual identity, both local and national. They considered this hybrid cultural identity the outcome of the continuing domination of

mainstream Ashkenazi culture. Should we then consider this cultural situation typical of the periphery as positive or negative?

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, my long-term research of “life in the periphery” leads me to the following dilemma. Apart from an “objective” statistical assessment regarding the economic and social circumstances of the residents of the Negev, are not the participants in the center-periphery critical discourse entrapped by a center-oriented ideological viewpoint that influences the way they examine and evaluate the life of others? Thus, for example, they often lament the loss of ethnic cultures, in the Israeli case the decline of Arab-Jewish culture, but they can not recognize and legitimize its viable existence in the periphery. Committed to their deep convictions about the premises of a liberal- pluralistic-egalitarian society, these critics denigrate a social space and a set of images that represent cultural symbols, religious beliefs and a life-style remote from the center. In contrast, as indicated by Faige, a social historian, also from Ben-Gurion University in Beer Sheba, Israeli anthropologists have emphasized the consolidation of the periphery as a cultural alternative to the center (Faige, 1998: 455-6).

An example of this is Cohen and Leon’s recent thesis (2008) that indicates the development of a strong Mizrahi middle class located in new suburbs close to the periphery or to more central areas. The authors argue against the critical sociologists’ view that there is a rigid dividing line between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in the structure of social class and cultural identity in Israeli society. Moreover, they contend that any change of behavior and attitudes that may be observed among the Mizrahi constituency is considered by the critical school as a manifestation of false unconsciousness by the Mizrahi “victims.” I share Cohen and Leon’s position regarding a dynamic process that also involves the socio-geographical sectors of the Israeli periphery. The Negev residents are not necessarily the passive victims of a tragic historical error on the part of the founders of the State, whose aim was population dispersal, conquering the wilderness and the fusion of cultures.

However, I do sometimes wonder if the perception of unlimited opportunities, the affluent lifestyle, a worldview of an open society and the consciousness of the “center,” is not itself a myth perpetrated by academics congregated in prestigious university campuses that are often located in close proximity to slums populated by disadvantaged ethnic and other socio-cultural segregated minorities?

Finally, is it possible to compare the Israeli case presented here with the existential conditions and the “center-periphery” discourse in other countries, including Canada?

NOTES

* Shils' famous exposition of "center versus periphery" actually did not relate to that division in socio-geographical terms. He was rather concerned with the central value system in society. His arguments mostly relate to the leading position of cultural, religious and political elites that command social authority in integrated societies.

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CHRISTIAN IMMIGRANTS IN A JEWISH STATE: ETHNIC IDENTITY OF NON-JEWISH MIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

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רבקה רייכמן היא פרופסור בחוג לסוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה באוניברסיטת חיפה. קבלה את תואר הדוקטור בסוציולוגיה באוניברסיטת שיקגו. תחומי המחקר שלה הם הגירה בינלאומית (בישראל, אירופה ו"ב) עם התמחות בהשתלבות של מהגרים בארץ החדשה. פרסמה מאמרים בנושא יזמות מהגרים בקרב מהגרים מקסיקנים בארה"ב, השלכות של הגירת יהודים בשוק העבודה הישראלי, הגירתם של לא יהודים לישראל וכן העמדות כלפי מהגרים בישראל ובאירופה. בשנת 2008 פרסמה עם אדריאנה קמפ ספר "עובדים זרים" העוסק בכלכלה הפוליטית בהקשר להגירת עבודה בישראל. משמשת כעורכת בכתב העת לענייני הגירה ופליטים.

Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, immigrants began exiting the former Soviet republics to resettle in Israel. The 1990s saw flows of migration from the FSU to Israel that included for the first time, an increasing number of immigrants who were not Jewish according to *halacha* (Jewish religious law). The percentage of non-Jews entering under the Law of Return rose from 6% in 1989 to 56.4% in 2006 (Raijman, 2008) and the actual number of those who are Christian and define themselves as such was about 26,000 to 30,000 individuals (Sheleg, 2004).

Although there is an enormous amount of literature about the processes of assimilation of FSU immigrants into Israel (see e.g. Gitelman, 1995; Lewin-Epstein et al. 1997; Al-Haj, 2004; Ben-Rafael et al, 2006; Remennick, 2007), little has been written about the cultural and social adjustments of non-Jewish migrants (see e.g. Polonsky, 2007; Zaslavsky, 2007). This paper aims to fill this gap by focusing on a specific group of non-Jewish migrants, those who prefer to keep their Christian religion in a country with explicitly Jewish character. Specifically, we focus on patterns of ethnic and religious identity and the role played by churches and religious organizations in the process of migrants' integration into Israeli society. The study is based on extensive field work conducted in churches and homes during 2004-05 and on 23 in-depth interviews that were carried out with Christian immigrants.

CONSTRUCTING ETHNIC IDENTITIES

An analysis of the interviews reveals that the identities most reported by the Christian migrants were *Russian*, *Jewish*, *Israeli*, and *Christian* which were used simultaneously creating thus, mixed forms of identification. We distinguish two main patterns: one we labeled *Patriotic* (and results from the combination of Israeli, Christian and Jew) and the other *Transnational* (that results from the combination of Russian and Christian).

PATRIOTIC IDENTITY – “JEWISH, CHRISTIAN AND ISRAELI”: COULD THIS BE?

Patriotic identity is mainly found among Jewish migrants (both of whose parents are Jewish) and Half Jews (mostly people with a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother, or a Jewish grandfather), hereafter referred to as patriotic.

Immigrants with a “patriotic” identity do indeed feel a strong affinity to Israel and the Jewish people. Take for example the case of 32 year old Vera, whose parents are both Jewish. She migrated with her family from Russia to Israel, where she converted to Christianity. Vera claims that she feels Christian, Jewish, and Israeli. Because of her affinity to the history of the Jewish people and her strong connection with Israel, she “identifies with her Jewish roots **but not in a religious way.**

Vera: “I definitely feel Jewish, and in the Soviet Union I felt Jewish too. Sometimes I was ashamed of it, sometimes I was proud. ... I had no doubt about my identity. Here I associate myself with the shared history of Diaspora Jews on the one hand, and with the future of Israel on the other. If I had to try and define how I see my identity... I feel Jewish and Israeli... If something happens to Israel I know exactly whose side I’m on and how I feel... Israel’s pain is my pain, the State of Israel is my country... And about the Christian religion... here belief takes on a different hue. Here you are party to the fate of the Jewish people, regardless of what you believe and who you believe in... It is in Israel that my being a Christian Jew takes on a new meaning. In the former Soviet Union I was Jewish, no matter what religion I belonged to. Here, we are all Israelis, so there’s no need to shout about being Jewish... We can let go the complexes that we had about Judaism in the former Soviet Union... For me, there is no division between the Old Testament and the New Testament. They are part of a continuity.”

An interesting sub-group among the patriotic Christians is comprised of people who only have a Jewish father, and thus are not Jewish according to the *Halacha*. Therefore the state does not consider them as Jewish and defines them according to the nationality of their country of origin: Russian, Ukrainian, and so on. Sergei, for instance, is a case in point. He wishes to belong to the Jewish collective because of his membership to the Jewish people and culture (as opposed to the Jewish religion). Sergei has an interesting answer to the question of who is a Jew, one which differs from the hegemonic definition in Israeli society. Following common practice in the former Soviet Union, Sergei distinguishes between the term “Jewish” by nationality (Hebrew) and “Jewish” by religion (Jewish). He argues that a (national) Jew can take

up any religion he chooses. Therefore, according to this outlook, there is no contradiction in the dyad of words, Jewish-Christian. One can be both at the same time.¹

Sergei: "Today I tried to explain to a Jewish Israeli how a Jew can also be Christian. I'm Jewish first of all because Jewish blood flows through my veins and Jewish culture is an important part of me, but my Jewish blood has nothing to do with religion... A Jew (a Hebrew) and a Jew (by religion) are two completely different things for me, just as an Arab can be Christian and Muslim, or a Seventh Day Adventist, while at the same time he is still an Arab. They are from the same family, but their religion distinguishes them. Why can't it be like that with the Jews?"

Despite having a strong patriotic identity, an affinity to their homeland (such as Russia or Ukraine) does not entirely disappear among most interviewees in this category but, at the same time, it does not remain a dominant aspect of their identity either. Along with those immigrants who construct a patriotic identity in Israel, we also find immigrants who define their identity as Christian and Russian, an identity we term "trans-national".

TRANS-NATIONAL IDENTITY: CHRISTIAN AND RUSSIAN

The trans-national identity refers to immigrants that define their identity in ethnic terms that link them to their countries of origin. Furthermore, their religious-Christian identity connects them to imagined global communities of Christians, which gives value to their marginal status in the receiving country (hereafter this group is referred to as transnational). Generally speaking, the Christian immigrants who belong to this category are not Jewish and migrated to Israel with a Jewish partner. This category also includes Jewish migrants (Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father), who were defined in the former Soviet Union as "Russian" because they had a Russian family name.

Kostia, 27, falls into this last category. He migrated to Israel from Russia with his family thirteen years ago. Kostia defines himself as Russian. He neither feels Jewish, nor part of Israeli society. His worldview and affinity to Russian culture are dominant in all aspects of his life.

Kostia: "I define myself as Russian and don't ask me why... Because there are many things that I don't understand that Israelis do understand... Maybe it's to do with personality, like the way Israelis protest more openly about things they don't like, express their opposition loudly, while 'Russians' bury the insult inside themselves... It's a matter of education

and high Russian culture: books, poetry, concerts, and an educated outlook on reality... when I was an adolescent in Israel... I saw that I was different from Israelis. In Israel I feel Russian. I don't belong with the Jews here, even though I get on very well with Israelis."

Kostia states that over time, his religious identity has strengthened and come to be more important than his national identity (Russian). As Kostia felt that he was excluded from the Russian Jewish community in Israel, he realized that his Russian identity was insufficient and that he needed to develop an additional – in his case, Christian – identity.

Transnational identity is clearly expressed among immigrants with no attachment to Judaism whatsoever, as demonstrated in Tatiana's story. Tatiana, who is 40 years old and not Jewish, arrived in Israel with her half-Jewish husband. She describes her national identity as Russian, despite the fact that she migrated from Ukraine. Her relationship with her country of origin is expressed through Russian culture, language, literature, and everything that she sees as belonging to a unique "Russian mentality".

Tatiana belongs to the category of Christians whose belief strengthened in Israel after facing obstacles with regards to acceptance into Israeli society. According to Tatiana, her Russian national identity and Christian identity are related:

Tatiana: "Here in Israel I started thinking about Christianity. I came to Israel with thoughts about Judaism, I was thinking about converting, but here I got closer to Christianity, because of the closeness I felt to my roots... Christianity is related to the place I grew up in and lived and where my parents lived."

As we have seen thus far, the trans-national Christians adhere to their Russian identity, which stems from nostalgia for Russian culture, including the mentality, language, literature, art, and so on. They prefer to identify themselves as "Russians", but nonetheless want to live in Israel. For them Israel is a place for economic mobility, while at the same time it is the "Holy Land", a place with historical and emotional significance because it is where Jesus lived in the past, and where he would be returning to in the future. Like Ania said: *"In the 'Holy Fathers' it says that you shall stay where you found your belief... What keeps me in Israel is the fact that I found my belief here."*

Both patriotic and transnational migrants use religion to create alternative spaces of belonging and are active in churches and religious groups, which play an important part in the process of social integration.

RELIGIOUS SITES AND THE CNSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

The two sites of Christian immigrants' social and religious activities that we shall refer to are: 1) Churches belonging to the Russian Orthodox Patriarch; and 2) Churches belonging to the Jerusalem Patriarch – Greek churches, that have traditionally served as places of worship for Christian Arabs in Israel.

The visitors to the Russian Orthodox Church in the northern town where we conducted the study are mostly *trans-national Christians*.² For Tatiana, the church is a way of keeping in touch with Russian culture. She says that she relates to the Russian Orthodox Church in the same way that she relates to her homeland (Ukraine). Thus, the church links her to Russian culture, which she misses greatly. She prefers visiting holy places belonging to the Russian Patriarch, which indicates her connection with Russian culture and language.

Tatiana: "Again, like I said, my preference is for Russians, because of the language and everything else. The Russian Patriarch is the Russian representative and I prefer that just like I have a preference for my homeland."

Some of the immigrants we interviewed used to pray at the Russian Orthodox Church, but they had been disappointed not only by the priest's sternness but also by his pro-Palestinian views. This drove them to start attending the Greek Church instead.

Roma: "I never go there... It's a Russian church and it's got everything that's bad about the Russian mentality. There is no concern or love for the churchgoers. When I was in that church recently, when the choir sang 'Let us pray for the Patriarch of all of Palestine' I didn't join in, I remained silent, because I don't recognize Palestine, there is no such country right now."

The priest's pro-Russian tendencies also bothered Sergei (patriotic identity). Sergei described a feeling of discomfort when visiting the Russian Orthodox Church in the north. He does not see himself as belonging to the Russian people, and so did not identify with the people attending the church. He stopped going to the church and moved to the Jerusalem Patriarch's church instead. Similarly to Sergei and Roma, most of the patriotic Christians do not attend the Russian Orthodox Church. They suggest that it has an anti-Semitic character, that it is not interested in including Jews, and that its prayers are sometimes offensive toward Israeli society. It bothers them that in this church the priest mainly prays for Russia and for the Russian saints while barely touching on Israel and the Jewish people.

The rigid social environment and anti-Israeli attitudes led them to choose Greek Orthodox churches instead. The Greek Orthodox churches are located in Kfar Kana, Nazareth, Shfaram, Jerusalem and Haifa. These churches carry out their services in different places weekly, regarding which an announcement is made in advance. We describe the church as having a “mobile” priest, because a Russian-speaking Arab priest moves around along with the worshippers to different churches and carries out the service at a different venue each time.³ Christian migrants also see the church with the “mobile” priest as an Israeli church, which is thus closer to their Jewish belief. Once, when one of the researchers visited the church after a terror attack in Israel, the priest explained that “we live in difficult times” and suggested that the congregation pray for the victims. By contrast, even during periods of terrorist attacks the priest in the Russian Orthodox Church conducted the ceremony while completely ignoring those events.

To summarize, the analysis of the social construction of migrants’ identities brings to light the complex relationship between ethnic and religious identities. Furthermore, it highlights the ways migrants’ identities are reinforced by the organizational contexts within which they participate. Thus for example, the visitors to the Russian Orthodox Church are mostly trans-national Christians who see the church as a way of keeping in touch with Russian culture. Furthermore, they see Christianity as an authentic marker of Russian identity, using it to construct a barrier against other encroaching identities, such as Israeli. Thus religion and nationality reinforce one another as these two loyalties motivate their continuing identification.

By contrast, the simultaneous relationship to Judaism and Christianity among patriotic Christians embedded in a pro-Israeli climate prevailing in the Greek churches encourages, or at least does not interfere, with the development of a sense of belonging to Israeli society in general and the Christian Arab sector in particular. Indeed, among the most interesting findings of the study are the close relationships that have developed between Christian Arabs and Christian FSU migrants as they (especially the patriotic) conduct joint religious activities in some of the churches. This finding is interesting given that many studies have pointed out the tense relations existing between Arabs (Muslims) and the new immigrants from the FSU (Polonsky, 2007).

When asked about Christian migrants’ relations and social networks, Christian Arabs were placed in the second circle of social contacts (after Christian Russians). Besides meeting Christian Arabs at their shared places of worship, some of them even work for Arab employers or receive help from them in finding work. The migrants’ positive attitude toward the Christian Arabs is also expressed through their identification with them based on the discrimination that both groups encounter from

the state. In addition, close relations are formed between the children of the Christian immigrants and Christian Arab residents who go to the same Arab schools.

The warm and close relationship between Christians (both Arab and Russian) stands out in contrast against the distant and antagonistic relationships between Christian and Jewish migrants from the FSU. Despite their shared origin, culture, and language, there is a great deal of tension between these two groups. This tension emerges from the Jewish immigrants' unwillingness to accept the Christian immigrants' religious affiliation, especially those of Jewish origin. The latter feel that the Jews are not interested in having any sort of relations with them whatsoever, that they try to prevent them from observing the Christian religion, and that they violate their right to religious worship.

Exclusionary attitudes and discrimination are not only felt at the level of social relations, but also from laws and institutions that have substantial stratifying effects in the materialization of various social and civil rights (marriage, burial) in the context of an ethno-national state like Israel (Kimmerling, 1998). The absence of an egalitarian notion and practice of citizenship for non-Jews coupled with the ethnic-religious nature of nationalism in Israel and of its incorporation regime, all serve to make Israel a de facto multi-cultural country, but with few prospects for multiculturalism.

NOTES

- ¹ It should be said that in the Russian language, there is a terminological difference between "Jewish by nation" and "Jewish by religion" that does not exist in Hebrew because of dominance of the orthodox definition of Judaism.
- ² On weekdays around 100-150 visitors come to the church, while up to 700 might come on festivals. The church's activities have expanded in the last two years, and prayers take place on Saturdays as well as Sundays. Most of the visitors are women, and most of them are older women (aged 40-80), while only a few are young (aged 14-30). By and large their partners accompany them on festivals.

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LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AS THE MAIN VEHICLE OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION: RUSSIAN IMMIGRANTS FROM THE 1990S IN ISRAEL

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רבקה רייכמן היא פרופסור בחוג לסוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה באוניברסיטת חיפה. קבלה את תואר הדוקטור בסוציולוגיה באוניברסיטת שיקגו. תחומי המחקר שלה הם הגירה בינלאומית (בישראל, אירופה וארה"ב) עם התמחות בהשתלבות של מהגרים בארץ החדשה. פרסמה מאמרים בנושא יזמות מהגרים בקרב מהגרים מקסיקנים בארה"ב, השלכות של הגירת יהודים בשוק העבודה הישראלי, הגירתם של לא יהודים לישראל וכן העמדות כלפי מהגרים בישראל ובאירופה. בשנת 2008 פרסמה עם אדריאנה קמפ ספר "עובדים זרים" העוסק בכלכלה הפוליטית בהקשר להגירת עבודה בישראל. משמשת כעורכת בכתב העת לענייני הגירה ופליטים.

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this article is on the key role of the host language acquisition as the principal tool for integration and socio-economic mobility for first generation immigrants. Although this assertion sounds fairly self-evident, there has been relatively little research in different immigrant communities to support it. The case in question – former Soviet Union immigrants in Israel – is rather unique in terms of its socio-demographic context: as a result of the rapid influx of immigrants from the deteriorating post-socialist countries, the Russian-speaking community has reached one million by the year 2000, or 20% of Israel's Jewish population. The actions of this critical mass of newcomers led to the formation of a rather autonomous community with its own economic infrastructure, political representation, media and social networks. In fact, the Russian language and related cultural lexicon was the main common ground for ethnically and socially diverse Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) (Leshem and Lissak, 1999). Since the early 1990s, the dilemma of acculturation vs. separatism, collectively faced by the Israeli Russian community, has largely revolved around the issue of the Hebrew language acquisition and usage. The apparent resistance of the majority of Russian speakers to switch to Hebrew as their primary language has emerged as a major challenge to the 'melting pot' aspirations of the Israeli establishment, compelling it to acknowledge the *de facto* existing multicultural social structure (Ben-Rafael, 1994).

The models of relationships between immigrants and host societies – from assimilation to multiculturalism to ethnic separatism – are strongly determined by the processes of the host language acquisition and the status of the immigrant's native language in the new country (Alba, 1999; Spolsky and Shohami, 1999). The bulk of socio-linguistic research so far was based on US immigrant communities. Studies among Mexican and other Latino immigrants have shown that despite living in ethnic enclaves, proximity to the border and availability of bilingual schooling in some states (e.g., Florida, California, New Mexico), most second-generation immigrants use English in both public and private realms (Portes and Schauffler, 1994). Several studies among Soviet/Russian immigrants in the US have shown that most willingly 'surrender' to the hegemony of English, consider it superior to Russian and other Slavic languages, and realize its utmost importance for economic success in the US. However, despite universal usage of English in the public domain, about 90% of adult Russian Americans speak primarily Russian at home (Chiswick, 2000; Gold, 1997).

How do these relations between hegemonic and immigrant languages play out in the case of Russian speakers in Israel? What are the determinants of host language acquisition for the first-generation immigrants? What are the pathways that connect Hebrew proficiency with economic success and social integration among first generation immigrants? And finally, how is language preference linked to cultural consumption and social networking among the immigrants? These are the critical issues addressed in this paper, drawing on the recent national survey among Russian immigrants of the 1990s.

THE STUDY

A national survey among Israeli Russian-speakers was conducted in the spring of 2001. At the time of the survey, most immigrants have lived in Israel for six to ten years, so some interim picture of their interaction with the host society could be drawn. A representative sample of 1,000 respondents aged 18+ who arrived in Israel from the FSU after January 1989 was drawn up by the polling company that conducted the survey. The sampling scheme was based on the demographic composition and settlement patterns of all adult last-wave immigrants from the FSU. After initial telephone contact, interviewers – educated middle-aged Russian-speaking women – conducted face to face interviews in the respondents' homes. The response rate was around 80%, and so the final sample included 804 respondents. A structured questionnaire in Russian was developed specially for this survey, although it included some items used in the earlier studies for comparative purposes. The survey produced a rich body of data on various aspects of the integration process of Russian-speakers in Israel. In this article, the discussion is limited to only the role of Hebrew and English language proficiency as a determinant of the immigrants' place in the new society.

FINDINGS

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

As was noted above, the socio-demographic profile of the sample was representative of all adult immigrants from the FSU who arrived after 1989. The gender ratio was 52% women and 48% men; 67% of respondents had two Jewish parents, 22% had one Jewish parent, and 11% were non-Jews who had Jewish spouses. Over half of the sample (57%) came from republic capitals or other largest cities of the FSU (among them 15.5% from Moscow or St. Petersburg); 37% came from middle-size cities or small towns; and only 6% – from rural areas. The mean period of life in Israel was 7.2 years (+/- 3.3). Mean age of the sample was 46 (+/- 5.2) –

45 among women and 47 among men. Some other characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1.

The social profile of the respondents corresponds to its source population – predominantly urban and well educated. Most came from Russia and the Ukraine, although previous research (Tolts, 1997) has shown that the republic of origin is less important than the size and economic profile of the city, so we used mainly city of origin in the analysis. Other social features of the sample were also as expected: only 33.2% of respondents had professional or skilled jobs and so did 18% of their spouses. Only 23.6% among working age couples included both partners employed as professionals or white-collar workers, while before emigration this was true about 57% of the couples in the sample. Over 37% were unemployed or pensioners and received modest state benefits. About 87% defined their income as close to the national average (13%) or below the average (74%). About 50% have estimated their housing conditions as below the average norms for their social group in Israel, among them, almost 38% shared the apartments with parents or other relatives.

When asked about the main difficulties during the initial accommodation period in Israel, 55% of respondents mentioned language barrier and related troubles as their No 1 problem. Thus, continuing language difficulties rank first among the problems faced by the immigrants even after 5-8 years in Israel, exceeding in their subjective evaluation, most other privations, both material and social. Let us turn now to the patterns of home and host language usage, as they emerged in the survey.

HEBREW PROFICIENCY AND USAGE

Given multi-faceted nature of the survey, no objective tests of language command were administered. Respondents were asked to rate their Hebrew command on a 5-point scale (1 for basic and 5 for excellent), separately for oral/comprehension skills and reading/writing skills. The mean scores were 3.14 and 2.76, respectively. The score distribution was as follows:

Apparently, respondents reported better speaking and comprehension than reading and writing levels. This is quite understandable, given a wide gap between spoken and written Hebrew and difficulties of Hebrew grammar and writing principles for the speakers of European languages (right to left direction, absence of vowels and capitals, merging the articles and prepositions with the main word, etc.). In their handwritten margin notes, many respondents described their acquaintance with Hebrew as cultural shock – so different it was from any other foreign language they had studied in the past. Conversely, spoken Hebrew resembles Russian in some respects (e.g., free order of words in the sentence, many similar idioms).

1-2	29%	42%
3	31%	30%
4-5	40%	28%

Most respondents perceived their limited Hebrew as a problem and made attempts to improve it. About 31% were engaged in active study (in class, with private tutor or independently); 49% did not study regularly but tried to increase their natural exposure to Hebrew (via radio/TV, conversations with Israelis, etc.). The remaining 20% reported no such attempts; among them 13% said they managed well enough without Hebrew and 7% believed that their level was sufficient for their needs. Older respondents and those working in manual occupations reported significantly less attempts at improving their Hebrew than younger and professionally employed ones ($p < 0.001$).

As for other languages, English was mentioned as most important generally, as an international language, and specifically for occupational advancement in Israel. Forty two percent of respondents said they had some knowledge of English, usually imperfect (the mean score on a 5-point scale was 3.17). A strong, positive correlation was found between Hebrew and English proficiency (Spearman's $r = 0.45$, significant at 0.01 level, two-tailed). Many Soviet-trained professionals admit that their poor English (other languages do not really count nowadays!) as the major barrier to high-quality jobs and promotion – in Israel and in the West (Chiswick, 2000; Kheimets and Epstein, 2001a).

As for language preferences and usage, the findings were in line with earlier research (Lissak and Leshem, 1995; Ben-Rafael et al., 1998; Dounitsa-Schmidt, 1999). The positive evaluation of Hebrew was related to two aspects: occupational/social mobility in Israeli society and connection with Jewish heritage. In contrast, Russian was perceived as the main vessel of cultural and personal expression, generally associated with the European cultural tradition most immigrants identified with. The usage of Hebrew was dominant in the occupational and public realms, while Russian remained the language of informal communication with family, friends and other co-ethnics.

Yet, these domains were not insular to each other. Hebrew gradually invaded also the private circle of communication: only 66.5% of respondents spoke pure Russian at home, while 22.5% mixed some Hebrew into Russian, and 9% spoke in so-called HebRush (a 50:50 mix of the two languages). The remaining 2% mixed Hebrew with Russian and other Soviet languages (Ukrainian, Georgian, etc.).

The relative weight of Hebrew usage at home grew along with tenure in Israel and was inversely related to age. Another booster of using Hebrew at home was having school age children. Among respondents whose households included children, 63% spoke only Russian at home, while 26% added Hebrew and 11% spoke in HebRush. Among respondents not living with the children, the respective shares were 75%, 17% and 8% (difference significant at $p < 0.002$).

The informal socializing networks among my respondents were predominantly co-ethnic. About 82% said they preferred to spend free time with their Russian friends and acquaintances, while 16% has a mixed circle of friends, and 2% spent time mainly with Israeli friends. Personal networks also included relatives and friends who stayed in CIS or migrated to Western countries. About 70% of respondents said they kept in touch with their families and friends abroad, regularly or sometimes, by means of phone calls, letters, e-mail and mutual visits. These transnational connections with co-ethnics also contributed to the maintenance of the Russian cultural and linguistic continuity (Remennick, 2007).

Women and men were pretty similar in their informal socializing patterns. As for the age differences, younger immigrants tended to include local peers in their informal networks (about 40% said they spent their free time with both Russian and Israeli friends and 10% – mainly with Israeli friends). With growing age, the share of local contacts and friends went down, to the minimum of 2-3% among the oldest immigrants (65+). Respondents, who worked as professionals or white collar jobs and met Israelis through work, reported more local contacts also in the informal realm (25% had a mixed circle of friends and 9% preferred Israelis to co-ethnics – vs. 16% and 2% in the general sample, significant at $p < 0.001$). Not surprisingly, oral proficiency in Hebrew surfaced as a more important predictor of social integration (in the sense of including Israelis into informal networks) than reading and writing skills.

Interestingly, many respondents in this survey reported common usage of Russian also at work since their company/organization employed other Russian-speakers and/or catered to Russian-speaking clients. Twenty-seven percent said they mainly dealt with their co-ethnics, and 24% has a mixed Russian-Hebrew work environment. About one-third provided services to Russian clients, solely or amongst others. Thus, due to dense concentration of Russian-speakers in some niches of the economic marketplace (both as service providers and users), the use of Russian in Israel cuts across different circles of communication.

THE DETERMINANTS OF HEBREW ACQUISITION

As expected, age and tenure in Israel surfaced as most important determinants of Hebrew command in the sample. However, the self-rated Hebrew proficiency tended to improve over time only among younger and middle-aged respondents. In this category, the percentage of respondents who rated their Hebrew as good or excellent grew from 12% among most recent arrivals (post-1999) to 68% among those who arrived in 1989-90 ($p < 0.001$). After age 55 there was almost no connection between the length of life in Israel and Hebrew level. This finding yet again points to the social isolation of older immigrants (predetermined by their low participation in the qualified workforce), as well as their own tendency to ethnic self-seclusion.

Contrary to expectations, there were weak gender differences in Hebrew proficiency. Women reported slightly better oral skills while men scored somewhat higher in reading and writing, but these differences did not reach statistical significance. There was some positive connection between Jewish origin and Hebrew level: compared to respondents who had two Jewish parents, among non-Jews the weight of excellent Hebrew self-ratings was three times lower (6% vs. 19%, $p < 0.005$).

Some interesting differences in Hebrew command were found by respondents' pre-emigration occupation, regardless of formal education. Those who had worked in engineering, technology or working class jobs tended to report poorer Hebrew skills than those who had worked in 'human services' and cultural sector – medics, teachers, journalists, etc. ($p < 0.005$). The city of origin in the FSU was found to be of borderline significance, although former residents of larger urban centers were somewhat more proficient than their counterparts from smaller towns. The latter finding may reflect the fact that Russian Jews from the capital cities were typically more educated, had stronger professional backgrounds and hence succeeded more in their occupational adjustment in Israel.

HEBREW AND ENGLISH AS TOOLS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC MOBILITY

High positive correlation has been found between employment type in Israel and proficiency in both Hebrew and English. Among the respondents who had professional jobs in their erstwhile specialization, over 70% defined their Hebrew as good or excellent – vs. 53% among those who had a skilled job after retraining, 30% among those working in menial jobs, and 22% among the unemployed or retired ($p < 0.001$).

A similar tendency surfaced regarding the level of English, although the weights of good/excellent knowledge were lower in all groups. Here again, oral skills and comprehension emerged as stronger correlates of upward social mobility

than reading and writing ability, since they are more crucial for developing new contacts, self-marketing, and negotiating work conditions. Respective Pearson correlations between self-rated Hebrew scores and employment quality were 0.42 and 0.29. Not surprisingly, better Hebrew and English command were also directly related to higher income (via better-paid professional jobs). Respective Pearson correlations were 0.41 and 0.36 ($p < 0.005$). Job satisfaction was also higher among respondents rating their Hebrew as better ($p < 0.001$). Apparently, these relationships are mutual and feed on each other: better host language skills at the outset promise better jobs with higher wages and chances for promotion.

LANGUAGE AND THE PATTERNS OF CULTURAL CONSUMPTION

Generally, the bulk of media and cultural consumption reported by respondents leaned towards Russian-language products, although signs of bilingual consumption were also present. Being largely educated people, respondents reported high interest in printed and electronic media, books and cultural events. General indicators of cultural consumption are shown in Table 3.

Interestingly, there is no reduction of interest in Russian-language cultural and media products with increasing tenure in Israel. Rather, many types of cultural consumption go up over time. For example, 19% of respondents who arrived in Israel up to two years ago, report regularly reading Russian newspapers and magazines, and among those who arrived nine years ago or more, this share reaches 43% ($p < 0.001$). The share of respondents who read Russian literature (fiction and other) remains stable over time at about 50-55% for 'regularly' and 70-75% for 'sometimes'. The same is true about attending shows and concerts of touring artists from Russia (who pay frequent visits to Israel due to dense concentration of Russian-speaking audiences). About 50% of newcomers (up to 5 years in Israel) attend such cultural events, and among relative old-timers (9 years or more) this share is about 68% (the interest levels are the same, but more of them can afford the tickets).

Over time, most immigrants add up some Hebrew-based cultural products to the permanent set of the Russian-based ones. This is most evident in relation to the media consumption. If in their initial years most respondents limited themselves mainly to Russian TV channels (54%), over time they report watching the mix of Israeli, Russian and international channels (such as BBC and CNN). The share of those who still watch mainly, or only, Russian channels after nine years or more in Israel was 26%, and these were mostly older immigrants with poor Hebrew. The same tendency to add Hebrew products to Russian ones, along with improving Hebrew proficiency, typified reading patterns. Generally, the share of Hebrew in

the bulk of reading was higher for respondents with professional jobs: 40% among them read Hebrew papers, 5% read Hebrew fiction, and only 36% said they seldom or never read in Hebrew (vs. 77% among unskilled and unemployed respondents). Yet, by and large, reading for pleasure remained mainly in Russian (even among respondents with very good Hebrew no more than 8% read fiction in Hebrew), while reading for functional purposes (occupational or the news, politics, etc.) combined Russian, Hebrew and English sources. Interestingly, almost no gender differences surfaced in the analysis of the cultural consumption. Men were slightly more inclined to read newspapers (in both languages) while women read more fiction and were more interested in tours of Russian artists.

Yet, even younger respondents did not sever their link with Russian language and continued reading Russian books (30%), newspapers (18%), and watching some Russian TV channels (40%). Relatively low reading rates in any language among younger respondents typify the tendency of younger generations to replace books and printed media by electronic media and the Internet. In this sample, virtually all respondents who often visited Russian websites (18%) were below age 35.

LANGUAGE, IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTEGRATION

It was not unexpected to find a significant link between Hebrew command and self-identification. Immigrant identity is, by definition, complex and elastic, including old and new elements that may surface as central in different contexts (Alba, 1999). Therefore, by formulating the traditional identity item (usually included in immigrant studies) as a three-item scale: 'regular Israeli' (11% of all answers), 'Russian Israeli' (69%), 'Russian living in Israel' (17%), and 'Other' (3%). As opposed to the earlier surveys (Ben-Rafael et al., 1998), this one deliberately excludes the general 'Jewish' or 'Russian Jewish' identity labels to make respondents think in terms of their relation to Israel, not their ethnicity.

Among respondents with the poorest Hebrew (defined by the combined index of oral, reading and writing skills), only 8% defined themselves as 'regular Israelis', while among those with excellent Hebrew there were 23% of such answers. Among those who identified as 'Russians living in Israel', only 18% reported good or excellent Hebrew, while about 50% said their Hebrew was basic or poor (all differences significant at $p < 0.001$). Pearson's r between Hebrew level and identity (from mainly Israeli to mainly Russian) was -0.34 . Hence, better Hebrew proficiency is intertwined with greater sense of belonging to Israeli society and self-perception as regular Israeli or Russian-Israeli.

CONCLUSION

Although the salience of host language acquisition for immigrant integration is implied by most scholars on immigration, there is relatively little concrete evidence to support this assertion (Portes and Schauffler, 1994). This article tries to shed more light on the relationship between host language proficiency, ethno-linguistic identity and integration/acculturation process among adult Russian-speaking immigrants in Israel. These findings also shed light on the interaction of home and host languages in the lives of Russian Israelis. In line with the expectations of some Israeli Russian scholars (Epstein and Kheimets, 2000), acculturation apparently develops along additive rather than replacive lines, i.e. immigrants add Hebrew (and to some extent, English) to their core linguistic and cultural agenda, which remains Russian. This adhesion of Hebrew and English layers to the existing ethno-linguistic identity gradually leads to the formation of bilingualism and biculturalism already in the first and 1.5 generations (i.e., those who moved to Israel as children or adolescents).

Although the division between host language use in the public realm and mother tongue in the private circle (usually found among first generation immigrants) largely holds true, Hebrew gradually invades informal communications and, conversely, Russian often enters the public/occupational domain. Hence, the domains of preferential use of Hebrew vs. Russian tend to merge over time – emerging as yet another sign of linguistic integration. As for the language-identity interface, the findings suggest that mastering and using Hebrew by itself serves as the key trigger for the reshaping of immigrants' identity to include new Israeli elements ('I speak Hebrew, hence I am Israeli'). Last, but not least, the ability for verbal expression and understanding is more crucial than reading and writing skills for the social insertion into new environment.

The study also identified some important differentials in the integration process and language acquisition within heterogeneous community of former Soviets. Immigrants who never made it professionally and work in unskilled occupations or are unemployed (comprising, unfortunately, up to two-thirds of the total) are most prone to ethno-linguistic retention. On the other hand, the very existence of a strong and autonomous Russian community with its own labor market, consumer services, media and social networks – is a potent disincentive from improving their Hebrew level. Although for this category of immigrants the Russian community serves as a key source of material and social support, their poor Hebrew skills precludes them from social engagement in the host society. Beside the detachment from a professional workplace, the principal correlates of

poor Hebrew include older age, employment in the co-ethnic sector, and having no school-age children at home. The improvement of Hebrew skills with increasing tenure in Israel was mainly found among young and middle-aged respondents, while older ones report almost no positive change over time. Interestingly, virtually no gender differences were found in language proficiency and usage, as well as in other aspects of acculturation process in Israel. This can be explained by the similarity in former Soviet men's and women's education, employment, life style and values, both before and after emigration.

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MISCONCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

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מורטון ויינפלד הינו פרופסור לסוציולוגיה ומחזיק בקתדרה ללימודים אתניים קנדיים באוניברסיטת מקגיל.

INTRODUCTION

From well before the jolt of 9-11, Canada and others Western immigrant receiving countries have been concerned with measuring, analyzing and improving the processes of immigrant economic and social integration. Apparent failures of economic and social integration can lead to weakened social cohesion, and may now have a national security dimension (McDonald & Quell, 2002; Reitz and Bannerjee, 2007). These perceived problems of integration have been spurring on Canadian research and policy initiatives, best exemplified by the Metropolis initiative, a Statistics Canada focus on immigrant economic performance. These efforts have made extremely valuable contributions to our stock of knowledge. But linking this research to a rhetorical context of problem, crisis, and failure may result from, and further entrench, misconceptions about how to define, measure, and understand the current economic and social outcomes for Canadian immigrants and for Canada (Li, 2003a; Li, 2003b). Immigration, broadly construed, continues to benefit Canada's economy and society.

GENERAL MISCONCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

A first misconception is that immigrants to Canada (or anywhere) behave as *homo economicus*. The neo-classical assumption is that immigrants, like most people, are rational economic actors, whose decisions are aimed at maximizing "utility," usually measured as income. From this perspective, so-called economic underachievement is

usually involuntary and problematic. But this assumption may not be accurate in general, and less so for immigrants. Some immigrants may well make economic decisions upon arrival driven by short-term needs specific to the immigrant experience rather than long-term calculations about their maximal economic interests.

The most important immigrant short-term need is finding an immediate job to provide for family members. It is worth remembering that most immigrants are by definition unemployed upon arrival, and thus should be compared with the Canadian unemployed – and not the full Canadian labor force – in assessing their economic performance. In fact, when compared to the pool of currently unemployed, immigrants have generally been as or more successful in terms of job search and employment. But of course, taking *any* job may be required in the short term, over waiting or planning for a *better* job. Family and communal obligations and the need for immediate income can limit opportunities for re-accreditation or complete re-tooling, for learning or perfecting English or French, for re-locating to better job opportunities, which can cut down on future earnings. This is part of the explanation for the ubiquity of highly educated, credentialed, trained, or experienced immigrant cab drivers in Canadian cities.

In addition, immigrant workers, perhaps more than native born Canadian workers, may be driven by concern for the long term welfare of their children, and in particular, with their children's educational success. Researchers who focus only or mainly on immigrant achievement or evaluate the immigrant experience based on immigrant earnings miss the fact that immigrants often evaluate their own experiences based on the life chances of their children. In terms of education, the news is good. By most measures, immigrant children as well as children of immigrants, including visible minority immigrants, on balance tend to do better than their parents, and often outpace the educational attainments of native born and/or white Canadians, especially when measured in terms of test scores, university graduation or high school completion (Davies & Guppy, 1998; HRSDC, 2008; Picot, 2008; 2009; Worswick, 2004).

The effect is clear in Canadian academic research and scholarship. In 2006, an estimated 14.9% to 15.8% of university teachers were identified as being visible minority, up from 10.3% in 1996. This matches the visible minority proportion of the Canadian population, and the large majority of this group would be foreign born. This is remarkable, given the possibilities of racial discrimination as well as immigrant adjustment problems. Moreover 13.2 % held non-Canadian citizenship, and 24.7% claimed a mother tongue other than English or French (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2008-2009, p. 19). The large majority of these

are in the sciences. Canadian graduate work and research in the physical and natural sciences, engineering, and mathematics, as well much of the high-tech employment in knowledge-based industries, would implode without the contributions of immigrant and second generation (and often non-European origin) students, professors, technicians, and researchers.

Certainly, there has been alarm in recent years concerning the apparent economic underperformance of recent immigrants compared to earlier waves, as seen in earnings differentials (Aydemir and Skuterud, 2004; Frenette and Morissette, 2003; Picot, 2008; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). This gap may reflect racism against non-whites, narrowing of gaps between immigrant and Canadian born education levels, general problems of recognizing credentials from non-European sources, language fluency, general adjustment and acculturation. But a focus on immigrant achievements alone may be misplaced.

Income data from the 2006 census suggest that gaps between visible minorities and whites shrink dramatically from the immigrant to the second and subsequent generations, especially in Toronto. This is not surprising given the strong educational attainments of the second generation. This process, however, occurs differentially among minority groups, with Asian groups faring best (Jedwab, 2008).

The problem of credential recognition and the evaluation of foreign work experience, has been well documented, Research has shown that in part some of these barriers to economic achievement are a result of unwarranted prejudice against credentials from non-Western sources, or their training or work experience in such countries. On the other hand there are also real gaps or inadequacies in terms of differential training and levels of experience (Esses, Dietz, Bennett-AbuAyyash, & Joshi, 2007; Khan, 2007). These do require significant reinvestments in re-accreditation, and re-training, which may be required of some immigrants. Some immigrants would not have the time, energy, money, or personal/familial circumstances to allow them to do this.

Immigrants often seek to live in cities or neighborhoods with many of their own community, which offer various forms of nurturance. They seek jobs from their own group members through ethnic networks, perhaps in an ethnic enterprise, which may not be the most high paying but may be the most convenient in terms of adjustment. They may choose what John Porter called the "psychic shelter" of their own communities over optimizing market returns. What some may call a psychic shelter for immigrants other analysts have called a "mobility trap" (Wiley, 1967) or an "enclave economy" or an "ethnic sub-economy" (Portes & Jensen, 1989; Weinfeld, 2007) which may be more or less remunerative than work in the mainstream economy.

It should also be recalled that it is mainly immigrant families who send significant remittances to families left in the old country (Houle and Schellenberg, 2008; Maimbo & Ratha, 2005). The obligation to send these remittances will also add to the need to take a job quickly. These remittances represent income which cannot be used by the immigrants to either generate additional income via financial investment, or invest in various educational and upgrading endeavors. The success which the foreign born achieve in the face of these remittances then becomes all the more impressive.

In short, even a good proportion of independent immigrants would not be able or willing to maximize economic returns, for reasons specific to their immigrant status.

REFUGEE AND FAMILY CLASS MIGRANTS

Moreover, many of the immigrants to Canada are admitted as either refugees or family class members, and not for human capital attributes. These immigrants are even *less* likely than independent migrants to be able or willing to maximize earnings.

By definition these immigrants are not selected to optimize economic returns. Some critics have argued that Canada has in fact selected “the best and the brightest” among the refugees (Dauvergne, 2003-2004; DeVoretz et al, 2004; Labman, 2007; Presse & Thomson, 2007). This makes sense. In selection processes overseas officers may be seeking those refugees who are not most in need, but those most likely to succeed in readjustment to Canada. And of course those refugees who are able to get themselves to Canada and make claims at our borders also can be considered to be advantaged in terms of having the mental, physical, and financial resources to make such a trip.

Some plucky refugees have been able to achieve success, and a very few, fame and wealth. And some studies of 1980s data found that over time, incomes of refugee and family class immigrants moved closer to those of the independent class (De Silva, 1997). But this does not detract from the observations that many refugees will have to overcome obstacles of trauma and distress as they resettle in Canada, and may not maximize income. (Most are thankful to be alive, safe, and in a free society.) Once again, children of refugees may do better (Beiser, 1999; Sigal & Weinfeld, 1989).

In addition, the sponsored family class immigrants are not chosen for economic productivity, but on humanitarian grounds. So, as is the case with refugees, one can wonder how much weight to put on assessing their economic integration. And yet it may well be that our econometric analyses of the economic productivity of family class immigrants systematically underestimates such contributions. Consider the economic contribution of “granny.” Granny may speak next to no English or French

and holds no paying job. Yet she may well make significant if undetected economic contributions. This can be either as unpaid help in a family enterprise, or as a loving caregiver for young children which enable both parents to go out to work with secure knowledge that children are well cared for by a loving babysitter.

In short, the assumptions underlying the very concept of “immigrant economic integration” may be misplaced. Expectations for “immigrant integration” must be recalibrated, and in aggregate, lowered. The very term is an oxymoron. We cannot expect, on average, adult immigrants to achieve full integration in Canada. Adult immigrants have historically had one foot firmly planted in the old country, and one in the new, and have had to juggle different and at times conflicting identities.

In fact, for many and perhaps most immigrants, integration has been a nested process (Weinfeld, 2000). Immigrants never integrate into something as large and amorphous as “Canadian” society. Rather, most will integrate into a series of nested sub-communities, among others of their own homelands, their own regions or sub-cultural groups, perhaps even from their own towns or cities. They will more likely choose bonding rather than bridging capital. How could it be otherwise? But no need to worry. Their children will branch out.

A CASE STUDY

Consider how some of the concerns described above might operate in evaluating the economic and social integration of the following hypothetical immigrant.

Imagine a Polish Jewish immigrant to Canada in the late 1940s. The immigrant has managed to survive the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Europe, and arrives with his wife, who has a similar background. The immigrant is trained as a lawyer in Poland, with a law degree from the Jagellonian University in Krakow, and ten years of legal work experience. These are not much valued in Canada. So this immigrant would comprise contemporary elements of both the refugee class and the skilled worker class. Once in Canada, the immigrant has a wife and infant son to feed, so decides to find work as a relatively poorly paid bookkeeper/office manager of the Yiddish daily newspaper in Montreal. The family lives in modest rental apartments.

The immigrant/refugee never finds the time or energy or desire to retool as a lawyer in Montreal, though he learns English well but not French. His wife also finds work as a bookkeeper.

Of course Canada in the late 1940s and 1950s was rife with anti-Semitism, especially in elite sectors of the corporate, professional, financial, cultural and educational world. Much of it, thankfully, was genteel in nature (Mendelson, 2008).

But in a sense this anti-Semitism has minimal impact on the immigrant's life, given his rather sheltered employment within a Jewish sub-economy (Weinfeld, 2007).

In fact sociologists analyzing the case of this immigrant as a datum in a research study would reach sobering, and pessimistic, conclusions. He would be likely assessed as economically underachieving, as victimized by a pervasive anti-Semitism and the consequences of traumatic wartime experiences, and also as poorly integrated into Canadian society. The immigrant's *entire* social network consisted of Jews, almost all Polish- Jewish Holocaust survivors. This analysis would miss the point.

There are elements of integration. The immigrant learns English, the ninth language he can speak and/or read (Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, German, Latin, classical Greek, Yiddish, and Hebrew.) He enjoys hockey and embraces *les Canadiens*, though his knowledge of Canadian history and familiarity with Canadian literature is always sketchy. He reads newspapers (more interested in foreign affairs) and votes regularly – like most immigrants, for the Liberal Party. (In fact, immigrants to Canada, both older European waves and the newer non-European cohorts, are as politically engaged as the native born (Bilodeau & Kanji, 2006).

Oddly despite the anti-Semitism prevalent in Canada in the first decades of his arrival, and even more virulent in the 1930s which prevented Canada from taking in Jewish refugees, he develops a deep affection for and loyalty to Canada. This is largely due to the fact that he has known far far worse. In Canada whatever anti-Semites there are will not be sending secret police to pound on his door at 3 AM to take him away for questioning. He is glad to be in Canada, and 75% of recent immigrants to Canada are also pleased with their immigration decision (Picot, 2008).

This immigrant and his wife do not devote themselves to maximizing incomes. Rather, they put their hopes into maximizing opportunities for their child, who as it happens is also raised within the cocoon of the rather close-knit Montreal Jewish community, (which might be interpreted sociologically as either nurturing or claustrophobic) and hoping that he will be successful educationally.

This hypothetical ideal type immigrant was in fact my father. The point of this exercise is to indicate that for many reasons, he was unable to generate an income commensurate with his education. He was not highly integrated by many other measures. But it is not at all clear that these “failures” present a social problem of any kind that required any political concern or policy remedy.

It seems that problems of economic and social integration in Canada are systematically overstated, in part because of unrealistic expectations, given the nuanced context of the existential constraints, and options, facing immigrants

today. That certain domestic factors may make things slightly more difficult for recent (non-white) immigrants over those of several decades earlier does not detract from this basic pattern.

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DE QUELQUES DÉBATS SUR L'INTÉGRATION DES IMMIGRANTS AU QUÉBEC ET SUR LA DIVERSITÉ CULTURELLE À LA LUMIÈRE D'UN RETOUR CRITIQUE SUR LA NOTION DE CAPITAL SOCIAL

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אניק ג'רמין מחזיקה בתואר שלישי בסוציולוגיה מאוניברסיטת מונטריאול. טרם הצטרפותה לצוות המחקרי במכון הלאומי למחקר מדעי (SRNI) – אורבניזציה, אותה ניהלה בין השנים 1997-1999, היא שימשה כפרופסור במכון לתכנון אורבני של אוניברסיטת מונטריאול. כמו כן, היא משמשת כמנהלת הגירה ומטרופולין במרכז המטרופולין של קוובק. כמומחית לנושאים אורבניים, עורכת פרופ' ג'רמין מחקרים במהלך 20 השנים האחרונות בנושאים הקשורים באזורים ציבוריים, גיוון חברתי ושילוב אורבני של מהגרים, בייחוד ברמת השכונה. בשנת 2000 היא פרסמה במונטריאול עבודה משותפת יחד עם דמאריס רוז בשם "מונטריאול: המסע אל עבר המטרופולין", בהוצאת ג'ון ווילי ובניו, לונדון.

INTRODUCTION

Les thèses de Robert Putnam sur le capital social sont de plus en plus utilisées pour discuter de l'intégration des immigrants et de l'impact de la diversité ethnoculturelle sur la cohésion de nos sociétés. La sortie des ouvrages *Making Democracy Work* en 1993 et *Bowling Alone* en 1995 avait déjà littéralement fasciné le monde des politiques publiques dans une variété de secteurs en commençant par le développement économique régional, sans qu'il soit question d'immigration. Mais en 2003, le Projet de recherche canadien sur les politiques en collaboration avec l'OCDE avait organisé à Montréal une conférence dont Robert Putnam était la vedette, pour savoir si le capital social des immigrants pouvait devenir un outil de politique publique intéressant pour améliorer leur insertion dans la société canadienne (voir notamment le numéro spécial de JIMI, 2004). Putnam avait alors présenté quelques résultats préliminaires de sa recherche sur «les sociétés en transition multiculturelle», et qui allaient donner lieu notamment à un texte largement diffusé : *E Pluribus Unum* (2007). On se doit de constater qu'hélas ses travaux ont, depuis, été la plupart du temps utilisés dans les débats publics pour cautionner les opinions les plus défavorables à l'immigration qui, entre autres, minerait la cohésion sociale en affaiblissant le capital social. Certes, Putnam se défendait bien dans son texte de 2007 d'être pessimiste et il l'avait terminé par une citation fort opportuniste du... sénateur Obama! Auparavant, les thèses de Putnam étaient plutôt utilisées pour dénoncer le fait que le capital social développé par les immigrants n'était pas le bon car il s'apparentait au *dark side* (côté sombre) du *bonding social capital* évoqué par Putnam pour désigner le capital qui unit les membres d'un groupe dans *Bowling Alone*, et n'avait pas les effets inclusifs du *bridging social capital* qui, lui, relie les membres de groupes différents (ou du *linking social capital* ajouté par M. Woolcock pour désigner les liens verticaux avec les institutions) (Woolcock, 2001).

Je voudrais dans les lignes qui suivent partir de ces deux types d'argument pour discuter de certaines particularités de l'immigration au Québec, en utilisant quelques recherches menées ces dernières années avec différents collègues sur Montréal. Mais auparavant, je voudrais brièvement évoquer la critique récente faite par l'école du MAUSS de la notion de capital social.

LE CONCEPT DE CAPITAL SOCIAL, UN CONCEPT UTILITARISTE ?

J'ai déjà évoqué ailleurs les nombreuses critiques formulées par les sociologues ces dernières années face à l'usage inflationniste de la notion de capital social (Germain, 2004). On semble en effet s'être considérablement éloigné du concept forgé à l'origine par Pierre Bourdieu pour montrer que les réseaux de relations

sociales des classes supérieures étaient des ressources utilisées conjointement avec le capital culturel et le capital économique dans la reproduction des positions de domination (Bourdieu, 1980). La notion de capital social est aujourd'hui de plus en plus utilisée dans une perspective normative, écrit Margit Mayer, pour gommer les ressorts économiques des inégalités sociales en localisant la solution de problèmes sociaux sur le registre des liens sociaux (Mayer, 2003). C'est clairement le cas pour toute une littérature qui fait du capital social la clef magique pour l'accès à l'emploi. C'est également le cas pour la littérature sur le déclin et l'appauvrissement des quartiers dont la survie reposerait désormais sur les ressources de la communauté locale (Bacqué, 2000). On pourrait aussi discuter de l'ambiguïté des écrits de Putnam lui-même où le capital social désigne tantôt la capacité d'action d'une communauté, tantôt des ressources relationnelles d'un individu.

Il me semble plus important pour notre propos de distinguer les analyses qui portent sur les **effets** du capital social (notamment celles de Putnam) de celles qui s'interrogent sur ses racines (ressorts) et plus généralement sur les fondements des liens sociaux. L'école du MAUSS qui prend appui sur les travaux du célèbre anthropologue du même nom sur le don et dont les thèses ont été particulièrement bien développées ces dernières années par le sociologue québécois Jacques Godbout (1992, 2007) mène un combat acharné pour défendre une vision non utilitariste des liens sociaux. Ceux-ci, selon le MAUSS, ne peuvent être réduits à des relations d'intérêts. En d'autres termes, tisser des relations sociales, ce n'est pas d'abord ou seulement faire du réseau utile (Caillé, 2006). Il y a dans les liens sociaux des ressorts qui ne sont pas seulement instrumentaux mais qui ont une valeur en soi, sont voulus pour eux-mêmes. C'est tout particulièrement vrai pour les liens basés sur l'affection, sur les croyances, sur l'engagement, sur les héritages culturels ou sur la sociabilité pure. Le *bonding social capital* évoque cette dimension du lien mais à titre d'effet. On pourrait même dire que la notion de capital social est une contradiction dans les termes car la notion de capital appartient au registre du marché. Or selon Jacques Godbout, les liens sociaux doivent être pensés en relation avec trois sphères : le marché, la communauté, l'État. Ces trois sphères ne sont pas étanches et ne doivent pas être vues comme trois registres séparés. Les relations économiques, les relations « communautaires » et les relations civiques ne sont pas des réalités discontinues. Or les thèses de Putnam les ont souvent présentés de manière séparée pour délégitimer ou substituer un des trois registres (la plupart du temps le communautaire), généralement au profit du marché ou de l'État. Voyons comment cette discussion traverse les débats sur l'immigration au Québec.

LES IMMIGRANTS ET LEURS ASSOCIATIONS

Le Québec est depuis longtemps en tension entre un modèle calqué sur l'intégration républicaine à la française (tapis sous un discours interculturel) et un modèle fondé sur les piliers communautaires (penchant vers le multiculturalisme sans le dire). Historiquement, la métropole montréalaise s'est développée sur un modèle d'intégration segmentée où, bien avant que l'on ne parle d'immigration internationale, les institutions sociales se construisaient autour de groupes ethnoculturels, linguistiques et religieux différenciés, ces axes de différenciation organisant aussi l'espace urbain. Par exemple, les Canadiens-français, les Écossais et les Irlandais avaient leurs quartiers, leurs organisations de charité, leurs églises, etc. Et ce modèle s'est jusqu'à un certain point poursuivi avec l'arrivée des immigrants internationaux au XX^e siècle (Germain et Rose, 2000). Aujourd'hui, la géographie sociale de Montréal donne à voir des quartiers **multiethniques**, dans lesquelles on ne trouve pas de ségrégation équivalente au tissu social des villes américaines évoquées par Putnam.

Les quartiers exhibent pour la plupart, sur l'île de Montréal, un tissu associatif dense, particulièrement dans les quartiers populaires et défavorisés. Une étude effectuée au début des années 1990 dans 7 des quartiers les plus multiethniques de la métropole avait de plus montré le rôle historique de nombreuses associations d'immigrants aux origines mêmes de la dynamique associative de quartier (Germain *et al.*, 1995). Cette étude montrait aussi la forte implication des immigrants dans ces dynamiques associatives. Il aurait donc été difficile de conclure à un affaiblissement du capital social induit par la diversité ethnoculturelle croissante de Montréal.

Il y a quelques années, le ministère provincial responsable de l'intégration des immigrants a tenté d'opérer ce que Helly et Mc Andrew ont appelé un virage du culturel au civique (Helly, 2000). Ce ministère a d'ailleurs souvent changé de nom, délaissant la notion de communautés culturelles après l'avoir instituée, puis y revenant, non sans hésitations. Aujourd'hui ce ministère de l'immigration et des communautés culturelles se veut davantage un ministère de l'intégration des nouveaux arrivants et des échanges interculturels, alors qu'à son origine il voulait courtiser les communautés culturelles pour les embarquer dans le projet québécois.

Mais lors du virage évoqué plus haut, il s'agissait d'éliminer dans la mesure du possible le soutien aux associations ethniques pour privilégier les organismes ouverts à tous les immigrants plutôt qu'à des communautés particulières. En même temps, on tentait de réorganiser l'aide aux immigrants sur une base territoriale et non plus communautaire, et la notion d'approche citoyenne fut mise de l'avant. Ces réformes ont cependant été assez mitigées pour diverses raisons, notamment parce qu'elles auraient exigé beaucoup de ressources financières (par exemple on s'est contenté de

4 grands territoires de ce fait trop abstraits et trop lourds pour stimuler la concertation entre organismes généralement attachés à des quartiers plutôt qu'à des régions administratives). En même temps, il fallait éviter de transformer les organismes communautaires en associations identifiées à l'État si l'on voulait gagner la confiance des immigrants. Par ailleurs, la plupart des personnes qui ont fondé les associations montréalaises et qui y oeuvrent encore sont d'origine immigrante (comme c'est aussi le cas pour la majorité des chercheurs qui travaillent sur les questions d'immigration !). Bref, la plupart de ces organismes issus de communautés ne pouvaient se transformer en organismes dits *mainstream*, mais ont néanmoins tenté d'élargir leur clientèle.

Cette intervention de l'État s'est doublée d'une décentralisation importante des services d'accueil et d'intégration de l'État vers les organismes communautaires qui se voient confier des mandats pour fournir un certain nombre de services par le biais d'ententes de partenariat. Ces mandats n'étaient pas toujours compatibles avec une mission de défense des droits et donc de groupes de pression. Mais la combativité du mouvement associatif général au Québec a conduit l'État à s'engager à ne pas interférer dans la mission des organismes reconnus comme faisant partie du mouvement communautaire autonome.

Au total, le secteur associatif dans le domaine des l'immigration et des communautés culturelles est aujourd'hui très important mais très hybride; on trouve d'un côté des organismes communautaires reconnus, bien établis et financés par diverses sources, fournissant des services financés par le gouvernement provincial, et de l'autre de nombreux organismes de petite taille, souvent sans permanents, souvent éphémères.

DU BONDING AU BRIDGING?

Au début des années 2000, nous avons effectué une recherche sur la participation des organismes s'occupant d'immigrants et/ou de communautés culturelles aux instances de concertation de quartier de la ville de Montréal (Germain et Sweeney, 2002). On trouvait alors 30 Tables de concertation de quartier (TCQ) financées par la Ville de Montréal, le gouvernement provincial (la Régie régionale de la santé et des services sociaux) et une fondation (Centraide). Ces forums locaux assuraient la coordination des intervenants associatifs et institutionnels sur de multiples aspects concernant le développement social à l'échelle des quartiers. Notons toutefois que ces TCQ ne considéraient d'ailleurs pas l'interculturel comme un des domaines (environnement urbain, santé, éducation, emploi, économie sociale, loisir, logement sécurité, vie communautaire) du développement social devant faire l'objet de concertation entre les ONG et les institutions.

L'enquête portait à la fois sur les listes d'organismes participant à ces TCQ et sur les visions des organismes participants ou qui au contraire n'y siégeaient pas.

L'analyse des listes a permis d'établir la présence significative d'organismes associés aux immigrants et aux communautés culturelles sur ces Tables. Par contre les entrevues ont révélé un portrait fort contrasté au chapitre des conceptions de la légitimité de la participation des associations ethniques.

Encore une fois, deux visions s'affrontaient, une vision plus universaliste, une vision plus culturellement segmentée. L'enquête menée alors auprès à la fois des organismes invités par les Tables et ceux non invités dans le domaine de l'immigration avait fait ressortir notamment des visions différentes en matière de lien social.

Un exemple. Les responsables des Tables se demandaient pourquoi certaines associations dites ethniques ne voyaient pas d'intérêt à participer aux différents comités, estimant que le fait d'être membre de la Table leur ouvrirait toute une série de réseaux qui pourraient s'avérer utiles pour leurs membres. De l'autre côté, ces organismes non membres disaient être désarçonnés par les manières de faire très formalisées et très abstraites des Tables, alors que pour eux, il faut prendre le temps d'établir des liens *autour d'un café* avant de savoir si on a envie de faire des affaires ensemble!

L'enquête a aussi montré que les organismes dits ethniques qui ne participaient pas aux Tables de concertation n'affichaient aucun déficit de participation en matière de *bridging*; simplement ils participaient à d'autres types d'organismes (généralement des organismes de première ligne comme les comités d'école) qu'aux tables de concertation.

L'enquête montrait par ailleurs chez les participants aux Tables l'émergence d'une *network fatigue* accompagnant la prolifération des Tables de concertation à différentes échelles et dans différents domaines : les organismes de petite taille étaient particulièrement désavantagés, n'ayant pas les ressources humaines suffisantes pour faire face aux nombreuses réunions de concertation.

Enfin, la question du capital social gravitant autour des lieux de culte était le lieu de toutes les incompréhensions, les TCQ étant particulièrement réticentes à accueillir des associations à connotation religieuse, alors que bon nombre des organismes dits «*mainstream*» étaient en fait issus d'une tradition catholique, notamment dans le domaine des loisirs.

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

Au terme de cette enquête, il était donc difficile de conclure à un déficit de *bridging and linking social capital* de la part des personnes issues de l'immigration.

Par contre, du côté des TCQ se profilait une attente de substitution du lien communautaire par un lien civique, et en fin de compte une sorte de délégitimation implicite du lien communautaire. Ultimement, on pourrait dire que s'affrontaient deux visions du lien social, l'un reposant sur une balkanisation des différentes sphères ou registres du lien social, l'autre reposant sur la transitivité de l'un à l'autre ou sur leur indissociation.

Des enquêtes récentes montrent bien que les immigrants qui arrivent au Canada y connaissent la plupart du temps déjà quelqu'un. Ce ne sont pas, en général, des individus isolés, sans ressources relationnelles. Or dans les flux migratoires, la part des travailleurs très qualifiés est très importante. Il s'agit généralement de clientèles notamment très scolarisées pour lesquelles les services publics n'ont généralement pas grand-chose à offrir en termes d'aide à l'établissement, ce qui tempère singulièrement le discours valorisant le *linking capital*. Le relais des réseaux personnels et communautaires est alors névralgique pour ces immigrants mais épouse des voies multiples, face auxquelles l'intervention doit être pensée davantage sur le mode de l'accompagnement.

Quant aux populations plus fragiles, moins scolarisées et/ou plus stigmatisées sur le plan racial, plusieurs études ont montré le rôle névralgique des liens intra-communautaires (*bonding social capital*).

C'est dire que la diversité des statuts d'immigration impose des filières différentes. Les ressources formelles sont utiles pour les immigrants peu qualifiés, guère pour les autres. Enfin, l'immigration canadienne est extrêmement variée dans ses origines ethnoculturelles et cette diversité change constamment, tout particulièrement au Québec, ce qui ne peut manquer de se répercuter sur les échanges sociaux et les réseaux.

Il est donc inévitable de voir le système associatif et communautaire devenir sans cesse plus hybride, c'est même un signe d'adaptation ! Par contre il faut que la reconnaissance suive cette profusion de modèles (y compris ceux qualifiés de côté sombre du capital social, généralement associés aux solidarités religieuses) et que l'État repense inlassablement ses formes de soutien au travail des associations *from bottom up* !

Par ailleurs, les formes les plus professionnalisées du mouvement associatif et communautaire doivent elles aussi se livrer à une réflexivité permanente sur leurs conditions de travail et tout particulièrement sur les conditions de l'engagement de leurs intervenants. Nous fonctionnons encore avec des vieilles idéologies en matière de travail communautaire, il est temps de les revisiter pour comprendre la nature de l'engagement de ces travailleurs autonomes du communautaire qui composent à mon avis une partie du personnel des ONG. Car ils seront plus que jamais mis à

contribution, les réalités de l'immigration devenant trop complexes et mouvantes pour nos institutions publiques. Il me semble en effet inutile de se demander si la montée de l'associatif est un avatar de l'idéologie néo-libérale ou une nouvelle approche dans la gestion de la diversité. Nous sommes rendus plus loin mais nous ne savons pas encore de quoi auront l'air ceux qui travailleront fort, demain, pour faciliter l'établissement des immigrants.

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BÂTIR UNE COMMUNAUTÉ ACCUEILLANTE : LE CAS DES COMMUNAUTÉS FRANCO-PHONES EN SITUATION MINORITAIRE AU CANADA

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צ'דלי בלקהודג'ה משמש כפרופסור משנה במחלקה למדעי המדינה באוניברסיטת מונטון בניו ברנסוויק. יצוין כי הוא סיים את לימודי התואר השלישי במכון ללימודי מדעי המדינה ובאוניברסיטת מונטסקייה בבורדו. תחומי העניין המחקריים שלו קשורים במחקר השוואתי של מפלגות ימין פופוליסטיות במערב, אסלאם עכשווי וניתוח כוחות טרנס-לאומיים בעולם התרבות.

INTRODUCTION

Depuis quelques années, une expression qui revient souvent dans les discours sur l'immigration et l'intégration est celle de « communauté accueillante » ou « communauté d'accueil ». En effet, la formule est devenue fort populaire et utilisée par les gouvernements, les consultants, les chercheurs et les acteurs de l'immigration. Dans le cadre de la phase III du projet Métropolis (2006-2011), un nouveau domaine prioritaire de recherche a été mis sur pied et propose des questions de recherche sur ce thème, notamment la capacité des plus petites villes et des collectivités à accueillir, intégrer et retenir les nouveaux arrivants, les méthodes exemplaires de différents acteurs impliqués, le rôle des écoles dans la construction d'un sentiment d'appartenance à la communauté, etc.

Cet article propose de cerner un peu mieux le sens de cette expression. Dans le contexte où l'immigration ne se limite plus aux grandes métropoles du Canada (Toronto, Montréal et Vancouver), une plus grande attention est alors portée à la capacité d'accueillir, d'intégrer et de retenir des nouveaux arrivants dans des communautés moins marquées par les flux migratoires. On pense principalement aux villes de taille moyenne (*Second and Third Tier Cities*) et à des milieux ruraux qui veulent avoir leur part d'immigrants. Puisque l'immigration est présentée comme une des solutions au développement économique et à la croissance démographique, il s'agit pour des nouveaux lieux de développer leur capacité à devenir une communauté accueillante.

Dans un premier temps, nous allons préciser un peu plus la définition d'une communauté accueillante. Dans un deuxième temps, nous voulons illustrer l'expression par le cas des communautés francophones minoritaires du Canada. Enfin, nous souhaitons terminer par quelques considérations plus fondamentales à comment penser autrement une communauté d'accueil.

DÉFINIR LA COMMUNAUTÉ ACCUEILLANTE

De façon générale, le concept de communauté accueillante nous ramène à la thématique centrale de l'intégration dans le cadre d'un territoire particulier et à une question fondamentale qui est de savoir où se situe la responsabilité de cette intégration. L'ouvrage collectif édité par John Biles, Meyer Burnstein et Jim Frideres (2008) propose quelques réponses pertinentes aux défis de l'intégration au sein de la société canadienne. Comme piste de solution, le principe de la responsabilité double ("two way street" of integration) est avancé par les auteurs. L'immigrant et la communauté d'accueil ont des responsabilités en ce qui concerne l'intégration et les deux doivent trouver des mécanismes pour s'adapter l'un à l'autre. Il ne s'agit pas

simplement pour une communauté d'absorber une nouvelle immigration mais de préparer un terrain d'accueil. Il est intéressant de noter cependant que la signification de l'intégration elle-même a beaucoup évolué en considérant l'ouverture des frontières et la croissance importante de la mobilité des individus dans un espace post-national. Comme l'indique une récente étude de l'Organisation mondiale pour les migrations (OIM, 2008 : p. 15) : «les migrants se trouvent confrontés à de nouveaux lieux et de nouvelles cultures tandis que les sociétés deviennent de plus en plus hétérogènes». Devant des parcours migratoires mobiles et de plus en plus temporaires, le rapport entre les cultures minoritaires et la culture de la majorité pose un défi pour la cohésion d'un vivre-ensemble (Banting, Courchene et Seidle, 2007).

Trois axes importants nous permettent de définir les contours d'une communauté accueillante. Dans un premier temps, une communauté accueillante se délimite à un espace géographique qui nous amène à (re)considérer l'importance du lieu physique et spatial dans la construction identitaire. Un Dans le cadre de la mondialisation, le régional, le local, le rural sont des territoires marqués par un accroissement des dynamiques de flux migratoires et d'ouverture des frontières (Castles, 2007; Vertovec, 2007). Il y a donc une nouvelle inscription du local dans le global. Les biens et les individus circulent plus librement, ce qui signifie qu'une communauté, grande ou petite, urbaine ou rural, cherche à s'inscrire dans ces logiques de mobilité, notamment par des stratégies visant à promouvoir leur lieu et à développer les capacités d'accueil et d'intégration. peu comme des promoteurs touristiques, les villes et les régions s'investissent beaucoup dans des stratégies de recrutement et dans la promotion de leur milieu afin d'attirer de nouveaux résidents : il suffit de se promener sur les sites internet de plusieurs municipalités et remarquer les efforts de celles-ci à développer les atouts d'une communauté accueillante.

Dans un deuxième temps, nous remarquons que l'expression de la « communauté accueillante » ou « collectivité d'accueil » exprime un discours plus présent de nos jours qui propose une nouvelle conception de la responsabilité citoyenne. Ce discours de la responsabilité s'est développé autour de la prémisse « positive » que les acteurs et les individus sont fortement invités à se prendre en main et le souhaitent également au nom de leur épanouissement personnel (Belkhdja, 2008). D'une part, la société d'accueil doit se responsabiliser tout entière à l'enjeu de l'immigration, c'est-à-dire développer des stratégies et des actions visant à accueillir, intégrer et retenir les nouveaux arrivants. Ce type de discours sous-entend que la responsabilité de l'intégration ne relève pas entièrement des gouvernements mais de l'ensemble des acteurs impliqués. D'autre part, un immigrant est responsable de s'intégrer à une nouvelle communauté. Dans ce nouveau cadre de la citoyenneté

responsable, les individus n'ont pas seulement des droits, mais auraient des devoirs et il est entendu qu'ils doivent adopter les valeurs et les coutumes communes de la société d'accueil.

Enfin, la communauté accueillante se présente de façon plus pratico-pratique, c'est-à-dire à partir du principe de bonnes pratiques pouvant aider des communautés à développer une politique d'immigration durable. Dans ce sens, de nombreuses communautés de taille petite et moyenne ont développé des outils et des initiatives, notamment des guides, et des structures pouvant améliorer la capacité d'accueil, d'intégration et de rétention des communautés aux nouveaux arrivants. L'intérêt ici est de voir des communautés effectuer un travail important autour de la représentation « positive » de la communauté et la capacité de développer des projets visant la participation et la prise en main citoyenne. Cette manière de faire illustre bien l'usage de nouvelles formes de gestion de la politique au-delà d'une conception plus traditionnelle du rôle de l'État. Dans ce sens, la communauté accueillante insiste sur une pratique de collaboration participative entre les divers intervenants du milieu.

Il s'agit de voir maintenant comment ces trois dimensions d'une communauté accueillante se retrouvent dans la façon dont les communautés francophones en situation minoritaire ont adopté une stratégie d'ouverture à l'immigration et la diversité.

VERS UNE COMMUNAUTÉ ACCUEILLANTE FRANCOPHONE

Depuis une dizaine d'années, les communautés francophones en situation minoritaire du Canada considèrent l'immigration comme un enjeu essentiel au développement économique, social et culturel de leur avenir. Comme les nouvelles données du recensement de 2006 l'indiquent, le poids relatif de la francophonie canadienne a diminué entre 2001 et 2006 et oblige les gouvernements et les communautés à développer des stratégies et des actions par rapport à l'attraction, l'intégration et la rétention de nouveaux arrivants francophones. Un accroissement prévu du nombre d'immigrants au Canada doit tenir compte de la situation linguistique et avoir des retombées pour les communautés francophones en situation minoritaire. Par conséquent, les questions de recrutement, d'intégration et de rétention sont beaucoup plus présentes dans les discours et les actions des acteurs gouvernementaux et de la société civile francophone (Gallant et Belkhodja, 2005).

Dans un premier temps, il est important de rappeler comment cet enjeu s'est inscrit dans l'agenda politique des communautés francophones. En mars 2002, le ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration annonçait la création du Comité

directeur Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada-Communautés francophones en situation minoritaire qui réunit des représentants communautaires, des cadres de CIC et des représentants d'autres ministères fédéraux et provinciaux. Le comité a élaboré un cadre stratégique avec un message clair : « Les communautés francophones et acadiennes doivent s'approprier le dossier de l'immigration francophone et reconnaître son importance pour leur rayonnement » (Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, *Cadre stratégique pour favoriser l'immigration au sein des communautés francophones en situation minoritaire*, Gouvernement du Canada, novembre 2003, p. 4). Plusieurs objectifs ont été mis de l'avant, soit améliorer les capacités d'accueil des communautés francophones, assurer l'intégration économique des immigrants, assurer l'intégration sociale et culturelle des immigrants, favoriser la régionalisation de l'immigration francophone à l'extérieur de Toronto et Vancouver. Le lancement en septembre 2006 du *Plan d'action pour favoriser l'immigration au sein des communautés francophones en situation minoritaire* (2006-2011) a constitué une autre étape importante dans le dossier de l'immigration francophone et la sensibilisation des communautés.

Dans ce mouvement, certaines provinces canadiennes ont élaboré une stratégie en matière d'immigration francophone essentielle pour maintenir un équilibre linguistique. Certaines ont emboîté le pas en précisant la particularité du dossier de l'immigration francophone dans leurs ententes respectives avec le gouvernement fédéral. Les ententes fédérales-provinciales donnent aux provinces la possibilité de recruter des immigrants qualifiés dans le cadre des programmes des candidats des provinces et des campagnes de recrutement à l'étranger. Le Manitoba, par exemple, a identifié une cible de recrutement d'immigrants qualifiés francophones. Dans son entente, le gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Écosse accepte que la Fédération acadienne de la Nouvelle-Écosse recommande des candidats d'expression française sélectionnés *par la communauté*. Le Nouveau-Brunswick propose une stratégie de recrutement dans les pays de la francophonie internationale et souhaite développer une sensibilité à la diversité au sein de la population acadienne.

La problématique de l'immigration a également touché le milieu associatif francophone qui a fait de l'immigration l'une de ses priorités. Dès le début des années quatre-vingt-dix, la Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes (FCFA) du Canada, organisme regroupant les associations francophones provinciales, va enclencher une importante réflexion sur l'avenir des communautés francophones minoritaires devant l'enjeu de la diversité et de l'immigration. Des initiatives tels *Dialogue* et *Vive la différence* ont souligné l'enjeu de

l'immigration et de la diversité culturelle. Dans son rapport final, le groupe Dialogue propose l'élaboration d'un plan d'action dans le dossier de l'immigration (Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada, *Parlons-nous ! Rapport du groupe de travail Dialogue*, 2001.) *Vive la différence* est présentée comme la suite logique du processus d'adaptation des communautés francophones et acadiennes à la diversité ethnique et culturelle. En juin 2007, le *Sommet des communautés francophones et acadiennes du Canada* faisait de l'immigration et de la diversité l'un de ses axes directeurs : d'une part, on reconnaît l'importance de passer à une étape plus active en matière d'immigration francophone travaillant les dimensions du recrutement, de l'intégration et de la rétention; d'autre part, on souligne plus clairement l'inscription de la diversité culturelle et immigrante dans le paysage de la francophonie. Enfin, les différentes associations francophones provinciales ont développé des structures pouvant mieux refléter l'importance du dossier de l'immigration, notamment des tables de concertation provinciale. Confrontés à de nouvelles demandes provenant des arrivants francophones, les acteurs communautaires cherchent à rassembler les principaux interlocuteurs pour être en mesure de prendre considération une voix différente qui souhaite être reconnue et intégrée au sein de la communauté francophone.

En 2008, la publication d'un numéro thématique de la revue *Thèmes canadiens* a permis de constater l'état des grandes mutations au sein de l'espace francophone à l'extérieur du Québec (Belkhodja, 2008). Une interrogation qui s'est dégagée de plusieurs articles est le défi que pose la diversité pour la francophone canadienne de demain. Historiquement, la société francophone canadienne s'est définie à partir d'un idéal de repli et de fermeture afin de préserver un espace vital. Durant les années soixante, la reconnaissance de la dualité linguistique du pays a permis aux minorités francophones du Canada d'obtenir une reconnaissance importante et de faire des gains considérables aux niveaux économique, social, politique et culturel. De nos jours, il nous semble fondamental de comprendre cette équation pour saisir la signification que pose l'ouverture de l'espace francophone minoritaire aux dynamiques de l'immigration et de la diversité. Dans ce numéro, Marc Johnson (2008) questionne le concept très en vogue et dynamique de la vitalité des communautés francophones en situation minoritaire. L'impression qu'il dégage est que la vitalité se présente comme une dynamique qui permet aux communautés francophones de s'épanouir de l'intérieur et non dans un rapport d'ouverture à l'autre. Au-delà de leur soi-disant apport démographique, les nouveaux arrivants francophones peuvent-ils contribuer à la vitalité des communautés francophones? Pour sa part, Jack Jedwab constate que la formulation d'une stratégie d'immigration

dans les communautés francophones n'a pas toujours été bien comprise. Selon l'auteur, il ne faut pas se limiter à certaines affirmations quant à l'échec d'une immigration francophone à l'extérieur du Québec en raison de l'érosion démographique des communautés francophones. À partir de données du Recensement de 2006, l'auteur précise l'apport de la diversité francophone en milieu urbain comme Toronto et Ottawa. Michèle Vatz-Laaroussi nous rappelle l'importance de ne pas négliger la problématique de la régionalisation de l'immigration au Québec et d'y voir un cas comparatif et non une exception en raison de la particularité québécoise. Une seconde section a réuni des études qui s'intéressent plus précisément aux enjeux de l'intégration et de la diversité dans l'espace francophone. Les auteurs questionnent la capacité d'ouverture et d'inclusion des acteurs et des structures de la communauté minoritaire, soit le cadre municipal (Ontario), le milieu associatif francophone (Saskatchewan), la représentation identitaire des jeunes (Saskatchewan, Acadie), les difficultés de reconnaître les jeunes noirs francophones issus de l'immigration (Ontario), l'intégration de la diversité immigrante au milieu de travail (Alberta).

Au sein des communautés minoritaires francophones du Canada, le discours de la diversité culturelle est reçu différemment. Il semble être mieux adopté par les communautés francophones minoritaires habituées à partager un espace identitaire plurielle et inclusif, notamment dans l'Ouest canadien où les francophones par nécessité de survie ont dû accommoder une nouvelle francophonie immigrante, notamment africaine (Gallant, 2008). En revanche, les communautés francophones bien ancrées dans le schéma de la dualité et du biculturalisme (Acadie) considèrent l'arrivée de la diversité comme un facteur pouvant entraîner la dilution du projet francophone. Il est important de bien comprendre le parcours de la minorité francophone qui a longtemps lutté pour la reconnaissance de droits linguistiques négligés par la majorité anglophone. Depuis les années soixante, en misant sur la dualité linguistique canadienne, les minorités francophones ont ainsi consolidé leurs communautés. Un lieu de vie francophone s'est constitué par des gains importants dans plusieurs champs, soit les droits linguistiques, le développement économique, la gouvernance scolaire. Par conséquent, le discours de la diversité canadienne provoque certains remous car il laisse entendre un réajustement de l'ensemble des communautés francophones minoritaires à de nouvelles demandes de reconnaissance d'autres minorités. Selon Joseph Thériault (2007), cette problématique de la diversité canadienne menace le projet commun et institutionnel de la francophonie canadienne. Le fait de briser ou vouloir remplacer «des raisons communes qui nous habitent» par une narration multiculturelle de l'identité

nationale vise le fondement même de la communauté francophone. Cette lecture est intéressante dans le sens où la diversité culturelle implique en effet une ouverture du milieu francophone au nouvel immigrant. Cependant, elle n'arrive pas à se dégager d'un argument qui consiste à croire que le projet francophone minoritaire ne peut pleinement se faire que dans un espace francophone homogène et constitué autour d'une narration de la fondation, comme si la communauté d'accueil francophone se fragilise par la rencontre avec le migrant.

CONCLUSION

Depuis quelques années, les communautés francophones en situation minoritaire sont devenues plus sensibilisées à l'enjeu de l'immigration et au besoin de développer leur capacité d'accueil. Au-delà d'une rhétorique souvent répétitive, il serait important de réfléchir à ce que signifie réellement l'intégration de l'immigrant au sein d'une société d'accueil, notamment aux notions de son absence ou de sa présence dans un espace de vie (Sayad, 1999). À notre époque, on s'intéresse plutôt aux dynamiques de déplacement des individus, en considérant que l'immigrant bien intégré sera celui qui aura accès à des services sans véritablement se préoccuper de la place qu'il va occuper dans la société d'accueil. Réduire la communauté d'accueil à une simple pratique de l'intégration positive risque d'évacuer une dimension plus humaine du type de relation entre le migrant et la société d'accueil. Le concept de communauté accueillante donne parfois l'impression de maintenir une distinction entre le nouvel arrivant et l'habitant local, surtout dans des petits milieux francophones ou anglophones « tricotés serrés ». Un risque est de faire la promotion de l'immigrant dans une différence culturelle attrayante et sécuritaire pour la communauté d'accueil, l'immigrant devant une sorte de figurant dans un tableau de la diversité culturelle. Un autre danger est de vouloir intégrer le « bon immigrant », c'est-à-dire une personne qui ressemble le plus aux membres de la communauté d'accueil.

Il est alors important de s'engager dans une logique politique et citoyenne qui seule peut mener à une véritable insertion à la société d'accueil. L'immigration doit se vivre dans un rapport au quotidien, c'est-à-dire dans un contexte de participation active à un projet politique de la société minoritaire. Il s'agit de valoriser le principe de la coexistence quotidienne aux lieux de vie comme « le travail, les écoles et les garderies, les magasins, le quartier et les clubs sportifs, ainsi que la participation à la vie politique » (OIM, 2007 : 29). Malheureusement, plusieurs immigrants ont l'impression de vivre dans un *no man's land*, ce qui accentue les différences au lieu de les rapprocher.

Permettre aux migrants d'avoir le sentiment d'appartenir à leur communauté d'accueil et aux réseaux sociaux qui les entourent est un élément important de l'intégration sociale. Une intégration sociale efficace banalise les relations entre les communautés culturellement distinctes, les rendant moins exceptionnelles pour les membres de la société d'accueil »(OIM, 2007 : p. 29).

La communauté accueillante devient un chantier qui va exiger de prendre des risques (ce que le discours dominant a du mal comprendre) et de laisser la place aux notes discordantes de différents points de vue. Mais, comme le fait remarquer Jacques Rancière (2005), nous vivons une époque de plus en plus consensuelle qui tend à nier la possibilité du conflit, préférant une machine consensuelle qui nous dit tout simplement qu'il n'y a rien à discuter devant une histoire autorisée, célébrée et commémorée. Voilà la vraie définition du consensus à savoir une manipulation des images et des discours en tant que logique de pouvoir et de domination : « il n'y a que ce qu'il y a »(Rancière, 2005, p. 8). D'où cette importance à créer un débat démocratique au sein des communautés accueillantes au risque de se faire imposer une modélisation d'une image et d'un discours façonnés par des entrepreneurs de la communauté accueillante.

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ESTIMATING SELF-SELECTION OF IMMIGRANTS: DECOMPOSING THE DIFFERENCE IN EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN NATIVES AND IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

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יצחק הברפלד הוא פרופסור בחוג ללימודי עבודה של אוניברסיטת תל אביב. בין תחומי העניין המחקריים שלו: שילוב כלכלי של מהגרים ואי-שוויון כלכלי בשוקי התעסוקה. הוא מכהן כחבר בוועדה המדעית של המכון להגירה ושילוב חברתי של המרכז האקדמי רופין.

INTRODUCTION

The economic assimilation of immigrants at destination countries has long been a central topic in migration literature. Theoretically, the level of immigrants' economic assimilation is determined by patterns of their self-selection from their source countries (Chiswick, 1978; 1986; 1999; Borjas, 1985; 1987). This topic is relevant for comparisons between assimilation rates of immigrant cohorts within countries and of immigrant groups across countries. Most of these comparisons are centered, naturally, on immigrants' self-selection on measured determinants of earnings – mainly their education levels.

The conventional approach towards evaluating immigrants' self-selection on such *unmeasured* skills is to estimate their *assimilation rate* using standard earnings equations, in which variation in earnings of natives and immigrants is attributed to human capital, demographic, and labor market characteristics¹. Assimilation rates are composed of immigrants' average annual earnings growth resulting from their accumulated experience in their destination labor market, and of any other factor not accounted for in the model, which is related to both immigrant status and earnings. The latter is, in fact, the *residual* difference between the earnings growth of natives and immigrants that is attributed to unmeasured variables. Accordingly, it is agreed that immigrant groups showing higher rates of assimilation are considered to be more positively self-selected on their unobserved attributes.

Several possible comparisons are relevant in this context. One, longitudinal in nature, is to compare the selectivity of immigrant cohorts of similar or different ethnic origin that arrived in one country at different times. The ongoing debate in the US whether the quality of recent immigrant cohorts has been declining in comparison to early cohorts can serve as an example for such longitudinal comparison (Borjas, 1990; 1995; 1999; Card, 2005). Another possibility, cross-sectional in nature, is to compare immigrant groups of similar or different ethnic origin that arrived at the same time in two or more different countries. An example for such cross-sectional comparisons is a series of studies examining the economic assimilation of the large wave of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) who arrived in the US, Israel, Canada, and Germany since the early 1990s (Chiswick, 1993; Cohen and Haberfeld, 2007; Cohen and Kogan, 2007; Klinov, 1991; Lewin Epstein, Semyonov, Kogan, and Wanner, 2003).

This paper offers a strategy for estimating self-selection patterns on unmeasured attributes by applying the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) method for decomposing difference in differentials. This method enables us to decompose the difference in earnings gaps between two groups (e.g., native-born workers and immigrants)

in two countries or in two time periods into two components: (a) a portion due to inter-country (or between-period) differences in *returns* to observed and unobserved characteristics, leading to differences in market structures; and (b) a portion due to differences in the *mean* attributes of immigrant groups. The second portion, which is due to immigrant groups' attributes, can be further broken down into two factors – the relative difference in the groups' measured characteristics, and the *relative difference in the unmeasured characteristics* of the two immigrant groups.

For our purpose, the most important component is, of course, the contribution of the difference in the mean unmeasured attributes of natives and immigrants in each country to the difference between the native-to-immigrant earnings differentials in the two countries. This is a much better estimate of the self-selection of immigrants than the previously used between-country differences in their assimilation rates (Cohen and Haberfeld, 2007; Klinov, 1991), because it captures the impact of the immigrants' unmeasured attributes on the native-to-immigrant earnings gap, net of their measured attributes, and the country-specific earnings structure. All analyses are performed separately for men and women due to gender-based differences in labor market opportunities and outcomes (e.g., Altonji and Blank, 1999 for the US; Haberfeld and Cohen, 2007 for Israel).

This method has three major advantages over the standard approach. First, it allows us to estimate differences in immigrant groups' unmeasured attributes, controlling for differences in the structure of their respective destination markets. Second, accounting for differences in market structures also enables us to relax the assumptions involved in the standard method of using assimilation rates as proxies of immigrants' unmeasured attributes. Third, the method provides us with a quantified and testable effect of immigrants' unmeasured characteristics on their economic success.

FSU IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL AND THE US

The situation being studied was characterized as a natural experiment (Cohen and Haberfeld, 2007): These immigrants originated from *one* country and immigrated during the same period to two *different destination countries*. The key element in this situation is the free choice that FSU immigrants were given between these two destination countries. Israel's Law of Return has provided free entry to Jewish immigrants and their family members since the establishment of the state in 1948, and the US granted refugee status to FSU immigrants during the Cold War.

From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, about 350,000 Jews who were allowed to leave the Soviet Union had the option of choosing between Israel and

the US (Cohen and Haberfeld, 2007; Gitelman, 1985; Lazin, 2005). The share of Jewish immigrants from the FSU who chose the US as their destination was negligible until 1974, but then rose to over one-half of the total in 1975-1979, when about 75,000 chose the US as their destination, compared with about 55,000 who went to Israel. This population of approximately 130,000 FSU Jewish immigrants is the focus of the present study.

Most previous research on Jews who left the Soviet Union for Israel or the US focused on selection on measured characteristics (Chiswick, 1993; 1997; Chiswick and Wenz, 2006; Friedberg, 2000; Klinov, 1991; Rajzman and Semyonov, 1998; Semyonov and Lerethal, 1991; Weinberg, 2001). The only study that did attempt to estimate unmeasured attributes of FSU immigrants, used the indirect strategy of estimating assimilation rates for pre-1983 immigrants in the US and Israel (Cohen and Haberfeld, 2007). Their results reveal that immigrants that chose the US assimilated better than those who chose Israel.

Building on theoretical models of immigrants' assimilation and on Cohen and Haberfeld's (2007) results, this study's hypothesis is that the difference in unmeasured attributes between natives and FSU immigrants to the US and Israel *favours the immigrants who chose the US* over their Israeli counterparts. Examining the economic performance of FSU immigrants during the 1990s (1995 in Israel, 1990 in the US) after they have spent a substantial period of time in the host countries (10-15 years in the US and 12-17 years in Israel) allows us to unveil the impact of their unobserved attributes on their economic success.

DATA

To analyze FSU immigrants who came to the US during the period 1975-79, the 5% 1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata files (PUMS) of the US census have been used. FSU Jewish immigrants in the PUMS were identified using the algorithm developed by Cohen and Haberfeld (2007). Both the 1980 and 1990 PUMS have been used in order to track the earnings growth of the 1975-1979 cohort in its first 10-15 years in the US, relative to a benchmark of native-born Americans. These procedures have yielded 429 immigrant men and 291 immigrant women in the 1980 census, and 287 men and 314 women in 1990.

The analyses of FSU immigrants who came to Israel rely on data drawn from the 20% demographic samples of the 1983 and 1995 Israeli censuses of population. The two census files have been used in order to track the earnings growth of the 1978-1983 cohort in its first 12-17 years in Israel, relative to a benchmark of native-born Israelis. Consequently, its earnings assimilation in Israel can be compared

to the earnings assimilation of the 1975-1979 cohort in the US during approximately the same period. These selection procedures have yielded 1,062 immigrant men and 1,030 immigrant women in the 1983 Israeli census and 651 men and 723 women in 1995.

In the US, the benchmark to which the FSU immigrants have been compared includes white, non-Hispanic, native-born Americans. In Israel the benchmark group is that of Israeli-born Jews to immigrant fathers born in European countries. This group is known to be the most successful in the Israeli labor market (Haberfeld and Cohen, 1998; 2007). A random sub-sample of natives from the US censuses and the entire benchmark group in the Israeli censuses has been used. The size of each one of these benchmark groups is about 10,000.

Analyses in both countries include salaried workers at the ages of 25-55 in the earlier census (1980 in the US and 1983 in Israel), who worked 8 hours or more per month and were located between the second and the 99th percentiles of the earnings distribution. Finally, in order to ensure that the migration decision was made by adult immigrants who came to their destination with skills acquired in the FSU, the analyses were limited to immigrants arriving when they were at least 22 years old.

RESULTS

1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used for the native-born benchmark groups and of the immigrants from the FSU who arrived in the US during 1975-9 or Israel during 1978-83.

The immigrants who settled in the US – both men and women – possess the highest levels of human capital as compared to all other groups whether natives or immigrants. Almost two-thirds of them hold an academic degree, as compared to about one-third only among all other groups.

The major change between the 1980s (not shown) and 1990s in differences between immigrants and natives, occurred in earnings. The immigrant-to-native earnings ratios in the US rose from 0.61 and 0.72 for men and women respectively in 1980, to 1.10 and 1.33 in 1990. Put differently, the 1975-1979 immigrants from the FSU who came to the US surpassed native-born, white, non-Hispanic Americans in their average earnings. The 1995 average earnings of immigrants who chose Israel vis-à-vis the earnings of native-born Ashkenazi Israelis remained close to those found in 1983 – 0.69 for men and 0.89 for women.

TABLE 1: MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS IN THE 1990S: NATIVE-BORN AND IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING FROM THE FSU TO THE US DURING 1975-1979 AND TO ISRAEL DURING 1978-1983: SALARIED MEN AND WOMEN, 35(37)-65(67) YEARS OF AGE

VARIABLES	MEN				WOMEN			
	US (1990)		Israel (1995)		US (1990)		Israel (1995)	
	NATIVE-BORN	IMMIGRANTS	NATIVE-BORN	IMMIGRANTS	NATIVE-BORN	IMMIGRANTS	NATIVE-BORN	IMMIGRANTS
Age	46.04 (8.09)	48.28 (7.46)	46.55 (6.90)	49.72 (7.14)	46.14 (8.09)	46.47 (7.04)	46.17 (6.43)	48.17 (6.63)
Married	0.821	0.892	0.911	0.937	0.691	0.799	0.805	0.808
Years of schooling	13.61 (2.74)	14.98 (3.38)	14.18 (3.11)	13.16 (3.61)	13.55 (2.35)	15.18 (2.71)	14.42 (2.78)	13.53 (3.29)
Academic degree	0.285	0.620	0.383	0.373	0.234	0.586	0.358	0.397
PTM occupation	0.339	0.474	0.520	0.366	0.378	0.436	0.519	0.487
Monthly hours of work	182 (44)	176 (43)	203 (55)	196 (53)	147 (51)	159 (50)	141 (53)	161 (52)
LN monthly hours of work	5.16 (0.34)	5.14 (0.29)	5.26 (0.40)	5.23 (0.35)	4.90 (0.52)	4.98 (0.52)	4.85 (0.50)	5.01 (0.43)
Monthly earnings (US\$ or NIS)	2,84 (1,579)	3,124 (1,601)	9,034 (5,287)	6,231 (4,109)	1,549 (1,051)	2,057 (1,318)	4,888 (3,288)	4,304 (3,095)
LN monthly earnings	5.30 (0.64)	5.40 (0.63)	8.92 (0.66)	8.54 (0.64)	4.61 (0.77)	4.94 (0.68)	8.29 (0.65)	8.14 (0.68)
Mean ranking in natives' earnings dist.	0.50	0.494	0.50	0.329	0.50	0.556	0.50	0.373
Mean ranking in natives' residual dist.	0.0	-0.013	0.0	-0.276	0.0	0.107	0.0	-0.218
N of cases	10,627	287	10,584	651	9,307	314	11,219	723

Source: The 1990 US Census and the 1995 Israeli Census.

The 1990s mean rankings of the FSU immigrants on the native-born distributions of (ln) earnings (MPC) and residual distributions (MRC) reflect these differences between the US and Israel. In the US, the mean rankings of the FSU male immigrants in both distributions are almost the same as those of native-born Americans (49% in the earnings distribution and -1% in the (imputed standardized) residual distribution), while the mean rankings of FSU women are higher than those of native-born women – 56% and 11% respectively. In Israel, both men and women immigrants' mean rankings are lower than those of native-born Israelis. FSU men's mean rankings are 33% in the natives' earnings

distribution and -28% in the natives' residual distribution. FSU women's mean rankings are 37% and -22% respectively.

2. DECOMPOSITIONS

Earnings models of native-born men and women in each country respectively are first estimated. The dependent variable in each equation is the 1990 (in the US) or the 1995 (in Israel) (ln) monthly earnings. The list of earnings determinants includes years of schooling, academic degree, age and its squared term, (ln) monthly hours of work, and indicators for being married and being employed in a professional, technical, or managerial (PTM) occupation. Then, the results of the earnings equations for natives are used to decompose the between-country difference in native-to-immigrant earnings gaps. Table 2 provides detailed results of these decompositions. Finally, the bootstrap method for deriving confidence intervals for each of these decomposed components is applied.

TABLE 2: DECOMPOSITION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US IN MEAN (LN) EARNINGS GAPS BETWEEN NATIVES AND FSU IMMIGRANTS WHO ARRIVED DURING THE 1970S: SALARIED MEN AND WOMEN, 35(37)-65(67) YEARS OF AGE^a

	TOTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US ^b	DUE TO RELATIVE DIFFERENCE IN NATIVES' AND IMMIGRANTS' MEASURED CHARACTERISTICS	DUE TO RELATIVE DIFFERENCE IN NATIVES' AND IMMIGRANTS' UNMEASURED CHARACTERISTICS	DUE TO DIFFERENCE IN MEAN GROUP-SPECIFIC	DUE TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US IN RETURNS TO OBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS	DUE TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US IN RETURNS TO UNOBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS	DUE TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US IN MARKET STRUCTURE CHARACTERISTICS
	1 (4+7)	2	3	4 (2+3)	5	6	7 (5+6)
Men	0.482***	0.208***	0.263***	0.472***	-0.016*	0.026***	0.010
	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Women	0.484***	0.122***	0.326***	0.447***	0.029***	0.007**	0.036***
	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.011)

^a The decomposition is based on the relative ranks of the residuals and the inverse residual distribution functions (nonparametric). A decomposition analysis based on standardized residuals and residual standard deviations (parametric) yields identical results to those presented in the table.

^b [D(indice)IS] – [D(indice)US].

*** = p < .01 ** = p < .05 * = p < .1

Source: The 1990 US Census and the 1995 Israeli Census

The results of the decomposition of the difference between Israel and the US are clear. The major source of the between-country difference in the earnings gaps between natives and immigrants is the inter-country difference in the unobserved

attributes of immigrants. The gap between native and immigrant men's earnings in Israel is larger by 0.482 log points than the equivalent gap in the US (column 1). Put differently, based on earnings means only, immigrants to Israel did much worse (relative to natives) than did immigrants to the US. With respect to the 0.263 log points (column 3) out of the 0.482 (55%) between-country total difference in earnings gaps between native men and the FSU immigrant men are attributed to the higher gap in Israel than in the US of the natives-to-immigrants unobserved earnings determinants. This finding is even more pronounced when looking at women. There, 0.327 log points out of the total of 0.484 (68%) difference between Israel and the US are the result of the difference between the respective native-to-immigrant differences in unobserved characteristics. These results indicate that FSU immigrants to the US belong to a much more selective group than their immigrant counterparts in Israel regarding unobserved earnings determinants. The effect of the market structure component (column 7) is found to be very small and statistically not different from zero. The remaining inter-country differences for men and women are the result of inter-country differences in the native-to-immigrant observed earnings determinants (column 2). Here, again, FSU immigrants to the US score higher on the observed attributes than their Israeli counterparts. In sum, the group of FSU immigrants to the US is found to be superior to the group of FSU immigrants to Israel on both unobserved and observed earnings determinants.

DISCUSSION

This paper provides answers to questions on differences in FSU immigrants' quality in the US and Israel, answers that have immediate implications for migration-policy formulation. The results concerning the differences between the unobserved earnings determinants of the two FSU Jewish immigrant groups are clear. Those immigrants who chose the US as their destination have been found to have higher levels of unobserved earnings determinants than their immigrant counterparts who chose Israel. Evidently, the non-random sorting of immigrants to Israel and the US was not limited to observed attributes, mainly educational levels, but occurred also on unobserved attributes among immigrants of similar observed levels. Those FSU immigrants who chose the US during the 1970s are of a significantly higher level of unobserved attributes than their counterparts who immigrated to Israel.

Methodologically, this paper offers a way in which immigrants' self-selection on unobserved earnings determinants can be estimated. This estimation is more

robust than the estimates derived simply from assimilation rates because it is not confounded by the possible impacts of market structures on immigrants' economic assimilation, nor by the type of assumptions made.

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NOTES

- ¹ It is estimated by the coefficient of the product term between "immigrant" (coded as '1' = immigrant; '0' = native) and "years since migration".
- ² A sensitivity analysis in which the native-born group in Israel contains both Ashkenazim and Mizrahim was performed. The results of the decomposition are even more pronounced than those presented in Table 3. For men, 0.228 log points out of a between-country total differential of 0.309 log points (74%) are attributed to the higher gap in Israel than in the US of the natives-to-immigrants unobserved earnings determinants. For women, the figures are 0.284 log points out of a total differential of 0.354 (80%).

IMPACT OF ETHNICITY ON THE FINANCING OF IMMIGRANT BUSINESSES

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קארין אמית היא מרצה בכירה במחלקה למנהל עסקים במרכז האקדמי רופין ומתאמת הוועדה האקדמית של המכון להגירה ושילוב חברתי. ביימה את הדוקטורט באוניברסיטת תל אביב בחוג ללימודי עבודה. תחומי המחקר שלה הם הגירה, שילוב חברתי של מהגרים, רשתות חברתיות ומנהיגות. חברה בוועדה המארגנת של פרויקט המטרופוליס הבינלאומי. בשנתיים האחרונות מנהלת מחקר בינלאומי הבוחן השתלבות כלכלית של מהגרים מבריה מ לשעבר בארבע ארצות: גרמניה, ישראל, ארה"ב וקנדה.

נעמה כרמי סיימה את הדוקטורט באוניברסיטת תל אביב ומרצה בפקולטה למשפטים באוניברסיטת חיפה. למדה פילוסופיה פוליטית במרכז הבינתחומי הרצלייה ונהלה הכשרת מורים בנושא זכויות אדם במרכז מינרובה באוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים. תחומי העיסוק שלה הם זכויות אדם, הגירה וליברליזם.

RESEARCH ISSUE OR PROBLEM

In the relevant literature, immigrant entrepreneurship is often described as ethnic entrepreneurship. According to the resources theory of entrepreneurship, both class and ethnic resources shape the opportunities for establishing immigrant businesses. Immigrant entrepreneurs differ from general business owners because they are endowed with ethnic resources. They tend to create informal, small networks for raising capital and are inclined to deal within their own community. Financing immigrant businesses should, therefore, be affected by the business owner's affiliation to an immigrant ethnic group and to co-ethnic business dealing.

Most previous studies pointed out that ethnic ties make up for immigrant entrepreneurs' lack of social capital and, therefore, can be regarded as a source of competitive advantage for them. Other research has found that co-ethnic dealing restricts immigrant business activity because it prevents ethnic entrepreneurs from utilizing local resources and markets.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how ethnicity and co-ethnic business dealing affect financing patterns of immigrant entrepreneurs. The study examines differences in financing between immigrant and indigenous businesses, investigating whether these differences can be attributed to co-ethnic business dealing of immigrant entrepreneurs.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The target research population consisted of two groups of entrepreneurs: indigenous and Former Soviet Union (FSU) immigrant entrepreneurs who came to Israel between 1989 and 2006 and were operating businesses at the time of survey. Based on a combination of convenient and snowball samples, 183 FSU immigrant and 244 Israel-born business owners from all regions of Israel and all spheres of business were surveyed. The questionnaire was presented in the native language of the entrepreneurs and took an average of one hour.

We measured co-ethnic business dealing in terms of share of co-ethnic clients, suppliers and partners. The reliability coefficient of these three items shows an internal consistency; hence, they were integrated into an index of co-ethnic business dealing calculated as the mean value of these items. The share of co-ethnic workers was not included because the majority of immigrant entrepreneurs employ only immigrants from their country of origin. We designated immigrant businesses whose index was more than 50 percent as ethnic oriented and other businesses as non-ethnic oriented. Thus, we compared three groups of businesses: indigenous businesses, immigrant ethnic oriented businesses and immigrant non-ethnic businesses.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study revealed significant differences between indigenous and immigrant business (both ethnic and non-ethnic oriented) in terms of scope and proportion of start-up capital. Both ethnic and non-ethnic oriented immigrant entrepreneurs set up businesses with less initial investment than indigenous entrepreneurs. Immigrant entrepreneurs, irrespective of their co-ethnic dealing, are more likely to invest their own savings: the share of personal equity in immigrant business funding is significantly higher than that of indigenous businesses. All immigrant entrepreneurs are less likely to borrow from a bank than indigenous entrepreneurs. The share of designated loans on favorable terms in funding of immigrant businesses is very small and even less than that of bank loans.

Personal savings and bank loans together constitute nearly 80% of business funding. Consequently, we consider them as variables determining the proportion of funding. Thus, start-up funds of businesses are affected by affiliation of business owner to immigrant ethnic group and are not affected by co-ethnic business dealing.

We found that although ethnic oriented immigrant entrepreneurs invest less than other groups, they frequently face problems raising capital when setting up a business. These problems are affected by a combination of co-ethnic business dealing and affiliation to immigrant ethnic group. When expanding a business we did not find a difference between indigenous and non-ethnic immigrant businesses, but saw a difference between ethnic and non-ethnic oriented businesses. Thus, co-ethnic business dealing drives the problems of raising capital for expanding a business.

Non-ethnic oriented immigrant entrepreneurs use less trade credit than the other two groups and their trade credit covers less expenditure than that of indigenous and ethnic oriented businesses. Thus, co-ethnic business dealing does fill a lack of social capital for immigrant entrepreneurs.

Respondents were asked to assess what happened to their sales revenues, profit, number of customers and number of employees during the past year. The options were: (1) decreased, (2) remained the same or (3) increased. The reliability coefficient of these four items shows an internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.843); therefore, they could be integrated into an index of business growth calculated as a mean value of these variables. Our study revealed that there is no significant difference in this index between indigenous and immigrant non-ethnic entrepreneurs, but we found difference between ethnic and non-ethnic oriented immigrant entrepreneurs: co-ethnic business dealing slows down the growth of businesses.

Summing up, the affiliation to immigrant group of business owners, influences the scope and proportion of immigrant businesses' financial funds irrespective of

co-ethnic business dealing: immigrant entrepreneurs invested less start-up capital; they rely more heavily on personal savings and use less bank loans. Yet this factor does not influence business outcomes. Our study also revealed that co-ethnic business dealing does not influence start-up financial funds of immigrant businesses, but drives the problems of raising capital for expanding a business and, therefore, slows down business growth. This is not critical factor at the stage of setting up a business but is a salient factor influencing business outcomes.

Thus, the affiliation to immigrant group of business owners is more important for financing the establishment of a business and co-ethnic business dealing is more important for financing the expansion of a business and influences business outcomes.

POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS

Our study has some policy oriented contributions. We found that the share of designated loans on favorable terms in funding of immigrant businesses is very small. Immigrant entrepreneurs need designated loans but have difficulty in accessing them. Our study brings to light the inefficiency of the existing government policy in this field and highlights communication failures between public institutions and immigrant entrepreneurs.

THE CURRENT WAVE OF FORMER SOVIET UNION IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR ABSORPTION PROCESS IN ISRAEL: A LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH (1989-2006)

YEHUDIT ROZENBAUM-TAMARI holds a MA in Sociology and Social Anthropology from The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, qualified in socio-linguistics. Yehudit serves as a researcher in the research department of the Israeli Ministry of Absorption (since 1976). Yehudit was also involved in studies on the linguistic and social integration of immigrants in Israel and focused on the post-1989 FSU immigrants. Currently in charge (with Dr. Natalia Damian) on a longitudinal project following the integration of post-1989 FSU immigrants in Israel. Yehudit has published fifteen research reports based on this large research project.

YEHUDIT ROZENBAUM-TAMARI possède une Maitrise en Anthropologie sociale de l'Université Hébreu de Jérusalem, qualifié en sociolinguistique; travaille en recherche au Département de recherches du Ministère israélien de l'absorption (depuis 1976); a été impliqué dans les études sur l'intégration linguistique et sociale des immigrés en Israël et s'est concentré sur les immigrés de post-1989 FSU; actuellement en charge (avec Dr. Natalia Damian) d'un projet longitudinal suivant l'intégration des immigrés de post-1989 FSU en Israël; a édité quinze rapports de recherches basés sur ce grand projet de recherche.

יהודית רוזנבאום-תמרי, בעלת תואר שני בסוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה חברתית מן האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים, מומחית לסוציו-בלשנות. היא משמשת כחוקרת במחלקת המחקר של משרד הקליטה מאז שנת 1976 ולקחה חלק במחקרים בנושא השילוב הבלשני והחברתי של עולים בישראל, תוך התמקדות בעולים מחבר העמים לאחר שנת 1989. כיום היא פוקדת (יחד עם ד"ר נטליה דמיאן) על פרויקט אורך שעוקב אחר שילובם של עולים מחבר העמים לאחר 1989 בישראל. היא פרסמה 15 דו"חות מחקר בהתבסס על פרויקט מחקר רחב זה.


Between the years 1989 and 2005, about 1,200,000 immigrants arrived in Israel from countries around the world. Almost one million of them came from the Former Soviet Union. This increased Israel's total population by about 16%, and has had a huge impact on all aspects of society.

As the chart indicates, approximately 400,000 FSU immigrants arrived in Israel during the first two years of the wave, from the end of 1989 to the end of 1991. In the following years, a gradual decline occurred in the number of arrivals, so that from 1992 to 1999, on the average, there were 60,000 new immigrants from the FSU each year. Between 2001 and 2006 the yearly average fell to around 14,000 a year, and in 2007 fewer than 7000 FSU newcomers came to Israel. Thus, while at the outset of the wave, these new immigrants constituted the vast majority of the yearly totals, starting from 2002 their number fell to 50% of the total influx, and by 2007 they made up less than a third of the new immigrants to Israel that year.

This wave of immigration is characterized by impressive numbers of immigrants with academic backgrounds, and with established careers in the free professions and various technical fields. Thus, for example, around 100,000 engineers arrived – during a period when the total number of Israeli engineers was only 30,000. Of course, the addition of such a large group of immigrants within such a short time period carries with it broad implications, which go beyond the economic sphere, for instance, in the areas of culture and art. Arriving in the recent wave were around 20,000 writers, hundreds of graphic artists, musicians, and communications personnel with backgrounds in journalism, radio, television and education.

In 1989, at the outset of this wave of immigration, a longitudinal survey on the absorption process in Israel was initiated by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. This survey has been in operation from that year to the present day.

Immigration from the FSU 1989-2006



The primary objectives of this initial survey were as follows:

1. to provide policy makers and field workers with basic information on the absorption process in real time
2. to understand the patterns of absorption of these immigrants over time; and
3. to evaluate the new government absorption policy, known as the “*Direct Absorption*” track.

METHOD AND DESIGN OF THIS RESEARCH:

All immigrant family units arriving in Israel from the FSU during a given time period were the Target Population of this research. Stratified samples of about 1100 heads of family each, were drawn from these populations. Each sample’s main characteristics, which included geographic distribution in Israel, age, sex, marital status, education and occupation before immigration, closely matched those of the target population.

It was planned that each individual in the sample would take part in the survey at 4 stages of his stay in Israel: during the *first year* after immigration, the *second year*, the *fourth year*, and, finally, *after five years* in the country.

During a 17 year period of immigration, 6 samples were included in the survey. Three of them were taken from the beginning of the wave: 1989, 1990 and 1991. The next groups immigrated in 1995 and in 2001, and the last one, between the end of 2005 to the beginning of 2006.

Ultimately, as can be seen on the chart, among the 6 samples, only the first two were interviewed five years after immigration. 4 of the samples were interviewed 3 times, the last interview being in the 4th year after immigration. One group was interviewed two times, and the last group included was interviewed only once. The face to face interviews were carried out, in the immigrants’ native language, by trained Russian speaking interviewers.

Each of the four questionnaires included about 140 questions, most of which were identical. Among the topics in the questionnaire were: housing and residence, economic absorption and standard of living, employment, language acquisition and usage, social and cultural absorption, Israeli and Jewish identity and level of commitment to Israel. For most topics we included objective measures as well as subjective ones. In addition, specific topics were investigated, in depth, at each stage. Thus, for example, in the first interview we focused on the immigrants’ situation in the country of origin, on his motives for immigrating, and on his first steps in Israel. In the last interviews we concentrated more on topics like language, social interaction and identity.

THE LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH - THE RESEARCH OUTLINE POINT IN TIME OF INTERVIEWS

GROUPS INTERVIEWED	FIRST YEAR	SECOND YEAR	FOURTH YEAR	SIXTH YEAR
1989 (Sept.)	*1990	1991	**	**
1990 (July)	1991	1992	1994	1995
1991 (Sept.)	1992	1993	1995	196
1995 (Jan.-March)	1995	1997	1999	**
2001 (July-Sept.)	2002	2003	205	**
2005-2006 (Oct. 2005-April 2006)	2006	**	**	**

* The year most interviews were conducted.

The special design of this research enables us to look at the data from 3 different perspectives: 1. The first perspective allows us to following the process of integration of *each group over time*, from their first months in the country until the 4th and 5th year. 2. The second one follows the changes *over the years*, from the beginning of the wave of immigration until today, at *each specified point in time*. 3. And the third perspective enables us to trace the changes over time in the process of integration *for each individual in the sample*.

FINDINGS

The findings presented relate only to 2 specific segments of the findings, using mainly the second perspective, the more "historical" one.

- A. The first segment refers to the patterns of absorption of the immigrants in their 4th year in the country, as reflected in the level of satisfaction with their absorption in different aspects, comparing the groups arriving from the beginning of the wave to 2001.
- B. The second segment refers to an analysis of the motives for immigration to Israel, as measured in the first interview; the changes in these motives over the years, from 1990 to 2001, and- the impact of these changes on the levels of commitment to Israel, as measured in the 4th year in the country.

A. SATISFACTION WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS OF LIFE

I will start with the first segment of findings: the levels of satisfaction with various aspects of life in Israel.

In this chart a number of subjective measures are presented. The data were received as answers to a set of questions, all phrased in the following manner: “To what extent are you satisfied with...;” for example: the city in which you are living; your neighborhood; your social interactions; and so forth. The findings depicted in this table show three levels of satisfaction, which characterize the absorption of these immigrants:

1. *The highest level* of satisfaction was found in the area of residential living: from the *locality* and from the *neighborhood*. 79 to 89% were satisfied with these two aspects of their residence. A comparison between the samples indicates a gradual rise in the percentage of satisfaction in this area over time. It appears that this high level of satisfaction with locality and neighborhood is linked to the fact that these immigrants were allowed to choose their own place of residence without the intervention of any government agencies, which was the key feature of the new absorption policy, that of direct absorption. This freedom of choice of locality enabled them to establish a pattern of initial absorption, in a place where the language and culture of their country of origin were prevalent.
2. *The lowest level* of satisfaction was found in two areas: *economic standard of living* and *cultural life*. Only about a third of the immigrants, who arrived in 1995 and 2001 were satisfied with their *economic standard of living*. Another expression of the low level of satisfaction with this area of life was found in the low *level of optimism* expressed by the immigrants with regard to their future chances for professional and economic success in Israel.

Of all groups interviewed, only 14% to 24% estimated that their chances for success in Israel, in the professional and economic sense, were “very good” or “quite good”. However, it must be added, in this context, that the level of *optimism* is much higher with regards to the chances for success of *the second generation in their families*, although the percentages here also decline from 66% in 1990 to 53% in 2001.

In regard to *cultural life*, we found that at the beginning of the wave, only 17% of the immigrants were satisfied with their cultural life in Israel. However, the level of satisfaction increases, quite dramatically, over the years, reaching 46% among the immigrants of 2001.

This rise is, at least partially, an expression of the influence of *this immigration itself* on Israel’s cultural arena, and of the objective improvement in the supply of cultural products in the Russian language, as a result of the growing number of Russian speakers in Israel.

3. *Between the two extremes of satisfaction, the low and the high, one can find a moderate level of satisfaction with two aspects of their life in Israel: social interactions and work.* In these two areas, there is also a drop in the level of satisfaction over the course of the years. These findings point to the inherent complexity and difficulties involved in the absorption of FSU immigrants in these two areas.

**LEVELS OF SATISFACTION WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS:
THE 4TH YEAR IN ISRAEL PERCENTAGE OF: “VERY SATISFIED” AND “QUITE SATISFIED”**

2001	1995	1991	1990	SATISFIED WITH...
89	85	87	81	Locality
85	81	80	79	Neighborhood
51	60	65	70	Social interactions
54	58	66	*	Employment
46	33	20	17	Cultural life
31	26	**	**	Economic standard of living

SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

The satisfaction with social interactions declined gradually from 70%, at the beginning of the wave, to only about 50% in 2001. This outcome expresses two seemingly “contradictory” trends, which are shown as well in some other findings of our research:

On one hand, the FSU immigrants, at least during their first few years in Israel, prefer the company of immigrants from their country of origin, and have very few social contacts with Israeli veterans. Connected with this is their preference for using their mother tongue, mainly in their personal encounters and in family relations, but also for their communication needs; and even in their business or work connections. Moreover, almost 100%, in all groups, reported that they are interested in preserving the Russian language for their children. On the other hand, there exists within this population a strong aspiration to be part of Israeli society, and to be accepted by the veteran public. This aspiration is not met by at least half of the immigrants, who report feeling rejected or treated with indifference by veteran Israelis.

EMPLOYMENT

The level of satisfaction with this aspect has declined from 66%, at the beginning of the wave, to 54% in 2001. These findings indicate that the absorption of these immigrants in their professional fields is also characterized by two apparently “contradictory” trends. *From one side*, the immigrants from the FSU are characterized by a high level of participation in the workforce, and a relatively low percentage of unemployment, which is not much higher than that of the general Israeli public. *From the other side*, their employment has been characterized, over all the different periods, by a clear professional downward mobility. Thus, the percentage of those working in their own professions hardly reaches 50%. This last problem explains much of their dissatisfaction with work in Israel.

B. MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATION

The second topic that I wish to relate to, in brief, is the question of the motives for immigration to Israel: How they change during the years, and what impact they have on the levels of commitment to stay in Israel.

Before I discuss the findings that relate to this issue, I would like to dedicate a few words to the unique significance of immigration to Israel, or, as we call it in Hebrew, “*aliyah*”. Despite the fact that for almost 2000 years the majority of the Jewish people has been living outside the borders of the Land of Israel, the Jews have always prayed to return to their homeland, and over the centuries they always arrived, whether as individuals or in groups. The unique concept in Hebrew, which is used to describe the immigration of Jews to Israel, is, as I have just mentioned, “*aliyah*”. This term expresses the idea that a person is “moving up” in a positive direction, or “ascending”, when he comes to Israel, returning to his homeland. And, in parallel, if he departs from Israel to live elsewhere, this is expressed by use of the term, “*yerida*”, meaning “going down” or “descending”. The ingathering of the Jewish people in its own homeland by means of “*aliyah*” is thus a central value in the national ethos of Israel and is, essentially, the reason for which the state was established. An expression of this is the fact that among the first laws instituted by the State in 1950 stands the “Law of Return”, which bestows the right to every Jew to “make *aliyah*” to the Land of Israel. In 1952 the Citizenship Law was passed, giving full citizenship to every Jew immediately as he enters Israel, on the basis of the Law of Return. Since the beginning of the last wave of immigration from the FSU, a widespread debate had been going on, about its character. The basic question is: Should these newcomers be regarded as “*Olim*”, with the special connotation of this term in

Hebrew, or, “just” as immigrants, who have chosen to come to Israel for economic or other reasons, similar to those of immigrants to any other country in the world?

Our data enable us to relate to this question, and also to see to what degree this distinction has implications for the absorption of these immigrants in Israel.

In the first interview, our respondents were asked, about the level of importance of various reasons in their decision to leave their country of origin and to come to Israel. They were asked to score each reason on a scale from 1 to 4, from “very important” to “not at all important”.

TYPOOGY OF MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATIN

	“PUSH” MOTIVES	“PULL” MOTIVES
Universalistic motives (“Immigration”)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the political situation in country of origin - the economic situation in country of origin - lack of opportunities for economic and professional advancement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - desire to advance in the economic and professional sense - lack of the possibility to immigrate to any other country
Particularistic motive (“Aliyah”)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - lack of chance to lead a Jewish life - anti-Semitism in country of origin 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - desire to raise one’s children in a Jewish environment - desire to live as a Jew in a Jewish state

In analyzing their responses, a distinction was made along two dimensions: *The first dimension* distinguishes between “Push” motives from the land of origin and “Pull” motives to the country of destination. *The second dimension* distinguishes between *Particularistic motives* (or “Aliyah” motives) which are unique to the Israeli case, being connected to Israel being the land of the Jewish people, versus *Universalistic motives* (or “Immigration” motives) characteristic of the phenomenon of immigration in general.

In the category of *Aliyah motives* (push and pull motives) we included reasons such as: “the existence of anti-Semitism in the FSU”; “a desire to live as a Jew in the Jewish State” and “a desire to raise one’s children in the Jewish State”.

In the category of *Immigration motives* (push and pull motives) were included items such as: “the desire for professional and economic advancement”; “the desire to live in a democratic state”; “the economic condition in the country of origin”; and “lack of the opportunity to emigrate to any other country”.

MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATION (AVERAGE)

	1990	1995	2001
"Ahliya motive" (push and pull)			
Average of "Ahliya" motives	2.9	2.5	2.4
Anti-Semitism in the FSU	2.8	2.0	1.9
Desire to live as a Jewish in a State	3.0	2.9	2.7
"the desire to raise on" children in the Jewish State	2.9	2.6	2.7
Immigration motives (push and pull)			
Average of "Immigration" motives	2.4	2.4	2.5
The economic situation in FSU	2.7	3.4	3.1
The political situation in FSU	2.7	2.7	2.3
The desire to advance in the economic and professional sense	2.2	2.2	2.6
The desire to live in a democratic state	2.8	2.6	2.8
Lack of the opportunity to emigrate to another country	1.6	1.3	1.5

4 = motive is "very important"; 3 = "moderately important"; 2 = "not very important"; 1 = "absolutely not important"

As can be seen in the chart, the majority of the FSU immigrants left their land of origin and chose to live in Israel out of a mixture of the two sorts of motives. The average scores of the Aliyah motives and the Immigration motives are quite close to each other. However, in most groups, the average score of the particularistic motives is higher, if only slightly, from that of the universalistic ones.

If we compare the scores of the two types of motives over the years, we may see that in the *universalistic* or *Immigration* motives, there is no consistent difference over the years. However, from 1995 onwards, we can notice some decline in the scores of the *particularistic* or, *Aliyah* motives, especially in the push motive – "*anti-Semitism in the FSU*". But, as can be seen, there is also some decline in the particularistic pull motives; for example, in the desire to live a Jewish life, and the wish to raise one's children in a Jewish state, which is evidence of the decline in the Jewish background of this population.

This decline is also expressed in the marked drop, observed among the immigrants of 1995 and 2001, in the percentage that reported that in the Soviet Union they felt themselves "Jews more than Russians": Whereas 71 to 89% reported this,

among the groups arriving during the first years of this wave, only around 40% felt more “Jews then Russians” among the groups that arrived later.

The last question in this context is: Do these changes in the motives for immigration have an impact on the level of commitment to remain in Israel? In all the questionnaires, we asked our respondents a similar question: “how confident are you that you will remain in Israel”. The scores ran from “very confident”, through “quite confident”, to “not so confident”, and finally, “not at all confident”.

CONFIDENCE THAT WILL REMAIN IN ISRAEL

	1990	1991	1995	2001
Very confident	60	60	48	40
Quite confident	26	26	42	34
Not confident	14	14	10	26

First of all I want to point out that, in general, most immigrants from the FSU, in all groups, and in all points of time, are highly confident that they will remain in Israel. However, the data reveal, that in parallel to the changes that have occurred in the nature of the motives for immigrating, there is also a significant increase in the percentage of immigrants who are not convinced that they will remain in Israel. Thus, among the immigrants of 2001, the percentage of those with low confidence more than doubled, compared with the previous groups. Specifically, about a quarter of them were not sure that they would remain in Israel, in comparison with only 10 to 14%, among the previous groups.

A confirmation of the connection between the motives for immigration and the level of commitment to Israel was also found in a regression analysis, which was carried out on the data of the 2001 immigrants. The analysis shows that the particularistic, or “Aliyah” motives, are *positively* connected to the level of commitment to remain in Israel, while the universalistic, or “Immigration” motives, are *negatively* connected to this commitment.

This correlation was found even when other factors, including absorption factors, and relevant demographic variables, were held constant. Thus, immigrants who came to Israel with stronger “Aliyah” motives are more committed to stay in Israel, while those who came with stronger “Immigration” motives are more inclined to consider leaving for another country, or “Yerida”.

The findings that have been presented here are, naturally, very partial. My intention has been to give you just a small sample taken from the much more

comprehensive research. The findings of our research have been published in 17 research reports, in Hebrew. In addition, selected findings from the research have been also published in English and in French in some reports and professional journals, listed below.

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QUELQUES REPÈRES ENTOURANT LA NOTION D'INTÉGRATION : LE CAS DU QUÉBEC

PATRICIA RIMOK has been the president of the Conseil des relations interculturelles du Québec since October, 2003. Prior to her tenure at this organization, she briefly served as Cabinet director for the minister of citizen relations and immigration (check for actual title). She was also a political advisor within the cabinet for the mayor of Montreal, in charge of municipal reforms and cultural communities from 1998 to 2001. Ms. Rimok has always been an active member in diverse communities and in intercultural relations.

She also occupied the role of Director in a number of organisms, such as executive director of the Gériatrique Maimonides Hospital Foundation (check for title) in Montreal, but also in the private sector as a Marketing consultant since 1983. Ms. Rimok holds a degree in Communications and political Science from McGill University.

PATRICIA RIMOK est la présidente du Conseil des relations interculturelles du Québec, depuis octobre 2003, où elle fut nommée après avoir brièvement occupé le poste de directrice de cabinet de la ministre des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration. Elle a aussi été conseillère politique au cabinet du maire de la Ville de Montréal, chargée du dossier de la réforme municipale et des communautés culturelles, de 1998 à 2001. Madame Rimok a toujours été très active dans le domaine des relations interculturelles et impliquée au sein des communautés.

Elle a aussi occupé des postes de direction dans plusieurs organismes, notamment à titre de directrice exécutive de la Fondation de l'Hôpital Gériatrique Maimonides, à Montréal, et dans le secteur privé en tant que consultante en communication et marketing depuis 1983. Madame Rimok possède un diplôme en communication et sciences politiques de l'Université McGill.


פטרישיה רימוק משמשת כנשיאת הוועד ליחסים בין-תרבותיים של קוויבק מאז אוקטובר 2003. טרם מינויה לתפקיד זה, היא שימשה במשך תקופה קצרה כמנהלת הקבינט של השליח אזוריים והגירה. כמו כן, היא שירתה כיועצת פוליטית בתוך הקבינט של ראש עיריית מונטריאול, שם הייתה אחראית לפרומות מוניציפאליות וקהילות תרבותיות בין השנים 1998-2001. הגב' רימוק תמיד שימשה כחברה פעילה בקהילות מגוונות וביחסים בין-תרבותיים.

1. UNE DIVERSITÉ CROISSANTE

En matière d'intégration des immigrants, l'approche qui a prédominé au cours des dernières décennies au Québec est basée sur une prestation de services orientée vers la sélection, l'accueil et l'intégration. Cette approche, si elle est nécessaire, connaît des limites lorsqu'on constate que les mesures qui visaient l'intégration sociale, économique et culturelle d'immigrants semblent moins efficaces quand l'immigration se diversifie dans sa composition. Cela s'explique, notamment, par le fait que les immigrants proviennent de pays de plus en plus diversifiés, du moins une fois que l'on compare ces derniers à ceux d'une quarantaine ou même d'une vingtaine d'années passées. Cela se traduit par une diversité ethnoculturelle plus grande au sein de la population québécoise, parce que leurs descendants contribuent aussi à nourrir cette diversité, même quand ils sont nés sur le territoire québécois ou ailleurs au Canada.

En 2006, la population immigrante du Québec représentait 11,5 % de la population. Bien que l'Europe demeure toujours le principal continent de naissance des immigrants, son poids relatif passe de 50 % en 1991 à 40,3 % en 2001² et à 35,7 % en 2006³. L'importance relative des autres continents est traduite dans le graphique suivant.

GRAPHIQUE 1: CONTINENT DE NAISSANCE DES IMMIGRANTS



Ajoutons que les « minorités visibles »⁴ (natives ou immigrantes) représentaient 8,8 % de la population québécoise en 2006, comparativement à 7,0 % en 2001 et 6,2 % en 1996⁵. Près de 50 % des immigrants sont identifiés à des minorités visibles en 2006⁶. Les individus nés à l'étranger et identifiés aux minorités visibles constitu-

aient, en 2001, 4,6 % de la population et, en 2006, 5,8 %⁷. Des projections estiment que le Canada pourrait compter, en 2017, entre 19 % et 23 % de personnes identifiées aux minorités visibles⁸. À titre indicatif, le recensement de 2006 révèle qu'une proportion de 40 % de la population québécoise déclare une origine ethnique unique autre que « Nord-américaine » (Canadien, Québécois, etc.), « Française » (Français, Acadien, etc.) ou « Britannique » (Anglais, Irlandais, etc.)⁹.

C'est donc dire que la diversité ethnoculturelle est maintenant une réalité incontournable au Québec, et c'est pourquoi il existe des outils qui visent l'intégration des immigrants. Ces outils s'inscrivent dans un ensemble plus large, la gestion de la diversité ethnoculturelle. Nous examinons d'abord le contexte canadien, puis le contexte québécois.

2. LES OUTILS CANADIENS D'INTÉGRATION

2.1. LE NIVEAU INSTITUTIONNEL

Au Canada, en termes d'accueil des nouveaux arrivants, ce sont d'abord les principes de « l'assimilation raciste » qui ont prédominé au XIX^e siècle. À cette époque les premiers Chinois, Allemands, Islandais, Ukrainiens et Russes s'installaient au Canada. Par la suite, « l'assimilation fonctionnelle » est le modèle qui a prédominé, jusqu'au début des années 1960. Les décideurs considéraient qu'il était nécessaire que les nouveaux arrivants s'assimilent à la culture nationale afin de contribuer efficacement à la reproduction de la société. En 1971, le Canada s'est donné une politique sur le multiculturalisme qui cherchait non plus l'assimilation des nouveaux arrivants, mais leur intégration tout en leur permettant de conserver des caractéristiques propres à leur culture. Le multiculturalisme devait permettre, de plus, de forger une nouvelle identité canadienne¹⁰.

La politique sur le multiculturalisme donna lieu à des critiques. Plusieurs craignaient qu'elle ne favorise la création de ghettos et la marginalisation de Canadiens dans des enclaves ethniques¹¹. D'où la nécessité, pour les décideurs, de mieux balancer les assises de cette politique. *La Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne* (1977), *la Loi sur la Citoyenneté* (1977), *la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* (1982) et *la Loi sur l'équité en matière d'emploi* (1986) venaient appuyer la politique sur le multiculturalisme¹². Le multiculturalisme, sans être clairement défini comme système, trouvait donc de nombreuses références devant favoriser son institutionnalisation. En matière de multiculturalisme, notons que le Canada a été suivi par la Suède qui a adopté une politique en ce sens en 1975, et par l'Australie qui a annoncé des mesures à partir de 1978¹³.

En 1988, le Canada adoptait la *Loi sur le multiculturalisme canadien*. Il s'agissait du premier pays à adopter, au plan national, une telle loi¹⁴. Depuis, les organismes fédéraux cherchent à l'appliquer sous forme de politiques publiques à travers divers programmes et mesures qui doivent notamment permettre de gérer la diversité ethnoculturelle. La loi reconnaît et veut faire en sorte que tous reconnaissent et acceptent la diversité ethnoculturelle canadienne en tant qu'un «atout national et le fondement du leadership dans une ère de mondialisation de plus en plus complexe»¹⁵.

2.2. DES INITIATIVES PLUS RÉCENTES

En 1991, le ministère du Multiculturalisme et de la Citoyenneté est créé. Il défend les principes du multiculturalisme, tout en invitant les diverses communautés à participer à la vie collective de manière inclusive, en mettant l'accent sur la compréhension interculturelle. Le Ministère est remplacé, en 1993, par le ministère du Patrimoine canadien qui met sur pied un secrétariat d'État au Multiculturalisme dont un des objectifs est de développer une identité canadienne à même la diversité culturelle. Puis en 1995, la politique sur le multiculturalisme est redéfinie afin de mettre l'accent «sur la participation égalitaire des Canadiens de toutes origines et sur la promotion de la cohésion sociale»¹⁷.

En 2001, le gouvernement canadien sanctionne la *Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés* qui relève de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada constitué en 1994. Ce ministère «regroupe les services d'immigration et de citoyenneté dans le but de promouvoir les idéaux particuliers que partagent tous les Canadiens et de favoriser l'édification d'un Canada plus fort»¹⁸. La Loi, quant à elle, a notamment comme objet «d'enrichir et de renforcer le tissu social et culturel du Canada dans le respect de son caractère fédéral, bilingue et multiculturel» (art. 3b) et «de favoriser le développement des collectivités de langues officielles minoritaires au Canada» (art 3b.1).

En 2004, Patrimoine canadien organise un événement qui vise à sensibiliser les fonctionnaires face à la diversité ethnoculturelle. Il est notamment question de partenariats avec la société civile, des employeurs, des services policiers afin d'évaluer les politiques et programmes du gouvernement en matière de lutte contre le racisme. En 2005, Patrimoine canadien pilote un forum stratégique intitulé *Canada 2017 – Servir la population multiculturelle du Canada de demain*. Les thèmes du forum étaient les villes, les marchés du travail, les services de santé et sociaux et les institutions publiques. Il réunissait 150 participants. Dans le cadre de ce forum, on soulignait entre autres l'impact positif de la diversité sur la

productivité, par exemple lorsque plusieurs idées nouvelles permettent aux organisations d'innover. On y indiquait aussi que les immigrants sont attirés par les endroits où il y a du travail. Si cela n'a rien d'étonnant, l'importance de développer des initiatives afin d'attirer et de retenir une population immigrante tant en milieu urbain qu'en milieu rural, est soulevée. Un comité interministériel devait être mis sur pied afin de dégager des options politiques résultant du forum. Mentionnons aussi la publication, en 2005, du *Plan d'action contre le racisme* de Patrimoine canadien.

Notons qu'une partie des responsabilités qui incombaient à Patrimoine canadien sont transférées à Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada en 2008, notamment, le *Programme du multiculturalisme*. Avec ce transfert, les priorités du Programme «mettent l'accent sur la promotion de l'intégration, les jeunes à risque et l'accroissement de la compréhension interculturelle»¹⁹. De plus, cela devait permettre «une meilleure coordination entre les programmes d'établissement pour les nouveaux arrivants du gouvernement et ses programmes de promotion de l'inclusion, de la participation et de la citoyenneté partagée»²⁰.

Avant d'aborder la situation québécoise au prochain point, soulignons que l'*Accord Canada-Québec* (1991) reconnaît le caractère distinct du Québec en matière d'immigration, du moins sous certains aspects. Plus particulièrement, il énonce ce qui suit :

*Le Canada reste responsable des normes et objectifs nationaux relatifs à l'immigration, de l'admission de tous les immigrants, ainsi que de l'admission et du contrôle des visiteurs. L'admission des immigrants peut vouloir dire l'application des critères relatifs à la criminalité, à la sécurité et à la santé, en plus du traitement administratif des demandes et de l'admission physique aux points d'entrée du Canada. Le Québec est responsable de la sélection, de l'accueil et de l'intégration des immigrants à destination du Québec, et le Canada s'engage à ne pas admettre au Québec les immigrants indépendants, ni les réfugiés qui ne répondent pas aux critères de sélection du Québec sauf en ce qui concerne l'arbitrage des revendications du statut de réfugié présentées par des personnes se trouvant déjà au Canada.*²²

3. DES OUTILS QUÉBÉCOIS D'INTÉGRATION

3.1. LE NIVEAU INSTITUTIONNEL

Si durant une partie du XX^e siècle le Québec est à la remorque des politiques canadiennes en matière d'immigration, la situation change avec les années 1960. La *Loi créant le ministère de l'Immigration du Québec* est sanctionnée en 1968, sous le gouvernement de l'Union nationale²². Entre autres, elle indique que le ministère « a pour fonction de favoriser l'établissement au Québec d'immigrants susceptibles de contribuer à son développement et de participer à son progrès » et « de favoriser l'adaptation des immigrants au milieu québécois²³ ». Ce sont là les principes qui guideront, par la suite, les politiques d'immigration, bien que les manières de les appliquer diffèrent avec les années. D'autres événements sont venus contribuer à soutenir cette idée selon laquelle la société d'accueil doit contribuer à l'intégration des immigrants, entre autres :

- la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du Québec (1975) qui reconnaît des droits à diverses catégories sociales (minorités ethnoculturelles, femmes, personnes handicapées, etc.);
- le plan d'action *Autant de façons d'être Québécois* (1981) qui veut « rassembler les cultures ethniques sous l'égide de la majorité francophone qui garde la priorité »;
- la Loi sur le Conseil des communautés culturelles et de l'immigration²⁴ adoptée en 1984 dont l'article 13 stipule que le Conseil doit « conseiller le ministre sur toute question relative aux relations interculturelles et à l'intégration des immigrants, notamment quant au rapprochement interculturel et à l'ouverture au pluralisme »;
- l'énoncé de politique en matière d'immigration et d'intégration, *Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble* (1990), qui introduisait la notion de contrat moral devant « lier les Québécois de toutes origines et sur lequel s'appuient les trois grands axes d'intervention de la politique d'intégration que sont l'apprentissage et l'usage du français, la participation et le développement de relations intercommunautaires harmonieuses ».

En 1996, le gouvernement, à travers l'adoption d'une loi, crée le ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration (MRCI). Sa mission est alors de favoriser le rapprochement interculturel et de faire en sorte que l'ensemble des Québécois soient ouverts au pluralisme²⁷. Elle doit aussi contrinuer à « renforcer le

sentiment d'appartenance à la société québécoise des citoyens et citoyennes» tout en assurant «la coordination des activités relatives à l'accueil et à l'intégration linguistique, sociale et économique des immigrants»²⁸.

En 2000, le MRCI organise un Forum national sur la citoyenneté et l'intégration²⁹. À cette fin, un document de consultation est publié. Tout comme au début des années 1990, il était question d'un contrat, mais cette fois-ci «civique». Celui-ci consistait à délaissier une approche en termes de catégorisations ethniques afin d'en privilégier une selon laquelle une personne immigrante devait être considérée comme un citoyen dans ses rapports à l'État. Toutefois, on soulignait l'importance de définir des balises pour assurer le respect de la diversité et de la différence.

En 2000, le MRCI soumet à la consultation publique un plan triennal d'immigration (2001-2003). On y fait état de politiques devant favoriser la régionalisation de l'immigration. Les grandes orientations consistaient à favoriser l'augmentation du volume d'immigration en fonction de la capacité d'accueil, la sélection de candidats connaissant le français et le choix des candidats ayant des compétences professionnelles, afin de soutenir rapidement leur intégration sur le marché du travail³⁰. Peu après, dans le plan stratégique qui accompagne le plan triennal, le Ministère insiste sur une meilleure représentation de la diversité dans toutes les instances, dans le but de favoriser une participation citoyenne et un sentiment d'appartenance à la société québécoise³¹.

3.2 DES INITIATIVES PLUS RÉCENTES

Dans son plan d'action pour les années 2004-2007 en matière d'immigration, d'intégration et de relations interculturelles, Des valeurs partagées, des intérêts communs, le ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles (MICC) reprend certains éléments du contrat moral du début des années 1990, en les actualisant. Il identifie cinq axes en matière d'immigration et d'intégration :

- 1) sélectionner «une immigration correspondant aux besoins du Québec et respectueuse de ses valeurs»;
- 2) «l'accueil et l'insertion durable en emploi» vise l'insertion économique des nouveaux arrivants mais aussi des Québécois des «communautés culturelles», ce qui nécessite des programmes ou mesures destinés aux employeurs (entreprises privées et organismes publics) et la reconnaissance des acquis tels les diplômes;
- 3) «l'apprentissage du français : un gage de réussite» a notamment comme cible le développement d'un sentiment d'appartenance en ciblant certains groupes d'immigrants afin qu'ils utilisent les services de francisation lorsqu'ils ne le font que faiblement;

- 4) « un Québec fier de sa diversité » consiste à développer diverses mesures favorisant la reconnaissance de la contribution des « communautés culturelles » au développement du Québec, à travers « le dialogue interculturel, l'ouverture à la diversité et la lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie ». Dans ce cas, le gouvernement estime important de promouvoir le développement de liens entre les « communautés culturelles » et les organismes communautaires qui les représentent;
- 5) « une Capitale nationale, une métropole et des régions engagées dans l'action » consiste à développer des mesures afin de favoriser une répartition des immigrants sur le territoire québécois et d'assurer un taux de rétention acceptable³².

En 2005, le MICC précise les cibles à atteindre dans son plan stratégique de l'immigration pour les années 2005-2008. Il tient compte des orientations de la planification des niveaux d'immigration 2005-2007. Celle-ci a fait l'objet d'une consultation publique exprimée à travers 85 mémoires qui abordent plusieurs thématiques dont la diversité, la régionalisation et les politiques des villes. Dès lors, le plan stratégique de l'immigration de 2005-2008 identifie deux enjeux : l'apport stratégique de l'immigration et des « communautés culturelles » au développement et à la prospérité du Québec, et l'amélioration de la qualité des services à la clientèle et la modernisation de l'État. Dans le cas du premier enjeu, quatre orientations le caractérisent et elles ne sont pas sans rappeler les axes du plan d'action 2004-2007 :

- 1) « stimuler une offre d'immigration adaptée et sélectionner des candidates et des candidats répondant aux besoins du Québec;
- 2) soutenir l'intégration des nouvelles arrivantes et des nouveaux arrivants et favoriser l'insertion durable;
- 3) favoriser une meilleure compréhension de la diversité auprès des citoyennes et des citoyens et contribuer à son rayonnement;
- 4) susciter l'engagement des instances locales et régionales en matière d'immigration, d'intégration et de relations interculturelles ».

Pour ce qui est du deuxième enjeu, une seule orientation le caractérise :

- « moderniser la prestation de services et offrir un milieu de travail mobilisateur »³³.

Plus près de nous, en 2008, le gouvernement du Québec a publié sa politique gouvernementale *La diversité : une valeur ajoutée*³⁴. Cette politique faisait suite à la

consultation de 2006, qui devait mener à l'élaboration d'une politique de lutte contre le racisme et la discrimination³⁵. Dans la politique, l'immigration est présentée comme faisant partie de la stratégie de développement du gouvernement du Québec afin « d'assurer une meilleure répartition de [la] richesse sur l'ensemble du territoire québécois »³⁶. La politique compte trois orientations qui sont intimement liées :

- 1- reconnaître et contrer les préjugés et la discrimination;
- 2- renouveler les pratiques;
- 3- coordonner les efforts.

Dans le premier cas, les défis pour le gouvernement est « d'assurer l'éducation aux droits pour tous les citoyens et de les sensibiliser à l'existence de préjugés et de discrimination ainsi qu'à l'importance de les éviter »³⁷. Pour le relever, le gouvernement fera une campagne de sensibilisation sur ces questions, développera « un plan intégré de sensibilisation et de formation sur les droits et libertés de la personne » ainsi que « des activités d'éducation interculturelle et antiraciste destinées aux jeunes »³⁸.

Dans le second cas, le défi consiste à « assurer l'égalité réelle et la pleine participation de tous les citoyens au développement économique, social et culturel du Québec en s'attaquant à toutes les formes de discrimination et en assurant une meilleure représentation des groupes sous-représentés tant dans le secteur public que privé »³⁹. Pour y arriver, entre autres, le gouvernement rendra les programmes d'accès à l'égalité plus performant, accompagnera les organisations privées et publiques en matière de gestion de la diversité, et améliorera la formation interculturelle et antiraciste à l'intérieur des services publics.

Enfin, pour ce qui est du troisième cas, le défi est « d'assurer la cohérence et la complémentarité des efforts des intervenants afin de lutter contre les préjugés et la discrimination »⁴⁰. Pour le relever, il apportera un soutien à ses partenaires locaux et régionaux pour réaliser des projets visant la cohabitation harmonieuse ainsi que la prévention du racisme et de la discrimination. Il appuiera les groupes sous-représentés pour qu'ils occupent une plus grande place dans les lieux et les postes de décision. Il contribuera aussi à mettre en place des « mécanismes de gouvernance qui permettront de veiller à la mise en œuvre de la politique et d'en assurer l'efficacité »⁴¹.

Bien entendu, toutes les mesures sont accompagnées de divers moyens d'action et c'est l'évaluation des résultats du plan d'action qui nous dira si elles ont été efficaces ou non⁴². Ajoutons que le ministre de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles a déposé, en mars 2009, un projet de loi pour appuyer la mise en œuvre de la politique gouvernementale dont il a été question. Il vise à obliger l'administration publique à « adopter une politique de gestion de la diversité culturelle et [à]

en rendre compte », tout en renforçant la reddition de compte en matière d'accès à l'égalité en emploi⁴³.

CONCLUSION

Un modèle semble donc prédominer depuis plusieurs années : en gros, le MICC est responsable de la sélection, de l'accueil et de l'intégration des immigrants. Sa politique d'immigration, comme on s'en doute, est en grande partie tributaire de la croissance économique : en temps de prospérité, celle-ci visera un plus grand nombre d'immigrants à admettre qu'en temps de récession. Une crise identitaire pourrait aussi avoir une influence sur les niveaux d'immigration. Toutefois, au Québec, dans le cadre de la consultation sur les niveaux d'immigration pour les années 2008 à 2010 qui a eu lieu au même moment que le débat sur les accommodements raisonnables, la grande majorité des intervenants a préconisé une hausse du nombre d'immigrants. Le gouvernement cible 55 000 immigrants en 2010.

Quant à la politique d'intégration, depuis près d'une trentaine d'années, outre l'intégration économique, les diverses politiques ont visé et visent encore les relations interculturelles harmonieuses, la reconnaissance de la diversité en tant qu'une richesse pour le Québec, le respect des valeurs démocratiques, l'usage du français comme langue publique, l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes, la lutte contre le racisme et les discriminations, etc. Avec sa nouvelle politique et son projet de loi, le MICC veut faire en sorte que la prise en compte et la gestion de la diversité ethnoculturelle soient mieux ancrées dans l'ensemble de l'administration publique et, éventuellement, à l'extérieur de cette dernière. À force de mettre des efforts sur l'intégration et en raison de la diversité croissante, on ne peut que souhaiter que certains écarts qui s'expriment, notamment par des taux de chômage plus élevés pour certaines catégories ou par la non-reconnaissance des acquis et des diplômes, se réduiront. Pour cela faut-il continuer à mettre des efforts sur la gestion de la diversité non pas pour diviser, mais bien pour que cette dernière soit considérée pour ce qu'elle est, une réalité incontournable qui caractérise le Québec au 21^e siècle.

NOTES

- ¹ Ce texte reprend en grande partie des éléments d'un avis du Conseil des relations interculturelles; voir : Ralph Rouzier et alii, *Avis sur la prise en compte et la gestion de la diversité ethnoculturelle*, Montréal, Conseil des relations interculturelles, 2007, 127 p. (www.conseilinterculturel.gouv.qc.ca)
- ² Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration (MRCI), *Portraits statistiques de la population immigrée recensée en 2001 : Québec, régions métropolitaines de recensement et régions administratives. Recensement de 2001 : données ethnoculturelles*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 2004, 149 p.
- ³ Statistique Canada, Citoyenneté (5), lieu de naissance (35), sexe (3) et statut d'immigrant et période d'immigration (12) pour la population, pour le Canada, les provinces, les territoires, les régions métropolitaines de recensement et les agglomérations de recensement, Recensement de 2006 - Données-échantillon (20 %).
- ⁴ « Selon la Loi sur l'équité en matière d'emploi, font partie des minorités visibles "les personnes, autres que les Autochtones [...] ou qui n'ont pas la peau blanche" ». (Dictionnaire du recensement 2006).
- ⁵ Statistique Canada, *La mosaïque ethnoculturelle du Canada, Recensement de 2006 : provinces et territoires*, 2006.
- ⁶ Statistique Canada, *Portrait des communautés*, 2006.
- ⁷ Statistique Canada, *Portrait des communautés*, 2006.
- ⁸ Alain Bélanger et Éric Caron Malenfant, Projections de la population des groupes de minorités visibles, Canada, provinces et régions : 2001-2017, Ottawa, Statistique Canada (ministre de l'Industrie), 2005, 80 p. Statistique Canada, Recensement 2006, Question portant sur les origines ethniques.
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- ¹¹ Ministère du Patrimoine canadien, *Rapport annuel de l'application de la Loi sur le multiculturalisme canadien – 2002-2003. Diversité du Canada : Respecter nos différences*, Ottawa, Ministre des Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux Canada, 2004, 69 p.
- ¹² Gilles Ferréol et Guy Jucquois (sous la direction), *Dictionnaire de l'altérité et des relations interculturelles*, Paris, Armand Collin, 2003, 353 p.
- ¹³ Marc, Leman, *Le multiculturalisme canadien*, Ottawa, Division des affaires politiques et sociales, 1999, 21 p.
- ¹⁴ Ministère du Patrimoine canadien, 2004, *Op.cit.* p. VI.
- ¹⁵ Marc Leman, 1999, *Op.cit.*
- ¹⁶ Marie Mc Andrew, « Projet national, immigration et intégration dans un Québec souverain : Dix ans plus tard, l'analyse proposée tient-elle toujours la route? ». *Sociologie et sociétés*, vol. XXXVIII, no 1, 2001, p. 217.
- ¹⁷ Citoyenneté et immigration Canada, *Au service du Canada et du monde*, Ottawa, 2001, p. 1.

- ¹⁸ <http://www.cic.gc.ca/francais/ressources/publications/multi-rapport2008/sommaire.asp>
- ¹⁹ Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, *Rapport annuel sur l'application de la Loi sur le multiculturalisme canadien, 2007-2008*, Ottawa, 2009, 85 p.
- ²⁰ Margaret Young, 2004, *L'immigration : l'Accord Canada-Québec*, Ottawa, Division du droit et du gouvernement, p. 2.
- ²¹ <http://bilan.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pages/collaborations/8731.html>
- ²² MCCI, *Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble. Énoncé de politique en matière d'immigration et d'intégration*, Québec, Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration, Direction générale des politiques et programmes, 1991, p. 6.
- ²³ <http://bilan.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pages/evenements/20244.html>
- ²⁴ Maintenant le Conseil des relations interculturelles.
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- ²⁷ MRCI, *Rapport annuel 1999-2000*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 2001, p. 11.
- ²⁸ Le Conseil avait soulevé la difficulté à définir le concept de citoyenneté et à l'appliquer. Voir notamment : Jocelyn Berthelot et alii., *Un Québec pour tous ces citoyens. Les défis actuels d'une démocratie pluraliste*. Avis présenté au ministre des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration, Montréal, Conseil des relations interculturelles, 1997, 91 p.
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³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ MICC, *OP. Cit.*, 2008b, p. 4.

⁴¹ Voir : MICC, Direction des affaires publiques et des communications, *La diversité : une valeur ajoutée. Plan d'action gouvernemental pour favoriser la participation de tous à l'essor du Québec, 2008-2013*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 2008c, 62 p.

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DILEMMAS IN THE FORMULATION OF AN ABSORPTION POLICY

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יאיר צבן כיהן בעבר כשר לקליטת עלייה ושירת במשך שנים רבות כחבר כנסת. מר צבן הנו היזם וחבר בצוות העריכה של האנציקלופדיה "זמן יהודי חדש: תרבות יהודית בעידן חילוני – מבט אנציקלופדי".

I would like to congratulate the Ruppin Academic Center for organizing this conference, welcome our distinguished guests from Canada, who head the Metropolis Project, and also extend my thanks to all the participants that contributed to the success of this event. In fact, while serving as Israel's minister of immigration absorption, I was privileged to participate in the 1st Metropolis conference in Milan. Also, twelve years ago, I signed an agreement with the Canadian Minister of Immigration, Mrs. Lucienne Robillard, on an immigration exchange program. Metropolis is the expression of that agreement.

I would like to say a few words on a personal note, with regards to my background.

I served as minister of absorption from 1992 to 1996, in the government of the late Yitzhak Rabin. Indeed, of the 14 ministers of absorption thus far, I was the only one who actually chose to head the ministry of his own free will as opposed to the others, who accepted it by default. For five years after that, I gave an introductory course on Immigration at Tel Aviv University. Alongside, I have been involved in

various activities related to immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia and I currently serve on the board of governors of *Tebeka* – the organisation for Advocacy for Equality and Justice for Ethiopian Israelis – established by a wonderful group of talented young Ethiopian attorneys. I also helped the *Bahalachin* organisation, which is concerned with the preservation of the Ethiopian community's heritage.

Unique circumstances led Yitzhak Rabin to offer me the choice of one of four portfolios – one of which was the immigrant absorption portfolio. Friends warned me not to take it, they said: “With hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the FSU and tens of thousands of Ethiopian immigrants, you will face a huge mountain of problems that you will never be able to overcome. There is no chance of making all the immigrants happy and you will become the target of their bitterness.” I knew that there was truth in their words and faced a dilemma, but I accepted the task anyway because I believed that the integration of immigrants from both, the FSU and Ethiopia, would play a crucial role in shaping Israel's future, and I considered it a great privilege to be part of such an important endeavour. I viewed it as an opportunity to implement approaches based on my own worldview and to put them to the test of reality. In the 16 years since then, I have never regretted that decision, for even a moment.

Soon I faced another dilemma: My ministry was dedicated to immigrant absorption, but other ministries also play a role in the process, especially the ministries of housing, education and labor and welfare. The question is: How could an absorption minister, whose ministry's budget was no more than one percent of the state budget, have any real influence in the national policy of immigrant integration? And more importantly – how to subordinate the activities of all the various state and national agencies involved to an agreed-upon policy while fostering constructive cooperation?

The previous government resolved this dilemma by forming a ministerial committee, known as the “Absorption Cabinet,” headed by the then minister of housing, Ariel Sharon. Rabin acceded to my request to re-establish the absorption cabinet and appointed me to head it. Experience, however, proved that the productivity of this kind of arrangement, as crucial as it may be, is nevertheless limited.

The third dilemma I faced was related to the nature of the principal message that I should be sending to all. It was left to me to prioritize countless policy areas, each of which was more crucial than the next. In order to deal with this, I convened a few hundred of the ministry's staff, most with hands-on experience behind them. I had one, central, clear-cut message to impart and so I asked them to prepare a

large poster and to write three words on it: “Absorption code: Respect!” I explained thus: “If an immigrant does not get a home on time, that’s bad, but it can be corrected; the same with providing jobs; but if we damage a person’s dignity, and especially that of a new immigrant, the wound is difficult to heal. And we have learned that even after many years have gone by, the wound starts bleeding once again. This is a lesson we should learn from the absorption of the immigrants from Yemen and North Africa in the fifties!”

During my tenure, the **greatest** task facing us was the absorption of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the FSU, although the **most complex** challenge was the absorption of 14,000 Ethiopian immigrants who came to Israel following Operation Solomon, along with thousands that came before and after it. At present, the Israeli-Ethiopian community numbers more than one hundred thousand so, when I formulated my policy regarding the Ethiopians immigrants, I declared my intent to comprehensively implement the principle of affirmative action. This was the first time that this principle had been adopted and used as a policy guideline.

In actuality, when I became minister, the immigrants had mostly been housed – by then for 14 months – in 22 caravan sites scattered in various places throughout the country. The conditions at these sites were poor and unrest began to grow on the back of false promises made on behalf of the housing minister Sharon, that the immigrants would be given apartments of their own if his party was to win the elections. It emerged that the housing ministry had earmarked over 5,000 apartments for Ethiopian immigrants, most of which were still in the early stages of construction.

At first, I thought that this would make it possible to clear out the caravan sites – not immediately as promised, but at least over the next three to four years. I was overjoyed. It was only at second thought that I fully understood the serious implications of the plan: All these apartments were located in development towns, most in the distant periphery. Not a single apartment has been built for immigrants in the center of the country.

My initial joy was replaced by misgivings: How could we further overload the development towns, those that so desperately needed to be bolstered with economic help and stronger populations, with a further burden in the form of the Ethiopian immigrants? How could we house these immigrants in these towns, which were so poor in employment options, in socio-economic infrastructure, whose schools were not ready for it? Add to this another dilemma: How would it be possible to forego the thousands of apartments in which at least half a billion dollars had been invested – and if we did, what alternative solution did we have?

It is out of these circumstances that the special-mortgage program for Ethiopian immigrants was born. It would give them mortgages of up to \$110,000

(depending on the specific town and the size of the family) compared to \$32,000 for other immigrants. The grant included was equivalent to almost 90 percent of the mortgage, compared to only 25 percent for other immigrants; the monthly payments were only \$50, compared to the hundreds of dollars that the other immigrants had to pay. Finally, the mortgage could only be used in 54 towns located in the center of the country and the near periphery.

It was hard to convince the ministers of finance and housing to adopt this program. It was also difficult to convince the immigrants themselves, because they were completely unfamiliar with the concept of a “mortgage”, and afraid to commit to pay back a debt to the bank over a period over 28 years. It was only after making a huge educational effort that we managed to overcome these fears. When did I know that we had succeeded? It was one day, when I heard a few of my assistants yell out in victory: “An Ethiopian Family from Ashdod had purchased an apartment with the mortgage.” The husband was 107 years old, the wife 99 years old, and their youngest daughter was 74. I said to myself: Wow – even they have signed the agreement to pay off their debt over a period of 28 years, and they are honest people – if they have committed, they will carry it out. The program made it possible to evacuate the caravan sites within a relatively short period of time and enabled the immigrants to purchase their own homes.

However, not all of the plan’s goals were achieved. First, the process of obtaining the mortgages was slow, because of the immigrants’ suspicions; second, the value of the mortgages had gone down; third, the value of the mortgages was further eroded as the result of a conspiracy between certain corrupt real estate brokers and apartment sellers, that involved tempting the immigrants to declare the value of the apartment they bought as higher than its real value. As a result, most of the apartments were purchased in weaker neighbourhoods.

I tried to have the mortgages adjusted, but I was unsuccessful. I was faced with a serious dilemma: After the enormous achievement of convincing the ministers of finance and housing to adopt the mortgage campaign, should I launch a new war to increase the mortgages, thereby further widening the gap – which in my view was entirely justified – between them and the immigrants from the FSU? After all, among the Russian immigrants too, were tens of thousands of single parents, the elderly, handicapped and terminally ill – all of whom were in desperate need of a suitable home.

My ministry had already come under considerable fire in the Russian-language press – with the low-point being a cartoon showing the minister of absorption embracing an Ethiopian baby, while a Russian baby lay on the floor bitterly weeping. The caption read: “Don’t waste your breath crying – he has no time for you.”

Another area where we were unsuccessful: We did not manage to prevent large concentrations of Ethiopian immigrants to build up in certain areas. This was primarily caused by the immigrants' tendency to prefer to live in the city closest to their caravan site, or to move into neighbourhoods where their relatives or friends already were living. We tried to keep concentrations of Ethiopian communities in any particular town from exceeding five or six percent of the total population, so that the town would be able to properly operate suitable absorption services, to enable better integration into the local population and to large extent, to guarantee the best absorption for children in the local school system. In fact, just this week, a naming ceremony was held in Rehovot, in which a school, all of whose students are Ethiopian, was named after Yonah Bugalo, a revered figure in the Beita Yisrael community. The establishment of this school is a direct result of the failure of mixed schools to integrate the Ethiopian children.

This incident should prompt a serious debate on the subject of integration. How did this happen?

An old governmental order made sure that children of Ethiopian immigrants would be directed to state-religious schools for their first years of study. The number of such schools in the relevant towns was relatively small. Both our ministry and the ministry of education believed that the right number should not be more than a quarter of the students of each class – that is, 7-10 Ethiopian children in classes with 30 – 40 students.

But here is yet another dilemma: Does this type of decision smack of quotas, of a *numerous clausus*, that is, a proto-racist approach? I completely oppose any attempt to cast racist aspersions on the motivation of those who shaped this policy; they were motivated entirely by a profound concern for the successful integration of those children. I cautioned that any significant deviation from the recommended numbers would cause veteran Israeli parents to transfer their children to other schools. And that is indeed what happened, with one school after another turning into black ghettos. In this context, I am happy that at a recent debate has been initiated by *Tebeka*, where strong voices were heard in support of maintaining a threshold.

It is clear to me that a policy of integration must make two principal endeavours: one – to invest whatever is needed so that the absorption of the children in mixed classes is successful; and two – to present parents with the option to choose between various streams, while at the same time emphasising the advantages of choosing regular state schools. I am sad to say that these efforts were not made at the required level, and the unfortunate results followed soon after. What has not

been done until now – must be now done. Unfortunately, the government's new five-year program to improve the absorption of Ethiopian immigrants does not sufficiently address this challenge.

I would like to conclude with a dilemma that was born in wake of the situation I have described to you here: At a certain stage, 8,000 apartments for the housing of elderly, handicapped and ill immigrants from the FSU were placed at the disposal of the ministry of absorption, almost all in distant, outlying areas. It was a serious dilemma: What should take priority – consideration for the suffering of these immigrants or the condition of the development towns, which would now be forced to bear an additional and very heavy burden?

I protest against the previous government, which had encouraged the construction of tens of thousands of apartments in outlying areas, with not a single public-housing apartment in the center of the country. Thus, with a heavy heart, I decided to use the 8,000 apartments.

Now it was important to make sure that no suspicion was cast on the fairness of the decision regarding who would be entitled to the apartments. I convened all the relevant immigrant organisations in my office in the ministry and explained my proposal regarding the relevant criteria, based on four components: age, date of immigration, state of health and financial status. I considered this an optimal expression of the weighting of justice. Almost all the participants at the meeting rejected my proposal. They expressed concern that my method would be too complex. They proposed that I set a single criterion: seniority in immigration, with priority given only to amputees and the terminally ill. I adopted their proposal, and I did not regret it.

Hence, once again, I received compelling confirmation that policy makers must consult with the “clients” of their policies when making decisions. The meaning of that slogan: “Absorption code: Respect!” includes viewing the immigrants as subjects rather than objects, and this means that the opinions of the immigrants must be heard when absorption policy faces complex dilemmas, a few examples of which I have shared with you here today.

Thank you.

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